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
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CONTEMPORARY STUDIES

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Editor's Note

The *Journal of Contemporary Studies* is a flagship publication of the Faculty of Contemporary Studies (FCS), National Defence University (NDU), Islamabad. It started with the unequivocal objective of advancing critically oriented, inter-disciplinary academic and intellectual discourse. It is a biannual, double blind peer-reviewed journal that offers its readers- in academia, government and the policymaking world- in-depth and scholarly analyses and diverse policy perspectives on important contemporary issues, and ongoing debates in the areas of national and international security, public policy and the wider field of world politics.

This issue comprises of five articles, two book reviews and five documents providing valuable primary information on significant international developments. The first article, titled, *Paradoxes of Globalization: Geopolitical Challenges in Central, West and South Asia* by Dr. Talat Farooq examines the fragmenting and integrating trends of globalization and how deeply these trends, directly or indirectly, have influenced the fast-paced geopolitical realities and developments in Central, West and South Asia. These competing trends of globalization have factored heavily into the intricate political geometric of Central, West and South Asia.

The second article, *The US Coercive Diplomacy and North Korea's Nuclear Challenge* by Tooba Mansoor and Dr. Nazir Hussain underscores limits of coercive diplomacy as a tool employed by powerful states against the weaker states to achieve their policy objectives. The US has increasingly used coercive diplomacy to deal with North Korea's nuclear challenge but could not achieve its desired goals. Thereby US needs to diversify the tools employed within this coercive diplomacy framework, such that the element of 'coerciveness' gets contained, while 'diplomacy' is reinforced.

The third article, *Trump's New Afghan Strategy: Policy Options for Pakistan* by Muhammad Munir and Muhammad Shafiq examines the limitations of Trump's new Afghan strategy, 2017. It argues that the policy is flawed as it focuses on military approach rather than political solution of Afghanistan. Further, granting India a significant role in Afghanistan while downplaying Pakistan's efforts to stabilise the country is not productive. It suggests dialogue among all stakeholders including the Taliban is essential to bring peace in Afghanistan.

The fourth article, *Measuring Followers' Impact in Shaping a Leader's Attitude and Behaviour* by Beena Khurshid, Umer Iftikhar Malik,

Areeb Masood empirically appraises the follower-leader relationship and how a leader is influenced by his follower's behaviour and attitude. It highlights certain behaviour of the followers and discusses how that behaviour has a lasting impact on a leader's attitude. The writers skilfully underline the importance of accentuating the followership and leaders' progression through various skill and development programs which is likely to boost the public sector's performance of Pakistan.

In the last article, *Primacy of Offense over Defense: India's Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) and Pakistan's Strategic Options* by Asim Ahmed and Mahroona Hussain Syed discusses diverse perspectives on Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) as a strategy for a state's defence. Amidst the ever-increasing defence requirements, a state, non-bearer of BMD, resorts to offensive strategies for its safety and security. The paper realistically analyses how Pakistan is likely to tread the path of offensive strategy vis-a-vis India's ambitions for BMD.

I am grateful to all the contributors who have sent their articles for this issue, and the anonymous peer-reviewers whose valuable comments helped authors to improve their contributions. We hope that the study of this journal will invoke desire among readers to contribute their perspectives in the ongoing academic discourses. Contributions are invited from a broad spectrum of related fields, like political science, security studies, political economy, terrorism, politics and religion, politics of energy, feminism, media and politics, management sciences, leadership psychology, military strategy, modern history, international law, sociology, education, conflict management and resolution, urban studies, demography, social anthropology, development studies, foreign policy analysis etc.

We are accepting articles for the upcoming issue of the Journal of Contemporary Studies based on original qualitative or quantitative research, an innovative conceptual framework or a substantial literature review that opens new areas of inquiry and investigation. Case studies and comparative analyses are also welcome. The editorial team at the journal promotes submissions from expert analysts from around the world. The Journal seeks to promote a scholarly understanding of contemporary developments and changes related to aforementioned disciplines/fields of social sciences. It intends to stimulate interdisciplinary research and writing.

Editor
Dr. Shaheen Akhtar

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PARADOXES OF GLOBALIZATION: GEOPOLITICAL CHALLENGES IN CENTRAL, WEST AND SOUTH ASIA

Dr. Talat Farooq*

Abstract

In a globalized world, events beyond individual territories are affecting states and societies because of a closer integration of domestic and external factors and softening of borders. This paper argues that contradictory processes of integration and fragmentation that emerge from modern globalization can affect regional geopolitics at great lengths. Outlining the overlapping complexities in selected key states of Central, West and South Asia, this paper aims to examine the impact of certain global trends on contemporary regional geopolitical challenges.

Key Words: *Globalization, Integration, Fragmentation, Sovereignty, Non-state Actors, Blurring Borders, Domestic and External Factors*

Introduction

Human history is a story of wars and peace, shifting territories, regional and global realignments and the balance of power as well as diverse political and economic ideologies. However, the speed of the contemporary globalization process is unprecedented as it derives its momentum from rapid technological advancements. Marked by a gradual erosion of state sovereignty and an overlap of the domestic and foreign policy spheres, the process is, commonly perceived as a manifestation of shared business interests and economic developments.

Globalization is neither monolithic nor homogenous. Globalization has been defined, within the discourse of capitalist liberal ideology, as a complex nexus of economic, social, cultural and political processes,¹ in

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which “the constraints of geography on social and cultural arrangements recedes and people become increasingly aware that they are receding”.² Thus, globalization is an integrative process emerging from not only economic interdependence but also shared values and cultural interactions that transcend borders and facilitate societal contact. Conversely, the fragmentary aspect of globalization is also evident in weakened physical and ideological borders and the rise of non-state actors (NSAs) that challenge the nation-state.

Traditionally national governments have been responsible for their citizens’ socio-economic welfare and security. The post-Cold War era is marked by a progressively integrated global economy and a re-conceptualization of international security. The definition has expanded to include not only conventional military threats but also food security, human rights, terrorism, disease and environmental concerns – issues that do not recognize state boundaries.

Although complex interdependence is an integrative force, globalization is also the driving force behind post-Cold War disintegration. This is evident from the dissolution of states, ethnic strife, rise of ultra-nationalism, increasing disparity between wealth and poverty, organized crime, terrorism, asymmetric warfare, privatized military firms and the fear of proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). These problems are far reaching because of technological advancement that has changed the modes of transportation, communication, and dissemination of ideas.

The diffused nature of transnational threats has contributed towards the changing character of warfare where the state employs conventional and unconventional military strategies to respond to terrorism seen as a conduit for achieving political ends. However, it is not only the violent NSAs that influence government responses, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), private companies and transnational corporations are equally influential in this domain. Governments often work with NGOs for service delivery, development assistance and humanitarian relief efforts in war-torn and under-developed regions. The private sector also plays a crucial role in the management and settlement of armed conflict.³

Similarly, according to Milne, Inter-Governmental Organizations offer a platform for interactions between sovereign members and can serve as a platform for conflict settlement. Furthermore, he argues that in

¹ M. D. Litonjua, “The Socio-Political Construction of Globalization,” *International Review of Modern Sociology* 34, no 2 (2008); 253-278.

² Malcolm Waters, *Globalization* (London: Routledge, 1995), 3.

³ Rainer Bauman and Frank A. Stengel, “Globalization and Foreign Policy Analysis: Neglect of or Successful Adaptation to Changing Political Practices?,” www.academia.edu/442379/.

times of crisis, news media can influence public opinion by interviewing so-called experts who interpret a foreign policy problem in a certain manner which may in turn spawn bias in public perception of the crisis at hand.⁴ Social media is yet another increasingly powerful tool that can mould public perceptions and policy prescriptions.

In short, the impact of globalization is evident in various fields of politics, security, economics and cultural interactions. Since the 1990s, conflicts in Central, West and South Asia have been influenced by the divisive and unifying patterns of globalization that continue to shape regional geopolitics in the contemporary international system.

Globalization is a multidimensional phenomenon. It is, therefore, important to point out at the outset, that it is beyond the scope of this article to cover all its facets. The writing instead aims to focus on some of the effects of globalization such as weakening of borders and diminishing sovereignty, in order to evaluate its inherent paradox of integration and disintegration that blurs the distinction between domestic and foreign domains. By doing so, the paper will attempt to explain the extent to which these contradictory global trends are influencing regional geopolitics in some of the key countries of Central, West and South Asia.

This study draws upon qualitative research since a complex social phenomenon like globalization is context-dependent. Accordingly, qualitative analyses allow a deeper understanding of underlying reasons and drivers. Deriving primarily from secondary sources, this research has benefitted from relevant books, academic articles, conference papers and newspaper reports that provide an insight into informed academic debates and analyses of diverse narratives. It is equally important to state here that this paper does not employ any theory as an analytical or interpretive tool.

The paper is divided into two sections; the first discusses the concept of globalization in the light of selected academic arguments. It is by no means an extensive or comprehensive literature review because of space constraint. The second section is further distributed into sub-sections specifically examining how weakened borders and diminishing state sovereignty influence the geopolitics of some of the key states in Central, West and South Asia. Subsequently, the conclusion briefly wraps-up the main arguments and themes of the paper.

Paradoxical Trends of Globalization

Different people perceive globalization differently. Sociologist Roland Robertson defines it as “the compression of the world and the

⁴ David Milne, America’s “Intellectual’ Diplomacy,” *International Affairs* 86, no.1 (2010): 49-68.

intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole.”⁵ According to Held and McGrew, there are three main schools of thought regarding globalization:

- 1) The “hyper-globalists” have a positive perception of globalization as a modern economic phenomenon that leads to economic growth and spread of democracy emerging from shared economic interests, softened borders and diminished state sovereignty.
- 2) The “sceptics” argue that economic globalization is in fact only a new title for an old phenomenon; economic interdependence, they argue, is not unprecedented in history and it is not “global” per se because not all countries are benefitting from it economically.
- 3) Finally, the “transformationalists” synthesize the foregoing two approaches, arguing that globalization is not only about economics; it is also the driving force behind the reshaping of politics and culture.⁶

Thomas Friedman is an optimist when it comes to globalization; however, he appears to endorse the first half of the “sceptics” argument that globalization is not a new phenomenon. In his book, *The world is flat*, he divides the process of globalization into three distinct periods:

- 1) The time-period from 1492 to 1800 comprises the first phase, when the New World and the Old World began trading with each other.
- 2) The second era lasts from 1800 to 2000, when multinational companies began to drive the global market.
- 3) The third phase of globalization is still unfolding; it is different from the rest in view of rapid technological developments and the fact that not only states and multinational corporations, but also common people can directly participate in political, financial and societal processes through social media and internet-based opportunities.

Friedman believes that the modern processes of globalization are levelling the competitive playing field between established industrial markets, emerging individual entrepreneurs and that more and more

⁵ Ronald Robertson, *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture* (London: Sage, 1992), 8.

⁶ David Held and Anthony McGrew, *Global Transformations: Politics Economics and Culture* (Cambridge: Polity, 1999); Lauren Movius, “Cultural Globalization and Challenges to traditional Communication Theories,” *Journal of Media and Communication* 2, no.1 (2010): 6-18.

countries- big or small- are becoming part of a complex, transnational global supply chain.⁷

This may be true as one sees people in different parts of the world using mobile phones and computers with access to social media as a conduit for raising social and political issues and finding financial opportunities. The magnitude of advancement in modern information, transportation and weapon technology is unprecedented in world history. Yet, as the “sceptics” correctly point out, few of the global economic processes are truly global because “the quality of life for many” has not improved and they continue to live “in abject poverty.”⁸

Critics of globalization point out that in view of the unending greed of multinational corporations, the developing world is vulnerable to economic exploitation and poverty.⁹ In fact, some perceive globalization as a new form of colonization.¹⁰ Interestingly, however, economic inequality has also affected the developed world; by outsourcing jobs to cost-effective labour in poorer regions, globalization has given rise to receding economic opportunity in advanced countries. Consequently, this discontent has recently found expression in Brexit and the electoral victory of Donald Trump in 2016.¹¹

As mentioned earlier, the process of globalization has expanded the previously militarist concept of international security to include issues that do not recognize state boundaries—such as human security, human rights, disease, environment, terrorism, mass migrations and displacement. Revolution in information technology has reduced geographical distances and softened political boundaries to facilitate movement with the potential to reshape local political, cultural and social institutions.¹²

For instance, global politics encompasses the international humanitarian law. As non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and

⁷ Thomas L. Friedman, *The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Farrar Straus and Giroux, 2005), 211-245.

⁸ “Globalization: Threat or Opportunity?,” IMF *Issue Brief* 2002, www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/041200

⁹ Joyce Osland, “The Pros and Cons of Globalization,” *Journal of Management Inquiry*, 12 (June 2003): 137-154; George Sorenson, *The Transformation of the State: Beyond the Myth of Retreat* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 46-47.

¹⁰ Nagesh Rao, “Neo-colonialism or Globalization?: Post-colonial Theory and the Demands of Political Economy,” *Interdisciplinary Literary Studies* 1, no. 2 (2000): 165-184.

¹¹ Steve Holland and Emily Stephenson, “Trump, now President, Pledges to put America First in Nationalist Speech,” *Reuters*, www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-inauguration-idUSKBN154010.

¹² John Pilger, *The New Rulers of the World* (London: Verso, 2002), 1-5.

multilateral institutions highlight human rights abuses through a vigilant media, public opinion reacts by pressurizing governments to protect the victims. NGOs can have a direct influence over policy by providing information and lobbying, or they can have an indirect influence by setting agendas and generating norms.¹³ Privatized military firms like the Blackwater, whose activities received publicity in Iraq in 2007, represent the most controversial example.¹⁴

Transnational organizations can help governments in addressing issues of terrorism, organized crime, environment, WMDs, peacekeeping or conflict settlement – problems that cannot be resolved unilaterally. Foreign ministries thus often engage and cooperate with NGOs and other private groups. Moreover, a proliferation of independent news channels and social media can shape public opinion and foreign policy choices.¹⁵ The integrative dimension of globalization manifests itself in multilateralism at the inter-state, supranational and non-governmental levels.

Global politics sometimes challenges state sovereignty by intervening in domestic affairs. For instance, transitional crises in the post-Cold war era compelled the UN Security Council to compromise on the principle of non-interference by allowing the US and NATO military interventions in civil wars to prevent human rights abuses. Since the 9/11 attacks, the legal concept of self-defence has been manipulated to justify great power military and non-military interventions in weaker states. Great power military interventions have put the traditional norm of state sovereignty and territorial integrity under increasing pressure.¹⁶ Drone attacks and cross-border pursuit of transnational militants continue to reshape notions of sovereignty, territorial integrity and international laws.

The contemporary amorphous nature of the security threat to state authority involves violent NSAs who resort to terrorism to achieve political goals, with civilians as the primary target of mass killings, kidnapping and rape. Integrative global trends including electronic

¹³ Richard Price, "Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines," *International Organization* 52, no.3 (1998): 613-644; Brian Lai and Dan Slater, "Institutions of the offensive: Domestic Sources of Dispute Initiation in Authoritarian Regimes, 1950-1992", *American Journal of Political Science* 50, no.1 (2006):113-126.

¹⁴ Peter W. Singer, *The Dark Truth about Blackwater*, *Brookings* (2 October 2007), www.brookings.edu/articles/the_dark_truth_about_blackwater.

¹⁵ Paul Williams, "Who is making UK Foreign Policy?," *International Affairs* 80, no.5 (2004):909-929; Carol C. Adelman, "The Privatization of Foreign Aid", *Foreign Affairs* 82, no. 6 (2003): 9-14; Lawrence Davidson, Privatizing Foreign Policy, *Middle East policy* 13, no.2 (2006): 134-147.

¹⁶ David Held and Anthony McGrew, "The End of the Old Order?," *Review of International Studies* 24 (1998): 219-243.

financial systems and ever-increasing mobility assist them in functioning as transnational and cross-border networks that can carry out coordinated attacks and disseminate their ideology through multiple modes of communication.¹⁷ Clearly, global trends that contribute to integration are also used to foment chaos.

The state response to global insurgency and asymmetrical warfare has expanded to include the tools of media and cyber operations among others; intelligence gathering and sharing as the first line of defence often blurs the boundaries between domestic and external spheres. There are arguments that Multi-national Corporations (MNCs), growth of interdependent trade and global financial flows are challenging the nation state.¹⁸ If domestic and foreign arenas have intermingled so closely that states cannot exercise full control over physical and ideational borders then threats can emerge from more powerful states as well as violent non-state actors.

Others have argued that globalization has strengthened, rather than weakened, the importance of the nation state. National policies remain feasible and the nation state plays a fundamental role in creating and sustaining international regulations to govern the economy. Krasner argues that challenges to state authority are nothing new and that “the conventional norms of sovereignty have always been challenged. The polities of many weaker states have been persistently penetrated, and stronger nations have not been immune to external influence.” He does not perceive modern global trends in binary terms, arguing that “the reach of the state has increased in some areas but contracted in others. Rulers have recognized that their effective control is bound to rise simply by walking away from issues they cannot resolve.”¹⁹

This concise review of the discourse on globalization is not exhaustive; however, it gives us a taste of how the concept of globalization is both multifaceted as well as contested. Accordingly, the following sections will attempt to highlight certain contradictory aspects of globalization with special focus on some of the key countries of Central, West and South Asia.

¹⁷ Rob Johnson, “The Changing Character of War,” *The Rusi Journal* 162, no.1(2017): 6-12.

¹⁸ Richard.N.Haass and Robert .E. Litan, “Globalization and its Discourses: Navigating the Dangers of a Tangled World,” *Foreign Affairs* 77, no. (1998): 2-6.

¹⁹ Stephen D. Krasner, “Think Again Sovereignty,” *Foreign Policy* (2001): 21-29.

Globalization and Geopolitics in Central, West and South Asia

Great power military interventions, global capitalist interests and an expanded concept of international security have combined to weaken or soften state borders that enable non-state actors to challenge state authority in Central, West and South Asia. Caught in a vicious cycle, these two factors - weak borders and diminishing state authority feed on each other and reinforce the integration of domestic and foreign policies.

Central Asia

The geography of Central Asia has immense geopolitical attraction. Located at the junction of different regions, it has vast oil and gas resources that attract great and regional power interests.²⁰ In the post-Soviet era, Russia remains the regional hegemon and its economic situation has a direct impact on Central Asia. Standish points out "in addition to being an important trading partner and investor in Central Asia, Russia is also a major destination for labour migrants from the region whose remittance flows have shrunk due to Russia's own economic slowdown. The economic sanctions imposed by the West on Russia have also adversely affected the Central Asian states, resulting in a financial crisis".²¹

At the same time, in the post-9/11 world, not only economic interdependence but also transnational security threats continue to shape regional geopolitics. Thus, what happens in Central Asia can have spillover effects in not only Russia, western China and Afghanistan but also in West Asia. Terrorist attacks carried out by Uzbek and Kyrgyz Islamic State (IS) operatives in Istanbul in 2017 demonstrate that IS recruits from Central Asia are abandoning their own nation states to fight in Syria and Turkey.²² Clearly, the geopolitical landscape of West Asia, within a globalized world, can have consequences far beyond the borders of Syria and Iraq. Hence, one of the main concerns of policy-makers in Central Asia is the prospect of Central Asian fighters in Iraq and Syria returning home. Similarly, the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan where the Taliban surge, expansion and the presence of the IS fighters in the north has increased the risk of violence spill- over into Central Asia.

²⁰ Jan H. Kalicki, "Caspian Energy at the Crossroads," *Foreign Affairs* 80, no.5 (2001): 120-134.

²¹ Reid Standish, "Central Asia's Autocrats Welcome the Age of Trump," *Foreign Policy* (2017), <https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/31/central-asias-autocrats-welcome-the-age-of-trump-russia-syria-isis/>.

²² Dana Abizaid, "Why ISIS Recruits from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan," *National Interest* (16 January 2017), <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-isis-recruits-uzbekistan-kyrgyzstan-19067>.

Since late 2017, both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have shown willingness to get actively involved in regional engagement with a focus on Afghanistan. Kazakhstan is the first Central Asian state to secure a non-permanent seat in the United National Security Council. In January 2018, it led a delegation of UNSC members to Kabul and reiterated its support for the Central Asian efforts to restore peace and stability. The effort was duly supported by the US. However, a few days after the departure of the UNSC delegation, Kabul was rocked by a devastating Taliban attack “as a rebuttal to those who claimed progress”.²³ It was a stark reminder of the role of non-state actors in any potential conflict settlement within and between states in Afghanistan. Thus, the presence of foreign forces and the unresolved conflict in Afghanistan is bound to perpetuate the influence of fragmentary geopolitics of Central Asia.

Interestingly, the persistent chaos in the Middle East that is rife with extremism has increased the significance of Central Asia on the geopolitical stage as a mediator trying to broker peace in the region. For instance, Kazakhstan played a positive role in normalizing Russia-Turkey relations after Turkey downed a Russian jet in 2015.²⁴ In addition, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) provides a platform for Central Asian states to help settle disputes between member states. To strengthen its position as a conflict resolver, however, Central Asia needs to overcome its own problems of economic instability, corruption and the absence of a power-transfer mechanism.²⁵

The inter-state relations between many Central Asian Republics are relatively conflictual due to unresolved territorial and water-sharing claims, as well as rivalries between leaders. Domestically, there is a need for improved governance and curtailment of institutionalized corruption.²⁶ The failure of Central Asian governments to make political and economic reforms could lead to greater jihadist-inspired conflict in the region.

Great power interests also directly affect Central Asia. The bilateral relations of Central Asian countries with the US, the domestic and external factors do come together to play an important part within the context of the changed nature of international security. These factors have usually

²³ Catherine Putz, “Central Asian States Step up Afghan Diplomacy,” *The Diplomat* (23 January 2018), <https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/central-asian-states-step-up-afghan-diplomacy/>.

²⁴ Catherine Putz, “What’s Kazakhstan’s Role in Calming Russia-Turkey Tensions?,” *The Diplomat* (1 December 2015), <https://thediplomat.com/2015/12/whats-kazakhstan-role-in-calming-russia-turkey-tensions/>.

²⁵ Galiya Ibragimova, “Central Asia: Challenges and Opportunities in 2016,” *Russia Direct* (30 December 2016), <http://www.russia-direct.org>.

²⁶ Niklas Swanstrom and Par Nyren, “China’s March West: Pitfalls and Challenges in Greater Central Asia,” *Policy Brief* 195, ISDP, 10 January, 2017, <http://isdpeu/publications>.

been limited to energy security and non-proliferation as well as the dismal human rights record. Post-9/11, the region became a U.S. ally and Western troops were deployed in several Central Asian countries. During the U.S. 'War on Terror,' regional governments welcomed the enhanced American role, seeing it as a way to improve their standing with a superpower and using the guise of counterterrorism to neutralize political opponents. However, counter-terror efforts faced a blow by the U.S. concerns over corruption and human rights abuses. For instance, U.S. relations with Uzbekistan soured after the Andijan massacre of 2005, when Uzbek security forces killed un-armed protestors.²⁷

Having said, Central Asia is of great economic and strategic interest to the US, Russia and China. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are part of the group of countries surrounding the Caspian Sea and contain some of the largest gas and oil reserves in the world. The construction of multiple pipelines can facilitate smooth transportation of oil and gas to regional and international markets. Regional countries like Pakistan and India have also a stake in stabilizing Afghanistan for security and economic reasons. The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline, also known as the 'peace pipeline project' is enough to fulfil the energy needs of Afghanistan, Pakistan and India for the next three decades. However, the desire of connecting regions economically has remained undermined continuously by the security situation in Afghanistan since the end of the Cold War. The U.S. war on terror has further added to the Afghan imbroglio since 9/11 and Afghanistan, that neighbours Central and South Asia, has been in the throes of fragmentation.

Globalization is nonetheless providing another opportunity for integration and connectivity in terms of economic interdependence as embodied in the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Central Asia is centrally located within the Silk Road Economic Belt, which will potentially connect China to markets in Europe through trade and transportation corridors. BRI is happening at a time when the traditional regional hegemon, Russia's "Eurasian Economic Union so far has not offered an economic alternative to China's BRI."²⁸

Khorgos is at the junction of a key transportation corridor in Kazakhstan for trains to travel from China via Kazakhstan to the Caspian Sea, Russia and Germany. The success of China's vision for the region depends on an enabling environment of stability and this presents the key foreign policy challenge for both Beijing and Central Asian capitals. Moreover, while BRI presents a picture of regional connectivity and trade

²⁷ Reid Standish, "Central Asia's Autocrats Welcome the Age of Trump."

²⁸ Kemal Kirişci and Philippe Le Corre, "The New Geopolitics of Central Asia: China vies for influence in Russia's backyard," *Brookings*, January 2, 2018, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/01/02/the-new-geopolitics-of-central-asia-china-vies-for-influence-in-russias-backyard/>.

growth, it also brings out questions of erosion of sovereignty and domestic business security. According to an expert, “the ‘China threat’ (is) serving as a staple of public discourse on security and the future of the country.”²⁹ Thus, domestic factors are overlapping with global trends having the potential to affect geopolitical outcomes.

While Central Asia can look forward to geopolitical and geo-economic changes in reaching out to China there is no such connectivity project in the offing for West Asia where fragmentation has been at play since the onset of the Arab Spring in 2011.

West Asia

With the rise of transnational terror groups, proxy wars have had devastating consequences for the Middle East, fuelling perennial sectarian tensions, reflected in the Saudi-Iran competition in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, for influence in the Middle East. The 2003 US invasion of Iraq was the catalyst in this regard. It also created the pre-conditions for the rise of radical Sunni groups like Al Qaeda in Iraq and IS that would later target Syria as well.³⁰

Although, Iraqi forces with support from the US have cleared Mosul from IS fighters, a 2017 report warns that “the war against the Islamic State has led to the extreme fragmentation of armed actors controlling territory, hindering post-IS stability (and) governance.”³¹ Members of IS are already scattered wide in the world, especially Afghanistan. This reflects the scattered nature of globalization where failed states, unlike prosperous interdependent developed countries, have become more chaotic because of weak borders.

Arguably, in the age of modern globalization, events inside one country can influence another more intensely than before and the Syrian conflict is an apt example. The territorial implications of the Sykes-Picot secret deal of 1916 between France and Britain—along with other indigenous issues—continue to plague the West Asian geopolitics. The 2011 Arab uprisings, known as the Arab Spring, motivated pro-democracy activists in Syria to protest the Assad regime. The integrative force of globalization was evident during the Arab Spring when social media was used to form online networks to organize activists. Although, social media

²⁹ Nargis Kessinova, “China’s Silk Road and Kazakhstan’s Bright Path: Linking Dreams of Prosperity,” *PONARS Eurasia*, October 2, 2017, <http://www.ponarseurasia.org/article/china%E2%80%99s-silk-road-and-kazakhstan%E2%80%99s-bright-path-linking-dreams-prosperity>.

³⁰ Jason Hanna, “This is how ISIS was really founded,” *CNN*, 13 August 2016, <https://edition.cnn.com>.

³¹ Iraq 2018 Scenarios: Planning after Mosul,” *IRIS Report*, <http://www.iris.france.org>.

did not cause the event, it was vital in disseminating information to the outside world. It served not as “a rallying cry” but as “a megaphone”.³²

The Syrian conflict is a glaring example of how events happening in one part of the globalized world can directly affect social and political scenarios elsewhere. The civil war, which started as a domestic tension between the state and society in 2011, quickly became a proxy war between Syria, Russia and Iran on one side and the US-Saudi Arabia and Turkey on the other. The conflict has thus, turned Syria into a global breeding ground for extremism. The country has direct links with the ongoing sectarian conflict in neighbouring Iraq as weakened borders continue to challenge state sovereignty. The Kurd problem illustrates the complexity. Two parallel struggles to counter the ISIS are taking place simultaneously —one is led by Ankara and the other by the Syrian faction of the PKK, which is supported by the U.S. These developments have links with the domestic conflict between Ankara and the Turkish Kurds occupying the Turkish side of the border with Syria. Turkey perceives this consolidation of Kurdish forces close to its border as a national security threat. Ankara is openly unhappy with Washington’s policy of supporting Syrian Kurdish militants against IS and has militarily intervened in Syria in 2018. This has serious geopolitical implications and “could lead Turkey to break away or be pushed out of NATO”.³³

Adding to the complexities, the Russian intervention in 2015 in support of the Syrian regime has not only helped entrench the Bashar-ul-Assad government but also the Iranian proxy Hezbollah inside the Syrian territory; this in turn has escalated tensions between Tel Aviv and Tehran.³⁴ Thus, the 2011 domestic tensions in Syria rapidly entwined with foreign agendas as regional and great powers intervened militarily in disregard of state sovereignty and territorial integrity. An unrelenting electronic news outlets and social media continue to keep the issue alive.

Instability and violence in West Asia (and parts of Africa) have prompted a global crisis in the form of refugees creating severe political and economic challenges for the European Union, which are partially responsible for Brexit. The refugee problem is the most apt example of the forces of fragmentation that globalization has unleashed. The resulting tensions, according to Walt, have provided grist for European populist

³² Aday Sean et al, “Blogs and Bullets II: Media And Conflict after the Arab Spring,” *Peaceworks: United States Institute for Peace*, 10 July 2012, <https://usip.org>.

³³ Kemal Kirisci, “The New Geopolitics of Turkey, Syria, and the West,” *Brookings*, 14 February 2018, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog>.

³⁴ Dror Michman and Yael Mizrai-Arnaud, “Iran and Israel face off in Syria,” *Brookings*, 13 February 2018, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog>.

political leaders who have promised to defend “traditional values” against the onslaught of aliens.³⁵

In keeping with global trends, West Asian conflicts highlight the shifting of responsibility from the state to NGOs and private groups. In conflict zones like Syria, where state control has loosened and political authority has disintegrated, non-governmental and private entities are active as relief, health and information providers. At the same time, violent non-state actors use public services as a weapon of war.

As the West and Central Asia face their geopolitical challenges, the emerging geopolitical scenario in South Asia is reflective of shifting regional and global alignments. The ongoing asymmetrical conflict in Afghanistan since 9/11 has set in motion the disruptive elements of globalization in South Asia. At the same time, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) offers a huge opportunity for regional integration.

South Asia

In South Asia, the role of Pakistan remains paramount within the context of the topic at hand. Pakistan has a major role to play in the scenario as it copes with the intertwining domestic and external factors that affect its bilateral relations with regional and great powers. Pakistan’s domestic security has direct links with not only Afghanistan but also Iran. Issues of cross-border terrorism have soured relations with both the countries. Growing Indian soft power gains in Afghanistan continue to be a matter of intense concern for Pakistani security managers who perceive this situation as strategic encirclement of Pakistan.

In this regard, the already porous Durand Line has facilitated the movement of militants on both sides and affected not only Pakistan-Afghanistan relations but also Islamabad’s ties with Washington. Thus, unlike Europe, the softened borders in this area since the 1980s have ushered in fragmentation rather than economic integration. Moreover, weak ideological borders aided by information technology have allowed militants to challenge Pakistan’s sovereignty, recruit fighters and disrupt domestic stability, with implications for Pakistan’s foreign policy. Similarly, US drone attacks inside Pakistan’s tribal region targeting the militants have spawned questions of sovereignty in the changing geopolitical environment. Furthermore, a porous border and the rise of violent NSAs have raised the question of any possible militant access to Pakistan’s nuclear assets. While the US and Western anxiety is mostly exaggerated, it has nonetheless put Pakistan under pressure.

Militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan have regularly used electronic media to disseminate jihadist ideology, creating confusion and

³⁵ Charles Lerche, “The Conflicts of Globalization,” *International Journal for Peace Studies* 3, no.1 (1998): 47-66; Stephen M Walt, “The Collapse of Liberal World Order,” *Foreign Policy* 26 June 2016, <http://foreignpolicy.com>.

even sympathy for the militant cause in the public; though this situation has gradually changed in the face of indiscriminate violent attacks on Pakistan's military and civilian assets. Islamabad has done much to crack down on militant groups especially since the launch of a full-fledged military operation in Pakistan's insurgency-infested tribal region, in mid-2014.

Denying the existence of organised terrorist camps on its territory, Islamabad points out that insurgents move throughout the country, among the Afghan refugee population of 1.5 million, inside Pakistan. They have roots and links across the border in Afghanistan. For the U.S. however, the political debate centres round the question of whether the Pakistani crackdown against the Afghan Taliban is comprehensive.

As US-Pakistan relations become more brittle under the Trump administration, Islamabad is warming up to Moscow to manage its deteriorating relations with the US that has traditionally been a lucrative source of military aid. According to the US academic Daniel Markey, Russia by improving its relations with Pakistan, aims to blunt the threat of IS militants in Afghanistan and U.S. influence in the region.³⁶ Russian anxieties over the long-term presence of the US in Afghanistan may be well founded. Tellingly, a Russian honorary consul was stationed in Pakistan's KP province in early 2018; KP Afghanistan's Nangarhar province that also serves as an ISIS stronghold.³⁷ That being said, the emerging geopolitical realities in South Asia are likely to be shaped by Pakistan's long-time ally, China rather than the US.

China's influence is on the rise from Nepal and Maldives to Sri Lanka. Colombo has handed over Hambantota port to Beijing after signing a 99-year lease as part of a \$1.1-billion deal. Beijing and Male have signed a free trade deal last year; on the other hand, left-alliance government was elected in Nepal in December 2017 that is more favourably inclined towards Beijing than the one it has replaced.³⁸

While the working of the multilateral South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has become dysfunctional due to the rivalry between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan, the SCO, a broader alliance against common security threats, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) that aims to facilitate regional infrastructure improvement under BRI, are promising prospects for South Asian

³⁶ Richard Armitage, Samuel Berger and Daniel Markey, *US Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan*, CFR Report No.65, <https://www.cfr.org/report>.

³⁷ Kathy Gannon, "Shifting Alliances as Pakistan Manages Relationship with US," *Washington Post*, February 27, 2018.

³⁸ M. K. Bhadrakumar, "Nepal, Maldives Poised to Move out of Indian Orbit," *Asia Times*, December 9 2017, <http://www.asiatimes.com/>.

geopolitics.³⁹ Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in particular has the potential to provide a forum for shared economic interests and dialogue for India and Pakistan.

Pakistan's strategic location, at the mouth of Strait of Hormuz in the Indian Ocean, enables it to assert its geopolitical role in the region. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a network of roads and railways spanning 3,000-km, laid with oil and gas pipelines from Pakistan's Gwadar (Pakistan) to Kashgar (China) further reinforces this physical location advantage. CPEC can serve as an integrative force for economic uplift and is likely to soften borders between China and Pakistan, physically, economically and culturally. In addition, a surge in economic activity can help open up space for a nexus between the pre-existing and new security threats of militancy. Especially in Balochistan as more Chinese entrepreneurs arrive in Pakistan to set up businesses in big cities as well as in comparatively unsafe areas.

In the wake of the quick change in the strategic significance of the Indian Ocean, India fears that CPEC has the potential to change regional geopolitics. As it provides China a shorter and safer access to the Indian Ocean that is the energy lifeline for the world's major economies. With its various maritime chokepoints, the Indian Ocean is a major element in influencing geopolitical outcomes.

To curtail China's advancement and to disallow any strategic or economic advantage to Pakistan, New Delhi is making efforts to disrupt progress on the projects involving the CPEC. Any unholy alliance between disruptive forces is bound to receive support from anti-Pakistan elements within the Indian establishment.⁴⁰ As the corridor becomes operational and trade goods are ferried to and from China across the far-flung areas of Balochistan, domestic and foreign policy elements will further interlock and affect geopolitics in South Asia where India's neighbours are increasingly willing to reach out to Beijing.⁴¹

According to a SIPRI report, despite the fact that one of the OBOR corridors involves India, New Delhi views CPEC as challenging its geopolitical aspirations of regional hegemony⁴² forcing it to plan and develop an energy corridor involving Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Iran's Chabahar port.⁴³ Simultaneously, the growing US-India economic and

³⁹ Hong Yu, "Motivation Behind China's 'One Belt, One Road' Initiatives and Establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank," *Journal of Contemporary China* 26, no.105 (2017) : 353-368.

⁴⁰ Talat Farooq, "Security for CPEC," *The News*, June 18, 2017.

⁴¹ Latha Jishnu, "Losing Friends and Making Foes," *Dawn*, 29 January 2018.

⁴² Quoted in *First Global Report on Why India Fears CPEC*, Samaa TV, February 6, 2017, www.samaatv.news.

⁴³ "India's Chabahar Port Plan is to Counter China's Plan to Develop Gwadar Port," *The Economic Times*, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com>.

military ties underscore the American foreign policy objective of building India as a counterweight to China. Since the security interests of US and India appear to converge in the Indian Ocean region and South China Sea. Whether or not India will become a tool for the U.S. foreign policy is a debatable issue.

Exemplifying the fragmentary and integrative processes of globalization, CPEC thus presents an opportunity for economic interdependence, while simultaneously bringing out regional and international hostilities into focus in South Asia.

Conclusion

Globalization is a complex milieu of economic, social, political, cultural and technological processes. It has expanded the militarist concept of international security to include societies and cultures. This in turn has facilitated great power interventions and increased the influence of NGOs, multilateral institutions and private groups on state policies, thus eroding sovereignty and challenging the territorial integrity of nation-states. Globalization connects the world via news channels and social media by allowing a greater focus on events, crises, developments etc. from around the globe.

At the same time, these technical facilitates also contribute to the rise of forces of destruction and chaos as manifested in terrorism, organized global crimes and internecine conflicts. On the other hand, economic projects like BRI have the potential for regional and global connectivity through softened physical and cultural borders and voluntary surrender of a portion of state sovereignty. Yet, such connectivity-oriented ventures may also have security implications. Globalization thus carries within itself the seeds of both integration and fragmentation. These contradictory trends are shaping geopolitical environments in Central, East and West Asia as their increasingly entwined domestic and foreign policies are becoming more and more difficult to separate.

THE US COERCIVE DIPLOMACY AND NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR CHALLENGE

Tooba Mansoor* & Dr. Nazir Hussain**

Abstract

Coercive diplomacy is a useful tool employed by powerful states against the weaker actors for ensuring the latter's compliance in matters related to maintaining the status-quo in International system. The US has increasingly used this instrument, particularly with regards to curtailing the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). However, North Korea has turned out to be an anomaly in this regard, where US efforts to coerce the DPRK into a nuclear roll-back have not only backfired so far, but have also weakened the probability of compliance on the US-preferred terms. North Korea's nuclear and missile programmes have expanded ever since they were first developed, viewed today as an ever-larger threat for US homeland security and American allies. These dynamics are suggestive of the fact that US approach towards North Korea needs some modification. It is imperative for the US to diversify the tools employed within this coercive diplomacy framework such that the element of 'coerciveness' gets contained while that of 'diplomacy' gets reinforced. It is high time that US learns from earlier policy failures regarding the Korean peninsula and brings flexibility in its response if ensuring regional and global peace is the ultimate end being sought.

Key Words: US, Coercive Diplomacy, Korean Peninsula, Nuclear and Missile Development

Introduction

Proliferation of nuclear weapons is a major concern for international community in general and the US in particular. Controlling the current and potential proliferation activities appears to be a pressing issue for the United States, especially with respect to North Korea. In the late 1950s, North Korea was constantly involved in researching, developing and testing nuclear technology in order to counter US hegemony in the region. Despite

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major efforts to make North Korea roll back its nuclear program, the country has achieved several milestones in the field, including nuclear and missile testing. The US adopted several measures including tools of coercive diplomacy to dissuade North Korea from following the nuclear path, but to no avail. This paper focuses on the concept of coercive diplomacy, applied to the case of North Korea, which is fast developing and expanding its nuclear credentials. It also analyzes how Donald Trump can modify the US strategy of using military power against North Korea to that of a 'less coercive diplomacy' where the main focus is on diplomatic persuasion instead of a military blow.

Theoretical Framework

In international politics, the interplay of power and military prowess is greatly relevant, but diplomacy remains the main tool of interaction between states. Through bargaining, states seek outcomes which might not be completely favourable but to some extent can benefit both parties. History seems to be replete with cases where conflicts were resolved through striking diplomatic bargains backed by the threat of using force.

In order to get rid of traditional warfare mechanisms and to make states aware of the possible destructive consequences of wars, coercive diplomacy has become a powerful tool in managing crises or as an alternative to warfare and military exchange.¹ Coercive diplomacy has been utilized throughout history as an instrument of policy to resolve crisis in a relatively more peaceful manner and to minimize the chances of escalation to war.

According to Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, coercion can be defined as a threat of use of force or communicating a threatened use of force for inducing the enemy to change its behaviour.² It is the force employed to make the adversary fulfil certain demands without even trying to persuade the enemy.³ Alexander George elaborated the term as "a strategy that is sometimes utilized by the policymakers in order to settle a dispute or for securing a peaceful resolution to an issue."⁴ Various scholars

¹ Sayde-Hope Crystal, "Coercive Diplomacy: A Theoretical and Practical Evaluation," *Glendon Journal of International Studies* 8 (2015): 1-2.

² Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, "Confronting Iraq: US Policy and the Use of Force Since the Gulf War," *RAND Report*, 2000.

³ Polad Muradli, "What is Coercive Diplomacy?" *The Politicon*, June 16, 2016.

⁴ Alexander L. George, *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War*, (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997).

have tried to explain the very idea of coercive diplomacy as one “used to promote peace by collaborating these efforts with those of strategic guidelines.”⁵

The general meaning of coercive diplomacy can be taken as a tool used to convince the adversary to surrender to one’s demands with the threat of punishment in case there is non-compliance to the demands. Coercive diplomacy, so far has been proved to be an attractive strategy as it offers the possibility to achieve ones objectives without bloodshed or with less chance of escalation when compared to the cost of employing the traditional military strategy.

Thus, the very concept of coercive diplomacy revolves around four major variables: the coercer’s demands, means being used for creating urgency, punishment in case of noncompliance, the possible use of incentives for persuading the adversary and securing the acceptance and fulfilment of demands. Accordingly, when a policy maker comes up with different features while constructing a certain strategy, different variants may overwhelm that particular strategy. These basic types of diplomacy or variants in coercive diplomacy are known as “ultimatum” or tacit ultimatum, the “try-and-see” approach, the “gradual turning of the screw” approach and lastly, the “carrot and stick approach”. The ‘ultimatum’ employs threats and also imposes a time limit for compliance in order to enhance the adversary’s urgency. The ‘try and see’ approach focuses on the use of mild coercion. If the demands are not met in a limited timeframe then more threats are brought up into focus. The coercive force is increased in order to compel the adversary for taking certain action or fulfilling the demands. The ‘gradual turning of the screw’ is somewhat different from the ‘try and see’ approach as the former focuses more on the increased use of force and pressure rather than on time constraints which is the domain of the latter. Finally, there is the ‘carrot and stick’ approach, which focuses on assurances. The coercer must assure the adversary or the target that there will be no further demands and the coercer will also offer some incentives as carrots to the targets along with the stick of threat and punishment.⁶

Historical Analysis

The US foreign policy was traditionally dominated by the use of military force and use of power in order to deter the Soviets from challenging US dominance and threatening its allies. In the post-Cold War era and following the collapse of the Soviet Union, a more difficult challenge came forth: to manage the internal conflict situation, terrorism and to pre-empt the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by rogue

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

states and non-state actors. Since then, coercive diplomacy has become a more proactive approach of dealing with international actors to make them behave in a certain way. There are almost 37 cases of the application of coercive diplomacy during 1990-2005, in order to stop the military exchange and the spread of WMDs and terrorism, but only a few of them were successfully operational.⁷

In the US history, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Iraq War, the Contras-affair, and Libya are key examples where peace was achieved by the adoption of coercive diplomacy. The Ukraine Crisis is another successful example of coercive diplomacy. The world saw great turbulence as the bipolar power struggle precipitated. In the 1960s, the US and the Soviet Union did not only see each other in a power tussle but were also struggling not to drag the world into another massive war.

When the Soviet President Khrushchev decided to put the Soviet missiles in Cuba, it was done out of the fear that USSR is falling behind in the arms race and that its missile capabilities are not adequate to instil fear in the US military. The US policy was then moulded under John F. Kennedy who decided to bombard the sea in order to stop the Soviet fleet from bringing missiles. Knowing the decision was taken under Kennedy, whose personality dictated not to fall back from his position; Khrushchev decided to pull back the fleet. Kennedy used the tactic of threatening to bombard the fleet, which successfully turned the game and made the Soviets turn back in order to avoid the chances of dragging the conflict into something much bigger and dangerous.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Reagan administration was dealing with the threat of Contra Rebels in Central America; the Contras were against the government of the Nicaraguan President. Reagan was very much in support of the rebels because he was not in favour of the formation of Communist or Socialist blocs in South America. In accordance with the Reagan doctrine, the rebels were significantly funded by the US government. He endorsed this funding by claiming that it is an unusual threat to the national security of the country. At last, Reagan applied certain strategies comprising of policy options as a means of coercive diplomacy. The government of Nicaragua was made to take democratic reforms and start negotiations. This move in fact, made him successful in achieving what he had desired.⁸

In 1993, when George Bush was told that Saddam Hussein was hesitant to allow the UN inspection team to do their job. Bush immediately asked the UN Security Council for assistance to halt these movements and

⁷ Peter Viggo Jakobsen, "Coercive Diplomacy: Frequently Used, Seldom Successful," *Kungliga Krigsvetenskapsakademien Handlingar och Tidskrift Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, Documents and Magazine*, (University of Copenhagen) 4, 2007.

⁸ Ibid.

activities by Iraq and as a result sanctions were imposed on Iraq. In reaction, Iraq started to move its missiles in the No Fly Zone, which was established by the US-led forces, following which Bush, along with his allied forces, launched a missile strike in Iraq, which eventually made Saddam agree to the cease-fire. The attacks were minimal with no casualties and the tools of coercive diplomacy were intelligently manipulated by Bush. This also demonstrated that with minimal use of force certain demands can also be met.⁹

Another case is that of Muammar Qaddafi who ruled Libya for more than 40 years. The use of coercive policies in Libya led to the elimination of WMDs from Libya in 2003 and then the actual demise of Qaddafi in 2011. Libya, during the early 1990s, was found to be involved in terrorist activities and was clearly but covertly developing its nuclear capability. With the change in US administration, the situation in Libya turned despondent. The Bush administration imposed economic sanctions, which brought Libya's economic decline leading to abandonment of its nuclear program. With the outbreak of 'Arab Spring' in 2011, the US and NATO decided to overthrow the Qaddafi regime. Thus, coercive diplomacy was used to make a country disarm successfully with certain inducements and incentives.¹⁰

History shows that the use of this strategy, together with its benefits and remunerations, has proved quite successful while maintaining state-to-state relations, and preventing and resolving conflicts. Therefore, there is a need to focus more on balanced and tactful coercion of the adversary rather than using military power and leading the world towards war.

Development of North Korea's Nuclear Program

The Korean nuclear program and its development dates back to the post World War II era when the unconditional support and provision of US security assurances to South Korea against North Korea raised concerns for the latter. Today, the North Korean nuclear and missile program has become a source of concern not only for the Korean Peninsula's security but also for the international community at large. Despite years of constant international condemnation and pressure, the country has been successful in developing its own nuclear weapons program and delivery mechanisms. Till now, North Korea has reportedly succeeded in conducting several nuclear tests, from nuclear devices to hydrogen bombs. It would be quite difficult to actually estimate the level of

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Alexander George, "The General Theory and Logic of Coercive Diplomacy," in *USIP Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991): 3-14.

technical sophistication of Korea but several experts are confident about the fact that Korea has developed a miniature sized nuclear warhead which can be paired up with a missile to destroy its targets.

Since the country's first nuclear test, which was conducted back in October 2006, the military developments in 2016 are enough to prove that Pyongyang poses a threat not only to the regional players but also to the US sovereignty. Since the end of the Korean War, the country seems to be improving both in the nuclear and missile domain on all technological fronts. The nuclear and missile development by North Korea seems to be paralleling South Korea, which not only allowed the country to develop its military program but also led the country to recover its economy after the 1990 famine - which had devastatingly engulfed the country.¹¹

Plutonium Based Program

The nuclear ambitions of North Korea were also reinforced by the Soviet Union as it provided the country with technical expertise and technology in the form of a research reactor. The reactor was operationalized in 1966 and was capable of enriching uranium. Along with this enrichment facility, there were speculations about the clandestine enrichment facility of North Korea, which is unknown in scale and can help the country in developing its nuclear weapons. North Korea's nuclear weapons program is supported and operated under both plutonium and uranium based routes.

In 1986, North Korea's Gas Graphite reactor of 5MWe started operating and was declared as the centrepiece of Pyongyang's Plutonium production house. Somewhere before the 1990s, North Korea planned to separate its plutonium spent fuel in order to produce up to 10 kg plutonium. By 1990, North Korea started to construct two large scale gas graphite reactors nearby Taechcon. In 1994 under the Agreed Framework, the plutonium production was halted along with the construction of larger research reactors. Nevertheless, North Korea restarted the processing on the plutonium plant when the Agreed Framework collapsed in 2003.

After being operational for several years, the 5MWe reactor collapsed and was disabled in 2006 as a result of Six Party talks. However, the appetite and intentions of the state to develop its weapons program never toned down. North Korea again started to construct its light water reactors in conjunction with a uranium plant, which could produce plutonium later. There were speculations regarding the light water reactors but North Korea denied all of these and claimed that these were for civilian use. There had been speculations that if these reactors were able to produce weapon grade plutonium then North Korea could actually

¹¹ Lorenzo Mariani, "Assessing North Korea's Nuclear and Missile Programmes: Implications for Seoul and Washington," Working Paper of Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Italy March 14, 2017.

get 20 kg of plutonium per year. Siegfried Hecker, the former director of Los Alamos Laboratory, estimated that once Korea has conducted its second nuclear test, the country actually owned 24-48 kg of plutonium as each of the first two tests carried 6 kg of plutonium.¹²

Uranium Based Program

During the 1990s, North Korea was believed to have received technical expertise and capabilities from the AQ Khan network. The US suspected this and decided to inquire from the Korean regime regarding the issue in a meeting held at Pyongyang in 2002. After the confrontation, the US started propagating that North Korea possibly got technical expertise and equipment from the AQ Khan network. There were traces of highly enriched uranium but DPRK constantly denied and refused to acknowledge the existence of uranium facilities. Following the nuclear test in 2009, DPRK announced that the country was in fact developing a uranium facility, which later could produce fuel in order to make the light water reactors workable. A US delegation visited the facility in order to watch over the very processing unit, which was quite modern and efficient compared to other Korean facilities.¹³

With reference to Korea's efforts in developing its nuclear program along with the procurement from the Khan network, China was never in favour of a nuclear North Korea. Initially, China had been supportive of North Korea and helped the country sustain its economy, which had collapsed after the Korean War. China had also intended to be the closest ally, the largest provider of fuel, food and industrial machinery to North Korea but the relations started to turn sour when North Korea first tested its nuclear weapon. The Chinese core interests of pursuing peace and stability in the Korean peninsula became largely focused on the denuclearization of North Korea. Obviously, with a nuclear Korea, Chinese influence would begin to decline while posing threats to its regional interests.¹⁴

Nuclear Weapons' Tests

Since the inception of North Korean nuclear weapons program, the country is believed to have tested a total of six nuclear weapons devices.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ David Albright and Paul Branan, "Taking Stock: North Korea's Uranium Enrichment Program," *The Institute of Science and International Security*, October 8, 2010, <http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/taking-stock-north-koreas-uranium-enrichment-program/>.

¹⁴ Bonnie S. Glaser, "China Policy in the Wake of Second DPRK Nuclear Test," *Journal of China Security* 5 no. 2 (July, 2009), <https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/GlaserChinaSecurity2.pdf>.

North Korea tested its first nuclear device in 2006 when the US spy satellites were very much active in monitoring the activities regarding military developments on the Korean Peninsula. The test was considered to be a nuclear fizzle rather than a fully effective blast.¹⁵ The second test was conducted on May 25, 2009; according to international experts, there was no leakage of radiations. This in fact gave the state capability to contain the nuclear test, which is a big step and advancement in Korea's nuclear weapons program.

On February 12, 2013, an unusual seismic activity was noted which was later claimed to be a successful test of a uranium device. It was a major development in the nuclear program of North Korea since the country had sufficient plutonium reserves but lacked in uranium reserves. North Korea successfully conducted its fifth nuclear test in September 2016. The bomb weighed 20 kilotons, which actually was much higher than the bomb used in attacking Hiroshima, which weighed almost 15 Kilotons. North Korea claimed the test to be a major advancement as it could strike the US if fit-up with some missile warhead. The first indication of the nuclear test carried out on 6 January 2016, was an earthquake. It was a hydrogen bomb test, which actually is more powerful than the atomic bomb and is the result of the fusion reaction. On September 3, 2017, North Korea claimed to have successfully tested a miniaturized hydrogen bomb, capable of being loaded on to a long-range missile. This development actually made the international community worried about the intentions of the 'rogue state.' Their local media portrayed the test as a meaningful step in completing the national nuclear program which alarmed the international media.

Missile Program

In order to predict the future of North Korea in the nuclear domain, the role of delivery mechanisms and systems is a key factor. The development and the basics of the missile program of DPRK are based on the old Soviet technology, which can reach regional targets. In order to tackle the Western threats, North Korea is pursuing efforts to develop a more sophisticated, long range and enduring missile technology. Over the years, North Korea's missile industry has developed and manufactured a variety of missiles. They were developed and upgraded partly by reverse engineering of the Russian technology with foreign assistance, and partly by their own technical expertise. Since Kim Jong Un's coming into power, considerable numbers of missiles have been launched compared to before.

¹⁵ "North Korea Nuclear Tests: What Did They Achieve?" *BBC News*, September 3, 2017. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-17823706>.

The missile family includes Hwasong, Scud, Musudan, Taepedong-Unha, and their variants.¹⁶

The year 2017 turned out to be productive and was marked by rapid progress for North Korea. They successfully announced the test of Hwasong-15 missile in late November, 2017. The country has fired 23 missiles during 16 tests since February this year. The tests are in fact a depiction of the country's efficiency in missile technology. The advancement and range of missiles depicts that North Korea has achieved technological capabilities over the years. The development of North Korea's missile program is to deter the US from a direct attack and perhaps confrontation. The missile development can also lead to an arms race between Pyongyang and Washington and between other regional states too.¹⁷

US Strategies and Implications

North Korea's nuclear weapons program and its military developments are exacerbating the already turmoil-ridden situation on the Korean Peninsula; it has further deteriorated the relations between North Korea and the Western powers. DPRK's nuclear ambitions have reached a point from where it can now launch an attack on the US mainland, which raises concerns within the US government and policy makers. The US, along with its allies, has formulated and adopted a variety of policy options, some of which were seemingly successful but failed. One successful policy option adopted against North Korea was the Agreed Framework of 1994, where the country was asked to halt the work on its plutonium facility. Afterwards, for a certain time-period, there was neither nuclear development nor missile expansion. Failure of the US/Western powers to implement the Agreed Framework led to the withdrawal of DPRK from NPT (Non-proliferation treaty) and from the Six Party talks reflecting a lack of trust, misperception and absence of mutual understanding between the two.

Since the arrival of Trump administration in the US, there seems to be a change in the US foreign policy. Trump's remarks on the development of North Korean military program are still to be analyzed. The US administration needs to review its policy options in order to achieve its high priority objective - denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Trump administration is still contemplating on how to deal with North Korea's nuclear crisis or it may continue its predecessors' path of wait and see approach. Given the vitality of the Korean regime and its nuclear

¹⁶ "The CNS North Korea Missile Tests Database," *Nuclear Threat Initiative*, www.nti.org, (accessed March 30, 2017).

¹⁷ Alo Levkowitz, "North Korea's Missile Program," *The Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies*, Perspective Paper 680, December 10, 2017, <https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/north-korea-missile-program/>.

ambitions, the Trump administration with its wait and see approach seems hardly efficacious.¹⁸

The US and the world at large must accept the reality that North Korea is now a nuclear power and that its nuclear program is meant to deter the US aggression and to demilitarize the Korean Peninsula. The coercive diplomacy has failed to deter DPRK from further developing nuclear and military programs. Donald Trump's 'do it alone' policy has led South Korea to work on its own and has compelled both Koreas to start working together. Kim Jong Un had also expressed to the US President his readiness to meet and discuss the Korean security. Kim's visit to China in March 2017 was also to harness its support against the US. Therefore, the US needs to reconsider its policy regarding the DPRK to bring it in accordance with international norms and laws if it wishes to dissuade North Korea from furthering its nuclear arsenal/military modernization.

The first workable option is to support the North Korea-South Korea diplomacy to help reach a mutual agreement on a comprehensive regional security arrangement including declaring the Korean peninsula as a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. The reason behind it is that South and North Korea are now on the same page. For these two states, the immediate concern happens to be the need of stability in their zone of influence and immediate neighbourhood. This shows that for the sake of regional security, the two arch-rivals have agreed to sit together and this initiative – involving the US - nullifies the need for coercive diplomacy and pushes forth the notion of simple diplomacy. The recent developments in the North Korean nuclear program are a source of concern for US security. The US efforts to coerce North Korea into a nuclear roll back have not been productive. Thereby, the Trump administration needs to re-assess and better strategize policy options, so to re-calibrate their tactics in order to fulfil its ambitions regarding DPRK's nuclear weapons.¹⁹

China has remained North Korea's long-standing and closest ally; in fact, it has become N. Korea's lifeline since it provides Pyongyang with economic, military, technical, food, and energy assistance. The US must seek the option to take China on board as this option might address certain concerns and security issues. Trump, since coming into power is in favour of a military strike on the nuclear program and missile facilities of North Korea.

¹⁸ Markus Liegl, "The End of Illusions Trump's North Korea Options," *Security Policy Working Paper 5*, Berlin-Germany: Federal Academy for Security Policy, 2017, <https://www.baks.bund.de/newsletter/archive/view/962>.

¹⁹ Joel S. Wit, "The Way Ahead: North Korea Policy Recommendations for the Trump Administration," *US-Korea Institute at the SAIS*, John Hopkins University, December 2016, https://www.38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/2016-12-Policy_Wit.pdf.

Another less coercive option could be to seek some kind of peace treaty, which can partially negotiate the concerns of both the parties. As part of the peace treaty the removal of all nuclear devices verified by a rigorous monitoring regime might be sought while agreeing to uplift all economic sanctions in return. Lastly, there can be the option of re-entering into the negotiations phase. This option, like the previous one, would also seek diplomacy and forceful negotiations in order to resolve the issue. The international community can play a major role by aligning with the US and bringing North Korea to the negotiating table; incentivizing the latter rather than coercing it, however, has to be the mainstay of all such efforts.²⁰

For North Korea, its national security is of prime importance. It must be acknowledged that United States' provision of security assurances to South Korea and presence of the its forces in the Korean Peninsula are a source of continued threat to North Korea. This threat consequently justifies and legitimizes its utilization of all available means (at North Korea's disposal) for ensuring its survival and territorial integrity. Therefore instead of adopting a futile coercive path, an incremental but consistent approach involving a framework of successive policy measures, which aims at engaging North Korea diplomatically, needs to be adopted at international level.

Conclusion

Use of coercive diplomacy for denuclearizing North Korea seems to have failed, despite that the current US administration led by Donald Trump is continuing with this policy. The sending of US aircraft carriers to strike targets in the Western Pacific hints at the administration's consideration of the North Korean nuclear assets, hence, they choose the option of displaying force and power.

The Trump policy of coercive diplomacy is four-fold, including: sanctions, pressurizing North Korea to stop nuclear and missile testing, incentivizing to China to impose hard economic sanctions on North Korea, and avoid the risk of a full-blown military clash between Korea and the West. Until now this hasn't worked effectively as a policy, and has only fuelled the North Korean leadership to further the nuclear program. For US and North Korea there is no channel of direct communication. To make both states sit on the table, China, Japan, Russia and South Korea can play an important role.

The status of North Korea as a nuclear weapons capable state is a reality. Asking it to roll back its nuclear program without a plausible

²⁰ John Deutch and Gary Samore, "How America can Thwart North Korea's Nuclear Threat," *The National Interest*, May 31, 2017, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-america-can-thwart-north-koreas-nuclear-threat-20934>

bargain would be too irrational an expectation/goal. There is a need for diplomatic efforts rather than display of military power as a sole component of the US strategy. In this regard, the European Union can help open a direct channel of communication between the two states. To stop North Korea from further developing its missile and nuclear weapons, some assurances of significance to the country, must be offered by the EU and the US. These might include an assurance of EU will oppose any kind of interference in the country's domestic affairs; that regime change is not an option; similarly military confrontation and invasion is off the list; and that there will be complete lifting of economic sanctions if North Korea agrees to a missile and nuclear testing moratorium. Lastly, security guarantees must be provided to North Korea in exchange for its commitment to give up its Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (IBM), Sea and Land based missile programs.

Military modernization and nuclear proliferation have already made the world unsafe; the use of means other than diplomacy has failed. Therefore, in order to create regional peace and stability leading to a less-conflictual global environment, diplomacy must be given a chance and the agreed principles must be seriously implemented, since national security and sovereignty are paramount for each state.

TRUMP'S NEW AFGHAN STRATEGY: POLICY OPTIONS FOR PAKISTAN

Muhammad Munir* & Muhammad Shafiq**

Abstract

The paper analyses the U.S. President Donald Trump's new Afghanistan strategy. It argues that the policy is flawed as it focuses on a military approach rather than a political solution for Afghanistan. It also does not address the internal vulnerabilities of Afghanistan, especially reconstruction and nation building. Afghanistan's turmoil is essentially a product of internal dynamics of the country, which comprises of a burgeoning insurgency, ethnic and sectarian fault lines, religious extremism, rampant corruption and fragile governance institutions. The prevailing scenario is the result of more than 16 years of various military strategies employed by the US which failed to stabilise the war-ravaged country. Furthermore, suspicion and mistrust between Afghanistan and Pakistan have obstructed the peace efforts. Under the U.S. South Asia Policy, India has been given a larger role in Afghanistan while taking a dim view of Pakistan's counter terrorism efforts. It has raised serious concerns in Pakistan. Against this backdrop, the paper examines the limitations of Trump's South Asia policy, for Pakistan and what strategic adjustments the country needs to make in this scenario. It suggests dialogue among all stakeholders including the Taliban which is necessary for peace in Afghanistan.

Key Words: *Terrorism, Afghanistan, Pakistan, US, Proxy War, Regional Instability, Quadrilateral Talks, South Asia Strategy*

Introduction

Exploitation of Afghanistan's internal fault lines by various powers of the world for their interests is a perpetual phenomenon in history. The prevailing scenario has created a critical security situation in Afghanistan; consequently, generating a spill over effect for its neighbours, particularly Pakistan, China Iran and the Central Asian States. The U.S.

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policy for Afghanistan has seen a major shift under the US President Trump. The present U.S. strategy announced on 21 August 2017 predominantly refers to American policy guidelines for Afghanistan and South Asia. While urging the Pakistani government to do more in countering terrorism in the region, President Trump praised India by declaring it the closest ally of the US suggesting a greater role for India in Afghanistan, especially in the area of economic assistance and development.¹ The new strategy is condition-based rather than time bound with a focus on tackling terrorism rather than Afghan nation building. Furthermore, the US support for the Afghan Unity Government is conditional depending on its commitment and performance.²

Pakistan believes that it has been an equal partner with the coalition forces in fighting against militancy in the region. Pakistan has made enormous sacrifices in terms of military damages, human lives, refugee influx and intense economic cost that weigh heavily on own economy. However, Trump's new national security strategy blames Pakistan for allowing militants to operate from within its territory and insists that Pakistan has to take decisive action against militant and these very terrorist groups. Pakistan being an immediate neighbor of Afghanistan is among the most impacted countries from terrorism; however, the country still strives to safeguard its national security and play its role to assist regional and international efforts for curbing the menace of terrorism. Even then, Pakistan's role in fighting terrorism continues to suffer from suspicion.³

The chaotic situation and the prolonged thirty-seven years of warfare in Afghanistan ranging from the Soviet intervention to the Afghan civil war and from the Taliban rule to the US invasion have resulted in over 2 million dead, with 700,000 widows and orphans in the country.⁴ Moreover about 1 million Afghan children live in refugee camps outside

¹ Ume Farwa, "Pakistan's Evolving Regional Policy; Impact of Trump's South Asia Strategy," *South Asian Voices*, October 27, 2017, <https://southasianvoices.org/pakistans-evolving-regional-policy-impact-of-trumps-south-asia-strategy/>.

² "The New US Strategy on Afghanistan and South Asia: Challenges and Prospects," *IISS*, October 18, 2017, <https://www.iiss.org/en/events/events/archive/2017-7df9/october-7570/afghanistan-and-south-asia-9f79>.

³ "Pakistan Ranks Third on Global Terrorism Index," *Dawn*, November 18, 2014.

⁴ Imrana Begum, "The War on Terrorism and NATO'S Role in Afghanistan," *SSRN Electronic Journal* 11, no. 3 (2010): 16-21, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1615961.

their country though over 3.5 million Afghan refugees have returned but a considerable number of Afghan refugees remain outside to date.⁵

Economic instability is another concern for the local population that has further exacerbated the situation with the Afghan refugees returning after the drawdown of US-led allied troops in 2014. This has affected the country's economy greatly, resulting in growing unemployment. A large number of Afghan youth are struggling for their future and seeking better employment opportunities abroad, particularly in the Europe. The political instability, insecurity, unemployment, poor economic condition and corruption are the biggest problems of present-day Afghanistan.⁶

Strategic Situation of Afghanistan

The prevalent strategic scenario in Afghanistan is marked by internal commotion, security vulnerabilities, political uncertainty and ambiguity in the minds of ordinary people. At the governmental level, the opinion on vital national issues usually appears divided and the same division is exploited by external powers for their vested- interests and to destabilize the country. In fact, this situation has been a matter of concern for the neighbouring countries as well. While giving a briefing to the Security Council, Tadamichi Yamamoto, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan highlighted:

Without enhanced efforts by the National Unity Government to increase political inclusiveness, strengthen accountability and improve the Government's credibility, particularly in the security sector, we are likely to face more crises in an increasingly fragile environment.⁷

Repeatedly, Pakistan has emphasised the need to find a political solution to the Afghan conflict. Pakistan's permanent representative at the UN stressed that "continued reliance on a military option, or enhancing troop numbers without an accompanying political strategy, would only lead to more violence and bloodshed".⁸

⁵ James A. Piazza, "The Opium Trade and Patterns of Terrorism in the Provinces of Afghanistan: An Empirical Analysis," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 24, no. 2 (2012): 213-234.

⁶ William Maley, "Transitioning From Military Interventions to Long-Term Counter-Terrorism Policy the Case of Afghanistan (2001-2016)," *Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Studies* 6, no. 2 (2016): 39-43.

⁷ United Nations Security Council, "Government Must Work to Improve Trust in Security Sector amid Rising Tensions, Terrorist Attacks, Special Representative Tells Security Council," June 21, 2012, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc12882.doc.htm>.

⁸ Ibid.

The conflict in Afghanistan is creating several vulnerabilities for Pakistan that have a lot to do with hostile forces. The strategic situation of Afghanistan calls for assessing the prevailing conflict, security environment and the militant groups operating there. Pakistan is in the immediate neighbourhood of Afghanistan and shares a vast border of 2,430 km, besides having multidimensional commonalities of language, religion, ethnicity and cultural bonds. This makes it significant that an insecure and unstable Afghanistan is not in Pakistan's own interest by any means. The regional security is also a variable in setting the course of relationship between the two. Particularly, the erosion of cordial and friendly relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan is because of militant insurgencies. The insecurity in Afghanistan is mostly a product of the internal dynamics of Afghanistan along with a deadly mix of ethnicity, sectarianism, religious extremism, corruption, weak law and order situation and bad governance as well as foreign interference. The drawdown of foreign troops and the ineffective writ of the Afghan National Unity, the government encouraged the Taliban to gradually re-emerge and intensify offensive strategies for capturing larger parts of the Afghan territory. The Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police have so far remained inept in countering the Taliban incursions.⁹

While on the other hand, the international efforts that have been going on for 16 years to bring peace and stability in the war-ridden country reflect failure of various military strategies to materialize the desired objectives of ensuring peace and stability in Afghanistan. Moreover, the recent situation portrays a position where Afghanistan is passing through severe political, economic and security transition mostly dominated by feeling of uncertainty about the future of the country¹⁰. However, the Afghan National Security and Defense Forces (ANSDF), with the support of the coalition forces are struggling to protect the urban population against militant attacks. Still, the Taliban have been successful in controlling most of the rural areas, which usually remained as uncontrolled and unconsolidated gains out of bounds for a persistent absence of government authority. Moreover, the recent attacks carried out by the Taliban, including attacks on 209 (Afghan National Army (ANA) Corps headquarters in April 2017 and similar such attacks in the high security zones of Kabul, has diluted the confidence of the people in Afghan forces' capabilities to handle security matters in an appropriate manner.¹¹

⁹ Pervaiz Nazir, "War on Terror in Pakistan and Afghanistan: Discursive and Political Contestations," *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 3, no. 1 (2010): 63-81.

¹⁰ Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín and Antonio Giustozzi, "Networks and Armies: Structuring Rebellion in Colombia and Afghanistan," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 33, no. 9 (2010): 836-853.

¹¹ Muhammad Munir, "The Situation in Afghanistan," *Pakistan Observer*, August 4, 2016.

Current State of Conflict

In the aftermath of the 2014 drawdown of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the Afghan forces have hardly demonstrated an efficacious aptitude for preventing insurgency. Though, the Afghan government is quite assertive about the capabilities of ANDSF to retain control of the major population centers, transit routes, urban centers and provincial capitals. However, the Taliban have repeatedly belied such proclamations and seized high priority areas of Kunduz and Helmand provinces, including major communication lines across the country.¹²

The high profile attacks conducted by the Taliban from December 2016 to June 2017 numbered 42 that killed around 194 security personnel including international coalition forces. Such massive and high profile attacks have significantly undermined public confidence in the coalition forces and the capability of the Afghan government to ensure people's security. The capture of Kunduz by a few hundred Taliban in September 2015 and the inability of over 7,000 Afghan troops assisted by coalition forces, to defend Kunduz weekend the confidence of the Afghan people in the government. Moreover, during 2016-17, five Eastern and Southern provinces, including Ghazni, Kunar, Kandahar, Helmand and Nangarhar witnessed intense fighting.¹³ The US has spent \$70bn training Afghan forces since 2002, and is still spending more than \$4bn a year, according to a report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), published on 22nd September 2017.¹⁴

The government at the local and provincial levels seeks assistance from various insurgent groups and private militias, including warlords who have been maintaining control and security of their respective areas. The Afghan government allocates a significant amount of funds for the militias to address these security challenges in areas under their control.¹⁵

Despite Taliban's tactical successes in increasing their hold over much of Afghanistan, the deadlock in Afghan peace process still persists. The security situation in Afghanistan still lingers between the Taliban and

¹² Jan Angstrom, "Escalation, Emulation, and the Failure of Hybrid Warfare in Afghanistan," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 40, no. 10 (2016): 838-856.

¹³ "General Security Situation in Afghanistan and Events in Kabul," updated December 21, 2017, <https://www.ecoi.net/news/188769::afghanistan/101.general-security-situation-in-afghanistan-and-events-in-kabul.htm>. (accessed October 4, 2017)

¹⁴ "SIGAR Report puts Afghan Security Deficiencies in Focus," *Aljazeera*, September 22, 2017. <http://www.com/news/2017/09/sigar-report-puts-afghan-security-deficiencies-focus-170922063148773.html>.

¹⁵ United States' Defence Department Report to Congress, "Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan," June 2017, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/June_2017_1225_Report_to_Congress.pdf.

the Afghan government for control of the country.¹⁶ In addition, this demonstrates a shift in the Taliban strategy for their prospective role in the political affairs of the country. Consequently, this also devastates US, India and Afghan authorities' efforts for a Taliban free Afghanistan. Therefore, the inability of Afghan government 'to rein in corruption, establish rule of law, provide security, or otherwise perform basic governance functions led Afghans to turn to local rulers, militias, and the Taliban, further undermining the government's influence'.¹⁷

The brutal attacks by the Taliban and ISIS in Afghanistan in January 2018 underscore the futility of the US role; the US has more than 14,000 troops in Afghanistan, accompanied by at least an equal number of security employees from American contractor firms. These attacks were all different, but equally negative in both their impact and implications.¹⁸ The first attack was on the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul on January 21, 2018. At least 22 people, including four Americans killed in the attack that saw a fourteen hour siege by the Taliban. The second assault occurred on 'Save the Children' office in Jalalabad on January 24, 2018, killing at least five people and wounding 12 others. The Islamic State claimed it. The third attack was on an interior ministry building and foreign embassies in Kabul on January 27, 2018. For this attack, an ambulance loaded with bombs killed more than a hundred people and wounded more than 230, and Taliban claimed its responsibility.¹⁹ On January 29, 2018, Afghan military academy came under attack by the Islamic State militants that killed at least 11 Afghan soldiers and wounded 16 more.²⁰

These details of various attacks serve the purpose to evaluate the critical security situation prevailing Afghanistan and to highlight the sufferings of the Afghan people. No strategy would lead to peace until and unless taking into account the ground realities. Moreover, reconstruction

¹⁶ Shaun Gregory, "Under the Drones: Modern Lives in the Afghanistan-Pakistan Borderlands," *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 6, no. 2 (2017): 338-340.

¹⁷ Daniel L. Byman, "The Case against Involvement in Afghanistan, Brookings," September 5, 2017, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/09/05/the-case-against-involvement-in-afghanistan/>.

¹⁸ "The Afghan Morass: Three Brutal Attacks Underscore Futility of U.S. Role," *Post-Gazette*, January 30, 2018, <http://www.post-gazette.com/opinion/editorials/2018/01/30/The-Afghan-morass-Three-brutal-attacks-underscore-futility-of-U-S-role/stories/201801300009>.

¹⁹ Pamela Constable, "A String of Deadly Attacks in Afghanistan Exposes Government Weakness, Limits of U.S. Training Effort," *The Washington Post*, January 29, 2018, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/>.

²⁰ Rahim Faiez, "IS Attack on Military Academy in Afghan Capital kills 11," January 29, 2018, *ABC News* <http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/gunbattle-occurring-afghan-military-academy-52674189>.

and development of Afghanistan is important for sustainable economic growth and political stability.

Terrorist Groups in Afghanistan

The presence of terrorist groups in Afghanistan is equally worrisome for the Afghan government, the US and coalition forces, other stakeholders and neighbouring countries like Pakistan, China, Central Asian States and the Russian Federation. The terrorist groups along with prominent criminal entities collectively are around 20; have a strong influence in Afghanistan. The criminal groups serve as a major source of funding for the terrorist groups and their vast resources, mostly generated through illicit drug trafficking and organized crime sustain the terrorist activities in the country.²¹

The last two years marked record high numbers of terrorist attacks, as well as criminal and conflict-related civilian casualties that testify to the struggles of the Afghans during 2016-17. In the meantime, the fall of the key Afghan province of Kunduz into the hands of the Taliban, along with unrelenting flux in the Northern provinces, the rise of the Islamic State (IS) in the East and the advance of the Taliban towards the center of Helmand province were major reasons for security concerns. Today the security dilemma of Afghanistan has further aggravated largely with the rise of ISIS, besides prevalent insurgent threats from terrorist groups operating in border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan.²²

The following is a synopsis of different groups engaged in insurgency in Afghanistan:

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Afghanistan

In January 2015, the terrorist group Islamic State (IS) announced the formation of the Islamic State of Khorasan (IS-K) and gradually started gaining momentum in the country. The IS emergence to dominance and replacing the Taliban and Al-Qaeda is yet an irresolute matter that may become obsolete in the near future. The emergence of IS-K is another factor for the anxiety in the chaotic security situation of Afghanistan. The US counterterrorism strategy and the increasing support of the masses for the Taliban as compared to ISIS will diminish the ISIS-Khorasan's influence in Afghanistan. During the peak time of its influence, it significantly appeared to be influencing and dominating six provinces of

²¹ Matthew P. Dearing, "Like Red Tulips at Springtime: Understanding the Absence of Female Martyrs in Afghanistan," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 33, no. 12 (2010): 1079-1103.

²² Bogusław Pacek, "Military Police as an Important Actor of the New Security Environment. The Experiences of the Military's Gendarmerie from its ISAF Mission in Afghanistan," *Security and Defence* 2, no. 2 (2017): 61-71.

Afghanistan during 2015-16, however, the IS-K now confines to merely four districts of Nangarhar province.²³

The IS-K mostly conducted its operations in the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan and has been effectively conducting massive insurgent attacks particularly in the urban centers of the country as well as claiming responsibility for many attacks inside Pakistan. The rising insecurity in Afghanistan due to the Taliban's growing insurgent activities, coupled with the emergence of the Islamic State (IS), and its consequent effects, have created a sense of anxiety among neighbouring countries like Pakistan, China, Russia and other countries in the surrounding region.

Notably, during 2015, the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-K) a Wilayat Khorasan had territorial control over many districts of the Nangarhar and some other parts of the country. However, the conflict between the Taliban and the IS-K proved to be a major reason for not letting the IS-K's emergence to prominence in Afghanistan. The IS Wilayat Khorasan militants frequently operate alongside Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) militants in the border areas of Turkmenistan and Afghanistan. Many Taliban militants have also joined the organization; therefore, such developments became helpful for the IS-K to expand its control over areas in Warduj and Yamgan districts in northern Badakhshan Province that was previously under Taliban control. However, because of the fierce conflict between the Taliban and the IS-K fighters, the Taliban successfully pushed Islamic State out of many areas, including most of the districts of Nangarhar province. Many factors proved disruptive for the IS-K's growth and power, including its conflict with the Taliban, lack of support from the local population and the counterterrorism operations of the coalition forces against the group²⁴. The group's efforts continue to induct disaffected militants from other groups including the Taliban and the TTP.

Afghan Taliban

The Afghan Taliban remained most powerful from 1996 to 2001 until the US invasion of Afghanistan. The fight between Taliban and the coalition forces to claim dominance of Afghanistan is still an unresolved issue that has caused immense destruction and losses of men and material. The Taliban are still one of the most powerful militant groups in Afghanistan to have over 35,000 fighters and control approximately 25 percent of the Afghan territories including important areas of Kunduz, Baghlan, Badghis, Faryan, Sar-i-Pul, Takhar, Jawzjan, Kapisa, Badakhshan,

²³ Thomas F. Lynch, "After ISIS: Fully Reappraising U.S. Policy in Afghanistan," *The Washington Quarterly* 38, no. 2 (2015): 119-144.

²⁴ Arkady Dubnov, "Dangerous Neighbors: is Russia Destined to Face ISIS in Afghanistan?", *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 12, no. 69 (2017): 18-19.

Nuristan, Kunar, Paktia, Paktika, Wardak, Logar, Ghazni, Ghor, Farah and Herat.²⁵

Since 2015, the Afghan Taliban have improved their position by diversifying their regional relations resulting in minimising their sole reliance on one particular country. Most of the regional countries such as Iran, Pakistan, Russia and China consider Taliban a potent force to neutralise the IS-K threat. This has increased their advantage and options. Further, in 2017, the Taliban transformed their fighting strategy by shifting their reliance from solely targeting civilian targets to hard targets—the National Unity Government (NUG), the Afghan national police and army. This has led to six per cent decrease in civilian casualties in 2017 compared to 2016.²⁶ According to a CNN report, 2018 the data, provided by the U.S. forces, has revealed that the Taliban control of Afghanistan was on the rise. According to this report the Afghan government control of Afghanistan was 72 percent of the country in 2015 which gradually decreased and in October 2017 the Afghan government controlled about 56 percent of Afghanistan while, 30 percent of Afghan districts were contested with the insurgency. This shows that the Afghan army is gradually losing its control on the country because of Taliban insurgency. The insurgents who were controlling just 7 percent districts of Afghanistan in November 2015 enhanced their control and in October 2017, they were controlling 14 percent of Afghan districts while contesting in 30 percent of other Afghan districts.²⁷

The Haqqani Network

The Haqqani network, headed by Sirajuddin Haqqani is an equally powerful militant group that has remained the greatest threat to Afghan government and the coalition forces. This group enjoys close connections with the Afghan Taliban and has assisted them in planning and logistics for an on-going effective insurgency in the country. The nexus between the Haqqani and the Taliban is so strong that both militant groups have assumed the character of a single entity, headed by two different leaders.²⁸

²⁵ "Post-Taliban Afghanistan," *Strategic Comments* 7, no. 10 (2013): 1-2. doi: [10.1080/1356788010701](https://doi.org/10.1080/1356788010701).

²⁶ Basit and Mahmood, "South Asia: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, India," *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses* 10, no.1, (January 2018): 34, <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/CTTA-Annual-Threat-2018.pdf>.

²⁷ Nick Paton Walsh, "Taliban Control of Afghanistan on the Rise, US Data Reveals," *CNN*, January 30, 2018, <https://edition.cnn.com/2018/01/30/asia/afghanistan-taliban-us-control-intl/index.html>.

²⁸ Husain Haqqani, "Islamists and Democracy: Cautions from Pakistan," *Journal of Democracy* 24, no. 2 (2013): 5-14; "An Enemy We Created: The Myth of the

Pakistan is trying its best to ensure that militant groups such as Tehreek-e-Taliban Afghanistan (TTA) and the Haqqani Network (HN) do not use its territory for any terrorist attacks in Afghanistan. Pakistan's Foreign Office announced on January 30, 2018, that 27 suspects were apprehended who belonged to the TTA and their affiliated Haqqani network and later expatriated to Afghanistan. The purpose of this announcement was to dispel the impression that Pakistan was not doing enough against the TTA/HN.²⁹

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan is a separatist militant group that has been actively involved in targeting the authoritarian government of Uzbekistan; however, the group has a strong affiliation with other militant groups of Afghanistan such as the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda. Qari Bilal leads the IMU's operations in Afghanistan who had also supported the Taliban by providing 300 fighters in capturing the province Kunduz in September 2015. In recent years, the fighters of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan are approximately 500, have realigned themselves with the IS in Afghanistan and are actively involved in the northern areas of the Afghanistan. The Jamaat Ansarullah is another insurgent group active in Central Asia is a splinter group of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.³⁰

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) also known as the Pakistani Taliban is an insurgent militant group comprises various Taliban groups who escaped Afghanistan following US invasion of the country in 2001. The group undertook most violent activities in Pakistan after the Lal Masjid Operation and the consequent arrest and killing of many leading clerics of the mosque in July 2007.³¹ In the later part of the year, the TTP formally announced its formation as a *jihadi* group under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud in the South Waziristan Agency of the erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The terrorist group appeared with its self-proclaimed agenda of *jihad* for imposing Sharia and reforming the Pakistani society through violent means. Moreover, the TTP declared

Taliban-Al Qaeda Merger in Afghanistan," *Choice Reviews Online* 50, no. 08 (2013): 50-61.

²⁹ Kamran Yousaf, "Pakistan Hands over 27 Taliban, Haqqani Network Suspects to Kabul," *The Express Tribune*, January 30, 2018.

³⁰ Svante E. Cornell, "Narcotics, Radicalism, and Armed Conflict in Central Asia: The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 17, no. 4 (2005): 619-639.

³¹ Khuram Iqbal and Sara De Silva, "Terrorist Life cycles: A Case Study of Tehrik-E-Taliban Pakistan," *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism* 8, no. 1 (2013): 72-86.

the aims of conducting operations as defensive *jihad* and strengthening Taliban fighters of Afghanistan against NATO troops.³² However, the terrorist attack on Army Public School of Peshawar on 16th December 2014 and the military operation of Zarb-e-Azb proved drastic for the TTP killing most fighters of the group and forcing the remaining to escape to Afghanistan.³³

Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)

Aymenn al-Zawahiri, the Head of Al-Qaeda, announced the formation of Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) on September 3, 2014. Al-Zawahiri declared the aims of AQIS, Al-Qaeda's designated group, as overseeing and carrying out operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Myanmar and Bangladesh.³⁴ The operation Zarb-e-Azab proved drastic for the AQIS since most of the militants of the group either captured or killed during the military operation; however, a few of the militants still survive in Afghanistan.³⁵ In recent years, the threat from Al-Qaeda has significantly decreased since the group is primarily struggling for its survival and organizational restructuring. This organization remains confined to the Eastern and the Northern parts of Afghanistan with the support of the Taliban.³⁶

Contours of Trump's New Afghan Strategy

President Trump announced its Afghanistan/South Asia Policy on August 21, 2017, is currently a condition - based counter-terrorism approach instead of a timeline-driven. With fresh deployment of 4,000 soldiers, the Trump Administration gave the U.S. military a greater autonomy in handling matters in Afghanistan. Instead of recognising Pakistan's sacrifices in the War on Terror, the new policy seemingly takes a tough stance on Pakistan.³⁷

³² "The Taliban Revival: Violence and Extremism on the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier," *Choice Reviews Online* 52, no. 09 (2015): 50-54.

³³ Tara Kartha, "Pakistan And The Taliban: Flux In An Old Relationship?" *Strategic Analysis* 24, no. 7 (2000): 1307-1331.

³⁴ J. Michael Barrett and Robert L. Hutchings, "Containing Al Qaeda," *Foreign Policy*, no. 144 (2004): 4.

³⁵ Alastair Reed, "Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent: a New Frontline in the Global Jihadist Movement?" *Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Studies* 7, no. 11 (2016): 39-48.

³⁶ Avery Plaw, "Is Turn about Fair Play With Al Qaeda?" *International Studies Review* 12, no. 4 (2010): 622-624.

³⁷ Abdul Basit and Sara Mahmood, "South Asia: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, India", *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses* 10, no. 1 (January 2018), 36. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26349854?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents.

The main contours of Trump's new Afghan strategy include:

- a) Granting the U.S. forces more autonomy to deal with ground situation in Afghanistan.
- b) Sending out a message to the Taliban that the U.S. is not to withdraw in haste, and to support the idea of incorporating Taliban into the government in Kabul through dialogue.
- c) Urging the Afghan government to show "determination and progress", and share "military, political and economic burden".
- d) Emphasising counter terrorism rather than nation building.
- e) Putting pressure on Pakistan to eliminate terrorist sanctuaries along its border.³⁸
- f) Inviting India to play a larger role in Afghanistan in the realm of economic and development assistance.³⁹

Some experts believe that the U.S. condition-based approach would be useful in terms of confidence and capacity building of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANFS) for a long term. The new strategy is focusing more on war fighting with little emphasis on political and economic reforms. Here the important question is for how long would the ANSF remain dependent on foreign troops? The Afghans should show a strong and sustained commitment without which there would be no success in any strategy prepared by the US or any other international organization.⁴⁰

It is interesting to note that the US strategy on one hand is de-emphasising the Afghan nation-building but at the same time urging India to help Afghanistan in the area of economic assistance and development. India's importance for the U.S. is not only for Afghanistan but the country also enjoys the status of a net security provider in the region as a key security and economic partner of the U.S.⁴¹

While highlighting Pakistan's concerns, Senator Mushahid Hussain Sayed questioned the Trump strategy by stating that if more than 100,000 U.S. and NATO forces could not stabilise Afghanistan then how could an

³⁸ Shahid Javed Burki, "Trump's Doomed Afghan Strategy," *Project Syndicate*, August 28, 2017, <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/trump-afghanistan-speech-policy-flaws-by-shahid-javed-burki-2017-08>.

³⁹ Ashok K. Behuria, "Trump's Afghan Policy Upsets Pakistan," *IDSA Weekly E-Bulletin*, August 21-27, 2017, <https://idsa.in/system/files/page/2015/PEW-Aug-4-2017.pdf>.

⁴⁰ Dr. Roger Kangas Academic Dean, John Wood, Jack Gill, Antoine Levesques, "The New US Strategy on Afghanistan and South Asia: Challenges and Prospects," *International Institute of Strategic Studies*, October 18, 2017.

⁴¹ Nihar Ranjan Das, "President Trump's Afghanistan Policy: An Assessment," *Issue Brief, Indian Council of World Affairs*, September 25, 2017, www.icwa.in/pdfs/IB/2014/PresidentTrumpAfghanPolicyIB25092017.pdf.

increase of 4000 troops would serve this purpose. He argues that giving more space to India in Afghanistan would lead to instability in Afghanistan and would surely be a recipe for a proxy war between the two arch rivals- Pakistan and India- are already witnessing tense relations. The Trump strategy is mainly focusing on military means whereas the resolution of the Afghan conflict lies in political reconciliation and negotiations by involving regional countries -Pakistan, Iran, China and Russia. Although one cannot totally ignore Indian interests in Afghanistan and Central Asia but as far as peace in Afghanistan is concerned, Pakistan remains the key country.⁴² While highlighting the same point, Senator Mushahid notes: Very soon, the realization will dawn on President Trump that the road to peace in Kabul lies through Islamabad, and Islamabad will be ready for the call that will come from Washington seeking a helping hand to extricate the United States from the Afghan quagmire.⁴³

Lutfullah Lutf, a senior researcher and fiscal policy analyst at the Ministry of Finance, Afghanistan, recommends that for establishing long term peace in Afghanistan, there is a need to follow multiple tracks rather than just focusing on military-led development. He believes that in the past most of the strategies in Afghanistan failed since those focused on benefitting the Afghan government and political elites while ignoring the common Afghans. Any strategy based on reconstruction and economic opportunities would help in winning the hearts and minds of the masses. While discussing India's economic assistance to Afghanistan, he notes that during the last decade, India has supported the Afghan government with almost \$2 billion for infrastructure development, human development and training programs for the national security forces of Afghanistan. However, he recommends that instead of just relying on India, the Afghan government should develop diversified economic relations with regional countries to pave the way for their peaceful engagement in Afghanistan. ⁴⁴ The Afghan situation can witness improvement through economic development and political settlement with the Taliban that would require a regional consensus on Afghanistan's future.⁴⁵

⁴² Mushahid Hussain, "Trump's Afghanistan Policy: The View from Islamabad, *CNN*," August 23, 2017, <https://edition.cnn.com/2017/08/22/opinions/pakistan-view-on-trump-afghan-hussain-opinion/index.html>.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Lutfullah Lutf, "Economic Imperatives and the New U.S. Strategy for Afghanistan and South Asia," November 14, 2017, <http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2017/11/economic-imperatives-strategy-afghanistan-south-asia-171114081449652.html>.

⁴⁵ Vanda Felbab-Brown, "President Trump's Afghanistan Policy: Hopes and Pitfalls," *The Brookings Institution*, September 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/afghanistan_hopes_pitfalls.pdf.

An important question is whether Trump's Afghan strategy would enable Afghanistan to run its affairs without the U.S. and other Western countries' support. Some senators such as Senator Bob Corker has questioned whether President Donald Trump's strategy in Afghanistan would bring end to the nation's longest war, which the U.S. officials estimated would cost taxpayers more than \$45 billion.⁴⁶

India's Involvement in Afghanistan

Growing Indian influence in Afghanistan and the continuous U.S. efforts to assist India for its ambitions to become a regional power is bound to polarize the regional environment. Traditional rivalry between Pakistan and India will always be a factor to influence any peace effort in Afghanistan. Presently, Afghanistan considers India as one of its most reliable regional partners that has largely been engaged in contributing in terms of development and assistance projects including Afghanistan-India Friendship Dam and construction of the Afghan parliament. Moreover, besides providing such material support to the Afghan government, India keenly trains over 130 Afghan military personnel in its academies and commissioning programs. In May 2016, Iran, India and Afghanistan signed an agreement for opening trade routes into Central Asia through Chabahar Port, bypassing Pakistan. Besides, all these developments, the Indian policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan has always been roaming around objectives of creating a counterweight against Pakistan. Except Taliban, the Indians have always supported every regime in Afghanistan.⁴⁷

The prevailing Indo-Afghan nexus causes a certain level of apprehension with the belief that Indian active involvement through investment and development projects in Afghanistan is actually an attempt to encircle Pakistan from the eastern and western sides. The Taliban can by no means become viable option for India; therefore, India is donating billions of dollars for establishing an anti-Pakistan government in Afghanistan for broader strategic objectives of destabilizing and pressurizing Pakistan. Moreover, India has actively been supporting militancy inside Pakistan, as do the enormous Indian consulates inside Afghanistan attempt at preventing Pakistan's influence in the region through strategic encirclement.

The U.S. President Trump's strategy of giving larger role to India in Afghanistan would further complicate the existing strategic situation in Afghanistan. On one hand, it will enhance the mistrust between Pakistan

⁴⁶ Jonathan Landay, "U.S. Senators Concerned Trump's Afghanistan Strategy will Not Succeed," *Reuters*, February 7, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-afghanistan/u-s-senators-concerned-trumps-afghanistan-strategy-will-not-succeed-idUSKBN1FQ30Y>.

⁴⁷ Wolfgang-Peter Zingel, "The Economics of Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations: Implications for the Region," *India Quarterly* 70, no. 1 (2014): 1-14.

and the U.S. and on the other hand, it will create more complications in Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan.

Policy Options for Pakistan

Many experts believe that Trump's strategy on Afghanistan has many flaws. Firstly, by using the same tools as have already been used by the U.S. in the past would not give different results. Secondly, the strategy is devoid of any diplomatic effort. Thirdly, Trump's undue pressure on Pakistan and enhancement of the role to India in Afghanistan is a sure recipe to complicate the issue. In this critical situation, what policy options are available to Pakistan?

The most important policy option for Pakistan is to improve relations with its neighbours, especially according priority to its relations with Afghanistan. The Senate of Pakistan on August 28, 2017, 'unanimously passed a motion recommending that the government launch a regional diplomatic initiative to coordinate responses to the U.S. President Donald Trump's new Afghan policy, which takes a dim view of Pakistan's anti-terrorism efforts.'⁴⁸ To avoid any negative fallout of Trump's Afghan strategy, Pakistan should enhance cooperation with Afghanistan. Pakistan should take all the measures to address the trust deficit it has with Afghanistan. The relationship between the two countries has principally remained critical since any development in Afghanistan has spill over effects for Pakistan. Particularly, the last three decades of instability in Afghanistan also have had consequences for Pakistan, ranging from issues of cross-border militancy, illicit drug trafficking, arms smuggling and Afghan refugees in Pakistan. The two sides have frequently been blaming each other for terrorist safe havens, cross-border infiltration and the movement of militants.⁴⁹ In a meeting of the UN Security Council in January 2018, accusations were hurled at Pakistan by the US, Afghanistan and India for 'giving sanctuary to terrorist organisations'. Pakistan's Ambassador to the UN, Dr. Maleeha Lodhi, urged Afghanistan and its partners to address 'the challenges inside Afghanistan rather than shift the onus for ending the conflict onto others'.⁵⁰

For smooth materialization of border management mechanisms, there is a need for both Pakistan and Afghanistan to maintain open

⁴⁸ Nadir Guraman, "Senate Recommendations to Counter US's Afghan Policy Receive Unanimous Approval," *Dawn*, August 30, 2017.

⁴⁹ Tushar Ranjan Mohanty, "Afghanistan-Pakistan: Border Disorder – Analysis," *Eurasia Review*, May 23, 2017, <http://www.eurasiareview.com/23052017-afghanistan-pakistan-border-disorder-analysis/>.

⁵⁰ Shabana Mahfooz, "Pak-Afghan Blame Game doesn't Bode Well for Regional Peace, Experts Say," January 31, 2018, <https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2018/01/31/pak-afghan-blame-game-doesnt-bode-well-for-regional-peace-experts-say/>.

communications, share of intelligence and facilitate inter-military cooperation in the border region.⁵¹ The establishments of telephone hotlines between the Afghan and Pakistani authorities has been effective in initiating calls between the corps headquarters of the two sides which prospectively facilitates meetings of corps commanders to de-escalate the tension arising due to cross-border militancy.⁵²

Pakistan has expressed solidarity with Afghanistan on the series of terrorist attacks in the last week of January 2018. In its meeting on February 2, 2018, the National Security Committee (NSC), strongly condemned the spate of terrorist attacks in Kabul and expressed the resolve to forge a close co-operation by enhancing engagement with Afghanistan.⁵³

A Pakistani delegation, consisting of civil and military officials led by the Foreign Secretary Tehmina Janjua, visited Afghanistan on February 3, 2018 and held discussions with her Afghan counterparts led by Deputy Foreign Minister Hekmat Khalil Karza on Afghanistan-Pakistan Action Plan for Peace and Solidarity (APAPPS). This joint action plan consists of five working groups focusing on comprehensive engagement for countering terrorism; intelligence sharing, military, economic, trade and transit interaction; refugee repatriation and connectivity.⁵⁴ Tehmina Janjua emphasised that both countries should work with close cooperation rather than engage in a meaningless blame game. Pakistan offered a joint investigation into the deadly terrorist attacks in Kabul. While urging the Afghan government to destroy the hideouts of anti-Pakistan militants, Pakistan also stressed the need for effective border management.⁵⁵

The militant insurgency on both sides is primarily an obstacle that never lets the other issues settled between the two countries. For instance, any positive move towards cooperation and reciprocation often faces sabotage through a series of terrorist attacks.⁵⁶ Following the January 10,

⁵¹ United States Department of Defence Report to Congress, "Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan," December 2017, <https://media.defense.gov/2017/Dec/15/2001856979/-1/-1/1/1225-REPORT-DEC-2017-FINAL-UNCLASS-BASE.PDF>.

⁵² Naveed Siddiqui, "Pakistan Army, Afghan Officials Establish Hotline Contact, *Dawn*, April 4, 2017.

⁵³ "High-level Security Huddle Condemns Afghan Attacks," *The Nation*, February 2, 2018.

⁵⁴ "Pak-Afghanistan Joint Working Group Meeting in Kabul on Feb 3," *The Nation*, February 2, 2018.

⁵⁵ "Pak-Afghan Joint Working Group Agree to Continue Talk Process," *Pakistan Today*, February 3, 2018.

⁵⁶ Isaac Kfir, "The Question of Afghanistan and Its Impact on U.S. Relations with Pakistan: The Need for Pragmatic Engagement," *SSRN Electronic Journal* 7, no. 6 (2014): 51-56.

2017, terrorist attacks in Kabul, Pakistan's Army Chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa reiterated Pakistan's rock solid stance of cooperation for working with the Afghan authorities for peace and stability in the country. Moreover, the Pakistani President Mamnoon Hussain also asserted Pakistan's resolve for security and stability in Afghanistan by urging the Afghan leadership to reject all nefarious moves by elements trying to sabotage the relationship of the two countries. However, the trust deficit is one of the major impediments in developing a sustainable cooperation between the two countries.⁵⁷

The prolonged issue of the Afghan refugees is also a matter that affects the relationship of two countries since Pakistan hosts a huge number of Afghan refugees who have allegedly been involved in the deteriorating security and law and order situation inside Pakistan. Though a sizeable number of refugees have returned to Afghanistan, the return of the remaining refugees requires international cooperation and assistance to the Pakistani authorities. Pakistan firmly supports regional and international efforts for setting up of an actual Afghan-led and Afghan-owned process for resolution of the Afghan conflict, because only peaceful political settlement ensure an enduringly stable Afghanistan. Currently, Pakistan is hosting about 2.38 million Afghan refugees out of which 1.38 million are registered refugees and about one million refugees are non-registered.⁵⁸

Pakistan's role vis-a-vis Afghanistan is marked with suspicion over the decades partly due to the repeated allegations by the Afghan government, besides the prevalence of trust deficit between Pakistan and the U.S. This trust deficit between Pakistan and the U.S. is a point of concern for the Pakistani authorities as it affects their role in brokering peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban. Moreover, in the same context, the previous peace efforts also failed because of the unilateral U.S. action of killing the Taliban leader Mullah Mansoor in a drone strike on May 21, 2016. Without taking into confidence other members of the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) on Afghanistan – i.e. China, Pakistan and Afghanistan on board, the U.S. took this action. This unilateral action of the U.S. ultimately hampered the peace initiative and seriously spoiled the reliability of the group amidst its negotiations with

⁵⁷ "Pakistan's Army Chief Concludes 'Constructive' Afghan Talks," *VOA*, last modified 2017, <https://www.voanews.com/a/pakistan-army-chief-in-afghanistan-for-talks/4051550.html>.

⁵⁸ Asad Hashim, "Deadline Looms for Afghan Refugees in Pakistan," *Dawn*, January 31, 2018.

the Taliban. Despite such developments, Pakistan still views political settlement as the only viable choice for enduring peace in Afghanistan.⁵⁹

In 2017, the security situation in Afghanistan remained turbulent as Afghanistan ranked the second most volatile country in the world after Syria, according to the Global Peace Index, 2017. While the Afghan Taliban further expanded their territorial control, the failure of Afghanistan's National Unity Government (NUG) to govern and provide security to the masses added to public anger and frustration. In an interview to CBS News on January 15, 2018, Afghanistan's President Ashraf Ghani said that the Afghan army would not last six months without the U.S. support. He added that Afghanistan was under siege by about 21 international terrorist groups and dozens of suicide bombers.⁶⁰ The overall deadlock over the Afghan conflict has continued to date, despite the U.S. President Donald Trump's Afghanistan Policy of staying the course that has preserved the existing status quo. The stalled Afghan peace process reinitiated in October 2017 under the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG), comprised Afghanistan, United States, Pakistan and China, but did not make much headway. Parallel to the QCG process, Russia launched its own Afghan peace initiative and held three meetings between late 2016 and early 2017. This has not only complicated the on-off Afghan peace process but also ended the regional and international consensus of reaching a joint settlement to end the war.⁶¹ Pakistan should continue its efforts for political reconciliation in Afghanistan by using tribal elders and religious leaders to put pressure on the Taliban to sit at the negotiation table.

The U.S. India-driven South Asian policy has bias against Pakistan and become an issue of concern for the country. The Pakistan Defence Minister Engr Khurram Dastgir Khan, while commenting on US's new strategy in Afghanistan has rightly opposed India's involvement in Afghanistan by arguing that:

The US new policy on South Asia underscores a greater role for India in Afghanistan and the region, while not acknowledging the exponential contribution, counterterrorism success, and sacrifices of Pakistan for peace and regional stability. There are strategic contradictions in the US approach, and most key regional and global players have not supported this declared U.S. policy since it envisages India to be a net security

⁵⁹ Mona Kanwal Sheikh, "Islamic State Enters Al-Qaeda's Old Hotbed: Afghanistan and Pakistan," *Connections: The Quarterly Journal* 16, no. 1 (2017): 37-49.

⁶⁰ "Afghan Army Can't Last Six Months Without US Support," *NUNN*, January 15, 2018, <https://nunn.asia/english/2481/afghan-army-cant-last-six-months-without-u-s-support-ghani-2/>. (accessed January 16, 2017).

⁶¹ Abdul Basit and Sara Mahmood, "South Asia: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, India."

provider in the region. In South Asia's security matrix, there is no room for self-proclaimed and artificially boosted states. Regional security in the 21st Century can only be ensured through relationships and collaborations based on mutual trust and equality.⁶²

In this scenario, Pakistan needs to create a regional consensus on Afghanistan, which will help improve relations with the regional countries. Similarly, it should continue to engage the U.S. to find a sustainable solution to the Afghan quagmire. Important is to keep in mind that any deterioration of relations with the U.S. would be detrimental to Pakistan's long-term interests in the region. One of the main challenges that Pakistan's foreign policy faces today is that the West, especially the U.S., sees Pakistan through India's lens, thereby creating a complex situation for Pakistan since Pakistan has multiple disputes with India. In this context, the U.S.' critical role in managing Pakistan's relations with India and Afghanistan cannot be relegated. Pakistan should continue its efforts to convince the U.S. that political reconciliation in Afghanistan is the most viable option for lasting peace in Afghanistan. In case the U.S. agrees to such a proposal, Pakistan in consultation with other regional countries should be ready to play a positive role for Afghan led and Afghan own political settlement in Afghanistan.

Conclusion

The failure of the U.S. and the Afghan security forces in controlling militant insurgency in the country has created unstable environment for Pakistan, the concerns in the political circles are that if the situation worsens in Afghanistan, this will have a direct impact on security and economic conditions in Pakistan. The resurgence of the Taliban with more formidable tactics and manoeuvring skills is posing a serious challenge for the Afghan and Allied Forces. Thus, the challenges of radicalization and terrorism will continue to affect regional stability. On its part, Pakistan has nearly eliminated terrorism by launching decisive military operations by tackling all sorts of criminal, terrorist and militant elements indiscriminately, but it should remain cautious of other sources of instability, especially the situation in erstwhile FATA.

The situation in Afghanistan demands more engagement between Pakistan, Afghanistan as the U.S. President Trump's undue pressure on Pakistan on the issue of counter-terrorism would not work as Pakistan has already been committed to countering terrorism. There is a need to address mutual concerns through diplomatic channels. Both countries

⁶² Parvez Jabri, "No Room for Self-proclaimed, Artificially Boosted States in South Asian Security Matrix," *Business Recorder*, September 20, 2017, <https://www.brecorder.com/2017/09/20/370376/no-room-for-self-proclaimed-artificially-boosted-states-in-south-asia-security-matrix/>.

should enhance cooperation in trade and investment and use public diplomacy in removing misunderstandings.

Pakistan should use all options to minimise the negative fallout of the U.S. new Afghan Policy and the U.S.' new National Security Strategy respectively. Pakistan must prioritize its own national interests while dealing with the U.S. The regional states such as Russia, China and Iran have openly criticized President Trump's remarks on Pakistan's role in the War on Terror. Contrary to the U.S, these regional countries appreciate Pakistan's contributions against terrorism since the 9/11.⁶³ While tactfully maintaining its relations with the U.S. and Afghanistan, Pakistan should also continue its efforts to consolidate its relations with China, Russia and Iran. There is a consensus among the most of the regional countries that one of the most suitable options for durable peace in Afghanistan is political reconciliation between Afghan government and the Afghan Taliban. It is a strong hope that the U.S. would also realise the importance of political reconciliation for Afghanistan as the experiences of settling the Afghan problem through military operations/strategies have failed and could not yield the desired results for bringing peace and prosperity in Afghanistan. Pakistan should continue its efforts in bringing peace and security in Afghanistan by highlighting the need to resolve Afghan conflict through Afghan led and Afghan owned political reconciliation.

⁶³ Abdul Rahim, "How should Pakistan Respond to Trump's Afghan Policy?," *Global Village*, August 30, 2017, <https://www.globalvillagespace.com/how-should-pakistan-respond-to;6-trumps-afghan-policy/>.

MEASURING FOLLOWERS' IMPACT IN SHAPING A LEADER'S ATTITUDE AND BEHAVIOUR

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Abstract

Many researchers acknowledge the relationship among leadership, administration and hierarchical execution in organizations. An efficient and vigilant leadership nurtures better and effective management framework in any organization. This study evaluates the relationship and impact of followers' behaviour on the leader's attitude in Pakistan. The current research conveniently collects the data from the supervisors and employees from four different organizations in Pakistan's public sector. Managers of public sector organizations exposed to an extensive scope of managerial activities alongside global advancement, provided a scope for developing followers' behaviour - based study. Hence, the paper shows how a followers' character shapes the leader's attitude and conduct. Besides, it sheds light on the effects of follower - leader relationship based on association, and identifies a need to accentuate followership and leader's progression and development programs. The findings of the study depict that it's in the followers' benefit to create a match between followership behaviour and their leadership's IFT, as trying to make it proactive will further benefit the organisation.

Key Words: *Followers' Behavior, Leader's Attitude, Leadership Development, Public Sector, Organizational Development*

Introduction

Present organizations' work settings rest on a diverse range of business standards, preferences, and necessities so the relationship between leadership and followership becomes more complex, intricate, and vigorous than the years before. Globalization is accelerating the variations and introducing novel workings in the officialdoms.

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Followership is comparatively a less studied dimension by the researchers. Mary Parker Follett a mother of modern management in 1933 thoroughly studied the theme; she described the followership as the subject of utmost importance. Follett's work on followership accelerated further research on this topic. Thus, many researchers started exploring the extents of followership. This notion is not researched well in the usual corporate domain.¹

Followership is the appropriateness to proficiently pursue the requests and hold up the guidelines of a pioneer to support an organized association. This term "followership" is usually connected to modest and degrading terms similar to dormant, delicate, and obedient. However, Williams and Miller in their examination on in excess of 1,600 administrators of a broad scope of enterprises investigated that, more than 33% of all officials are adherents in some direct.² The belief that skillful followership just does what the leader orders, and, the concept that professional employment accomplishment is associated with effectual headship, does not predict the potentials of the follower's character rather followership in its true sense is beyond the image which is associated with this word.

Most centers of research are working to improve the skills relevant to leadership. Until now, this vision fails to notice the fact that, the efficient leader needs efficient followers in order to achieve his objectives. This is also a fact that "*Leaders are not leaders without followers.*"

Hansen explicates that energetic following determines that inspiration of the leader has been recognized over them that grants supremacy to the leader to administer and communicate his visualization to the cohorts. The cohorts take decisive chunk in the development of a headship as well. In order to become a leader, any individual needs to have an effective followership. Besides this significant fact, the behavior and uniqueness of followers remain frequently ignored in the leadership studies. As a result, there is less awareness among people about the phenomenon of effective followership. Many leadership studies are based on the belief that leadership behaviour are unique and are relatively more important than followership for the better productivity of groups and for overall organizational performances.³ In order to comprehensively understand the process of leadership, there is a need to conduct all-inclusive studies and research to comprehend the job of adherents.

¹ K. Bjugstad, "Internet Book Search on Leadership and Followership 2004," <http://www.amazon.com.html>.(accessed July 4, 2017).

² G.A. Williams, and R.B. Miller, "Change the Way You Persuade 2002," *Harvard Business Review* 80 (2002): 65-73.

³ T.L. Jr. Hansen, "Management's Impact on First Line Supervisor Effectiveness," *SAM Advanced Management Journal*.52 (1987): 41-45.

Administrations of 21st century associations are confronting broad varieties and difficulty in their work environments.⁴

Since, followership is more in numbers than leaders and needs more diverse training as every leader happens to be a follower some time in his life. Indeed, even the Chief Executive Officer is a supporter in his individual work hierarchy for the reason that he is accountable to a BOD.

A disciple essentially adds unswervingly to managerial triumph. If training funds for cohorts are to be increased directly in proportion to the training budgets for leaders, it will bring an improved return on invested capital. This study examines the correlation between the follower's behavior and the frontrunner's outlook. There is a prerequisite to discover how organizations visualize the followership. Hence, this study looks into how followers' behaviour shape leaders' attitude with a special focus towards the Pakistan's public sector to observe its manifestation.

Followership is defined as "the set of behaviours of team members performing relative to team members of superior position."⁵ Researchers broadly differentiate followership as an expanding concept. They define, "Adherent as a subordinate who has less specialist, less impact when contrasted with his unrivaled, and who thus for the most part, however not generally, drops into line."⁶

Followership is the flair to get heading, and to work in accordance with a plan, carrying on mindfully as a major aspect of a group and performing effectively according to desires for the pioneers. In general, it is an inclination of a person to pursue his leader energetically. Followership is the consequential social practice of authority. Primarily, Robert Kelley recognizes the expansion of this arena of followership in detail. He studied it as a job held by explicit individuals in an association, or cluster. In particular, an individual progressively following a pioneer in this way followership is the complementary communal process of power.⁷

Followership is an important factor in the success and failure of groups, organizations, and teams. Efficient devotees are people who are energetic, shrewd, yearning, and confident. The existing literature on

⁴ M.K. Carsten, and M.Uhl-Bien, "Implicit Followership Theories (IFT): Developing and Validating an IFT Scale for the Study of Followership," (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Management Association, 2009).

⁵ M.K. Carsten, and M.Uhl-Bien, "Exploring the Antecedents and Consequences of Follower Behavior 2008," (paper presented on the *Annual Meeting of the Society for Industrial Organizational Psychology*, San Francisco, CA, 2008)

⁶ M.K. Carsten, M. Uhl-Bien, B.J. West, J.L. Patera, and R. McGregor, "Exploring Social Constructions of Followership: A Qualitative Study," *Leadership Quarterly*, 21 (2010):543-562.

⁷ B. Crossman, and J. Crossman, "Conceptualising Followership – a Review of the Literature," *Leadership*, Vol. 7, No. 4 (2011): 481-497.

leadership theories mainly focuses on analysis of the administration mentalities, attributes, abilities and individual characteristics. It most of the time neglects the importance of fandom or followership in any given setting and considers them just as recipients of a leader's dynamic impact.

In addition, as an amendment or an addition to leader-focused perspectives, recent researchers have developed new theories that address or recognize the due part of adherents as increasingly broad and more huge in the authority procedure than the standard points of view.

A tribute to the Memory of James R. Meindl, Shamir expands an eye catching investigation that opens up an improved perception. Shamir et al. have additionally perceived five broad qualities that feature devotees' significance in initiative speculations.

1. Supporters are considered as beneficiary of a pioneer's position.
2. Supporters as a aspect moderate the effect of administration.
3. Supporters as supernumerary for the initiative.
4. Supporters as constructors of initiative.
5. Supporters as pioneers.

All points of view base on crafted by supporters.

Defining Followership

Townsend and Gebhart extend that followership is “a process in which subordinates recognize their responsibility to comply with the orders of leaders and take appropriate action consistent with the situation to carry out those orders to the best of their ability.”⁸

Crossman gives several descriptions of “followership” and “followers”. As per him, writing sees followership and adherents in alternate points of view. Bjugstad et al., explains followership as “the ability to effectively follow the directives and support the efforts of a leader to maximize a structured organization”. Different scholars see followership moderately as “leaders and followers, in any context, share a common fate of responsibility for their family, group, organization, or nation. Their objectives lead them to think that”.

After examining all these descriptions, the description of Carsten et al., looks the best appropriate on followership. He says followership is “a relational role in which followers have the ability to influence leaders and

⁸ M.W. Dickson, D. B. Smith, M. W. Grojean and M. Ehrhart., “Ethical Climate: The Result of Interactions Between Leadership, Leader Values, and Follower Values,” *Leadership Quarterly* 12 (2001) :1-21.

contribute to the improvement and attainment of group and organizational objectives".⁹

Effective or Exemplary Followers

Of late, devotees are seen as torpid, respectful subordinates, following the order of a pioneer; this picture has been expediently withdrawing with the quick modification in the aggressiveness of worldwide economies.

The personality of devotees has progressed toward becoming upset after some time transforming from the "subordinate customary supporter" to being dynamic adherents who are getting to be dynamic members in the race of productivity and high hierarchical success. Followers "contribute to the competitive viability and longevity of the organization consistent with values, norms, and needs of society".¹⁰

Jerry Westbrook and Gene Dixon outline 5 fundamental and unmistakable personality components of the adherents. That is:

- a. Valor to think and accept duties.
- b. Fearlessness to help and assist the association.
- c. Strength to acknowledge the difficulties and to experiment the activities.
- d. Boldness to take an interest in the transformational procedure inside the association.
- e. Boldness to take moral measures for the improvement of association.¹¹

Leadership

The idea of leadership has an unsure locus in authoritative applies, as it does in hierarchical theory and speculations. As a rule, overseeing individuals and the framework is by all accounts practicing power by administration. Most occupations are explicit in substance and technique with the goal that the distinctions among individuals could end up being unessential.

He expresses that it creates the impression that the idea of authority dodges us or advances in another structure to prod us afresh with its ambiguousness and multifaceted design. All of administration

⁹ G. Dixon and J. Westbrook, "Followers Revealed," *Engineering Management Journal* 15 (2003) : 19-25.

¹⁰ D. Katz, and R.L. Kahn, *The Social Psychology of Organizations* (second ed.) (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966)

¹¹ Northouse, "PG. *Leadership Theory and Practice*," (Sage, London Pearce, CL & Conger, 2004) in *Shared Leadership: Reframing the Hows and Whys of Leadership*, eds. J.A. Conger (California: Sage, 2003).

definitions are underlining method, specialist, group and target. Be that as it may, these definitions clarify distinct identity of the pioneer. Specialists clarifies administration as

- a) A process
- b) As an impact
- c) A process which needs group activity
- d) Achievement of objectives.¹²

In recent theories another transactional action has been added to the list called as energetic management by exemptions.¹³ Another idea Transformational initiative sets that the gathering will pursue that pioneer who empowers them, with a dream and energy, can accomplish targets well as they complete the things power and enthusiasm."

Leadership Theories

Following Leadership philosophies will also make clear how different types of followership- leadership behaviours and attitudes work or act. Vertical leadership is based on those leadership attitudes and styles by which it controls followership, while horizontal and situational theories highlight the followers' behaviours and its impact on leadership. Horizontal leadership theory believes that leadership disperses among the affiliates of the team or organizations. The situational initiative hypothesis portrays that the circumstance and the immediacy of supporters decide the style and capacity of authority.

The following is a cursory view of multiple leadership philosophies:

Vertical leadership

Vertical leadership philosophies are those, which just feature the conduct and activities of initiative by overlooking the characteristics of adherents. These hypotheses depict the pioneer devotee connexion as vertical affiliation i.e., the top to down impact approach.¹⁴

Every theory has its own reasoning about the role of leadership but according to Van Wart, "every leadership theory was exaggerated by the fortitude of the time in which it was presented."¹⁵ Burns J.M

¹² Northouse, "PG. *Leadership Theory and Practice*."

¹³ B.M. Bass and B.J. Avolio, "Developing Transformational Leadership 1990, and Beyond," *Journal of European Industrial Training*.¹⁴ (1992): 21-27.

¹⁴ Gary Yukl, *Leadership in Organizations*, 7th edition (New York: Pearson, 2009).

¹⁵ Montgomery Van Wart, *Leadership in Public Organization: An Introduction* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2007).

categorized vertical leadership concepts into two categories: transactional and transformational.

Transactional leadership is defined through numerous statements and some of them are as follows:

- 1) People can be motivated through reward and punishment.
- 2) Working of a social system can become the best by creation of a comprehensible chain.
- 3) When people become ready to perform a particular job, they start following every single way of the forerunner.
- 4) The fundamental purpose of followership is to adhere to the guidance of their pioneer.

The transactional leadership crafts coherent association for working, and exhibits what the necessity of their devotees is and what results in respectful adherents. Typically the disciplines are not expressed consistently but rather are all around appreciated and an endorsed structure of guideline is generally arranged.

Transformational leadership assumes that;

- 1) People for the most part pursue an individual, who empowers and rouses them.
- 2) People by and large pursue an individual, who has an extraordinary vision and enthusiasm as that individual can accomplish incredible targets.
- 3) Tasks should be possible with excitement and vitality.

The new definition of hypothesis includes three kinds of transformational practices:

- 1) Idealized impact.
- 2) Intellectual incitement.
- 3) Individualized thought.

Positive impact and acknowledgment from the pioneer allures an adherent's eagerness. Scholarly motivation builds up a superior comprehension of devotees for the arrangement of any issue. It controls supporters to envision issues with alternate points of view. Individualized re-evaluation of the hypothesis presents another transformational conduct called empowering motivations, which comprises of correspondence of an alluring and suitable vision, by using signs to spotlight devotee's endeavours, and building up a reasonable chain of definitive behaviours. Boss imagines the transformational and value-based administration styles, as a conduct, which an initiative has at once. Consumes J. M portrays transformational and value-based initiative as proportionally self-deciding

elements. At the end of the day, a pioneer with transformational authority can't be a value-based pioneer and the other way around.¹⁶

Horizontal Leadership Theories

Horizontal leadership hypotheses trust that administration for the most part scatters among the members of the groups or associations. Littler quantities of speculations are following this wonder and they have come into understanding during the 1970s. Follett presented the laws of the circumstance which brought up that one ought to pursue the pioneer who has the most precise learning about the current circumstances instead of following a pioneer with formal expert. This idea of Follett is a precursor of shared authority speculations in spite of the fact that reviews identified with shared initiative in associations did not start until late 1990s. Hirsch horn likewise inspected that the connection among initiative and followership is moving. He assesses the connections among initiative and followership in 3 decades:

1. Outdated
2. Contemporary
3. Post-Industrial era

In the post-modern period, the expert itself indicates receptiveness to request that adherents cooperate with specialist in deciding the association's bearing. Fletcher likewise confirms that the initiative model has been moved from:

- a. Individual endeavors to aggregate endeavors
- b. Controlling individuals to gaining from individuals
- c. Self to self-in-association with adherents
- d. Influence over adherents to offering capacity to devotees.

Van Wart underlined that if these three components:

- a. Competence of the subordinates
- b. Propensities of administration to stretch out and to depend
- c. Willingness of the association to allow and bolster the work of distributive initiative prototypes together empowers the common administration to be fruitful.

Situational Leadership

It portrays that the circumstance and speediness of supporters decide the style and capacity of initiative. By having comprehension of the connection among circumstance and the instantaneousness and

¹⁶ G. Yukl, *Leadership in Organizations*.

inspiration dimension of supporters, one can list authority aptitudes, experience and certainty of administration style.

Situational initiative hypothesis underpins the ideas that a gathering responds adequately to working and administration style. Situational administration clarifies the errand conduct, the degree of bearing which authority gives; relationship conduct, the degree of societal and compelling help initiative offers; supporters' availability, show how devotees play out a specific responsibility or effort or accomplish a particular objective; and adherents' improvement, it demonstrates devotees' advancement and inclination to regulate themselves in an authoritative domain or in any circumstance. These factors are interweaved and do not work autonomously of one another or in partition; As indicated by current speculations of situational authority created by P. Hersey, K. H. Blanchard, and D. E. Johnson in their compelling exploration work, 'The board of Organizational Behaviour: Leading Human Resources', is the most ideal approach to control individuals. This hypothesis portrays that the determination of initiative style and use of this will rely upon the circumstance and the ability or bent of adherents. Primary concern is that the supporters decide the initiative style; that is, the adherents' conduct ought to decide the authority frame of mind most reasonable for their working. Uniquely, if supporters participate in diligent work that causes them to accomplish an errand, thus, a pioneer ought to want to discover means and let the devotees to work freely. Then again, if a supporter appears to be reluctant and uncertain about how to continue or do the errand, a pioneer should stroll in and utilize task conduct—bearings, preparing, and direction.¹⁷

Errand conduct characterizes the obligations and assignments of an individual or gathering. Assignment conduct incorporates guiding supporters on what to do, how to do it, and when to do it. Gary Yukl (2006) prescribes that task conduct has confinements when utilized alone, in light of the fact that it has a penchant to effect sly affect devotees' fulfilment and profitability.¹⁸

Relationship Behaviour

Relationship conduct is the degree to which pioneers interface in a two-manner or multidirectional correspondence with adherents. This sort of conduct incorporates tuning in, encouraging, lauding, teaming up, directing, counselling, all in all and delicately promising practices. Analysts have demonstrated that authority relationship conduct broadly builds up

¹⁷ P. Hersey, K.H. Blanchard, and D.E. Johnson, "Management of Organizational Behavior," in *Leading Human Resources*, 8th Edition., (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc., 2001).

¹⁸ G. Yukl, *Leadership in Organizations*.

followership's' exhibition. Especially, in the event that you hit a halt in the conduct or advancement of a mission, the relationship conduct can resolve the issue. Devotees will make better move on the off chance that they trust that pioneers are strong and humane to the test they face in playing out their employments. Errand practices and relationship practices are differing authority practices, however estimated together, they are useful in characterizing four fundamental styles of initiative.

Types of Leaders' Behaviour

Situational leadership notion, divides leadership style in four basic types of leadership, in view of undertaking conduct on one hub and relationship practices on the other axis of a graph.

Style 1 (S1 or Directing): High task/low relationship

The leadership uses better than expected processes of errand manner and under normal actions of connexion demeanour.

Style 2 (S2 or Coaching): High task/high relationship

Leadership style uses supplementary noteworthy than-normal procedures of both assignment and association practices.

Style 3 (S3 or Supporting): High relationship/low task

This leadership style, includes more noteworthy than normal measures of relationship conduct and underneath normal measures of assignment practices.

Style 4 (S4 or Delegating): Low relationship/low task

Pioneers of this sort utilize the two kinds of relationship and assignment practices somewhat.

The Connection Between Followership and Leadership

In the wake of considering in detail, the exploration uncovers that the characteristics of useful adherents are not unique in relation to the characteristics of a useful administration. Henceforth, it is noteworthy to look at and portray the association among administration and followership to perceive the significance of this association. Chaleff clarifies this affiliation as different sides of one procedure. It tends to be said that both authority and followership are two pieces of one piece. Therefore, much the same as an educators and understudies bond in which one deprived of the other can't exist, pioneers without supporters and devotees without pioneers can't exist.¹⁹ Goffee and Jones additionally attest a similar that followership is only the other piece of initiative.

¹⁹ R. Goffee, and G. Jones, "Followership: It's Personal Too," *Harvard Business Review*, 79,(2001), 148.

Further, they clarify that initiative itself is a connection among pioneers and devotees, and on the off chance that there is no supporter, at that point it implies that there is no pioneer also.²⁰ Damen, van Oudheusden, and VdeKerkhof trust that leading and following are intelligent scales and are not two ideas. Especially, when we are watching regulatory pioneers, they are the two heads and devotees at once in their association.²¹


Kellerman concurs with the perspectives on going before researchers that initiative and followership are related, indivisible, and it isn't practical to imagine the one without the other. As the followership influences the relationship among pioneers and different devotees, in this way, there is a need of proficient emotionally supportive network by the followership for useful pioneers. Adherents catch eye when there is an unmistakable issue that can best be settled by the joined endeavors blended by the pioneers devotees game plan and many existing issues in the open associations need progressively participative and community oriented goals. Additionally, it is valuable to explore the followership and various angles that can impact followership style.

This research facilitates the public segment to comprehend dissimilar opinions of disciple's behaviour, leader's approaches, besides directing at development in the Pakistan's public sector. It brings vigorous proposals for leadership progress and followership training programs and strategies. Usually, frontrunners in the public sector organizations are visible to a wide-ranging of headship mounting actions; however, still there is requisite to improve investigations having a focus on followers. Therefore, this research explains the significance of the correlation amongst leaders and followership and explores how the pioneers can urge adherents to make their initiative agreeable, and how devotees conduct can shape the pioneer's demeanor.

The article propounds two hypotheses; firstly, there is a noteworthy connection which exists among followership behaviours and leadership attitudes. Secondly, this relationship is strong and its impact is significant. Towards this purpose, surveys have been the bedrock of the research design method. A non-probability convenience examining strategy is utilized by conveying surveys, quantitative method is used to makes references to situation the way they exist, in actuality, and generally affordable as far as time and assets.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ber Damen, Katrijn Van Oudheusden, and Twan Van de Kerkhof, *The European Business Forum*, no.30 (2007).



With reference to sample explanation, the sample size of this research is based on convenience sampling of 250 supervisors and employees in 4 diverse officialdoms in the public sector of Pakistan. Questionnaires were disseminated directly to the supervisors and employees from different organizations of public sector of Pakistan. Almost, 201 questionnaires were returned back, carrying 200 usable responses in total, i.e., 80.4 percent response. A research analytical method has been used which includes exploratory factor analysis, reliability and validity. The examinations likewise utilize SPSS (rendition 20) program for Windows to complete the dissipative measurable investigation. The questionnaires were gathered cautiously, with every member requested to remark on his/her individual job similar to a pioneer and a supporter.

The Research Instruments

The five-point likert scale technique is utilized for the gathering of information. The initial segment contains things that look for statistic information, for example, sex, age, understanding, capability and conjugal status. The second part comprises of inquiries where ²² we measure followership as an independent variable both at the individual and aggregate dimension.

The third part of the survey concerning subordinate factors was created by Richard M. Wielkiewicz.²³ The poll includes eight measurements, two symmetrical measurements, fundamental reasoning and various levelled considering, on multi measurements (Personal order

²² R. Marion, and M. Uhl-Bien, "Leadership in Complex Organizations," *Leadership Quarterly* 12, no.4 (2001): 389-419.

²³ R.M. Wielkiewicz, "The Leadership Attitudes and Beliefs Scale: An Instrument for Evaluating College Students Thinking about Leadership and Organizations," *Journal of College Student Development* 41 (2000):335-347; N.P. Podsakoff, S.W. Whiting, P.M. Podsakoff, and B. D. Blume, "Individual- and Organizational-Level Consequences of Organizational Citizenship Behaviors: a Meta-Analysis," *Journal of Applied Psychology* 94, no.1(2009): 122-141.

and Punctuality, Task explicit practices, Communiqué, Determination, Assists the gatherings and his or her associates, Managerial or authority segment, Managerial assignment ,Enhanced Enactments, Enhanced Conduct) of employment execution which is a needy variable of the examination. The third part is identified with the inquiries relating to transformational authority that comprise of different things: moxy, customised thought, moving inspiration, steady administration, rousing correspondence, scholarly incitement, strong initiative, individual acknowledgment, glorified impact.

Data Analysis Procedures

Testing

Table: 1 Descriptive Statistics of all variables (N =200)

One-Sample Statistics				
	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
FSBi	200	4.0014	.40033	.01525
LSAp	200	4.2503	.44522	.01696

Tables 1 show the descriptive analysis of sample size of 200 and the mean value of FSBi and LSAp are 4.0014 and 4.2503 and standard errors are .01525 and .01696 which are in acceptable range.

Reliability

Instruments reliability and validity has been measured by calculating the alpha coefficients.

Table: 2

Alpha Reliability Coefficients of all Scales (N=200)

Variables	No. of Items	Alpha Coefficient
Followership Behaviour	20	.853
Leadership Attitude	27	.957

The table 2 displays that the all instruments used in order to collect the data are reliable as their alpha co-efficient lies in between 0.853 to 0.957.

Table: 3

Correlations: Correlations			
Variables		FB	LA
FB	Pearson Correlation	-	
LA	Pearson Correlation	0.821**	-

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Statistical results shown in table 3 The value of the Pearson Correlation concerning total Followership behaviour and the leadership attitude is 0.821**, which entails that they both shared a significant and a positive connection

Regression

Table: 4

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.981 ^a	.962	.962	1.21512

a. Predictors: (Constant), FSB

Model		Un-standardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	T	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	2.904	.674		4.306	.000
	FB	.606	.062	.217	9.797	.000

a. Dependent Variable: LA

The results of analysis of regression show value of R square is 0.962 that means 96 percent change in dependent variable is caused by independent variable. The remaining 4 percent change is caused by other variables that are not studied in the research. Results are highly significant and positive.

Discussion

This research explores the connection amongst followers 'behaviour and leaders' attitude. Hypotheses drawn are the result of a rigorous and extensive literature review on the subject at hand. Analysis demonstrates that outcomes are as per theories and there is a huge connection between supporters conduct and pioneers frame of mind. Pioneers will in general value their devotees helping conduct and conclusions. Positively, the adherents who work with genuineness and go past their personal responsibility to fill in as collaborate with their initiative to deal with the issues for the advantages of their association, are considered as true and empathetic in contrast with compromising and detached supporters. These are practices of adherents simply like OCB-I mean, devotees and chiefs connection, which is altogether connected with administrator stamping of supporters' assignment execution. It has been seen that pioneers are prepared to impart some region of control to positive and energetic devotees. This current examination's estimations and results set up that there is a positive connection between the conduct and administration frame of mind in an association. Moreover, followership conduct can make sway in molding of initiative's disposition. Research portrays that followership's conduct and initiative's demeanor are related; results demonstrate that impact of followership's conduct can set the authority frames of mind. The adherents' practices demonstrate their wants about their pioneer that what sort of initiative frame of mind, the pioneers should show. These examinations recommend this is in devotees' advantage to make a match between followership's conduct and their authority's IFT and trying to make it proactive will further benefit the organisation.

Conclusion

There is a need for extensive investigation on followership and leadership, on the pattern that could present and integrate theories and could enlighten the concept that how the followership's behaviour and actions can shape leadership's attitudes. The paper has studied that followership's behaviour plays a vital part in influencing the leadership's attitude, and it affects the administrative functioning and performances as well. This research and its outcomes define the tactic as to how followers affect their leadership. There is a need for developing a comprehensive training and development platforms for followers as well as leaders. The current research highlights that proficient followership is always essential for the development of an organization and for the overall improvement of its leadership's performance and attitudes. Therefore, training platforms for skills' growth and behaviour shaping need to be adept in every association, which can be organized along the lines of financial, non-financial and structural development of the organization. This research

recommends that organizations should enable cohorts to improve upon their performances and get this awareness that how their adaptable behaviour could create a positive impact on the organization. It also concludes that how proficient and compelling followership can improve the authority's frame of mind and occupation exhibitions which results in high efficiency, other than helping them in grooming themselves, and motivating the employees for better performances. This study also helps the public sector to comprehend diverse opinions about followers' behaviour and leader's attitudes thereby helping at enhancement of the functioning of the public sector of Pakistan.

PRIMACY OF OFFENCE OVER DEFENCE: INDIA'S BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE (BMD) & PAKISTAN'S STRATEGIC OPTIONS

Asim Ahmed* & Mahroona Hussain Syed**

Abstract

Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) as a strategy carries conflicting standpoints for the bearer and the non-bearer of BMD. For a bearer of BMD, it is an effort to protect the humankind from a nuclear holocaust and a move that may eventually lead towards disarmament, whereas, for non-bearer, the deployment of BMD by a rival state is likely to intensify the arms race and increase risk of nuclear strike due to the vulnerability of a non-bearer. The non-bearer of BMD in such circumstances would opt for offensive strategies that may permit it to penetrate the BMD shield so that the rival becomes vulnerable and strategic stability prevails. Against this backdrop, the article discusses fragility of BMD within the ambit of primacy of offense over defence, while linking the historical experiences of the Cold War with the present day perspectives.

Key words: *Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), Antibalistic Missile (ABM), Inter-continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Offence, Defence, Strategic Stability.*

Introduction

"You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you."
Leon Trotsky

Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) is a strategy, conceived and designed to intercept and destroy incoming hostile missiles. The strategy was conceptualised in the middle of Cold War, when the Cold War rivals - United States of America (USA) and erstwhile Union of Soviet Socialist

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Republics (USSR) - considered deploying a defensive system to counter incoming nuclear-armed Inter Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBMs). In case of failure of nuclear deterrence between the Cold War rivals, the ICBMs appeared to be the most likely and effective choice to deliver nuclear weapons (NWs) to longer distances with impunity. The strategy conceived to counter these ICBMs was named BMD. In technical jargon, a prototype BMD possesses three components: it should be able to provide early warning about an incoming missile, tracking and destroying it in the final stage through interception.¹

Security of the mainland had been the locus of Cold War rivals against the nuclear armed ICBMs. The US efforts to develop an effective defensive shield – a BMD, started in 1955. Nike Zeus, Nike X, Sentinel and Safeguard are few of the stages of this programme, which it underwent during the period of development.² Likewise, the USSR also started to pursue an ABM system with the name of ‘Galosh’ for the protection of Moscow.³ During the Cold War, despite deliberate efforts by both the states, they could not develop a foolproof defensive shield against ICBM.⁴ This led to a thought process between both Cold War rivals for reaching an agreement to restrict either of the states from developing ballistic missile shield, which resulted into the enactment of Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 between both rivals. Apparently, maintaining the then-existing strategic stability through nuclear deterrence was the goal of both the superpowers. In the hindsight, lack of technology forced both states to opt for ABM treaty 1972.

Essentially, US wanted single-handedly to achieve security against ICBMs with the development of BMD. Therefore, even after entering into ABM treaty with the USSR, the US was not satisfied with its security. It still considered development of the BMD a vital objective of the security. Although the ABM treaty of 1972 prohibited any further testing in pursuance of technology and the system,⁵ but a sense of dissatisfaction

¹ Dean A. Wilkening, “A Simple Model for Calculating Ballistic Missile Defense Effectiveness,” *Science & Global Security* 8, no. 2 (1999): 183-215.

² Ernest J. Yanarella, *The Missile Defense Controversy, Strategy, Technology and Politics, 1955-72* (Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1977), 6.

³ Viktor Koltunov, Alexander Kubyshekin and Vladimir Stepanov, “Anti-ballistic Missile Defense: History and Modern Times,” *Institute of Strategic Stability of the Rosatom State Corporation*, http://stat.mil.ru/files/Anti-ballistic/11_Rosatom_eng.pdf.

⁴ Sidney D. Drell and Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, “The Case Against Strategic Defense: Technical and Strategic Realities,” *Issues in Science and Technology* 1, no. 1 (Fall 1984): 46.

⁵ “Treaty between the USA and USSR on the Limitations of ABM System,” *Aerospace*, Article I., https://aerospace.org/sites/default/files/policy_archives/Anti-Ballistic%20Missile%20Treaty%20May72.pdf.

about security from ICBMs became a corner stone in the US strategic thinking which resulted in Strategic Defence Initiatives (SDI) of 1983. The purpose of the programme was not only restricted to research, but also to develop a system of BMD for protecting the US mainland against any potential threat of nuclear armed ICBMs. During the Gulf Wars, US deployed module of BMD to protect the US and allies' forces from the missile emanating from Iraq. In the year 2001, in the unipolar world, the US withdrew from the ABM treaty of 1972 and decided to deploy BMD. However, this time instead of following a contentious strategy in isolation, the US decided to follow a hegemonic path to extend BMD to allies in Europe, Eastern Europe, East Asia and South Asia. This will remain a question, whether the efforts by the US to develop a BMD system was sagacious and well-intended to ensure security of the world or a misleading move to create schism in the regional and international balance of power.

Drell has defined the balance of offensive forces as 'offense dominance,' according to which, fear of retaliatory nuclear strike prevents rival state from a nuclear strike;⁶ whereas, BMD carried an equivocal explanation of security having different meanings for the BMD and the non-BMD opponent. A BMD state enjoys security, which will permit it a nuance of offence against an opponent non-BMD state. Thus, a condition of vulnerability required for nuclear stability between nuclear rivals is missing, where a BMD protected state might be tempted for a nuclear strike. Proponents of BMD consider that BMD is not a destructive programme but its real purpose is to protect non-combatants from the perils of nuclear weapons. The deployment of BMD will make the NWS redundant and may as well lead towards abolishment of NWS, a prospective goal of disarmament.⁷

On the other hand, a non-BMD state will strive to ensure its security against a BMD state by either acquiring offensive strategies or developing BMD shield, as both the objectives will generate arms race in the region or between the opponents. Therefore, arms race is the likely consequence of developing the BMD system. The article will bring into consideration these aspects into regional setting of South Asia, where India has been developing its BMD systems to protect itself against missile threats emanating from its regional rivals, namely Pakistan and China.

The inherent advantage in Offense lies in its flexibility and the liberty of action it allows, unlike the relatively rigid 'Defence'. In terms of missile strategy, the country launching the ICBM has nothing to fear except a possible ineffectiveness of the attack or worse—loss of the weapon while the recipient defending country fears the ability of the incoming ICBM to penetrate and cause massive destruction. Faced with the chances of an

⁶ Drell, "The Case Against Strategic Defense," 46.

⁷ Ibid., 46-62.

impending devastation, it has little choice but to ensure interception and destruction of the incoming ICBM. Whereas another opposing form of offense intrinsic to a BMD state is protection available to it against the missile threat, which may permit a BMD state to take an offence against its rival with impunity.

The Regional Strategic Environment

Pakistan, presently, faces numerous security challenges arising from its eastern and western borders. The presence of superpower US as its immediate neighbour in Afghanistan has particularly changed the security environment for Pakistan. Two occasions are of particular importance to Pakistan, when the US violated its airspace. In May 2011, US conducted raid in Abbottabad, Pakistan by violating the Pakistani airspace to hunt and kill Osama Bin Laden⁸ and in November 2011 NATO, helicopters attacked a Pakistan Army Post in Mohmmad Agency, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in which twenty -four Pakistani soldiers killed.⁹ This might in fact be indicative of a serious impediment for Pakistan that an overwhelming focus, per force, on protecting its eastern borders for decades has in fact impeded Pakistan's ability and capacity to protect its aerial borders in the west, which has further exacerbated Pakistan's worries concerning its security.

Simultaneously, any strategic development in India is a cause of major security concerns for Pakistan as these directly affect the prevailing strategic stability between the both states.¹⁰ Particularly, in areas where major powers like the US and Russia contribute directly in enhancing the nuclear or strategic capability of India. Few of such noticeable examples in strategic domain are the U.S.-India Nuclear Agreement 123 and the US willingness to extend BMD to India. In the nuclear deal, the US has allowed India to continue to build its nuclear stockpiles by intentionally leaving obscurity and uncertainty in the Nuclear Agreement 123 by specifically

⁸ Scott Wilson, Craig Whitlock and William Branigin, "Osama Bin Laden Killed in U.S. Raid, Buried at Sea," *The Washington Post*, May 2, 2011, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/osama-bin-laden-killed-in-us-raid-buried-atsea/2011/05/02/AFx0yAZF_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.a0e7a17619e9.

⁹ Karin Brulliard, "Pakistani Officials Say Alleged NATO Attack Kills 24 Soldiers," *The Washington Post*, November 27, 2011, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/pakistani-officials-say-alleged-nato-attack-kills-at-least-12/2011/11/26/gIQA2mqtxN_story.html?utm_term=.914b323725c1.

¹⁰ Colin S. Gray, "European Perspectives on U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense," *Comparative Strategy* 21, no. 4 (2002): 279-310, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01495930290043056a>.

not accounting for the nuclear waste material, ipso facto which could be used for development of nuclear weapons.¹¹ Besides, the US has been demanding that the proposed Fissile Missile Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) must be accepted by the nuclear powers without linking it with past fissile material stockpiles.¹² An interpretation of the FMCT in this way will only be more of an obstacle for Pakistan as compared to India in terms of nuclear stockpiles.¹³ The US is also pursuing India's entry into Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), an exception to the NSG requirement for full-scope safeguards.¹⁴ This will be a clear oversight of Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime, where a non-NPT state's entry into NSG is being pursued.¹⁵

Waltz considers that the rivalries between two states have to some extent, influenced development of nuclear weapons in pairs, which has ensured strategic and deterrence stability among them.¹⁶ That said, India's BMD is the cause of strategic instability in South Asia. Interestingly, many powers like the US, Russia, Europe (including NATO) and Israel have stakes in India's BMD programme and are directly involved in its development.¹⁷ In addition, they are doing this apparently without paying due cognizance to the fact that it is going to significantly upset the prevailing strategic stability in South Asia. As the strategy of BMD has a nuance of offence, which will permit India to look for nuclear offence, as it knows it protects itself behind the shield of BMD. According to Toby Dalton and George Perkovich, "the offensive form of damage limitation is the ability to target the adversary's nuclear assets as a way to reduce the number of nuclear weapons that might be detonated on one's own territory."¹⁸ India is maintaining 'No First Use' nuclear doctrine as opposed

¹¹ Mirza Nasrullah and M. Sadiq, "Indo-US 123 Agreements: Impacts on Deterrence Stability in South Asia," *South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI)*, Research Report 07 (January, 2008).

¹² Tariq Rauf, "Engagement on Nuclear Disarmament between Nuclear Weapon-Possessing States and Non-Nuclear Weapon States," *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)*, Working Paper (2017): 8.

¹³ Asma Khalid, "Pakistan's Policy on FMCT," *Pakistan Observer*, February 7, 2017, <https://pakobserver.net/pakistans-policy-on-fmct/>.

¹⁴ Mark Hibbs, "The Future of Nuclear Suppliers Group," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* (2011), https://carnegieendowment.org/files/future_nsg.pdf.

¹⁵ Rauf, "Engagement on Nuclear Disarmament," 8.

¹⁶ Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed*, 2nd ed (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2003), 13.

¹⁷ Zafar Khan, "India's Ballistic Missile Defense: Implications for South Asian Deterrence Stability," *The Washington Quarterly* (Fall 2017):187-202.

¹⁸ Toby Dalton and George Perkovich, "India's Nuclear Option and Nuclear Dominance," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, May 19, 2016,

to Pakistan 'First Use,' however, despite the India's draft nuclear doctrine that mentions that it retains a right to use NWS against any perceived threats makes the case of India dubious.¹⁹ However, this may be a polite warning for a non-BMD state about the vulnerability of their nuclear asset to a BMD protected rival. In a situation where India protects itself behind BMD, the 'First Use' pillar of Pakistan's nuclear doctrine will be degraded and may not remain an effective deterrent strategy. The strategic balance will shift in favour of India. Consequently, the conventional asymmetry of India with its immediate neighbour Pakistan may permit her to activate its 'Cold Start' or 'Proactive Doctrine' in order to browbeat its nuclear- armed neighbour.

Defensive or Offensive Options

The fresh arms race in the region is likely as Pakistan may try to maintain strategic stability in the region due to the introduction of deployed defences in the South Asian region. The options for Pakistan generally fall among defensive strategies to develop a parallel BMD, or offensive in order to break the opponent's defensive shield, while simultaneously using diplomacy to restrict India for BMD. On the other side, the cost of deploying a BMD system due to the present financial conditions may restrict Pakistan in pursuing such an option. Even if it is a possibility, whether the option will be effective in the given circumstances, when offensive strategies have prominence over the defensive strategies, presents a big question mark. On a couple of occasions, Pakistan was not able to counter air threats emanating from western borders posed by International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which may be due to a deliberate oversight or incapacity but may provide a leaf and encouragement to India to look for an opportunity for hot pursuits within Pakistan. Such fake claims by India have already started to appear in the media,²⁰ which needs firm measures from Pakistan as hot pursuit or surgical strike inside Pakistan may be their prospective desire. Besides, India in order to browbeat its immediate neighbour Pakistan is continuously developing its conventional capability. It has struck a deal

<https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/05/19/india-s-nuclear-options-and-escalation-dominance-pub-63609>.

¹⁹ Zafar Iqbal Cheema, "The Role of Nuclear Weapons in Pakistan's Defence Strategy," *IPRI Journal* no.4 (2) (2004): 72–87.

²⁰ M. Ilyas Khan, "India's 'Surgical Strikes' in Kashmir: Truth or Illusion?" *BBC News*, October 23, 2016, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-37702790> ; "Indian Army Killed 138 Pakistani Soldiers in 2017 in Tactical Operations," *The Economic Times*, January 10, 2018. <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/indian-army-killed-138-pakistani-soldiers-in-2017-in-tacticaloperations/articleshow/62443429.cms>.

with France to buy 36 Dassault Rafale or Euro Typhon multirole jet aircraft, which will definitely multiply its capacity against Pakistan,²¹ against whom it already has air superiority.

Efficacy of BMD – Defensive Options

In order to reinforce the degrading deterrence stability in South Asia primarily occurring due to BMD, Pakistan's basic options lie between offensive and defensive strategies. A defensive strategy would involve a similar option of developing a BMD for Pakistan. However, to consider a BMD, missile threat to a state has to be critically analysed. Pakistan faces immediate missile threats from India. India is continuously pursuing missile development and it has added a number of missiles to its list of ICBMs; most obvious are Agni and Surya capable of carrying nuclear warheads from short to longer ranges. Surya III can hit anywhere across the globe with its projected range of 20,000 km²² and to cover entire Pakistan, India may not even need ICBMs.

Does the option of developing BMD consider as more pragmatic and practical by a state to counter missile or a developing BMD of a rival state? BMD as a strategy is deployed for defence of a complete country, defence of forces in the battlefield or for the protection of important sites or installations. The two broader categories of BMD are the National Missile Defence (NMD) and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD). That is, on the one hand, NMD is a multi-layered 'defensive' system that falls under the category of a system, which protects geographical boundaries of a state,²³ but on the other hand, THAAD provides protection to comparatively smaller areas. It has a capability to intercept short, medium and intermediate missile up to the ranges of 1000 kms.²⁴ During the Cold War, the inability of the US to develop an effective NMD led to enactment of the ABM treaty between the US and erstwhile the

²¹ "India, France Ink €7.87 Billion Agreement for 36 Rafales," *The Hindu*, September 23, 2016, <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/India-France-ink-%E2%82%AC7.87-billion-agreement-for-36-Rafales/article14995775.ece>.

²² Richard Speier, "U.S. Satellite Space Launch Cooperation and India's Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Program," *Gauging US-Indian Strategic Cooperation*, ed. Henry Skolski, (March 2007): 187-192, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/pub755.pdf.

²³ Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, "National Missile Defense and the Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy," *International Security* 26, no. 1 (Summer 2001): 40-92.

²⁴ Michael Elleman and Michael J. Zagurek, Jr., "THAAD: What It Can and Can't Do," 38 North (March 10, 2016), https://www.38north.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/2016-03-10_THAAD-What-It-Can-and-Cant-Do.pdf.

USSR in 1972.²⁵ The primary purpose of the US to pursue BMD was to achieve security against the threats of ICBMs emanating from the erstwhile USSR. However, lacking in technology to intercept incoming ICBMs forced both the powers to enter into the ABM Treaty. After the dismemberment of USSR, the US renewed efforts for the development and deployment of BMD, which are reminiscent of its desire to achieve security through BMD against the hostile ICBMs. Currently, many reports suggest that the Americans are focusing on the protection of their corridors against any possibility of missile attack aimed at the US mainland. So far, the US considers Alaska and California as corridors of ICBMs, and BMD with the combination of midcourse and terminal phase interception is planned at these two locations.²⁶ There are indications that the US is involved in testing of laser capability and first such airborne test conducted from Point Mugu's Naval Air Warfare Center-Weapons Division Sea Range off Ventura in central California.²⁷ The Missile Defence Agency (MDA), US, deals with deployment of missile defence.²⁸ During the tests, the agency demonstrated Airborne Laser Testbed (ALTB) with the help of directed energy to intercept ballistic missiles. In these tests, the ALTB was provided on modified Boeing 747 jumbo Jet, whereas, Northrop Grumman supplied the higher-energy laser and Lockheed Martin developed the beam and fire control system.²⁹ These tests provide ground for employment of laser from space for intercepting missiles; however, this may not be possible in near future being nascent yet. India is presently considering area defence-BMD and developing NMD that may neither be desirable nor realizable due to the lack of technological advancement. The present status of India's BMD is more of a blend of PAC-III,³⁰ comprising of domestically built PAD and components of the BMD supported by foreign states.³¹ On the other hand, at present Pakistan does not have the requisite technological advancement to develop NMD, as such, an option requires boost, midcourse and terminal phase interception, and more so, it seriously lacks in satellite outreach. It also does not have much to boast about in satellite capability. Unless and until a major technological expansion is undertaken for tracking and intercepting missiles and

²⁵ ABM Treaty 1972, signed between the US and the USSR at Moscow on 26 May 1972.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ "U.S. Successfully Tests Airborne Laser on Missile," *Reuters*, February 12, 2010.

²⁸ Missile Defence Agency, <https://www.mda.mil/>.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ "U.S. Successfully Tests Airborne Laser on Missile," *Reuters*, February 12, 2010.

³¹ Harsh V. Pant, "India Debates Missile Defense," *Defence Studies* 5, no.2 (June 2005): 228–246.

acquiring radars for EW, Pakistan's prospects for developing an effective missile system are seriously doubtful, especially considering the acute lack of capacity, investment and capability so essential for the venture. An overreliance on limited domestic research and Chinese assistance at the cost of acquiring advanced technologies from the developed world does not seem to be a viable strategy. Given the magnitude of costs and time involved, Pakistan literally faces a choice between Scylla and Charybdis, each having long-term implications.

As identified in the preceding sections, the immediate missile threat to Pakistan arises from India from its eastern borders, whereas, southern side exposes to ship-launched ballistic missile from the direction of Arabian Sea. The potential targets in Pakistan could be its missiles sites and silos to teeth-out Pakistan's capability of 'First Use.' India no longer remains the only source of threat to Pakistan, especially ever since the news have started to flash on and off in the media about the possible US attack on Pakistan's nuclear programme. In June 2011, President of Iran Mr. Ahmadinejad warned Pakistan, "We have precise information that America wants to sabotage the Pakistani nuclear facilities in order to control Pakistan and to weaken the government and people of Pakistan."³² Such news about negative intentions of the US against Pakistan's nuclear assets keeps surfacing on and off. However, the immediate threat is still perceived to be emanating from India, as amply obvious from the fact that the very origin of Pakistan's nuclear programme is historically linked to two major events: 1) the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971 where India confessedly played a vital role³³ and 2) India's nuclear weapons' test in 1974. These two events forced Pakistan to look for security elsewhere. The development of nuclear weapons was the most convenient option for Pakistan to deter the regional hegemonic with 'First Use' as pillar of its nuclear doctrine. However, Indians propagate it as Pakistan's nuclear blackmailing tactic against India particularly in the background of Kargil Conflict 1999 and 2001 military-standoff between both the states.³⁴ Thus, opting for BMD will shift the strategic balance in India's favour by offsetting Pakistan's nuclear parity with her; thereby allowing it a chance to use its conventional asymmetry to browbeat Pakistan.

In the list of defensive options, it may be extremely difficult for Pakistan to develop an NMD. Due to high cost and technological shortfalls of NMD, Pakistan may have to restrict itself for point defence or defence of

³² Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmed, "US has Designs on Pakistan's Nukes: Iran," *The Express Tribune*, June 8, 2011, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/184086/us-plans-to-sabotage-pakistan-nuke-facilities-ahmadinejad/>.

³³ "Vajpayee accorded Liberation War Honour," *The Dhaka Tribune*, June 7, 2015, <https://www.dhakatribune.com/uncategorized/2015/06/07/vajpayee-accorded-liberation-war-honour>.

³⁴ Harsh Pant, "India Debates Missile Defense," 228–246.

likely approaches of missile attack. Point defence is one part of the terminal defence, and it relates to defence of a single object or a limited area, e.g. shipbuilding or an airfield, against air attacks and missiles.³⁵ The purpose of point defence is to protect missile sites and silos against a possible first strike; whereas, the purpose of corridor defence is to protect a territory against missile threat from a particular direction.

In case of US, midcourse defence from Alaska and California permits the US to intercept the missile threat emanating from a particular direction. In case of Pakistan, the concept does not seem to be relevant because of the extended border between Pakistan and India and domination of Indian Ocean by India. Thus, corridors, in case of Pakistan, can best be explained as, the ones leading towards strategic installations and interests. Southern corridor is one such route that may comprise some part of Arabian Sea and the geographical layout from south to north leading to launch sites, silos or the strategic installations.

On a similar note, the significant variations between the nature of technology of point and corridor defence need due consideration too. Point defence is a terminal defence, in which short-range interceptor will engage the missile within the close area of defence. Corridor defence on the other hand, may be a sea-based or land-based midcourse interception. In addition, the mode of EW and type of radars used for coverage etc are different too. Another difference lies in the range of the interceptor missile because the range of interceptor missile intended for midcourse interception is sufficient only for engaging the incoming ballistic missile in exo-atmospheric phase.

As far as development of an EW system is concerned, a lot of complexities are involved which cannot be dealt with by Pakistan on its own and it will have to engage external sources for the purpose, especially as the system requires a host of satellites and radars in order to become effectively operational. Restructuring, modernization and even reorganization of the Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) will first and foremost be required for provision of EW, especially for detection and tracking of incoming enemy missile and for guiding own interceptor missile to the target. In the wake of this, it needs no rocket science to understand that, although Pakistan immediately needs BMD but it can only opt for this course of action through a well-planned strategy with clearly defined multiple developmental phases spread over decades to bring about a matured product which could lead it from point to midcourse defence soon.

³⁵ Aldridge, Robert C, *First Strike: The Pentagon's Strategy for Nuclear War* (Boston: South End Press, 1983), 192.

Offensive Capabilities

Deterrence is active when nuclear strike between two rivals is guaranteed. The inability of a state to ensure delivery of its nuclear weapons to targets is an indication of degeneration of prevailing strategic stability. BMD is a strategy, which protects one state against the hostile missile of the rival state, as a missile is the most reliable of means for delivery of nuclear weapons. The degeneration of strategic stability due to BMD, forces the opponent state to take measures, which may permit her to offset the advantage of a BMD. These may include use of advanced technologies to penetrate the opponent BMD shield. During the Cold War, once both the superpowers were trying to develop BMD for their states, it was the primacy of offensive strategies, which could easily make BMD efforts redundant. Therefore, this aspect forced the US and erstwhile the USSR to enter into ABM Treaty in 1972.

In the list of offensive strategies, improvement in missile technologies is the most effective and viable means to offset opponent's BMD. Taking the example of cruise missile, the weapon is designed against land and sea targets and can be launched from any platform i.e. land, air and sea.³⁶ They are land-hugging missiles that follow the layout of ground and, therefore, are not easy for the radars to detect. They can be used with the conventional and nuclear warheads. However, cruise missile also faces problems like at the terminal stage; it may face interception by point defence.³⁷ These can also be intercepted through aircrafts.

The state-of-the-art aircrafts are equipped with several features including shoot-down, lookdown and especially the pulse-doppler radar³⁸ technology that enables carrying out observation and directing air-to-air missiles against low-altitude airborne targets.³⁹ The problem with the jet aircraft is that they cannot continuously remain present in air for longer duration due to their sustenance issues, therefore, lack ability to react at short notice. Although, in times of alert, Combat Air Patrols (CAPs) can be effectively deployed to defend against incoming cruise missiles during the times of alert, but their sustained and permanent employment in air is problematic.

³⁶ Jeff Kueter and Howard Kleinberg, "Cruise Missile Challenge: Designing a Defence against Asymmetrical Threats," *The Marshall Institute*, Washington, (May 3, 2007), 1-45, www.marshall.org/article.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ William H. Long David H. Mooney William A. Skillman, "Pulse Doppler Radar," in *Radar Handbook*, 2nd edition, ed : Merrill I. Skolnik, Daniel A. Gonneau and Beatrice E. Eckes (USA: McGraw-Hill, 1990), 17-42.

³⁹ Ibid., 17-42.

PAC-III and Aegis and Aegis system held with US are other ways of ensuring active defence.⁴⁰ Nonetheless, the simple design and the very size of cruise missiles make them easy to hide in containers and transport, for example, in cargo ships. It is common knowledge that most cargo ships sail between East Asia, America, Europe and Africa pass through the territorial waters of India with an approximately 7,517 kilometres long coastline.⁴¹

It is estimated that around 95 percent of India's trade by volume and 70 percent by value is carried out through maritime transport.⁴² Additionally, concerns about vulnerability of India's BMD are exacerbated by the almost off-the-shelf availability of missile technology and their components in the black market, making these somewhat prized trophies for terrorist organizations.⁴³

In the neighbourhood of India, Pakistan is continuously pursuing development of cruise missile. It tested 700 kms range Babur VII Hatf cruise missile in 2011.⁴⁴ In addition to cruise missile, is aiming leaps in developing Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs) technology because of efforts of Pakistani and Chinese engineers, as reported by BBC.⁴⁵ MIRV is capable of engaging multiple targets from a single missile duly nullifying the notion of effective defence provided by the BMD. Efficient and smart use of chaff and decoys are other means for misleading the interceptor missile and can effectively blind the vision of radars.⁴⁶ During an air attack, Radar jamming helps to obscure the defender's vision particularly during the air attack. However, in the wake of a missile attack on a BMD site/area, its use in combination with above referred technology will practically impair the efficacy of the BMD system.

⁴⁰ Jeff Kueter and Howard Kleinberg, "Cruise Missile Challenge, Designing a Defence against Asymmetric Threats."

⁴¹ "Smart Border Management: Indian Coastal and Maritime Security," *FICCI-PWC (Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry-Price waterhouse Coopers), Report* (September 2017), <http://ficci.in/spdocument/20955/Smart-Border-Management-study.pdf>.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ Dr. Carlo Kopp, "Bypassing the National Missile Defence System-The Cruise Missile Proliferation Problem," *Technical Report* APA-TR-2007-0708 updated in April 2012, <http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Cruise-Missile-Proliferation.html>. (accessed November 13, 2017)

⁴⁴ "Pakistan Successfully Test Fires Nuclear-Capable Cruise Missile," *Dawn*, October 28, 2011.

⁴⁵ Syed Shoib Hasan, "Pakistan's Growing Nuclear Programme," *BBC News, South Asia*, December 1, 2010, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-11888973>.

⁴⁶ Eric Stubbs, "Soviet Strategic Defence Technology," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist* (April 1987): 14-19.

Conclusion

India wants to create a condition of 'invulnerability' for itself through the deployment of BMD. Such condition will shift 'balance of power' in favour of India, which will allow India to use its conventional asymmetry against Pakistan, as in this case, Pakistan's nuclear 'First Use' nuclear doctrine will not remain valid. In the words of Williams, 'the deterrence through denial'⁴⁷ will actually be the redundancy of Pakistan's NWs. The actualisation of Cold Start doctrine under the circumstances by India against its immediate regional rivals, in particular Pakistan, becomes an opportunity. However, perceived security by India under the BMD will actually lead the region into more instability. The arms race is likely to be the consequence, which may equally be in the domain of offensive or defensive strategies.

In the present circumstances, when India is incessantly pursuing BMD, the burden to stabilise the region has fallen with Pakistan. It may have to consider its options from a broader array to include military and diplomatic options. In military options, Pakistan may have to enhance deterrence, by a combination of offensive and damage limitation measures. The varied offensive measures to penetrate the shield by a BMD opponent may include cruise missile, aircrafts, MIRVs, increase in NWs and modest measures. India might consider it as strengthening of Pakistan's first strike, however, India has to realize that developing a BMD is the *raison d'être* of such options for Pakistan. Simultaneously, Pakistan may have to ensure 'hard site defence' or 'point defence' in order to protect its silos, launching sites and other connected operational sites against a missile threat emanating from India as part of damage limitation measures. This is different from area defence as it focuses on selected target areas to be protected. Correspondingly, this will complement the second-strike capability of Pakistan; the second-strike capability is likely to prove as an ultimate objective of NWS to fulfil the prerequisite of vulnerability of rivals and virtually nuclear deterrence, which leads towards strategic stability.

On the diplomatic front, Pakistan needs to galvanize efforts to bring upon the world community the negative fallout of India's BMD on the region and its strategic balance, at the same time making concerted efforts to somehow circumvent, if not restrict, the role and ability of US, European nations and Israel in supporting India's BMD. For the purpose, Pakistan may be able to strike a common chord with both Russia and China who may share the concerns, especially owing to the likely impact of America's BMD and its likely extension to its other partners in the world. Although Russia had been supporting India in development of BMD, but it

⁴⁷ Phil Williams, *Contemporary Strategy II, the Nuclear Powers* (Great Britain: Croom Helm Ltd, 1987), 44.

carries serious reservation about BMD deployment by the US in Eastern Europe. This common perspective allows these three countries to develop a joint strategy for generating awareness campaign about BMD's impact on the 'have-nots' and on overall global security. Moreover, it is against the concept of disarmament as arms race is likely to result into proliferation of NWs and its related strategies. Simultaneously, a regional security approach may be needed to work out a treaty on the lines of US-USSR ABM treaty of 1972. India and Pakistan can look up to the 1972 USA-USSR ABM Treaty model in the larger interest of security of the region which in turn could serve as a great confidence building measure that could lead to undertaking of similar other pacts including, for example, Nuclear Free Zone Agreement or a No War Pact. There is a need to realize that a mindless pursuance of negative defensive strategies should not come at the cost of denial of opportunities for peace and positive security in the region. Such pursuits of negative defensive strategies will plague the populations on both sides of the borders with immense economic fallouts in the wake of race for developing a missile defence system.

Book Reviews

Title: **Rival Power: Russia in Southeast Europe.**
Author: Dimitar Bechev
Publisher: Yale University Press: USA, 2017, 320.

In the Book *Rival Power: Russia in Southeast Europe* Dimitar Bechev offers a pragmatic approach towards Russian influence in Balkan States with emphasis on the leading role of pragmatism over ideology. This approach challenges the dominant narratives of relations between states in contemporary world. Balkan States stand as regional asset in terms of economic, security and energy pursuits in the New Great Game of geopolitical competition, where all are looking over the Balkans. In this context this latest book, published by Yale university press in 2017 and comprising of 320 pages, is a timely effort of Bechev; the best-fitting researcher for this study. The Bechev through 6 maps and 11 fig. adeptly highlights that Russian soft power, economy, energy, and covert operations all have sturdiest impact over the Balkans-the region which has too long been neglected by Western governments and scholars equally. This book spotlights not only the currently established bonds beyond ideology in Russian-Balkan relations but also unfolds the challenges to the West posed by Russian pragmatism and tough-minded pursuits of material gains. Where this book discusses the abundant opportunities for Russia created by local players, it highlights existing limitations to Russian influence coming from the serious question of stability of Southeast Europe.

Russian influence in Southeast Europe has become a fervently debated topic since the affairs between Moscow and the West have turned into confrontational nature. The West is observing the Russian engagements with Balkans as a diplomatic tool for material gain. In this way the *soft underbelly of Europe*-the Balkans are again serving a playground to Russia to undermine the West from within. However, scholarly Dimitar Bechev has missed some important linkages while analyzing the implications of Russian-Balkans relations to the West. Because it is very important to have insight of the two questions that; does Russia has a coherent plan in this sense, and does it has the resource capability to pull-off Western feat out of Balkans. But, Dimitar, a research fellow at the center for Slavic, Eastern Europe and Eurasian Studies, at University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, remains passive towards developing a satisfactory account over these questions. Because when Bechev answers 'no' for these two important questions, the anxiety of an independent scholar increased in two dimensions. One is that, without a coherent plan and a resource capability how Russia would be able to clutch the material-gains even at the cost of ideology and the second is that, in the absence of resource capability how Russia would be able to pull the West off

from Balkans. This curiosity turns into more investigative debate in academia towards detecting the Russian plans and resource capability in-order to define Russian revival.

Ditimar, while skilfully unfolding the extent and nature of Russian influence in the Balkans, Greece, and Turkey, argues that both the sides are driven by bindings of pragmatism and opportunism rather than ideological or historical loyalties. Ditimar asserts that Russia is looking for an influential role in Europe's security architecture in-order to establish its gas exports including the Southern Gas Corridor. Bechev asserts that Russia has a support from local leaders, therefore, it instantly attract NATO members to respond particularly regarding annexation of Crimea and the Putin-Erdogan rift over Syria.

After the Headley's work of 2008 which only had considered the former Yugoslavia, this book *Rival Power: Russia in Southeast Europe* is first academic effort to deal with the heated topic; the revival of Russia and its implications for the Europe and West. The book is divided into two parts. In the first part, the theme is critically examined by applying the historical approach, for which countries and territories like former Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Cyprus and Turkey are taken into account. This wide array of studied countries towers Bechev's understanding of knowledge, history, politics and languages of complex region. However, in the second part through clear and concise style, the prism of analysis is reversed by focusing on three dimensions; the first is economy being played under the energy card, the second is security-from military standoff to hybrid warfare, and the third dimension is allure of Russia's might in the form of soft power. The second part of the book is comparatively shorter than the first one but appropriately communicates the built narrative in non-partisan tone; pragmatism is decisive over ideology. This twofold perspective of the book offers a wide-ranging and complete account.

According to the author, *Russia to destabilize Europe* is merely a prognostication and exaggerated phenomenon; therefore, he tries to defuse this prognosis by documenting all the relevant facts contrary to it. For instance, Bechev concedes that Russia has extended tremendous amount of support across countries with Eastern Orthodox majorities. This shows that the book is not pushing an agenda. The discussion, by taking soft power into perspective, highlights that Russia plays a weak hand very well, and how the local players of Southeast Europe have been involved by Russia through soft power in the journey of Russian transformation from ideology to pragmatism. Moscow in many ways is playing an equally important and dynamic role. Finally, Bechev puts up the analysis that dysfunctional democracies, state-centered and authoritarian style of governance are home-grown evils and not an outcome of Russian influence in Southeast Europe.

***Reviewed by Dr. Muhammad Imran Ashraf, Assistant Professor in IR,
National Defence University, Islamabad, Pakistan.***

Title: **The People Next Door: The Curious History of India's Relations with Pakistan.**

Author: T. C. A. Raghavan.

Publisher: Harper Collins: Uttar Pradesh, India, 2017, 345.

Books on various facets of India-Pakistan ties are already present in abundance. The general understanding in this regard is substantial. *The People Next Door* by T.C.A. Raghavan is, however, meant to reveal a more wholesome essence of the India-Pakistan relationship with a more personal and discerning assessment of events and individuals in the wider domain of the main highs and lows of the association. The book presents a chronological outline of the reasons and means through which India and Pakistan adopted the path they did. It presents the cyclical shifts in the relationship as being dominated by ideology, viewpoints, history, overt bravado and hidden pragmatism. Although, the author has attempted to remain impartial while discussing the relationship, yet it is an Indian viewpoint on a contentious and profoundly disputed history.

Raghavan is a former Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan and Singapore. He has a Ph.D in history from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. The author has a distinctive outlook on India-Pakistan relations as he has previously served in the External Affairs Ministry in different capacities.

Raghavan has divided the book into eight chapters. The chapters follow a distinct timeline. The first two chapters cover the time span from the inception of the two states in 1947 until the year 1960. The third and fourth chapters cover the events till the breakaway of East Pakistan in 1971. The fifth, sixth and seventh chapters elucidate the ties during the 1970s, '80s and '90s respectively. The last chapter relates the account up to 2008. The author has condensed the account from 2008 until 2017 in an epilogue.

Besides the fields of politics and strategy, the book brings out other angles as well: such as separated blood relatives, steady comradeships, mediators, hawks, opposing scholars, the impact of Indian film industry and fiction. Such things are an integral component of the tangled ties between the two neighbours.

The book follows seven decades of the India-Pakistan connection. Incidents, tales and individuals guide its narrative to portray the concoction of animosity, patriotism and reminiscence that delineate all the aspects of the linkage. It discerns the incidents through the senses of the real actors and modern-day analysts to elucidate the profoundly divergent lenses through which the events in history are viewed in the two states. It also reflects how historical experiences continue to re-emerge and have an unavoidable reverberation till date.

The initial months, following the inception of the two independent states, pieced together an environment of distrust, crisis and betrayal that

laid down the foundation for the India-Pakistan connection that lasts till date. Recollections of Indian misdeeds resurface intermittently in Pakistan as part of the amassed stock of complaints. Carnages and genocide, the dissection of resources, the accession of Junagadh and Hyderabad, the injustice done to Kashmir; Kabul's preliminary disapproval of Pakistan in the United Nations; the ever looming water dispute etc persist as veneers of the foundation of this relationship, despite the on-going deliberations on the twisted past. At any moment of intensified strain in the relationship, the incidents of the early period following independence re-emerge and past injuries and grievances become relevant again. Thus, the sense of unfairness lingering in their history arouses strong reactions in both the states even today.

The book underscores the notion that prospects for tomorrow rest in the bygone era. Various events and conflicts of the past transmute and metamorphose to attain fresh features and at times an even severer ferocity. This is especially true in the case of India and Pakistan. Evidently, the projection of history matters a lot in this peculiar relationship. In addition, Raghavan opines that certain other factors also need to be taken into account. Firstly, domestic altercations and clashes continued to remain a key influence on foreign policies of the two countries. Secondly, the international situation has retained an unrelenting influence on the relationship. Thirdly, one cannot undervalue either the level of friendliness or the level of resentment in both the states toward the other. After every few years, prospects for cordiality emerge on both sides of the border but subsequent incidents prove any optimism held in this regard as wrong. Then again, the failed attempts of yesterday have not dissuaded either side from undertaking attempts for bringing a constructive change in the relationship. Although contention and clash has remained the most noticeable feature of the relationship, yet there has been a tacit agreement on both sides that regardless of the significance of a dispute, a single facet shouldn't be allowed to overshadow the overall relationship.

A key aspect that sets the book apart from the rest of the works in this subject area is the narration of peculiar accounts of individuals in the wider backdrop of chief events in India-Pakistan history. Their thoughts and responses offer an avenue into the curious matrix of India-Pakistan ties at various points in time.

Raghavan poses a question as to whether the on going pattern of attempts and failures itself is resistant to change. Some analysts consider it true while others believe that the current measures are quite above the parameters of old-style enmities and irredentist philosophy. In the world of today, the chant of economic development and the capacity of technology to bring about transformation have gained currency. The author suggests that the ties, during the last two decades, have been different in their capacity to restore normalcy, as compared to those during the five decades before them. In contrast to the longer span of time

required to normalise ties after any mishap in the earlier decades, the relations have returned on track much quicker in the later decades. However, it is generally easier to assess a situation while looking back at it in time, rather than identifying a change while being a part of the same time -period. Therefore, it is yet to be seen if such economic and technological advancements suggest any significant change in the India-Pakistan relationship in the present era.

The People Next Door concludes on the note that the recurring pattern of India-Pakistan ties diminishes the significance of warmongers and peacemakers, as both groups take turns to be proven right for some period of time. Such an alternating pattern is the highlight of the curious history of the relationship. The book is a significant read for the students and analysts of India-Pakistan relations, as it aims to scrutinize the often distressed relationship and, in the process, decipher it.

Reviewed by Fareha Iqtidar Khan, MPhil from Department of IR, NDU, Islamabad.

DOCUMENTS

Document: 1

Remarks by President Trump at the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly, September 19, 2017,

United Nations.

New York, New York.

10:04 A.M. EDT.

President Trump: Mr. Secretary General, Mr. President, world leaders, and distinguished delegates: Welcome to New York. It is a profound honour to stand here in my home city, as a representative of the American people, to address the people of the world.

As millions of our citizens continue to suffer the effects of the devastating hurricanes that have struck our country, I want to begin by expressing my appreciation to every leader in this room who has offered assistance and aid. The American people are strong and resilient, and they will emerge from these hardships more determined than ever before.

Fortunately, the United States has done very well since Election Day last November 8th. The stock market is at an all-time high — a record. Unemployment is at its lowest level in 16 years, and because of our regulatory and other reforms, we have more people working in the United States today than ever before. Companies are moving back, creating job growth the likes of which our country has not seen in a very long time. And it has just been announced that we will be spending almost \$700 billion on our military and defense.

Our military will soon be the strongest it has ever been. For more than 70 years, in times of war and peace, the leaders of nations, movements, and religions have stood before this assembly. Like them, I intend to address some of the very serious threats before us today but also the enormous potential waiting to be unleashed.

We live in a time of extraordinary opportunity. Breakthroughs in science, technology, and medicine are curing illnesses and solving problems that prior generations thought impossible to solve.

But each day also brings news of growing dangers that threaten everything we cherish and value. Terrorists and extremists have gathered strength and spread to every region of the planet. Rogue regimes represented in this body not only support terrorists but threaten other nations and their own people with the most destructive weapons known to humanity.

Authority and authoritarian powers seek to collapse the values, the systems, and alliances that prevented conflict and tilted the world toward freedom since World War II.

International criminal networks traffic drugs, weapons, people; force dislocation and mass migration; threaten our borders; and new forms of aggression exploit technology to menace our citizens.

To put it simply, we meet at a time of both of immense promise and great peril. It is entirely up to us whether we lift the world to new heights, or let it fall into a valley of disrepair.

We have it in our power, should we so choose, to lift millions from poverty, to help our citizens realize their dreams, and to ensure that new generations of children are raised free from violence, hatred, and fear.

This institution was founded in the aftermath of two world wars to help shape this better future. It was based on the vision that diverse nations could cooperate to protect their sovereignty, preserve their security, and promote their prosperity.

It was in the same period, exactly 70 years ago, that the United States developed the Marshall Plan to help restore Europe. Those three beautiful pillars — they're pillars of peace, sovereignty, security, and prosperity.

The Marshall Plan was built on the noble idea that the whole world is safer when nations are strong, independent, and free. As President Truman said in his message to Congress at that time, "Our support of European recovery is in full accord with our support of the United Nations. The success of the United Nations depends upon the independent strength of its members."

To overcome the perils of the present and to achieve the promise of the future, we must begin with the wisdom of the past. Our success depends on a coalition of strong and independent nations that embrace their sovereignty to promote security, prosperity, and peace for themselves and for the world.

We do not expect diverse countries to share the same cultures, traditions, or even systems of government. But we do expect all nations to uphold these two core sovereign duties: to respect the interests of their own people and the rights of every other sovereign nation. This is the beautiful vision of this institution, and this is foundation for cooperation and success.

Strong, sovereign nations let diverse countries with different values, different cultures, and different dreams not just coexist, but work side by side on the basis of mutual respect.

Strong, sovereign nations let their people take ownership of the future and control their own destiny. And strong, sovereign nations allow individuals to flourish in the fullness of the life intended by God.

In America, we do not seek to impose our way of life on anyone, but rather to let it shine as an example for everyone to watch. This week gives our country a special reason to take pride in that example. We are celebrating the 230th anniversary of our beloved Constitution — the oldest constitution still in use in the world today.

This timeless document has been the foundation of peace, prosperity, and freedom for the Americans, and for countless millions around the globe, whose own countries have found inspiration in its respect for human nature, human dignity, and the rule of law.

The greatest in the United States Constitution is its first three beautiful words. They are: "We the people."

Generations of Americans have sacrificed to maintain the promise of those words, the promise of our country, and of our great history. In America, the people govern, the people rule, and the people are sovereign. I was elected not to take power, but to give power to the American people, where it belongs.

In foreign affairs, we are renewing this founding principle of sovereignty. Our government's first duty is to its people, to our citizens — to serve their needs, to ensure their safety, to preserve their rights, and to defend their values.

As President of the United States, I will always put America first, just like you, as the leaders of your countries will always, and should always, put your countries first. (Applause.)

All responsible leaders have an obligation to serve their own citizens, and the nation-state remains the best vehicle for elevating the human condition.

But making a better life for our people also requires us to work together in close harmony and unity to create a more safe and peaceful future for all people.

The United States will forever be a great friend to the world, and especially to its allies. But we can no longer be taken advantage of, or enter into a one-sided deal where the United States gets nothing in return. As long as I hold this office, I will defend America's interests above all else.

But in fulfilling our obligations to our own nations, we also realize that it's in everyone's interest to seek a future where all nations can be sovereign, prosperous, and secure.

America does more than speak for the values expressed in the United Nations Charter. Our citizens have paid the ultimate price to defend our freedom and the freedom of many nations represented in this great hall. America's devotion is measured on the battlefields where our young men and women have fought and sacrificed alongside of our allies, from the beaches of Europe to the deserts of the Middle East to the jungles of Asia.

It is an eternal credit to the American character that even after we and our allies emerged victorious from the bloodiest war in history, we did not seek territorial expansion, or attempt to oppose and impose our way of life on others. Instead, we helped build institutions such as this one to defend the sovereignty, security, and prosperity for all.

For the diverse nations of the world, this is our hope. We want harmony and friendship, not conflict and strife. We are guided by

outcomes, not ideology. We have a policy of principled realism, rooted in shared goals, interests, and values.

That realism forces us to confront a question facing every leader and nation in this room. It is a question we cannot escape or avoid. We will slide down the path of complacency, numb to the challenges, threats, and even wars that we face. Or do we have enough strength and pride to confront those dangers today, so that our citizens can enjoy peace and prosperity tomorrow?

If we desire to lift up our citizens, if we aspire to the approval of history, then we must fulfil our sovereign duties to the people we faithfully represent. We must protect our nations, their interests, and their futures. We must reject threats to sovereignty, from the Ukraine to the South China Sea. We must uphold respect for law, respect for borders, and respect for culture, and the peaceful engagement these allow. And just as the founders of this body intended, we must work together and confront together those who threaten us with chaos, turmoil, and terror.

The scourge of our planet today is a small group of rogue regimes that violate every principle on which the United Nations is based. They respect neither their own citizens nor the sovereign rights of their countries.

If the righteous many do not confront the wicked few, then evil will triumph. When decent people and nations become bystanders to history, the forces of destruction only gather power and strength.

No one has shown more contempt for other nations and for the wellbeing of their own people than the depraved regime in North Korea. It is responsible for the starvation deaths of millions of North Koreans, and for the imprisonment, torture, killing, and oppression of countless more.

We were all witness to the regime's deadly abuse when an innocent American college student, Otto Warmbier, was returned to America only to die a few days later. We saw it in the assassination of the dictator's brother using banned nerve agents in an international airport. We know it kidnapped a sweet 13-year-old Japanese girl from a beach in her own country to enslave her as a language tutor for North Korea's spies.

If this is not twisted enough, now North Korea's reckless pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles threatens the entire world with unthinkable loss of human life.

It is an outrage that some nations would not only trade with such a regime, but would arm, supply, and financially support a country that imperils the world with nuclear conflict. No nation on earth has an interest in seeing this band of criminals arm itself with nuclear weapons and missiles.

The United States has great strength and patience, but if it is forced to defend itself or its allies, we will have no choice but to totally destroy North Korea. Rocket Man is on a suicide mission for himself and for his regime. The United States is ready, willing and able, but hopefully this will

not be necessary. That's what the United Nations is all about; that's what the United Nations is for. Let's see how they do.

It is time for North Korea to realize that the denuclearization is its only acceptable future. The United Nations Security Council recently held two unanimous 15-0 votes adopting hard-hitting resolutions against North Korea, and I want to thank China and Russia for joining the vote to impose sanctions, along with all of the other members of the Security Council. Thank you to all involved.

But we must do much more. It is time for all nations to work together to isolate the Kim regime until it ceases its hostile behaviour.

We face this decision not only in North Korea. It is far past time for the nations of the world to confront another reckless regime — one that speaks openly of mass murder, vowing death to America, destruction to Israel, and ruin for many leaders and nations in this room.

The Iranian government masks a corrupt dictatorship behind the false guise of a democracy. It has turned a wealthy country with a rich history and culture into an economically depleted rogue state whose chief exports are violence, bloodshed, and chaos. The longest-suffering victims of Iran's leaders are, in fact, its own people.

Rather than use its resources to improve Iranian lives, its oil profits go to fund Hezbollah and other terrorists that kill innocent Muslims and attack their peaceful Arab and Israeli neighbours. This wealth, which rightly belongs to Iran's people, also goes to shore up Bashar al-Assad's dictatorship, fuel Yemen's civil war, and undermine peace throughout the entire Middle East.

We cannot let a murderous regime continue these destabilizing activities while building dangerous missiles, and we cannot abide by an agreement if it provides cover for the eventual construction of a nuclear program. (Applause.) The Iran Deal was one of the worst and most one-sided transactions the United States has ever entered into. Frankly, that deal is an embarrassment to the United States, and I don't think you've heard the last of it — believe me.

It is time for the entire world to join us in demanding that Iran's government end its pursuit of death and destruction. It is time for the regime to free all Americans and citizens of other nations that they have unjustly detained. And above all, Iran's government must stop supporting terrorists, begin serving its own people, and respect the sovereign rights of its neighbours.

The entire world understands that the good people of Iran want change, and, other than the vast military power of the United States, that Iran's people are what their leaders fear the most. This is what causes the regime to restrict Internet access, tear down satellite dishes, shoot unarmed student protestors, and imprison political reformers.

Oppressive regimes cannot endure forever, and the day will come when the Iranian people will face a choice. Will they continue down the

path of poverty, bloodshed, and terror? Or will the Iranian people return to the nation's proud roots as a center of civilization, culture, and wealth where their people can be happy and prosperous once again?

The Iranian regime's support for terror is in stark contrast to the recent commitments of many of its neighbours to fight terrorism and halt its financing.

In Saudi Arabia early last year, I was greatly honoured to address the leaders of more than 50 Arab and Muslim nations. We agreed that all responsible nations must work together to confront terrorists and the Islamist extremism that inspires them.

We will stop radical Islamic terrorism because we cannot allow it to tear up our nation, and indeed to tear up the entire world.

We must deny the terrorists safe haven, transit, funding, and any form of support for their vile and sinister ideology. We must drive them out of our nations. It is time to expose and hold responsible those countries who support and finance terror groups like al Qaeda, Hezbollah, the Taliban and others that slaughter innocent people.

The United States and our allies are working together throughout the Middle East to crush the loser terrorists and stop the re-emergence of safe havens they use to launch attacks on all of our people.

Last month, I announced a new strategy for victory in the fight against this evil in Afghanistan. From now on, our security interests will dictate the length and scope of military operations, not arbitrary benchmarks and timetables set up by politicians.

I have also totally changed the rules of engagement in our fight against the Taliban and other terrorist groups. In Syria and Iraq, we have made big gains toward lasting defeat of ISIS. In fact, our country has achieved more against ISIS in the last eight months than it has in many, many years combined.

We seek the de-escalation of the Syrian conflict, and a political solution that honours the will of the Syrian people. The actions of the criminal regime of Bashar al-Assad, including the use of chemical weapons against his own citizens — even innocent children — shock the conscience of every decent person. No society can be safe if banned chemical weapons are allowed to spread. That is why the United States carried out a missile strike on the airbase that launched the attack.

We appreciate the efforts of United Nations agencies that are providing vital humanitarian assistance in areas liberated from ISIS, and we especially thank Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon for their role in hosting refugees from the Syrian conflict.

The United States is a compassionate nation and has spent billions and billions of dollars in helping to support this effort. We seek an approach to refugee resettlement that is designed to help these horribly treated people, and which enables their eventual return to their home countries, to be part of the rebuilding process.

For the cost of resettling one refugee in the United States, we can assist more than 10 in their home region. Out of the goodness of our hearts, we offer financial assistance to hosting countries in the region, and we support recent agreements of the G20 nations that will seek to host refugees as close to their home countries as possible. This is the safe, responsible, and humanitarian approach.

For decades, the United States has dealt with migration challenges here in the Western Hemisphere. We have learned that, over the long term, uncontrolled migration is deeply unfair to both the sending and the receiving countries.

For the sending countries, it reduces domestic pressure to pursue needed political and economic reform, and drains them of the human capital necessary to motivate and implement those reforms.

For the receiving countries, the substantial costs of uncontrolled migration are borne overwhelmingly by low-income citizens whose concerns are often ignored by both media and government.

I want to salute the work of the United Nations in seeking to address the problems that cause people to flee from their homes. The United Nations and African Union led peacekeeping missions to have invaluable contributions in stabilizing conflicts in Africa. The United States continues to lead the world in humanitarian assistance, including famine prevention and relief in South Sudan, Somalia, and northern Nigeria and Yemen.

We have invested in better health and opportunity all over the world through programs like PEPFAR, which funds AIDS relief; the President's Malaria Initiative; the Global Health Security Agenda; the Global Fund to End Modern Slavery; and the Women Entrepreneurs Finance Initiative, part of our commitment to empowering women all across the globe.

We also thank — (applause) — we also thank the Secretary General for recognizing that the United Nations must reform if it is to be an effective partner in confronting threats to sovereignty, security, and prosperity. Too often the focus of this organization has not been on results, but on bureaucracy and process.

In some cases, states that seek to subvert this institution's noble aims have hijacked the very systems that are supposed to advance them. For example, it is a massive source of embarrassment to the United Nations that some governments with egregious human rights records sit on the U.N. Human Rights Council.

The United States is one out of 193 countries in the United Nations, and yet we pay 22 percent of the entire budget and more. In fact, we pay far more than anybody realizes. The United States bears an unfair cost burden, but, to be fair, if it could actually accomplish all of its stated goals, especially the goal of peace, this investment would easily be well worth it.

Major portions of the world are in conflict and some, in fact, are going to hell. But the powerful people in this room, under the guidance and auspices of the United Nations, can solve many of these vicious and complex problems.

The American people hope that one day soon the United Nations can be a much more accountable and effective advocate for human dignity and freedom around the world. In the meantime, we believe that no nation should have to bear a disproportionate share of the burden, militarily or financially. Nations of the world must take a greater role in promoting secure and prosperous societies in their own regions.

That is why in the Western Hemisphere, the United States has stood against the corrupt and destabilizing regime in Cuba and embraced the enduring dream of the Cuban people to live in freedom. My administration recently announced that we will not lift sanctions on the Cuban government until it makes fundamental reforms.

We have also imposed tough, calibrated sanctions on the socialist Maduro regime in Venezuela, which has brought a once thriving nation to the brink of total collapse.

The socialist dictatorship of Nicolas Maduro has inflicted terrible pain and suffering on the good people of that country. This corrupt regime destroyed a prosperous nation by imposing a failed ideology that has produced poverty and misery everywhere it has been tried. To make matters worse, Maduro has defied his own people, stealing power from their elected representatives to preserve his disastrous rule.

The Venezuelan people are starving and their country is collapsing. Their democratic institutions are being destroyed. This situation is completely unacceptable and we cannot stand by and watch.

As a responsible neighbour and friend, we and all others have a goal. That goal is to help them regain their freedom, recover their country, and restore their democracy. I would like to thank leaders in this room for condemning the regime and providing vital support to the Venezuelan people.

The United States has taken important steps to hold the regime accountable. We are prepared to take further action if the government of Venezuela persists on its path to impose authoritarian rule on the Venezuelan people.

We are fortunate to have incredibly strong and healthy trade relationships with many of the Latin American countries gathered here today. Our economic bond forms a critical foundation for advancing peace and prosperity for all of our people and all of our neighbours.

I ask every country represented here today to be prepared to do more to address this very real crisis. We call for the full restoration of democracy and political freedoms in Venezuela. (Applause.)

The problem in Venezuela is not that socialism has been poorly implemented, but that socialism has been faithfully implemented.

(Applause.) From the Soviet Union to Cuba to Venezuela, wherever true socialism or communism has been adopted, it has delivered anguish and devastation and failure. Those who preach the tenets of these discredited ideologies only contribute to the continued suffering of the people who live under these cruel systems.

America stands with every person living under a brutal regime. Our respect for sovereignty is also a call for action. All people deserve a government that cares for their safety, their interests, and their wellbeing, including their prosperity.

In America, we seek stronger ties of business and trade with all nations of good will, but this trade must be fair and it must be reciprocal.

For too long, the American people were told that mammoth multinational trade deals, unaccountable international tribunals, and powerful global bureaucracies were the best way to promote their success. But as those promises flowed, millions of jobs vanished and thousands of factories disappeared. Others gamed the system and broke the rules. And our great middle class, once the bedrock of American prosperity, was forgotten and left behind, but they are forgotten no more and they will never be forgotten again.

While America will pursue cooperation and commerce with other nations, we are renewing our commitment to the first duty of every government: the duty of our citizens. This bond is the source of America's strength and that of every responsible nation represented here today.

If this organization is to have any hope of successfully confronting the challenges before us, it will depend, as President Truman said some 70 years ago, on the "independent strength of its members." If we are to embrace the opportunities of the future and overcome the present dangers together, there can be no substitute for strong, sovereign, and independent nations — nations that are rooted in their histories and invested in their destinies; nations that seek allies to befriend, not enemies to conquer; and most important of all, nations that are home to patriots, to men and women who are willing to sacrifice for their countries, their fellow citizens, and for all that is best in the human spirit.

In remembering the great victory that led to this body's founding, we must never forget that those heroes who fought against evil also fought for the nations that they loved.

Patriotism led the Poles to die to save Poland, the French to fight for a free France, and the Brits to stand strong for Britain.

Today, if we do not invest ourselves, our hearts, and our minds in our nations, if we will not build strong families, safe communities, and healthy societies for ourselves, no one can do it for us.

We cannot wait for someone else, for faraway countries or far-off bureaucrats — we can't do it. We must solve our problems, to build our prosperity, to secure our futures, or we will be vulnerable to decay, domination, and defeat.

The true question for the United Nations today, for people all over the world who hope for better lives for themselves and their children, is a basic one: Are we still patriots? Do we love our nations enough to protect their sovereignty and to take ownership of their futures? Do we revere them enough to defend their interests, preserve their cultures, and ensure a peaceful world for their citizens?

One of the greatest American patriots, John Adams, wrote that the American Revolution was “effected before the war commenced. The Revolution was in the minds and hearts of the people.”

That was the moment when America awoke, when we looked around and understood that we were a nation. We realized who we were, what we valued, and what we would give our lives to defend. From its very first moments, the American story is the story of what is possible when people take ownership of their future.

The United States of America has been among the greatest forces for good in the history of the world, and the greatest defenders of sovereignty, security, and prosperity for all.

Now we are calling for a great reawakening of nations, for the revival of their spirits, their pride, their people, and their patriotism.

History is asking us whether we are up to the task. Our answer will be a renewal of will, a rediscovery of resolve, and a rebirth of devotion. We need to defeat the enemies of humanity and unlock the potential of life itself.

Our hope is a world of proud, independent nations that embrace their duties, seek friendship, respect others, and make common cause in the greatest shared interest of all: a future of dignity and peace for the people of this wonderful Earth.

This is the true vision of the United Nations, the ancient wish of every people, and the deepest yearning that lives inside every sacred soul.

So let this be our mission, and let this be our message to the world: We will fight together, sacrifice together, and stand together for peace, for freedom, for justice, for family, for humanity, and for the almighty God who made us all.

Thank you. God bless you. God bless the nations of the world. And God bless the United States of America. Thank you very much. (Applause.)
END

10:46 A.M. EDT

<https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-72nd-session-united-nations-general-assembly/>

Document: 2

President Donald J. Trump Announces a National Security Strategy to Advance America's Interests,

December 18, 2017,

White House Briefing.

Our government's first duty is to its people, to our citizens — to serve their needs, to ensure their safety, to preserve their rights, and to defend their values. President Donald J. Trump

A New National Security Strategy For A New Era: Less than a year after taking office, President Donald J. Trump is unveiling a new National Security Strategy that sets a positive strategic direction for the United States that will restore America's advantages in the world and build upon our country's great strengths.

- The 2017 National Security Strategy (Strategy) builds on the 11 months of Presidential action to restore respect for the United States abroad and renew American confidence at home.
- Strategic confidence enables the United States to protect its vital national interests. The Strategy identifies four vital national interests, or "four pillars" as:
 - I. Protect the homeland, the American people, and American way of life.
 - II. Promote American prosperity.
 - III. Preserve peace through strength.
 - IV. Advance American influence.
- The Strategy addresses key challenges and trends that affect our standing in the world, including:
 - I. Revisionist powers, such as China and Russia, that use technology, propaganda, and coercion to shape a world antithetical to our interests and values;
 - II. Regional dictators that spread terror, threaten their neighbors, and pursue weapons of mass destruction;
 - III. Jihadist terrorists that foment hatred to incite violence against innocents in the name of a wicked ideology, and transnational criminal organizations that spill drugs and violence into our communities.
- The Strategy articulates and advances the President's concept of principled realism.
 - I. It is realist because it acknowledges the central role of power in international politics, affirms that strong and sovereign states are the best hope for a peaceful world, and clearly defines our national interests.

- II. It is principled because it is grounded in advancing American principles, which spreads peace and prosperity around the globe.

I. PROTECT THE HOMELAND: President Trump's fundamental responsibility is to protect the American people, the homeland, and the American way of life.

- We will strengthen control of our borders and reform our immigration system to protect the homeland and restore our sovereignty.
- The greatest transnational threats to the homeland are:
 - I. Jihadist terrorists, using barbaric cruelty to commit murder, repression, and slavery, and virtual networks to exploit vulnerable populations and inspire and direct plots.
 - II. Transnational criminal organizations, tearing apart our communities with drugs and violence and weakening our allies and partners by corrupting democratic institutions.
- America will target threats at their source: we will confront threats before they ever reach our borders or cause harm to our people.
- We will redouble our efforts to protect our critical infrastructure and digital networks, because new technology and new adversaries create new vulnerabilities.
- We are deploying a layered missile defense system to defend America against missile attacks.

II. PROMOTE AMERICAN PROSPERITY: A strong economy protects the American people, supports our way of life, and sustains American power.

- We will rejuvenate the American economy for the benefit of American workers and companies, which is necessary to restore our national power.
- America will no longer tolerate chronic trade abuses and will pursue free, fair, and reciprocal economic relationships.
- To succeed in this 21st century geopolitical competition, America must lead in research, technology, and innovation. We will protect our national security innovation base from those who steal our intellectual property and unfairly exploit the innovation of free societies.
- America will use its energy dominance to ensure international markets remain open, and that the benefits of diversification and energy access promote economic and national security.

III. PRESERVE PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH: An America strengthened, renewed, and rejuvenated will ensure peace and deter hostility.

- We will rebuild America's military strength to ensure it remains second to none.
- America will use all of the tools of statecraft in a new era of strategic competition—diplomatic, information, military, and economic—to protect our interests.
- America will strengthen its capabilities across numerous domains — including space and cyber — and revitalize capabilities that have been neglected.
- America's allies and partners magnify our power and protect our shared interests. We expect them to take greater responsibility for addressing common threats.
- We will ensure the balance of power remains in America's favor in key regions of the world: the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East.

IV. ADVANCE AMERICAN INFLUENCE: As a force for good throughout its history, America will use its influence to advance our interests and benefit humanity.

- We must continue to enhance our influence overseas to protect the American people and promote our prosperity.
- America's diplomatic and development efforts will compete to achieve better outcomes in all arenas—bilateral, multilateral, and in the information realm—to protect our interests, find new economic opportunities for Americans, and challenge our competitors.
- America will seek partnerships with like-minded states to promote free market economies, private sector growth, political stability, and peace.
- We champion our values – including the rule of law and individual rights – that promote strong, stable, prosperous, and sovereign states.
- Our America First foreign policy celebrates America's influence in the world as a positive force that can help set the conditions for peace, prosperity, and the development of successful societies.

<https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-announces-national-security-strategy-advance-americas-interests/>

Document: 3**Joint Press Release of the 1st China-Afghanistan-Pakistan Foreign Ministers' Dialogue,
December 26, 2017,
Beijing, China.**

Foreign Minister Wang Yi of the People's Republic of China, Foreign Minister Salahuddin Rabbani of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and Foreign Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan held the 1st China-Afghanistan-Pakistan Foreign Ministers' Dialogue in Beijing, China on 26th December 2017.

Afghanistan and Pakistan congratulated China on the successful conclusion of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, and fully supported the initiative proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping to build community with a shared future for mankind.

The three sides reaffirmed their commitment to improving their relations, deepening mutually beneficial cooperation, advancing connectivity under the Belt and Road Initiative, and fighting terrorism in all its forms and manifestations without any distinction. The three Foreign Ministers agreed to jointly work together on political mutual trust and reconciliation, development cooperation and connectivity, security cooperation and counter-terrorism as three topics of the trilateral cooperation.

The three sides reaffirmed that a broad-based and inclusive peace and reconciliation process, which is "Afghan-led, Afghan-owned", and fully supported regionally and internationally, is the most viable solution to end the violence in Afghanistan. In this regard, they call on the Afghan Taliban to join the peace process at an early date.

The three sides agreed to conduct win-win trilateral economic cooperation, with an incremental approach, starting from the easier initiatives to the more difficult ones. The three sides agreed to continue economic development cooperation in areas of mutual interest, and expressed willingness to strengthen people-to-people contacts.

The three sides reiterated their firm resolve to fight the menace of terrorism. They expressed their strong determination not to allow any country, organization or individual to use their respective territories for terrorist activities against any other countries. The three sides agreed to strengthen counter-terrorism coordination and cooperation in an effort to combat all terrorist organizations and individuals without any discrimination. The three sides will communicate and consult on developing of the Memorandum of Understanding on Counter-Terrorism Cooperation.

The Afghan and Pakistani sides thanked the Chinese side for the successful holding of the 1st China-Afghanistan-Pakistan Foreign

Ministers' Dialogue and its warm hospitality, and the three sides agreed that the 2nd China-Afghanistan-Pakistan Foreign Ministers' Dialogue will be held in Kabul in 2018.

http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/yzs_663350/xwlb_663352/t1522147.shtml

Document: 4**Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mr. Igor Morgulov's Remarks at the Conference on "Russia and India: Strategic Vision of Bilateral Relations and the Changing World Order",****October 12, 2017, Moscow.**

Ladies and gentlemen,
Dear friends,

Thank you for the invitation to attend the conference dedicated to Russian-Indian relations and timed to coincide with the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between Russia and India that is being observed this year. I am pleased to meet my colleagues here, as well as experts on international relations who I know very well.

The special privileged partnership between Russia and India is based on a high degree of mutual trust, the coincidence of key geopolitical interests, shared approaches toward topical issues and the similarity of our economic and social development goals. And of course, the mutual sympathy and draw of our nations, which have a centuries-old history, to each other.

At present, international relations are going through a difficult and conflicting period of transformation. We see India, which is committed to democratic ideals, as a reliable ally in building a polycentric and fair world order based on the rule of law. New Delhi's independent and responsible foreign policy is making a substantial contribution to building a more secure world and to adapting global multilateral structures to new realities. Through joint efforts, we are promoting a positive, unifying agenda in international affairs and working to meet the challenges and threats of the 21st century.

Our countries cooperate productively within the framework of the UN, G-20, BRICS and RIC, as well as other formats. We welcome India's status as a full member of the SCO and its active involvement in the organisation's activity in its new capacity.

Russia and India coordinate their positions on challenging issues, such as the settlement process in Afghanistan, the Middle East and North Africa, including Syria, and building an inclusive and open security architecture in the Asia Pacific Region.

Political dialogue between our countries is characterised by both intensity and substance. Annual summits allow us to synchronise our positions on key issues on the bilateral and international agenda. The most recent summit took place in June in St Petersburg in the wake of the St Petersburg International Economic Forum. In-depth top-level talks took place on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Xiamen (September 4).

For Russia, India is not only a long-standing friend but also an attractive business partner, being one of the world's largest economies with impressive growth rates and tremendous potential.

The current level of Russian-Indian trade and economic cooperation certainly does not measure up to the high level of our political contacts (in 2016, trade was \$7.7 billion). Our main tasks include increasing the volume and improving the structure of bilateral trade (the target: \$30 billion by 2025), primarily with supplies of high-tech goods and by stimulating reciprocal investment.

A special working group on priority investment projects was created within the framework of the Intergovernmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific, Technical and Cultural Cooperation with a view to increasing the mutual inflow of capital. These include the construction of a butyl rubber production plant by the Sibur company in the state of Gujarat and setting up lighting equipment production in the state of Karnataka by the Russian company Svetovye Tekhnologii. AFK Sistema is developing a smart city model in India.

Cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear power is a key component of our bilateral partnership. In 2013, the first power unit at the Kudankulam nuclear power plant was put into operation. It has now attained its maximum capacity. In October 2016, the second unit was handed over to India and construction began on the third and fourth units. Work on the third stage of the Kudankulam NPP (Units 5 and 6) got under way. There are plans to build at least 12 more reactors in various parts of India, which will help to a very large extent meet the [energy] needs of India's steadily growing economy.

We are increasing our hydrocarbon exports to India. The total volume of oil deliveries in the first half of the year (1.1 million tonnes) increased almost eight-fold year on year. Incidentally, Rosneft's acquisition of the Indian company Essar Oil Ltd has become the largest foreign capital investment in India's economy on record – almost \$13 billion.

There are large-scale projects in machine manufacturing, the chemical and mining industry, the pharmaceutical industry, health care, and nano- and bio-technology. Such well-known Russian economic operators as Silovye Mashiny, Gazprom, Story Trans Gaz, Uralmash Zavod, Sibur, Mechel and others, have a presence on the Indian market.

We welcome the December 2016 decision to open talks on signing an agreement on creating a free trade area between the EAEU and India. Prospects for building effective infrastructure for the North-South international transit corridor are under consideration. All of this opens up additional opportunities for fostering cooperation on both the bilateral and regional track.

The Make in India national programme launched by Narendra Modi's Government provides an extra incentive to establishing joint

ventures on Indian territory in spheres that are traditional to us in both the civilian and military-industrial sectors.

Despite the serious competition on India's arms market, Russia has retained its unique position in terms of direct supplies and co-production, with India, of arms and military equipment. Russia is sharing the most advanced military technology [with India], thus helping strengthen India's defence industry.

Military cooperation is also growing stronger. Russian-Indian exercises with all branches and services of the armed forces are conducted every year. In October and November 2017, the first joint inter-branch exercise, INDRA 2017, will take place.

Our countries' cultural traditions invariably generate mutual interest. The ongoing Indian culture festival, Namaste Russia, is a great success. Such festivals are held annually, by turns in Russia and in India.

Tourism exchanges are expanding. In 2016, 35 per cent more Russians visited India than in 2015. The number of Indian tourists to Russia was up by approximately 20 per cent in the same period.

In short, we have approached the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations with something to show for ourselves. We are proud of what we have been able to achieve and have every reason to confidently look to a prosperous future.

In conclusion, I would like to say that contacts between our countries' experts, like this meeting today, make a significant contribution to further strengthening the Russian-Indian strategic partnership, deepen mutual understanding and allow us to clarify our long-term goals.

From the bottom of my heart I wish all conference participants success in your work.

Thank you.

http://www.mid.ru/en/maps/in/-/asset_publisher/EpJ5G4lcymvb/content/id/2899078

Document: 5**A Keynote Address by Indian Foreign Secretary, Dr. S. Jaishankar at the Second IORA Meeting of Experts for Maritime Safety and Security,****November 7, 2017, India.**

1. It gives me great pleasure to address you this morning. I extend a warm welcome to all IORA delegates to New Delhi. After an initial search for identity, IORA has today grown in substance and stature and carved a definitive place for itself. The recognition of IORA at the UN Ocean Conference last June is testimony to its growing salience in international fora. As Indian Ocean takes centre-stage in the 21st century, the onus is on us as equal stakeholders to collectively secure and nurture our oceanic space.
2. Maritime security and collaboration is central to our strategic thinking and policy. We consider IORA as an important instrument for promoting cooperation and ensuring stability in the region. Security challenges do not respect borders and need to be tackled through effective partnerships at the regional level. Those who live in this region have the principal responsibility for its peace, stability and prosperity. Today, the occasion calls for all of us to deliberate on the cooperative possibilities of this region rather than its competitive challenges that are admittedly there.
3. Throughout history, the Indian Ocean has been characterized by commercial flows, alongside migration of people, ideas and cultures. The Indian Ocean of today is, in that sense, not very different. It is one of the important trade and energy waterways in the world, and as Gen Deb noted, one carrying half the world's container shipments, one-third of the bulk cargo traffic and two-thirds of the oil shipments. It is the medium that connects the producers of Gulf and Western Indian Ocean to the consumers of South and East Asia. Its demography - housing nearly 40% of the world's population spread over 35 littoral states - speaks for itself. Notwithstanding the diversity, the challenges faced by the Indian Ocean rim countries are actually quite similar.
4. The IORA mechanism has a vital role to play in realizing our common vision for the region. It is a collective platform to highlight regional causes and concerns and the path for joint action to tackle challenges that we confront. Economic, trade and development issues are dominant in this agenda.

Therefore, we have been supportive of the intensification and invigoration of IORA activities, from renewable energy and the blue economy to maritime safety and security.

5. Recognizing emerging geo-strategic challenges, IORA identified in 2011 "Maritime Safety and Security" as one of its six priority areas. This Indian initiative gained further traction with Australia and Indonesia assuming leadership roles subsequently as succeeding Chairs of IORA. Now under South Africa's stewardship, we look forward to not only sustaining this momentum but also further deepening our engagement within IORA under a collective framework.
6. The focus on maritime safety and security as a priority area within the IORA framework has helped to promote a shared understanding of maritime issues, enhance regional maritime security, strengthen capabilities, establish cooperative mechanisms, develop inter-operability and provide speedy HADR responses.
7. Maritime safety and security is a multifaceted issue, especially with the growth of non-traditional threats. The scenario we confront is of maritime terrorism, smuggling, transnational crimes, drug-trafficking, illegal immigration, IUU fishing, gun-running, piracy, unregulated private maritime security companies and proliferation of sensitive items. It is further compounded by natural disasters, oil spills and effects of climate change, to which our region is highly prone. These threats and challenges impinge on the national interests of the IORA littorals. More importantly, these conspicuously highlight the acute and imperative need for protection of Sea Lines of Communication. Only through collective action can we successfully meet these challenges.
8. With sustained economic growth in the countries on the littoral of the Indian Ocean, this region has assumed greater importance in all realms. The growing need for raw materials, minerals and other natural resources including the energy to fuel development in the countries in the region, has enhanced the strategic significance of trade that traverses the Indian Ocean. The economic dimension and the security challenges in the IOR have together defined the naval and national strategies of nations within the region and beyond. Regional cooperation within the IOR will become increasingly important in order to ensure the safety and security of these vital trade routes, particularly the choke points, over the coming decades.
9. Maritime trade has become increasingly important for interconnected economies; India itself conducts nearly 40% of its trade with littoral nations along the Indian Ocean Rim. India

has been working with like-minded countries to preserve the integrity, inviolability and security of maritime domain, much of which is a global commons. Recognising this growing importance of maritime trade in an increasingly globalised world, India supports freedom of navigation and over-flight, and unimpeded commerce, based on the principles of international law, particularly UNCLOS that serves as a constitution for the oceans. We also encourage resolution of territorial and maritime disputes through peaceful means in accordance with these universally recognized principles. We have always stood for exercising self-restraint in the conduct of activities that could complicate or escalate disputes affecting peace and stability. India's own record in this regard is well known.

10. Maritime security is an important dimension of India's bilateral relations with all Indian Ocean littoral states as well with almost all regional bodies that are either based in or border the Indian Ocean region- ranging from IORA, ARF, ADMM Plus to Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum and ReCAAP. Maintaining a favourable maritime environment in the Indian Ocean is a broad objective that requires coordination between India's military, diplomatic and economic institutions. I am glad to note that this is increasingly the case. We have consequently made more progress in our maritime engagement in the region and its immediate areas beyond.
11. There has been growing interest in the conduct of joint exercises and patrols with the aim of enhancing interoperability within the region. The importance of coastal surveillance systems has also been recognized. India has initiated efforts to help our maritime neighbours set up their network and contribute to the shared development of Maritime Domain Awareness. Maritime connectivity is also today one of the key pillars of our development cooperation in Asia and Africa.
12. We have signed White Shipping Agreements with a number of countries, provided capacity building assistance and ensured capability enhancement by imparting training. In addition, our ships have undertaken coordinated patrolling with other countries and EEZ Surveillance on the request of our partners. India's sense of responsibility will grow with its capabilities and the IOR should be assured that it can count on us.
13. The large number of piracy attempts off the East coast of Africa led to the emergence of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) mechanism of which India was a founder member. The Indian Navy has been undertaking anti-

- piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden and the sea routes of the Indian Ocean since 2008.
14. Our persevering efforts to secure shipping traffic in the area from pirate attacks has contributed to the greater maritime safety in the region and enabled the reduction of the High Risk Area in December 2015. This in turn has reduced shipping insurance costs, thereby promoting mercantile traffic in Eastern and Central IOR.
 15. India's HADR and Search & Rescue efforts in the Indian Ocean have been increasingly in evidence. Building on its 2004 tsunami relief experience, India has since undertaken a wide range of HADR operations. Deployment of Indian Naval ships for major non-combatant evacuation operations in Libya, Iraq, Syria and Yemen have benefitted not just Indian citizens but nationals of several countries in the region and beyond. From bringing drinking water to the Maldives in the wake of a major water crisis, to providing relief supplies by air to Fiji and Sri Lanka, we have been the first to respond in times of distress in our immediate as well as extended neighbourhood.
 16. We have been laying additional emphasis on developing greater synergies with the Navies in the region by investing sufficient expertise in consultation forums like the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS). India is a founding member of IONS, which currently has 35 countries.
 17. Another effort to ensure the safety of navigation in the IOR has been the hydrographic support provided to chart the waters of the region. We have augmented this with a large training effort. Over the past three decades, more than 11,000 foreign personnel from over 40 countries have undergone training in India, many of whom are from the Indian Ocean littorals.
 18. Our Prime Minister's strategic vision articulated during a visit to Mauritius in March 2015 has spurred a qualitative transformation in India's engagement with IORA in recent years. In his words, and I quote, India seeks a future for Indian Ocean that is outlined by the acronym 'SAGAR' – Security And Growth for All in the Region". SAGAR in Hindi means the Ocean. This succinctly outlines our vision for the region – of advancing cooperation and using our capabilities for larger benefit. Prime Minister Modi's vision has four key elements:
 - To safeguard our mainland and islands, defend our interests, ensure a safe secure and stable Indian Ocean, and make available our capabilities to others;
 - Deepen economic and security cooperation with our maritime neighbours and strengthen their capacities;

- Envisage collective action and cooperation to advance peace and security and respond to emergencies; and
 - Seek a more integrated and cooperative future for the region that enhances sustainable development.
19. The growing appreciation and acceptance of the concept of Indo-Pacific further underlines the importance of IOR in global affairs. It should also serve as an encouragement to Indians themselves to think more strategically of IOR. The Pacific and the Atlantic both have an identity and a community. IORA should and is moving in that direction.
20. Relations with countries in the IOR and nurturing a climate of peace and stability are important cornerstones of India's foreign policy. More so, given the growing economic relevance of countries in this region and the changing geo-political scenario. This places a great responsibility on all of us in IOR - to collaborate, to co-operate and to work together to tackle the maritime security challenges in the region, ranging from terrorism and WMD proliferation to territorial and maritime disputes. I am confident that this sense of responsibility will guide your deliberations.

<https://idsa.in/keyspeeches/s-jaishankar-foreign-secretary-IOA-maritime-safety-and-security>

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