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
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JOURNAL OF
CONTEMPORARY STUDIES

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Editor's Note

The *Journal of Contemporary Studies* is a flagship publication of the Faculty of Contemporary Studies (FCS), National Defence University (NDU), Islamabad. It started with the unequivocal objective of advancing critically-oriented, inter-disciplinary academic and intellectual discourse. It is a biannual peer-reviewed journal that offers its readers—in academia, government and the policy-making world, in-depth and scholarly analyses and diverse policy perspectives on important contemporary issues, ongoing debates in the areas of national and international security, public policy and the wider field of world politics.

This is the ninth issue of the journal containing five articles, three book reviews and five documents providing valuable primary information. The first article, titled *The U.S. Wars of the 21st Century and Sun Tzu's Art of War* by Syed Najeeb Ahmad, argues that the strategies pursued by the U.S. to control violence, wherever its national interest was threatened, saw significant challenges in the 21st Century. He maintains that US strategic follies in the Afghan and Iraq wars can be explained in the light of Sun Tzu's understanding of warfare. The 'Art of War' is still as relevant in understanding the criticality of 'moral,' 'intellectual' and 'circumstantial' factors of war. A thorough understanding of war is an existential necessity for a state because it is a matter of its survival. Failure in understanding these moral, intellectual and circumstantial factors led to the setbacks faced by the U.S. in the Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) invasions.

The second article presents an in-depth analysis of Turkmenistan's positive neutrality. Penned by Dr. Saima Ashraf Kayani and Raja Qaiser Ahmed, the article titled *Turkmenistan's Political Culture of Positive Neutrality and its Implications*, describes how after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Turkmenistan went through a process of political transition. Existing political culture at that time was not supportive for state, nation building and democratization. However, adoption of a culture of neutrality facilitated Turkmenistan at the national, regional and global level in coping with these challenges. The political culture of neutrality helped Turkmenistan to achieve its post-Soviet stability and post-communist process of democratization. It also analyzes the factors that facilitated Turkmenistan to pursue the policy of neutrality and the criticisms on the policy of neutrality.

The third article authored by Salma Malik is titled: *The Humanitarian Dimension of Suffering in Terror-hit Areas of Pakistan*. The author argues that contemporary conflicts are not limited to war zones

and therefore sustainable peace requires effective post-conflict rehabilitation and settlement, coupled with civilian ownership and a near ideal mix of civil-military cooperation. She focuses on the impact of terrorism on Pakistan and the compound effects of problems arising out of this chaotic situation through a holistic lens. Beginning with a review of changing dimensions of security, she emphasises on the humanitarian impact of terrorism in the country and suggests a way forward.

Fourth article, titled *Human Security Concerns of South Asia: Pakistan's Perspective* and co-authored by Muhammad Imran Ashraf, Sajida Begum and Iqra Jathol, highlights the human security challenges confronted by South Asia, especially Pakistan. The author argues that South Asian states have been facing grave challenges to human security since long as a result of increasing extremism, border conflicts and terrorism. These domestic, regional and global factors are hindering the progress and prosperity of this region. Pakistan is facing different types of internal and external problems causing political instability, socio-economic underdevelopment, energy crisis and terrorism, impacting human security in the country. Pakistan and India are two major players in the region. Therefore, the issues regarding peace and security depend on the relationship between these countries. The author suggests that India and Pakistan need to make progress in the field of economics and trade which is in the interest of not only the two states but also their huge populations.

The last article on *Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan: Historical, Constitutional and Administrative Development*, co-authored by Midhat Shehzad, Dr. Sabahat Akram and Sadia Bano Hashmi, explores the rationale behind peculiar and *ad hoc* administrative structures of these two regions and their relationship with Pakistan. These areas have a unique character as they are neither independent in their administrative affairs nor are they a part of Pakistan for administrative purposes like the other four provinces. The authors argue that constitutional development of the liberated territories of the State - AJK and GB- has been very slow largely due to the non-resolution of the question of final status of the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir. The study identifies the legal and constitutional voids in the administrative systems of these territories and suggests some corrective measures as a way forward.

I am grateful to all the contributors who have sent their articles for this issue, and the anonymous peer-reviewers whose valuable comments helped the authors to improve their contributions. We hope that the study of this Journal will invoke the desire among the readers to contribute their perspectives in the ongoing academic discourses. Contributions are invited from a broad spectrum of related fields, like political science, security studies, political economy, terrorism, politics and religion, politics of energy, feminism, media and politics, management sciences, leadership psychology, military strategy, modern history, international law, sociology,

education, conflict management and resolution, urban studies, demography, social anthropology, developmental studies, foreign policy analysis etc.

We are accepting articles for the upcoming issue of the Journal of Contemporary Studies based on original qualitative or quantitative research, an innovative conceptual framework or a substantial literature review that opens new areas of inquiry and investigation. Case studies and comparative analyses are also welcome. The editorial team at the journal encourages submissions from expert analysts from around the world. The Journal seeks to promote a scholarly understanding of contemporary developments and changes related to aforementioned disciplines/fields of social sciences. It intends to stimulate interdisciplinary research and writing.

Editor
Dr. Shaheen Akhtar

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THE US WARS OF THE 21ST CENTURY AND SUN TZU'S ART OF WAR

Syed Najeeb Ahmad*

Abstract

The strategies pursued by the U.S. to control violence, wherever national interest was threatened, saw significant challenges in the 21st Century. By juxtaposing Sun Tzu's 'Art of War' (400-320 BC) to the U.S.' policies in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, the strategic follies of those campaigns can be better explained. The 'Art of War' argues that war is a matter of vital importance to the State; a matter of life or death; a matter of survival or ruin. Its thorough understanding is, therefore, an existential necessity. On the subject of understanding the enemy and one's own strategies, Sun Tzu prophesied that ignorance of oneself and ignorance of one's enemy is a recipe for disaster. Sun outlines the fundamentals of strategy and tactics in a simple, ageless and succinct manner. At times he displays disdain for war by admitting the significance of the 'evils' of war-waging, without comprehending which wars can never be won. In brief, 'Art of War' is still relevant in understanding the criticality of 'moral,' 'intellectual' and 'circumstantial' factors of war. Failure in understanding these moral, intellectual and circumstantial factors led to the setbacks faced by the U.S. subsequent to the Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) invasions.

Key words: *Indirect Strategy, Purpose of War, Afghan Invasion 2001, Counterinsurgency, Iraq Invasion 2003, Harmony, Correlation and Contextualization, Al Qaeda*

War has remained a perpetual phenomenon of critical importance in human societies. The criticality stems from the unintended consequences of imprudently prosecuted wars. War is essentially a calculated endeavour for victory, reflected in a subdued opponent. Though apparently chaotic and emotional, war is actually an organized and rational activity, requiring immense sagacity at the strategic level. Strategies to prevent and deter or to seek and win wars have been

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the fundamental ambition of US political actors. Owing to major changes in the ends, ways and means of violence, the strategies pursued by the US to control violence, wherever national interest was threatened, saw significant challenges in the 21st century. For students of world politics, finding theories about warfare that can best explain contemporary strategy is essential. This paper argues that the strategic follies of the US in Afghanistan and Iraq wars can be better explained by juxtaposing Sun Tzu's 'Art of War' projections to the miserable outcomes of those campaigns.

The emerging character of war

The motives and purposes of war remain the same in the 21st century, but its methodology and construct have seen significant variations. The lasting nature but changing character of war is often argued.¹ The diffusion of power, spreading of hateful ideologies, age of information technologies, loose networks of transnational terrorism and innovative means of destruction have given rise to amorphous patterns of conflict that have confronted the US in the 21st century. Instead of aggrieved states challenging each other with violence as the sole actors on the centre stage of warfare, violent ideological franchises have also pushed themselves into the spotlight. Strategic competition composed of inter-state rivalries is mostly nuanced but at the same time the possibility of an armed conflict cannot be ruled out with ramifications for core US interests. The US faces conflict levels that have merged and morphed, along with mixed levels of warfare, sometimes called hybrid wars, low intensity conflicts, proxy wars, irregular wars or unrestricted wars.²

The mutation of sectarian rivalries in Iraq leading to formation of self-styled Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the unending Taliban resistance in Afghanistan, both resulting from US the intervention, are a glimpse of the complexities of contemporary warfare. External groups often support intra-state violence on ethnic, ideological or sectarian grounds. The multi-ordered economic and political fallouts in these wars result in deficit spending, war weariness, global demographic disruptions, exacerbated geopolitical competitions and proliferating radical ideologies. Some examples of such fallouts are the rising US debt seen as a national security threat, disillusionment of Syrian, Iraqi, Yemeni and Afghan populations, Syrian migration crisis, growing Russian influence in the Middle East, the Saudi-Iranian standoff and the spate of terrorism in France and Belgium.

¹ Colin S. Gray, "War-Continuity in Change, and Change in Continuity," *Parameters* 40, no. 2 (2010): 5–13.

² Tony Corn, "Peaceful Rise through Unrestricted Warfare: Grand Strategy with Chinese Characteristics," *Small Wars Journal*, 2010, <<http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/449-corn.pdf>>.

Sun Tzu's exhortations on war and strategy

To put the emerging character of war in context, Sun Tzu's exhortations are an essential reading. The fundamentals of strategy and tactics are outlined by Sun Tzu in a simple, ageless and succinct manner. He highlights the significance of realism and moderation in contrast to absolutism and extremism in the theory of war and emphasizes upon the indirect strategy in warfare. In fact, Sun Tzu famously exalted the 'acme of skill'³ in subduing the enemy without fighting. All of Sun Tzu's expositions about the higher direction of war aim to reinforce understanding of the moral, intellectual and circumstantial elements of strategy within the classical Chinese concept of *harmony*,⁴ the organizing principle of optimized situational advantage.

Sun Tzu opens his brief treatise, *The Art of War*⁵, with a chapter titled 'Estimates', saying, "War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied."⁶ On 'Waging War' he said, "when the army marches abroad, the treasury will be emptied at home," emphasizing, "victory is the main object in war," and "when the army engages in protracted campaigns, the resources of the state will not suffice," assuring that "there has never been a protracted war from which a country has benefitted." He reemphasized upon the detriments of protraction, saying, "when your weapons are dulled and ardor damped, your strength exhausted and treasure spent, neighboring rulers will take advantage of your distress to act," making it impossible to dominate strategically. He compared war to fire, which will engulf armies entangled due to protraction, saying "those unable to understand the dangers inherent in

³ Samuel B. Griffith, trans., *Sun Tzu - The Art of War* (London: OUP, 1963): 77.

⁴ Zhang Lihua, "China's Traditional Cultural Values and National Identity," *Carnegie-Tsinghua Center - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, November 21, 2013, <<http://carnegietsinghua.org/publications/?fa=53613>>.

⁵ Art of War is originally divided into thirteen very short chapters, each covering some important aspect of war, i.e., Estimates, Waging War, Offensive Strategy, Dispositions, Energy, Weaknesses and Strength, Manoeuvre, The Nine Variables, Marches, Terrain, The Nine Varieties of Ground, Attack by Fire, Employment of Secret Agents. Insightful maxims comprise each chapter, some of which are apparently simplistic, while most are extremely meaningful and timeless. Correlation of these maxims to one's era requires imaginativeness. There is lot of emphasis on deliberation before waging war and indirectness of approach in strategy. The age of this treatise is between 400-320 BC, within the context of one and a half century (450 - 300 BC) marred by excessive warfare between tribal states that resulted in lot of bloodshed and many vanquished armies. In Warring States China, scholastic debates on strategy naturally evoked interest. Sun Tzu, who also displayed generalship in those wars, endeavoured to chart out a course for future strategists based on his observations and experience.

⁶ Griffith, *Sun Tzu - The Art of War*, 63.

employing troops are equally unable to understand the advantageous way of doing so.”⁷

On understanding the enemy and one’s own strategies, he said, “know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril, ... when you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal, ... if ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril.” Li Ch’uan, one of the earliest interpreters of *The Art of War*, explains: “Such people are called ‘mad bandits’. What can they expect if not defeat?”⁸

Besides defeat, the embroilment of the attacking forces causes complete socioeconomic disruption, indicated by Sun Tzu: “where the army is, prices are high (because everyone covets the extraordinary profits to be made), when prices rise wealth of the people is exhausted.”⁹ About the aftermath of war, Sun Tzu said: “Treat the captives well, and take care of them, ... with magnanimity and sincerity so that they may be used by us; it is called *winning a battle and becoming stronger*.” *The Art of War* also cautions about needlessly enraging your enemy as “rage would multiply their strength by ten.” Sun Tzu emphasized not to put a premium on killing because “what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy, i.e., to balk the enemy’s plans.”¹⁰

Lastly, on the significance of a clear understanding of the *purpose* of war, Sun Tzu succinctly remarked, “one who is confused in purpose cannot respond to his enemy,” thus outlining five circumstances for the prediction of victory. Firstly, the one who knows when he can fight and when he cannot, will be victorious. Secondly, the one who knows how to use both large and small forces will be victorious. Thirdly, the one whose ranks are united in purpose will be victorious. Fourthly, the one who is prudent and lies in wait for an enemy who is imprudent will be victorious. Fifthly, the one whose generals are able and are not interfered with by the government will be victorious: “the supreme requirements of generalship are a clear perception, the harmony of his host (the government he serves), a profound strategy coupled with far-reaching plans, an understanding of the seasons and an ability to examine the human factors.”¹¹

Did these exhortations have practical value in guiding the US strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq? Were the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq planned with as much deliberate thinking as suggested by Sun Tzu? To answer these questions, we turn briefly to the US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, which were major wars that have been resistant to a meaningful

⁷ Ibid., 73.

⁸ Ibid., 84.

⁹ Ibid., 74.

¹⁰ Ibid., 75–77.

¹¹ Ibid., 82, 87.

victory. In our understanding, the planning of 'Operation Enduring Freedom'¹² (OEF) and 'Operation Iraqi Freedom'¹³ (OIF) did not reflect deference to the wisdom in *The Art of War*.

The Afghan invasion, 2001

The public vengeance arising from the tragedy of 9/11 drove the US decision to wage war against the Taliban Government and the Al Qaeda terrorist network in Afghanistan. The ensuing war aimed at toppling the Taliban Government by providing military and financial support to Taliban's arch rivals, the Northern Alliance. The next phase was to defeat Taliban's insurgency, protect the population from Taliban, win popular support for the counterinsurgency, and build Afghan infrastructure and state institutions. Employed as early as 26th September, 2001, the CIA team *Jawbreakers*, began to garner anti-Taliban forces, with all-out war raging on 7th October.¹⁴ Simply, the time period that elapsed between 9/11 and the initiation of war plans is indicative of the haste to go to war on part of the US Government. Contrary to Sun Tzu's exhortation of thorough study of the decision to go to war, being a matter of life or death for a nation, the US decision seemed considerably less deliberated. A widely shared understanding of victory, the main object of war, was not deliberately developed because of the failure to understand both the enemy's and one's own capabilities. The enormous cost of nearly one trillion dollars led to the 'certain peril' predicted by Sun Tzu, as the decision-makers were ignorant of their own and the enemy's potential.¹⁵ The costly political missteps in Afghanistan amounted to hundreds of billions of dollars wasted in mismanaged projects,¹⁶ which eroded the US public confidence in their policy-makers' and policy-implementers' capabilities. The inherent dangers of employing troops was not deliberated, hence the military could not be employed gainfully. Similarly, the economic disruption and its fallout theorized by Sun Tzu could also not be predicted despite the abysmal socio-economic history of Afghanistan. Rather, the unrealistic economic bubble of the war economy, propped up

¹² Daniel Bolger, *Why We Lost* (Boston: HMH, 2014): 25–45.

¹³ Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II* (New York: Vintage Books, 2007).

¹⁴ "Afghanistan War: 2001-2014," accessed July 17, 2016, <<https://www.britannica.com/event/Afghanistan-War>>.

¹⁵ Geoff Dyer and Chloe Sorvino in Washington, "Afghan War Costs US \$1 Trillion, Hastening Retreat," *CNBC*, December 15, 2014, <<http://www.cnbc.com/2014/12/15/-for-us-cost-1tn.html>>.

¹⁶ Chloe Sorvino, "Costly Missteps Mark US Road to War," *Financial Times*, December 14, 2014, <<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3f5466bc-83d0-11e4-8a84-00144feabdc0.html#slide0>>.

by multilateral aid and local rent-seeking, was misinterpreted as a sign of economic improvement.¹⁷

The US led invasion of Afghanistan could not achieve its desired objectives due to a “simplistic application of hard power and development work,” as described by Jack Fairweather in his latest book, *The Good War*.¹⁸ Billions of dollars were thrown in unwittingly, exacerbating an already raging civil war by preferring certain factions over others in both fighting and development. The wider security commitment needed for the development projects was extremely difficult to fund and implement. The ruthless internal power struggle of Afghans was aggravated when certain groups exploiting the US preferences pursued vested interests. Progress could not be achieved in Afghanistan because the problem was “the old triad of atavism, avarice and opportunism.”¹⁹ Thus, inability to understand the dangers inherent in employing troops led to their disadvantageous entanglement in a protracted war for which the resources of state could not suffice.

Sun Tzu had suggested ‘winning a battle and becoming stronger’ by taking care of the captives so they might be used later on and cautioned against needlessly enraging the enemy so as not to multiply their strength. The US prisoner abuse in Afghanistan is now a well-documented part of the country’s abysmal political history recorded by their Senate showing “the willingness to face an ugly truth and say ‘never again.’”²⁰ The widespread abuse incited the Taliban further and reinforced their age-old societal norm of ‘revenge’ against the invading forces. Even when tactical battles were won by the US and Afghan forces against segments of the Taliban, the social media driven impression of rampant torture and incarceration of prisoners caused disaffection in the wider public, weakening the US forces’ position as predicted in *The Art of War*. The trend of prisoner abuse permeated from the mentoring US-led coalition to the mentored Afghan indigenous forces leading to further multiplication in Taliban rank and file due to enagement caused by such abuse at the hands of locals.²¹

¹⁷ Faridullah Sahil, “Afghan Economy Trembles Amid Foreign Investment Decline: ACCI,” accessed July 17, 2016, <<http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/23747-afghan-economy-trembles-amid-foreign-investment-decline-acc>>.

¹⁸ Jack Fair weather, *The Good War: Why We Couldn't Win the Peace in Afghanistan* (New York: Basic Books, 2014).

¹⁹ Rob Johnson, “Misunderstanding War,” *The American Interest*, April 13, 2015, <<http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/04/13/misunderstanding-war/>>.

²⁰ Mark Mazzetti, “Panel Faults C.I.A. Over Brutality and Deceit in Terrorism Interrogations,” *The New York Times*, December 9, 2014, <<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/10/world/senate-intelligence-committee-cia-torture-report.html>>.

²¹ Azam Ahmed, “Prisoner Abuse Still Widespread in Afghanistan, U.N. Says,” *The New York Times*, February 25, 2015, <<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/26/world/asia/abuse-of-detainees-remains-widespread-in-afghanistan-un-says.html>>.

Sun Tzu's exhortation of not putting a premium on killing, rather attacking the enemy's strategy, remained unheeded in the US Afghan War. For example, night raids by the US Special Forces caused a large number of unwarranted killings duly acknowledged by independent war research groups in the US. According to one such report, more than 1,500 civilians were killed by the night raids during a short period of 10 months in 2010-2011. In a total of 6,282 raids, the US Special Operations Forces killed around 2,844 alleged insurgents along with 'relatively few women and children killed by accident.' The report concluded, "the socio-cultural and physical setting of the raids guarantees that the percentage of civilians killed is extremely high."²²

Instead of pursuing the strategy of targeted killings, Sun Tzu had emphasized on attacking the enemy strategy, i.e., on balking the enemy's plans. The Taliban strategy in Afghanistan had been to control as much territory as possible, dominate the perception of winning and use the negative public sentiment against foreign troops to reduce favourable space for the US and Afghan military forces. The US could neither prevent Taliban from gradually expanding their territorial control nor counter the burgeoning perception about their winning streak, thus, failing to create favourable strategic and operational space for the US forces and the struggling Afghan military to operate with more freedom. In order to attack the Taliban strategy, the offensive capability of the Afghan forces needed to be focused upon from the outset to prevent Taliban's control of territory, instead of which, the offensive capability of the US forces was over-capitalized to pursue a killing spree. Resultantly, Taliban now control more territory in Afghanistan than ever, since their ouster.²³ In the perception domain too, owing to the US impatience to announce drawdown schedules, the Taliban's strategy of creating an 'impression of winning' could not be defeated. Finally, the catalyst of 'foreign forces' also remains there to be used by Taliban to foment public sentiment against the Coalition and its 'altruistic' ambitions. A premium on killing the enemy prevented devising far-reaching strategies to 'balk' the enemy's plans.

In matters of strategy, Sun Tzu had emphasized clarity of purpose to be of cardinal significance. Dan Bolger is a retired US military Lieutenant General who published a scathing criticism of the US purpose of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, pointedly titled *Why We Lost*.²⁴ He rightly

²² "U.S. Night Raids Killed Over 1,500 Afghan Civilians in Ten Months - World Can't Wait," accessed July 24, 2016, <<http://www.worldcantwait.net/index.php/features/afghanistan-pakistan/7425-us-night-raids-killed-over-1500-afghan-civilians-in-ten-months>>.

²³ Lynne O'Donnell, "The Taliban Now Hold More Ground in Afghanistan than at Any Point since 2001," *Military Times*, June 16, 2016, <<http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/pentagon/2016/06/16/afghanistan-nicholson-commander-pentagon-report-war/85972056/>>.

²⁴ Bolger, *Why We Lost*.

puts the blame on the US military hierarchy for pursuing such a vague purpose for war as counter-insurgency. It led to wastage of billions of dollars, thousands of US and coalition military lives and hundreds of thousands of lives of Afghans and Iraqis, with a compounded number of radicalized population continuing to haunt peace prospects in those regions.²⁵ The US 'hope' of strengthening the Afghan forces to a level where they could ward off a Taliban takeover in major parts of the war-torn country was not a very well defined purpose of war either.²⁶ The unclear thought on the purpose of war in Afghanistan, beyond the defeat of Al Qaeda, predictably led to the much-dreaded 'protraction', which Sun Tzu had so presciently despised.

The Taliban regime and the terrorists affiliated with Al Qaeda thriving in Afghanistan under state patronage were identified as the enemy. The US military and covert operatives supporting the local forces of Northern Alliance, the sworn enemies of Taliban, constituted the overall force organized to defeat Taliban and cause their regime to fall by a strategy of 'Shock and Awe.' The amorphous nature of this threat and its potential capability to survive the onslaught, disperse and engage in guerrilla warfare subsequently was not 'estimated', despite the very recent history of 'Afghan Jihad' against the erstwhile USSR. The enemy was not analyzed in detail and relevant questions were not deliberated. What was the regime's political grounding, its military strength and its ability to reconstitute? What were the demographics of the land? What was the culture? What were the regime's weaknesses that could be exploited in the short term? Would a long term engagement be fruitful? Was direct military engagement the only solution? Sun Tzu had said, "With many calculations, one can win; with few one cannot ...examine the situation (before hostilities) and the outcome will be clearly apparent."²⁷

The 'calculations' of the US' own and allied forces' capabilities were grossly inaccurate. The impact of Afghanistan's warlord culture and absence of any central authority backed by an armed force to enforce the fundamentals of statehood, after toppling the Taliban regime, were not appreciated in the campaign design of OEF. Post-Soviet Afghanistan had remained in complete socio-political turmoil, requiring unimaginable resources for its restructuring. Reconstruction of damages to property and infrastructure inflicted by war and rehabilitation of the people through reinvigoration of economy were to be factored in the concept of

²⁵ Spencer Ackerman, "General Dan Bolger Says What the US Does Not Want to Hear: Why We Lost," *The Guardian*, November 10, 2014, sec. US news, <<https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/nov/10/general-dan-bolger-iraq-afghanistan-why-we-lost>>.

²⁶ Nick Paton Walsh "Afghanistan War: Just What Was the Point?," *CNN*, accessed July 16, 2016, <<http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/25/asia/afghanistan-war-analysis/index.html>>.

²⁷ Griffith, *Sun Tzu - The Art of War*, 71.

operations, if the goodwill of the masses was to be won. The paucity of US forces allowed the terrorists to escape into adjoining Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, with its tribal dynamics of loose administrative control, creating hideouts. Thus, short-sighted calculation led to the loss in a distant, protracted campaign that contributed to straining the country's economy in combination with the war in Iraq and the 2008 financial crisis.

On the concept of strategic advantage, Sun Tzu said: "In the business of war, there is no invariable strategic advantage which can be relied upon at all times."²⁸ In Afghanistan, the US did not realize the loss of strategic advantage by supporting a non-inclusive Northern Alliance after achieving the initial ouster of Taliban, as it later went about constructing a demographically lopsided power structure in the country. In realization of the existing weakness in the Afghan security machinery, relative to Taliban's strategic advantage of demonstrated power, a shift in the US strategy to encourage negotiation could have been an advantageous strategic move for the US. However, with the recent killing of Taliban leader Mullah Mansour, the US strategic approach whether to achieve victory through fighting or negotiating is unclear. Does it indicate the US has given up on prospects of a political settlement, taking recourse to seek a military victory over Taliban, illusive for the past fifteen years?²⁹ Is the purpose of victory being sought by Afghan military, with dwindling support of the drawn down US forces, the complete submission of Taliban? With an enhanced mandate of offensive action given to the 8,400 remaining US forces in Afghanistan, will the US - Afghanistan combined effort be able to achieve such a victory? The killing of Mullah Mansour has practically scuttled the Quadrilateral Coordination Group's peace process. Sun Tzu had advised, the victorious would be the one who knows when he can fight and when he cannot, and victory is *the only* purpose of war. Given this advice, the US needs to assess the position of its forces supporting Afghan military's bid to achieve victory under the prevailing political circumstances in Afghanistan. The US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reported in July 2016 that the NATO-backed Afghan Government is in control of 65.6% of districts in Afghanistan, compared to the 70.5% held in January 2016.³⁰ As the Afghan and US-led Coalition do not seem to be heading for victory, the

²⁸ Roger T. Ames, *Sun Tzu - The Art of Warfare* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1993): 80.

²⁹ "Q&A: Drone Strike's Impact on Afghanistan, Pakistan," *United States Institute of Peace*, accessed July 30, 2016, <<http://www.usip.org/publications/2016/05/23/qa-drone-strikes-impact-afghanistan-pakistan>>.

³⁰ Mazin Sidahmed and Spencer Ackerman, "Afghan Forces Lose Ground to Taliban despite Delayed US Troop Withdrawal," *The Guardian*, July 29, 2016, <<http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jul/29/afghan-army-taliban-us-troop-withdrawal>>.

circumstances beg to consider Sun Tzu's advice: 'victorious will be one who knows when he can fight and when he cannot.'

The Iraq invasion, 2003

Roger T. Hames describes the ancient Chinese philosophy of harmony as "the quality of the combination at any one moment created by effectively correlating and contextualizing the available ingredients, whether they be foodstuffs, farmers or infantry."³¹ The failure to have a ruler at the helm who could decide the course of events sagaciously is failed *harmony*. The inability of Bush's team to avoid slowly getting bogged down in Iraq, even after imminent failure of secure-stabilize-reconstruct strategy, was also a case of failed *harmony*. Ignoring the brewing Afghan fiasco at the time, the Bush Administration repeated the same mistakes in designing the campaign to invade Iraq in 2003.³²

The Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP), as elucidated in the US Joint Services 'keystone' document 'Joint Publication 5-0,' explains the process of joint, inter-agency and multinational campaign designing activities. As exhorted by Sun Tzu, it is an analytic process of 'correlating and contextualizing' all conceivable factors for undertaking a 'thorough study of war'. JOPP provides comprehensive methodology for designing a campaign from pre-war to post-war phases. It analyzes the repercussions of Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information and Infrastructure (PMESII) factors on military operations, when faced by a dynamic enemy. The tensions, threats, opportunities and limitations emanating from their own action, the enemy's actor and the operating environment, along with their projected mutations, are factored in the planning. JOPP is meant to analyze the political direction of war into attainable military objectives in order to win a favourable strategic end state.³³ It provides a sound theoretical framework for achieving Sun Tzu's 'harmony' in campaign planning. However, in the case of planning for OIF, the strategic end state of JOPP – broadly expressed conditions that should exist after the conclusion of a campaign were not clearly stated, as was evident from Rumsfeld's strategic directions. Ambiguity in the strategic end state contributed to some extent in the Combatant Commander's short-sighted determination of the strategic military objectives.

The strategic direction for the March 2003 Iraq invasion, OIF, began to take shape as early as 19 September, 2001. The Secretary of Defence, Rumsfeld, during post 9/11 planning, desired to expand the threat visualization to include Iraq.³⁴ As early as 21st November, he

³¹ Ames, *Sun Tzu - The Art of Warfare*, 62.

³² Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco* (New York: Penguin, 2006).

³³ "Joint Operation Planning; Joint Publication 5-0" (Joint Chief of Staff, 2011): III-7.

³⁴ Gordon and Trainor, *Cobra II*, 11.

provided specific guidance to General Franks, Commander US Central Command. Rumsfeld who considered Saddam's hold on power to be 'brittle', stressed the need to exploit vulnerabilities for quickly eroding Saddam's support, identifying Iraq's northern and southern oil fields, WMDs, missile sites, air defence and the Republican Guard as main objectives, or 'slices' in his parlance. He directed the campaign to be marked by 'surprise, speed, shock and risk' to speed up the regime change. Anticipating the early fall of the regime, he wanted to plan the beginning of military action before moving the entire force, which, in his opinion, might only be needed in the 'worst case'.³⁵ Other guidance aspects for the planning process, which he intended to remain iterative, included deploying Special Operation Forces in the north to work with the Kurds, protecting a provisional government, seizing the western desert, cutting off Baghdad and thinking about a political solution for post-war Iraq.³⁶

Moreover, as the process to plan and crystallize strategic objectives went ahead, Rumsfeld's desired iteration in the planning process became 'constant negotiation',³⁷ which hampered Franks' ability to "collaborate with policymakers in the development of these objectives."³⁸ After going through nine months of 'negotiations', Franks described his strategic military objectives as: the destruction of regime leadership and power base, control and destruction of WMD, preservation of territorial integrity, the elimination of Iraq's ability to threaten its neighbours and the installment of an acceptable provisional or permanent government.³⁹ These objectives clearly lacked in-depth visualization of the enemy, the environment and the post-war developments, reflecting the incoherence of war planning.

Harmonious development of policies and plans is dependent on sound 'correlation and contextualization' of the relevant policy and planning directions. Rumsfeld's initiatives, upon coming into office in 2001, to reduce the size of the US Army, making it more agile, lethal and efficient, achieving more effectiveness with less numbers, was not finding support in the army. The corporate world's efficiencies, which Rumsfeld desired to be incorporated in the army, could not help the army win future wars in complex scenarios, irrespective of how precise and effective the mobility and firepower become. The domestic policy environment was marred by this debate, which, to some extent, also affected common understanding of the operational environment leading to OIF.

Even more detrimental was the assessment given by Chalabi, the controversial Iraqi dissident, in mid-September 2001, totally discounting

³⁵ Ibid., 25.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid., 29.

³⁸ "Joint Operation Planning; Joint Publication 5-0," III-7.

³⁹ Gordon and Trainor, *Cobra II*, 77.

Saddam's power. He described the northern Iraq as out of Saddam's control, the southern part isolated, armoured forces in poor shape, officers unpaid and the situation ripe for Saddam's toppling by insurgents supported by the US airpower. In his assessment, this would be followed by an uprising, turning Iraq into a stable, pro-western, free market state, while the Iraqi military would help stabilize the country afterwards.⁴⁰ This assessment was biased and it tainted the administration's view on three important facets: the potential of insurgency against Saddam, the 'liberator's image' of the US and the likelihood of getting the maximum out of Iraqi Army after Saddam. The 'composite' understanding of operational environment's 'conditions, circumstances and influences'⁴¹ was disaffected, undermining determination of the strategic approach later.

Another important determinant of OIF planning was how the US intelligence agencies had little direct knowledge about Saddam's weapons programme, despite a \$40 billion budget.⁴² As was proven later, Saddam had no active WMD programme but was only bluffing to keep Iran, and perhaps local dissidents, at bay. Use of WMDs against the US forces, their falling into terrorist hands and their use against dissenting population or unfriendly neighbours dominated the US perception of Saddam's perceived end state, leading to incorrect assumptions. Furthermore, there was no direct or effective link between the Iraqi regime and Al Qaeda, whereas the Bush administration needed it as justification for the attack, inculcating a tendency in the US policy analysts to "give the White House what it wanted."⁴³

In the same quest, Saddam's desired end state was visualized by the US planning team as use of WMDs to deter and defeat the invading forces and a determined battle in Baghdad, both of which were concocted and did not happen. Support contemplated from Arab states, Turkey and some other NATO allies, critically needed for employment in post-war Iraq, did not materialize. The desired end state analysis of the environment on Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information and Infrastructure (PMESII) basis proved wrong in most assumptions of each domain. Some examples in the immediate aftermath illustrate the point. A smooth political transition remained a dream, the military could not be reorganized, utilization of oil revenues to jump start the economy could not be orchestrated, the society revolted against the 'occupiers' rather than heralding them as liberators, the information campaign to woo the Iraqis failed and strategic bombing caused irreparable damage to infrastructure; none of these were visualized as the desired end state. Farsighted advice about the global pattern of invasion warfare in the past,

⁴⁰ Ibid., 21.

⁴¹ "Joint Operation Planning; Joint Publication 5-0," III-8.

⁴² Gordon and Trainor, *Cobra II*, 144.

⁴³ Ibid., 154.

suggesting continued violence for 2-3 years in Iraq, was not incorporated in planning.⁴⁴

As the planning process continued, the strategic end state was finally articulated in a top secret document, *Iraq: Goals, Objectives and Strategy*, in mid-August 2002, outlining the administration's recommendations, signed by President Bush a week later. It included eliminating Iraqi threat to its neighbours, liberating the Iraqi people from tyranny and preventing Baghdad from supporting terrorists as the broad goals. The document proposed to utilize all instruments of US national power to achieve those goals and build a moderate, pluralistic and democratic society for the Iraqis with their help, working with a coalition or alone, if necessary. After the fall of Baghdad, the US would demonstrate long-term commitment for reconstruction and reform of Iraqi bureaucracy and security institutions.⁴⁵ Soon thereafter, during the brief to President Bush in September 2002, Franks gleaned the conditions from the administration's guidance to emerge from Iraq's invasion, rather simplistically; deterring other regimes, preventing Saddam from fortress defence in Baghdad, limiting post-hostilities phase to one year or more with heavy reliance on Iraqi forces for internal security. The mismatch in Franks' analysis of the President's direction, under Rumsfeld's tutelage, disrupted the decision making, leading to an ill-defined problem set and an unbalanced ends, ways and means approach.

Ignoring well informed counter opinions on the presence of WMDs and the linkage between Saddam and Al Qaeda, President Bush's policy team went about planning a campaign doomed to fail due to lack of critical thinking in the pre-war calculations. The protraction of war, despised by Sun Tzu, was evident before the beginning of OIF. The half-hearted planning of Iraqi reconstruction after the invasion, conceived in policy but not supported in strategy, led to the inevitable quagmire.

Essentially, the treatise of Sun Tzu reflects a dislike of war because of the 'inherent losses' in it. As Sun Tzu observed, "If one is not fully cognizant of the evils of waging war, he cannot be fully cognizant of how to turn it to best account."⁴⁶ Ignoring well informed counter opinions on the presence of WMDs and the linkage between Saddam and Al Qaeda, President Bush's policy team went about planning a campaign doomed to fail due to lack of cognizance 'of the evils of waging war.' Bush's ineptitude in understanding these evils led to an unending civil war in Iraq, introducing wicked complications like ISIS, which plead a better 'cognizance of the evils of waging war' by the future US war planners.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 181.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 83.

⁴⁶ Ames, *Sun Tzu - The Art of Warfare*, 85.

Conclusion

Sun Tzu's theories on warfare did not find much traction in the US strategic thinking while waging the Afghan and Iraq campaigns, which led to disastrous outcomes as predicted in *The Art of War*. Despite useful tactical and operational discussion, Sun Tzu's enduring value remains in understanding "the moral, intellectual and circumstantial elements of war." The weakness in thoroughly studying the moral, intellectual and circumstantial elements of war, as perceived in *The Art of War*, led to the serious setbacks faced by the US in the fallout of Afghanistan and Iraq wars. The moral reaction of the invaded country's diverse populations, the intellectual dimensions of the full strategic spectrum and the circumstantial aspects of the political environment were not 'thoroughly studied.' The ethnic, sectarian and political diversity in Afghanistan and Iraq proved too complex to be of any strategic advantage. The anti-Taliban or the anti-Saddam sentiments which were perceived to be of instrumental 'moral' value in garnering public support for the US' military strategies in those regions proved ephemeral. The post-Taliban and post-Saddam strategic linkages of Afghan and Iraq politics in the wider Middle Eastern context could not be intellectually parsed and studied by the US war managers. The biggest failure in terms of Sun Tzu's advisory remained in misreading the circumstantial elements of war. As the circumstances evolved in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US war effort shuttled between regime change, institution building, decapitating leadership, counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, and political negotiation. At times it simply bordered on frustration, evident in some of the strategies aimed to contain ISIS or Taliban resurgence. The US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq were not envisioned as 'road to survival or ruin,' perhaps due to their expeditionary nature, ignoring the significance of 'harmony' created through 'correlating and contextualizing' the whole gamut of strategy. In fact, Sun Tzu helps in understanding the significance of total strategy over total war, an all-time conceptual nugget for the strategist.

TURKMENISTAN'S POLITICAL CULTURE OF POSITIVE NEUTRALITY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

Dr. Saima Ashraf Kayani* & Raja Qaiser Ahmed**

Abstract

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, as elsewhere in Central Asia, the process of political transition began in Turkmenistan. The political culture that existed in Turkmenistan did not support a smooth transition from the Soviet-era political system to the configuration of democracy and state or nation-building process. To achieve its de-Russification and foreign policy objectives, Turkmenistan adopted the political culture of neutrality. It is argued that as the post-Soviet state building strategy, the concept of neutrality has promoted Turkmenistan's interests at the national, regional and global level. The research examines the questions: One, how the political culture of neutrality helped Turkmenistan to achieve its post-Soviet stability and post-communist process of democratization. Two, what are the factors that facilitated Turkmenistan to pursue the policy of neutrality. Three, what are the criticisms on the policy of neutrality.

Key words: Turkmenistan, Positive Neutrality, Political Culture, Critique

Introduction

“The status of neutrality is a key factor for the development of Turkmenistan’s mutually advantageous and constructive international partnership that meets the national interests as well as the goals to ensure peace, prosperity and sustainable development in the region and throughout the world”.

President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov

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Political culture studies revealed the fact that the phenomenon of political culture is the result of past (history), political system and the socialization of personalities involved in the system, such as the top leadership of any country. Political culture consists of a society's values, beliefs, traditions and political system, which are passed to future generations and are the constituent building block of the characteristics and identity of a nation. It plays its role in the internal and external policies of any country. It is used to create unity in a nation. *Encyclopedia Britannica* equates political culture with political psychology of a country;¹ whereas, *International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences* relates political culture with attitudes, beliefs, sentiments and rules of political process and system in any country; and all this is manifested in the public and private life of citizens². Political culture, with the passage of time, developed into an important characteristic of a society and this manifests itself in every segment of a society associated with social, economic, political aspects and so on.

After independence, Turkmenistan's leaders opted for a political culture of neutrality to achieve its double-faceted objectives of de-Russification and formulating its foreign policy, so as to be a part of the international community and to counter the threats and pressures of neo-Great Game in the region of Eurasia. To begin with, the concept of neutrality is more related to wars where sovereign states take up neutrality to avoid any kind of involvement in an armed conflict between states.³ Many scholars are of the view that with the introduction of the United Nations Charter, the concept of neutrality becomes archaic and obsolete. However, some are of the view that the concept of neutrality remained enforced during the Cold War period, like the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).⁴ Neutrality, as a policy, is defined by Véronique Panchaud in the following words:

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1. *Encyclopedia Britannica*. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1084748/political-culture>. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Sage Publications: London. <http://costa.wustl.edu/teaching/IntroComp/Reading/almond1963.pdf>
 2. *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 12, (New York: Macmillan, 1968), 218. Cited in Jo Freeman, *The Political Culture of the Democratic and Republican Parties* <<http://www.uic.edu/orgs/cwluherstory/jofreeman/polparties/polculture.htm>> #footnote1. For concept and history also see Ronald P. Formisano, "The Concept of Political Culture" *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 31, no. 3. (Winter, 2001), 393-426. <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/207089><http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/207089.pdf?acceptTC=true>>.
 3. Thom M. Armstrong, *Neutrality, Encyclopedia of the New American Nation* <<http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/E-N/Neutrality.html>>.
 4. Hersch Lauterpacht, *Oppenheim's International Law*. 7th ed., Vol. 2., 661-663 (1952) cited in <<http://lawofwar.org/Neutrality.htm>>.

The policy of neutrality is the set of political decisions and measures a neutral state freely takes in peace times with the aim of securing the credibility and the efficiency of its legally binding neutrality. The policy of neutrality differs in neutral states and depends on their situation.⁵

Peter Hazelip Lyon, while explaining the concept of foreign policy neutralism, is of the view that this policy is based on hopes, fears and driving force behind such policy is the concept of nationalism. Neutrality is the policy on which neutral states formulate their security and foreign policy.⁶

Currently, Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, Ghana and many other states are designated as neutral states. However, all of them attained neutral status to save themselves from the devastating effects of wars. In addition, many states, to avoid the Cold War politics, followed the neutrality policy during the time of the bipolar world. Turkmenistan opted for neutrality after the end of Cold War, and it is only state that opted for neutrality in peace times. Turkmen are nomad people divided into clans, each clan observing their own traditions and following its own leader. Under Tsarist rule, the process of Russification started in present day Turkmenistan and under Stalin's leadership, nation building began to strengthen territorial cohesion, unity of language, cultural values and economic condition of the country.⁷ Russian leadership promoted Russian norms and values all over the region in order to promote a separate Soviet identity. Former Soviet Union promoted its own institutions, language, culture and political structure. Moscow ruled Turkmenistan by keeping it under the umbrella of central government in Moscow. For about seventy years, Turkmenistan followed a political culture that was given to them by a communist state.

The post-Soviet Turkmenistan leader, Saparmurat Niyazov (First Secretary of Turkmenistan Communist Party 1985-1991), trained in the authoritarian system, learned how to centralize power with no opposition to challenge his power and authority. The political culture that has emerged in Turkmenistan revolves around the cult of personality. This was adopted by the first president of Turkmenistan, Saparmurat Niyazov, and has been followed by the second president of Turkmenistan, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, with minor variations depending on the

5. Véronique Panchaud, "Neutrality of Switzerland: A Brief Introduction," *Strategic Orientation*, no 15, (October-December, 2009).

6. Peter Hazelip Lyon, *Neutralism: Its meaning and significance in contemporary International Politics*. see abstract. <http://theses.lse.ac.uk/667/1/Lyon_Neutralism.pdf>.

7. Chantal Lemerrier-Quelquejay, "From tribe to Umma", *Central Asian Survey*, 3, no 3, 1985, 21. Cited in Ahmet T. Kuru, "Between the State and Cultural zones: Nation Building in Turkmenistan," *Central Asia Survey* 21, no 1, (2002), 71. <<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/02634930220127955>>.

socialization and clan affiliation of the post-Soviet leaders in Turkmenistan⁸. However, both the presidents, in a diplomatic manner, used the policy of neutrality in a constructive way to secure interests of Turkmenistan.

Thus, this article focuses on the political culture of neutrality, which Turkmenistan adopted immediately after its independence from the Soviet Union. It is argued here that in the post-Soviet Turkmenistan, the policy of neutrality has been deliberately adopted to facilitate Turkmenistan to achieve its domestic, regional and international objectives. This work tries to analyze the political culture of neutrality, by making use of the constitutional tenets of Neutrality of Turkmenistan. It takes into consideration implications of the policy of neutrality for Turkmenistan at domestic, regional and international level. It also examines the criticism on Turkmenistan's policy of neutrality which most believe has helped country to evade discussion on human rights abuses by categorising them as an internal issue.

Turkmenistan's Policy of Neutrality

The unpredicted and unexpected independence brought Turkmenistan's leaders to a situation where they had to decide either to emerge as a developed nation and responsible member of the contemporary world or hold on to the traditional arrangements and legacy of the former system that is viewed as totalitarian, oppressive and authoritative. It was apparent that the leadership of Turkmenistan, keeping in view the emergent situation (after the disintegration of Soviet Union) opted for the policies which can make them a responsible member of the globe, wash away past tags and help them to build-up reputation and worldwide trust for the country. Domestic and foreign policy related decisions were taken by the leaders, which ultimately resulted in the policy of neutrality. According to Article 1 of the Constitutional law of Turkmenistan on Permanent Neutrality of Turkmenistan:

Within the scope of realizing the integral rights of the sovereign state, Turkmenistan declares voluntarily about its permanent neutrality and will support it and put into practice consistently. The permanent neutrality of Turkmenistan is the basis of its foreign and domestic policy aimed at strengthening the stability and consent in society, developing friendly and mutually beneficial relations with the states of the region and the whole world.⁹

⁸. Slavomír Horák. "The Elite in Post Soviet and Post-Niyazow Turkmenistan: Does Political culture Form a leader?," *The Institute of International Studies*, (Charles University in Prague, 2012).

⁹. "Constitutional Law of Turkmenistan on Permanent Neutrality of Turkmenistan, 1995," <<http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/405ab3d14.pdf>>.

Policy and strategy aiming at nation-building of the country was named as 10 year's stability policy. As a result, a new constitution was passed and the first parliamentary elections were held in Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan's culture was promoted by declaring Turkmenistan as the official language and Islam as the official religion of the state. CIS and United Nations membership was achieved and new infrastructures were given top priority to make Turkmenistan's people proud and satisfied.¹⁰ Thus, during the initial years of independence, the main focus of the leading class was on bringing home stability, maintaining sovereignty, and portraying a positive image of Turkmenistan.¹¹

The economic crisis that engulfed the entire Central Asian states confronted Turkmenistan as well, however, Turkmenistan's government has been able to perform well. In comparison with other states in the region, the living standard of Turkmenistan's people is much better. The natural gas reservoirs, along with the agriculture sector, are given maximum importance because of their usage. Major industries contributing in the economy of Turkmenistan are mainly natural gas and oil.¹² Keeping in view the economic performance of Turkmenistan, Nicola Contessi describes it as the next Central Asian Tiger¹³.

After stabilizing the country's internal situation, the leaders moved towards maintaining a proactive foreign policy, which is based on the following codes.

- Safeguarding the sovereignty of Turkmenistan and emerging as a significant actor in the international system.
- Creating all the basic conditions for the development of the country.
- Giving importance to the interest of the general masses.
- Safeguarding the security of Turkmenistan by various means.
- Working with foreigners and bringing mutual cooperation projects which will promote equality, justice and respect for each other.
- Ensuring that all activities and policies should be according to the international law and the UN Charter¹⁴

10. Heiko Schmid and Joachim Langbein, "Turkmenistan- Nation Building and Economic Development since Independence," <<http://www2.geog.uni-eidelberg.de/anthropo/mitarbeiter/schmid/pdf/turkmenistan.pdf>>.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Nicola Contessi, "Is Turkmenistan the next Central Asian Tiger?," *The Diplomat*, July 15, 2014. <<http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/is-turkmenistan-the-next-central-asian-tiger/>>.

14. "Foreign policy of Turkmenistan," <<http://www.turkmenemb-sa.org/ForeignPolicyENG.html>>.

In July 1992, Turkmenistan's president, in the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe, illustrated the strategy of Positive Neutrality. President Saparmurat Niyazov defined the major characteristics of the policy of neutrality as under:

- Sovereignty and integrity of all should be maintained.
- No interference in the internal affairs of any other states.
- Use of force should be avoided in inter-state conflicts.
- Role of United Nations in maintaining peace worldwide should be recognized.
- Promotion of cooperation in different sectors.¹⁵
- Alliances should be avoided including both military as well as political.
- Develop relations for maintaining good ties.
- National interest to be achieved at fair grounds.
- Promote international cooperation.¹⁶

The president of Turkmenistan listed the neutral status obligations for Turkmenistan as follows:

- Turkmenistan will not join any political, economic or military alliances.
- Military power will be restricted to safeguarding freedom and stability
- Manufacturing or presence of lethal weapons would be avoided.
- Turkmenistan will not be forced by anyone to join any political or military alliance.
- UN should play an effective role to end all clashes.
- Moral values should be uplifted.
- Good relations with all states regardless of their size would be maintained.
- Policies should be made while maintaining the international humanitarian organization's aims.¹⁷

The policy of neutrality emphasized on friendliness, respect for each other, equality, justice, mutual benefit and loyally satisfying all responsibilities and vows. The policy became a part of the constitution of Turkmenistan and is internationally recognized. Constitutional law of Turkmenistan on Permanent Neutrality of Turkmenistan consisted of

15. "The World Recognized Turkmenistan's Neutrality 9 Years Ago," <<http://presidentniyazov.tripod.com/id33.html>>.

16. "Foreign policy of Turkmenistan," <<http://www.turkmenemb-sa.org/ForeignPolicyENG.html>>.

17. "Neutrality is the Greatest Achievement of our people," <<http://presidentniyazov.tripod.com/id49.html>>.

12 articles and it became operational in 1995. General Secretary of the UN, Kofi Annan said on October 23, 2002:

Your country contributed to the process of finding a solution to the civil war in Tajikistan, having held three rounds of inter-Tajik talks here, in Ashgabat, which was a turning point in the peaceful process, simultaneously giving a shelter to thousands of Tajik refugees. In the same manner Turkmenistan actively assisted the UN in its efforts on the establishment of peace in Afghanistan hosting a number of meetings between the Afghan sides. Today, one of the most important corridors to provide the Afghan people with so much needed humanitarian assistance runs across Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan's strong commitment to international order, trust put in it by the UN, also led us to implementation of joint preventive actions with a view of bringing down the regional tensions.¹⁸

To begin with, Turkmenistan's diplomatic missions were involved in getting international support and recognition for the policy of neutrality. The policy was introduced to the domestic and foreign public. Government officials tried to convince the audience that neutrality does not mean isolation, rather it means positive, active and supportive contribution in regional and international affairs by Turkmenistan.¹⁹ According to Luca Anceschi, the policy of neutrality is based on three aspects: political, economic and humanitarian.²⁰

The political aspect of neutrality helps Turkmenistan establish bilateral relations with respect and assurance with all countries. According to Article 3 of the Constitutional Law of Turkmenistan on Permanent Neutrality of Turkmenistan, "Turkmenistan pursues a peaceful foreign policy, makes its relations with other states on the principles of equality of rights, mutual respect and non-interference to internal affairs of other states"²¹. This provided acceptance of Turkmenistan among the community of nations. It established bilateral relations with US, Russia, Iran, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, China, India, Pakistan, and many others, keeping aside the clutches of new Great Game in the region.

Related to the political dimension of the policy of neutrality is the economic aspect; this helps Turkmenistan to integrate its national economy into the global economic system. This economic aspect is

18. "Neutral Factor of Turkmenistan," <http://presidentniyazov.tripod.com/id26.html>.

19. Luca Anceschi, *Turkmenistan's Foreign Policy: Positive Neutrality and the Consolidation of the Turkmen Regime* (New York: Routledge 2009), <http://books.google.com.pk/books?id=OSCEd71ld9QC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false>.

20. Ibid.

21. "Constitutional Law of Turkmenistan ..."

stipulated in Article 7 and 8 of the Constitutional Law of Turkmenistan on Permanent Neutrality of Turkmenistan.

Article 7

Turkmenistan develops the international economic co-operation on the basis of equality of rights, mutual benefit and accounting for the interests of the parties involved into this process, considering such cooperation as an important means of strengthening trust between countries and regions, and maintaining peace and stability.

Article 8

Turkmenistan provides its financial and economic space openly, cooperates with all states, international economic and financial organizations, promotes the world community efforts when solving economic problems. Turkmenistan considers the economic pressure of one state on another one unacceptable as a means of gaining political objectives, and doesn't participate in economic blockade announced by them.²²

Similarly the policy of neutrality also highlights Turkmenistan's commitment to human right issues with commitment to support the human rights organizations' efforts.²³ Article 11 says:

Turkmenistan joins the basic international legal acts providing the rights of refugees, displaced persons and compelled migrants, maintains the efforts of the states and international public relating to rendering help to countries suffering from wars, conflicts, natural calamity, catastrophes, epidemics and their consequences. Turkmenistan collaborates actively with world and regional humanitarian organizations.²⁴

Different reasons persuaded Turkmenistan to go for the policy of permanent neutrality: Firstly, norms, principles and beliefs that give a sense of belonging and pride like respect for religion, neighbors, elders, family, and traditions. Secondly, geographical location and conditions, that teaches the strategy to survive and the importance of peace. Thirdly, natural wealth like oil, natural gas, minerals and agricultural are an important wealth to improve relations. Fourthly, international politics, to

²². Ibid.

²³ Luca Anceschi, *"Turkmenistan's Foreign Policy: Positive Neutrality and the Consolidation of the Turkmen Regime"*

²⁴. "Constitutional Law of Turkmenistan ..."

avoid joining any specific political block or ideology. Finally, to promote national interest by maintaining neutral status.²⁵

These factors for maintaining neutral policy have been further heightened by Turkmenistan's internal stability, economic and infrastructure development, devotion to international law and treaties, commitment for nuclear non-proliferation, commitment not to produce and stockpile biological and chemical weapons and decision not to allow any foreign military presence on its territory.²⁶

Policy of Neutrality: Implications for Turkmenistan

Neutrality policy benefits Turkmenistan to achieve its policy goals at three levels: domestic, regional and international. Turkmenistan started developing at the national level by overcoming national challenges only because of its policy of neutrality, which helps Turkmenistan to concentrate on its domestic restructuring and get its own house in order. An expansion plan was carved out in the Ten Years of Stability Program in 1992. This program interlinked the national policy with foreign policy by induction of democratic principles and institutions. As per requirement, new legislation was passed so that all citizens are considered equal before law and should be treated equally.

After independence, "Turkmenification" process started in the newly independent state of Turkmenistan²⁷. The main aim was to stabilize the newly independent country keeping in view the unexpected emergent scenario due to demise of the Soviet Union, domestically, regionally and internationally. Sapamurat Niyazov was elected president of Turkmenistan. He founded a new political party named Democratic Party of Turkmenistan (DPT). Soviet era administrative divisions, 'oblasts' of Turkmenistan, were redrawn into five velayats.²⁸ Reforms were introduced in politics, economy and culture.²⁹ For domestic stability, political reforms were introduced. Importance was given to constitution making and in 1992, a constitution based on western principles of division of power with a strong position for the president was drafted. In 1994,

25. Boriso O. Shikhmuradov, "Positive Neutrality as the Basis of the Foreign Policy of Turkmenistan", <<http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume2/June-August1997/volII2POSITIVENEUTRALITYASTHEBASISOFTHEFOREIGNPOLICYOFTURKMENISTAN.pdf>>.

26. Ibid.

27. Schmid and Langbein, "Turkmenistan: Nation Building and Economic Development Since Independence".

28. Law on Constitution's Implementation (Ashgabat: Turkmenkayalskra, May 19, 1992), 1,3., as reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service [FBIS], Daily Report: Central Eurasia, 24 June 1992., 101,102. Cited in *Turkmenistan Political Conditions in the Post-Soviet Era*, February 1993. INS Resource Information Center Washington DC., 7. <<http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/ins/turkme94.pdf>>.

29. Ibid.

first elections for parliament were held. While, after a period of five years in 1999 second parliamentary elections were held. Later, President Sapamurat Niyazov was declared life time president by the same house (Majlis). He ruled absolutely from 1985 till 2006 and declared himself the leader or head of all Turkmen known as Turkmenbashi. President is head of state as well as government, making Turkmenistan a presidential republic. Only one political party, the Democratic Party of Turkmenistan, has the right to contest elections with no opposition candidate. It was in 2012 that political parties got the right of registration in Turkmenistan. After Sapamurat Niyazov's death, Deputy Prime Minister Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow became the president of Turkmenistan.

The first president of Turkmenistan, very diplomatically, carved the policy of neutrality to achieve internal stability, economic development and a sense of self-reliance. National revival of Turkmenistan was based on revival of language, education, media, and history.³⁰ Policy of neutrality has been mentioned in the book *Ruhnama* (written by President Sapamurat Niyazov). Turkmen was declared as the official language, Russian language was discouraged and Russian names (of places; administrative units; political institutions) were replaced by Turkmen words. Arrangements were made to encourage citizens to speak and write in the Turkmen language.³¹ Medium of instruction in educational institutions was declared to be the Turkmen language. Latin alphabets were replaced with Cyrillic alphabets.³²

Religion was considered as an important element to revise Turkmenistan's culture and national identity. New mosques were opened. The role of Islam in consolidating the national identity of Turkmenistan has been depicted by President Niyazov in his book *Ruhnama*.³³ The book depicts Turkmenistan's culture, art, literature, history, Sufism; and portrays Turkmenistan as a nation in a constructive way. The Book is divided into different sections: Turkmen, the Turkmen's Path, the Turkmen Nation, the State of Turkmen, the ancient Oguz State, and the spiritual world of the Turkmen.³⁴ The book is strongly recommended for preserving the national identity of Turkmenistan.

Media played an important role in developing nationalism among the tribal Turkmen people. As mentioned by Ahmet T. Kuru:

30. Ahmet T. Kuru, "Between the state and cultural zones: nation building in Turkmenistan," *Central Asian Survey*, 21, no. 1, (2002) 21(1), 74. <http://grad.sdsu.edu/~akuru/docs/Kuru_CAS.pdf>.

31. Ibid.

32. Schmid and Langbein, "Turkmenistan: Nation Building and Economic Development Since Independence"

33. Ibid.

34. Suparamat Niyozov, *Ruhna*. <<http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/eBooks/Asia/BOOKS/Ruhnama%20Niyozov.pdf>>.

Turkmenbashi shows respect for other national symbols, e.g. he kisses the flag on some memorial days and architectural structures, such as the Neutrality Arch, the Earthquake Memorial and the National Museum have been constructed as tangible symbols of national identity. They are shown in TV broadcasts as the symbols of independent, permanently neutral and rapidly developing Turkmenistan. The Turkmenbashi Palace, for instance, is regularly represented on TV programs.³⁵

Historical figures are given respect and slogans are used to inculcate the spirit of nationalism. Most popular slogans are: 'the 21st century will be the golden age of Turkmens', and 'people, Motherland, Turkmenbashi'. Emphasis was on rewriting the history of Turkmenistan; the country's history has been re-written to glorify the past and future.³⁶

Turkmenistan was the most neglected republic in the former Soviet Union with least support from Moscow. In 1989, 45 percent of its population lived below the poverty line with low per capita income,³⁷ high inflation rate and unemployment. Cotton and natural gas dominated the country's economy. The industrial sector was not well developed. To overcome its economic problems, the government in Ashkhabad gave top priority to economic development of the country which is based on the strategies of "pipelines, extraction of hydrocarbons and electricity generation."³⁸ In 1992, the government introduced "Ten Years of Prosperity Program" which was termed as "Ten Years Stability Program." Manat, a new currency, was introduced in 1993, and the privatization process started. Electricity, water and fertilizers were subsidized. Foreign firms were encouraged to operate in the country. New roads and rail links were constructed. Currently the export of gas and oil is hampered because of pipelines directed to former Soviet markets and mainly dependent on Russia. New markets are to be searched for export of gas and oil, but with construction of a new pipelines network.³⁹ Foreign companies from US, Iran, Russia, China, EU, Japan and Israel are allowed to explore oil and gas, along with their contribution in other sectors. Thus, policy of neutrality helped Turkmenistan to keep the Great Game out of its borders. It entered into a number of agreements to transport gas and oil from Turkmenistan

35. Ahmet T. Kuru. "Between the state and cultural zones: nation building in Turkmenistan", 75.

36. Ibid.

37. Steven Sabol, "Turkmenistan: Permanent Transition or Elusive Stability?" *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, 8, no. 3 (2010), 13.

38. Nicola Contessi, "Is Turkmenistan the next Central Asian Tiger?"

39. Richard Pomfret, "Turkmenistan: From Communism to Nationalism by Gradual Economic Reform", *Economic Reform in Central Asia*. (2001 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Netherlands) <http://download.springer.com/static/pdf/421/art%253A10.1023%252FA%253A1012202313876.pdf?auth66=1394768434_d977511fcf1bbdafc3afdf41c0bdb9e6&ext=.pdf>.

like Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline, Trans-Caspian gas pipeline to central Europe, Central Asia oil pipeline, Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India Pipeline etc.

A number of problems such as: inadequate power distribution, economic challenges, resource scarcity, security issues, instability and ethnic issues were common after independence in the Eurasia region. Turkmenistan's policy of neutrality turned out to be the "pole of peace"⁴⁰ in the region and enhanced bilateral relationships through cooperation in different sectors, bringing an end to different conflicts and disputes.⁴¹ An important role has been played by Turkmenistan to deal with problems in Afghanistan, as well as climate change and environmental scarcity in the region. Conferences and summits were arranged to address important issues such as arms control, disarmament, collective defense, collective security, preventive diplomacy, and other issues related to regional states of Eurasia.⁴² The Silk Road has been made useful to bring East and West closer and this is evident in foreign relations of Turkmenistan.⁴³ The neutrality policy played an important role as all the conflicting groups of the civil war going on in Tajikistan decided to join the inter-Tajik negotiations held by Turkmenistan. It also provided humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan.⁴⁴ Further, Turkmenistan became a member of IMF, World Bank, UN, ECO and many other regional and international organizations. However, Turkmenistan's leaders avoided being part of any such initiatives in the Eurasian regional organizations, which gave Russia any dominating position. Furthermore, in 2005 Turkmenistan became an associated member of CIS.

The region of Eurasia is rich in energy resources and is strategically located, which attracted major actors of the international community like the US, China, EU, India, Turkey, Iran, etc., all trying to keep their influence in the region. This resulted in the New Great Game. After the death of Turkmanbashi, the new president Berdymukhamedov, carefully developed relations with USA, Germany, Iran, Azerbaijan, China and even Russia- any country which could contribute in the development of Turkmenistan. Also, Turkmenistan attended the meetings of SCO and CAREC as an observer.⁴⁵ Presently, Turkmenistan is enjoying good relations with about one hundred and twenty five countries, besides, it is a

40. "The Year 2010 in the chronicle of the Epoch of new Revival: Turkmenistan's Foreign Policy," <http://www.turkmenistan.gov.tm/_en/?idr=2&id=110119a>.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid. Turkmenistan developed friendly relations with Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, Iran, Russia, China, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Belarus.

44. "Regional strategy of Ashgabat," <<http://presidentniyazov.tripod.com/id41.html>>.

45. Richard Pomfret, "Turkmenistan's Foreign Policy," *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, 6, no. 4 (2008).

key member of more than forty international organizations serving humanity at their best, including NAM.⁴⁶

In 1994, Turkmenistan became a part of NATO under the Partnership for Peace (PFP).⁴⁷ The PFP played an important role in strengthening cooperation in areas such as border control and security, civil emergency planning, defense planning, coastal narcotics training, disaster relief, humanitarian and search and rescue operations.⁴⁸ Military courses such as control and disarmament, non-proliferation, the laws of armed conflicts, combating terrorism, defense planning and budgeting were offered to Turkmenistan soldiers and they participated wholeheartedly.⁴⁹ Turkmenistan also participated in Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and Science for Peace and Security (SPS) programs.⁵⁰ Turkmenistan did not take part in any military operation of NATO as it decided not to use its forces outside Turkmenistan.⁵¹ Consequently, the policy of neutrality minimized the Neo Great Game competition in Turkmenistan and also protects the country from outside interference in its domestic affairs.

President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, while showing his commitment to follow the policy of neutrality, also accepted that the world is rapidly changing. For this reason, in February 2017, President Berdimuhamedov approved seven years concept of foreign policy of Turkmenistan for the period of 2017-2023,⁵² which provides the following framework for Turkmenistan:

1. To cooperate with the United Nations and follow its principles.
2. To work for environmental issues. For this Turkmenistan will follow its environmental and water diplomacy.
3. To work with UN for energy security and a sustainable energy system.
4. To work with UN for transport system and corridors.
5. To expand its relations with regional and international organizations.

46. "Foreign policy of Turkmenistan," <<http://www.turkmenemb-sa.org/ForeignPolicyENG.html>>.

47. "NATO's Relations with Turkmenistan," <<http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-turkmenistan/index.html>>.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. "Turkmenistan defines domestic and foreign policy directions for 2017-2023. 20 February 2017," News Central Asia <<http://www.newscentralasia.net/2017/02/20/turkmenistan-defines-domestic-and-foreign-policy-directions-for-2017-2023/>>.

6. To develop close and multilateral relations with its closest neighbors
7. To cooperate for solving Caspian Sea related issues.
8. To accept Russia as a strategic partner of Turkmenistan.
9. To develop bilateral and multilateral relations with the states of Caucasus, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova.
10. To develop strategic relations with China and to strengthen relations with other countries in the Asia-Pacific region
11. To further cooperate with European countries and the US in combating threats and restore peace to Central Asia and cooperate in the field of energy security.
12. To develop political cooperation with Latin American countries.
13. To develop relations with African countries and the African Union.
14. To cooperate with major economic and financial international institutions and to join the WTO.
15. To develop and fully utilize the cultural diplomacy.
16. To use sports diplomacy.

By careful analysis of the above mentioned text it seems as if Turkmenistan has compartmentalized its relations with other countries and specified the role of the mentioned countries: Russia as a strategic partner, China as a trade partner, USA and EU as security partners, peace with neighboring countries, UN role for energy and transport system, and relations with monetary organizations. It seems as if from now onward Turkmenistan is not going to strictly follow its neutrality policy and will adapt the policy that helps Turkmenistan to achieve its domestic goals and objectives.

As the President of Turkmenistan had declared:

No matter the final direction of our foreign policy, it must always be balanced and consistent. It must pursue one main goal – to create an enabling international environment for domestic development of Turkmenistan, as well as help to ensure the legitimate interests of our neutral state in the global arena serve to improve its credibility as a reliable and stable partner.⁵³

Scholars are of the view that the main shift in the foreign policy of Turkmenistan is to minimize the international isolation of Turkmenistan, as mentioned by Slavomír Horák and Jan Šír: “In foreign policy, the new leadership’s major task was to overcome Turkmenistan’s international

⁵³. Ibid.

isolation, which was the result of Türkmenbaşy's isolationist policy pursued under the rhetorical guise of 'permanent neutrality'.⁵⁴ The new president developed and expanded relations with Russia, Belarus, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Persian Gulf countries, Japan, US and European Union countries.⁵⁵ It's a clear shift from the policies of former president and it seems as if Turkmenistan is moving from isolation to cooperation and an active role for Turkmenistan as far as the international arena is concerned. However, it must be kept in mind that this shift in the foreign policy of Turkmenistan is meant to achieve the domestic or national objectives of the country.

Criticism on the Policy of Neutrality of Turkmenistan

After independence, the political culture that Turkmenistan followed was based on the cult of personality and authoritarianism and all this was skillfully wrapped in the policy of neutrality in peace time. This policy does not have explicit objectives and strategy. According to Luca Anceschi, the policy of positive neutrality "has lacked clarity and complexity. Stated objectives were generally vague and there was little evidence of operational strategies to achieve them"⁵⁶ It has been criticized that President Niyazov deliberately kept the neutrality policy vague and this helped the President to consolidate his power at home and circumvent international criticism on human rights violations in Turkmenistan such as restrictions on religious performances, media, freedom of expression and movement and restrictions on the role of civil society activities, women rights, and political authoritarianism. David Lewis is of the view that, "Neutrality [became] a useful disguise for a policy of isolation from the rest of the world, and a rejection of international norms on human rights and every other part of international law."⁵⁷ Some scholars are of the view

54. Slavomír Horák Jan Šír, "Dismantling Totalitarianism? Turkmenistan under Berdimuhamedow," *Silk Road Papers*, March 2009, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program., 44. <http://isdpc.eu/content/uploads/publications/2009_horak-sir_dismantling-totalitarianism.pdf>.

55. Ibid.

56. Luca Anceschi, *Turkmenistan's Foreign Policy: Positive Neutrality and the Consolidation of the Turkmen Regime* (London: Routledge, 2008), 31. cited in Kathrin Hamm, Nate Rawlings, Tsuyoshi Shiina, Natalia Vazhenina, Jesse Walter, Jared Williams, *Turkmenistan Natural Gas Outlook 2020: The Chinese Connection. How will U.S. security policy Adapt to the Evolving Sino-Turkmen Relationship?* <<http://www.sipa.columbia.edu/academics/workshops/documents/RANDTheFinalCopyIII.pdf>>.

57. David Lewis, *The Temptations of Tyranny in Central Asia*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 98. Cited in Kathrin Hamm, Nate Rawlings, Tsuyoshi Shiina, Natalia Vazhenina, Jesse Walter, Jared Williams, *Turkmenistan Natural Gas Outlook 2020: The Chinese Connection. How will U.S. security policy adapt to the evolving Sino-Turkmen relationship?*, <<http://www.sipa.columbia.edu/academics/workshops/documents/RANDTheFinalCopyIII.pdf>>.

that the neutrality policy of Turkmenistan has nothing to contribute except that it didn't support military blocs. The Doctrine of Positive Neutrality is intentionally vague and simultaneously all encompassing. As a policy, it is designed to steer the direction of the entire country, but it has no specifics, only that military force is not an acceptable solution for disputes."⁵⁸ Further, some scholars believe that Turkmenistan, by its neutral position, tries to save itself from the post-Soviet turmoil that engulfs the region of Central Asia: security issues, energy crisis, economic disorder, political institutionalization, social mobilization, rise of nationalism, world powers' competition and instability.⁵⁹ Steven Sabol is of the view that:

Beset by domestic economic concerns, limited military capabilities and fragile neighboring states, Turkmenistan decided to base its foreign policy on an unusual principle described as "positive neutrality."⁶⁰

Positive neutrality has hampered the multilateral approach in Turkmenistan's foreign policy and bilateral diplomacy has gained importance. This slows down any useful role Turkmenistan can play in international affairs. Najia Badykova is of the view that Turkmenistan does not take active part in regional organizations, international coalition against war on terrorism and drug trafficking. It also did not cooperate regarding the regional issues of water, energy, transportation, trade and ecology. Further, there is corrupt political and economic system in the country. The policy of neutrality helped Niyazov to consolidate his control domestically and isolate the country from the external world.⁶¹ This policy also provided a shield to Turkmenistan to close off the country from any kind of international evaluation and assessment on the internal situation in Turkmenistan. It was considered a violation of the policy of neutrality as the policy respects the internal sovereignty of the state and as Turkmenistan does not interfere in the internal affairs of other states, thus other states have no right to interfere in the internal matters of Turkmenistan. The policy did not achieve its stated objectives.⁶² Therefore, Turkmenistan has to re-examine its policy of neutrality.

⁵⁸. Kathrin Hamm, Nate Rawlings, Tsuyoshi Shiina, Natalia Vazhenina, Jesse Walter, Jared Williams *Turkmenistan Natural Gas Outlook 2020: The Chinese Connection. How will U.S. security policy adapt to the evolving Sino-Turkmen relationship?*

⁵⁹. Rajan Menon, *The Dynamics of Security in Post Soviet Central Asia*, Lehigh University, 1995. i-viii, <www.ucis.pitt.edu/nceer/1995-808-08-2-Menon.pdf>.

⁶⁰. Steven Sabol, "Turkmenistan: Permanent Transition or Elusive Stability?," 17.

⁶¹. Najia Badykova, <<https://www.csce.gov/sites/helsinkicommission.house.gov/files/Badykova%20Testimony.pdf>>.

⁶². Steven Sabol, "Turkmenistan: Permanent Transition or Elusive Stability?," 17-18.

Conclusion

Whatsoever criticisms are leveled against the policy of neutrality, this facilitated Turkmenistan in three areas: firstly, at the national level Turkmenistan set its own house in order and didn't allow any other state to interfere in the internal affairs of the country, which helped Turkmenistan to be stable politically and economically. Further, state and nation building processes started simultaneously under the same policy. Secondly, the neutral foreign policy assists Turkmenistan to minimize the new Great Game competition on its territory and develop its gas and oil pipeline projects on its own terms and conditions. And finally, at the regional level, it developed cordial bilateral relations with all countries of the region.

Although, President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov showed his commitment to adhering to the principles of neutrality, but on the other hand one can notice that the present government in Turkmenistan has shown signs of a more active foreign policy. This is a clear shift from the policies of the former President Niyazov. Ashgabat gave priority to developing new gas and oil pipelines to export its energy resources, develop its infrastructure, reconstruct the modern Silk Road, develop trade and business and focus on the emerging security scenarios in the neighboring countries of Turkmenistan and this indicates that in future Turkmenistan will play an active role in global and regional affairs. Additionally, this means Turkmenistan has to skillfully make use of the policy of neutrality, which does not stand for isolation now, rather it gives an edge to any government in Ashgabat to follow their policies and engage with the world on its own terms and conditions.

THE HUMANITARIAN DIMENSION OF SUFFERING IN TERROR HIT AREAS OF PAKISTAN

Salma Malik*

Abstract

The contemporary discourse on conflict brings forth the realization that the impact and toll of armed violence does not remain confined to the active war zone alone. For enduring and sustainable peace there needs to be effective post-conflict rehabilitation and settlement, coupled with civilian ownership and a near ideal mix of civil-military cooperation. Security needs to be viewed from a holistic perspective and not the traditional security lens alone. As the reasons behind conflicts, especially those of an internal nature, become complex, so does the need for using a variety of means to tackle and address these problems by involving a cross section of stakeholders and concerned actors. In the case of Pakistan, the greatest toll of militancy and terrorism has been on the civilian population, which stood to lose its economic livelihood, safety and comfort of home and had to suffer death and destruction at the hands of militants and terrorists as well as displacement, sometimes more than once. The paper focuses on the impact of terrorism on Pakistan and the compound effects of problems arising out of this chaotic situation through a holistic lens. The complex interplay of security dynamics involving extra-regional powers' interests, cross border conflict, drone strikes, displacement of population are studied with a view to determine its overall impact on Pakistan's security. Beginning with a review of changing dimensions of security, this paper specifically examines the humanitarian impact of terrorism in the country and attempts to suggest a way forward.

Key words: *Displacement of Population, Impact of Terrorism, Cross Border Conflict, Drone Strikes, Post-Conflict Rehabilitation, Civil-Military Cooperation*

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Terrorism and militancy is not a menace new to Pakistan, where unfortunately owing to its existential threat from India, Pakistan has endured low scale acts of terrorism in different forms as well as active armed conflict with the eastern neighbor since inception. Owing to uneasy relations with the western neighbour Afghanistan, Islamabad's security concerns became much more pronounced and profound with the initial inflow of Afghan nationals post-Spring Revolution of 1978 in Afghanistan. Pakistan, itself a country with challenging economic and socio-political dynamics, faced the full brunt of worsened political dynamics in Kabul, when at the end of December 1979, Soviet troops formally entered the country, thus initiating a unique security situation, which has inextricably linked the fate of these two countries for the last three and a half decades. The policies pursued during the 1980s legitimized CIA sponsored jihad and gave birth to a breed of fighters motivated with religious fervor and zeal, who became more emboldened with the demise of the Soviet Union. The use of Pakistani state as a refuge for the beleaguered Afghan population, a safe haven for the fighting jihadis and a transit route for weapons and armaments for the warring mercenaries from the world over in turn created many problems for the country, which continues to struggle against these challenges to date.

Post 9/11 developments and re-convergence of the global powers' interest in this region, now christened by US policy makers as *Af-Pak*¹ despite Islamabad's dislike, the spillover effects of US war on terror became extremely pronounced for Pakistan. For the US, the virtual ground zero of the war on terror was now in Afghanistan, while Pakistan, besides facing a huge inflow of conflict affected Afghan nationals, also had to bear the brunt of terrorists and militants fleeing across the border and seeking sanctuaries in Pakistan's tribal areas. As a result, Pakistan was compelled to play a mainstream role in the US led war on terror. Despite facing immense cost in terms of loss of precious lives and economic as well as political instability, the US mantra "to do more" fuelled a strong anti-American sentiment, which manifested itself through the spread of militancy and terrorism throughout the country, but more specifically in

¹ The term *Af-Pak* gained fame and was possibly coined, by the Obama administration's Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke in March 2008, a year prior to his assuming the designated position, explaining the reason behind the term, Ambassador Holbrooke said:

"First of all, we often call the problem Af-Pak, as in Afghanistan Pakistan. This is not just an effort to save eight syllables. It is an attempt to indicate and imprint in our DNA the fact that there is one theater of war, straddling an ill-defined border, the Durand Line, and that on the western side of that border, NATO and other forces are able to operate. On the eastern side, it's the sovereign territory of Pakistan. But it is on the eastern side of this ill-defined border that the international terrorist movement is located."

For details see: *Hampton Roads International Security Quarterly*, 22 March 2009.

the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. Not only did Pakistan suffer immense physical losses, with no less than 81, 000 people killed² and more than 1.8 million Pakistani nationals internally displaced,³ but there has been a heavy economic cost alongside political and societal cost that the country has borne.

The contemporary discourse on conflict brings forth the realization that the impact and toll of armed violence does not remain confined to the active war phase alone. For enduring and sustainable peace, there should be effective post-conflict rehabilitation and settlement coupled with civilian ownership, a near ideal mix of civil-military cooperation along with the realization that security needs to be viewed and treated through a holistic lens and not the traditional security lens alone. As the reasons behind conflicts, especially those of an internal nature, become complex; so does the need for using a variety of means to tackle and address the problems by involving a cross section of stakeholders and concerned actors. A mere peace agreement may not prove sufficient unless the stake holders and parties to conflict chart out a strategy which takes cognizance of finer issues of post-conflict settlement, rehabilitation, repatriation and reintegration of affected and vulnerable actors, alongside addressing the root cause of the violence. It is very important to have an inclusive approach towards problem solving, a full ownership and involvement of the security sector with stakeholders comprising of a mix of civil, military, law enforcement, local as well as non-governmental entities.

The biggest challenge for any country faced with armed militancy and violence is the protection, timely safe evacuation (if so needed), upkeep and then proper resettlement of affected population groups. This also includes revival of economic and commercial activities, which more often than not are the biggest collateral damage in such situations. The challenges faced by contemporary states in rehabilitation and responsible resettlement are many. Firstly, no longer are governments faced with singular, isolated (purely military) threats, but have to deal with the compound effects of natural as well as man-made disasters, thus making

² More than fifty percent of the total count includes civilian casualties, which according to this study stands at 48,504 people killed, with 45 Journalists killed, Civilians fatalities resulting from drones around 416 to 951, Security personnel 5,498 and Militants killed: 26,862, coming to a total of 81,325 – 81,860 in Pakistan alone. See for details: “Body Count of the ‘War on Terror’: Casualty Figure after 10 Years,” *Physicians for Social Responsibility* et al, First Edition, March 2015, http://www.ipnw.de/commonFiles/pdfs/Frieden/Body_Count_first_international_edition_2015_final.pdf.

³ According to estimates, “As of July 2015, there were more than 1.8 million people displaced by insurgency, counter-insurgency and other related violence in Pakistan.” And these statistics include registered internally displaced people only. For details see: “Pakistan IDP Figures Analysis,” *Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC)*, <http://www.internal-displacement.org/south-and-south-east-asia/pakistan/figures-analysis>.

the task of managing the ensuing conflict an onerous and difficult one, especially in the absence of responsible partners to help and assist. In such cases, very often the gap in the provision of relief, services and security parameters results in the introduction and inclusion of non-state actors with vested interests who exploit this vacuum and burnish their image as charitable entities and extend their network of grass-root support.

In the case of Pakistan, the greatest toll of militancy and terrorism has been on the civilian population, which stood to lose its economic livelihood, safety and comfort of home and had to suffer death and destruction at the hands of militants and terrorists as well as displacement, which in certain instances was more than once. An added dimension has been the non-declaration and recognition of these places as zones of conflict, thereby making it difficult for aid providers, volunteers, health administrators as well as aid convoys to reach out to the affected population. Furthermore, since the US led ISAF operations in Afghanistan, the struggle against militancy and terrorism was not the only trouble for Pakistan. It also had to deal with a prolonged military standoff with India on the eastern front, a devastating earthquake in 2005 which claimed more than 87,000 lives and 2.8 million people were displaced, catastrophic floods annually since 2010 and the pockets of unrest and militancy in various parts of the country. All of these events have further compounded the stress on the country's fragile economy. Of the several military operations against insurgents in Swat, Malakand and Waziristan, there have been some peace accords signed, which include Shakai (2004), Sararogha (2005) and Miran Shah Agreement (2006). Yet none of them adequately addressed the issue of post-conflict resettlement and rehabilitation, thus resulting in a complex security dilemma which needs a multiple range of actors and innovative approaches towards problem solving.

Security as a Holistic Notion

The discourse and debate dominated by traditional security narrative altered significantly with the end of the Cold War. During the five long decades of the Cold war, which moved from decolonization, anti-colonialism, alliance politics centered on ideological battlegrounds to structural imperialism and a world polarized around economic haves and have-nots, the state was the sole unit of analysis, both the provider and the beneficiary in this distinctive system. The collapse of the Soviet Union was a victory for the free world, as not only was it an ideological battle field won, but also what the West considered as a recognition of its democratic ideals. It was a moment of reckoning for the world, reaching the final frontiers of democratic ideals which Fukuyama's much deliberated thesis

considers as the *End of History*.⁴ It ushered in a global governance system based on US-led Western ideals of liberal democracy and free market economy which would only result in progress and prosperity.

Unfortunately, many of the expectations from this ideal form of governance and statehood proved short-lived as a number of countries, which were part of the Cold War's global South, remained embroiled in conflicts, old and new. With states now categorized as strong, weak, fragile⁵ or failing, the changed discourse and dynamics also brought forth the realization that state actors were confronted with threats no longer confined to the traditional realm. Also, the much talked about notion of globalization failed to turn the world into a borderless entity referred to as the "global village." It did however make nontraditional concerns such as health, crime, epidemics, trafficking, movement of illicit economy and goods as well as movement and operations of non-state actors more fluid and conceivable. The initial post-Cold War years brought about a transitional phase, where state and non-state agents sought to realign and adjust themselves to changed power structures. Mercenaries and free agents of yesteryear, hailed as heroes and freedom fighters such as Al Qaeda or the Afghan Taliban who were carefully nurtured and equipped to fight ideological battles against the Soviets, were now left to their fate and then later hunted post 9/11 as they were using the same skills to bring down their mentors. Cold War conflicts such as the one in Afghanistan, which on one hand were the biggest success story for the US, became a classic case study of inadequate post conflict settlement, thus giving rise to ungoverned spaces plagued by civil strife and break down in governance. This made Afghanistan a festering ground for non-state actors to establish, enhance and consolidate their writ.

The events of September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states like Afghanistan can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. Poverty does not turn poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, combined with weak institutions and corruption, can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.⁶

Similarly, many other under-developed countries struggled with rising security challenges, as they no longer had the patronage and comfort of alliance politics, which provided them political, military as well

⁴ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992). Fukuyama expanded on his 1989 essay "The End of History?" published in the international affairs journal *The National Interest*, into a book form, presenting the central argument that the advent of Western liberal democracy may signal the end point of humanity's sociocultural evolution and the final form of human government.

⁵ Lothar Brock, Hans-Henrik Holm et.al, *Fragile States Violence and the Failure of Intervention* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), 8.

⁶ "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," September 2002, accessed at: <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf> 2.

as economic protection. Although not every country suffered a fate similar to Afghanistan, but many a state suffered the classic symptoms of fragility and weakness as per Western based indices and criteria of gauging states' performance and governance. This also paved the way for applying concepts such a *humanitarian intervention and assistance*⁷ as well as the *responsibility to protect*,⁸ though selectively. This was evident in Iraq, Afghanistan, Egypt, Libya and now Syria, countries of strategic interest to the US and the West, but not in genuine cases such as decades' long atrocities and human rights violations in Indian occupied Kashmir to date.

When viewed holistically, security is no longer the mere protection of physical boundaries of a country, as a range of issues affecting the citizens fall in the purview of the government, however weak it may be. Security now implies a much wider meaning that covers personal, social, communal, economic, political aspects as well as health and sustenance. A country, riddled with any kind of conflict does not have the potential to devote its entire efforts to ensure security in comprehensive terms,

⁷ There is no generally accepted definition of *Humanitarian Intervention*; primarily due to the concern that states would exploit the humanitarian exception to justify military aggression and intervention in breach of another country's internal affairs and sovereignty. Majority of the member states has rejected a UNSC resolution legitimizing humanitarian intervention repeatedly since 1999, considering it a pretext for self-assertion of national interest, power and greed. See: Ryan Goodman, "Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for War," *The American Journal of International Law*, 100:107, (2006), 107-109.

⁸ According to the *UN Office of the Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide*, Prevention requires apportioning responsibility to and promoting collaboration between concerned States and the international community. The duty to prevent and halt genocide and mass atrocities lies first and foremost with the State, but the international community has a role that cannot be blocked by the invocation of sovereignty. Sovereignty no longer exclusively protects States from foreign interference; it is a charge of responsibility where States are accountable for the welfare of their people. This principle is enshrined in *Article 1 of the Genocide Convention* and embodied in the principle of "sovereignty as responsibility" and in the concept of the *Responsibility to Protect*.

The three pillars of the responsibility to protect, as stipulated in the *Outcome Document of the 2005 United Nations World Summit (A/RES/60/1, para. 138-140)* and formulated in the *Secretary-General's 2009 Report (A/63/677) on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect* are:

- The State carries the primary responsibility for protecting populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and their incitement;
- The international community has a responsibility to encourage and assist States in fulfilling this responsibility;
- The international community has a responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other means to protect populations from these crimes. If a State is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the international community must be prepared to take collective action to protect populations, in accordance with the *Charter of the United Nations*. See: <http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/responsibility.shtml>.

therefore adding to a state's fragility. Where on one hand it invites intervention and support by legitimate international state actors and organizations, it equally attracts non-state actors who exploit state weakness and fragility for their vested interests, as in the classic case of Afghanistan.

Pakistan and the Impact of Terrorism

It is widely believed that for Pakistan, terrorism became a major issue in the post 9/11 environment and as such the country did not suffer from this malaise before that. However, the declining security and political situation in Afghanistan and India's active involvement (as well as admission of it) in Pakistan's internal security, which is visible through its covert support to militants and political actors in Balochistan, Sindh (Karachi) as well as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), have been a strong contributor in instigating militancy and terrorism in the country. There have been actions undertaken by various governments (both under civil and military administrators) to curb terrorism, such as the Anti-terrorism Act 1997, establishment of anti-terrorism courts, counter-terrorism legislation, de-weaponization campaign (early 2001) which predate the landmark events of 9/11. Yet, it was after 9/11 that the full impact of militancy and terrorism manifested itself, taking a heavy toll on life as well as negatively affecting economic and political security of the state and its political image.

Although Pakistan's relations with its Northwestern neighbor Afghanistan have not led to an active war, but owing to divergent positions over the Durand Line, there have been select incidents where the security forces on both sides came to a standoff.⁹ Most of Pakistan's current internal security problems are linked directly to the country's policies and support rendered in ousting Soviet military presence from Afghanistan during the 1980s. Pakistan's problematic security relations with India have contributed greatly to the country's evolution as a "security state" thereby giving rise to a peculiar strategic culture. Over the seven decades of its independent existence, not only has Pakistan been compelled to invest heavily in conventional armaments, but since the 1971 war, the financially stressed country formally embarked on a costly nuclear

⁹ Although the Durand line alongside Pashtunistan issue have always been a point of friction between Islamabad and Kabul, the latter has not only used these two for political currency and garnering internal support, but has also breached the sanctity of the border or Durand line several times, twice resulting in a military exchange, first in year 1955, and then 1960-1. This led to a breakdown in diplomatic ties between the two countries. The Shah of Iran, helped mediate a *détente* between the two neighbors in the year 1963, which coincides with the departure of ultra-(Pashtun) nationalist prime minister of Afghanistan Sardar Daud Khan's exit from office. Read, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Tara Vassefi, "The Forgotten History of Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations," *Yale Journal of International Affairs*, March 2012. 38-45.

program which provided it adequate deterrence: a negative security guarantee as well as a balancer in an increasingly costly and widening arms race with India. The extent of India-Pakistan rivalry does not remain confined to border skirmishes or open wars alone, but low intensity wars as an effective 'slow bleed strategy' or 'war of a thousand cuts' has been able to create sufficient internal security problems for both neighbors. If India blames Pakistan for fueling an active 'insurgency' in the Indian-held Kashmir (a UN sanctified disputed region) and stoking militancy in Sikh dominated Punjab, then India stands equally guilty of similar actions in Balochistan, Karachi as well as FATA and KPK. Indian intelligence heads as well as none other than India's previous Prime Minister Manmohan Singh have openly admitted these actions.¹⁰ Furthermore, the security dilemma becomes much more intense, with India exercising classic Kautaliyan doctrine through a policy of encirclement, using Afghanistan as an active proxy ground against Pakistan.

In the post 9/11 scenario, Pakistan's domestic security landscape has become increasingly volatile and complex. Not only has there been introduction of new violent actors in addition to the old ones, but these actors have employed new techniques of terrorism and have correspondingly contributed to an unprecedented number of casualties and damage that was never witnessed before. With access to latest and sophisticated firearms and emboldened by a mix of religio-political zeal, these violent actors have proved far more resilient and stronger than the LEAs targeting them. Given the complexity and multiplicity of the aforementioned actors, the conflict spectrum by itself has been very complicated and wide ranged. Sectarian and ethnic strife, militancy, sub-nationalist movements, terrorism, along with inclusion of and tolerance towards violence in the body politic of the state' has created an environment which has allowed a gradual though informal and indirect as well as (in certain instances) direct empowerment of non and sub state actors. This has contributed to state insecurity and enhancement of fragility in governance, which on the one hand are symptomatic of unresolved protracted conflict, while on the other hand they have become

¹⁰ "Text - India, Pakistan prime ministers' joint statement," *Reuters*, July 16, 2009, <http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-41092220090716>. Also see: "PM introduced Balochistan, terror delink in Egypt statement," *The Times of India*, July 25, 2009, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/PM-introduced-Balochistan-terror-delink-in-Egypt-statement/articleshow/4817599.cms>, and "Pakistan has proof of '3 Indian Kasabs' in Baluchistan," *Rediff News*, July 28, 2009, <http://www.rediff.com/news/special/hamid-mir-on-the-real-reason-why-india-agreed-to-discuss-baluchistan/20090728.htm> furthermore, India's Defence Minister, Manohar Parrikar has time and again eluded to use of terrorism as a viable policy tool to counter Pakistan which gained him criticism even within India, Parnav Kulkarni, "You have to neutralise terrorist through terrorist only," says Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar," *The Indian Express*, May 22, 2015, <http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/kill-terrorist-with-terrorist-defence-minister-manohar-parrikars-idea-2>.


a source and precursor of new forms of conflict – compounding the existing one and exacerbating the scope and magnitude of violence.

The country also had to face the brunt of US-led ISAF military operations in Afghanistan, which aimed at targeting terrorist networks led by Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Given the porous nature of the Pak-Afghan border, a huge number of operators from these groups spilled over into Pakistan, especially in the challenging terrains of tribal agencies. In order to weed out and check these cross border infiltrators as well as their local sympathizers, the Pakistani security agencies had to wage various counter terrorism operations, such as those mentioned previously. The US also waged a Predator drone campaign in FATA, with the aim of specific surgical and precision targeting of the militants and their hideouts, in order to ensure minimal collateral damage. Yet the drone campaign over the years, not only became a politically controversial issue, but many a times proved counter-productive when civilian casualty count started to mount. Although the exact statistics regarding civilian casualties resulting from drone strikes remains disputed across various studies, but in the decade spanning the years 2004 to 2014, the civilian casualty rate in the drone campaign has been assessed as about 32 percent,¹¹ the year 2010 being the deadliest in terms of number of civilian fatalities with estimated 850-950 fatalities.¹² In a compilation of various American watch bodies monitoring drone strikes, the Brown University tabulated the following statistics.

¹¹ “Drone Wars Pakistan: Analysis,” *New America Foundation*, <http://natsec.newamerica.net/drones/pakistan/analysis> (accessed August 5, 2013). Also see Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, “The Year of the Drone. An Analysis of U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004-2010,” *New America Foundation*, February 24, 2010, <http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/bergentiedemann2.pdf>, 3.

¹² For a database compilation by PIPS, see “Drone Attacks (2004–2014),” *Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies*, <http://san-pips.com/app/database/download.php?f=3.pdf> (accessed March 5, 2016)

Table 01: US Predator Drone Strikes Between Years 2004-2014.¹³



*TBIJ: The Bureau of Investigative Journalism; LWJ: Long War Journal; NAF: New America Foundation; PBC: Pakistan Body Count.¹⁴

However, the overall number and percentage of civilians killed as a result of these strikes remains uncertain, therefore there has been much reliance on estimations. Furthermore, the myth that these strikes were carried out in close cooperation with the Pakistan military also remains questionable, as many a times the US not only led ground offensives and border patrols but also drone strikes which were not in consonance with counter terrorism operations led by the Pakistani security forces across the border. This created disconnect between the two allies. Lack of intelligence sharing and coordination, mutual distrust, US insistence for Pakistan to do more and reliance on unreliable ground informants made the entire drone strategy a very controversial moot point. Not only Pakistan, but many humanitarian agencies and individuals in the West strongly campaigned against the grey and extra judicial nature of these operations. This did bring down the number of drone strikes in targeted countries, but by no means has this strategy been ruled out and still

¹³ Neta C. Crawford, “War-related Death, Injury, and Displacement in Afghanistan and Pakistan 2001-2014,” *Costs of War*, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, May 22, 2015, 11.

¹⁴ Ibid., *The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ)* (2014). “All Estimated Casualties in Pakistan by Year (correct as of 26/11/14).” Retrieved from www.thebureauinvestigates.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/All-Totals-Dash67.jpg; *Long War Journal (LWJ)* (2015). “Pakistan Strikes.” Retrieved from www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-strikes; *New America Foundation (NAF)* (2015) “Drone Wars Pakistan: Analysis.” <http://securitydata.newamerica.net/drones/pakistan/analysis.html>; (2015). *Pakistan Body Count (PBC)* Retrieved from <http://pakistanbodycount.org/> and PBC data set via email communication with Zeeshan Usmani, March 10, 2015.

remains operational, though at a minimal level. The following table shows the number and percentage of civilians killed by drone strikes according to the aforementioned US sources:

Table 02: Number and Percentage of Civilians Killed by US Drone Strikes in Pakistan, Various Sources, 2004-2014.¹⁵

| Source | Civilian Killed | Total Killed | % Civilians killed |
|-------------|-----------------|--------------|--------------------|
| TBIJ Min | 416 | 2,648 | 15.7 |
| TBIJ Max | 953 | 3,837 | 24.8 |
| LWJ | 156 | 2,882 | 9.5 |
| NAF average | 286 | 3,002 | 9.5 |
| PBC Min | 1,409 | 1,944 | 92.5 |

According to the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), not less than 2,898 civilian deaths have been recorded in 361 drone strikes during the same period. As mentioned previously, the drone strategy proved counter-productive and politically as well as legally controversial, once the civilian casualty and infrastructure loss mounted thus fueling resentment among affected population groups both against the US as well as the Pakistani establishment. This provided militant organizations such as the Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan with moral justification and popular support as well as a solid basis for recruitment. Questioning the legality of these strikes, Phillip Alston, the United Nation's special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, argues that the use of Predator drones to carry out targeted killings lacks legal basis and may be in violation of international law.¹⁶ At the humanitarian level, living under a constant fear and threat of strikes has driven many people away from the safety of their homes. Besides, at the micro level, fear, distrust and suspicion about each other, as the US recruits locals as its eyes and ears has created a divide in what otherwise used to be close knit traditional societies in these tribal zones.

The biggest humanitarian challenge for the Pakistani civil and military administration has been the protection, safe evacuation from conflict areas, encampment and later resettlement and repatriation of affected civilian (non-combatant) population. According to Crawford:

¹⁵ Crawford, *Costs of War*, 12.

¹⁶ "Alston Says Drone Attacks on Pakistan-Afghanistan Border May Violate International Law," *NYU Law*, October 30, 2009, www.law.nyu.edu/news/ALSTON_UN_GENERALASSEMBLY. See also Ben Emmerson's interim report to the UN General Assembly, "Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism," *UN doc. A/68/389*, September 18, 2013, www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Emmerson-Report.pdf

In July 2014, before the peak of the flight due to Operation Zarb-e-Azb, the UNHCR counted 1.2 million internally displaced persons in Pakistan. In addition, there were 1.6 million refugees from neighboring countries (mainly Afghanistan, Somalia and Iraq) for a total of more than 2.8 million refugees and internally displaced persons inside Pakistan. Further, an additional 176,000 Pakistanis had fled the country and sought refuge elsewhere in mid-2014.¹⁷

Pakistan, despite being a non-signatory to the 1951 International Refugee Convention,¹⁸ has not only hosted one of the world's largest refugee populations but also for the longest period of time, now spanning close to four decades. Being itself a resource stressed country, Pakistan has had to face a dual challenge of deteriorating internal security situation and turbulent conditions in Afghanistan, and each time an attempt was made to repatriate the affected Afghan nationals, the problematic security situation in Afghanistan become a major impediment. With the assistance of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) office, repatriation started in 2002 and out of the 3 million registered (Afghan) refugees, the figure currently stands at 1.6 to 1.8 million (registered) refugees, however an equally large number of Afghan nationals continue to reside in Pakistan owing to the security issues.

Adding to this challenging situation is the number of Internally Displaced People (IDPs), who are referred to by the federal, provincial as well as tribal authorities as Temporarily Displaced People (TDPs) comprise of two categories. The first category is of those affected by natural disasters such as earthquakes and annual floods, and the second are those displaced by conflict. According to governmental statistics, the total number of TDPs ranged between 1.8 million (ISPR) to 2 million (NADRA). The international monitoring agency on IDPs, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), cites a similar count i.e. around 1.8 million population displaced owing to insurgency, militancy and counter insurgency operations, which include 1.5 million from FATA (out of the total population of 3.18 million residents of FATA)¹⁹ and 275,000

¹⁷ Crawford, *Costs of War*, 17. Also see: UNHCR (2014), Pakistan. (accessed March 20, 2014) from <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e487016.html>

¹⁸ The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees is the key legal document in defining who is a refugee, their rights and the legal obligations of states. The 1967 Protocol removed geographical and temporal restrictions from the Convention. For details refer to: *Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees*, Text of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees Text of the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees Resolution 2198 (XXI) adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, *Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees* <http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html>

¹⁹ Total Population of FATA: 3,176,331 Source: *FATA Disaster Management Authority (FDMA)*, <http://www.fdma.gov.pk/federally-administered-tribal-area-fata>.

from the Balochistan province.²⁰ Unverified independent sources even quote a staggering figure of 3.5 million displaced, citing that not less than 80% people remained undocumented and resided outside designated IDP camps with host communities.²¹ This figure has been cited for the year 2009, which registered the highest number of displacement, and which, according to the International Research Committee, has been the largest in the South Asian region since 1947.

Table 03:**TDPs Statistics as of 03-05-2016** ²²

| Agency | NADRA Verified | A=Registered Return/Verified | B=Spontaneous Return | Total Verified Return: A+B | Un-Registered Return | Total Balance | Return %age |
|--------------------|----------------|------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------------|----------------------|----------------|--------------|
| Bajaur | 72,895 | 72,895 | 0 | 72,895 | 0 | 0 | 100.00 |
| FR-Tank | 2,228 | 1,852 | 0 | 1,852 | 0 | 376 | 83.12 |
| Khyber | 91,689 | 81,857 | 4,646 | 86,503 | 54,264 | 5,186 | 94.34 |
| Kurram | 33,024 | 18,334 | 7,815 | 26,149 | 13,857 | 6,875 | 79.18 |
| Mohmand | 36,759 | 36,759 | 0 | 36,759 | 0 | 0 | 100.00 |
| *NWA | 104,002 | 19,283 | 19,734 | 39,017 | 6,246 | 64,985 | 37.52 |
| Orakzai | 35,823 | 7,425 | 14,371 | 21,796 | 14,627 | 14,027 | 60.84 |
| SWA | 71,124 | 17,084 | 0 | 17,084 | 15,720 | 54,040 | 24.02 |
| Grand Total | 447,544 | 255,489 | 46,566 | 302,055 | 104,714 | 145,489 | 67.49 |

Source: FATA Disaster Management Authority (FDMA).

Amongst these population groups, according to the IDP Vulnerability Assessment and Profiling (IVAP) index, the profile of the IDPs comprised of 21-22% adult men and women below 60 years of age, 1-2% older men and women above the age of 60, 31% boys and 23% girl-child.²³ With the gradual improvement in the security situation and clearance of militancy and conflict from the affected area, a sufficient

²⁰ Internally Displaced Monitoring Centre, (IDMC) "Pakistan IDPs Figure Analysis," <http://www.internal-displacement.org/south-and-south-east-asia/pakistan/figures-analysis>

²¹ Ibid.

²² TDPs Statistics as of May 3, 2016, FATA Disaster Management Authority FDMA, <http://www.fdma.gov.pk/tdps-statistics-as-of-22-03-2016>

²³ Ibid.

number of IDPs have returned to their homes, with 104,000 returnees alone rehabilitated for the year 2014. Yet, a disturbing trend has been that in certain instances, affected population groups, facing threat to their lives and livelihood, had to undergo the trauma and suffering of repeated displacement as well. According to the IDMC and IVAP estimates:

The national government continued to prioritise the return of registered IDPs to “denotified” areas where it deems military operations to be over. IVAP found that 79 per cent of IDPs planned to return to their places of origin as soon they were declared safe, and that 13 per cent planned to go back regardless of the security situation. More than 108,000 IDPs from FATA returned to their homes and were deregistered during the year. The government and international organisations provided transport and food rations.²⁴

As mentioned repeatedly and evident from the statistics, the most affected have been the Pashtun dominated areas as well as to a certain effect, the conflict and natural calamity stricken population of Balochistan. However, during the Swat operations, the people of *PATA* (Provincially Administered Tribal Areas) were also the unfortunate victims of a similar displacement, whose rehabilitation and repatriation has been considered a successful case study.

Deeming such inter twining crises, such as dual suffering by population groups because of natural disasters as well as conflict, as ***Complex Emergencies***, explains not only the complicated nature of the problem, but also the need for multilayered strategizing and innovative means to address the problem at hand. Very often the question faced by responders (both governmental as well as non-government) is, what takes precedence-physical security of the state which traditionally has been tasked to be the Provider and Protector or the well-being, security and safety of individuals? The United Nation’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, in its country appraisal, explains the complexity as:

The displacement of population due to insecurity and natural disasters has been a major humanitarian concern for the past few years. Recurrent security operations in Pakistan’s north-west region have resulted in 1.6 million new or previously displaced people in 2015. Monsoon floods in 2015 affected approximately 1.6 million people in more than 4,000 villages. Pakistan also suffers from a prevalence of under-nutrition with an estimated 14.7 million pregnant and lactating women and 22.2 million children affected. The Government of Pakistan, with support from the

²⁴ “Pakistan: Internal displacement in brief,” *Internally Displaced Monitoring Centre, (IDMC)*, December 2013.<http://www.internal-displacement.org/south-and-south-east-asia/pakistan/figures-analysis>

humanitarian community is leading the efforts to meet the needs of these populations.²⁵

The plight of displaced people does not remain restricted to mere quantification and narrating of statistics. Displacement under extreme hostile circumstances often means leaving established homes, businesses, ripe crops and orchards and walking for miles and endless hours, with little in the pocket and diminishing hope of when and what they would return to once peace and security is restored. With survival as the overriding concern, gender and women-protection as well as security remain a low priority. Not only do women stand vulnerable directly because of violent conflict and displacement, sometimes without adequate chaperon and protection nets; they are also indirectly affected when their children or the male family members remain vulnerable and unprotected. As mentioned earlier, the ratio of displaced people comprises of 31% boy-children, 23% girl-children, 21-22% women under the age of 60 and 1-2% above 60 years of age. Even if the ratio of women in this pool is around 40-50%, it puts approximately 70% IDPs as highly vulnerable, when and if we include the ratio of boy and girl children to the pool of dependent and vulnerable people.

The children often exhibit anxiety and psychological disorders; facing identity crises and trauma resulting from abrupt dislocation, physical and personal insecurity, loss of safety nets as well as sociological reference groups. Despite government and donor agency plans, the heavy inflow of IDP/ TDPs has often resulted in lack of provisions and services such as availability of long-term female medical staff, schools, books as well as money. With the challenges and uncertainties of living in IDP camps higher for woman, it is frequently observed that there are a higher percentage of early marriages for girls; secondly families don't feel comfortable sending girls to camp schools. Women have to wait for days to receive medical aid, as female doctors and staff may not be available on a daily basis or if they are, the ratio of patients to medical staff is extremely disturbing. Often people have little money or resources for spending, which adds to this distress and despondency.

The already fragile governmental infrastructure and institutions have been further brought under stress due to the compound effects of these complex emergencies. In order to deal with such challenges, it is imperative to first build a clear comprehension that every emergency may look similar in the magnitude of issues at hand, but may not necessarily require the same set of tools to handle and resolve it. Every case study has its set of unique challenges that need to be fully understood rather than generalizing all. Yet at the same time there may be standardized actions; such as provision of basic health care, schooling, sanitation, shelter that

²⁵ "Pakistan: Country Overview," *UNOCHA*, <http://www.unocha.org/pakistan>.

follows the prompt and timely registration of individuals and making budgetary allocations correspondingly. However, this becomes difficult especially when there is little credible information available regarding the real conflict scenario, as well as the fact that whether an on-going conflict is acknowledged by the government as an active conflict zone or not. One of the basic yet most critical issues concerned in institutions face is that the country has not had an official population census since 1998. Although, in 2011 there had been an attempt, and another one in 2016, yet the former is considered unofficial and unreliable and the latter got postponed. In the absence of a solid database, the government as well as relief bodies have to work on estimations, which can result in flawed relief operations.

With little credible information regarding the affected population, coupled with limited state capacity to manage the complex emergencies, two alternative outcomes may result. Firstly, instead of civil institution, the military oversees the relief, settlement, resettlement, recovery and repatriation activities post-conflict. Ideally this should not fall into the military's purview, as the ownership and handling of reconstruction and rebuilding efforts should be purely civilian-led. Unfortunately, as in the case of Swat and a few other instances, the insufficient civilian institutional infrastructure and the military's prominent positioning in such areas not only led to a question of ownership and credibility amongst the responders as well as affectees, but also resulted in fractured civil-military relations. Secondly, and most importantly, poor civilian oversight and ownership results in stepping in of non-governmental as well as non-state actors (NSAs), who seek and manipulate such critical spaces to build grass-root popular support base and legitimacy. These NSAs burnish their image as charitable organizations and through their good Samaritan act, extend their networks through grass root support.

Besides, there are also issues of politicizing or using emergency response for their vested interests by political actors, thereby compromising the core principles of humanitarian action i.e. neutrality, impartiality and independence. In the case of Pakistan, international response to this unprecedented displacement crisis has been slow, inadequate and lacking in influence, which has negatively affected relief efforts. The other twining concern has been the usage by donor agencies or their sub-contractors of relief efforts to gather critical and confidential conflict related data, to which the government response has been tough, bringing the critical question of linkage between security and humanitarian assistance to the fore and enhancing the already fragile situation. Last but not least are the genuine concerns and plight of aid providers, who stand equally vulnerable and at the cross roads when it comes to their role in genuine provision of relief services and care. They have very often become targets of militants, as evident in the case of polio campaign workers, many of which were target killed despite being

provided security. According to informal reports, not less than 70 polio immunization workers have been killed since 2012.²⁶ Besides, military convoys carrying relief goods and evacuees from affected areas have also been occasionally targeted by militants, thus enhancing the vulnerability and sense of insecurity amongst people.

Conclusion and Way Forward

Despite having disaster management bodies at the federal, provincial as well as tribal agencies' level, it is never easy to respond to complex emergencies. The governmental bodies such as NADRA worked very hard at timely distribution of registration cards, so that health, food, medical as well as all kinds of relief efforts can be provided to the people in an orderly fashion in the shortest possible period. Yet many displaced people who moved to host communities, instead of designated relief camps or registration sites remained without assistance. Many people had never sought a national identification card ever in their life; still others maintained duplicate or dubious registrations. Despite all these challenges, the relief and repatriation process has to work.

The building blocks of any preparatory strategy in humanitarian relief effort according to Tomasini & Van Wassenhove (2009), are based on knowledge management, human resources, logistics, financial resources and lastly the community and its support.²⁷ Without adequate and updated statistics such as census data, none of these tenets can work with complete efficiency. Based on a triple A principle i.e. agility, adaptability and alignment, disaster and humanitarian relief efforts are 80% dependent on logistical efficacy and effective supply management chain.²⁸

Moreover, there is a need to be better prepared and effectively adapt to humanitarian crises and multi-natured disasters. This can be effectively managed by training and building a first line of responders amongst the local communities which help in averting disasters and reduce their impacts. There is also the need to train aid workers (from local communities if possible) as better providers and responders and this also empowers and makes local affected communities active stake holders in their relief and rehabilitative efforts. Aid and relief agencies need to lobby governmental institutions to invest in reducing the risks of disasters (preemptively) and have better coordination amongst stakeholders involved – pooling of resources, increased transparency and minimizing

²⁶ "Four kidnapped polio workers are found dead in Pakistan," *BBC News*. Retrieved 2015-10-20.

²⁷ R. Tomasini, & L. N. Van Wassenhove, *Humanitarian Logistics*, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.)

²⁸ L. N. Van Wassenhove, "Humanitarian aid logistics: Supply Chain Management in High Gear," *Journal of the Operational Research Society*, 57, no. 5 (2006), 75–489.

the bureaucratic indolence, thereby ensuring an efficient, timely and result oriented system.

Not only there is a need for all stakeholders to adopt a preemptive as well as a preventive strategy, but a comprehensive approach necessitates sensitization through curricula; having specialized study programs, effective understanding and training of citizens, a better security sector as well as civil military cohesion and coordination. And last but not the least there is a need of respecting the dignity of affected and displaced people, whose plight is certainly not skin deep. They too are stakeholders and can be effectively utilized as a critical human resource than a liability. Since stabilization efforts go beyond the traditional humanitarian mandate, yet remain reliant on governmental coordination, governments need to preemptively develop a coherent strategy and have the foresight to develop a pool of resources for return, recovery and stabilization of IDPs. Very often critical time is lost in developing a plan that ends up compounding the crises.

HUMAN SECURITY CONCERNS OF SOUTH ASIA: PAKISTAN'S PERSPECTIVE

Muhammad Imran Ashraf,* Sajida Begum,**
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Abstract

The South Asian states have been facing grave challenges to human security since long as a result of increasing extremism, border conflicts and terrorism. These domestic, regional and global factors are a menace and main hindrance in the progress and prosperity of this region. Terrorism has posed a serious threat to peace, security and stability of this region and the rest of the international community. This article highlights the human security problems specific to Pakistan, though contextualised within broader human security challenges affecting South Asia. Today, Pakistan is facing different types of internal and external threats. The South Asian region has strategically strong and weak features, where Pakistan and India are two major regional players. Therefore, the issues regarding peace and security depend on the relationship between these countries. Pakistan lives in an environment lacking in human security. At present, she is facing crucial problems like political instability, socio-economic underdevelopment, energy crises, terrorism, drone attacks, suicide bombing impacting human security in the country. The authors suggest that India and Pakistan need to make progress in the field of economics and trade and realize that at present it is in the interest of not only the two states but also their huge populations.

Keywords: South Asia, Human Security, Political Instability, Economic Underdevelopment, Media, Regional Conflicts Terrorism, Extremism.

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Introduction

South Asia has a distinctive role to play in world politics because of its geographical setting. South Asia holds a very important geopolitical position in relation to the rest of the world because it connects the East and the West, with the potential to bridge the Global South with the North. Thus, it forms an important locus for discussing the role of global powers' rivalry in the region as well as role of democracy and democratic institutions in bringing about and sustaining peace. This sets it apart from the other regions of the world. As for the history of present day South Asia, it begins with the Indus valley civilization dating back to 2350 B.C.¹ It is indeed one of the four oldest civilizations of the world. The South Asian region comprises of eight countries: Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan and Maldives. South Asia hosts almost a quarter of the world's population. Despite achieving consistent economic growth, the region is marked by dense poverty and human deprivation. South Asian countries inherited a weak and backward economic infrastructure from their colonial masters or the indigenous authoritarian rulers. Except Sri Lanka and India, where some kind of infrastructural development had taken place during the colonial rule, the other countries lacked even the basic economic infrastructure. All the South Asian countries began the process of modernization and development in the nineteen fifties. There have been numerous problems and challenges which have affected the South Asian economies. The region needs to tackle the burgeoning non-traditional security threats in order to promote well-being of the people and improve the quality of their lives by investing resources in human development and implementing constitutional provisions that protect fundamental human rights and dignity. South Asia is one of the most populous regions of the world. Despite achieving consistent and rapid economic growth over the last several years and possessing huge potential for regional development and prosperity, the region is marked by severe political, economic, social and cultural inequalities.

The political and economic policies of the governments in South Asia continue to pre-dominantly focus on the traditional state-centric security paradigm. For this, states channelise the bulk of their resources for state security while paying minimal attention to human development. This practice not only contributes to the prevalence of dense poverty and deprivation but also contributes to inter-state conflict and rivalry in South Asia.²

¹ Muhammad Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System* (London: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 17.

² Muhammad Saleem Mazhar and Naheed Goraya, *Post-2014 Afghanistan: Reflections & Off-Shoots* (Lahore: University of the Punjab, 2014), 19-21.

India and Pakistan are the most prominent and rival states in the regional setting. Both the states came into being in August 1947, but have never been able to maintain cordial relations due to various issues, disputes and security challenges. As for Pakistan, it has been facing the challenges of lack of democratic values and stability for more than 66 years of its existence. Pakistan began with a democratic system of governance but could not sustain it.³ Thus, in South Asia, Pakistan is a significant regional actor, whose tribulations have implications for the security of other countries in the region. These implications have spillover effect for not only the traditional but human security as well.⁴

The article argues that in South Asia the internal and external policies of states are rival centric and not people centric. As a result, human security at the community level is affected by larger geopolitical concerns. The greatest threats to human security at the local level are issues relating to geopolitics because terrorism, religious extremism and political instability are the consequences of geo-political problems.

Conceptualizing Human Security

The literal meaning of security or safety is freedom from various internal and external threats. It is defined as the condition of being secure from or not wide-open to menace; safety or freedom from scare, concern or anxiety; and feelings of security or freedom from danger.⁵ Analytically, the concept of security is essentially controversial in nature due to its complexity, seamlessness and lack of factual objectivity, thus the concept has to be understood with the help of broader approaches. It is a subjective problem that mainly depends on one's ontology. In other words, the concept of security has multiplicity of meanings. Thus, it needs to be contextualized. Barry Buzan argues that people don't coincide on a single idea of security due to their moral, ideological, and normative differences. Therefore, the security perspective is always defined with the support of other established theoretical frameworks. In the realist framework, security is seen as derivative of power or mere synonym of power⁶. The notion of security and safety is highly relative and multifarious in nature, therefore security can be well-defined or explained in its own specific and exact surroundings; it differs according to the context.

³ Manas Chatterji, ed. *Conflict and Peace in South Asia* (UK: Emerald Publishing Ltd., 2008), 39-49.

⁴ Shahid Burki, *Pakistan: Fifty years of Nationhood* (Lahore: Vanguard, 2004), 71.

⁵ John Andrew and M. Proffitt, *Oxford English Dictionary*, (UK: Oxford University Press, 1993), 12.

⁶ Marianne Stone, "Security according to Buzan: A comprehensive security analysis", *School of International and Public Affairs, Security Studies Discussion Papers Series1* Columbia University (New York: GEEST, Spring 2009), 2-4.

Further, there are a number of security theories that have emerged and evolved with shifting international and national priorities and as a result of domestic, regional and global key events. These theories are not static; each has its variations and permutations. Likewise, each theory is to some extent reductive and essentialist, relying upon assumptions about the nature of the world we live in. While there has been an evolution in security discourse, it is not strictly linear or time-specific but dynamic, so that some theories had greater prevalence at certain times and with particular actors. Equally, there are differing perceptions as to where we are along this evolving continuum. Given below are some of the central theories that have shaped security discourse by way of background to the emergence of the 'human security' concept.

The theorists of law have had equally varying perspectives on security, ranging from the more traditionalist views- placing the protection of the state and state sovereignty as fundamental goals and determinants of security- to a number of broader and diverging concepts. Theorists of law have an added drawback of considering the role of law in addressing insecurity. Recurring debates on the relationship of law with politics play on in the background, such as whether law is a constraining force on state action or itself a consequence of state interests. In particular, law experts grapple with the extent to which law is a tool, or indeed the principal tool, to ensure security. Lawyers are most comfortable within the certainty and predictability of a rules-based system, but are typically frustrated when at moments of greatest political tension the rules appear flawed or lack the requisite force.⁷

However, theoretical schools prior to the Critical Security Studies (CSS) could not sufficiently explain security in the human context, but finally the School of Critical Security Studies (CSS) provided the closest theoretical underpinnings for the shift to the concept of human security. The CSS recognizes that the bifurcation of security into the material world 'out there' and the inner world of human relationships, reflected in the nominative and adjectival forms of the word, exaggerates the gap between the two images. McSweeney argues that the assumption of security studies, which ignores the human dimension is contradicted by the practical dependence of policy-makers and theorists alike on the human individual as the ultimate referent or subject of security. Thus, the individual is ignored in conceptualizing the idea of security at the state level only to be reinstated as its basic rationale – as it must be – in order to make sense of and legitimize the policy derived.⁸ For security to make sense at the international level, critical security theorists argue that it

⁷ Alice Edwards, Carla Ferstman, *Human Security and Non-citizens Law, Policy and International Affairs* (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 4.

⁸ Bill McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations* (UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 16.

must make sense at the basic level of the individual.

Critical Security Studies (CSS) further provides insight to the student of security studies to know that the use of 'security jargon' is a double-edged sword. This double-edged use of security terminologies can label the subjects of this security discourse as threats to security, rather than being victims or at risk of insecurity. The process of 'normalizing' the language of security can hide from view the real agendas at play and permit the erosion of fundamental rights, as states feel justified reducing or removing rights in situations of 'exception' or 'crisis'. As a collective discourse, there is concern that individuals can become voiceless or that the term may be misappropriated and misused to justify state-centric responses to the movement of people. This is not an uncommon response to migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees who have been increasingly portrayed as security threats, rather than as individuals fleeing violence, persecution or human insecurity. Thus, there is concern in framing such issues within 'security' terms.

Human security and human rights have been coexisting aims of the UN Charter since 1945. However, it is interesting to analyze that where most threats to human security can be formulated as human rights violations, at the same time human security is threatened by the acts for provision of human security.⁹ Such as, the US led wars threatened human security in the name of protecting human rights. In this context, it is essential to first define the contours of human security.

According to Freedman, when anything that generates anxiety or threatens the quality of life in some respect becomes labelled as a 'security problem', the field risks losing all focus.¹⁰ The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) Report defines human security as the security of people-their physical safety, their economic and social well-being, respect for their dignity and worth as human beings and the protection of their human rights and fundamental freedoms. However, the ICISS definition is criticized for making no explicit mention of how the state, particularly in the indebted South, can guarantee the 'economic and social well-being' of their citizens under conditions of 'predatory globalization'. By concentrating on 'freedom from fear' and effectively ignoring 'freedom from want', the 'narrow approach' may be seen as consistent with a neo-liberal framework.¹¹ The idea of the new security framework under Critical Security Studies is that it focuses directly and specifically on individuals and communities, as opposed to

⁹ Barbara von Tigerstrom, *Human Security and International Law: Prospects and Problems* (UK: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2007), 30-40.

¹⁰ Tadjbakhsh Shahar banou, *Human Security: Looking Back Before Looking Forward* (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 1-2.

¹¹ World Bank, *World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 39.

states. The traditional realist approach is not indifferent to individuals (or citizens), whom the state is charged to protect, however, individuals are passive in that framework. There is concern that national defense is frequently achieved at the cost of individual security or safety.

The significant feature of the human security framework is its recognition that the providers of security extend beyond the state. Security providers are said to include states, inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations and the affected individuals and communities themselves. This position is likened to liberal institutionalism, which recognizes the critical role of organizations (particularly the UN) in addressing transnational and international challenges. Yet proponents of human security go further, understanding that even in purely domestic contexts there is a need for a multiplicity of actors.¹²

People rather than states as the focus of security denoted the obvious shift from traditional to non-traditional security framework. The traditional geopolitical security traits were prioritized during the Cold War era under the conventional view of security in the Westphalian state system. It considered the state as the sole actor and was centered on state's security preservation of its territorial integrity and political sovereignty against any military threats. According to the traditional security notion, the only actual security concern is for a country to preserve persistence, power, control and freedom against external pressures from rival states.¹³

The Westphalian order moved the world towards globalization, which was characterized by two synchronized trends: firstly, global politics and its existential security implications and secondly, economic integration. In the late 1980's, economic and environmental aspects were also included in the notion of security as 'comprehensive security'. In the 1990s, the conceptual trajectory indicated an obvious paradigm shift from material security threats to normative social security threats. It appeared as a major shift in the Westphalian order of international affairs that brought the individual to the center of state's concerns. The non-traditional threats challenged the traditional concept of security; it included threats such as environmental pollution, transnational terrorism, massive population, and infectious diseases that posed a threat to the individual's security.

In warfare studies, it is established that a person's security cannot be achieved through military capabilities. Consequently, it involves the notion of human security. According to Morgenthau, the international

¹² Tadjbakhsh Shahar banou, *Human Security : Looking back before looking forward*, (UK : Cambridge University Press, 2009), 15-19.

¹³ Sung Won Kim, "Human Security with an Asian Face", *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies*, 17-1 (USA: Indiana University Maurer School of Law, 2010), 83-103.

relations of the new millennium is impelling many analysts to broaden their conception of security to include issues of human security broadly defined¹⁴. Human security is a shared phenomenon, which delivers freedom from fear and wants to individuals. Beginning in the mid-1990s, the concept of human security has begun to visibly influence and challenge global politics, institutions, and governance.

In 1993, a UNDP document formally articulated and stressed that the concept of security must change from an exclusive emphasis on national security to a much greater stress on people's security. It shifted focus from security through armaments to security through human development; from territorial security to food, employment and environmental security. In the Human Development Report (HDR) of 1994, an Asian scholar, Mahbub-ul-Haq, encouraged comprehensive scope of human security. The HDR formalized and defined the idea, which identified security with people rather than regions and with progress rather than arms. However, it did not advocate for weak defence but talked about 'freedom from wants' and 'freedom from fear'. The idea brought about a new shift in global climate and governance of human rights safety.

The United Nations Development Program (1994) delineates the expanded scope of human security as follows:

- Advance human growth, not weapons
- Connect political decision-makers to undertake the new dividend of peace
- Give the United Nations a clear mandate to promote and support human development
- Increase the concept of development cooperation so that it comprises all streams, not just aid.
- Agree that 20 % of national budgets and 20 % of foreign aid be used for human development.
- Establish an Economic Security Council.¹⁵

An analysis of human security in different situations helps recognize that the inability to address a potentially extensive variety of reasons of specific insecurity can finally destabilize a country's security and definitely that of neighboring countries for instance, where people are forced to flee across borders. Where people seek to flee their country in such numbers that they are perceived by receiving states as a threat to national security, it may result in border closures, as done by Turkey against the Kurds in 1991 or Kenya against the Somalis in early 2007. People may alternatively become stuck in a 'no man's land' between borders, such as currently on the Iraqi borders with Syria and Jordan.

¹⁴ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among the Nations : The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York : A.A. Knopf, 1948), 29.

¹⁵ UNDP, *The Human Development Report* (New York : Oxford University Press, 1994), 10.

Peace and security have also been described in a report titled : *In Larger Freedom* as 'freedom from fear', that's why it is often a central concern of efforts to protect refugees.¹⁶

In this connection, the concept of human security further focuses on initiatives taken by the international community under the UN Charter to enhance the security of particular groups including refugees, citizens in armed conflict and children in armed conflict. It also discusses how interventions to strengthen the establishment of sustainable peace are critical to successful voluntary repatriation with safety and dignity of refugees. In each of these areas, initiatives in recent years can be seen as having adopted a broader and more inclusive approach, although the term 'human security' is rarely used as such. Finally, UN Report 2008 outlines briefly UN efforts to integrate the gender perspective into both peace and security concerns, notably through Security Council Resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2008). This shows how a more comprehensive and inclusive approach is being taken when seeking to establish and consolidate peace and that women empowerment, refugees' settlement are more widely recognized as critical to such efforts.

UN initiatives in recent years to strengthen the protection of civilians in armed conflict are relevant not only to the protection of IDPs but also of refugees, as noted above. Although IDPs may well be more likely than refugees to find themselves caught up in such a situation, armed conflict is a major cause of insecurity and flight for both refugees and IDPs. Refugees may also be intermingled with IDPs, as is the case in Darfur (Sudan), Chad, the Central African Republic or the DRC.

Especially where refugees remain in border regions or where conflict and insecurity spill over into neighbouring countries, refugees risk becoming unintended 'collateral damage' or even direct targets in the very conflict they are seeking to flee. Camps may be raided by armed groups, or become controlled by combatants who have temporarily withdrawn from the conflict to recuperate. In such unstable situations, the delivery of humanitarian assistance may be deliberately obstructed and humanitarian access denied. As the UN Secretary-General has noted access to civilians in armed conflict is anything but safe, certainly not timely, and far from unhindered. The result is millions of people excluded from access to life-saving assistance and the minimal protection provided by the mere presence of humanitarian workers.¹⁷

¹⁶ Personal Security of Refugees. No. 72 XLIV, *United Nations High Commission for Refugees, UNCHR* (New York: The UN Refugee Agency, 1993), Document No. 12A (A/48/12/Add.1).

¹⁷ Alice Edwards, Carla Ferstman, *Human Security and Non-citizens Law, Policy and International Affairs* (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 47-50.

Human Security in South Asia

Today South Asia, despite having been independent for the last century, is the poorest and most backward region in the world after Africa. The primary goal of every nation is to protect and ensure satisfactory defence for its homeland. No state feels relaxed living in an environment (of any type) of threat. To strengthen their security environments, nations employ various strategies to find the help of an outsider in the form of a mutual alliance. States try to join a bilateral alliance for the following reasons: to support their own abilities, to induce an outsider to come into the area and act as a balancer, to isolate the adversary, to promote a regional alliance and to reconcile with the adversary even at a cost deemed to be considerably high. The third world countries join an alliance mainly to deal with a regional adversary. Therefore, the security in the third world countries (that includes Pakistan as well) is state-centered in character, in terms of both its territory and institutions and to the security of those who profess to represent the state territorially and institutionally.

Multiple Dimensions of Inter-State Conflict in South Asia

It is clear that there are multiple dimensions of inter-state conflict in the South Asian region. Many of these conflicts have serious implications for security in the region. It may also be added here that these conflicts are mainly territorial disputes. Here an attempt has been made to explore various dimensions of these conflicts and their security implications in South Asia. The comprehensive approach to security proposes that if human beings are secured, society is secured and if society is secured, state is also secured. Since it is human beings who need to be secured, all fields of their activity such as social, political, economic, environmental etc. become components of the comprehensive security approach.

South Asia is often described as the most dangerous place on earth and now there is an urgent need for the region to overcome the bitter legacies of the past in order to create peaceful and secure environment. Since the nuclear tests by India and then Pakistan in May 1998, the focus of this region has been almost exclusively on the nuclear dimensions of the confrontation between the two states. In reality security in South Asia is challenged by interplay of several factors operating at three different levels: domestic, regional and global.¹⁸ All the South Asian states have different perspectives over these three spillover factors. Here, this study aims to portray Pakistan's perspective in this respect.

¹⁸ Malheea Lodhi, "Security Challenges in South Asia," *The Nonproliferation Review*, 8, no. 2, (Summer 2001), 118-124.

Human Security-Pakistan's Perspective

Domestic Factors

It is in the context of the comprehensive approach to security that domestic conflicts become a major challenge to human security in Pakistan. Actually domestic conflicts emanate due to various reasons that threaten human security in Pakistan. It is also implied that if the domestic conflicts are resolved amicably, the challenges of human security could be resolved to a large extent in Pakistan.

Over half a century after independence, Pakistan remains mired in a vicious cycle of poverty, deprivation, and underdevelopment. It is at the very bottom of the world league in social and human development indicators. In Pakistan only 40 percent have access to clean drinking water and fewer have nutritious food. Quality education is available only to the most fortunate and dropout rate is high. Human life in these conditions is nasty, brutish, and short.¹⁹

Thus, Pakistan is in a precarious situation today largely because of its internal problems and instability. Sectarian, ethnic and provincial conflicts are common, and terrorist activity, corruption and crime are rising in number. Pakistan has weak internal security which is damaging its international reputation. In India the situation is a bit different: it is more stable internally, developing economically and is therefore viewed as politically, economically and strategically viable, precisely what is necessary for the stability of South Asia in the eyes of US.²⁰ However, the prime fears of both countries-Pakistan and India-are currently internal rather than external which can still lead to the renewing of old wounds of enmity.

In Pakistan, at the domestic level, terrorism, religious radicalization, political instability and the unrestricted media are the main challenges to human security.

Terrorism

There are three elements of terrorism that the region is concerned about: 1) the Al-Qaeda factor, 2) what India is calling cross-border terrorism and Pakistan is calling the freedom struggle in Kashmir, 3) the sectarian (Sunni vs Shia) extremism and terrorism in Pakistan.²¹ The War on Terrorism has turned out to be the most critical clash of the 21st century and it is Pakistan that has suffered the most in this war. Pakistan's

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Umbreen Javaid, "Compulsive Peacebuilding in South Asia: Analysis of Pakistan-India Relations", in *South Asia in Perspective*, ed. Dr. Umbreen Javaid (Lahore: Center for South Asian Studies, University of the Punjab, 2013), 12-14.

²¹ Steve Coll, "Between India and Pakistan, A Changing Role for the US," *Washington Post*, May 26, 2002.

role in this war has caused multi-dimensional exterior security coercion for the country. It has been the greatest victim in this entire war in terms of irrecoverable loss of human capital more than 45000 in number. Pakistan, as compared to the other actors in Afghanistan, has also taken serious beatings.²² By making Pakistan a front line state, such a game is being played that Pakistan is American friend and foe at the same time. After 9/11, Pakistan has become the theater of a blind war. It is becoming difficult to assess with every passing day that who is against whom.²³

Religious Radicalization

Religious radicalization and its violent eruption have been developing along two levels in Pakistan: the domestic level and the international level. Pakistan's leadership, both military and civilian, has done its best to prevent social and political chaos and its major goals have little to do with development in structures of civil society, rather it has been applying all its energies for reigning in bothersome ethnic groups. Separation from East Pakistan, tensions and wars with India and outstanding issue of Kashmir between India and Pakistan have contributed to the emergence of an unstable regional environment. Similarly, the Afghan war has had a strong impact on internal security, having been strictly connected with growing Islamic militancy, drug trafficking and smuggling.

Political Instability

The concept of comprehensive security led to a broader and more holistic approach. It was recognized that security is affected not only by the military balance of power, but also by instability resulting from mutual clash, communal strength, poverty, joblessness, planned criminality, terrorism and conservational deprivation, as well as by mass population movement. Human security thus came to be seen as requiring the establishment of both security from such continuing fears as starvation, illness and protection from abrupt turbulence in daily routine life. Currently, Pakistan is facing various kinds of security as well as terrorist threats from several Taliban groups. In the tribal parts of Pakistan, many terrorist groups are active and trying to weaken Pakistan with acts of terrorism. Pakistan also has many issues with respect to its sovereignty and survival in this situation. So, there are different types of internal and external players who want to play a very negative role in the survival,

²² Muhammad Saleem Mazhar, Samee Ozair Khan and Naheed Goraya, "Post-2014 Afghanistan", *Journal of South Asian Studies*, 28, no. 1, (2013) 67-82 (Lahore: University of the Punjab, Lahore).

²³ Dr. Naheed Shabir Goraya, "Global War against Terrorism: A Security Threat to Pakistan", in *South Asia in Perspective ed.*, Dr. Umbreen Javaid (Lahore: CSAS, University of the Punjab, 2013), 86.

trade and economy of Pakistan.²⁴

There are different types of political, religious and ethnic organizations, which have been growing by utilizing Information Technology (IT) tools effectively for creating political chaos and instability for the last fifteen years. There have been ethno-linguistic movements in all the provinces, as well as sectarian and tribal conflicts in many areas, resulting in the convergence of multiple typologies and a widespread Islamic radicalization. The reasons for this situation are multi-dimensional and represent a complex phenomenon, to be considered as a part of an unmanageable process of socio-cultural change creating tension and social crisis.

Human Security and the Role of Media

The role of media has domestic, regional and global implications for human security. However, domestic and regional role of media is more relevant to human security issues in the context of Pakistan. At the domestic level, Pakistan has a plural culture across several religious sects. Radio and TV stations broadcast many programs based on religion and culture. The lack of debate on religious issues and certain cultural taboos forces people to rely on the given interpretations of religious issues unquestioningly. The ill-informed and conservative religious teachers are totally free to misuse the loud speakers of mosques to propagate their extremist viewpoints on world affairs, without any checks and balances. Resultantly, the population encounters manipulated news and fundamentalist ideas, which cause flawed perceptions, unrealistic expectations, sensationalism, fanaticism, and sectarianism.²⁵ In this way, media at the domestic level contributes to the factors which have been posing threat to human security in Pakistan since its inception.

Apart from the domestic factors, external developments at the regional level, such as events in Iran, Afghanistan and China could also be key concerns for human security in Pakistan.²⁶ Overall, at the regional level, the Indian traditional rivalry against Pakistan poses a greater threat to the human security of the Pakistani nation, owing to nuclear capability of India and Pakistan.

Regional Factors

At the regional level, the pursuit of domination by one state over its neighbours is a recipe for insecurity and instability. The prevailing

²⁴ Muhammad Jahangir Tamimi, "India's Foreign Policy towards South Asia and Pakistan," in *South Asia in Perspective*, ed. Dr. Umbreen Javaid (Lahore: CSAS, University of the Punjab, 2013), 34.

²⁵ Yoginder Sikand, "Pakistan, Islam and Indian Media Stereotypes," *Countercurrents.org*, January 21 2006, <https://www.countercurrents.org/ipk-sikand210106.htm>.

²⁶ Michael Krepon and Alex Stolar, "Outlook for Regional Security in South Asia", *Pakistan Horizon*, 60, no. 3, (2007), 73-82.

asymmetry with regard to both strategic objectives and the relationship between military forces of the largest country in South Asia, i.e. India and its smaller neighbours is a structural factor for instability and has been exacerbated by Delhi's desire to dominate. Certainly, attempts at domination can be destabilizing and thus highly dangerous in terms of human security provision, particularly for Pakistan. The Indian rivalry factor has also been important in aggravating conflicts generally in the region and particularly in Pakistan, thereby posing serious challenges to human security. Indian interference plays a negative role in aggravating domestic conflicts in some areas of Pakistan like Baluchistan.

Pakistan and India have engaged themselves in a number of conflict management talks, negotiations and agreements but all of them proved to be futile in the end. Agreements and summits like the Tashkent Agreement in 1965, the Shimla Accord in 1972, the Lahore Declaration in 1998, the Agra Summit in 2001 and Composite Dialogue that began in 2004 proved to be major steps initially but in the end they could not produce desired result. This has added to the resentment between these neighbouring states. Furthermore, both sides tried to resolve their conflicts through other channels like Track II diplomacy and were engaged in extensive talks with the help of retired diplomats, former military men, business groups and other social entities, but like previous efforts, they remained unable to extract a successful or major positive result. Pakistan and India as the two most important states of the South Asian region need to manage and resolve their conflicts.²⁷ The internal terrorism menace, a significant challenge by itself, as well as external involvement by India and events in Afghanistan have complicated the task, which has been compounded by years of neglect and errors of omission and perhaps commission. While on the military front public, media and parliamentary efforts have provided the essential support needed for the Swat operation on wards, much more needs to be done.

Kashmir Dispute

Kashmir dispute has been a burning issue over the last sixty-eight years, waiting to be resolved. Under the UN resolution of 1948, on January 1, 1949, a ceasefire agreement was signed between Pakistan and India through the mediation of United Nations and it was decided that Kashmir issue will be resolved according to the wishes of the Kashmiri people through a plebiscite, but it was never conducted by India. Henceforth, the issue remains an unresolved and biggest conflict because both states have diverging positions and claims over the Kashmir.²⁸ The outstanding

²⁷ Umbreen Javaid, "Conflict Management Between India and Pakistan: Challenges and Failures," *Journal of South Asian Studies*, 31, no. 1 (Lahore: University of the Punjab, 2016), 253 - 254.

²⁸ Victoria Schofield, *Kashmir in Conflict; India, Pakistan and the Unending War* (London: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd, 2003), 15.

Kashmir conflict has proven threat to the human security as these two neighbouring states have fought three conventional wars in the backdrop of Kashmir dispute which had damaged not only human lives at large but stunted the growth of socio-political and economic development compatible to human security.

Siachen Conflict

Siachen conflict is a by-product of the Kashmir dispute. The conflict began in 1984 when Indian forces occupied the glacier. For its part, Pakistan asserts that Siachen is an essential part of Gilgit-Baltistan, administered by Islamabad. "Pakistan fears that India will use the passes over the glacier to invade and occupy more territory in Baltistan. Indian occupation of Siachen Glacier also represents a threat to Karakoram Highway, the major road linking Pakistan to China through the Khunjerab Pass." ²⁹ In CPEC scenario, such fears have worsened. Pakistan also argues that its troops on Siachen are trying to prevent further Indian aggression in the region. The Indian condition for de-escalation in the Salto range has been for Pakistan to agree to a demarcation of the posts which is not acceptable for Pakistan. In a joint statement of defence secretaries of India and Pakistan after talks in June 1989 agreed on redeployment of forces and future positions on the grounds under the Simla Agreement. India however, backtracked. Again, bilateral talks were held in New Delhi in November 1992, but could not produce meaningful outcome. A hope of settlement emerged when Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Siachen in 2005 and showed a gesture towards resolving the conflict with Pakistan by turning Siachen into a 'mountain of peace'. However, it did not happen due to resistance from the Indian Army. Meanwhile, conflict has claimed 2700 human lives on both side not due to combat but avalanches, exposure and altitude sickness caused by the thin, oxygen-depleted air at Siachen. The conflict continues to pose challenge to human security in both countries.

Kargil Conflict

The Kargil crisis in 1999 also reflected Pakistan and India's conflict over Kashmir. The conflict brought out the serious threat of nuclear war as both states had tested their nuclear bombs a short time before this conflict. James Woolsey, a former head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), termed the Kashmir issue as a flashpoint that had the probable prospects for future use of weapons of mass destruction

²⁹ Omer Farooq Zain, "Siachen Glacier Conflict: Discordant in Pakistan-India Reconciliation," *Pakistan Horizon*, 59, no. 2 (2006), 73-82. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41394127>.

including nuclear weapons.³⁰ The conflict ended with intervention by the international community, in particular, the United States convinced Pakistan and India to come to the negotiating table to discuss and resolve disputed issues including the Kashmir problem.³¹ The conflict claimed more 1200 human lives on both sides.

Hostility of Media and Failed Negotiations

On the other hand, the hostility of media is another challenge and reason of failure of peace efforts between both sides-India and Pakistan. Media propaganda is sustained on both sides, but more so by the Indian media. In case of any incident, militant or terrorist attack, the media starts to blame the other state, without due evidence, as in almost every case Indian media starts targeting Pakistan for the incident. The major examples are Samjhota Express blasts in 2006, in which over a hundred Pakistanis were killed but the Indian media started to blame Pakistan for the attack. However, as the investigations progressed, it proved that right wing Hindu extremists were involved in the attack. This negative media propaganda has never been controlled by either side which has resulted in more enmity between both states. This media hostility has caused the negotiations to fail on a number of occasions, as in some cases the masses were not ready to accept the proposed solution. For instance, on Musharraf's five point 'Kashmir Formula' in 2005 Indian media started negative propaganda and campaign against it, which created a negative environment for the ongoing dialogue process between the two countries.³²

The electronic and print media in India and Pakistan has been contributing to the exacerbation of existing misperceptions on both sides. Mishandling of various issues by media has proved to be a major obstacle in the way of normalization of relations between India and Pakistan. Exaggerated facts and propaganda do not necessarily always produce fruitful results. The role of media can be highly constructive regarding resolution of various issues by highlighting different aspects of the issues and discussing possible options available to solve problems. This is one of the major responsibilities upon the shoulders of the media of both India

³⁰ Rashid Ahmad Siddiqi, *Deterrence Stability in Nuclear South Asia-A Study of Post 1998 India-Pakistan Conflict and US Role*, PhD Thesis (New Zealand: University of Auckland, 2011), 72-119.

³¹ Muhammad Jahangir Tamimi, *India's Foreign Policy towards South Asia and Pakistan*, in *South Asia in Perspective*, ed., (Lahore: CSAS, University of the Punjab, 2013), 21.

³² Umbreen Javaid, "Conflict Management Between India and Pakistan: Challenges and Failures", *Journal of South Asian Studies*, 31, no. 1, (Lahore: University of the Punjab, 2016), 253-254.

and Pakistan in securing durable peace in the region of South Asia.³³

For this, the role of media at regional level is more relevant and important because it has been making the people of India and Pakistan perceive each other in a hostile way for a long time. This perceived antagonism poses challenges to human security policies formulation and implementation in Pakistan.

Global Factors: International Involvements and Interventions

Pakistan, due to its geo-political and strategic location, has been the pivot of world politics since independence. It soon became a part of the block politics by joining SEATO and CENTO. Pakistan played a role as part of the US-led capitalist block against the USSR throughout the Cold War period, but in particular during the Afghan war followed by USSR's invasion in Afghanistan in 1979. Pakistan thus played a pivotal role in converting the global power structure from bipolar to unipolar corresponding to the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. During the period of Cold War, human security in Pakistan remained at stake and Pakistan not only sacrificed lives in support of Afghan Jihad but also bore the burden of Afghan refugees which later converted into a threat to the socio-political and economic security of its own people. Pakistan had not fully overcome the spillover effects of Afghan war when the incident of 9/11 took place which put Pakistan into another global conflict: war on terrorism.

Thus, post 9/11 Pakistan witnessed human security threat on Western border as well. Because of joining hands in the US led war on terrorism, Pakistan sacrificed on socio-political and economic fronts which damaged the human security badly in Pakistan. After 9/11, the threat for Pakistan rapidly expanded from the state-centric Indian conventional threat at the Eastern border to a trans-border asymmetric threat from the Western front. This altered the dynamics of internal and external security for Pakistan.³⁴

This state of play in South Asia, described above, has an obvious bearing on the international environment, including security in adjacent regions. The reverse also holds true. The pursuit of a lopsided approach in South Asia by the world's primary power, the United States, could undermine security and compound regional tensions. For instance, the suggestion made by some to build up India as a counterweight to China could prove to be destabilizing and counterproductive for the region and indeed for US interests globally. Instead of pursuing an outdated balance of power approach, American interests would be better served by a partnership with South Asia as a whole.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Muhammad Saleem Mazhar, Samee Ozair Khan and Naheed Goraya, "Post-2014 Afghanistan", *Journal of South Asian Studies*, 28, no. 1, 67-84 (2013), 67-82.

Many terrorist groups and organizations, influenced by or affiliated with Al-Qaeda, exist in different parts of the world. They are not only in the Muslim majority countries, but many cells also exist in non-Muslim western countries like the United Kingdom, France, and Spain etc. Pakistan has been blamed by US led allies that madrassas in Pakistan are facilitating the recruitment process of members of banned organizations. This is also because of the perceived notion of a defensive jihad by the Muslim Ummah. Consequently, some members of these organizations had been travelling to Pakistan to join banned organizations³⁵.

In recent years, Pakistan has joined CPEC-a flagship project of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) led by China, which will promote people centric economic development. This will have positive impact on the demographic, social, economic and political aspects of the lives of Pakistani people. At the same time, pollution due to some energy projects and human displacement is expected to impact human security in Pakistan.

The Way Forward: Ensuring Human Security

Human security operates more as a unifying, 'umbrella' concept and encompasses threats to social and economic security as well as to physical security.³⁶ Therefore, both human security and human responsibility go side by side while focusing on human security measures at the bilateral, regional and global levels. Pakistan and India must resolve conflicts at the bilateral level. At the regional level, Afghanistan along with India and Pakistan must play a role to curtail terrorism so that threat to human security from the western border of Pakistan may be reduced. Further, India must play a role in Afghanistan's stability with Pakistan's cooperation but not the role in Pakistan's destruction through supporting anti-Pakistan terrorist groups. Also at the regional level, the key players China and USA, must understand the human security dimension in South Asia and try to bring the South Asian nations together for regional development and comprehensive security through trade and investment.

This is the time for regional countries, particularly Pakistan to get advantage of the emerging economic opportunities in South Asia. In order to achieve its short-term as well as long-term goals in the region, the United States wants peace in South Asia. It was for this reason that US has supported Pakistan-India dialogue process. The U.S. administration is

³⁵ Seth Jones, *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan*, Vol. 4 (US: National Defence Research Institute, RAND Corporation, 2008), 67-111.

³⁶ *General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security*, UNGA, 22 May 2008, at www.un.org/ga/president/62/ThematicDebates/humansecurity.shtml, fulfilling the commitment of the World Summit Outcome document, UN Doc. A/RES/60/1, 'to discussing and defining the notion of human security in the General Assembly' (New York : UNGA), para 143.

quite concerned about a number of critical challenges that Pakistan faces such as: fighting terrorism, countering extremism, preventing nuclear proliferation as well as reforming education and building viable democratic institutions in Pakistan, especially in its tribal areas (FATA). On the other hand, China wants global connectivity where Pakistan has a pivotal role to play via the Gawadar port. Pakistan should pursue a balanced approach towards both that will serve its long-term interest to promote human security in the country.

Conclusion

As the world changes, many scholars, analysts and policy makers agree that while governments need to confront external threats, creating sustainable domestic environments is an imperative policy priority. In the post-Cold War period, several conflicts, including the nuclear tests of 1998 and the post-9/11 war on terror, have made South Asia a focussed region and continue to make India and Pakistan vital states, where Pakistan has a pivotal role to play in the region. In this context, human security remains a top priority for Pakistan.

The Indo-Pak security complex has been posing new challenges for the human security in the region since nuclearization of both states, because the Kashmir dispute has often been described as a potential nuclear flash point across the region. This risk to human security can only be mitigated within the framework of cooperative security. India and Pakistan need to focus their attention on how to bring about this transformation. They must unambiguously commit themselves to seek a negotiated settlement of the Kashmir dispute. If the Kashmir issue had been resolved peacefully during 2004-2006, there would have been no further bloodshed, no political interference and no ethnic disturbances. Only peaceful, practicable, equitable, democratic and honourable actions can bring a durable solution of the Kashmir issue and this shall ensure a peaceful and prosperous future for the entire world in general and for South Asia in particular.

It is the need of the hour that India and Pakistan make progress in economic and trade relations. Both states need to realize that at present it is in the interest of not only the two states but also their huge populations to have improved relations, which will absolutely be advantageous to both Pakistan and India. It is a pity that the South Asian region lags behind in regional trade as compared to other regions and the development and progress of South Asia is directly linked with peace in this region. It is the only solution for peace and stability in South Asia.

It is high time that the leaders of both India and Pakistan initiate meaningful efforts to uplift living standards of the people. This will enhance the opportunity for India and Pakistan to cooperate in trade and development under Chinese initiated economic connectivity. India must

join the CPEC. This will bring peace in the region. Pakistan must also change the direction of its policies to overcome the challenges it faces internally and externally.

AZAD JAMMU AND KASHMIR AND GILGIT-BALTISTAN: HISTORICAL, CONSTITUTIONAL & ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENT

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Abstract

Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) and Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) are two parts of the erstwhile state of Jammu & Kashmir affiliated with Pakistan. These areas have a unique character as they are neither independent in their administrative affairs nor are they a part of Pakistan for administrative purposes like the other four provinces. Since the question of final status of Jammu and Kashmir remained unresolved, the constitutional development of both AJK and GB has been slow. This study explores the rationale behind peculiar and ad hoc administrative structures of these two regions and their relationship with Pakistan. It examines issues in their administrative and constitutional evolution, the legal and constitutional voids in the systems of these territories and suggests some corrective measures as a way forward. The study relies mainly on data of official archives and structured interviews of policy makers and relevant stakeholders.

Key words: *Constitutional Voids, Ad Hoc Administrative Set Up, Azad Jammu & Kashmir, Gilgit-Baltistan, Unresolved Kashmir Dispute*

Introduction

The area of the state of Jammu and Kashmir is 88,471 square miles. Out of this 33,958 square miles or about 25 percent is under the control of Pakistan since 1947, comprising 29,814 square miles of

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Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) and 4,144 square miles of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK).¹ The population of GB is 1.4 million and the population of AJK is 3.5 million. Besides, the people of GB and AJK residing outside these areas in the rest of the country and overseas are 1.6 million and 1.5 million respectively.²

Formerly known as the Northern Areas, GB is situated in the north of Pakistan and is surrounded by the Chinese province of Xinjiang in the North, Indian Held Kashmir (IHK) in the East, AJK in the South and Afghanistan and Central Asia, through the Wakhan Corridor in the West. Gilgit being the political and administrative capital, Skardu and Diamer districts are the other important areas. GB is also famous for its five peaks of over 8000 meters including K2 and Nanga Parbat and to more than fifty peaks above 7000 meters. Three of the world's longest glaciers including the Biafo, Batura and the Baltoro Glacier are found in GB. Deosai Plains is the second-highest plateau in the world at 4,115 meters after Tibet.³

AJK, the southern part of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir is surrounded by the IHK in the East, separated by the Line of Control (LoC), the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in the West, the Federally Administered Northern Areas (FANA) in the North, and the Punjab Province of Pakistan in the South. Muzaffarabad is the capital of AJK. It is mainly hilly and mountainous with valleys and plains. It is bequeathed with natural beauty having thick green forests, gushing rivers and meandering streams; main rivers are Jhelum, Poonch and Neelum. It has two divisions and ten districts.

Currently, AJK is governed by the Interim Constitution Act of 1974. This Act was passed by the legislative assembly of AJK and vetted by the government of Pakistan. GB on the other hand is governed by the Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self-governance) Order 2009, which was issued by the President of Pakistan after a long process of informal consultation with local and national leaders. The administration of both territories was entrusted to Pakistan by a United Nations Security Council resolution. Both have since been treated in many aspects as administrative units of Pakistan and are subject to most of the liabilities and obligations of a province, though not enjoying any of the constitutional rights and powers availed to other provinces. Thus, both GB and AJK are independent of the constitution of Pakistan, having different administrative set ups, from rest of Pakistan. Reflecting upon the inclusion of AJK and GB in the national politics and decision making set ups, it is revealed that the regions don't have any seats in the parliament of Pakistan or in the

¹ *Assessment of Socio Economic Trends in GB*, (Agha Khan Rural Support Program, 2005).

² *AJK at a Glance*, (Muzaffarabad: Planning and Development Department, 2013), pndajk.gov.pk accessed May 26, 2014.

³ M. R. Cyan & A. Latif, *Northern Areas Strategy for Sustainable Development* (Gilgit: IUCN, 2003).

institutions established by the constitution for consultation and coordination between the federation and its component units, such as the National Security Council, Counsel of Common Interest (CCI), and the National Finance Commission. Similarly both have no representation in the Indus River System Authority (IRSA) and unlike the provinces, they get no share in the profits earned from the hydroelectric projects located in AJK and GB. This denial of rights of royalty has generated considerable resentment in both areas.

Political History of Azad Jammu and Kashmir

In the backdrop of centuries old geographical and demographic developments, the State of Jammu and Kashmir was taken over by Dogra ruler Gulab Singh of Jammu on 16th March, 1846 through Treaty of Amritsar (Sale Deed) signed between Maharaja Gulab Singh of Jammu and British Government. As a consequence of partition plan under the Independence Act, 1947, British India was divided into two sovereign and independent dominions: India and Pakistan. Almost five hundred sixty princely states including the State of Jammu and Kashmir were given the option to accede to either of the two dominions. The criteria for acceding to the two sovereign dominions were such that geographical situation and communal interests were to be considered.⁴ The wishes of the people of Jammu and Kashmir were reflected by the Resolution adopted by the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference on 19th July, 1947 in which accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan was univocally declared⁵. The Hindu Maharaja of Kashmir had sympathies with the Indian leadership so both started a large scale massacre in Jammu and adjoining areas. Resultantly, widespread armed conflict took place between Muslim activists and the Dogra Forces, which resulted in rebellion against the Rule of Maharaja Hari Singh.

News of brutalities reached Pakistan through its press. To help their Muslim brethren, tribal-men started marching towards Kashmir and reached the outskirts of Srinagar in the last week of October, 1947⁶. Maharaja Hari Singh remained indecisive regarding accession to either of the two dominions as per partition plan. He sent telegrams to the High Commissioners of India and Pakistan simultaneously on August 12, 1947 and offered a stand-still agreement with India and Pakistan to continue existing arrangements till a settlement of the details⁷. The government of Pakistan accepted the proposal of the Maharaja vide its telegram dated 15

⁴ Ijaz Hussain, *Kashmir Dispute: An International Law Perspective* (Islamabad: National Institute of Pakistan Studies, 1998), 70.

⁵ Sardar Ibrahim Khan, *The Kashmir Saga* (Mirpur : Verinag Publishers, 1965), 89.

⁶ Mirza Hassan Khan, *Shamsheer, Se Zanjeer Tak*, (Islamabad : Maktab Press, 2010).

⁷ Ijaz Hussain, *Kashmir Dispute: An International Law Perspective* (Islamabad: National Institute of Pakistan Studies, 1998),120.

August 15, 1947 while government of India did not. The acceptance of the stand-still agreement by the Government of Pakistan had entitled it to exercise sovereignty/suzerainty over state of Jammu and Kashmir. A declaration of the Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir was issued on 24th October, 1947, long before Hari Singh allegedly acceded to India. The massacre continued even after establishment of the Azad Government.⁸

On 1st January, 1948, the Government of India sent a telegram to President of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and levelled allegations against the Government of Pakistan that it allowed the invaders to transit across the Pakistani territory and use it as their base for operations. The Indian complaint was based on Article 35 of Chapter VI of the UN charter which relates to “peaceful settlement of disputes” and not chapter VII which deals with “acts of aggression”.⁹ The Indian and Pakistani delegates traded charges against each other in the Council. UNSC assumed the role of mediator between the parties and passed a Resolution (No. 38) on 17th January, 1948 through which it stressed upon the Governments of Pakistan and India to take all measures to improve the situation and refrain from any action which might worsen the situation.¹⁰

The successive UNSC Resolution on Jammu and Kashmir set up United Nations Commissions on India and Pakistan (UNCIP) consisting of three UN members and one each from parties to the dispute. Under different UNCIP Resolutions, three distinct stages towards the resolution of Kashmir problem were contemplated. First relates to cease fire, which was governed by part one of the Commission’s Resolution of 13th August, 1948.¹¹ The second relates to negotiations in the light of truce agreement in accordance with the principles set out in 1948 Resolution and the third relates to the holding of a free and impartial plebiscite under auspices of the UN, to determine whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir should accede to India or Pakistan in accordance with principles set up in the Commission’s Resolution of 5th January, 1949.¹²

⁸ Mirza Hassan Khan, *Shamsheer Se Zanjeer Tak*, (Islamabad : Maktab Press, 2010).

⁹ Pauline Dawson, “Indian Complaint, supra note 24” in, *The Peacekeepers of Kashmir: The UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan* (London: Palgrave Macmillian, 1994), <https://www.amazon.com/Peacekeepers-Kashmir-Military-Observer-Pakistan/dp/1850651086> (accessed June 6, 2014).

¹⁰ “United Nations Security Council Resolution 38,” <http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/1948.shtml> (accessed August 8, 2015).

¹¹ “Resolution adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on 13 August 1948”, Part I, <http://www.mofa.gov.pk/documents/unsc/Resolution%20adopted%20by%20the%20United%20Nations%20Commission%20for%20India%20and%20Pakistan%20on%2013%20August%201948.pdf> (accessed August 9, 2015).

¹² Ibid.

The responsibilities of the Government of Pakistan under the UNCIP Resolution include¹³ the defense and security of Azad Jammu and Kashmir; the issuance of current coin or the issue of the bills, notes or other paper currency; manage the external affairs of Azad Jammu and Kashmir including foreign trade and foreign aid (under Section 31(3) of AJK Interim Constitution Act, 1974).¹⁴ Besides, Pakistan was bound to provide guarantee and protection of human and political rights of AJK people; empowerment of the people of AJK; self-rule no less than the provinces of Pakistan; good governance and non-discrimination; socio-economic development of AJK; due share from federal pool of resources; net hydel profits earned from bulk generation of hydro electric power stations located in AJK (Mangla and Neelum and Jhelum hydro-electric power stations) as mandatory under Article 161 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973. Likewise, representation in National Finance Commission (NFC) and other Federal/Inter Ministerial Forums is also mandatory in pursuance of UNCIP Resolution and GOP policy No. 8/9/70(cord) 1, dated 24th June, 1970, which treats AJK at par with other provinces of Pakistan.

Political History of Gilgit-Baltistan

The chronology of Kashmir entails a chain of events leading to the current situation. Gulab Singh was the Sikh ruler of Hindu-majority fiefdom of Jammu; he annexed Laddakh in 1930s and Baltistan in 1941 to his fiefdom. In 1846, the British sold the beautiful northern valley of Kashmir (which had an overwhelmingly Muslim population) to Gulab Singh. Thus for the next few decades, history witnessed the creation of a strong mini-empire, consisting of the outermost regions of India's northern frontier and establishing control over a large area including the predominantly Muslim regions of the former principalities of Gilgit, Hunza, Nagar and other territories bordering Afghanistan and the Chinese province of Xinjiang.

By the 1930s, Maharaja Gulab Singh had acquired almost complete control over the agency and its neighborhood, with the compliance of the British government. However, the chain of events led the Maharaja to lose control over this area, and in 1935 he handed over control of part of Gilgit Agency to the British for 60 years on lease. This arrangement remained in place until 1st August, 1947. On the eve of partition of subcontinent, British government decided to unilaterally dissolve the lease agreement and return Gilgit Agency to Hindu Dogra ruler of Kashmir. The people of Gilgit, who were predominantly Muslims and Gilgit Scouts who again consisted of predominantly Muslim soldiers, were much displeased at being reassigned

¹³ Sumit Ganguly, *The Origins of War in South Asia* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 98.

¹⁴ "Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government Act, 1974," Consultative meeting group proceedings retrieved from http://www.ajkassembly.gok.pk/AJK_Interim_Constitution_Act_1974.pdf

to the Maharajah's rule and service. In August 1947, when the Maharaja decided to accede to India, this resentment converted into a rebellion. So in October 1947, Pashtun tribesmen from the North West Frontier Province (NWFP now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) declared a "holy war" against Kashmir's Hindu ruler, and started a march towards Srinagar, the Maharaja's capital.

The territory they captured became *Azad* (free) Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) on 24th October¹⁵. The Maharaja panicked and asked the Indian government for help and allegedly acceded to India, following which India moved troops to Srinagar, starting the first of several wars with Pakistan. The Maharaja's decision also led to a full-scale rebellion in Gilgit, spearheaded by the Gilgit Scouts and Muslim members of the Jammu and Kashmir state troops, with the support of the overwhelmingly Muslim local population¹⁶. They were victorious in keeping control over a large area of Gilgit and Baltistan and power was transferred to the first Pakistani Political Agent in Gilgit on 16th November. Hunza and Nagar signed instruments of accession to Pakistan. Indian and Pakistani military representatives signed an agreement in Karachi on 29th July, 1949, which defined the ceasefire line in the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

In 1949, Pakistan's Ministry of Kashmir affairs was established initially to deal with matters related to the Kashmir dispute. This ministry was later renamed as the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas (KANA) and it assumed administrative control over Gilgit Agency, including Baltistan¹⁷. The Northern Areas' constitutional status is uncertain to this day and awaits a final solution of the Kashmir dispute to clarify its position. As a result, the Northern Areas were neither included in any reference of the three constitutions of Pakistan, nor given representation in any of its parliaments. The region remains in a constitutionally indeterminate state. The people of this area largely support integration with Pakistan, but are still seeking for an identity and deeply piqued by their uncertain status. At last on continuous demand of local people, the government of Pakistan has decided to grant GB further internal autonomy and bring it at par with the provinces of Pakistan but not to a status of province. The Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self Governance Order 2009 was introduced in August 2009.¹⁸

¹⁵ Mirza Hassan Khan, *Shamsheer Se Zanjeer Tak*, 4.

¹⁶ William A. Brown, *The Gilgit Rebellion 1947* (London: Ibex, 1998),164.

¹⁷ Retrieved from unpublished official archives (2013).

¹⁸ Prime Minister Secretariat, *Gilgit Baltistan Self-Governance Order 2009* (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 2009).

Evolution of AJK Governance Structure

The Government of AJK was established on 24th October, 1947, to work as a war council. Under the Rules of Business which were developed in order to run the administration of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, the executive as well as the legislative authority was vested in the President. The law of the land was enacted in 1948 which laid the foundation for running the judicial administration and even some laws of former State of Jammu and Kashmir remained in operation. In 1952, new needs arose and the Rules of Business were revised. The system was streamlined and new rules for administration as well as new legislation were incorporated in the Rules of Business. Another revision of the Rules of Business took place in 1957. This system prevailed from 1947 to 1960, in which the person who had the confidence of the Working Committee of Muslims was nominated as the president of Azad Jammu and Kashmir.¹⁹ Another position called the office of Supreme Head, also existed in the earlier years of AJK parliamentary history, which was the final body to approve the legislation for Azad Jammu and Kashmir, but this office was abolished in 1952. After that the President was declared the Executive Head, who worked with the assistance of some cabinet ministers.²⁰

In 1960, another system was introduced which was the Presidential election system through the “votes of basic democrats” in Azad Jammu and Kashmir. Within this system another body known as 'Azad Jammu and Kashmir State Council' was established and it was decided that its members will be elected by the basic democrats. The council consisted of 24 members, of which 12 members are supposed to be from Azad Jammu and Kashmir elected by people living in AJK, whereas 12 members were to be from among the refugees and elected by the refugees from the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir settled in Pakistan. In 1964, this system was also abolished and replaced by the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government Act, 1964. This act also contained the provision for the State Council with the amendment that eight State Councilors were to be elected by the basic democrats of Azad Jammu and Kashmir. In 1965, another amendment was made and provision for appointment of two more members to be nominated by the President from amongst the refugees settled in Pakistan was allowed. Under the Act of 1964 the Chairman of the Council was to be nominated by the Chief Advisor from amongst the members. The Chairman had to act as the President for Azad Jammu and Kashmir ex-officio. In 1968, the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government Act, 1968, was enacted with the provision that eight members will be elected, while four members were to be nominated by the Chief

¹⁹ “AJK rules of Business, 1952,” retrieved from unpublished Government documents

²⁰ “Legislative Assembly of Azad Jammu & Kashmir,” www.ajkassembly.gok.pk/ajkinintroduction.htm (accessed August 9, 2015).

Advisor from amongst the refugees settled in Pakistan. The Chairman of the Council was elected by the Councilors, who was also ex-officio President. In 1969, a caretaker government was inducted in the office.²¹

In 1970, the system of a democratic setup i.e. adult franchise was adopted in Azad Jammu and Kashmir through Azad Jammu and Kashmir Act, 1970. For the first time, it provided the opportunity of electing the Legislative Assembly as well as President of Azad Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of adult franchise by the people of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, and the refugees of Jammu and Kashmir settled in Pakistan. The Assembly consisted of 24 elected members and it was decided that there would be quota for one woman member selected by the other members.²² The presidential system of government prevailed for about 4 years when, in 1974, it was again replaced by the parliamentary system which was introduced in AJK under the AJK Interim Constitution Act, 1974.

The salient features of the present structure of governance in AJK introduced through re-enactment of AJK Interim Constitution Act, 1974 are briefly highlighted in the following table.²³ For the purpose of analysis the present system is being compared with the previous system as defined by AJK Government Act, 1970.

Table: 1
Comparison of the AJK Act, 1970 and Interim Constitution Act, 1974

| AJK Government Act, 1970 | AJK Interim Constitution Act, 1974 |
|--|--|
| Presidential form of government elected on the basis of adult franchise by the state subjects living in Azad Kashmir and Pakistan. | Parliamentary democratic form of govt. with Prime Minister as Chief executive and repository of all executive powers. |
| Full internal executive and legislative autonomy except the responsibilities of GoP. The responsibilities of the GoP under the UNCIP Resolutions were: i) The defense and security of Azad Jammu and Kashmir. ii) The issuance of currency, coins, bills, notes or other | AJK Council, with the Prime Minister of Pakistan as its Chairman, was vested with legislative powers with respect to 52 subjects in the form of 'Council Legislative List' Responsibilities assigned to GoP under Act, 1970, however, were continued with following addition:- i) The external affairs of Azad Jammu and Kashmir including foreign trade and foreign aid. ii) Institution of "Joint Sitting" as legislative body also created for purposes mentioned in Section 31, |

²¹ Unpublished Archives, 2013.

²² AJ&K Portal, *AJ&K History*, <http://www.ajk.gov.pk/history.php> (accessed August 11, 2015).

²³ "The Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974", www.ajkassembly.gov.pk/AJK_Interim_Constitution_Act_1974.pdf (accessed August 15, 2015).

| | |
|--|---|
| paper currency. Legislature consists of AJK Assembly, only. | 33 and 53 etc. and different other purposes. |
| Executive Authority vested in the government | Executive Authority bifurcated among Government of AJK, AJK Council and Govt. of Pakistan |
| Four year term of Government/AJK Assembly | Five years term of AJK Assembly/ Government |
| Fundamental Rights guaranteed through written jurisdiction of High Court AJK | Similar to former Act, 1970 |
| Independence of Judiciary | Same as in Act of 1970 |
| Appointment of High Court Judges and of Chief Election Commissioner by the President. | The appointment of Judges in Superior Courts and of Chief Election Commissioner to be made by the President AJK. The method has been modified through subsequent amendment made in year 1975 under which these appointments can be made on mandatory advice by the Prime Minister of Pakistan/Chairman AJK Council. |

Source: Compiled by the authors.

The presidential form of government introduced by AJK Government Act, 1970 was replaced by re-enactment of AJK Interim Constitution Act, 1974 that introduced Parliamentary Democratic System, as proposed and agreed with Government of Pakistan. The Constitution Act, 1974 defines three organs of statehood i.e. Legislature, Executive and Judiciary.²⁴

The legislative Assembly consists of 49 members out of which 41 are elected by the people of AJK and Kashmiri refugees settled in Pakistan, on the basis of adult franchise. Out of 41 elected seats, 29 MLAs are elected from constituencies within AJK territory and 12 MLAs are elected from constituencies in Pakistan for representation of Kashmiri refugees settled in Pakistan. Eight MLAs are indirectly elected against seats reserved for technocrat, overseas Kashmiris, ulema, mushaikh and women.²⁵ This body is empowered to make laws with respect to residuary matters not enumerated in the Council Legislative List nor assigned to Government of Pakistan.

The AJK Council consists of the Prime Minister of Pakistan (ex-officio Chairman), the President of AJK (Vice Chairman), the Prime Minister of AJK or any person nominated by him (Member), six members elected by AJK Legislative Assembly and five members nominated by the

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Interim Constitution Act, 1974, Section 22.

Prime Minister of Pakistan.²⁶ The Council as a legislative body is assigned 52 subjects for making laws. The AJK Council is also vested with executive powers in respect of laws made by AJK Council despite its composition as a legislative body. Joint sitting of the two bodies is held occasionally for making amendments in the Interim Constitution Act, 1974, voting for election, removal of the president and consideration of matters concerning proclamation of emergency under Section 33 of the 1974 Act.

Under Section 31 (3) of AJK Interim Constitution Act, 1974, the Government of Pakistan is empowered to exercise Executive Authority in relation to certain matters and to regulate the AJK territory in terms of legislation and administration, to fulfill its responsibilities under the UNCIP Resolutions, the defense and external security of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, the issuance of currency, coins or bills and the external affairs of Azad Jammu and Kashmir including foreign aid.²⁷

Analysis

Peculiarity of Structure

There are many tiers of government structure in AJK governance: Government of Pakistan, Government of AJK and the AJK Council. AJK Council is a constitutional body established under section 21 of AJK Interim Constitution Act, 1974, with defined executive and legislative powers. Similar to former Federal list in the constitution of Pakistan, AJK Council has a list of 52 subjects called AJK Council Legislative list with a status of centralized power of AJK. Being vested with executive powers w.r.t. AJK Council's law, it was conceived as another body of AJK legislature, for the legislation of certain subjects dealt by AJK Government. At the same time, through section 19 (2) (b) of AJK Interim Constitution Act some legislative powers were amalgamated with executive power as well.²⁸ Now AJK Council is neither a legislative body Federal legislature nor an executive authority in AJK but is vested with both kinds of powers in it.

Bureaucratic Authority

From day one, all those subjects which are enlisted in AJK Council's Schedule are being controlled, managed and coordinated by a huge infrastructure of offices and a large manpower by the Government of Pakistan. Legislative and executive powers cannot be conjoined within the legislature but it has been done in case of AJK Council/Council Secretariat (located at Islamabad). Executive Authority entrusted to AJK Council is contrary to the principles of separation of powers between legislature and executive authority. The executive authority entrusted to AJK Council to be

²⁶ Interim Constitution Act, 1974, Section 21

²⁷ Interim Constitution Act, 1974, Section 31 (3).

²⁸ Ibid., Section 19 (2) (b).

exercised by the Chairman himself or nominated Federal Minister without corresponding provision of accountability to the AJK Assembly (Chamber of AJK people) is inherently alien to principles of justice and democracy. That is why even the politicians of AJK, especially of the opposition parties, always made calls of foul play in this matter. So the Government of AJK has been continuously exercising de facto executive control over many subjects enumerated in AJK Council Legislative List, since 1974.

For instance, Tourism and Electricity Departments are located in AJK while these subjects are with AJK Council's list. Now practically it is so difficult for AJK Council to set up extensive branches of offices all over AJK and handle mapping of tourists, managing of the rest houses and electricity billing processes for the reason that AJK Government is handling all these matters via its extensive official set up all over the area. The situation on ground has created many anomalies because assigning legislative list of subjects to both authorities is one thing while ground reality regarding the use of authority on these subjects is a different one. So the lists of powers assigned to both AJK Council and Assembly direly need to be revised and brought in coherence with the operational contingencies. In this regard, all the subjects like Tourism, Electricity etc must be delisted from AJK Council's list and be made part of AJK govt. authority.

Parity with other Provinces

Despite the unique status of AJK, that of neither a full-fledge province not an entirely independent entity, there still are many legal, administrative and constitutional features and practices which bring AJK at par with other provinces.²⁹ These measures include voting rights to AJK state subjects living in other provinces of Pakistan, regular issuance of CNICs and passports for them by the Government of Pakistan and many other practices where for all practical purposes it is considered equivalent of the other four provinces.

Evolution of the Governance Structure

When Government of Pakistan took over control of GB in 1947, the first law to be enforced there was a continuation of the colonial law of Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) which was enforced over the entire area. The FCR was also enforced in all other agencies annexed with Pakistan including Federally Administrative Tribal Areas. Under this British law for the tribal areas and GB, a civil bureaucracy exercised all judicial and administrative powers. However, before enactment of this law in November 1947 in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, an independent

²⁹ S.M.H Gillani, *Proposed Constitutional Ammendments in the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 for Empowerment of Azad Jammu & Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan* (Islamabad: PILDAT, 2011).

judicial system for the areas was in place. Over the years, different administrative and political reforms have been introduced by the Government of Pakistan in response to increasing demands for such reforms by the local people.

In 1950, the Federal Government established the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas (KANA) and the affairs of the Northern Areas were handed over to the Ministry.³⁰ Joint Secretary of the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs has been performing duties of Resident in the Northern Areas with all administrative and judicial authority since 1952. In 1967, Ministry of Kashmir Affairs initiated reforms by transferring powers of High Court and Revenue Commissioner to the Resident and appointed two Political Agents, one each for Gilgit and Baltistan. The democratic elections were held for the first time in 1970. Through this election, 16 members of Northern Areas Advisory Council (NAAC) were elected in 1970.³¹ Again in 1972, through a Presidential order the post of Resident was re-designated as Resident Commissioner and Gilgit and Baltistan Agencies were changed into districts. An additional district of Diamer was created and Deputy Commissioners were appointed.

In 1974, the government of Z. A. Bhutto abolished the State of Hunza and Frontier Crime Regulation (FCR) and announced a package of administrative and judicial reforms instead. In 1977, General Zia-ul-Haq imposed martial law in Pakistan and GB was also included in it and was declared as the Zone-E of this martial law.³² This was the first major step showing the deviance from Pakistan's stance about GB with regard to Kashmir issue. The representatives from GB were included in the Majlis-e-Shura. In 1994, another major breakthrough was achieved when the Federal Cabinet approved a "Reforms Package" as Legal Framework Order 1994 for NAs and Northern Areas Rules of Business were framed for the first time. The offices of the Chief Secretary and Civil Secretariats were established and judicial reforms were introduced. The LFO of 1994 empowered the Northern Areas Legislative Council (NALC) to legislate on a list of 49 focuses as envisaged in schedule-II of the LFO.³³ In May 1999, the Supreme Court of Pakistan gave a landmark verdict on the legal status of the Northern Areas in response to Constitutional Petition 17 of 1994, which sought after the enforcement of fundamental rights under the constitution of Pakistan.

Although there was occasional unrest and resentment for the lack of fundamental human, political and constitutional rights by the local

³⁰ Ershad Mahmud, "Status of AJK in Political Milieu," *Policy Perspectives*, 3, no. 2 (July - December 2006), 105-123.

³¹ Altaf Hussain, "The Gilgit-Baltistan Reforms 2009", www.civiceducation.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/Gilgit-Baltistan-Reforms.doc (accessed September 4, 2015).

³² Ibid.

³³ Ijaz Hussain, *Kashmir Dispute: An International Law Perspective*, 4.

people of GB, yet they continued their legal and political efforts. During this development, some organized and some unorganized reactions broke out in the area against the actions of officers appointed by the government of Pakistan but these issues were resolved through interventions from Islamabad.

The Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order 2009

The people of Gilgit-Baltistan have been living in a constitutional void for over sixty years; they were neither given representation in the parliament, nor a chance to have their own local assembly. Whereas AJK has had an elaborate governance structure operating under an Interim Constitution which was enacted by the Legislative Assembly of AJK in 1974, GB has remained devoid of such an arrangement. In August 2009, the Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self Governance Order 2009 was introduced; this was deeply influenced by the AJK setup and provincial setups of Pakistan. It explains that on the continuous demand of local people, the federal government of Pakistan has decided to grant GB greater internal autonomy and bring it at par administratively with the other provinces of Pakistan. But it should not be considered a separate province of Pakistan in terms of Article-1 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan which defines the territorial boundaries of the country. However, if the Northern Areas Council Legal Framework Order 1994 was the first stepping stone, the present package of reforms is in fact, a step further towards fulfilling the demand of local people for their constitutional rights.

Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order, 2009, gave a new name to the area, from Northern Areas to Gilgit-Baltistan; new Offices of Governor, Chief Minister and Ministers were also created.³⁴ On the pattern of AJK Council, the Gilgit-Baltistan Council was introduced; like AJK, this Council was also headed by the Prime Minister of Pakistan. The powers of approving budget were delegated to Gilgit-Baltistan. The concept of Consolidated Fund was introduced and the legislative powers of the Assembly were increased from 49 to 61 subjects along with powers to legislate on all other subjects not in the domain of the Gilgit-Baltistan Council.³⁵ Gilgit-Baltistan Council has the power to legislate on 55 subjects. The GB Assembly was given freedom to formulate its own Rules of Procedure while legislation on various subjects pertinent to governance were allotted to the Council and Assembly in their respective jurisdictions.

The Legislative Assembly of GB consists of 33 members, of which twenty four members are to be elected directly on the basis of adult franchise. Six women members shall be elected on reserved seats on the

³⁴ Ibid., 6.

³⁵ Ibid.

pattern prevailing in other provinces; three technocrats and professional members are to be elected on the same pattern. The lower house will have 61 subjects for legislation given in the fourth schedule of the Presidential Order.³⁶

Gilgit-Baltistan Council consists of thirteen members headed by the Prime Minister of Pakistan. It was decided that the Governor shall be the Vice-Chairman of the Council and the Minister of State for Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit-Baltistan would be an ex-officio non-voting member of the Council. The prime minister will advise the president to appoint the Governor of GB.

Evolution of governance structure for GB since 1970 and administrative set-up during this period is summarized below:-

Evolution from Northern Areas to Gilgit-Baltistan

| | |
|------|--|
| 1970 | The NAs Advisory Council with 22 members (14 elected 8 nominated) was setup under Constitutional Order 1970. |
| 1972 | Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) was abolished and Civil and Criminal Laws extended to NAs. |
| 1974 | Legal Framework Order was introduced which repealed Constitutional Order 1970. |
| 1975 | Advisory Council was renamed as Northern Areas Council with 18 elected members only. |
| 1994 | LFO 1994 was introduced by repealing LFO 1974. Eight additional seats in NAs Council, post of Deputy Chief Executive and 5 Advisors were created. |
| 1999 | LFO was amended; NAs Council was renamed as NAs Legislative Council and powers given to legislate on 49 subjects. The post of Speaker and 3 women seats were also created. |
| 2003 | Post of Deputy Speaker created. |
| 2004 | 6 seats of Technocrats created, women seats increased from 3 to 6 (one for each district). |
| 2007 | NAs Governance Order 2007 replaced LFO 1994. |
| 2009 | Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and self-Governance Order 2009. |

The Northern Areas Administration

| | |
|--------------|---|
| 1878-1950 | Political Agent |
| 1950-1986 | Resident Commissioner |
| 1986-1992 | Administrator |
| 1992-1994 | Chief Commissioner |
| 1994 to date | Chief Secretary |
| | Presently Northern Areas has a Provincial setup administratively (not constitutionally) |

Source: Compiled by the authors.

³⁶ Ijaz Hussain, *Kashmir Dispute: An International Law Perspective*, 7.

Dichotomy of Structure

As far as the constitutional situation in GB is concerned, the main stay is the reforms package. The reforms package in the form of GB Empowerment and Self Governance Order 2009 has been promulgated through a Presidential Order. These reforms, although approved by the federal cabinet, were never presented before either house of the parliament with the reasoning that the area does not come under the purview of Pakistan's legislating body and therefore, cannot be discussed here. According to the law of the land (constitution of Pakistan), the President has the authority to issue any orders through an ordinance, but the same would have to be approved by the Parliament with simple majority to make it an Act of the Parliament within 120 days after the ordinance was issued. This is because an executive order of the President, in its own standing, has no legal or constitutional binding on future governments to continue the reforms.

Peculiarity of Tiered Structure

The reforms, presented through a presidential order, were never vetted by any legislative body and also without any debate on pros and cons of the initiative at any forum. There are some strange peculiarities in the reforms package where a Governor and Federal Minister would be working parallel: one as In-charge of the Gilgit-Baltistan Secretariat and the other as Deputy Chairman as well as head of the Government of Gilgit-Baltistan. In the past, during successive governments of Pakistan, the KANA ministers used to act as Governor GB, Deputy Chairman of Council as well as Executive head for administration at the same time. Although Gilgit-Baltistan has been governed by the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs for a long time but the new governance structure, with obscurities and inconsistencies in roles and responsibilities among different offices, would cause interruptions in delivery of services, which would eventually affect the performance of the government and efficiency of the reforms.

In this governance structure of GB, there would be dichotomy of two (legislative as well as executive) powers. GB Government and GB Council would start struggling for their due share of power and common people will suffer. If GB Council is confined to legislation only and that too on important subjects that would have been enough for the new government in GB. As for implementation of legislation, GB government already has a web of infrastructure that could have been enhanced with postings from federal government but controlling GB area affairs from GB Council's Islamabad office became an anomaly here as well. While the role of GBLA has now been changed from a developmental platform to a law making body, the members of GBLA are still perusing the agenda of development projects for the betterment of their constituencies. The paradigm shift for members from development of their constituencies to

policy making is a challenging task to make GBLA an effective legislative body.

Further, to transfer full autonomy to GB Government, some constitutional reviews are needed as well. New Governance Order should be renamed as Interim Constitution, just as fundamental law of AJK and that very constitution should be deliberated upon, approved and passed by GB Assembly instead of being promulgated through executive fiat. Furthermore, power to amend those constitutional provisions should lie with the GB Assembly. GB Council's legislative list also needs revision to transfer more power to GB Assembly so that concepts of self-governance and empowerment are fully materialized.

Parity with other Provinces

Like AJK, GB's status is also neither of a province of Pakistan nor of a completely independent entity. The government of Pakistan is taking some constitutional and legal measures to grant it internal autonomy and bring it at par administratively with the other provinces. These measures include voting rights of AJK state subjects living in other provinces of Pakistan, regular issuance of CNICs and passports by the government of Pakistan among many other practices.

Conclusion

Azad Jammu & Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan fall under the control of Pakistan, but their status is such that they are neither independent in their administrative affairs nor under direct administrative control of Pakistan unlike the other provinces. In addition to these external dimensions of the special status related to unresolved Kashmir issue, internally the constitutional development of these liberated territories faced a retarded growth because of the non-resolution of the question of final status and definition of the State. Following are some recommendations based on above analysis:

- In order to resolve ambiguities regarding its constitutional and administrative structure, AJK Council may continue only as legislative body for making laws which would be implemented/executed by Government of AJK, while Section 19 (2)(b) of Interim Constitution Act, 1974 be amended accordingly.
- The Council's Legislative List consists of 52 subjects need re-consideration as per the practical realities.
- The entrustment of Executive Authority to AJK Council Secretariat also be re-considered because under Section 19 of Interim Constitution Act, 1975, Government of AJK is obligated to implement and secure compliance with the laws made by AJK and there cannot be two parallel executive authorities or provincial

governments working at one and the same time.³⁷ Government of AJK is recognized as the only local authority, competent to exert executive control within AJK and also having Constitutional relationship with Federal Government (GOP). It is the Government of AJK (Executive) solely and not the Council, which is made responsible and accountable to the Assembly (chamber of the people) for exercising executive powers both in AJK or in the parliament of Pakistan.

The entire government setup and environment in Gilgit-Baltistan is very bureaucratic, as it does not have any exposure to working in a democratic atmosphere. Although through various reforms, the power was delegated to the GB Assembly for legislation but these powers were not really exercised because of a strong bureaucratic presence of the federal government in the area and also because of the low institutional capacity of the GB Administration. It is suggested that the capacity of the local institutions (GBLA) should be enhanced so that they could deliver according to the agenda of the new reforms. Secondly, legislative and executive authority of GB Council may also be shed off and transferred to the elected representatives of GB people i.e. GB Assembly. Third, the legislative lists of both GB Assembly and Council need to be revised as recommended for AJK. Finally, GB Assembly should be empowered to make amendments in the "Empowerment Order 2009" and this can be done only when this order is converted into an Interim Constitution passed by GB Assembly.

³⁷ Manzoor Hussain Gillani. *Discussion paper on Proposed Constitutional Amendments in The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 for Empowerment of Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan*, (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency, May 2011).

Book Reviews

Pakistan and a World in Disorder

Author: Javid Husain

Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan: Austin, USA, 2016, 222.

Pakistan and a World in Disorder is an riveting read by the author Javid Hussain that makes a compelling argument regarding the exigency to take into account changing dynamics of the 21st century for formulating a grand strategy for Pakistan, particularly in wake of the evolving regional and global trends. This book has eleven chapters and each chapter comprehensively underscores an important aspect of the 21st century, setting it as the backdrop to Pakistan's foreign policy analysis

To begin with, the author believes that if the grand strategy of Pakistan is oblivious of the internal, regional and global changes, the process of achieving national interests can become exasperating. A brief overview of Pakistan's historical challenges is provided as evidence to bolster the aforementioned argument. For instance, among the most important variables, the chaos of 1971 and Pakistan's role in the aftermath of 9/11 are two cases in point that draw the attention of policymakers toward revising the grand strategy of Pakistan.

The second chapter provides a brief overview of the book and lays stress on addressing the challenges in the policy-making process in the form of tangible and non-tangible variables, which are put forth as solutions to the problems raised by the author. For example, the disorder at the global level in the form of changing polarity and chaotic nature of world affairs (anarchy), among others, make it crucial for Pakistan to define the broad contours of its grand strategy, which may guide the process of shaping and accomplishing foreign policy goals. With the advent of power politics and overreliance on liberal values, new threats have emerged in the 21st century and Pakistan needs to come up with a cohesive foreign policy in response to these challenges.

The third chapter explicates the factors contributing to the rise of China and its place in the global order. Though the formidable rise of China has been discussed by the author from a historical point of view, however, the repercussions of China's ascent for Pakistan and the region is of more relevance to Pakistani policymakers. While the merits and demerits of China's emergence as a major power in the world have been discussed, however, if one delves into the details, the bias of the author (Mr. Husain) towards China as well as its significance for Pakistan is hard to ignore.

The fourth chapter talks about the hegemonic aspirations of India in the region of South Asia, which should not be seen from an isolationist perspective, according to the author, as it has implications for the security, economy, and politics of Pakistan, in addition to the undeniable impact on regional dynamics. The cultural implications of the strategic and economic

policies of India are presented as threats to Pakistan. Moreover, expansion of diplomatic ties with neighbouring countries, most importantly China, and de-escalation of the Kashmir issue are some of the means to strengthen the position of Pakistan in negotiations with India. Therefore, prioritization of economic policy from a strategic perspective can help to respond to the hegemonic designs of India.

After referring to the precursors of regional economic blocks, the fifth chapter highlights the merits and demerits of the two prominent economic forums: Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), in order to narrow down the policy options for Pakistan. The historical and cultural history of Pakistan with the ECO countries is seen as one of the common denominators as compared to the SAARC.

The role of Afghanistan, particularly in the aftermath of America's drawdown of 2014, which has the potential to determine the regional politics, is explored in the sixth chapter. Specifically, the peace and stability of Afghanistan are not only necessary for Pakistan and Afghanistan, but for the whole region. The Soviet invasion of 1979 is presented as the event that saved the country from foreign occupation as a result of Muslim states' role, particularly Pakistan and Iran. However, if one reviews the literature on the same topics, critics view it as a strategic mistake that can be debated.

The portrayal of Iran-Pakistan relations over the past few decades is the main topic of the seventh chapter, however, a section of the chapter suggesting policy measures for ameliorating the Pak-Iran relations seems disproportionate as compared to the historical analysis. In addition to the Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979, the difference in the Afghanistan policy of 1990 is the main impediment that aggravated diplomatic tensions between Pakistan and Iran, in the opinion of the author.

The title of the eighth chapter is probably one of the most discussed topics in academic circles, which reflects on surging Islamophobia and how it has tarnished the image of Islam. For instance, some analysts associate terrorism with Islam, which has been countered by many scholars. For Mr. Husain, selective focus on phases of instability related with Islam by critics fails to consider the periods of peace led by Muslims in history.

In the ninth chapter, mistakes in the history of Pakistan's foreign policy have been highlighted in order to make room for learning and revision so that new approaches can be introduced with the aim of not repeating the same mistakes, in addition to envisaging a grand strategy in line with contemporary international relations. For the author, the ideological character of Pakistan is one of the most significant rationales for the independence of Pakistan; it is, therefore, unwise to completely negate it in the contemporary world, as done so by the left wing in Pakistan.

While the significance of the regional and global variables cannot be ignored in the tenth chapter, however, if the national realities are considered critically, a comprehensive grand strategy can be developed. It is, therefore, important to find the balance between overly militaristic and (different types of) one-dimensional approaches.

In the last chapter, all the pertinent factors are succinctly concluded to make a case for Pakistan's grand strategy and to expedite the process of securing national interests for the future. This means that focusing merely on security, that too at the cost of political and economic goals, may not yield the expected results of Pakistan's grand policy. A combination of past experiences, lessons and present changes can guide the future grand policy of the country.

Furthermore, the global and regional changes are repeatedly mentioned to highlight how disorder and power politics are dominating the principles of international law. So, Pakistan's relative power direly needs reorientation in terms of taking note of the advantages and disadvantages of the global order. Even though the challenges posed to Pakistan since its inception are significant, but repeating them seems redundant, as those points have been mentioned by the author in the earlier chapters thoroughly.

One of the merits of this book, rightly underlined by Mr. Husain, is that it fills the literature gap when it comes to books on the foreign policy of Pakistan. Therefore, this book can be recommended for students of foreign policy who are interested in understanding the connection of contemporary political changes with Pakistan. Similarly, if one evaluates the merits of the variables mentioned by the author, it can be said that he somewhat covers all the significant national, regional and international factors. The language used in the book is easily comprehensible for students, as it coherently connects history with the present and the future. The book is also argumentatively comprehensive as most of the chapters fairly consider the other side of the argument.

Reviewed by Iqra Mobeen Akram, M.Phil in International Relations, National Defence University, Islamabad.

Honour Unmasked: Gender Violence, Law and Power in Pakistan**Author: Nafisa Shah****Publisher: OUP: Pakistan, 2016, 408.**

Nafisa Shah is an academic, writer, artist, and accidental politician. She has a PhD in Social and Cultural Anthropology from the University of Oxford. She is presently serving her second term as Member of the National Assembly from the Pakistan People's Party Parliamentary platform. As an MNA, Shah is a strong voice on rights-based policies and has led cross-party caucusing on gender issues.

Political theory demonstrates that gender-based classification of human beings may lead to exploitation and violence of social and discursive categories of people. The debate on gender violence has a long history leading up to the contemporary state of sexual orientation and gender identity rights. Historically, women had the legal status of property, and it took a lot of time and struggle on the part of the proponents of gender equality to create a recognition of the need for equal rights for all human beings—including women. One illustration of the fruit of this long struggle is Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) which proclaims that “everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex.... birth or other status.”

However, many feminists have argued that the contemporary conception and practice of human rights is nowhere close to addressing the real challenges for women when it comes to ground realities, as evident in the cases of domestic violence and honour killings. Key concerns here are the focus of human rights debate on the public sphere and the actions of state officials as well as its prioritization of individual human rights violations as opposed to the structural conditions which sustain those violations. Such conditions may include political, economic and social structures. Accordingly, Shah's book explores the topic of honour killings and substantiates how certain religious, social, economic and cultural factors as well as state officials collectively provide the space for honour-based violence in Sindh, known as 'karokari'.

The matter of real concern for Shah is not to dig up the cultural traditions of rural areas of Pakistan but how these function as a mask used by the perpetrators to advance a variety of ulterior motives. Against this context, the author persuasively provides the details of underlying factors of honour killing such as contest over resources, marriages, immigration, and leadership. Discourse of honour is, therefore, used to justify the violence which in turn serves the power and interests of the people involved in these heinous acts of violence against women.

While ascribing the problem of gender violence to the ulterior motives of perpetrators, Shah missed the role of discourse which constructs and establishes the power relations and provides justification

for the use of violence. The sad stories and harrowing accounts of gender-based violence have successfully made the topic of gender violence a matter of common debate but not a very promising research topic. Further, the author's idea of excluding politics from society by emphasising on the constituent factors of gender violence, is not that appealing as social and cultural values are deeply embedded in politics and state structures and vice versa as political culture, which has enough power to shape social or even religious culture.

Any serious academic effort to analyze the honour-based atrocities against women must, in the first instance, be problematized in terms of the very genesis of such discourse. The analogies set and categories juxtaposed in the hegemonic, patriarchal social narrative must be questioned, be they imported from religion, tradition, cultural and social values or common practices. The challenge of normative social and political change can only be met by a researcher if she explicitly offers the strategies of inclusion and exclusion in the hegemonic narrative on the topic of concern.

Along with several economic and institutional factors, the author also refers to the patriarchal culture and male chauvinism as constitutive of violence against women. Therefore, she suggests that there is need for an ideology that is competitive, impartial and in search of an objective truth which may be grounded in human ideology rather than based on gender. However, some feminists may argue that a different voice is required, one based on care, context and empathy.

Shah's voice is very strong against gender violence and grounds the central argument on anthropological perspectives. Moreover, she impressively links violence against women with cultural relativism, consequently, proving limits of law to punish the perpetrators. The author suggests putting an end to the excuse of cultural relativism and social awakening in favor of gender equality which may bring a positive change to emancipate women at all levels of state and society.

Shah concludes that it is not honour which is addressed through violence; it is violence committed in the name of honor, hence, well deserving of the title "Honour Unmasked". What the author suggests to the reader about the issue is that 'face it and address it' instead of simply glamorizing agony and human atrocities. More interestingly, Shah believes that the very practice of gender violence is also rational as such atrocities are found to be based on cost benefit analysis and most of the time involves materialistic considerations of the society. Here comes the role of state and society in the resolution of the issue, albeit it must begin with society to create an environment required for the change. Aptly, for the author, power resides at the level of society where ideas are constituted and practiced accordingly.

The book is scholarly and reflects the role of socio-cultural reality very well. Moreover, it demonstrates a serious effort to expose the ways in

which social and cultural ideas and identities serve as a power-base in atrocities such as gender violence. It is equally enlightening literature for the students of society, politics, law and anthropology. All in all, the book is a compulsory text for all those who are sensitive to the state of human rights in Pakistan and elsewhere and are committed to bringing positive change in the world.

Reviewed by Dr. Tasawar Hussain who holds PhD in American Studies from Area Study Center, QAU Islamabad and MA in International Studies from the University of Sheffield, UK.

Modi's World: Expanding India's Sphere of Influence**Author: C. Raja Mohan****Publisher: Harper Collins: India, 2015, 229.**

Narendra Damodardas Modi, former Chief Minister of Gujrat and 15th Prime Minister of present-day India has calculatedly inaugurated an ambitious era of multidimensional economic growth, technological advancements, political developments, and social reforms for his country. Moreover, the regional and extra-regional foreign policy approaches of Modi, coupled with substantial diplomatic aspirations, attempt to luminously adorn the Indian image globally. His multiple foreign trips, interaction with Indian diaspora across the globe, exclusive focus on the business community and religiously grounded political conduct invigorated the academic potential of Indian political commentators. Various authors, including C. Raja Mohan, attempt to scholastically comprehend the Indian politics under Modi's stewardship.

The collection of articles for two years 2014 and 2015 from *The Indian Express* in the compilation *Modi's World: Expanding India's Sphere of Influence* reflects Mohan's scholarly slant to study Modi's political vision. Mohan is the founding director of the Indian chapter of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (New Delhi, India), distinguished fellow at the Observer Research Foundation and previously served three different terms on India's National Security Advisory Board. In addition to his academic services in various universities, the scholarly and journalistic attributes of Mohan's vision were reflected in contributions to various newspapers as well. After discussing various aspects of Indian foreign policy in his three books, he tries to provide an insight into several regional and extra-regional stints of India under Modi in his fourth book.

This work of Mohan, India's leading strategic intellectual, on Modi's proactive political vision comprises of ten chapters. First two chapters discuss India's political history, strategic culture and major security challenges. The subsequent chapters emphasize New Delhi's disturbed relations with neighboring states: China and Pakistan respectively. The genesis of Indo - US strategic nexus, Modi - Obama diplomatic relations and an analytical survey of both state's interests are core ideas are the focus of chapter six. Modi's policies towards Japan, South Korea, Australia, Vietnam, along with Middle Eastern and Gulf regions revitalized India's engagements with Asia, according to Mohan. The succeeding portions of the book examine Modi's response toward Southeast Asian states and ASEAN under the "Look East Policy", and the notion of Sagar Mala as a counterbalancing force to Chinese String of Pearls. The ninth chapter of Mohan's volume focuses on the strengths of India's soft power by highlighting Modi's jettisoning of religious commonalities with Buddhism and Sikhism. Modi's religious lexicon and its promotion around the globe enlightens the filament of India's cultural

diplomacy. In the end, the author overestimates Modi's leadership by calling India a "Leading Power". The inaccurate calculations of Mohan do not take into account New Delhi's toxic relations with its immediate neighbors, unchecked growth of Indian strategic forces and India's inflexibility regarding restoration of regional peace and stability.

The scholarly discrepancies in the book undoubtedly overemphasize Modi's influence by mentioning India as 'Vishwaguru' (a teacher of the world). Furthermore, it vividly advocates India's international obligation for moral politik. (p. 203 – 209). The whole study of Mohan, in this way, unambiguously reflects an academic dedication to Modi's policies. The combination of various ideas such as modernity, leadership and scientific progress could help India to tap into actual national potential under Modi, according to Mohan. Moreover, the author devotedly visualizes Modi as an enthusiastic, energetic and pragmatic leader. Eventually, Mohan hopes, the new government possesses adequate potential to introduce a purposeful and confidential era in New Delhi's foreign policy. While earnestly considering the global power equation among great powers, Modi carries rationally strategic aspirations for India, which are profoundly useful in actively evolving Indian diplomatic powers.

Mohan's work pays minute attention to communal polarization, violation of minorities' rights, and an unforgettable account of issues attached to Hindu majoritarianism. Mohan suggests that Modi should prioritize minority problems by overhauling Hindutva's anomalies. Moreover, he believes that the adventurous policy toward Muslims would further deteriorate Indo – Pak bilateral relations (p.70). Parallel to diplomatic attributes of contemporary India, the writer attempts to provide, reluctantly, a critical examination of New Delhi's foreign policy. In Mohan's view, an exclusive concentration on neighborhood diplomacy can significantly refine Indian image internationally by marking a new age in Indian history (p.165). In short, he presents a concise and scholarly overview of Modi's departure from traditional Indian foreign policy by adequately underlining the issues of his predecessors.

The compendium of articles or chapters contemplate India's role in swiftly changing regional and international world order. The scholarly journalistic approach of Mohan presents an analytical account of most significant leadership of both governments, former Congress and newly elected BJP. In short, Mohan's intellectual debate about Modi can exclusively help the scholars working on Indian foreign policy, Narendra Modi's leadership, BJP's politics and New Delhi's global ambitions. Coupled with his solo writings, Mohan constantly shares his thoughts with other authors. His second co-edited work with Anit Mukherjee, *Indian Naval Strategy and Asian Security*, has been published recently, followed by another co-edited study, *Power Realignment in Asia: China, India and the United States*.

Reviewed by Attiqur Rehman, Lecturer, National University of Modern Languages (NUML), Islamabad.

DOCUMENTS

Document: 1

President Ghani's Speech at Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process Ministerial Conference, 9 December, 2015.

Islamabad, Pakistan, December 9th, 2015.

Let me, at the beginning, thank the governments of Turkey, Kazakhstan, and China, the previous chairs and conveners of this conference, and to thank the government of Pakistan for their excellent arrangements and the hospitality offered to us.

Let me also thank the people of Pakistan for having hosted millions of Afghan refugees over decades. Our bonds are deep, people-to-people sets of relationships.

Unfortunately, recent events in Pakistan have forced us to host close to 350,000 to 500,000 of Pakistani refugees on our soil. The refugee issue is a common issue, like other issues that confront us. I had began with Allama Iqbal's poem, so instead of reading it in English, allow me to read it in Dari. As the Prime Minister earlier said, Asia is a body of water on Earth, of which the Afghan nation is the heart; from the discord of the heart, Asia's disorder; from the concord of the heart, Asia's accord.

What is the status of discord and accord in the heart and what is Asia's impact on it?

Last year, in Beijing, I spoke of four transitions: the political transition, the security transition, the economic transition, and most significantly a transition to turn the culture of the state to being citizen-focused. In terms of the two main themes of this conference, let me take very quick stock, first, of what we've been able to do during 2015 to establish regional cooperation.

Afghanistan is becoming firmly anchored in Central Asia.

I want to express our gratitude to the government of Turkmenistan for having taken a cluster approach to the development of infrastructure and linkages.

Turkmen railways, transmission lines, highways, gas pipelines, and oil pipelines are reaching Afghanistan and imminently, we are going to inaugurate the TAPI pipeline in Turkmenistan.

This is a very significant transformational event and hopefully also with H.E the Prime Minister, we will sign a 500 KV transmission line from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan, which will significantly change the energy picture in both of our countries.

With Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan on the one side and Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan on the other sides, two major other transmission lines, respectively called CASA 1000 and TUTAP are moving from ideas to implementation. We are also extremely pleased that the Port of Chabahar,

jointly invested by Iran and India is moving from conception to implementation and the related railway structures.

Also with China, the five-nation agreements on railways and related sets of connectivities is rapidly moving. In short, Afghanistan is rapidly moving towards regional integration towards Central Asia, East Asia, and West Asia.

By contrast, our ambitious projects of cooperation for transit and for linkages through Pakistan have still remained at the level of conception and aspiration. I hope that this conference would result in significant movement on this too.

We have nine airports that were built with tens of billions of dollars, though courtesy of NATO/ISAF.

We have moved to a project of creating in every single one of these airports, a special economic zone.

The initial estimates are that between 2016 and 2032, we will be able to earn a revenue of 32 billion dollars from these airports. Afghanistan also, in terms of generation of energy, is finally moving from talking about our immense natural resources to the actual realization.

The first hydro dam called India-Afghanistan Friendship Dam at Salma is going reach fruition next spring and we thank our partners.

Next year, we are going to be able to generate 240 MW of power all from renewable, 42 from hydro, 100 from natural gas, and a 100 from solar.

Our highway program will create the possibility in our railways for Herat to become the second city in Afghanistan to be linked to the Iranian system and then on to the Turkmenistan system. And, completion of the ring road will open the way for Iran to Tajikistan direct contact and on to China.

These sets of possibilities speak of the potential that is there but also, what I'd like to respectfully bring and ask for studies is lost opportunities.

36% of our people live below poverty line, \$1.25; if the line were \$2 a day, almost 70% of our people.

Poverty elimination is our most significant goal and I'm convinced that regional cooperation could allow us to have the types of rates of growth that would allow us to tackle the most fundamental weakness, which is the poverty and exclusion of three majorities: women, youth, and the poor.

So, I urge the Secretariat of the Istanbul Process to actually document the costs of forgone opportunities in regional cooperation and the advantages that accrue from this.

In terms of the four transitions, very briefly, and then I come to main issue, which is regional security. Political transition in Afghanistan, we took the unusual step of forming the Government of National Unity. Let me assure, on behalf of Dr. Abdullah, the Vice Presidents, and the members

of the Cabinet, that the Government of National Unity is an enduring phenomenon.

We've learned from 300 years of discord that politics must become a win-win formula not a lose-lose proposition.

And, that is an important part of the new political culture and as part of this, again, I strongly reiterate our commitment to a lasting and just peace, within which all movements that resort to arms convert themselves into political parties and participate in the political process legitimately.

They need to reduce and renounce violence because violence is not the way in a democratic society and culture.

Last year in Beijing, I brought your attention that we're facing one of the hardest economic transitions any country has seen. We inherited a deep recession bordering on a depression but we've imposed an austerity program and met all our agreements with IMF, including for the first time all the revenue agreements. This is creating the ground for launching a stimulus package and a through growth series of programs that would ensure that Afghanistan's economy moves out of an aid-dependent entity into a self-reliance system, and as part of that, our location, our natural wealth, our water, our land, and entrepreneurial energies of our people will be harnessed. In terms of change of the culture of the state, there have been significant changes.

Our first thing is our willingness to confront corruption. Kabul Bank had become a symbol of the failure of wealth.

I'm very pleased to share with you that out of the over \$800 million that they stole from the public purse, we've realized fully \$450 million to the legal process and are determined to realize the rest.

But, let me come to the security issue.

On December 31st, 2014, the NATO/ISAF forces ended their combat role.

I want to thank President Obama and the leaders of framework nations of Turkey, Italy, and our other colleagues from 14 nations that committed themselves to the Resolute Support Mission.

On security, our key goal was to generate peace. I've had to become a war president because an all-out war has been imposed on us.

We've gone through seven phases of a war, each more intense than the previous one but I'm extremely proud, as the Commander-in-Chief of the Afghan forces, to share that the main objective of our enemies that was to divide Afghanistan into two political geographies has not been realized.

Our people have paid an immense price.

Our children have been murdered while playing in fields. Our women have been murdered while going shopping or attending schools. Our mosques have been attacked; our hospitals have been attacked. All civilian spaces, all spaces of public gatherings have been viciously attacked but our will and our resilience, I hope, has been demonstrated. Our will is strong and the Afghan Security and Defense Forces, contrary to the

predictions of skeptics, have not only held together, they are learning fast and no vacuums have been created. Here, let me again thank the Commander of Resolute Support Mission, John Campbell, for his very able role in assisting and supporting us.

I would also like to indicate our gratitude, first to President Obama for his very principle decision to extend the mission of the Resolute Support Mission, as well as leaders in Europe—Chancellor Merkel, Prime Minister Renzi, Prime Minister of Sweden, and UK Prime Minister Cameron, and leaders of 14 nations that have again joined us in supporting this mission.

International forces will not have a combat role. Let me repeat, Afghan forces are fully assuming responsibility, but our true friends have come to help us and we express gratitude for this international solidarity.

Let me also thank all governments that have financially supported us in addition to the governments that I have named, government of Canada, governments of Australia, Japan, and many other nations are supporting our security forces and this again is an act of international solidarity for which, on behalf of people and the government of Afghanistan, I say thank you. Let me shift to the drivers of conflict. What is driving the conflict?

Is it an insurgency or are we dealing with a much larger conflict, because to formulate a plan of action along the lines H.E the Prime Minister has suggested for regional cooperation, it is important that we name the problems.

The first driver of the conflict is regional and international terrorism, Al Qaeda, Daesh and terrorists from China, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, the Middle East are all, unfortunately, present on our soil.

The courageous decision of Prime Minister Sharif to launch the military actions in Pakistan has created unintended consequences, bringing about the displacement of a significant number of these groups onto our soil.

What I bring to your attention is there is no historical precedent for solving this problem because the quarrel of these people is not with the government and people of Afghanistan.

We are fighting on behalf of all of you but we are the ones, who are daily suffering some of the worst atrocities, including the butchering of our young children and our elderly, totally innocent, totally unharmed, but theater has become a part of this.

The second issue is, unfortunately, these terrorist groups are not going to be a short-term challenge.

I want to pay tribute to all the victims of terrorism, particularly in the recent events, Istanbul, Paris, Sharm-el-Sheik—the Russian plane—Mali, San Bernardino, it goes on. We do have a problem, it's a global and a regional problem and it requires us to focus on it systematically and coherently.

The second issue is, Taliban began as an Afghan phenomenon, became a regional phenomenon. Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan launched a vicious attack on children in Peshawar to which very robustly, H.E. the Prime Minister, and the people and government of Pakistan responded. But, that very response has brought them on to our country. Until now, we have launched 40 operations by our special forces against them but the question that this raises is what is the nature of the Taliban and how do we deal it because that question needs exploration?

Can we have two standards, one standard, how do we differentiate between reconcilables and the irreconcilables?

What are the networks that enable these people, devoted to violence rather than political dialogue, to continue?

How do we coordinate regionally in order to deal with this phenomenon?

And, it's important, I think, in this regard to create a mechanism of verification, a mechanism of regional cooperation, in seeing how the networks of terror coordinate, who finances them, what is their linkage with the criminal economy, the drug economy particularly, but the rest of the criminal economy?

How is radicalism shaping and maligning our holy religion and our opportunities for global engagement and dialogue?

On the third issue, I will be brief, because H.E. Prime Minister just stated something very significant, which we welcome.

In Afghanistan, there was considerable uncertainty, whether Pakistan would truly acknowledge a sovereign Afghan state, with its legitimate government and its legitimate Constitution? Your words today have gone a very long way to assure us in this regard and that opens up the possibility of a sustained dialogue among us.

Given the threat of terrorism, we need to recognize that terrorism, while morally an aberration, has become a sociological system. It has a distinctive ecology of competition and cooperation. It's a regional, national and global phenomenon.

It has a morphology, meaning it is changing its form very rapidly % If Al Qaeda was version one, Daesh is version six % and the worst feature of it is its pathology.

Now it has directed its violence for the sake of violence, in order to overawe, make news and in order to put fear in the hearts of people. Given this threat, what is our response?

So, I would like to highlight some issues.

First, Afghanistan has been a platform for international cooperation, we continue in this regard, and very much welcome the engagement of China and our other neighbors near and far, from India to Azerbaijan in the common quest for containing terrorism.

States of the region must face the common threat that is the second issue.

Without rules of the game where states respect the rights and obligations of mutual sovereignty and cooperate in the state-to-state sets of relationships, we will have enormous difficulty containing terrorism.

In the past, there have been occasions, where there has been great temptation to use non-state actors as instruments of policy, whatever the justification of those behaviors in the past, in the current threat environment;

we must distance ourselves from malign non-state actors because the word of state is a word of predictability and key to prosperity.

In this regard, we suggest that the Istanbul Process in association with regional mechanisms of security cooperation, convene a meeting regarding regional cooperation precisely what H.E. was suggesting to give it concrete shape and movement forward.

Our relations with Pakistan, first again let me state as H.E. stated, millennia of relationships bind us to South Asia.

Afghans, Tagore famously give us a brand that a a millions a dollars of advertisements could not do through a short story of Kabuli Wala, have been on the move. We have been entrepreneurs, we have connections, and there are millions of refugees in Pakistan and in Iran.

The dignified return of these refugees is absolutely central to regional cooperation and that requires coordination in the elimination of the threats that currently haunt us. With regional cooperation, I'm confident that we could generate double-digit growths that ensure poverty elimination. But, our central issue is state-to-state cooperation and that again is multi-dimensional, political-to-political, military-to-military, economy-to-economy, and finally intelligence to intelligence.

We need to create the framework for comprehensive cooperation so that, in the light of the drivers of conflict, we can fashion solutions that are going to be lasting.

Peace, therefore, is not equivalent to reconciliation. Peace requires dealing with all the drivers of conflict so that a multi-dimensional peace that truly will ensure that all of us live in harmony, that all of us can count on each other for enforcing an agreed set of rules of the game is as such. As part of this, because H.E. the Prime Minister and I both do not believe in blame games, we would like to suggest mechanisms of verification.

Again, Istanbul Process and association, with regional and international security organizations should reach agreement on a mechanism of verification, as to what type of actors threaten our common interests because with a proper regime of verifications, we could fashion the instruments of cooperation.

Let me again, in conclusion, thank H.E. the Prime Minister for hosting us, for inaugurating the meeting. You've honored me by coming to the airport, a rare privilege Mr. Prime Minister. On behalf of the Afghan people and the government and myself, let me thank you. And, let me again thank Mr. Sartaj Aziz for the excellence of the arrangements.

I'm sure that the proceedings of the meeting will be very productive and we can count on 2016 being very different than 2015. In 2015, Afghanistan was forced to fight for its survival.

I hope that with this meeting, 2016 would be a year, where we embark on a path of true stability and prosperity in coordination and cooperation with our neighbors, near and far.

Thank you.

<http://thekabultimes.gov.af/index.php/opinions/politics/9086-full-transcript-of-president-ghani%E2%80%99s-speech-on-heart-of-asia-istanbul-process-ministerial-conference.html>

Document: 2

PM Sharif's speech at Heart of Asia – Istanbul Process Conference, 9 December, 2015.

**Your Excellency President Ashraf Ghani,
Excellencies,
Distinguished dignitaries from participating and supporting
countries and regional and international organizations of Heart of
Asia-Istanbul Process,
Ladies and gentlemen,**

I warmly welcome you to this Conference and wish you an enjoyable stay in Islamabad.

It is indeed an occasion of great pride for Pakistan to co-host with Afghanistan, the fifth Ministerial Conference of the Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process.

It is an honour for me personally to especially welcome brother Ashraf Ghani, President of Afghanistan, who graciously agreed to visit Islamabad and jointly inaugurate this Conference with me.

Ladies and gentlemen,

More than a century ago, the Poet of the East and Pakistan's national poet, Allama Muhammad Iqbal, described Afghanistan as the Heart of Asia and a pivot for peace, stability and prosperity for the entire region. He said:

“Asia is a body of water and flowers.

Afghanistan is its heart.

If there is instability in Afghanistan, Asia is unstable.

If there is peace in Afghanistan, Asia is peaceful.”

In keeping with this vision, Pakistan attaches great importance to the Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process as a forum for sustainable peace, progress and development in Afghanistan, our region and beyond.

Excellencies,

Since its inception in 2011, the process is emerging as an important and credible initiative offering immense opportunities for participating and supporting countries in pursuit of our shared objectives.

After the political and security transitions of 2014, we have to intensify efforts to move forward from a conceptual domain to tangible landmarks for the implementation of concrete ideas and projects envisioned in the Heart of Asia – Istanbul Process Declarations.

The theme of today's Conference “Enhanced Cooperation for Countering Security Threats and Promoting Connectivity in the Heart of Asia Region” aptly reflects our desire for promoting regional development,

increasing economic and trade linkages, improving quality of life for our peoples and meeting security challenges to achieve these objectives. I am confident that your deliberations and the proposed Islamabad Declaration, will appropriately encompass all these areas.

In my view, the Heart of Asia initiative should not be seen in isolation. This initiative can be linked to several other regional infrastructure and connectivity projects flowing along and across Afghanistan.

Processes like RECCA, based on the concept of building east-west and north-south linkages add to the dimensions of the Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process. Regional projects like CASA-1000, TAPI, Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline and China-Pakistan Economic Corridor are a few other mega projects with a promise of changing the economic landscape of the region.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Working for the achievement of a peaceful neighbourhood is a cardinal principle of Pakistan's foreign policy. We firmly believe that peace is vital for development and development is vital for durable peace. Adhering to these principles, Pakistan remains committed to strengthening its relations with all its neighbours and regional countries, as well as promoting regional cooperation and connectivity.

For us, Afghanistan is more than a neighbour. Our cordial ties are rooted in shared history, common religion, cultural and linguistic affinities and people-to-people relations since times immemorial. Due to these close bonds between our peoples, Pakistan has always stood by Afghanistan.

During the past half a century, external interventions have seriously eroded peace, stability and socio-political cohesion of the Afghan society. It is important that efforts for durable peace and stability should hinge upon respect for Afghanistan's sovereignty, territorial integrity and the inherent values of Afghan society.

Excellencies,

Pakistan has always emphasized a holistic approach for bringing lasting peace to Afghanistan. It is our firm belief that a robust and meaningful reconciliation process owned and led by Afghans, is vital for long term peace and stability in Afghanistan.

I would like to reiterate Pakistan's commitment and desire to facilitate the resumption of the stalled reconciliation process. In this regard, Pakistan is ready to extend support to a meaningful process, wherein both the Afghan Government and the Taliban can move forward, in a spirit of accommodation and reconciliation.

We deeply appreciate the support of our friends for the Afghan reconciliation process. We believe that the association of China and the US in the reconciliation process has been instrumental in moving the process

forward. Pakistan looks forward to continued engagement in achieving positive results in the reconciliation process.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is my conviction that without peace and security, countries of our region cannot achieve the desired socio-economic development. The scourge of terrorism that has been plaguing our region for many years requires a firm and coordinated response on the part of all of us.

The Government and the people of Pakistan have demonstrated an unflinching resolve to uproot the menace of terrorism and violent extremism from our soil. The consensus-based military operation “Zarb-e-Azb” and the National Action Plan have been remarkably successful in our campaign against terrorism and extremism. These are delivering desired results.

We are convinced that terrorism and extremism is the common enemy of Pakistan and Afghanistan. We need a collective approach to combat this menace. In our view, finalization of border management SOPs at an early date, will be helpful in containing movement of terrorists across the border.

We believe our efforts for long term stability in Afghanistan should envisage the return and resettlement of Afghan refugees to their homeland, in a dignified manner. Massive cross-border movement of refugees constitutes a security risk and is exploited by the miscreants for their nefarious designs.

Moreover, the emergence of newer and more threatening terrorist groups like Daesh should strengthen our resolve against terrorism. We should envisage collective and coordinated measures on the regional security front, to ensure that the gains in the struggle against terrorism are durable and irreversible.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am confident that the Foreign Ministers and the Heads of delegations of the participating and supporting countries will have constructive deliberation to confront the challenges and harness the potential of a well-integrated region.

I am confident that the Islamabad Declaration to be adopted by this Conference will identify a way forward to the participants of the Heart of Asia Process for strengthening regional connectivity, in pursuit of a better future for our peoples.

I wish you every success in your deliberations.

Thank you.

<http://www.newsmedialive.com/pm-sharifs-speech-at-heart-of-heart-of-asia-istanbul-process-conference/>

Document: 3**U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue Joint Statement
Washington, DC, March 1, 2016.**

Pakistan's Advisor to the Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs Sartaj Aziz and United States Secretary of State John Kerry met on February 29 in Washington to convene the sixth ministerial-level Pakistan-U.S. Strategic Dialogue. The last ministerial-level Strategic Dialogue was held in Islamabad on January 13, 2015. This session built on Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's successful visit to Washington in October 2015, with the two sides reiterating their commitment to further strengthening the United States' and Pakistan's strong, multifaceted partnership across a range of critical issues, as exemplified by the framework of the Strategic Dialogue.

Both sides expressed their conviction that a robust, long-term bilateral relationship remains critical to regional and international security and prosperity. Both sides agreed that a strong, prosperous, and democratic Pakistan is an essential partner for the United States in advancing these shared goals. As such, the United States and Pakistan have a shared and enduring interest in Pakistan's continued economic growth and prosperity, increased bilateral trade and investment, education and social development, respect for human rights and rule of law, regional stability, and ongoing collaboration on measures to counter violent extremism and combat terrorism.

The two reaffirmed the importance of the Strategic Dialogue, which provides vision and direction for this bilateral partnership, and reviewed progress made in its six working groups, which represent core areas of joint interest and cooperation: 1) Energy; 2) Security, Strategic Stability, and Nonproliferation; 3) the Defense Consultative Group; 4) Law Enforcement and Counterterrorism; 5) Economics and Finance; and 6) Education, Science, and Technology. They also acknowledged the importance of sustaining cooperation on shared interests through U.S. civilian assistance, in line with the intent of legislation known as the "Kerry-Lugar-Berman" act. Finally, they charged the Working Groups with continuing to meet according to a mutually determined schedule.

Expanding Trade and Accelerating Economic Growth

Secretary Kerry and Advisor Aziz reaffirmed their shared commitment to expand and deepen bilateral trade, investment and environmental cooperation. Secretary Kerry commended the steps Pakistan has taken to implement an economic reform agenda, which has advanced Pakistan's macroeconomic stability and improved growth, including the government's commitment to complete the set of home grown reforms that are being supported by the World Bank Group, the

Asian Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other multilateral financial institutions. Both sides affirmed that continued reforms will make Pakistan more economically competitive and attractive for foreign investment.

Taking into account the importance with which Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif and President Barack Obama hold deepening bilateral trade and investment relations as the most effective, mutually beneficial, and durable form of bilateral economic partnership, the two sides agreed to intensify discussion on trade and investment related initiatives as a core area of joint interest.

Both sides agreed that the modernization of Pakistan's economy through better technology, improved business climate, entrepreneurship, enhanced worker rights, and opportunities for women will drive the country's economic growth. The recent visit of a U.S. Chamber of Commerce trade delegation to Pakistan reflected the great potential of their economic ties to benefit the private sectors of both countries. Secretary Kerry welcomed Pakistan's participation in the Global Connect Initiative, which aims to link an additional 1.5 billion people worldwide to the internet by 2020. The Pakistani delegation highlighted its "Smart Universities" public-private partnership with U.S. company CISCO, which will provide Wi-Fi broadband access to 100 Pakistani university campuses nationwide. Secretary Kerry highlighted the success of the U.S.-Pakistan Women's Council, which harnesses the power of the private sector in both countries to foster women's economic advancement. Noting that the Council has brought on four corporate members committed to expand women's entrepreneurship, employment, and access to higher education in Pakistan, he underscored U.S. interest in continuing joint cooperation on women's economic empowerment.

The United States reiterated that it sees Pakistan's prosperity as both good for the region and good for the United States. Secretary Kerry and Advisor Aziz reflected with satisfaction on Secretary of Commerce Penny Pritzker's visit to Islamabad for U.S.-Pakistan Economic Partnership Week in 2015. They also looked forward to the fourth annual U.S.-Pakistan Business Opportunities Conference, the first to be held in the United States, which will bring scores of U.S. and Pakistani executives from across all sectors to New York City this year, and a meeting under the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) in 2016.

Education, Science, and Technology

Secretary Kerry and Advisor Aziz applauded the reinstatement of the Education, Science, and Technology Working Group in June 2015 in Islamabad as an important mechanism through which to facilitate and emphasize the already extensive U.S.-Pakistan cooperation in these vital fields. Under the rubric of a new "U.S.-Pakistan Knowledge Corridor" and Pakistan's *Vision 2025* development plan, both sides committed to both

expanding U.S.-Pakistan education cooperation and strengthening Pakistan's education system, which serve as engines of economic growth and prosperity. Advisor Aziz reiterated Prime Minister Sharif's commitment to double Pakistan's education expenditures from two to four percent of gross domestic product by 2018, including by expanding girls' access to education.

Secretary Kerry noted that the Education, Science and Technology Working Group met this week on the margins of the Strategic Dialogue Ministerial, and lauded the February 2016 Memorandum of Understanding between the Pakistan Higher Education Commission and the United States Educational Foundation in Pakistan, in which Pakistan will fund up to 125 additional Pakistani PhD scholars from Pakistan to study in the United States through the Fulbright program over five years. Complementing what is already the largest U.S. investment in the Fulbright program worldwide, Pakistan's commitment solidifies Fulbright and exchange programs as a step towards building a lasting U.S.-Pakistan Knowledge Corridor that already includes over 15,000 alumni of U.S. programs throughout Pakistan. Advisor Aziz praised the U.S. Merit and Need Based Scholarships Program for Bachelors and Masters level students studying at Pakistani universities, and highlighted Pakistan's urgent need to expand its faculty in its higher education system in order to provide quality education to its youth by training 10,000 PhDs by 2025 at U.S. universities.

The two sides agreed to explore initiatives to enhance the number of educational opportunities for Pakistani students in the United States at the tertiary level, including increased numbers of PhDs at U.S. institutions. The United States is committed to facilitating the legitimate travel of Pakistani students who want to study at American academic institutions. Both sides resolved to set up a sub-working group for following and monitoring implementation.

Both sides also acknowledged the 23 existing partnerships between U.S. and Pakistani universities, their critical contributions to cultural and intellectual exchange, and the importance of sustaining them long-term. Both sides also noted the June 2015 launching of the U.S.-Pakistan Centers for Advanced Studies, which established three cutting-edge partnerships in energy, water, and agriculture for academics, policymakers, and industry. The United States agreed to consider additional academic cooperation on Climate Change.

The Working Group also highlighted ongoing cooperation in critical science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields, including the February 2016 Memorandum of Understanding signed by U.S. Ambassador Hale and Higher Education Commission Chairman Mukhtar to double joint funding for joint research grants under the U.S.-Pakistan Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement. The Working Group also deliberated on other important matters including the proposed

revival of ties between the Pakistan Science Foundation (PSF) and the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF). Pakistan expressed interest in U.S. assistance in the areas of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), commercialization of technologies, and technology transfers.

As the next chapter in bilateral cooperation, Advisor Aziz reiterated Prime Minister Sharif's commitment to expanding opportunities for girls, including under the Let Girls Learn initiative in Pakistan launched by First Lady Michelle Obama and First Daughter Maryam Sharif in October 2015. The Education, Science and Technology Working Group discussed the next steps toward achieving the initiative's goals and objectives.

In recognition of the transnational nature of global health issues, the United States and Pakistan will each undergo and publish an external evaluation in 2016 of capabilities in each country to achieve the core capacities required by the World Health Organization International Health Regulations, including the targets of the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSa). Pakistan is developing a mutually agreed five-year GHSa roadmap to achieve the Agenda's eleven targets.

Both sides recognized the importance of civil society to the fundamental health and stability of all democratic societies. They also reaffirmed that International Nongovernmental Organizations (INGOs) and civil society organizations can contribute to Pakistan's national development goals and complement the work of the government. Secretary Kerry noted that any policy guidelines governing INGOs should be transparent and consistent with international norms. Advisor Aziz reiterated Prime Minister Sharif's commitment that these guidelines will be reviewed and implemented in consultation with all stakeholders.

Continued Cooperation on Energy

The two sides reviewed the progress of their energy cooperation and that of the Energy Working Group since it last met in Islamabad in April, 2015.

Secretary Kerry and Advisor Aziz recognized the new chapter in U.S.-Pakistan energy cooperation, building on substantial cooperation to date that has already helped Pakistan add over 1,750 megawatts to its electric grid, facilitate private investment in the sector, and begin imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG). The U.S.-Pakistan Clean Energy Partnership, launched by President Obama and Prime Minister Sharif in October 2015, will facilitate new private sector investment in clean energy in Pakistan – particularly in hydroelectric, natural gas, wind, solar, and biomass energy sectors. Through these investments in power generation, transmission, and distribution, the partnership aims to add 3,000 megawatts to Pakistan's electricity supply by 2020. Both countries agreed to prepare a roadmap for achieving this target in each of the aforementioned areas. Both sides acknowledged the success of the first initiative under the

Partnership, the U.S.-Pakistan Clean Energy Conference, hosted in Washington in December 2015, and attended by leading energy firms and financiers.

Pakistan also thanked the United States for its support for facilitating U.S. private sector investment in energy projects through USAID and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). They appreciated OPIC's work with the Government of Pakistan and private investors to facilitate investment in Pakistan, through the financing of five wind power projects.

Following up on the last meeting of the Energy Working Group in April 2015, Advisor Aziz also noted the significance of the U.S. Department of Energy national laboratories visit to Islamabad in February 2016 to foster lasting technical collaboration, to help Pakistan design its own integrated energy plan, and to improve its grid and energy efficiency. This will be followed by an integrated energy planning conference in April 2016, co-sponsored by USAID, the National University of Sciences and Technology, Arizona State University, and the University of Engineering and Technology – Peshawar.

The two delegations expressed appreciation for the fact that, by partnering on cleaner energy technologies, the United States and Pakistan are also partnering to curb greenhouse gas emissions. Both countries recognized the importance of following up on the Paris climate commitment, including their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs). Further, the two sides reaffirmed their respective countries' commitments to work together to amend the Montreal Protocol this year to curb the production and consumption of hydrofluorocarbons, acknowledging that the impact on Pakistan's economy and industry would be taken into account. They welcomed the next meeting of the Energy Working Group in March 2016, which will highlight new areas for U.S. clean energy investment in Pakistan and provide strategic direction to the two countries' energy partnership for the coming years.

Fostering Strategic Stability

The delegations reaffirmed the great importance that both countries attach to preventing the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery to states as well as non-state actors. The United States and Pakistan resolved to continue to work together to achieve the objectives of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1540, and noted that both have supported and implemented relevant UNSC Resolutions.

Both countries highlighted the constructive discussion at the 2015 meeting of the Security, Strategic Stability and Nonproliferation (SSS&NP) working group. The United States acknowledged Pakistan's ongoing efforts to harmonize its strategic trade controls with those of the multilateral export control regimes. The United States noted appreciation

for Pakistan's proactive engagement with the international community, including through its hosting of IAEA training activities at its Nuclear Security Center of Excellence and its active participation in the Nuclear Security Summits. The United States looked forward to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's participation in the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit and appreciated Pakistan's commitment, in principle, to ratify the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

Pakistan affirmed that it remains committed to pursuing measures aimed at building confidence and lessening the risk of armed conflict. Both sides recognized the shared interest in strategic stability in South Asia and in pursuing increased transparency. The two sides look forward to the upcoming SSS&NP working group meeting in May 2016.

Continued Cooperation on Law Enforcement and Countering Terrorism

The two countries agreed on the need for effective action against all violent extremists, specifically underscoring that no country's territory should be used to destabilize other countries. The United States expressed appreciation for the sacrifices of Pakistan's security personnel and civilians in the fight against terrorism and violent extremism. Both countries reaffirmed their commitment to countering terrorism including by targeting all terrorists without discrimination. Advisor Aziz affirmed the Government of Pakistan's resolve to take effective action against United Nations-designated terrorist individuals and entities, including al-Qa'ida, the Haqqani Network, and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and its affiliates, as per its international commitments and obligations under United Nations Security Council resolutions and the Financial Action Task Force. The United States and Pakistan committed to continue promoting peace, stability, and transparency in the region and to eliminate the threats posed by violent extremism and terrorism.

The two sides looked forward to the upcoming Law Enforcement and Counterterrorism working group meeting where the United States and Pakistan will work together to further bolster the capacity of Pakistan's judicial and law enforcement authorities to enforce the rule of law and combat terrorism, including the financing of terrorism. The two sides agreed to further enhance cooperation between their respective counter terrorism authorities. Additionally, both states emphasized the importance of efforts to enhance bilateral cooperation and information-sharing between Afghanistan and Pakistan, including through joint training, to better interdict the flow of illicit materials and narcotics. The two sides also agreed to continue efforts to encourage the recruitment, retention, and advancement of policewomen. The two sides also emphasized the importance of strengthening Pakistan's capabilities to more effectively counter the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

The United States expressed appreciation for Pakistani efforts in this regard.

The United States expressed its concern regarding U.S. citizens being held hostage by terrorist groups in the region and Pakistan agreed it would assist in every way possible with the safe return of American and other hostages.

Defense and Security Cooperation

Both sides noted the importance of U.S.-Pakistan defense cooperation, which supports shared strategic objectives relating to counterterrorism and regional stability. Both the United States and Pakistani delegations expressed their desire for the U.S.-Pakistan bilateral security relationship to continue on a mutually beneficial and sustainable trajectory. The United States reiterated its continuing support for the Armed Forces of Pakistan in their ongoing counterinsurgency operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and disruption of militant networks. The United States also expressed appreciation for the sacrifices made by Pakistani security forces and civilians in these efforts. The Pakistani delegation expressed its appreciation for U.S. support in bolstering Pakistan's counterterrorism and counterinsurgency capacity. Both sides underscored the importance of bilateral defense cooperation as serving their mutual interest and noted their willingness to explore new avenues to refine defense collaboration. Both sides noted the challenges of enabling the return of internally displaced persons to the FATA in the wake of operations. Pakistan expressed its appreciation for the pledge of \$250 million announced by Secretary Kerry in 2015 for the relief, recovery and rehabilitation of internally displaced persons from the FATA. The United States continues to partner with Pakistan to reconstruct schools, hospitals, and infrastructure to restore communities in the FATA and assist in the return of people to their homes.

Both sides underscored the need for effective action against all violent extremists that threaten regional security. The United States expressed appreciation for the role Pakistan has played in helping to degrade al-Qa'ida and its affiliates. Pakistan reaffirmed its commitment to taking action, in line with the country's National Action Plan, to ensure that the Taliban are unable to operate from Pakistani soil. Acknowledging the emerging terrorist threat posed by ISIL/Da'esh in the region, the U.S. and Pakistani delegations agreed that their countries should work closely together to counter this threat of mutual concern, and affirmed their commitment to combat the extremist ideology that fuels such groups. Pakistan reiterated its firm resolve not to allow ISIL/Da'esh to develop a foothold in its territory, and the United States expressed its appreciation for Pakistan's efforts in this regard.

Regional Cooperation

The United States commended Pakistan's role in hosting the successful 2015 Heart of Asia Conference, designed to bolster regional cooperation. Secretary Kerry welcomed Pakistan's commitment to facilitating an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace and reconciliation process. The two sides underscored the imperative of quickly catalyzing direct peace talks between the Afghan government and Taliban to end the bloodshed and preserve Afghanistan's unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Secretary Kerry welcomed Pakistan's calls on the Taliban to seek a negotiated settlement to end the Afghan conflict and its constructive role in establishing and hosting the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG), an important regional initiative that brings together representatives from Afghanistan, Pakistan, China, and the United States to achieve the shared objective of initiating peace negotiations between the Afghan government and Taliban. It was agreed that all members of the QCG will intensify their efforts to forge broader regional consensus in support of the Afghan-led reconciliation process as the best way to bring peace and stability to the region.

The United States and Pakistan emphasized the importance of meaningful dialogue in support of peaceful resolution of outstanding issues, including Kashmir. The delegations underscored that all parties in the region should continuously act with maximum restraint and work collaboratively toward reducing tensions. Noting the steps taken by Pakistan to date, including the detention of Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) leader Maulana Masood Azhar, the United States appreciated Prime Minister Sharif's stated commitment to take prompt and decisive action on this investigation and to bring the perpetrators of the January 2, 2016 attack on the Pathankot air base to justice.

The United States commended Pakistan's exemplary generosity in hosting one of the largest, longest lasting refugee populations and reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to humanitarian assistance for Afghan refugees, returnees, and displaced persons in the region. The two sides reiterated their commitment to facilitate the orderly return and reintegration of Afghan refugees to Afghanistan.

Secretary Kerry and Advisor Aziz further commended the substantial progress made by Pakistan, Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan on the CASA-1000 electricity project. The four countries are now working together for implementation of the project by 2018. They welcomed the inaugural ceremony of the CASA-1000 project, to be hosted by Tajikistan in Dushanbe in May 2016.

Secretary Kerry and Advisor Aziz also commended the progress being made on the TAPI (Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India) gas pipeline project. They noted with appreciation the groundbreaking ceremony of the TAPI project at Mary, Turkmenistan in December 2015, which was also attended by Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif,

among other leaders. Such regional projects would greatly facilitate regional integration and cooperation.

Recognizing the opportunities and challenges presented by information and communications technologies, both countries agreed that international cooperation is essential to make cyberspace secure and stable, and look forward to continued engagement on cyber issues.

Looking Ahead

Secretary Kerry and Advisor Aziz committed to further strengthening the long-term partnership between the United States and Pakistan, built on robust cooperation across a wide range of issues and reflecting shared interests and common values. The two sides reiterated their commitment to democracy, human rights, economic growth, and respect for international law as essential for long-term regional peace and prosperity, and agreed that the two governments would meet for the next Ministerial-Level Strategic Dialogue in 2017.

<https://pk.usembassy.gov/u-s-pakistan-strategic-dialogue-joint-statement/>

Document: 4**JOINT STATEMENT: The United States and India: Enduring Global Partners in the 21st Century, June 7, 2016.**

1) The Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi and the President of the United States of America Barack Obama met today in the White House during an official working visit of Prime Minister Modi to the United States. Marking their third major bilateral summit, the leaders reviewed the deepening strategic partnership between the United States and India that is rooted in shared values of freedom, democracy, universal human rights, tolerance and pluralism, equal opportunities for all citizens, and rule of law. They pledged to pursue new opportunities to bolster economic growth and sustainable development, promote peace and security at home and around the world, strengthen inclusive, democratic governance and respect for universal human rights, and provide global leadership on issues of shared interest.

2) The leaders welcomed the significant progress made in bilateral relations between India and the United States during their tenure, in accordance with the roadmaps set out in the Joint Statements issued during Prime Minister Modi's visit to the United States in September 2014 and President Obama's visit to India in January 2015. The leaders affirmed the increasing convergence in their strategic perspectives and emphasized the need to remain closely invested in each other's security and prosperity.

Advancing U.S.-India Global Leadership on Climate and Clean Energy

3) The steps that the two Governments have taken in the last two years through the U.S.-India Contact Group, including by addressing the nuclear liability issue, inter alia, through India's ratification of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, have laid a strong foundation for a long-term partnership between U.S. and Indian companies for building nuclear power plants in India. Culminating a decade of partnership on civil nuclear issues, the leaders welcomed the start of preparatory work on site in India for six AP 1000 reactors to be built by Westinghouse and noted the intention of India and the U.S. Export-Import Bank to work together toward a competitive financing package for the project. Once completed, the project would be among the largest of its kind, fulfilling the promise of the U.S.-India civil nuclear agreement and demonstrating a shared commitment to meet India's growing energy needs while reducing reliance on fossil fuels. Both sides welcomed the announcement by the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd, and Westinghouse that engineering and site design work will begin

immediately and the two sides will work toward finalizing the contractual arrangements by June 2017.

4) The United States and India share common climate and clean energy interests and are close partners in the fight against climate change. Leadership from both countries helped galvanize global action to combat climate change and culminated in the historic Paris Agreement reached last December. Both countries are committed to working together and with others to promote full implementation of the Paris Agreement to address the urgent threats posed by climate change. India and the United States recognize the urgency of climate change and share the goal of enabling entry into force of the Paris Agreement as early as possible. The United States reaffirms its commitment to join the Agreement as soon as possible this year. India similarly has begun its processes to work toward this shared objective. The leaders reiterated their commitment to pursue low greenhouse gas emission development strategies in the pre-2020 period and to develop long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies. In addition, the two countries resolved to work to adopt an HFC amendment in 2016 with increased financial support from donor countries to the Multilateral Fund to help developing countries with implementation, and an ambitious phasedown schedule, under the Montreal Protocol pursuant to the Dubai Pathway. The leaders resolved to work together at the upcoming International Civil Aviation Organization Assembly to reach a successful outcome to address greenhouse gas emissions from international aviation. Further, the two countries will pursue under the leadership of the G20 strong outcomes to promote improved heavy-duty vehicle standards and efficiency in accordance with their national priorities and capabilities.

5) The leaders welcomed the signing of an MOU to Enhance Cooperation on Energy Security, Clean Energy and Climate Change, and an MOU on Cooperation in Gas Hydrates.

6) Reflecting Prime Minister Modi's call to embrace wildlife conservation as a development imperative, the leaders welcomed the signing of an MOU to enhance cooperation on Wildlife Conservation and Combating Wildlife Trafficking.

Clean Energy Finance

7) The United States supports the Government of India's ambitious national goals to install 175 GW of renewable power which includes 100 GW from solar power.

8) The United States welcomes the launch of the International Solar Alliance (ISA), recognizes the critical role it can play in the development and deployment of solar power, and intends pursuing membership in the ISA. To this end, and to strengthen ISA together, the United States and India will jointly launch the third Initiative of the ISA which will focus on

off-grid solar for energy access at the Founding Conference of ISA in September, 2016 in India. The United States also remains committed, with other developed countries, to the goal of jointly mobilizing \$100 billion per year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries in the context of meaningful mitigation and adaptation action.

9) The United States is committed to bring to bear its technical capacity, resources and private sector, and is jointly launching with India new efforts, to spur greater investment in India's renewable energy sector, including efforts that can serve as a model for other ISA Member Countries. In particular, the United States and India today are announcing: the creation of a \$20 million U.S.-India Clean Energy Finance (USICEF) initiative, equally supported by the United States and India, which is expected to mobilize up to \$400 million to provide clean and renewable electricity to up to 1 million households by 2020; a commitment to establish the U.S.-India Clean Energy Hub as the coordinating mechanism to focus United States Government efforts that, in partnership with leading Indian financial institutions, will increase renewable energy investment in India; a \$40 million U.S.- India Catalytic Solar Finance Program, equally supported by the United States and India, that, by providing needed liquidity to smaller-scale renewable energy investments, particularly in poorer, rural villages that are not connected to the grid, could mobilize up to \$1 billion of projects; the expansion of handholding support to Indian utilities that are scaling up rooftop solar and continuation of successful cooperation with USAID on "Greening the Grid".

10) The United States and India also remain committed to the goals of Mission Innovation, which they jointly launched during COP-21 in Paris to double their respective clean energy research and development (R&D) investment in five years. Toward this end, the two leaders reaffirmed their commitment to cooperate on research and development, including through the announcement of an upcoming \$30 million public-private research effort in smart grid and grid storage.

Strengthening Global Nonproliferation

11) The President thanked the Prime Minister for his substantive contribution to and active participation in 2016 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C., and welcomed his offer to host a Summit on Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism in 2018. The United States and India will work together to combat the threat of terrorists accessing and using chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological materials.

12) Recalling their shared commitment to preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, the leaders looked forward to India's imminent entry into the Missile Technology Control Regime. President Obama welcomed India's application to join

the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and re-affirmed that India is ready for membership. The United States called on NSG Participating Governments to support India's application when it comes up at the NSG Plenary later this month. The United States also re-affirmed its support for India's early membership of the Australia Group and Wassenaar Arrangement.

Securing the Domains: Land, Maritime, Air, Space, and Cyber

13) The leaders applauded the completion of a roadmap for cooperation under the 2015 U.S.-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region, which will serve as a guide for collaboration in the years to come. They resolved that the United States and India should look to each other as priority partners in the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean region.

14) They welcomed the inaugural meeting of the Maritime Security Dialogue. Owing to mutual interest in maritime security and maritime domain awareness, the leaders welcomed the conclusion of a technical arrangement for sharing of maritime "White Shipping" information.

15) The leaders affirmed their support for U.S.-India cooperation in promoting maritime security. They reiterated the importance they attach to ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight and exploitation of resources as per international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and settlement of territorial disputes by peaceful means.

16) The leaders applauded the enhanced military to military cooperation between the two countries especially in joint exercises, training and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR). They expressed their desire to explore agreements which would facilitate further expansion of bilateral defense cooperation in practical ways. In this regard, they welcomed the finalization of the text of the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA).

17) Noting that the U.S.-India defense relationship can be an anchor of stability, and given the increasingly strengthened cooperation in defense, the United States hereby recognizes India as a Major Defense Partner. As such:

- The United States will continue to work toward facilitating technology sharing with India to a level commensurate with that of its closest allies and partners. The leaders reached an understanding under which India would receive license-free access to a wide range of dual-use technologies in conjunction with steps that India has committed to take to advance its export control objectives.
- In support of India's Make In India initiative, and to support the development of robust defense industries and their integration into the global supply chain, the United States will continue to

facilitate the export of goods and technologies, consistent with U.S. law, for projects, programs and joint ventures in support of official U.S.-India defense cooperation.

18) The leaders also committed to enhance cooperation in support of the Government of India's Make In India Initiative and expand the co-production and co-development of technologies under the Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI). They welcomed the establishment of new DTTI working groups to include agreed items covering Naval Systems, Air Systems, and other Weapons Systems. The leaders announced the finalization of the text of an Information Exchange Annex under the Joint Working Group on Aircraft Carrier Technology Cooperation.

19) President Obama thanked Prime Minister Modi for his government's support for the Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency (DPAA) missions in India, including a recovery mission that resulted in the recent repatriation of remains of the United States Service Members missing since the Second World War. The leaders announced their commitment to future DPAA missions.

20) As space faring nations, India and the United States acknowledge that outer space should be an ever expanding frontier of human endeavour, and look forward to deepening their cooperation on earth observation, Mars exploration, space education and manned space flight. The leaders welcomed the progress toward establishment of an ISRO-NASA Heliophysics Working Group as well as toward finalization of a Memorandum of Understanding for exchange of earth observation satellite data.

21) The leaders emphasized that cyberspace enables economic growth and development, and reaffirmed their commitment to an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable Internet, underpinned by the multistakeholder model of Internet governance. They committed to deepen cooperation on cybersecurity and welcomed the understanding reached to finalize the Framework for the U.S.-India Cyber Relationship in the near term. They committed to enhance cyber collaboration on critical infrastructure, cybercrime, and malicious cyber activity by state and non-state actors, capacity building, and cybersecurity research and development, and to continue discussions on all aspects of trade in technology and related services, including market access. They have committed to continue dialogue and engagement in Internet governance fora, including in ICANN, IGF and other venues, and to support active participation by all stakeholders of the two countries in these fora. The leaders committed to promote stability in cyberspace based on the applicability of international law including the United Nations Charter, the promotion of voluntary norms of responsible state behavior during peacetime, and the development and implementation of practical confidence building measures between states.

22) In this context, they affirmed their commitment to the voluntary norms that no country should conduct or knowingly support online activity that intentionally damages critical infrastructure or otherwise impairs the use of it to provide services to the public; that no country should conduct or knowingly support activity intended to prevent national computer security incident response teams from responding to cyber incidents, or use its own teams to enable online activity that is intended to do harm; that every country should cooperate, consistent with its domestic law and international obligations, with requests for assistance from other states in mitigating malicious cyber activity emanating from its territory; and that no country should conduct or knowingly support ICT-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to its companies or commercial sectors.

Standing Together Against Terrorism and Violent Extremism

23) The leaders acknowledged the continued threat posed to human civilization by terrorism and condemn the recent terrorist incidents from Paris to Pathankot, from Brussels to Kabul. They resolved to redouble their efforts, bilaterally and with other like-minded countries, to bring to justice the perpetrators of terrorism anywhere in the world and the infrastructure that supports them.

24) Building on the January 2015 U.S.-India Joint Statement commitment to make the U.S.-India partnership a defining counterterrorism relationship for the 21st Century, as well as the September 2015 U.S.-India Joint Declaration on Combatting Terrorism, the leaders announced further steps to deepen collaboration against the full spectrum of terrorist threats.

25) The leaders committed to strengthen cooperation against terrorist threats from extremist groups, such as Al-Qa'ida, Da'esh/ISIL, Jaish-e Mohammad, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, D Company and their affiliates, including through deepened collaboration on UN terrorist designations. In this context, they directed their officials to identify specific new areas of collaboration at the next meeting of U.S.-India Counterterrorism Joint Working Group.

26) Recognizing an important milestone in the U.S.-India counterterrorism partnership, the leaders applauded the finalization of an arrangement to facilitate the sharing of terrorist screening information. They also called for Pakistan to bring the perpetrators of the 2008 Mumbai and 2016 Pathankot terrorist attacks to justice.

27) The leaders affirmed their support for a UN Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism that advances and strengthens the framework for global cooperation and reinforces that no cause or grievance justifies terrorism.

Bolstering Economic and Trade Ties

28) The leaders highlighted the strong and expanding economic relationship between the United States and India and committed to support sustainable, inclusive, and robust economic growth, and common efforts to stimulate consumer demand, job creation, skill development and innovation in their respective countries.

29) In order to substantially increase bilateral trade, they pledged to explore new opportunities to break down barriers to the movement of goods and services, and support deeper integration into global supply chains, thereby creating jobs and generating prosperity in both economies. They look forward to the second annual Strategic and Commercial Dialogue in India later this year to identify concrete steps in this regard. They also commended the increased engagement on trade and investment issues under the Trade Policy Forum (TPF) and encouraged substantive results for the next TPF later this year. They welcomed the engagement of U.S. private sector companies in India's Smart City program.

30) The leaders applauded the strong bonds of friendship between the 1.5 billion peoples of India and the United States that have provided a solid foundation for a flourishing bilateral partnership, noting that two-way travel for tourism, business, and education has seen unprecedented growth, including more than one million travelers from India to the United States in 2015, and similar number from the United States to India. The leaders resolved to facilitate greater movement of professionals, investors and business travelers, students, and exchange visitors between their countries to enhance people-to-people contact as well as their economic and technological partnership. To this end, they welcomed the signing of an MOU for Development of an International Expedited Traveler Initiative (also known as the Global Entry Program) and resolved to complete within the next three months the procedures for India's entry into the Global Entry Program.

31) The leaders recognized the fruitful exchanges in August 2015 and June 2016 on the elements required in both countries to pursue a U.S.-India Totalization Agreement and resolved to continue discussions later this year.

32) Recognizing the importance of fostering an enabling environment for innovation and empowering entrepreneurs, the United States welcomes India's hosting of the 2017 Global Entrepreneurship Summit.

33) The leaders welcomed the enhanced engagement on intellectual property rights under the High Level Working Group on Intellectual Property and reaffirmed their commitment to use this dialogue to continue to make concrete progress on IPR issues by working to enhance bilateral cooperation among the drivers of innovation and creativity in both countries.

34) The United States welcomes India's interest in joining the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, as India is a dynamic part of the Asian economy.

Expanding Cooperation: Science & Technology and Health

35) The leaders affirmed their nations' mutual support in exploring the most fundamental principles of science as embodied in the arrangement reached to cooperate on building a Laser Interferometer Gravitational Wave Observatory (LIGO) in India in the near future and welcomed the formation of the India-U.S. Joint Oversight Group to facilitate agency coordination of funding and oversight of the project.

36) The leaders look forward to India's participation at the September 2016 Our Ocean Conference in Washington, D.C. as well as holding of the first India-U.S. Oceans Dialogue later this year, to strengthen cooperation in marine science, ocean energy, managing and protecting ocean biodiversity, marine pollution, and sustainable use of ocean resources.

37) The leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the Global Health Security Agenda and the timely implementation of its objectives. The Prime Minister noted India's role on the Steering Group and its leadership in the areas of anti-microbial resistance and immunization. The President noted the United States' commitment to support, undergo, and share a Joint External Evaluation in collaboration with the World Health Organization.

38) The leaders recognized the global threat posed by multi-drug-resistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB) and committed to continue collaboration in the area of tuberculosis and to share respective best practices.

39) The leaders noted the growing threat of non-communicable diseases and the urgent need to address the risk factors by, inter alia, promoting healthy lifestyles, controlling sugar and salt intake, promoting physical activity especially among children and youth and strengthening efforts to curb tobacco use. The leaders also reiterated the importance of holistic approaches to health and wellness, and of promoting the potential benefits of holistic approaches by synergizing modern and traditional systems of medicine, including Yoga.

40) The leaders strongly endorsed expansion of the Indo-U.S. Vaccine Action Program, which is fostering public-private research partnerships focused on the development and evaluation of vaccines to prevent tuberculosis, dengue, chikungunya and other globally important infectious diseases.

Global Leadership

41) The leaders reaffirmed their resolve to continue working together as well as with the wider international community to augment

the capacity of the United Nations to more effectively address the global development and security challenges. With the historic adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in September 2015, and recognizing its universality, the leaders reaffirmed their commitment to implement this ambitious agenda domestically and internationally and work in a collaborative partnership for the effective achievement of Sustainable Development Goals.

42) The leaders reaffirmed their support for a reformed UN Security Council with India as a permanent member. Both sides committed to ensuring that the Security Council continues to play an effective role in maintaining international peace and security as envisioned in the UN Charter. The leaders are committed to continued engagement on Security Council reform in the UN Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) on Security Council Reform.

43) The leaders welcomed the successful convening of the Leaders' Summit on UN Peacekeeping and committed to deepening engagement on UN peacekeeping capacity-building efforts in third countries, through co-organizing the first UN Peacekeeping Course for African Partners in New Delhi later this year for participants from ten countries in Africa. The leaders also reiterated their support for ongoing reform efforts to strengthen UN peacekeeping operations.

44) Building on their respective bilateral engagements with Africa, such as the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit and India-Africa Forum Summit, the leaders reflected that the United States and India share a common interest in working with partners in Africa to promote prosperity and security across the continent. The leaders welcomed trilateral cooperation with African partners, including in areas such as agriculture, health, energy, women's empowerment and sanitation under the Statement of Guiding Principles on Triangular Cooperation for Global Development. They looked forward to opportunities to deepen the U.S.-India global development cooperation in Africa, as well as in Asia and beyond.

Building People-to-People Ties

45) Both sides committed to open additional consulates in each other's country. India will be opening a new consulate in Seattle and the United States will open a new consulate at a mutually agreed location in India.

46) The leaders announced that the United States and India will be Travel and Tourism Partner Countries for 2017, and committed to facilitate visas for each other's nationals.

47) Reflecting on the strong educational and cultural bonds between the two countries, the leaders welcomed the growing number of Indian students studying in the United States, which increased by 29 percent to nearly 133,000 students in 2014-2015, and looked forward to increased

opportunities for American students to study in India. The leaders also appreciated their governments' joint efforts through the Fulbright-Kalam Climate Fellowship to develop a cohort of climate scientists to confront the shared challenge of global climate change.

48) Recognizing its mutual goal of strengthening greater people-to-people ties, the leaders intend to renew efforts to intensify dialogue to address issues affecting the citizens of both countries that arise due to differences in the approaches of legal systems, including issues relating to cross-country marriage, divorce and child custody.

49) Prime Minister Modi welcomed the United States repatriation of antiquities to India. The leaders also committed to redouble their efforts to combat the theft and trafficking of cultural objects.

50) Prime Minister Modi thanked President Obama for his gracious invitation and warmth of hospitality. He extended an invitation for President Obama to visit India at his convenience.

<https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/06/07/joint-statement-united-states-and-india-enduring-global-partners-21st>

DOCUMENT: 5

Statement by Ambassador Dr. Maleeha Lodhi, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations, in the General Assembly meeting on UN Secretary General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism General Assembly Hall, 12 February, 2016.

Mr. President,

We thank you for convening today's debate affording Member States the opportunity to express their views on the Secretary General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (A/70/674 of 24 December 2016).

We welcome the Secretary-General's initiative and believe that violent extremism can best be addressed and effective responses evolved by taking into account the views and experiences of Member States.

Pakistan fully aligns itself with the statement delivered by the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia on behalf of the OIC.

Mr. President,

Pakistan reiterates its principled position against terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. We also endorse the Secretary-General's view that "Violent Extremism is an affront to the purposes and principles of the United Nations." At the same time, we are of the view that lack of respect for and violation of the fundamental principles of the UN Charter also leads to violent extremism.

There is no agreed definition of violent extremism just as there is none for terrorism. The conditions under which violent extremism morphs into terrorism are also open to different interpretations. This warrants assessment of the phenomenon in broader and more considered terms.

We all agree that violent extremism and terrorism cannot be associated with any country, race, religion, culture or nationality. We deplore any attempt to do so and urge the international community to ensure that this understanding is fully reflected in their national and international actions.

Mr. President,

Pakistan has consistently called upon the international community to address the root causes of terrorism and the conditions and breeding ground that give rise to it. We have also always urged respect for human rights and the rule of law in efforts to counter terrorism so that such efforts do not prove to be counter productive. That is why we have consistently stressed balanced implementation of the UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy, including its Pillar I and IV.

We are gratified to note that the international community is finally acknowledging the need to go beyond security and military centred (counterterrorism) measures and adopt a more comprehensive approach. Pakistan has long advocated this so that the underlying factors that drive terrorist violence are addressed in their entirety. So we are surprised and dismayed at the relatively little attention given to some of the most obvious international factors that have so decisively influenced the emergence of violent extremism.

Mr. President,

If we are to find effective ways to prevent violent extremism, we must objectively analyze the full range of the phenomenon. Flawed and partial assessments will only lead to flawed approaches. If we are to deal with it comprehensively, we must fully comprehend and recognize both local and external drivers. Often it is the confluence and interplay between local and external drivers that leads to violent extremism.

Moreover, in today's globalized and inter-connected world, we can hardly separate violent extremism's local and international contexts or dimensions. Economic deprivation, political injustice, social exclusion and marginalization of people need to be addressed not only in the local context but also in the wider international context.

Injustices done to peoples under foreign occupation, denial of the right to self-determination, long-festered and unresolved international disputes, interference in the internal affairs of States and the continued violation of the principles of the UN Charter create conditions that are exploited by violent extremists and terrorists to propagate their twisted ideologies. The international community, in particular the United Nations, already has a responsibility to address these issues. Doing so, diligently, will also address the drivers of violent extremism and the conditions conducive to terrorism.

Mr. President,

On the human rights based approach to preventing violent extremism, Pakistan regrets that a number of significant and relevant elements have either been ignored or given too little consideration.

Negative stereotyping, stigmatization, discrimination and intolerance all need to be countered to prevent violent extremism. Effective implementation of the Human Rights Council resolution 16/18 is important to prevent radicalization. Its violation nourishes the narrative that violent extremist use to justify their vile acts.

Xenophobia, in particular Islamophobia, is on the rise in the West. This has so far gone unchecked and unfortunately unprincipled, xenophobic politicians have sought to build their political fortunes by spreading fear and deliberate mischaracterization of people of other faiths or culture. This too fuels the process of radicalization.

Mr. President,

We fully subscribe to the need to ensure respect for international law and human rights in counterterrorism measures. This is what all of us committed to do when we endorsed the UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy.

But what do we make of foreign military interventions that have rendered not just societies but countries and regions susceptible to chaos in which violent extremism thrives?

Did we realize the impact of so-called surgical counterterrorism strikes, in violation of the territorial integrity of States, which have resulted in thousands of civilian casualties and left entire communities angry and determined to avenge such impunity?

Mr. President,

The fact is that the world is a much more dangerous place, 15 years after we committed to make it more peaceful and terror-free. We need to revisit the response that was used to counter terrorism and violent extremism which has yielded this outcome.

Mr. President,

With regard to the Secretary General's call for National Action Plans to prevent violent extremism, I can report that my country has already initiated a number of steps towards curbing this threat, at the national, regional and international levels.

Eight of the 20 Action Points of Pakistan's National Action Plan to counter terrorist violence pertain to preventing violent extremism. We are fully cognizant of our national challenges and are making focused efforts to undertake educational reforms, prevent misuse of the Internet and social media, promote tolerance and reform our criminal justice system.

My Government has particularly focused on the potential of youth. The Prime Minister's Youth Program is geared to providing educational scholarships, vocational training and skills development as well as loans to young entrepreneurs. We are also partnering with the United Nations in a Youth Skills Development and Engagement Program with the purpose of preventing violent extremism.

Pakistan has led a number of initiatives to promote inter-faith and inter-cultural harmony. Just a week ago, we organized a side event at the United Nations on Countering Xenophobia during inter-faith harmony week, inviting a number of scholars from different faiths who presented their successful initiatives on inter-faith harmony.

Mr. President,

At the international level, we remain committed to support all efforts aimed at preventing violent extremism and terrorism in a balanced manner, consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Finally, let me say that the international community must meet this challenge in a coordinated and unified manner which takes into account the views of all member states.

I thank you.

http://www.pakun.org/statements/Plenary_of_General_Assembly/2016/02122016-01.php

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