DEVELOPMENT IN A CONFLICT ZONE: THE CASE OF BALOCHISTAN

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Abstract

All over the world, internal conflicts have created challenges for development. Balochistan, one of the provinces of Pakistan, has been facing different forms of conflict leading to issues related to socio-economic development. This qualitative-descriptive research adopts a case-study design for investigating the challenges faced by development practitioners while implementing development projects in Baluchistan, and strategies adopted to overcome the challenges. Four cases that this research focuses on include: polio campaign in four districts of Balochistan, Balochistan Education Support Project (BEP) in three districts, the Refugee Affected and Hosting Areas Project (RAHA) in two districts, and Construction of Turbat- Buleda Road in Kech district. The data collection tools are observations and in-depth interviews based on purposive sampling. It has been found that a dominance of local customs and religious beliefs, security problems, and lack of skilled labour are the main challenges inhibiting development which need to be dealt with by incorporating community based development, engagement with powerful actors, local approach and out-of-the-box solutions.

Keywords: *Conflict, Development, Balochistan, BEP, RAHA, Polio Campaign, Local Approach*

Introduction

End of Cold War changed the nature of conflict from inter-state to intra-state and since 2010, the number of deaths from internal conflicts have increased worldwide. In 2016, 76 percent of the total deaths in Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq were due to intra-state conflicts. Syria's death toll alone has been 400,000 since March, 2011.[1] Middle East

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[1]   United Nations and World Bank, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict (Washington DC: World Bank, 2017)

and North Africa together, comprising of 5 percent population of the world, witnessed 68 percent conflict related deaths, and 45 percent resulting from terrorism incidents[2]. According to a World Bank report[3], the number of countries affected by major or minor civil wars increased from 17 percent in 1960 to 35 percent in 2008, and among these 90 percent have a history of internal armed conflicts. As internal conflicts are increasing, so these conflicts pose challenges for development. A study[4] illustrates that violence and development are bi-directionally correlated. There are three types of arguments regarding relationship of security and development. As per studies by Crost, Felter and Johnston[5]; Cairns and Bryer[6]; and Hoeffler and Collier[7], the first argument posits that due to development activities, conflict in an area increases because of different reasons The second argument[8] states that development activities in conflict zones reduce violence. The third one (Chou[9], Child[10]) suggests that there is no effect of development activities on security, which means the conflict neither increases nor decreases.

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[2] Paul D. Williams, "Continuity and Change in War and Conflict in Africa," Prism: a Journal of the Center for Complex Operations 06, no. 04 (2016): 33-45.

[3] The World Bank, World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development, (New York: The World Bank, 2011)

[4] Tschirgi, Neclâ, Michael S. Lund, and Francesco Mancini, "The Security-Development Nexus," Security and Development: Searching for Critical Connections, ed. by Michael S. Lund, and Francesco Mancini Neclâ Tschirgi, (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010) : 1-16.

[5] Benjamin Crost, Joseph Felter, and Patrick Johnston, "Aid under Fire: Development Projects and Civil Conflict," The American Economic Review 104, no. 06 (June 2014): 1833-1856.

[6] David Bryer & Edmund Cairns, "For Better? For Worse? Humanitarian Aid in Conflict1," Development in Practice 7, no. 4, (1997): 363-374, doi: 10.1080/09614529754152.

[7] Paul Hoeffler, Anke Collier, "On Economic Causes of Civil War," Oxford Economic Papers50, no. 04 (1998): 563-573.

[8] Eli Berman, Jacob N. Shapiro, and Joseph H. Felter, "Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq," Journal of Political Economy 119, no. 04 (2011): 766-819 ; Andrew Beath, Fotini Christia, and Ruben Enikolopov, "Winning Hearts and Minds through Development Aid: Evidencefrom a Field Experiment in Afghanistan," Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR) New Economic School (NES)166, (2011).

[9] Tiffany Chou, "Does Development Assistance Reduce Violence? Evidence from Afghanistan," The Economics of Peace and Security Journal 07, no. 02 (2012): 05-13.

[10] Travers Barclay Child, Reconstruction and Insurgency: The Importance of Sector in Afghanistan. Department of Development Economics, Amsterdam: VU University, 2014.

It has been observed that the countries affected with violence were unable to achieve United Nations' Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)[11] and were lagging behind in almost every development indicator.[12] These countries may not be able to achieve Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)[13] in the future too, as almost 50% of the poor people in world will be living in conflict zones by 2030.[14] Increasing number of intra-state conflicts, global ambitions for SDGs, and concentration of poor in conflict zones imply that bringing development to such regions would continue to be difficult.

The Conflict-Development Nexus

Internal conflicts challenge development practitioners around the world and researchers are keen to know about development practices in conflict zones. It is feared that countries affected with conflict will for a long time remain far from achieving SDGs; nevertheless, there are ways and means to conduct development activities in conflict zones. This paper explores challenges faced by development practitioners in conflict zones of Balochistan, and suggests strategies to be applied in order to overcome challenges and ensure development.

Conceptual Framework for Implementation of Development Projects in Conflict Zones

The conceptual framework is based on 'Greed theory of Conflict' by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler,[15] which states that when development increases, violence also increases. It means that initiation of development projects in any area ignites conflict in the project location. When conflict is exacerbated, the parties to conflict may create hurdles for development projects which leads to challenges for implementation of development projects in the field. So, after emergence of conflict, challenges are bound to surface and to counter these challenges development practitioners in the field use different strategies.

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[11]   United Nation Development Programme, "Millennium Development Goals," accessed on February 17, 2020, https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sdgoverview/mdg_goals.html.

[12]   Deepa Narayan, and Patti Petesch, *Moving out of Poverty: Rising from the Ashes of Conflict* (Washington, DC: World Bank and Palgrave Macmillan, 2010)

[13]   Sustainable Development Goals, "Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development," accessed on February 18, 2020, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld.

[14]   OECD, States of Fragility 2015: Meeting Post-2015 Ambitions (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2015), https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264227699-en.

[15]   Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," (policy researchworking paper 2355, The World Bank Development Research Group, May 2000), http://www.ihmsaw.org/resourcefiles/1260034024.pdf.

Challenges in the Implementation of Development Projects

The implementation of development activities in conflict zones is subject to numerous difficulties or challenges. The most important challenge faced is a lack of understanding about the culture of the project-area; many projects fail due to this challenge as misperceptions arise among people which act as hurdles to implementation.[16] Further, during the execution of development projects in conflict zones, there is the issue of 'lack of skilled staff'[17], since most skilled labour migrates from conflict zones to peaceful settlements to find jobs. Corruption is another challenge for carrying out development projects in conflict zones[18] because there is a lack of institutions of accountability in these areas. When accountability bodies do not work embezzlement of development funds is an easy job.

Strategies for Implementation of Development Projects in Conflict Zones

Although, there are difficulties associated with the implementation of development projects in conflict zones but strategies to counter these may be devised. The UN and World Bank joint document *Pathways for Peace* states that each conflict is unique in its nature with roots embedded in a specific culture and area.

First, development projects can be contracted out to organizations having experience of working in conflict zones;[19] the local people may have a positive perception about that intermediary organization (be it

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[16] Noor Elahi, Ingrid L.P. Nyborg, and Bahadar Nawab, "Participatory Development Practices: A Critical Analysis of Gender Empowerment and Development in Pre- and Post-crises Swat, Pakistan," *Forum for Development Studies* 42, no. 02 (2015): 333-356; Mahmood Monshipouri, "NGOs and Peacebuilding in Afghanistan," International Peacekeeping 10, no. 01 (2003): 138-155 ; Adam Burke, "Peacebuilding and Rebuilding at Ground Level: Practical Constraints and Policy Objectives in Aceh," Conflict, Security & Development 8, no. 01 (2008): 47-69.

[17] Neavis Morais, and Mokbul Morshed Ahmad, "Sustaining Livelihoods in Complex Emergencies: Experiences of Sri Lanka," *Development in Practice* 20, no. 01 (2010): 5-17.

[18] Yuliya G. Zabyelina,"Buying Peace' in Chechnya: Challenges of Post- Conflict Reconstruction in The Public Sector," *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 8, no. 03 (2013): 37-49.

[19] Kuniko Ashizawa, "Japan's Approach to Peacebuilding in Afghanistan: Money, Diplomacy and the Challenges of Effective Assistance," *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 9, no. 03 (2014): 1-16; Muhammad Ammad Khan, Nazish Kanwal, and Libin Wang, "Violent Attacks on Education in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and the Role of NGOs in Providing Educational Services," Conflict, Security & Development 18, no. 02 (2018): 113-136.

local semi- or non-governmental). Second, for completing development projects in conflict zones, practitioners may temporarily ally with powerful elites in the project area[20] resulting in local support from the people of that area.[21] Fundamentally, project success is dependent on local support, which can be obtained in any way. Third, having local support means that people can participate in the decision-making regarding the projects implemented for them. This leads to a participatory approach in project execution.[22] Fourth and last strategy is to provide basic rights to the people of project area before execution of original project[23]; this may create a positive perception about the project. This strategy is useful when a large-scale project is being carried out in conflict zones.

Inter-relationship between Development and Conflict in Balochistan

The security situation in Pakistan has deteriorated during the last decade and more than 50,000 people, including civilians and law enforcement personnel, have been killed. Despite 16 percent decline as compared to 2016, 370 terrorist attacks were reported in 2017 resulting in 815 deaths and 1736 injuries. Militant groups with religious, nationalist and sectarian motives carried out these attacks. In 2017, Balochistan[24] remained the most affected region as it suffered 44 percent of the total

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[20]　Jonathan Goodhand, and Peter Chamberlain, "'Dancing with the Prince': Ngo's Survival Strategics in the Afghan Conflict," *Development in Practice* 6, no. 03 (1996): 196-207; Christopher Cramer, Jonathan Goodhand, and Robert Morris, Evidence Synthesis: What Interventions have been Effective in Preventing or Mitigating Armed Violence in Developing and Middle-Income Countries? (London: Department for International Development, 2016)

[21]　Diloro Kadirova,"Implementation of Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Aid Initiatives: Evidence from Afghanistan," *Journal of International Development* 26, no. 06 (2014): 887-914.

[22]　Ariel Delaney, "Endogenous Development in Somalia: Bridging the Gap between Traditional and Western Implementation Methodologies," *Development in Practice* 24, no. 5-6 (2014): 714-721.

[23]　Pamina Firchow, "Must Our Communities Bleed to Receive Social Services? Development Projects and Collective Reparations Schemes in Colombia,*"* *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 8, no. 03 (2013): 50-63; Linda Agerbak, "Breaking the Cycle of Violence: Doing Development in Situations of Conflict," *Development in Practice* 1, no. 03 (1991): 151-158.; Hamish Nixon, and Richard Mallett, Service Delivery, Public Perceptions and State Legitimacy: Findings from the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (London: Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium, 2017).

[24]　Government of Balochistan, "About Balochistan," accessed on 18th February, 2020, https://www.balochistan.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content& view=article&id=37&Itemid=783.

attacks in Pakistan.[25] Although there has been a decrease in overall terrorist attacks in Pakistan but in Balochistan the situation is still grave. In 2016 alone, three suicide attacks at different localities in Balochistan killed 180 people. In the north of Balochistan religious militancy is on the rise; while in the Southern areas, where nationalist separatist insurgents are dominant, though their strength is decreasing with the time but they still are considered long-term threats. Nationalist insurgent groups are active in many districts of Balochistan, mostly in Makran division including Gwadar District - the pivot of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.[26] Due to security problems in the past and present, infrastructure and social development have remained a challenge in Balochistan. For example in 2018-19, the literacy rate in Balochistan remained 55.5 percent, as compared to 64.7 percent in Punjab, 62.2 percent in Sindh and 55.3 percent in KPK. Similarly, during the same year, the measles Supplemental Immunization Activities (SIAs) coverage in Balochistan remained 96 percent as compared to 102 percent in Sindh, 100 percent in KPK and 96 percent in Punjab.[27] The Baloch people are not willing to accept mega projects because first, they see it as a threat to their social and cultural milieu; and secondly, the influx of workers from other provinces will alter their demography. Therefore, mega infrastructure projects are resisted by Baloch insurgents.[28] Moreover, due to religious, nationalist and sectarian militancy, the completion of development projects such as CPEC, poses as big a challenge as an opportunity for future socio-economic uplift of the province. Although security measures have been taken for CPEC-related projects but still Chinese workers have been killed in Balochistan and Sindh.[29]

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[25] Muhammad Amir Rana, "Overview of Security Situation in 2017," Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) Research Journal Conflict & Peace Studies 10, no. 1 (2018): 17-24.

[26] China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), "Introduction," accessed on 18th February, 2020, http://cpec.gov.pk/; Shahzada Zulfiqar, "Bloodshed in Balochistan," in Pakistan Security Report 2016, Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), 2017: 115-121)

[27] Finance Division, Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Economic Survey, 2018-19, Survey, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 2019.

[28] Alok Bansal, "Factors Leading to Insurgency in Balochistan," Small Wars & Insurgencies 19, no. 02 (2008): 182-200.

[29] Safder Sial, "CPEC Security Developments in 2016," in Pakistan Security Report 2016, by Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), 2017: 101-108)

Methodology

This is a qualitative research based on interpretation and description of non-numeric data. Case study design has been used to study in detail the relationship between conflict and development in Balochistan. For this research, four case studies/development projects have been selected, implemented in conflict zones of Balochistan based on the nature of projects. Two are social sector projects: polio campaign in Balochistan and Balochistan Education support Project (BEP). The other two are infrastructure projects including Refugee Affected and Hosting Areas Project (RAHA), and construction of Turbat- Buleda Road.

The data has been collected from development practitioners who have experience in implementation of development projects in conflict zones. The sample size for this research is 40; ten personnel from each project. The entire sample was interviewed using semi-structured interviews. Most of the interviews were conducted in Quetta, and some in Pishin – all in July 2018. Purposive Sampling of two kinds has been used for sample selection: fixed purposive sampling that helps in having sample units before start of field work (for sample types 1 and 3 listed below), and sequential sampling that helps find more samples through references and answers of original samples (for sample types 2 and 4 listed below). Four types of people working in conflict zones in Baluchistan have been included in the sample:

1. The managers, project directors or officers who have executed/ are executing infrastructure development projects
2. The contractors of infrastructure development projects
3. The managers or project directors who have executed/are executing social sector development projects
4. The field staff involved in implementation of social sector development projects

For analysis of data thematic analysis of case study has been used and Robert K. Yin method of 'analysis of themes' has been employed, because it deals with multiple case studies for examination.

Results and Analysis

The data collected for four cases shows that development practitioners faced multifarious challenges in implementation of development projects and had to devise strategies to deal with those challenges.

Case 1: Polio Campaign in Balochistan

In Pakistan, polio vaccination started in 1994 and formal campaigns were initiated in 1996 in specified centres. Till date Pakistan has achieved considerable progress in polio eradication, although security threats to polio workers remain a challenge; this is a challenge in all

provinces but in Balochistan the situation is grave. On 18th January, 2018, two female polio workers were killed in Quetta,[30] which led to disruption of the campaign. Quetta region consisting of district Quetta, Pishin and Killa Abdullah, is most security sensitive with maximum number of reported cases. This region has been designated as 'Tier 1', which means that it is a high risk area for polio campaigns.[31]

Challenges

Data collected through interviews suggests that the challenges confronted by Polio workers in the field include repeated campaigns, religion-based refusals, spill-over effects, and social media propaganda. Examples across the world suggest that after three or four campaigns polio gets eradicated, however, in Pakistan the case differs. Due to repeated rounds of polio campaigns people get suspicious of polio vaccines which are given twice or thrice in a month. As shared by a polio vaccinator: "When we go for polio vaccination, people ask too much questions about repeated campaigns and get suspicious of us. The response of people (community) is really disturbing for us in existing environment of fear".[32] Many people in Balochistan refuse to vaccinate their children due to religious reasons as shown by this interview response:

> There are sermons of religious scholars that in polio drops there are ingredients which are prohibited in Islam and misconception that it will make children impotent. There is propaganda that in polio drops there are ingredients of pork. Even sometimes educated people refuse to vaccinate their children. Majority of religious refusals are in Quetta, Pishin and Killa Abdullah.[33]

There is spill-over effect of polio virus, which means that Afghanistan and Pakistan are mutually dependent on each other for eradication of polio, as each day thousands of people from both sides cross the border for trade and other purposes. In simple words, polio in Pakistan can't be eradicated without its eradication in Afghanistan as stated by this interviewee:

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[30] Syed Ali Shah, "2 Female Polio Workers Shot Dead in Quetta," *Dawn*, January 18, 2018, https://www.dawn.com/news/1383730.

[31] End Polio Pakistan, "Latest on Polio," accessed July 31, 2018, http://www.endpolio.com.pk/

[32] Fahmida Ahmed, (Polio Vaccinator, EOC Quetta Region), in discussion with Muhammad Shakeel, July 12, 2018.

[33] Nawaz Bugti (Chief of Section, Health, Planning and Development Department, Government of Balochistan), in discussion with Muhammad Shakeel, July 9, 2018.

Polio cannot be totally eradicated from Pakistan because of spill-over effect from Afghanistan and the same is true for Afghanistan due to the reason that thousands of people cross borders of both countries on a daily basis. Further, if a single case is not found in Balochistan, it can still not be declared polio free because people travel from one province to another province and there are chances that a virus affected child may transmit it to another province.[34]

There is also propaganda against polio campaigns on social media that's why people hesitate to vaccinate their children with polio drops. One polio worker states that "When we go to field people ask too much questions about credibility of polio campaigns. These questions are based on contents of propaganda available on social media".[35]

Response Strategies

The strategies being used to counter these challenges include: community-based vaccination, engagement of religious scholars, awareness campaigns, and campaigns at grassroots level. To overcome the obstacles faced by repeated campaigns, polio administration hired local polio workers in the Quetta region. This approach is referred to as community-based vaccination. According to an administrative official:

Almost 4000 workers have been hired for Quetta region. The purpose of this is risk reduction, as polio workers can move freely in those streets as they are known by members of that community. Further, polio workers do not have to travel on vehicles to perform their duties. This means that 'local approach' was used because local support is needed to perform any activity. Due to community based vaccination, there is social mobilization within the community. Some years ago polio refusals were around 15000 to 20000 but now at maximum there are 2000 refusals.[36]

To counter refusals based on religious grounds, religious scholars have been engaged in polio campaigns to raise awareness in people regarding polio vaccination, as one of the interviewees revealed:

The religious *ulemas* (scholars) are engaged in polio awareness campaigns. For this purpose, 'provincial scholar task force' and 'religious support persons' are designated to resolve religious issues. In provincial task force, well-known religious scholars work to mitigate religious misconceptions regarding polio vaccination on the provincial level. In addition, in 'religious support persons',

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[34] Jamil Khan (Monitoring Officer, Provincial EOC), in discussion with Muhammad Shakeel, July 12, 2018.

[35] Arslan Baloch (Polio Worker, EOC Quetta Region), in discussion with Muhammad Shakeel, July 12, 2018.

[36] Bilal Khan (Monitoring Officer, EOC Quetta Region), in discussion with Muhammad Shakeel, July 11, 2018.

local level religious scholars are hired to spread awareness about benefits of polio vaccination.[37]

To overcome propaganda on the social media and through other means, awareness campaigns have been launched to counter misconceptions regarding polio vaccination as stated by this official:

First of all, there is mobilization by polio workers during vaccination campaigns, in which they tell people that polio drops are not dangerous for health of children. Secondly, religious scholars are engaged to counter religious refusals. Thirdly, there are advertisements regarding benefits of polio vaccination by government of Pakistan on print, electronic and social media. Fourthly, people are also informed about benefits of polio vaccination at local level through advertisements at billboards in cities. [38]

In order to counter challenge of administrative bottle-necks, nowadays polio campaigns are performed at district level but before that, polio drops were given at selected centres of the city. The launching of polio campaigns at district level has made the task easy as this statement shows:

We [Expanded Programme on Immunization (EPI)] provide vaccines and other equipment to Deputy Commissioner, and then a committee is formed at district level called District Polio Control Room (DPCR) in the DC[39] office. All DPCR meetings of pre and post campaigns are chaired by DC. In these meetings DHO[40] and district representatives of donors are to be present. Before campaigns DPCR meeting is held, targets are set and at the end of campaign, again meeting is called, and day-to-day progress of campaign is analysed.[41]

Case 2: Balochistan Education Support Project (BEP)

The Balochistan Education support Project (BEP) is funded by Global Partnership for Education (GPE) with a grant of US $34 million. It started in 2015 and was implemented with the help of World Bank,

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[37] Dr. Aftab (Coordinator, EPI Balochistan), in discussion with Muhammad Shakeel, July 9, 2018.

[38] Bilal Khan (Monitoring Officer, EOC Quetta Region), in discussion with Muhammad Shakeel, July 11, 2018.

[39] Finance Department, Government of Balochistan, "Officers in Category-II: The Balochistan Delegation of Financial Powers and Re-Appropriation Rules, 2019," accessed on February 18, 2020, https://www.balochistan.gov.pk/.

[40] Health Department, Government of Balochistan, "Provincial Setup," accessed on February 18, 2020, https://www.balochistan.gov.pk/.

[41] Dr Aftab (Coordinator, EPI Balochistan), in discussion with Muhammad Shakeel, July 9, 2018.

Education Department of Government of Balochistan (GoB) and United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). Further, Education Department, GoB has established Project Management Unit (PMU) to manage and implement project activities. The project is being implemented in all districts of Balochistan. There are three main components of the project which include: access and equity, quality and increased accountability, and technical assistance for management and monitoring.

The results of in-depth interviews show that there are some challenges encountered by project staff of 'Balochistan Education Support Project' in the field, along with strategies being adopted to cope with the challenges.

Challenges

Irresponsible attitude of the community, government's slow response and misperceptions about NGOs are the major challenges faced by this project. It has been found that the community's response to project staff involved in coordination of project activities is not good:

> Some members of the community do not allow construction of schools and have disputes with contractors. Secondly, sometimes there are problems of land acquisition from the community because when the school was built no formal agreement was signed with the community. These things are creating problems for us, said a social organizer.[42]

The government's response towards project activities is very slow:

> The response of staff of Education Department is not encouraging as they are not interested that a parallel system should run successfully. The teachers' unions do not welcome such initiatives because it is undermining their authority. Further, government has slow process of performing tasks.[43]

People's perception about NGOs is not very positive particularly in Pashtun areas due to religious orthodoxy: In many areas, religious people are not allowing co-education system and are not coordinating with our staff as they think that project activities are being handled by NGOs. In one of the schools, religious scholar of the area demanded for enrolment of children of his immediate family instead of the whole public. Due to this situation, we cancelled school related project activities.[44]

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[42] Gulab Khan (Social Oraganizer, SPO Quetta), in discussion with Muhammad Shakeel, July 20, 2018.

[43] Asmat Zehri (Education Officer, BEP Khuzdar Region), in discussion with Muhammad Shakeel, July 16, 2018.

[44] Hameed Khan (Monitoring Officer-II, BEP Quetta Region), in discussion with Muhammad Shakeel, July 16, 2018.

Counter-Strategies

The strategies adopted for successful implementation of the project are: community support process (CSP), implementation through local organizations and real time monitoring system. To overcome irresponsible attitude of the community, the project started community support process (CSP) for smooth implementation of project activities as reflected by the interviews:

> With community support, we identified absent teachers, fined and even terminated through the platform of parents-teacher school management committee (PTMC). Sometimes, we solve problems regarding schools with the help of community support process.[45]

To deal with the challenge of misperceptions about NGOs, the project adopted monitoring of the schools through local organizations of the particular area:

> For monitoring of schools, local organizations are hired for the project. In Khuzdar region (Khuzdar, Awaran, Lasbella and Kalat districts), we also hired local partners for monitoring purpose. These organizations hire local people for monitoring of schools. The success of monitoring system is that local people are involved in monitoring system.[46]

To counter the challenge of government's slow response, real time monitoring system is adopted by the project as the traditional method of government monitoring was not providing desired results:

> For monitoring purpose project gave me an android device installed with apps. When I visit schools, I used to send pictures of schools and reports of attendance to higher authorities. In this case nobody can influence higher authorities.[47]

Case 3: Refugee Affected and Hosting Areas Project (RAHA)

Refugee affected and hosting areas (RAHA) project started in 2009 and ended in 2015. The project was implemented in two phases: first from July 2009 to June 2011, while second from July 2011 to June 2015. The total cost of first phase was US $22 million, funded by the Japanese government, while the second phase was sponsored by European Union with 40 million euros. The project aimed to compensate the local communities affected by Afghan refugees by improving their livelihoods,

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[45] Beeberg Mengal (Monitoring Coordinator, BEP Khuzdar Region), in discussion with Muhammad Shakeel, July 18, 2018.

[46] Asmat Zehri (Education Officer, BEP Khuzdar Region), in discussion with Muhammad Shakeel, July 16, 2018.

[47] Ghulam Nabi (Monitoring Associate, BEP Quetta Region), in discussion with Muhammad Shakeel, July 18, 2018

rehabilitating their social service infrastructure and the environment. Interviews with staff of RAHA revealed that they faced some challenges in the field and had to come up with suitable strategies to deal with them.

Challenges

The challenges that field staff and monitoring officers faced in implementation of project activities included: law and order issues, community's lukewarm attitude, harsh winter weather, and lack of skilled staff. Poor state of law and order was a major hindrance, as shared by a project official: "In Chaghai, when we visited sites for construction purposes, people looked at us with suspicion and perceived us as government agents." [48]

The response of the community was not very encouraging and they refrained from coordinating with the project staff. One of the respondents said,

I have observed that some members of the community have high expectations from the project, so they have high demands for their areas which were not fulfilling the criteria of the project. So such schemes were dropped and for this reason the community resisted and created hurdles in construction activities of the schemes.[49]

Due to the harsh winter season, the construction activities of the project had to be halted, which posed another challenge:

The weather of project locations is very cold in winter season and in peak winter the temperature goes to -10 C. As majority of the components of the project involve construction work, so in extreme winter season it was not possible to work. This season spans over almost four months from December to March. During this season, project activities slowed down, due to which schemes cannot be completed on time, leading to cost escalation.[50]

Interviews also showed the average quality of construction work due to lack of skilled labour:

We were unable to find good engineers. Although, government has provided engineers of good calibre but still they lack technical skills. Due to lack of skilled engineers, infrastructure

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[48]   Javed Baloch (Social Mobilizer, RAHA District Chaghai), in discussion with Muhammad Shakeel, July 16, 2018.

[49]   Jamal Ahmed (Monitoring Officer, RAHA District Quetta), in discussion with Muhammad Shakeel, July 18, 2018.

[50]   Mohsin Hasan (Assistant Engineer, RAHA District Quetta), in discussion with Muhammad Shakeel, July 18, 2018.

schemes could not be constructed of good quality. Due to low quality schemes, project reputation may get damaged".[51]

Remedial Measures

These measures adopted to alleviate the situation included participative development and government ownership. To deal with challenges of law and order and lukewarm attitude of the community, the project administration adopted the approach of participative development. It means that the community was involved in the development process:

> We involve the community in development process. Through community organizations (COs), RAHA gave community management trainings to communities of the project area. In these trainings awareness was given to communities to sustain these schemes.[52]

To overcome slow pace of work or a complete halt during the winter season, and lack of skilled labour, the project was brought under ownership of the government as shared by this official:

> Although majority of funding of the project was from donors and UNDP was managing the project but government of Balochistan owned the project due to its significance. For this purpose, Planning and Development Department (P & DD), GOB played key role and helped the project in tackling governmental issues.[53]

Case 4: Construction of Turbat-Buleda Road (19.12 KM)

This project was included in provincial development budget of 2006 and construction work started in 2009. Initially, the total approved cost was Rs 929.119 million for 19.12 KM, but now the cost of the project has risen to Rs 1472.836 million.[54] From 2009 till July 2018 the project could not be completed due to deteriorated law and order situation. During construction of the project in 2012, terrorists attacked the man-power involved with the project which resulted in the death of 7 labourers and damaging of construction equipment. Due to terrorist attacks, work was suspended for about one and a half years. The work was again started

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[51] Muhammad Bilal (Provincial Coordinator, RAHA Head Office, Quettta), in discussion with Muhammad Shakeel, July 19, 2018

[52] Javed Baloch (Social Mobilizer, RAHA District Chaghai), in discussion with Muhammad Shakeel, July 16, 2018.

[53] Muhammad Bilal (Provincial Coordinator, RAHA Head Office, Quettta), in discussion with Muhammad Shakeel, July 19, 2018.

[54] Azmat Budhani and Hussain Bux Mallah, "Collective for Social Science Research," *Research Collective*, March 2007, http://www.researchcollective.org/Documents/Mega_Projects_in_Balochistan.pdf.

and this time the project met the same fate and two labourers were killed by terrorists and contractor machinery was severely damaged.[55]

Challenges

The discussions with staff and contractor revealed the hurdles facing the project completion, which included, law and order issues, difficult terrain and litigation issues. There are problems of law and order on the site due to which construction had to be stopped many times as per the contractor: "My workers have been killed in terrorist attacks and we faced losses of millions of rupees due to damage of construction machinery".[56] According to another official associated with the project:

> During visit of the road some years ago, we were advised not to go beyond some areas due to bad law and order situation. Even government engineers in the district were not ready to go in those areas for inspection.[57]

Due to difficult terrain, there are difficulties in construction work and movement of equipment:

> Although road is 19.12 Km but it is in difficult mountainous range. In such terrain there is need of cutting and blasting of mountains for construction of road. Due to this reason, survey of road proved difficult because very expensive and latest tools were used for conducting survey. Further, when construction of the road started, then first activity was cutting and blasting of mountains for construction of the road. The cutting and blasting of mountains proved a very difficult, expensive and time-consuming task.[58]

Due to law and order situation, litigation battles started between the contractor and the government as discussed by the contractor:

> I have filed a petition against the government in High Court of Balochistan because I am not satisfied with existing rates as I have borne losses of human lives and millions of rupees. Further, in

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[55]   Nawaz, interviewed by Muhammad Shakeel Khan, Progress of Turbat-Buleda Road, July 7, 2018).

[56]   Ahmed Khan (Contractor, Turbat-Buleda Road), in discussion with Muhammad Shakeel, July 24, 2018

[57]   Anwar Jan Shahwani (Monitoring Officer, Planning and Development Department, Government of Balochistan, Quetta), in discussion with Muhammad Shakeel, July 22, 2018.

[58]   Dilnawaz Dashti (Ex- Executive Engineer, Road, District Turbat/Deputy Project Director, Turbat-Buleda Road), in discussion with Muhammad Shakeel, July 24, 2018.

such circumstances the government wanted to change the award of contract, which is unacceptable for me.[59]

Strategies Adopted

Despite the above challenges the field staff used some means to construct some portions of the road. These include deployment of security on site, and allocation of high rates to the road project. To address law and order related issues, security forces were deployed on the site of road construction. Same strategy was used by bringing infrastructure development to foment peace by the security forces of Pakistan in Karachi, Swat and former FATA.[60] As shared by one of the officials related with the project: "The deployment of FC gave positive results and work was started. In my opinion it should continue till completion of the project."[61] Also, to deal with challenges of difficult terrains and litigation issues, government approved high rates above permissible limits for the project. As shared in one interview, "Government provided high rates for the construction of road so that work may be completed within revised schedule".[62]

Findings and Recommendations

From the data collected for four cases and analysed, some findings have emerged with regard to challenges and strategies. Development practitioners need to pay attention to these for moving towards successful implementation of development projects in conflict zones of Balochistan.

Challenges

Challenges facing development projects in Baluchistan, collectively extracted and generalized from discussions with project staff of the four cases include: dominance of customs and norms, hegemony of rigid religious thought, security issues and scarcity of technical labour.

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[59] Ahmed Khan (Contractor, Turbat-Buleda Road), in discussion with Muhammad Shakeel, July 24, 2018.

[60] Dr. Najimdeen Bakare Khan and Ms. Faryal, "Peace and Sustainable Development," *Development Advocate Pakistan* (UNDP) 6, no. 03 (September 2019): 2-7.

[61] Dilnawaz Dashti (Ex- Executive Engineer, Road, District Turbat/Deputy Project Director, Turbat-Buleda Road), in discussion with Muhammad Shakeel, July 24, 2018.

[62] Anwar Jan Shahwani (Monitoring Officer, Planning and Development Department, Government of Balochistan, Quetta), in discussion with Muhammad Shakeel, 22nd July, 2018.

Dominance of Customs and Norms

Majority of the community members were not ready to accept activities of the projects because they thought that these are detrimental to their social norms and culture, hence the community members' non-cooperation with project staff. In case two (BEP), the people showed a negative response with respect to engagement in development activities of schools. In case three (RAHA Project), the lukewarm response of the community indicates that at the initial stage, community members were not ready to accept project activities due to perceived clash with their culture.

Prevalence of Rigid Religious Thought

The results illustrate that people in Balochistan are dominated by orthodox religious thought due to which they cannot give space to development activities which were portrayed negatively by local religious leaders. In case one (Polio Campaign in Balochistan), the challenge of religiously-motivated refusals indicates that people refused to vaccinate their children due to sermons of different religious scholars. They thought that it is a conspiracy of non-Muslims to make children of Muslims impotent. So, orthodox religious thought played a key role in such refusals. In case two (BEP), misperceptions about NGOs in conjunction with orthodox religious beliefs led people to think that female staff of NGOs are immoral.

Security Issues

Several security problems were faced during implementation of development projects in conflict zones of Balochistan. Due to law and order issues, project activities were delayed. In case three (RAHA) and four (Turbat-Buleda road), there was a common challenge of deteriorating law and order situation. Due to this deterioration, projects faced delays, wastage of resources and stoppage of work. So due to initiation of development projects, security issues have emerged.

Scarcity of Skilled Labour

For any project's success, technically skilled labour is required, but in Balochistan due to law and order related hurdles, there is lack of skilled labour. In case two (BEP), the challenge of government's slow response indicates that there is an issue of human resource not only in development projects but also in the government. Due to this, government employees respond slowly to the queries of different agencies. In case three (RAHA Project), lack of skilled labour meant that the project could not find qualified engineers for construction work, due to which they faced issue of quality of work.

Strategies

The collective results indicate four strategies which include community based development, engagement with powerful actors, local approach, and out-of-the-box solutions.

Community Based Development

Community is involved in development process, and project needs are identified in consultation with the community. In case two (BEP), the strategy of Community Support Process (CSP) shows that identification of schools in this project was done by the public in response to an advertisement and then scrutinized schools were built. In case three (RAHA Project), the strategy of Participative Development illustrates that for construction of different schemes, community members were involved through constitution of community organizations (COs).

Engagement with Powerful Actors

The results show that in conflict zones there are some peaceful powerful actors, engagement with whom may lead to successful completion of project activities. In case one (Polio Campaign in Balochistan), the strategy of 'engagement with religious scholars' showed that although technically religious scholars have nothing to do with polio campaigns but they were involved because they have a say in society. In case four (Turbat-Buleda Road), the strategy 'deployment of security on site' indicates that security forces were involved for construction of road.

Local Approach

The local approach implies that for carrying out development in conflict zones, it is important that local people be entrusted and be taken as partners in the task of development. In case one (Polio Campaigns in Balochistan), the strategy 'community based vaccination' wherein local people were hired for polio vaccination helped improve public perception. This tool proved to be successful because polio campaign coverage has increased after this. In case two (BEP), the strategy 'implementation through local organizations' shows that to achieve project objectives, local NGOs and organizations can be effectively involved for monitoring of schools.

Out-of-the-box Solutions

It has been found that for conducting development activities in conflict zones of Balochistan, there is a need to apply methods other than traditional ones. In case two (BEP), 'real time monitoring system' was adopted where monitoring of schools was not done in the traditional way of government inspection, rather android devices were installed with apps and provided to monitoring officers for inspection of schools. In case four (Turbat-Buleda Road), the strategy 'allocation of high rates' indicates that

high rate tenders were given to the contractor of the project because of bad law and order situation.

Policy Recommendations

Keeping in view the findings of the study, the following are recommended for successful implementation of development projects in conflict zones of Balochistan:

Community based development

It is recommended that first of all those schemes should be initiated which are needed by the community. Further, needs are to be identified on a priority basis by community members. When needs are identified then schemes should be designed accordingly. Otherwise, externally imposed schemes in any area might lead to increased intensity of conflict in the area. When projects are started with the consultation of community members, then implementation of projects becomes easier. Further, those projects which were based on community identified needs, proved to be more successful. These projects achieved their objectives and were beneficial for the community. Such projects will not clash with cultural interests of the community as well. So, in conflict zones of Balochistan, community based projects have proved to be more successful.

Assessment of Socio-economic and Political Context

Before initiating development projects in conflict zones, feasibility study should be carried out. It should be seen whether the project aligns with the culture and customs of that society or not. Project objectives and activities should not clash with the norms of the society. Secondly, research findings indicate that the project should not damage the religious sentiments of any religion, sect or cast, because religious concerns are dominant in conflict zones of Balochistan. Thirdly, misperceptions within the society regarding the project should be removed from the minds of people through awareness campaigns. Lastly, it must be ensured that a project employs skilled staff for execution of the project, failing that its own performance will suffer. Skilled labour may be found for projects in conflict zones by providing security and attractive pay packages.

Localized Development

For conducting development activities in conflict zones of Balochistan, local approach to development should be followed. It means that first of all, local people should be hired for performing project tasks because they are aware of the local environment. Secondly, they will be helpful in tackling local issues during implementation phase. Thirdly, it will prove a useful tool for promoting a positive perception of projects within society. Moreover, in localized development, project administration can delegate some of their tasks to local organizations. Through this way

implementation of the project will be easy and also increase employment ratio in the community.

Innovative Development

It means that while undertaking development activities in conflict zones of Balochistan, instead of traditional methods, new and innovative methods should be used. It will facilitate members of the community, ensure timely completion of project, and aid in achieving objectives of the project. The bureaucratic way of carrying out development work might lead to delays in performing tasks. So, some new methods should be used, for example in Polio Campaign, one window operation was started instead of utilizing the existing bureaucratic channels due to which the number of polio cases were reduced. Similarly, in construction of the Turbat- Buleda road, rates above government ceilings were given to the contractor due to which work started again. These examples show that innovative methods may be applied for implementation of development projects in conflict zones which might be helpful in achieving objectives of a project.

Conclusion

In conflict zones it is not easy to carry out development activities in a smooth way. There are challenges associated with projects implemented in these areas, as faced by development practitioners all over the world. Balochistan is also a victim of deteriorated law and order situation due to which the development process is facing challenges. The analysis of four selected cases including Polio campaign in Balochistan, Balochistan Education Support Project (BEP), Refugee Affected and Hosting Areas Project (RAHA) and Construction of Turbat- Buleda Road show that project administrations face challenges in the field. To deal with those challenges they adopted effective strategies for implementation of those projects.

In the end, it is recommended that to implement development projects in conflict zones it is needed to focus on community based development, assessment of socio-economic and political context, as well as localized and innovative development.