

Journal of Contemporary Studies

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
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Editor's Note

The *Journal of Contemporary Studies* is a flagship publication of the Faculty of Contemporary Studies (FCS), National Defence University (NDU), Islamabad. The journal offers its readers in academia, government, and the policymaking world in-depth and scholarly analyses, diverse policy perspectives on important contemporary issues, and ongoing debates in the areas of national and international security, public policy and the broader field of world politics.

This journal issue comprises six articles, four book reviews and two documents providing valuable primary information on significant international developments. The first article, *Securitisation of Deterrence: Implications for Strategic Stability* by Salma Shaheen, examines the negative impact of the post-Cold War international strategic environment on the concept and practice of deterrence. Drawing upon the securitisation theory, the author argues that the high risk of escalation and competitive impulse is driving states into a relentless arms race, undermining strategic stability.

The second article, *The Decolonial Turn: New Challenges to International Relations Traditions* by Syed Wajeeh Ul Hassan and Fatima Sajjad, argues that the decolonial turn in IR challenges the basic foundations of the discipline that until recently has been dominated by Eurocentric discourses. The authors underscore the need for a change in the parameters of discussion around the principles and assumptions underlying the knowledge production system in the IR discipline.

The third article, *Strategic Divergence in the US-Pakistan Relationship under the Trump Administration* by Yasir Malik and Saira Aquil analyses the US-Pakistan relationship during the Trump era from the neo-classical realist lens. It reveals that during the Trump period, Pakistan was not a strategic choice for Washington since the two countries had a contrasting understanding of evolving global developments and emerging geopolitical reconfigurations. Thereby, Washington exploited Islamabad's economic vulnerabilities as leverage in bargaining its interests. This compelled policy planners in Islamabad to rethink that a strong foreign policy always rests on a solid domestic base.

The fourth article, *CPEC and Gilgit-Baltistan: A Socio-Economic Perspective* by Summar Iqbal Babar and Najeeb Alam, explores the potential socio-economic and political dividends of CPEC for GB. The authors argue that CPEC is expected to create over half a million jobs, boost the tourism industry, develop hydropower, and hone the human resources of the region, which will have a positive political impact on the region.

The fifth article, *Hybrid Warfare: Emerging Challenges for Pakistan* by Hassan Jalil Shah, and Muhammad Ehsan examines the impact of technological revolution, information operations, psychological operation and digitisation of the battlefield on the nature of conventional warfare. The authors argue that hybrid warfare is an increasingly favourable instrument of application against Pakistan and is going to negatively impact its national security.

The last article, *Saudi-Iran Rivalry: A Sectarian Divide or Security Dilemma?* by Junaid Jahandad and Ali Mustafa, analyses two major reasons for their mutual hostility - sectarian schism and power politics. Drawing upon the constructivist lens, the authors argue that security dilemma and uncertainty about each other's actions is the driving force and predominant cause of Saudi-Iran rivalry rather than the sectarian divide.

I am grateful to all the contributors who have sent their articles for this issue and the anonymous peer-reviewers whose valuable comments helped authors to improve their contributions. We are accepting articles for the upcoming issue of the Journal of Contemporary Studies issue based on original qualitative or quantitative research, an innovative conceptual framework, or a substantial literature review that opens new areas of inquiry and investigation. The editorial team at the Journal promotes submissions from expert analysts from around the world. The Journal seeks to promote a scholarly understanding of contemporary issues pertaining to traditional and non-traditional security, peace studies, public policy, and human resource development. It intends to stimulate interdisciplinary research and writing.

Editor
Prof. Dr. Shaheen Akhtar

CONTENTS

ARTICLES

1. **Securitisation of Deterrence: Implications for Strategic Stability** 1
Salma Shaheen
2. **The Decolonial Turn: New Challenges to International Relations Traditions** 23
Syed Wajeeh Ul Hassan & Fatima Sajjad
3. **Strategic Divergence in the US-Pakistan Relationship under The Trump Administration** 42
Yasir Malik & Saira Aquil
4. **CPEC and Gilgit-Baltistan: A Socio-Economic Perspective** 56
Summar Iqbal Babar & Najeeb Alam
5. **Hybrid Warfare: Emerging Challenges for Pakistan** 70
Hassan Jalil Shah & Muhammad Ehsan
6. **Saudi-Iran Rivalry: A Sectarian Divide or Security Dilemma?** 87
Junaid Jahandad & Ali Mustafa

BOOK REVIEWS

1. **Aid, Politics and the War of Narratives in the US-Pakistan Relations - A Case Study of Kerry Lugar Berman Act** 103
Hussain Nadim
2. **Great Potential, Many Pitfalls Understanding China's Belt and Road Initiative** 106
Bijan Omrani
3. **Global Pakistan: Pakistan's Role in the International System** 109
Jochen Hippler & Vaqar Ahmed
4. **The New Climate War: The Fight to Take Back Our Planet** 112
Michael E. Mann

DOCUMENTS

1. **Joint Communiqué- SCO Heads of Government (Prime Ministers) Council Meeting, November 2, 2022** 115
2. **Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan, Revised Draft Decision -/CMA.4, November 20, 2022** 128

SECURITISATION OF DETERRENCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGIC STABILITY

Salma Shaheen*

Abstract

The post-Cold War international strategic environment transformed into one characterized by high level of certainty and complexity. This challenged the concept and practice of deterrence, which had remained the mainstay of the Cold War strategic environment. This research employs securitization theory to evaluate the actions that nuclear-armed states (particularly the US, Russia, China, UK, and France) took in response to this shift. The research finds out that the nuclear-armed states responded with de-securitization, re-securitization and wider securitization of deterrence. By doing so, as a concept and practice, deterrence has entered into a high and extraordinary phase of politics, resulting in the construction of a response (deterrent posture) that pervades across different sectors of society/national power, including politics, society and industry. However, the research notes that this posture is based on a high risk of escalation and competitive impulse driving states into a relentless arms race. Nonetheless, the effectiveness of this posture depends on how consistent nuclear-armed states are and will be in maintaining such a posture.

Keywords: *Deterrence, Securitisation Theory, Emerging & Disruptive Technologies, Three-staged Deterrent Posture*

Introduction

The international strategic environment transformed immediately after the Cold War primarily due to the dissolution of bipolarity and the emergence of new conditions for multi-polarity; however, it was recast with the overall widespread development and acquisition of emerging and disruptive technologies (EDT). However, the absence of bipolarity in post-Cold War does not restrain states from engaging in a geopolitical rivalry that reinforced the idea that stalemate is not enduring in international politics. Hence, the competitive acquisition of technology

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for security would continue. Nuclear-armed states are motivated to compete for technological advancements since nuclear weapons that are secure today might not be so in the future.¹ Nonetheless, this has challenged the concept and practice of deterrence that remained a mainstay of the Cold War strategic environment.

During Cold War, deterrence was generally characterised by the reliance of superpowers on an enormous quantity of nuclear weapons to destroy each other's nuclear arsenal before the war and strategic nuclear weapons on high alert constantly; reliance of smaller nuclear-armed states on sufficient arsenals as well as counter-value targeting; reliance on threats of retaliation more than on defences for deterrence; reliance on standing conventional forces to deter low-intensity attacks; and the emergence of unilateral and collective efforts to manage security via deterrence. Besides the fact that nuclear weapons have not revolutionized international politics, nuclear deterrence is the best strategy that served Cold War and nuclear weapons are the ultimate instruments of deterrence. Nonetheless, it is becoming susceptible to technologies capable of disarming strike capabilities.² With emerging technologies, an adversary could create chaos without seizing territory, generate confusion and threaten or undermine a country's norms, values and international order.³ Deterrence based on Cold War relics does offer some solutions such as limited retaliation, crisis stability, or something leaving to chance; however, adversary today is smarter enough to undercut those deterrence solutions. With new technologies, non-military tools (such as cyber and information) have dominated military tools to influence security and strategy. New threats and tools required nuclear-armed states to design creative deterrent posture. The current deterrent policies of nuclear-armed states are a step in this direction.

It is argued that the nuclear-armed states responded to the post-Cold War strategic environment by de-securitising, re-securitising, and expanding the securitisation of deterrence in accordance with the securitization theory's desecuritisation process⁴ and Sperling and Webber

¹ The technology remained a key factor during the Cold War in driving superpowers to compete. see John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), p. 231.

² Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, "Should the United States Reject MAD? Damage Limitation and U.S. Nuclear Strategy toward China," *International Security*, 41, no. 1 (2016): 49-98.

³ Julian Jang-Jaccard and Surya Nepal, "A Survey of Emerging Threats in Cybersecurity," *Journal of Computer and System Sciences*, 80, no. 5, (Aug 2014): 973-993.

⁴ Ole Waever, "Politics, Security, Theory," *Security Dialogue*, 42, no. 4-5 (2011): 465-480.

model's dynamic and reversible process.⁵ The de-securitisation of deterrence occurred in the absence of Soviet threat and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, followed by nuclear reductions and arms control negotiations. With the end of the Cold War, the interest in nuclear weapons reduced; however, after 9/11, the threat of nuclear terrorism loomed large in deterrence calculus and has "consumed significant military leadership and intellectual bandwidth," especially in the US.⁶ This enhanced the salience of nuclear weapons in military doctrine. The new technological advancements have created conditions integrating conventional and nuclear forces; however, the current understanding of nuclear forces is another challenge.

The new threats and technologies drove nuclear-armed states to re-securitize and widen the securitization of deterrence at three dimensions – foreign policy, societal and industrial integration, and technological integration. This entails fusing deterrence with foreign policy baseline, industrial and societal resilience, and military modernization. This is evident in concepts like integrated deterrence, full spectrum deterrence, and multi-instrument deterrence that rely on ambiguity and resilience. Due to this fusion, deterrence has entered into an extraordinary phase of politics where securitization has extended to other sectors of national power, demonstrating societies' obsession with meeting enhanced security demands. Moreover, the fusion/integration of deterrence with foreign policy, industrial and societal resilience and military modernization across different nuclear-armed states validates this new deterrent posture as a "just and good way of life."⁷

This research studies how nuclear-armed states in different regions securitize deterrence at individual and group levels, that deepens and widens into societal and industrial level and military modernization resulting in shifting and institutionalising deterrence into high/extraordinary politics. In doing so, this research contributes to and extends existing limited literature on securitization and deterrence to provide better a understanding of deterrence practices in the post-Cold War world. It presents a framework that argues how deterrent threats and responses can be mobilized deeper and broader within a society with more deeper and wider consequences of securitization across national power sectors.

⁵ James Sperling & Mark Webber, "NATO and the Ukraine Crisis: Collective Securitisation," *European Journal of International Security*, 2, issue 1 (2016): 19-46.

⁶ Robert Peters, Justin Anderson & Harrison Menke, "Deterrence in the 21st Century: Integrating Nuclear and Conventional Force," *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, 12, no. 4 (2018): 15-43.

⁷ Huysmans, "The Question of the Limit," 569–89.

The article is divided into three sections. Section one reflects upon the limitations of different theories in explaining the gradual widening scope of deterrence by nuclear-armed states in the post-Cold War world. Section two assesses to what extent the securitization theory is applicable and what add-ons can be introduced to create an analytical space that can help explain deterrence travelling through three stages. This is followed by section three, which offers a stylised framework of comprehensive securitization of deterrence to illustrate how the three stages of desecuritisation, resecuritisation and widening securitization of deterrence occur in post-Cold War era.

Deterrence and International Relations Theory

Realist assumptions about states competing in an anarchic world through the accumulation of power relative to the adversary and alliance formation to maintain a balance of power and preserve the status quo⁸ or to attain a hegemonic position in the international system⁹ could help explain the power dynamics of Cold War. The presence of external threats and scarce resources encouraged states (especially adversaries tied in security dilemma) to acquire nuclear weapons as an ultimate deterrent and security provider.¹⁰ The possession of diverse nuclear weapons in massive quantity helped maintain peace during the Cold War. However, the realists' assumptions could not fully explain the state's behaviour in the post-Cold War world. For instance, the Kargil war between India and Pakistan and the deployment of Indian air power against Pakistan's mainland in the 2019 Pulwama-Balakot crisis negate the realist proposition of deterrence.

The structural-realist argument renders significant automaticity to nuclear weapons while arguing that nuclear weapons enable the possessor state to deter others.¹¹ The realist paradigm is limited in explaining state behaviour because key factors such as interdependence,¹² domestic politics,¹³ and norms¹⁴ are not emphasized in this paradigm. The post-Cold

⁸ Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*: 2.

⁹ Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited," *International Security*, 25, no. 3 (Winter 2000-01): 128-161.

¹⁰ Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, "Is Nuclear Zero the Best Option?" *The National Interest*, no. 109 (2010): 92.

¹¹ Kenneth Waltz, "More May be Better," in Kenneth Waltz and Scott Sagan, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed* (NY: W. W. Norton, 2003): 5.

¹² Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977): 86-109.

¹³ James D. Fearon, "Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and the Theories of International Relations," *Annual Review of Political Science*, vol. 1 (1998): 289-313.

War world is characterized by multipolarity, the emergence of new nuclear-armed states, rogue states, non-state actors and technological progression where realism is less relevant.¹⁵ For instance, the ideological motives behind non-state actors acquiring nuclear weapons have complicated the idea of mutually assured destruction.¹⁶

Liberalism, an alternative paradigm, holds that people are good-natured, logical, and motivated to pursue their rights and freedoms.¹⁷ International institutions such as the League of Nations are essential to safeguard those freedoms at the state level. However, its demise raises questions about the veracity of liberalism. This led to the emergence of neoliberalism, which proposes that states can cooperate in an international system characterised by security competition.¹⁸ Institutions based on collective decision-making promote cooperation through increased interdependence,¹⁹ reduce insecurities,²⁰ and render military power or use of force redundant.²¹ As a result, international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and alliances and partnerships such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States (AUKUS) security pact are established that do not fully embrace liberal ideas.²²

Furthermore, the NATO operations in the Balkans “was a muddled compromise that lacked strategic purpose” because a humanitarian crisis in Bosnia did not threaten NATO allies’ “core national interests”; therefore, the intervention did not necessarily “ameliorate the situation on the

¹⁴ Audie J. Klotz, *Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995).

¹⁵ William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” *International Security*, 24, no. 1 (1999): 5-41; Stephen J. Cimbala, “Nuclear Proliferation in the Twenty-First Century: Realism, Rationality, or Uncertainty?” *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, 11, no. 1 (2017): 129-146.

¹⁶ Sagan and Waltz, “Is Nuclear Zero the Best Option?” 88; William W. Newmann, “Hegemonic Disruption: The Asymmetric Challenge to US Leadership,” *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, 5, no. 3 (2001): 67-101.

¹⁷ Michael W. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 12, no. 3 (1983): 206-207.

¹⁸ Tore Fougner, “The State, International Competitiveness and Neoliberal Globalisation: Is There a Future Beyond ‘The Competition State’?” *Review of International Studies*, 32, no. 1 (2006): 165-185.

¹⁹ Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, “The Promise of Institutional Theory,” *International Security*, 20, no. 1 (1995): 45.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ The military power is less important in state of complex interdependence. Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*: 24-26.

²² Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Lastman*: 282.

ground”.²³ Likewise, the US invasion of Afghanistan and calling Iran, Iraq and North Korea as the axis of evil, and generating notions such as rogue states have demonstrated American imperialist powers and its failed policies resulted in more violence and chaos across the world.²⁴ It can be argued that international regimes to control trade, human rights, and environmental issues are essential to promote liberal order; however, they have come under threat from growing political unrest, economic insecurity, and political polarisation in the western industrial world, raising concerns about the regimes' liberal instrumentality.²⁵ Moreover, the ostensibly liberal regimes/alliances to regulate international security lack the substance to cope with changing world. Therefore, to address threats and challenges that emerged in the post-Cold War world, engagement among states through norm building is argued to have an impact²⁶ - a constructivist paradigm.

The third approach to international relations is constructivism that argues that anarchy is constructed through interaction among states.²⁷ The constructivists assume that human relations as well as international relations are based on inter-subjective ideas and thoughts that are shared across.²⁸ Those ideas and thoughts then define identities and interests. For instance, state sovereignty is a collective social institution that does not have any material reality but exists because people of the state collectively believe in it.²⁹ The material power and state's interests are defined through a social and ideological lens.³⁰ Within this approach, the social norms against the use of nuclear weapons are the causal variables instead of the destructive capability of nuclear weapons at the heart of

²³ Stefano Recchia, "Protecting Civilians or Preserving NATO? Alliance Entanglement and the Bosnian Safe Areas," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2022.2044315

²⁴ Michael C. Desch, "It is kind to be Cruel: The Humanity of American Realism," *Review of International Studies*, 29, no. 4 (2003): 421-422; J. Mearsheimer, "Realists as Idealists," *Security Studies*, 20, no. 3 (2011): 424-430.

²⁵ G. John Ikenberry, "The End of Liberal International Order?" *International Affairs*, 94, issue 1 (Jan 2018): 7-23.

²⁶ Desch, "It is kind to be Cruel": 415-426.

²⁷ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization*, 46, no.2 (1992): 391-425.

²⁸ Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism," 171-200.

²⁹ Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics," *Annual Review of Political Science*, no.4 (2001): 391-416.

³⁰ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999): 20.

deterrence.³¹ Moreover, the treaties to control nuclear proliferation, arms control and nuclear disarmament such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), were negotiated and enforced demonstrating shared understanding among states that due to destructive capability of nuclear weapons the states must work together to reduce not only nuclear risks but also towards nuclear disarmament eventually. On the other hand, reliance on nuclear deterrence as a status symbol and tool to address security threats that cannot be dealt with by inferior conventional strength has become a norm.³²

This research contends that ideas and concepts (ideational factors) underscore power (material and structural elements) and interdependence (security and economic cooperation) to investigate deterrence in the post-Cold War. This argument helps understand the framework of interaction among foreign policy baseline, societal and industrial resilience, and military modernisation/technological progression that help in the re-securitisation of deterrence. In this way, the framework considers non-discursive practices such as alliance patterns and technological advancements along with concepts, approaches and doctrines explicated in official documents (e.g., white papers, strategic reviews, nuclear posture reviews). The research further argues that deterrence is based on the threat of retaliation, but it is no more limited, like security,³³ to the military domain, but rather integrated into different sectors of life or, in other words, the threat of retaliation is socialised with other sectors. This research grounds its arguments with securitisation theory that relates to speech act theory,³⁴ theory of governmentality,³⁵ and

³¹ Nina Tannenwald, *The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007): 38-43.

³² Nina Tannenwald, James M. Acton and Jane Vaynman, "Meeting the Challenges of the New Nuclear Age: Emerging Risks and Declining Norms in the Age of Technological Innovation and Changing Nuclear Doctrines," *American Academy of Arts and Sciences* (April 2018). <https://www.amacad.org/publication/emerging-risks-declining-norms>

³³ David Mutimer, "Beyond Strategy: Critical Thinking and the New Security Studies," in Craig A. Snyder (ed.) *Contemporary Security Studies* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997): 90.

³⁴ Michael C. Williams, "Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization in International Politics," *International Studies Quarterly*, 47, no. 4, (2003): 511-31.

³⁵ Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-1978*, translated by Graham Burchell (NY: Picador, 2009); Mitchell Dean, *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society* (London: SAGE, 2010): 30.

social constructivism.³⁶ Here, the emphasis on speech act gives security a performative character with an ability to transform social reality not just describes the contextual world and is context-specific.³⁷ The securitisation theory provides necessary theoretical framework to address questions that are key to this research. Questions like what makes an event a security issue? How does a particular event permeate into a society/audience and establishes as a threat? What kind of responses are required? What are the consequences of socialisation around an event to declare it a threat?

Relevance of Securitisation Theory

The securitisation theory (ST) gained prominence in international relations with Copenhagen School's research that securitises non-traditional security issues.³⁸ In parallel to the original ST, Floyd³⁹ presents moral right or just version of securitisation theory that allows both traditionalist and Critical security studies (Welsh School) to conduct morally right securitisation. However, with regard to the securitisation of security issues, scholars study the construction of security in the non-democratic political system for different political purposes, including deterrent threats,⁴⁰ and argue adding norms, identity formation,⁴¹ and

³⁶ Friedrich Kratochwil, *Rules, Norms and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Thomas Risse, "Let's Argue! Communicative Action in World Politics," *International Organization*, 54, no. 1 (2000): 1–40; Charlotte Epstein, *The Power of Words in International Relations: Birth of an Anti-Whaling Discourse* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008)

³⁷ Scholars have argued that this performative character could be intrinsic and independent of audience or could be acquired when used by particular actors in particular contexts. See Ole Wæver, "Securitization and Desecuritization" in Ronnie D. Lipschitz (ed.), *On Security* (NY: Columbia University Press, 1995): 46-86; Thierry Balzacq, "The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context," *European Journal of International Relations*, 11, no. 2 (2005): 171–201; Matt McDonald, "Securitization and the Construction of Security," *European Journal of International Relations*, 14, no. 4 (2008): 563–87.

³⁸ Buzan, Waever and Wilde, *Security*: 21; B. McSweeney, "Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School," *Review of International Studies*, 22 (1996): 81-93.

³⁹ Rita Floyd, "Can Securitization Theory be used in Normative Analysis? Towards a Just Securitization Theory," *Security Dialogue*, 42, no. 4-5 (2011): 427-439.

⁴⁰ Vuori, "Illocutionary Logics and Strands of Securitization," 65–99.

emotion (especially collective fear appraisals)⁴² into the analysis broadens the relation between securitisation and security doctrine with identity being a critical factor in securitization process.⁴³

The securitisation theory allows an understanding of why and how securitisation happens and the effects of this process on the politics of a state or community. The literature on ST mainly offers insight into state-centric and non-governmental actors' securitisation,⁴⁴ and is largely biased towards democratic political systems, especially in the European context, where security issues moved out of normal politics to avoid democratic procedures rather legitimizes extraordinary measures.⁴⁵ However, Vouri has studied the construction of security in the non-democratic political system for different political purposes including deterrent threats.⁴⁶

⁴¹ Roxanna Sjostedt, "The Discursive Origins of a Doctrine: Norms, Identity, and Securitization under Harry S. Truman and George W. Bush," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 3, no. 2 (2007): 233-254.

⁴² Eric Van Rythoven, "Learning to Feel, Learning to Fear? Emotions, Imaginaries, and Limits in the Politics of Securitization," *Security Dialogue*, 46, no. 5 (2015): 458-475.

⁴³ Jarrod Hayes, "Identity and Securitization in the Democratic Peace: The United States and the Divergence of Response to India and Iran's Nuclear Programs," *International Studies Quarterly*, 53, no. 4, (2009): 977-999.

⁴⁴ Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and Powers*, 71; Jef Huysmans, "The European Union and the Securitization of Migration," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 38, no. 5 (2000): 751-777; Claire Wilkinson, "The Copenhagen School on tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is Securitization Theory Useable outside Europe?" *Security Dialogue*, 38, no. 1 (2007): 5-25; Mely Caballero-Anthony, "Non-traditional Security and Infectious Diseases in ASEAN: Going Beyond the Rhetoric of Securitization to Deeper Institutionalization," *Pacific Review*, 21, no. 4 (2008): 507-525; Jocelyn Vaughan, "The Unlikely Securitizer: Humanitarian Organizations and the Securitization of Indistinctiveness," *Security Dialogue*, 40, no. 3 (2009): 263-285; Tine Hanrieder, and Christian Kreuder-Sonnen, "WHO Decides on the Exception? Securitization and Emergency Governance in Global Health," *Security Dialogue*, 45, no. 4 (2014): 331-348; Gabi Schlag, "Securitization Theory and the Evolution of NATO," in Mark Webber and Adrian Hyde-Price (eds), *Theorising NATO: New Perspectives on the Atlantic Alliance* (NY: Routledge, 2016): 161-182.

⁴⁵ Wæver, "Securitization and Desecuritization," 46-86; Balzacq, "The Three Faces of Securitization," 171-201; Juha A. Vuori, "Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization: Applying the Theory of Securitization to the Study of Non-Democratic Political Orders," *European Journal of International Relations*, 14, no. 1 (2008): 65-99.

⁴⁶ Vuori, "Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization."

Besides Vuori, Berling⁴⁷ and Lupovici⁴⁸ have made notable contribution towards the study of the relation between securitisation and deterrence. This research builds on these studies to present a framework considering the emergence of new and fluid challenges/threats and emerging disruptive technologies in post-Cold War as a precipitating event or disruption threatening normal deterrence practices. Hence, there is a need to appreciate the adoption and institutionalisation of deterrence strategies in response to threats and challenges.⁴⁹ Therefore, this framework further reasons that in order to respond to this event or disruption, deterrence undergoes three-dimensional securitisation by nuclear-armed states across time and space involving a wider audience. The audience here comprises domestic, adversary, or target audience and international audience, including other nuclear-armed states. Here, the securitising actor is a nuclear-armed state; the referent object is new entities and technologies that are threatening. Another referent object is deterrence, which, as a security policy is threatened, the audience includes societies, industries, and other nuclear-armed states, and the context is post-Cold War.

The process of securitisation is initiated or triggered by a precipitating event or disruption in the external environment, such as pandemic, immigration etc.⁵⁰ The existentiality of threat is defined and interpreted through speech act, which is then subject to securitization to build inter-subjective understanding that calls for an urgent and exceptional response.⁵¹ The speech act is an important element that works around securitising actor, the language signifying a securitising move and the history associated with the threat.⁵² Regardless of the significance of speech act, the securitising actor cannot excessively rely on semantics of threat instead needs to engage with what role culture, norms, contextual

⁴⁷ Trine V. Berling, "Science and Securitization: Objectivation, the Authority of the Speaker and Mobilization of Scientific Facts," *Security Dialogue*, 42, no. 4-5 (2011): 385-397.

⁴⁸ Amir Lupovici, "Towards a Securitization Theory of Deterrence," *International Studies Quarterly*, 63, no. 1 (2019): 177-186.

⁴⁹ Amir Lupovici, "Securitization Climax: Putting the Iranian Nuclear Project at the Top of the Israeli Public Agenda (2009-2012)," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 12, no. 3 (2016): 413-432.

⁵⁰ Lousie Bengtsson and Mark Rhinard, "Securitisation Across Borders: The Case of 'Health Security' Cooperation in the European Union," *West European Politics*, 42, no. 2 (2019): pp. 346-368.

⁵¹ Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and Powers*, 491; Wæver, "Securitization and Desecuritization": 55.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 32-33; Floyd, *Security and the Environment*: 13.

factors, power relations, identity and audience play in securitisation.⁵³ Nonetheless, the rhetoric is an important feature of securitization that a securitising actor uses to take an issue out of “normal politics”,⁵⁴ however, for speech act, it is important to engage with practical policy.⁵⁵ Together, this will allow the securitising actor to give sufficient salience to threat for audience’s endorsement.⁵⁶

The audience’s endorsement allows the threat to permeate deeply and widely and authorizes an actor to use necessary resources to prepare a response. For an issue to be securitised, it is important to have an audience accept it “as such”,⁵⁷ which requires political interaction and bargaining between actor(s) and audience to reach an agreement on what constitutes a threat.⁵⁸ In this way, an active audience not only helps explain policy choices but also provides legitimacy.⁵⁹ The entanglement of actor and audience also allows the audience to demand securitisation, but it is the state that authorizes the securitisation process through a common language, meaning and policies. The actor and audience in deterrence securitisation are entangled; this mitigates the concern that actor (state) has access to resources that places it in an advantageous position over the audience (public, interest groups), who tend to be more constrained in political mobilisation.

In the post-Cold War, the status-quo of threat, deterrence was based upon, dramatically changed with the conspicuous absence of threat (former Soviet Union), leading to nuclear deterrence off the security agenda; hence de-securitisation of deterrence occurred. This is evident from nuclear reductions by nuclear-armed states and arms control negotiations. However, the precipitating event is the gradual emergence of

⁵³ Williams, “Words, Images, Enemies”: 511-531; McDonald, “Securitization and the Construction of Security,” 563-587; Lene Hansen, “The Little Mermaid’s Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 29, no. 2 (2000): 285-306.

⁵⁴ Buzan, Wæver and Wilde, *Security*: 24-25; Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and Power*: 491.

⁵⁵ Rita Floyd, “Extraordinary or Ordinary Emergency Measures: What, and Who, Defines the “Success” of Securitization,” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 29, no. 2 (2016): 684.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 52-54.; Adam Cote, “Agents without Agency: Assessing the Role of the Audience in Securitization Theory,” *Security Dialogue*, 47, no. 6 (2016): 541-558.

⁵⁷ Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, *Security*, 25.

⁵⁸ Wæver cited in Roe, Paul, “Is Securitization a “Negative” Concept? Revisiting the Normative Debate over Normal versus Extraordinary Politics,” *Security Dialogue*, 43, no. 3 (2012): 255.

⁵⁹ Balzacq, Leonard & Ruzicka, “‘Securitization’ Revisited,” 494-531.

fluid threats such as non-state actors, rogue states, and challenges such as new nuclear-armed states, innovative deterrent postures and emerging disruptive technologies that blur lines between conventional and nuclear deterrence or disruption in the external environment. The new threats and challenges also challenged the collective identity of nuclear deterrence of states and norms governing interactions among nuclear-armed states and between nuclear-armed states and non-nuclear-armed entities; hence triggered re-securitisation by upgrading deterrence to extraordinary politics followed by widening securitisation of deterrence. The existing approaches of nuclear-armed states towards deterrence imply a conviction that the world at large, and nuclear-armed states in particular, is facing a combination of existential security threats and challenges in response to which extraordinary measures are being carried out.

Re-securitisation might be easier than securitisation because the grammar of speech act is already there that can help initiate securitisation move and engage the audience without resistance;⁶⁰ however, it could still face some strains from earlier established rules and norms. New realities that encourage re-securitisation could be more challenging and demanding. In case of re-securitisation of deterrence, existing norms of nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear taboo, and dis-entanglement must be compromised. This is evident from the emergence of new nuclear-armed states (India, Pakistan, North Korea) and the developments of improved counterforce capabilities, offensive and defensive non-nuclear capabilities as well as asymmetric options that challenged Cold War relics of deterrence such as survivability, dis-entanglement and counter-value targeting. The development of permeable EDT further raised the ante for nuclear deterrence via integrating conventional, strategic and non-nuclear strategic weapons into the security calculus. The blur between conventional and nuclear deterrence and the EDT widens the securitisation of deterrence because nuclear-armed states rely on industrial (military and non-military) and societal resilience to prepare a response.

Moreover, the discussion on the audience in deterrence securitization relates to credibility. The issue of credibility is key in deterrence. This refers to one's ability to convince a challenger or adversary about the certainty of retaliation if the challenger or adversary refuses to follow the deterrent threat. There are different ways, such as improved second-strike capability, risk of uncontrolled escalation, controlled escalation, and uncertainty-based force posture through which a state can signal its deterrent credibility to make its challenger/adversary

⁶⁰ Juha A. Vuori, "A Timely Prophet? The Doomsday Clock as a Visualization of Securitization Moves with a Global Referent Object," *Security Dialogue*, 41, no. 3 (2010): 259.

believe. Like Vuori,⁶¹ the audience is a potential challenger or adversary. Besides convincing challenger/adversary (first-order audience), a state needs to make an international system including nuclear- and non-nuclear-armed states (second-order audience) believe in the credibility of one's control over its conventional and nuclear deterrent.⁶² Furthermore, the credibility of retaliatory threats depends upon the willingness of the deterrent to sustain momentous costs/damage and ability to legitimize deterrent threats among the domestic audience.⁶³ Here, the engagement with foreign policy, society and industry, and military modernization is central in appealing to the domestic audience and building an intersubjective understanding that is both deep and wider about the existence and nature of the existential threat and the state's response. The depth and width of this inter-subjective understanding allow the actor to carry out exceptional measures that would help take deterrence out from its traditional normal practices to an extraordinary level and facilitate its sustainability of deterrence at that extraordinary level.

Three-Dimensional Securitisation of Deterrence:

The emerging and disruptive technologies (EDT) have brought nuclear-armed states to an inflection point where their deterrence practice needs a concavity change. The EDT is an entourage of technologies including artificial intelligence (AI), semi-autonomous and autonomous machines such as unmanned aerial/underwater vehicles, hypersonic vehicles, Internet of Things involving integrated information systems, cyber operations, advanced telecommunication networks such as fifth-generation (5G) technology and quantum computing. Besides weapons capability and technology, deterrence depends on the threat's credibility, leaders/states' perceptions, and will that are affected by the autonomous nature, speed, precision and co-mingling of assets, and targets of EDT. The following table highlights emerging technologies with their potential impact on civil and military assets.

⁶¹ Vuori, "Illocutionary Logics and Strands of Securitization," 81–85.

⁶² Ibid., 81; Buzan, Wæver and Wilde, *Security*, 30; Lupovici, "Towards a Securitization Theory of Deterrence," 177-186; Ole Wæver, "The Theory Act: Responsibility and Exactitude as Seen from Securitization," *International Relations*, 29, no. 1 (2015): 122–23.

⁶³ Cote, "Agents without Agency," 546; Lupovici, "Towards a Securitization Theory of Deterrence," 177-186.

**Table 1: Impacts of Emerging & Disruptive Technologies
on Civil and Military Assets**

Emerging & Disruptive Technologies	Impact
Semi- or fully- automated systems	<p>Includes robotics, UAVs, swarms, lethal autonomous weapon systems etc. Can be used:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Target Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities • For data acquisition & processing, exploring alternative courses of action • Affect operational strategy • Carry out precision strikes <p>Augment cyberwarfare and electronic warfare operations</p>
Hypersonic vehicles	<p>Hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) and Hypersonic cruise missiles (HCMs) are capable of rapidly targeting:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Time-critical targets • Missile defense systems • Prevent a decapitating strike
Quantum technology	<p>(Although at experimental stage) involves advanced computing, sending and communication technologies could target military communications Attack military cryptography, inertial navigation systems</p>
Cyber space weapons & directed energy weapons	<p>Cyber capabilities, laser weapons and high-powered microwave weapons can impact military & civilian sectors Capable of targeting:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Space installations including satellites • Navigation systems • Missile defence systems • Civilian & military Communications • IoT devices • Smart cities operations • Critical infrastructure such as

	banking, power grids, information transmission systems etc <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UAVs & UUVs Sensor-based infrastructures
Information technologies	Distort adversary's perception or beliefs through deep fakes, spoofing etc Involve deception and concealment operations to target adversary's societal cohesion and resilience Target national will and resolve during crisis

Source: Compiled by the Author.

These technologies centred on the use/manipulation of information, infiltration, speed, entanglement and precision capable of un-disciplining deterrence out of its traditional security/defence school to open up for integration of other disciplines/sectors of national power to prepare a three-stage deterrent posture.

Fusion with Foreign Policy

The absence of strategic threat like the former Soviet Union liberated the deterrents of de-jure nuclear-armed states from the shackles of bipolarity, followed by reductions in strategic weapons, arms control negotiations, and augmented nuclear non-proliferation efforts.⁶⁴ This de-securitised deterrence for a while; however, with the emergence of fluid threats and technological challenges, the foreign policy started leading defence reviews. Furthermore, the entanglement of symmetric and asymmetric threats in post-Cold War requires cooperation in deterrence through alliances and partnerships among states, as envisaged in collective-actor or pivotal deterrence, to promote general welfare.⁶⁵ However, this collective-actor decision-making regarding deterrence could

⁶⁴ French White Paper on Defence 1994, <http://www.livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/pdf/le-livre-blanc-sur-la-defense-1994.pdf>; US Nuclear Posture Review 1994, <http://missilethreat.csis.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/1994-NPR-News-Release-Slides-Clinton.pdf>; Britain, *Statement on the Defence Estimates 1995: Stable Forces in Strong Britain*, (London: HMSO) https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/273324/2800.pdf; A. A. Pikayev, *The Rise and Fall of START II: The Russian View*, CEIP Research Report (1999) https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep12997#metadata_info_tab_contents

⁶⁵ For a discussion on deterrence in post-Cold War see Patrick M. Morgan, "The State of Deterrence in International Politics Today," *Contemporary Security Policy*, 33, no. 1 (2012): 85-107.

work in the case of NATO and other alliances and partnerships; nonetheless, nuclear-armed states such as France, India, Pakistan and North Korea maintain their strategic autonomy. Regardless of the strategic autonomy, the fusion of foreign policy baseline with strategic deterrence posture is important (as evident from their national security policies and postures) primarily because of the nature of threats and responses needed to address those threats in today's world.

Among nuclear-armed states, the US strongly believes in partnerships and close cooperation with allies to deter asymmetric threats; however, its allies have diverse beliefs in the utility of alliances and rely on alliances to hedge against serious threats. Likewise, Britain's deterrent posture is dovetailed with the foreign policy baseline.⁶⁶ In contrast, France emphasizes maintaining its autonomy to avoid alliances' complex and lengthy decision-making as well as cooperating in small groups below the EU and NATO to fight against asymmetric threats.⁶⁷ This demonstrates the breaking of deterrent posture from its traditional rules and suspension of standard practices. At the alliance level, the recursive interaction among member-states led to the strategic reorientation of NATO post-2014 Ukrainian crisis and Russian invasion in 2022,⁶⁸ the building of AUKUS to counter China, and the Quadrilateral Security

⁶⁶ For instance, from 1997 onwards Britain conducted foreign policy-led defence reviews aimed at an assessment of Britain's national interests, overseas commitments and structure and deployment of armed forces to achieve those interests and commitments with an emphasis on continued possession of nuclear deterrence necessary for Britain's role and security against uncertainties in post-Cold War. The focus on foreign policy to deter is explicit in 2021 Britain's Integrated Review. Cabinet Office, "Global Britain in a Competitive Age: the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, July 2021. <https://www.gov.uk>.

⁶⁷ Government of France, "Defence and National Security Strategic Review 2017," *DSN*, 2017, <https://www.dsn.gob.es/sites/dsn/files/2017%20France%20Strategic%20Review.pdf>

⁶⁸ The NATO's attitude towards its priorities changed in post-2014 environment that is characterized as "the most complex and unpredictable security environment since the end of the Cold War. The latest NATO's Strategic Concept 2022 emphasized upon a mixed and integrated deterrence posture. NATO, "NATO: Ready for the Future, Adapting the Alliance (2018-2019)," 2018-19. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_11/20191129_191129-adaptation_2018_2019_en.pdf; NATO, "NATO Strategic Concept 2022." June 29, 2022, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf

Dialogue to intensify economic and security ties against China.⁶⁹ On the other hand, Russia impresses upon lonely yet independent Russia with few allies and partners (notably India and China),⁷⁰ while China emphasizes upon peaceful co-existence and fostering Shanghai Cooperation Council and the ASEAN.⁷¹ The emphasis on alliances and partnerships demonstrates securitization by a collective actor that pushed deterrence towards the extraordinary phase of politics.

Societal and Industrial Support

With the emergence of new threats, from the mid-1990s onwards, the modernization programmes started in de-jure nuclear-armed states, evident from their official documents, which helped amplify the salience of nuclear weapons and facilitate the re-securitisation and wider-securitisation of deterrence. In order to justify the criticism (domestic and international) and, simultaneously, to gain endorsement from the audience (domestic and external), the nuclear-armed states used speech acts such as “sub-strategic,” “strict sufficiency,” “minimum deterrence,” “cross-domain deterrence,” “nuclear brinkmanship,” “full-spectrum deterrence,” “integrated deterrence.”

The audience approval can discern from political, societal, and industrial commitment within nuclear-armed states. For instance, the French deterrent is based on principles of sufficiency that endured cohabitation as well as changed international security environment.⁷² Likewise, the deterrents of China and Pakistan also enjoy broad-based bureaucratic influence and political support and commitment regardless of their political systems respectively;⁷³ while Russian military analysts

⁶⁹ Patrick Wintour, “What is the Aukus Alliance and What are its Implications?” *The Guardian*, September 16, 2021, <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2021/sep/16/what-is-the-aukus-alliance-and-what-are-its-implications>; Ed Griffith & Moises de Souza, “Quad Heralds New Era of Micro Alliances Against China,” *Asia Times*, June 2, 2022, <https://asiatimes.com/2022/06/quad-heralds-new-era-of-micro-alliances-against-china/>.

⁷⁰ Julian Cooper, “Russia’s Updated National Security Strategy,” *Russian Studies Series* 2/21, July 19, 2021, <https://www.ndc.nato.int/research/research.php?icode=704>.

⁷¹ The People’s Republic of China, *China’s National Defence in the New Era*, July 2019, https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html

⁷² Bruno Tertrais, “The Last to Disarm? The Future of France’s Nuclear Weapons,” *Nonproliferation Review*, 14, no. 2 (2007): 258.

⁷³ Eric Heginbotham and et. al., *China’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrent*, RAND Research Report RR-1628-AF, 2017; 97-120; A. Z. Hilali, “Pakistan’s Nuclear

emphasize upon firm political control over the military force and its rules of engagement.⁷⁴ Moreover, the anti-hegemonic and anti-imperialist remained a stable *raison detre* of French and Chinese strategic deterrent throughout⁷⁵ that aided in accumulating audience's approval. Furthermore, the development of deterrents in the US and the UK faced domestic criticism and compromises.⁷⁶ British modernization of like-for-like Trident replacement programme and abandoning the policy of decreasing overall nuclear arsenal in the *2021 Integrated Review* effectively addressed operational, financial and political resistance to deterrent based on increased salience of nuclear weapons.⁷⁷

Besides expanding their defence budgets, the nuclear-armed states are mobilising other sectors and spheres of national power, including society and scientific industry, allowing these sectors to socialize and build a consensual view about threat perception and response that facilitates building a strong and resilient audience endorsement of their deterrent postures. For instance, the French strategic posture is based on a comprehensive approach that incorporates the entire state apparatus from armed forces, civil defence, cyber defence, intelligence, and internal security forces to transportation, energy, and other resources of local

Deterrence: Political and Strategic Dimensions," *PERCEPTIONS: Journal of International Affairs*, 7, no. 4 (2002).

⁷⁴ Anya L. Fink, "The Evolving Russian Concept of Strategic Deterrence," *Arms Control Today*, 47, no. 6 (July/Aug 2017): 16.

⁷⁵ In case of China, the concept of People's war indicates integration of political, societal, industrial and military power to pursue China's national security that concurs with Beijing's foreign policy-led peace approach, (France 2013, 19-45; Chang 2022) *French White Paper on Defence 1994*: 56-57; *French White Paper on Defence and National Security, 2013*, http://www.livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/pdf/the_white_paper_defence_2013.pdf; Vincent K. L. Chang, "China's New Historical Statecraft: Reviving the Second World War for National Rejuvenation," *International Affairs* 98, no. 3 (2022): 1053-1069.

⁷⁶ The UK's minimum credible deterrence based on fewer warheads, as stipulated in the 1998 *Strategic Defence Review*, "backed by a firm commitment to arms control" helps address criticism on country's nuclear deterrent. Government of Britain, "The 1998 Strategic Defence Review," *House of Commons Library, 1998*, para 8 and 55. Likewise, the Biden Administration cancelled submarine-launched nuclear cruise missile programme as well as retired gravity bomb to pacify critics, to an extent, on country's arms control commitments. Julian Borger, "Biden to Scrap Trump Missile Project but Critics Attack US 'Nuclear Overkill'," *The Guardian*, 27 October 2022, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/27/biden-trump-missile-nuclear-posture-review>.

⁷⁷ Nick Ritchie, "Replacing Trident: Britain, America and Nuclear Weapons," *Contemporary Security Policy* 28, no. 2 (2007): 384-406.

authorities.⁷⁸ Likewise, Britain's full-spectrum deterrence incorporates diplomatic, military, economic, intelligence, cyber, legal and strategic communications' means to sustain denial posture.⁷⁹ Similarly, the US 2022 National Defence Strategy aims at "working seamlessly across warfighting domains, theatres, the spectrum of conflict, all instruments of U.S. national power" and "network of alliances and partnerships" to ensure security against a broad spectrum of threats.⁸⁰ Even China uses multiple sectors of national power, besides the military, including economic assertiveness, diplomatic influence, and information management to uphold its deterrence.⁸¹ Comparatively, Russia further broadened the scope of its national security beyond socio-economic development by declaring the protection of "the traditional spiritual and moral foundations of Russian society" a priority.⁸² In this way, nuclear-armed states intend to build societies and industrial base that are more generative during peacetime as well as capable of adapting and growing in response to disruption. The linking of almost all elements of national power to deterrent posture demonstrates that deterrence dynamics have left their conventional practices and political ground to enter into extraordinary high politics.

Military Modernization

The new threats and technological challenges in post-Cold War require nuclear-armed states to modernize their deterrent by improving their strategic arsenal's survivability, reliability, penetrability, and safety and incorporating new emerging and disruptive technologies (EDT) into deterrent mix. The new technological attributes of speed, precision, autonomy, and entanglement undermined the deterrent's key pillars of survivability (hardening, concealment, and redundancy). The Cold War deterrence relied upon and provided states with flexible options and improved strike capabilities. States living under nuclear threat become accustomed to dangers and uncertainties therefore for such actors uncertainties inherent in deterrence might not be a deterrent rather adversary's war-fighting capabilities and flexible options that new

⁷⁸ French White Paper on Defence and National Security 2013: 67-123.

⁷⁹ Office, "Global Britain in a Competitive Age."

⁸⁰ US National Defence Strategy 2022, <https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF>.

⁸¹ George Perkovich, "Engaging China on Strategic Stability and Mutual Vulnerability," CEIP Paper, October 12, 2022. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/10/12/engaging-china-on-strategic-stability-and-mutual-vulnerability-pub-88142>.

⁸² Decree of the President of the Russian Federation On the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation, July 2, 2021. <http://actual.pravo.gov.ru/>

technologies offer could be more convincing.⁸³

In the post-Cold War, a nuclear-armed state must address the diminishing invulnerability of nuclear forces and keep offering risks to potential attackers to retain the deterrent status of its nuclear force. This indicates integration at two levels: 1) integration of conventional, non-nuclear, and nuclear forces and new technologies into the deterrent posture,⁸⁴ and 2) integration of increased salience of nuclear weapons and competition into deterrence. The integration of EDT (conventional and non-nuclear) into deterrence has entangled the expertise and resources of military and civilian/private sectors at every level. In this way, the same technological knowledge is put to use in both sectors; thus, more resources are available for war – a case for widening securitization of deterrence. Alongside risks, the integration would increase the significance of conventional/non-nuclear strategic weapons in the mix and allows states to tailor deterrence strategies for different contingencies.⁸⁵

The EDT enhanced the sensitivity of deterrent posture to technology to a level where states, to strengthen deterrence, are eager to invest in whatever technology brings up. The new technologies offer improved accuracy, speed, autonomy, enhanced ambiguity, and precision that could reduce the yield and volume of nuclear force, potentially lower the threshold for escalation, encourage war fighting and coercive activities, incentivise first-strike, provide perfect kill tendencies and mitigate the problem of fratricide.⁸⁶ These attributes would undoubtedly strengthen deterrence. However, deploying these technologies, for instance, machines wide and across different battlefields by all

⁸³ The US prompt global strike (GPS) could provide “Washington to conduct a pre-emptive strike against Beijing without fear of retaliation” that “cuts to the heart of the concept that Washington seeks primacy at Beijing’s expense.” ; Lora Saalman, “Prompt Global Strike: China and the Spear,” Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, April 2014: 3, <https://apcss.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/>

⁸⁴ Gen John Hyten, commander of the US Strategic Command, noted, “We have adversaries that are looking at integrating nuclear, conventional, space and cyber, all as part of a strategic deterrent.”; Cheryl Pellerin, “STRATCOM Commander Describes Challenges of 21st Century Deterrence,” *DOD News*, 17 August 2017, <https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1281946/>

⁸⁵ The 2018 NPR integrates nuclear deterrence strategies and operations with conventional strategies and operations, which allows civilian policy makers and military commanders to tailor deterrence strategies for present challenges. Peters, Anderson & Menke, “Deterrence in the 21st Century,” : 14-43.

⁸⁶ James M. Acton, “Escalation through Entanglement: How the Vulnerability of Command-and-Control Systems Raises the Risks of an Inadvertent Nuclear War,” *International Security*, 43, no.1 (2018): 56-99, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00320.

crisis/conflict participants could reduce the attractiveness of their advantages. Moreover, machines, for example, can then solve the problem of commitment; however, the chances of accidental launches increase. Furthermore, the ambiguity associated with entanglement or comingling of strategic and non-strategic (including the EDT) assets is challenging as it could exacerbate the risks of unintentional and/or uncontrolled escalation.⁸⁷ The challenge becomes further formidable when there is a low nuclear threshold.

Therefore, military modernization and integrating the EDT into deterrence mix is part of re-securitisation of deterrence in post-Cold War, and facilitated wider securitisation of deterrence. Evident from defence and security white papers of nuclear-armed states, geopolitical rivalry instead of stalemate is an enduring characteristic of international system therefore acquisition of technology for security would continue. The nuclear weapons that are secure today might not remain invulnerable in future hence nuclear-armed states have a good reason to engage in competitive technological acquisition.⁸⁸

Conclusion

This research demonstrates that deterrence, as a concept and practice, has entered into a high and extraordinary phase of politics. The study of deterrence through the lens of securitisation theory explains the transition of deterrence in post-Cold War from normal politics of de-securitisation characterized by arms reductions and arms control negotiations and agreements to the realm of high end of security where the nuclear-armed states, along with new nuclear-armed states, appear to side-step democratic practices in discourse and procedure resulting in re-securitisation and widen-securitisation of deterrence. The post-Cold War security environment played a key role in this process. The bipolarity of the Cold War that provided a coign of vantage to nuclear deterrence among security discourse and policies shattered with the emergence of multi-polarity, fluid threats and new innovative and disruptive technologies after the disintegration of the former Soviet Union. This pushed nuclear-armed states to respond with an approach that aligns all elements of national power including foreign policy, societal and industrial

⁸⁷ The threat of EDT to nuclear infrastructure could risk escalation of a non-nuclear conflict among great powers to global nuclear crisis and war.

⁸⁸ As John J. Mearsheimer noted about the Cold War competition: "The continuation of the arms race was not misguided, even though nuclear superiority remained an elusive goal. In fact, it made good strategic sense for the United States and the Soviet Union to compete vigorously in the nuclear realm, because military technology tends to develop rapidly and in unforeseen ways," Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*: 231.

resilience, and military modernization together to develop a deterrent posture. Two caveats are important with this kind of securitization of deterrence. One, this wider securitization allows deterrence to permeate deeper and wider into society; however, this posture is based on high and rapid risk of escalation and competitive impulse ensuing arms race. It is also possible that deterrence based on high and rapid risk of escalation could convince nuclear-armed states to engage in arms control initiatives but the trajectory of states developing their weapons and doctrines has put such a possibility in limbo. Two, the real test for the effectiveness of extraordinary deterrent posture of nuclear-armed states does not lie in their integration, investments and modernization plans that has widened and deepened securitisation rather in their consistency of maintaining such a posture.

THE DECOLONIAL TURN: NEW CHALLENGES TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS TRADITIONS

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Abstract

International Relations emerged as a discipline in the aftermath of World War I to avert destructive events through the systemic study of interstate relations. The mainstream IR reflected Eurocentric discourse that viewed the world from the prism of the western colonial powers. This paper reviews relevant literature to examine the decolonial turn in IR and its challenges to established traditions of the discipline. It is a critical reflection of a scholar from the South trying to understand Eurocentricity in a discipline that claims to be international. The research concludes that the decolonial turn in IR is challenging the basic foundations of the discipline and underscores the need for a change in the parameters of discussion around the principles and assumptions underlying the knowledge production system of the IR discipline.

Keywords: *Colonial Matrix of Power, Decolonial Thinking, Coloniality of Knowledge, Eurocentrism*

Introduction

A turn within an academic discipline is a metaphor for a cognitive disturbance within the discipline's traditional framework. It re-evaluates the traditions of the field by providing new perspectives. Due to their novel method of self-reflection, certain academic turns receive more acceptance than others. The decolonial turn is a widespread phenomenon that calls for the decolonization of university institutions and cultures, including the curriculum.¹ It emphasizes that IR originated in the

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¹ Jo-Anne Vorster and Lynn Quinn, "The "Decolonial Turn": What Does it Mean for Academic Staff Development," *Education as Change* Volume 21, Number. 1 (2017): 32.

global North and hardly talks about the global south contribution. As a corollary, local non-Western knowledge, despite its relevance and applicability, does not find a place in the curriculum because the near-universal embrace of Western knowledge generates a perception of “a hierarchy of superior and inferior knowledge, by extension, of superior and inferior individuals.”² The decolonial turn does not create new knowledge power structures but establishes a trans-epistemological discourse between Northern and Southern epistemologies.³

IR as a discipline has undergone introspection since the advent of the ‘Critical Turn’.⁴ The decolonial turn identifies ‘Eurocentrism’ as an outcome of imperialism and colonialism as the foundational base of the discipline. Decolonialists challenged the discipline’s dominant narratives, theoretical underpinnings, and historical origins that originally was rooted in power and domination. The turn purports that IR origins do not lie in an idyllic desire to prevent future wars and encourage global peace by systematically studying international politics. Instead, the discipline was conceived to manage the issue of race relations between the ‘White’ and the ‘Coloured races’, which was the world’s most significant problem in the early 20th century.⁵ They accused the mainstream IR scholarship for the promotion of systematic international relations scholarship predated World War-1 to preserve imperialism and racial hierarchies in international politics.⁶ The decolonial thinkers believe that rationalist turn in IR only worked to maintain the Western hegemony and imperialism and had paid no or less to the race and suppression issues in the discipline.

The paper is structured into three interconnected parts, followed by logical appropriateness. It begins with a discussion of decolonial thinking and significant concepts that form the backbone and underlie the foundational claims of decolonial perspectives. The turn contests the non-neutral character of Eurocentric political and social explanation and views the European colonial and imperial empires as the central issue. The turn, distinct from other critical approaches that tend to remain within the Eurocentric paradigm, endeavours to shift the discipline’s locus of enunciation away from Europe by unveiling the imperial and colonial legacies permeated in the discipline’s traditional concepts, theories, and

² Ramón Grosfoguel, “The Epistemic Decolonial Turn: Beyond Political-Economy Paradigms,” *Cultural Studies* 21, no. 2-3 (2007): 214.

³ Claire Gallien, “A Decolonial Turn in the Humanities,” *Alif: Journal of Comparative Poetics* 40 (2020): 28–58.

⁴ Anthony Leysens, “The ‘Critical Turn’ in International Relations,” In the *Critical Theory of Robert W. Cox* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 89–114.

⁵ Lord Lugard, “Colonial Administration,” *Economica* 41 (1933): 249.

⁶ David E. Long and Brian C. Schmidt, ed. *Imperialism and Internationalism In the Discipline of International Relations* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005), 6.

language of inquiry. Following the elaboration of the decolonial turn in IR, the article highlights the challenges posed by the decennial turn to the established traditions of the discipline. They criticize and contest the 'Eurocentrism' and the prevailing hegemonic discipline's 'Westphalian narrative'. The paper concludes that the decolonial turn in IR has not only challenged the discipline's foundational essence by augmenting with a new direction, a step towards liberation.

Decolonial Thinking

Decolonial thinkers criticise Western-centric knowledge rather than explaining the phenomenon. This leads to thinking that finds traces of imperialism and colonialism in the modern world. Decolonial thinking is a topical subject that emerged within the Modernity/Coloniality/Decoloniality (MCD) group - a combined initiative of Latin American intellectuals, having a history of around 200 years and since last decade, studied in the Anglo-American university. The Colonial Matrix of Power (CMP) or Coloniality explains the pervasiveness of colonialism's enduring control patterns that how it has impacted the culture, labour, intersubjective connections, and knowledge production of the oppressed colonized people.⁷ Further, the pushing factor of its advancement was the response to the Western influence in the political and economic systems of newly independent nations that came into being after WW II due to the decolonization drive.⁸

Quijano conceptualized the CMP while participating in the South American dependence theory discussion⁹ during the 1960s-1970s.¹⁰ While Mignolo conceptualized the CMP as the masked effects or the uglier side of

⁷ Nelson Maldonado-Torres, "On the Coloniality of Being: Contributions to the Development of a Concept," *Cultural Studies* 21, no. 2-3 (2007):243.

⁸ Ramón Grosfoguel, "The Epistemic Decolonial Turn: Beyond Political-Economy Paradigms," *Cultural Studies* 21, no. 2-3 (2007): 219.

⁹ The dependency theory purports that developing nations in the Third World, notably South America, were forced to become structurally reliant within a global centre-periphery logic. It showed how underdevelopment in Latin America was accomplished by exploiting their natural resources, to benefit the Western world. Dependency theory served as the foundation for the idea of coloniality in this context. Noah De Lissovoy, and ROF Bailón, "Coloniality: Key Dimensions and Critical Implications," in *Keywords in Radical Philosophy and Education - Common Concepts for Contemporary Movements* (2019), 85-86.

¹⁰ Walter D. Mignolo, "Delinking: The Rhetoric of Modernity, the Logic of Coloniality and the Grammar of De-Coloniality," *Cultural studies* 21, no. 2-3 (2007): 449-514.

modernity that reinforced European or Western Philosophy.¹¹ To them, to understand the decolonial turn needs to understand the 'decolonial attitude'; a willingness to take multiple perspectives, especially of those whose very identity of being has been put into question and whose contributions are dismissed as trivial or irrelevant.¹² Additionally, to comprehend decolonialism, we need to understand the linkages between privilege and oppression.¹³

Coloniality, according to Schöpf, is the subjugation of subordinates' culture, political, and economic domains.¹⁴ They view the 'Eurocentric' knowledge production as the promotion of domination on the one hand, and exploitation based on racial, sexual, gender, and socioeconomic status on the other hand, having its roots in modernity and colonialism. Quijano appealed to historical and social codes to identify the negative effects of modernity. Decolonial thinking is a broad spectrum of intellectual work and analytic effort to comprehend and understand the logic of coloniality entrenched in the philosophy of Latin America, dependency theory, the theology of liberation, critical theory, and the post-positivist approaches such as post-structuralism, post-colonialism, and feminism who explore new dimensions to the production of knowledge.¹⁵

The decolonial thinkers intellectually converge on the problematization of coloniality combined with a set of shared epistemic assumptions. It discerns Western hegemony in the socio-economic domain, production of knowledge, and intellectual thought and how it shaped their colonial/racial experience. Cetshwayo states that coloniality has permeated every aspect of social life, where the world has been mapped and divided into limits and borders, and people's mobility has been restricted. Identities and belonging have been politicized, in which outsiders and insiders have become permanent adversaries across the world.¹⁶ CMP/coloniality has three strands: coloniality of 'power',

¹¹ Walter D. Mignolo, *The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization* (United States: University of Michigan Press, 2003), 3 & 9.

¹² Nelson Maldonado-Torres, "On the Coloniality of Being: Contributions to the Development of a Concept," *Cultural studies* 21, no. 2-3 (2007), 262.

¹³ Catherine E. Walsh, "The Decolonial for - Resurgence, Shifts and Movements," in *On Decoloniality: Concepts, Analytics, Praxis* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2018), 17.

¹⁴ S. Caroline Schöpf, "The Coloniality of Global Knowledge Production: Theorizing the Mechanisms of Academic Dependency," *Social Transformations: Journal of the Global South* 8, no. 2 (2020): 12.

¹⁵ Walter D. Mignolo, and Arturo Escobar, eds. *Globalization and the Decolonial Option* (London and New York: Routledge, 2013)

¹⁶ Cetshwayo Zindabazwe Mabhena, "On the Colonial Matrix of Power," *The Sunday News*, August 6, 2017, <https://www.sundaynews.co.zw/on-the-colonial-matrix-of-power/>

'knowledge,' and 'being,' which are discernible in political structures, knowledge production, academic standards, contemporary literature, cultural tendencies, individuals' common sense, aspirations, etc.

Decolonial thinkers use the modernity/coloniality dyad - the master narrative of world history that masks the oppressive aspects of colonialism or modernity,¹⁷ to describe the control mechanisms to maintain hegemony following the advent of colonialism in 1492.¹⁸ The rhetoric purports that salvation, progress, civilization, modernization, development, democracy, and having more assets would lead to happiness and redemption. To colonialists, the discourse is self-serving as by considering it a collective good it allows them to conceal and repress what does not fit the imagination and desires. Further, it legitimizes oppressors' actions that guarantee the well-being and interests of Europeans to monopolize and universalize European/Western modes of thought, to exclude and exploit others through contemporary authority. Moreover, it assists in confronting issues common to all former European colonies.¹⁹

Coloniality of knowledge unveils the imperial and colonial legacies prevalent within academic scholarship and calls attention to the production, spread, and replication of Eurocentric knowledge at the global level.²⁰ Nurtured through CMP; these legacies are primarily epistemic, structural, and normative. Owing to its enduring implications, the coloniality of knowledge is the principal component of CMP that transforms colonial people into casualties of the coloniality of being. Coloniality of knowledge is the embedded distortions and biases in academic dominant knowledge production caused by the primacy of the

¹⁷ Walter D. Mignolo, "The Conceptual Triad - Modernity/Coloniality/Decoloniality," in *On Decoloniality: Concepts, Analytics, Praxis* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2018), 139.

¹⁸ Modernity and coloniality are distinct notions conjoined to form the modernity/coloniality dyad. The line in "modernity/coloniality" makes them mutually inclusive, like both sides of a coin. According to the concept, the rhetoric of modernity promotes Western civilisation by glorifying its victories while suppressing coloniality, the darker side of modernity. Walter D. Mignolo, and Madina V Tlostanova, "Theorizing From the Borders: Shifting to Geo-and Body-Politics of Knowledge," *European Journal of Social Theory* 9, no. 2 (2006): 208.

¹⁹ Walter D. Mignolo, "The Conceptual Triad - Modernity/Coloniality/Decoloniality."

²⁰ Walter D. Mignolo, *The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options* (United States: Duke University Press, 2011), 189.

West/Global north legacies.²¹ Coloniality of knowledge simultaneously operates on multiple fronts - first, it exterminates other forms of knowledge; second, it either subsumes or replaces the exterminated knowledge with Eurocentric knowledge; and lastly, it constructs Eurocentric knowledge as an authentic, unbiased knowledge system posing it as a civilizing project. In addition, this kind of knowledge ensures that all western atrocities remain cloaked, and all thoughts are shaped and remain convinced by its good intentions.²²

The concept of 'colonial or imperial difference' is crafted by proclaiming anything European as a superior and exemplary model to be followed while rendering others to a subservient status.²³ Thus, Western values, ethics, and norms act as a force of cognitive colonization of the global South,²⁴ realized through the knowledge paradigm that sanctions Western courses, the supremacy of English as the mode of learning, and the excessive desire for international rankings and Western certification.²⁵ The education paradigm, as per Grosfoguel, represents the intersection of coloniality and the epistemic ego-politics of knowledge.²⁶ Furthermore, it contributes to academic imperialism by privileging Western epistemology

²¹ Caroline M. Schöpf, "The Coloniality of Global Knowledge Production: Theorizing the Mechanisms of Academic Dependency," *Social Transformations: Journal of the Global South* 8, no. 2 (2020): 6.

²² Branwen Gruffydd Jones, "Introduction: International Relations, Eurocentrism, and Imperialism," In *Decolonizing International Relations*, ed. Branwen Gruffydd Jones (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2006)

²³ Ramón Grosfoguel, "World-Systems Analysis in the Context of Transmodernity, Border Thinking, and Global Coloniality," by Fernand Braudel Center, Research Foundation of State University of New York (2006): 167–87.


²⁴ Ramón Grosfoguel, "Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of Political-Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality," *Transmodernity: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World* 1, no. 1 (2011): 1–38.

²⁵ Walter D. Mignolo, "Globalisation and the Geopolitics of Knowledge the Role of Humanities in the Corporate University," in *The American-Style University At Large*, ed. Kathryn L. Kleypas, and James I (Maryland: McDougall Lexington Books, 2012); Ramón Grosfoguel, "The Structure of Knowledge in Westernized Universities: Epistemic Racism/sexism and the Four Genocides/epistemicides of the Long 16th Century," *Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge* (2013) : 73–90.

²⁶ Grosfoguel defines "ego-politics of knowledge" as the prejudice that promotes Westernized knowledge production as impartial, fair, and universal while relegating non-Western knowledge produced on the basis of socio-political location, lived experience, and social interactions as inferior and unscientific.; Ibid.

over other modes of knowing.²⁷ Coloniality of knowledge is discernible through its effects, as schematically laid out in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Salient Effects of the Coloniality of Knowledge



Source: Compiled by the Author

A hierarchy of knowledge is created by side-lining, suppressing, or invalidating other epistemes resulting in the erosion of the views from the global South.²⁸ The ‘rhetoric of modernity’ builds hierarchies, and its pervasiveness makes it difficult to imagine a society where epistemic diversity is acknowledged and valued,²⁹ what Gatsheni described as ‘epistemicide,’ ‘linguicide,’ ‘culturicide,’ and ‘alienation’.^{30,31} The geopolitics of knowledge describes the notion that information is anchored in a particular geopolitical environment from which it continues to disperse. While revealing the epistemological privilege of the West, the concept concurrently marginalizes and obscures other epistemes.³²

Recognizing the relationship between power, knowledge, and social identities, it discerns Western knowledge hegemony that relegates

²⁷ Walter D. Mignolo, “Globalisation and the Geopolitics of Knowledge, the Role of Humanities in the Corporate University,” In *The American-Style University at Large*, ed. Kathryn L. Kleypas, and James I. McDougall, (United States: Lexington Books, 2012):3 – 39.

²⁸ Lauri Jokinen, “Giving and Receiving, or Denying Knowledge? Aspects of Knowledge Production in Development Studies Seen Through a Perspective of Decoloniality,” diss, (Sweden: Lunds University, 2014), 1-44.

²⁹ Castro-Gómez Santiago, “The Missing Chapter of Empire,” *Cultural Studies* 21, no. 2-3 (2007): , 444.

³⁰ Epistemicide is the elimination of existing endogenous knowledge; linguicide is the decimation of surviving local languages and replacing them with foreign languages, and culturicide eradicates cultural practices and the formation of cultural imperialism. Finally, alienation is the removal of indigenous people, either in the physical or cognitive sense, from their territory.

³¹ Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “The Cognitive Empire, Politics of Knowledge and African Intellectual Productions: Reflections on Struggles for Epistemic Freedom and Resurgence of Decolonisation in the Twenty-First Century,” *Third World Quarterly* 42, no. 5 (2021): 5.

³² Walter D. Mignolo, *The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011), 129.

other forms of knowledge and thoughts as 'folklore'.³³ The geopolitics of knowledge prioritize Western knowledge systems as global and unquestionably applicable in all settings,³⁴ thereby historically allowing for the subjugation, subordination, and dismissal of other forms of frames, knowledge, topics, and thinkers.³⁵

Flowing the geopolitics of knowledge, academic or intellectual imperialism is the ascendancy or command of one group of individuals in their realm of thought by another group.³⁶ For example, it implies Western scholars' extraction of stories (raw data) from the formerly colonized regions and then assigning meanings to them without any participation of the locals.³⁷ It generates a tutelage presumption that Westerners know more about everything than other people, thus generating a consensus that proper understanding only originates from the West which keeps the global South dependent academically.³⁸ Also, this academic dependency keeps the South's mind captive - an uncreative, unoriginal, and imprisoned one that is alienated and oblivious to the critical issues of the local society.³⁹

Academically, the Epistemic violence originates from the hegemonic dismissal and erasing of non-European perspectives, specifically those formulated by the subaltern.⁴⁰ It erases the past and convinces the subalterns that they have nothing to offer the 'modern' world, so they must instinctively conform to the 'enlightened' colonialists, absorb their knowledge and viewpoints, and live on the periphery of their society as second-class citizens. This type of violence also legitimizes and

³³ Catherine Walsh, "Shifting the Geopolitics of Critical Knowledge: Decolonial Thought and Cultural Studies 'Others' in the Andes," *Cultural Studies* 21:2-3 (2007): 225.

³⁴ Riyad A. Shahjahan, and Clara Morgan, "Global Competition, Coloniality, and the Geopolitics of Knowledge in Higher Education," *British Journal of Sociology of Education* 37:1 (2016): 95.

³⁵ Catherine Walsh, "Shifting the Geopolitics of Critical Knowledge: Decolonial Thought and Cultural Studies 'Others' in the Andes," *Cultural Studies* 21:2-3 (2007): 224.

³⁶ Syed Hussein Alatas, "Intellectual Imperialism: Definition, Traits, and Problems," *Asian Journal of Social Science* 28, no. 1 (2000): 24.

³⁷ Caroline M. Schöpf, "The Coloniality of Global Knowledge Production: Theorizing the Mechanisms of Academic Dependency," *Social Transformations: Journal of the Global South* 8, no. 2 (2020): 9.

³⁸ Syed Farid Alatas, "Academic Dependency and the Global Division of Labour in the Social Sciences," *Current Sociology* 51, no. 6 (2003): 603.

³⁹ Syed Hussein, "Intellectual Imperialism: Definition, Traits, and Problems," *Asian Journal of Social Science* 28, no. 1 (2000): 37.

⁴⁰ Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" In *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, ed. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg, (Hampshire and London: Macmillan Education Ltd, 1988), 271-313.

enshrines practices of power⁴¹ known as the ‘zero-point epistemology’ or ‘zero-point hubris’, which claims to be universal and superior to other ways of knowing.⁴² Castro-Gómez explains it as – a moment when Europeans installed themselves above God as the sole arbiters of knowledge and truth, thereby achieving epistemological hegemony.⁴³ The Enlightenment’s replacement of ‘religious theology,’ and ‘Theo-politics of knowledge’ with secular ‘ego-logy and ego-politics of knowledge’ provides more support for the phenomenon.⁴⁴ The pervasiveness and ingress of the coloniality of knowledge can be ascertained by its success in persuading colonized people to think like those in the hegemonic locations.⁴⁵

Europe thus becomes a subject and object of inquiry as an architect and arbiter of the method and an epitome of progress. Europe’s theoretical formulations and analytical methods take the driving seat in providing explanation and interpretation, placing Eurocentric knowledge at the centre of social analysis. Europe’s political systems and cultural practices are the bearers of a universal reason, i.e. the enlightenment that maps out the ideal course of all human history. Quijano believes that Eurocentrism is created by the perspective of knowledge that produced intellectual conceptualization of modernity and knowledge that provided a strict account of the character of the universal standard of power: colonial/modern, capitalist, and Euro-centred.⁴⁶

Analytically separating the East and West, Eurocentrism portrays the West as the repository of purely virtuous and progressive properties sanctioning it to pioneer progressiveness in world politics and to civilize and/or eliminate the barbarians and savages living in the South.

It appeals to a timeless notion of global politics and economic progress, summed up by Chakrabarty by highlighting “first the West and then elsewhere” or Hobson as ‘first the West, then the Rest’.⁴⁷ Thus, Global

⁴¹ Savo Heleta, “Decolonisation of Higher Education: Dismantling Epistemic Violence and Eurocentrism in South Africa,” *Transformation in Higher Education* 1 (2016): 4.

⁴² Walter D. Mignolo, “Epistemic Disobedience Independent Thought and Decolonial Freedom,” *Theory, Culture & Society* 26, no. 7-8 (2009): 4.

⁴³ Castro-Gómez Santiago, “The Missing Chapter of Empire,” *Cultural Studies* 21, no. 2-3 (2007): 428–48.

⁴⁴ Walter D Mignolo, and Madina V Tlostanova, “Theorizing From the Borders: Shifting to Geo-and Body-Politics of Knowledge,” *European Journal of Social Theory* 9, no. 2 (2006): 206.

⁴⁵ Ramón Grosfoguel, “The Epistemic Decolonial Turn: Beyond Political-Economy Paradigms,” *Cultural studies* 21, no. 2-3 (2007): 213.

⁴⁶ Anibal Quijano, and Michael Ennis, “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America,” *Nepantla: Views from South Volume 1, Issue 3* (2000): 533–80.

⁴⁷ Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008), 7; John M Hobson, *The Eurocentric Conception of*

racial and ethnic hierarchies are reflected in and reinforced by the Eurocentric knowledge system.⁴⁸ It constructed, in the words of Edward Said, a universal consensus about the Europeans' right to be the superior race with a primary duty to extend beyond its realm and govern the other inferior people who need to be subjugated and directed by Europeans.⁴⁹

The most significant kind of injustice, Eurocentrism committed, was the censorship of the ideas of others, determining what was reasonable and not, what to be published, and whose work to be scaled as passed or failed that entails the story of intellectual imperialism to protect and prevail their domination.⁵⁰ In the 20th century, Eurocentrism blended itself into what many scholars have described as the 'even more virulent geo-cultural form' of Americentrism.⁵¹ Although the two have crucial differences and affinities, both cultural formations have been underwritten and propelled by the coloniality of power. A hierarchy of superior and inferior knowledge has been created as a result of Eurocentrism and Americentrism, which in turn has stratified superior and inferior individuals all across the globe.

The Decolonial Turn in IR

The decolonial turn in IR, adhering to the reflectivist's strands and a better understanding of the world, highlights that IR history, traditional concepts, theories, and language of analysis are permeated with imperialist and colonialist legacies.⁵² Reflectivists argue that individual behaviour – such as beliefs, opinions, values, and reasons, instead of a priori commitment to scientific principles, plays in making sense of the world of politics. They also prioritize interpretive methods, i.e., qualitative, discursive, or historical, over systemic scientific methods in their inquiries. Decolonialists contest the non-neutral character of Eurocentric knowledge. They seek to expose the real essence of coloniality by exposing

World Politics: Western International Theory 1760–2010, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 24.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 221.

⁴⁹ Edward Said, "Secular Interpretation, the Geographical Element, and the Methodology of Imperialism," In *After Colonialism: Imperial Histories and Postcolonial Displacements*, ed. by Gyan Prakash, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 21 – 39.

⁵⁰ Siphamandla Zondi, "Decolonising International Relations and Its Theory: A Critical Conceptual Meditation," *Politikon* 45, no. 1 (2018): 16–31.

⁵¹ Derek Gregory, Ron Johnston, Geraldine Pratt, Michael J. Watts, and Sarah Whatmore, *The Dictionary of Human Geography* (Singapore: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009): 221.

⁵² Alexander E. Davis, Thakur Vineet, and Vale Peter, *The Imperial Discipline: Race and the Founding of International Relations* (London: Pluto Press, 2020), 145.

the rhetoric of modernity to liberate the formerly colonized regions of the world.⁵³ They also acknowledge the importance of comprehending social meanings, language, and ideas.⁵⁴

Contrary to the positivists' argument that the social world can be studied similarly to nature, Decolonial thinkers insist that the social world consists of ideas and concepts that need interpretation and understanding. To Meera, it comprises three different strands of thinking. First, it introduced a novel way of thinking about the issues challenging IR rather than a particular theory. The next strand recovers the previously colonized as a subject of discipline by focussing on the history, ideas, and practices of formerly colonized people to address the issue of their omission in disciplinary narratives and investigate alternative political alternatives that may be recognized within them. The third strand analytically reviews the traditional issues of world politics through decolonial thinking.⁵⁵ Decolonial thinking demonstrates that the discipline's European expertise inadequately addresses questions of race and empire in international politics. Further, they emphasize the selective amnesia in IR about its racial and colonial origins and have paid insufficient attention to these concerns.⁵⁶

Decoloniality is embedded with layers of theoretical engagement, especially with the questions of ontology, epistemology, normative, or ethical concerns.⁵⁷ At the ontological level, it concerns the nature of the IR system, that is, who and what is being investigated. It argues that IR overemphasizes states primarily focusing on Western powers' interaction globally. The turn further draws attention to the selective use of history, in

⁵³ Walter D. Mignolo, *The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options*, (Duke University Press, 2011): 6.

⁵⁴ Milja Kurki, and Colin Wight, "International Relations and Social Science," In *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, ed. by Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013): 20.

⁵⁵ Meera Sabaratnam, "Postcolonial and Decolonial Approaches," In *the Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, ed. by John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020): 160 – 176.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 163; Jones Branwen Gruffydd "Introduction: International Relations, Eurocentrism, and Imperialism," In *Decolonizing International Relations*, (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers):1 – 19.; Julian Saurin, "International Relations as the Imperial Illusion; or, the Need to Decolonize IR," In *Decolonizing International Relations*, ed. by Branwen Gruffydd Jones, (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006), 26.

⁵⁷ Meera Sabaratnam, "Postcolonial and Decolonial Approaches," In *the Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, ed. by John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020): 161.

which the influence of colonialism and imperialism on the current world remains concealed. It also seeks to comprehend global politics by considering colonialism and imperialism as a construct that affects and moulds the international system.

At the epistemological level, it rejects the premise that knowledge is neutral or objective. It contends that academics communicate their perspectives by the imperial social order. It highlights the radicalized and racist assumptions of famous Western Philosophers, who view non-white people as backward or uncivilized while considering white Europeans as the epitome of humanity.⁵⁸ In addition, they emphasize understanding the world from the viewpoint of people who are disempowered or dispossessed by coloniality.

While contending in the ethical or normative sphere, they assert that power systems built via colonialism and imperialism tend to elevate Western ideals and, in turn, Western governments and people as essentially more important, valuable, and relevant than non-Westerners. These power systems are labelled unequal and racist due to their propensity to generate mindsets of superiority, entitlement, indifference, and hypocrisy against the non-West and thus challenging the dominant narratives driven by the West.

Decolonial Challenges to IR Discipline

IR has its understanding of the concepts like ‘traditions’ and ‘concepts’ that form the discipline’s foundational framework, where the former is defined as a broad conception essential for the development of sound arguments and robust reasoning’, while the latter, is understood as a long-established, repeatedly practiced social and cultural standard or a style of thinking typical of the general populace whose official source cannot be validated.⁵⁹ Both are used to critique, analyse, and reflect on events or ideas. Concepts are often unclear, complex, and ambiguous,⁶⁰ but scholars in this tradition endow them with meaning to interpret the social

⁵⁸ The decolonial turn is apprehensive about employing a lexicon to construct social hierarchy. Mawuna Koutonin, writing on the distinction between expats and immigrants, argues that the human migration vocabulary includes hierarchical phrases designed to elevate white people above the rest of us.; Mawuna Remarque Koutonin, “Why Are White People Expats When the Rest of Us Are Immigrants,” *The Guardian* 13, no. 05 (2015).

⁵⁹ Andrew Heywood, *Key Concepts in Politics and International Relations*(London: Palgrave, 2015), 224.

⁶⁰ M. Neil Browne, Stuart M. Keeley, and Mary Vasudeva, *Asking the Right Questions: A Guide to Critical Thinking*, (New York: Pearson, 2018), 104.

world. They are either normative⁶¹ or descriptive⁶² and, at times, imbued with more worth and ideological importance than they deserve or that subsequent scholars are aware of. Thus, concepts are value-laden constructed ideas that advocate for specific patterns of behaviour, making it difficult to differentiate them from the moral, intellectual, and ideological beliefs of those who support them. In contrast, traditions are ideas or stories that people generally accept as historically correct but find challenging to verify since they are handed down through the generations. As concepts and traditions are constructed notions, it is essential to know the reason for their creation, whether for historical or practical reasons, to interpret what they mean.⁶³

IR concepts and traditions are long-standing social and cultural norms⁶⁴ that started with the Westphalian narrative and were solidified by the great debates in IR and the classical theoretical traditions of international political thinking and Western philosophy, as depicted in Figure - 2.

Figure 2: IR Discipline's Framework



Source: Compiled by the Authors.

⁶¹ Values are moral principles but occasionally appear as normative political ideas, for instance, "liberty," "rights," "justice," "equality," or "tolerance," that needs to be attained.

⁶² Descriptive or positive concepts refer to 'facts' that presumably have an objective and demonstrable existence; they are concerned with what is. In this sense, descriptive notions are objectified or reified and considered as such rather than cognitive instruments.

⁶³ Renée Jeffery, "Tradition as Invention: The Traditions and the History of Ideas in International Relations," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 34, no. 1 (2005): 57–84.

⁶⁴ Andrew Heywood, *Key Concepts in Politics and International Relations*.

Realism, liberalism, and International Society are the main theoretical traditions schools of the discipline.⁶⁵ IR thinking also corresponds to present events and is inspired by academic disciplines such as philosophy, history, law, sociology, and economics. The decolonial turn in IR states that the discipline's framework, including self-proclaimed history narrated through established traditions, is founded on Western philosophy that works within Eurocentric episteme, an outcome of CMP. The turn attempts to go deep into the historical context to break free from CMP, paving the way for other modes of seeing, thinking, doing, and existence in the world.⁶⁶

By thinking and doing so, the turn challenges the very foundation of the discipline. It identifies the importance of questioning the foundation of Western ontology and examines the epistemological traditions from which the edifice of Eurocentric IR narratives has been constructed.⁶⁷ As mentioned previously, Eurocentrism promotes the West as the reservoir of everything good and progressive, making it an ideal to which the rest of the world should aspire. Texts within the IR discipline follow this theme and carry the Eurocentric bias forward. Several scholars have discussed the effects of Eurocentrism on the discipline.⁶⁸

According to the Decolonial viewpoint, Eurocentrism does not represent a geographical position but operates on an epistemological, ontological, and methodological level. It creates a social stratification of humankind and division of labour through different means to promote the belief that there is only one source of universal values and knowledge which Mignolo coined as the 'Western code'.⁶⁹ The decolonial turn's criticism of Eurocentrism challenges the IR discipline's framework (See figure 2). They believed that eurocentrism as an analytical framework is insufficient to conceptualize and interpret the world thoroughly by taking European history, theoretical concepts, traditions, IR founding fathers, and examples to explain international relations. Zondi argues that 'scholars from the global North, especially white men, are said to have control over the discipline'.

⁶⁵ Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013): 32.

⁶⁶ Catherine Walsh, and Walter D. Mignolo, "Introduction," In *on Decoloniality: Concepts, Analytics, Praxis*, ed. by Walter D. Mignolo, and Catherine E. Walsh, (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2018):1-12, 4.

⁶⁷ Walter D. Mignolo, "The Conceptual Triad - Modernity/Coloniality/Decoloniality."

⁶⁸ Zeynep Gulsah Capan, "Decolonising International Relations?", *Third World Quarterly* 38, no. 1 (2016): 1. and Hobson John M., *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics*.

⁶⁹ Walter D. Mignolo, *The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options*.

According to Decolonialists, Eurocentrism acts like a citadel to preserve the dominance of the Western code in the discipline where the West has remained the central player in IR. It was the architect of modern international organizations, such as the League of Nations, the UN, and many others. However, despite the West's widespread role in establishing IR as a vibrant discipline, the 'West as a concept' is seldom discussed and thus lacks the theoretical foundation required to appreciate the complexity of the term adequately.⁷⁰ IR discipline, with its state-centric approach and level of analysis, remains disabled to analyse the West. Consequently, the West as a concept remains obscured from IR theory.⁷¹ This creates an interesting situation of the most prominent and dominant player remaining away from the gaze of ordinary scholars while performing an enduring hegemonic function in the discipline.

The Eurocentrism of IR is also vividly visible in the discipline's consensus on the Westphalian narrative, which holds that the two bilateral treaties signed in 1648 constitute the beginning of international relations. The traditional depiction of Westphalian history asserts that it established the state with territorial sovereignty as the foundation of the modern state system by publicly recognizing a system of sovereign states imbued with legal egalitarianism, sovereignty, and non-interference in the internal matters of other states, thereby ushering in the modern age.⁷²

However, several revisionist academics have rejected this narrative, insisting that attributing the progress of the idea of state sovereignty to the Treaty of Westphalia is primarily based on imaginary history,⁷³ what they named as 'Westphalian common sense of the discipline, and a 'foundational myth'.⁷⁴ The narrative adds to the exceptionalism that stresses the European/ Western order and lifts its thoughts and principles in IR scholarship by emphasizing that European

⁷⁰ The "West" has intellectual and geographical connotations, referring to a group of liberal, capitalist nations. Earlier during the Cold War, the notion of the West coexisted as the antithesis of the Third World and, in this sense, represented the world's prosperous, industrialised, and developed civilisation. Thus the "West" carried different and wide-ranging meanings to different audiences according to the context of the usage.

⁷¹ Jacinta O'Hagan, *Conceptualizing the West in International Relations Thought: From Spengler to Said* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 9.

⁷² Turan Kayaoglu, "Westphalian Eurocentrism in International Relations Theory," *International Studies Review* 12, no. 2 (2010): 193–217.

⁷³ Andreas Osiander, "Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth," *International Organization* 55, no. 2 (2001): 268.

⁷⁴ Sandra Halperin, "International Relations Theory and the Hegemony of Western Conceptions of (Modernity)" In *Decolonizing International Relations*, ed. by Ranwen Gruffydd Jones (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2006), 45.

empires dealt with their issues through cultural or contractual development. In contrast, non-Europeans lacked this virtue and astuteness. They remained in disorder until European states permitted them to join the international system – upon achieving ‘civilizational norms’ through a protracted colonial period.⁷⁵

The Westphalian narrative thus allowed scholars to invent a normative hierarchy where Western states construct norms, ideologies, and organizations of international Society, and non-Western states lack these until they are socialized into the norms, regulations, and institutions of the international community. Interesting to note that the Westphalian narrative was a constructed thought developed by German historiographers and expropriated by international jurists in the 19th century.⁷⁶ The narrative contrasted the Napoleonic imperial vision and led to incorrect diagnoses of contemporary international relations.⁷⁷

As Vitalis stated that ‘generations of IR specialists are unaware that the disciplinary history and its praxis are under the sway of foundational myths’.⁷⁸ This is because, according to Ringmar, as a university-level subject, IR is often taught with scanty historical depth.⁷⁹ Once placed next to the discipline’s selective amnesia concerning imperialism, which is still on the periphery of IR treatises, the Westphalian narrative subtly expunges the history of imperialism from the theoretical and substantive concerns.⁸⁰

Decolonial scholars argue that the discipline was designed to preserve the race and social stratification of the Europeans and the pre-eminence of powerful countries. Contesting the idyllic origin of discipline, as per the Aberystwyth narrative, to be motivated by the assumption that the ‘scientific study of international politics’ would assist in avoiding wars and promoting world peace. The Decolonial thinkers, on the other hand,

⁷⁵ John M. Hobson, *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760–2010*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 19.

⁷⁶ The English School academics renewed the story of Westphalia's centrality during the 1960s - 1980s. In the 1980s and 1990s, with the cultural movement in international relations studies, constructivists introduced the Westphalian narrative to the literature on international norms.

⁷⁷ Turan Kayaoglu, “Westphalian Eurocentrism in International Relations Theory,” *International Studies Review* 12, no. 2 (2010): 193–217.

⁷⁸ Robert Vitalis, *White World Order, Black Power Politics - the Birth of American International Relations*, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2015), 7.

⁷⁹ Erik Ringmar, *History of International Relations: A Non-European Perspective*, (Cambridge: Open Book Publishers, 2019), 1.

⁸⁰ Branwen Gruffydd Jones, “Introduction: International Relations, Eurocentrism, and Imperialism,” 9.

blame the Westphalian narrative for concealing the discipline's discriminatory origins,⁸¹ as once Carr described that IR for 'English-speaking countries' is simply a study about "managing the world from positions of strength, and in essence, IR discipline and its praxis are a rationalization for the exercise of power by the dominant nations over the weak".⁸²

By emphasizing the link between imperialism and the origins of IR, the decolonial approach has challenged the narrative that IR began with the efforts of the idealists to scientifically study international affairs after WW I. They argued that after the war, the discipline was premised on race and empire instead of peace and war.⁸³ DuBois prophesied that "the major issue of the 20th century would be the relation of the darker to the lighter (coloured) races of men and called it the 'colour line,' which initiated the competing perspectives on the best way to maintain Caucasian (white) hegemony."⁸⁴ To support the Decolonialists claim, Mahan, stated that "*maintaining white superiority is the fundamental objective of IR.*"⁸⁵ Furthermore, a study conducted in 1916, mentioned that "splitting humankind on a graded scale, ranging from barbaric to civilized, is the fundamental reality of human history. It expected superior civilized races (white) to take on the burden of cultivating the riches of the 'tropics', which may result in significant battles between 'civilized' governments."⁸⁶ During those times, IR was truly called 'interracial relations.'⁸⁷

A criticism of the knowledge ecology grounded on European experiences is another example of a challenge to the long-held norms of

⁸¹ Meera Sabaratnam, "Postcolonial and Decolonial Approaches," 174. Alexander E. Davis, Vineet Thakur, and Peter Vale, *The Imperial Discipline: Race and the Founding of International Relations*, (London: Pluto Press, 2020) 13.

⁸² In introduction by Michael Cox in Carr, Edward Hallett, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: Reissued with a New Preface from Michael Cox*, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 29.

⁸³ Alexander E. Davis, Alexander E., Vineet Thakur, and Peter Vale, *The Imperial Discipline: Race and the Founding of International Relations*, 3.

⁸⁴ Robert Vitalis, "Beyond Practitioner Histories of International Relations," In *What's the Point of International Relations*, ed. by Synne L. Dyvik, Jan Selby, and Rorden Wilkinson, (London, New York: Routledge, 2017): 99.

⁸⁵ Craig N. Murphy, "Relocating the Point of IR in Understanding Industrial-Age Global Problems," In *What's the Point of International Relations*, ed. by Synne L. Dyvik, Jan Selby, and Rorden Wilkinson, (London, New York: Routledge, 2017): 76.

⁸⁶ Philip Henry Kerr, "Political Relations Between Advanced and Backward Peoples," In *An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, (London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1916): 154.

⁸⁷ Errol A. Henderson, "Hidden in Plain Sight: Racism in International Relations Theory," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 26, no. 1 (2013): 72.

the discipline. Western philosophy served as an epistemic framework that sustained the system of meanings and significance by which a group understands and evaluates its individual and collective life.⁸⁸ Decolonialists contend that the speaking subject is always concealed in Western philosophy that is to say that the Western philosophy generated a myth about truthful universal knowledge because it disentangles the speaker's ethnic, racial, gender, and sexual identities from their epistemic place within the institutions of colonial authority and knowledge.⁸⁹

IR theories and concepts were developed under the pretext of Europe's renaissance, enlightenment, and industrial age. IR's disciplinary concepts, theoretical moorings, and meaning were reshaped to take on new flavours and modalities during the transition from one period to another.⁹⁰ According to Henderson, "white racism gained legitimacy from Western philosophy and later on developed different but overlapping and mutually reinforcing rationalizations based first on religion, then biology, and finally anthropology."⁹¹

D. Hume (1953), 'the Enlightenment philosopher, in support of white racism, wrote that "there never was a civilized nation of any other complexion than white....In so many countries and ages, such a uniform and constant difference could not happen if nature had not made an original distinction between these breeds of men".⁹² IR rationalists' theories carried the 'Eurocentric approach', except for Marxism and constructivism challenged the conventional wisdom, though they relied on a Eurocentric epistemological framework to depart and differentiate themselves from the former conventionalists.⁹³ However, the Decolonialists rejected the Eurocentric perspective of history which placed Europe at the centre while omitting the non-Eurocentric historical views.⁹⁴

Navnita Behera, domineered the mainstream IR on the ground of its 'epistemological inadequacy' to cope with religion especially considering the return of religion to international relations in the 21st

⁸⁸ Rajeev Bhargava, "Overcoming the Epistemic Injustice of Colonialism," *Global Policy* 4, no. 4 (2013): 416.

⁸⁹ Ramón Grosfoguel, "The Epistemic Decolonial Turn: Beyond Political-Economy Paradigms," 211–23.

⁹⁰ Torbjorn Knutsen, *L. A History of International Relations Theory*, (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1992), 2.

⁹¹ Errol A. Henderson, "Hidden in Plain Sight: Racism in International Relations Theory."

⁹² Ibram X Kendi, *How to be an Antiracist*, (New York: One World, 2019), 21.

⁹³ Siphamandla Zondi, "Decolonising International Relations and Its Theory: A Critical Conceptual Meditation," *Politikon* 45, no. 1 (2018): 16–31, 21.

⁹⁴ Pinar Bilgin, "How to Remedy Eurocentrism in IR? A Complement and a Challenge for the Global Transformation," *International Theory* 8, no. 3 (2016): 494.

century. IR rationalist traditions are believed to only function within the dichotomy of 'secular nation-states' against 'irrational' groups, nations, and civilizations thus fomenting conflict with non-European entities. Further, these theories claim that IR is based on the idea that the world would become progressively areligious, in which the irrationality of Islamic nations seems archaic and out of place in a contemporary secular national-state framework.⁹⁵ Decolonialists thus challenge Western philosophy and argues it provided the essential arguments that normalized epistemic violence and injustice associated inflicted by European empires against the oppressed [neo]colonized people.

Conclusion

The decolonial turn, as a reflexive approach, employs the colonial matrix of power, particularly the coloniality of knowledge. It reveals that Eurocentrism is embedded in knowledge production and encourages one to actively seek to ignore, dismiss, distort, and deny data, subjectivities, world senses, and ways of looking at life from a non-European lens. Further, de-colonialists argue that IR scholarship, since its inception, has remained disabled to fully consider the experiences and perspectives of non-Western countries and communities and has instead reinforced hegemonic power structures. It also questions the universality of the discipline's Eurocentric knowledge without addressing the underlying assumptions sanctioning imperial and colonial ambitions.

Similarly, they put a question mark on the discipline's birth, growth, and advancement as described in the classic international relations debates by focusing on the role of colonialism, imperialism, and racism in the discipline. The turn signifies rethinking and re-evaluating IR's dominant concepts, theories, and methodologies in promoting more inclusive and diverse ways of understanding global politics. The colonial matrix of power explains the continuance of uneven power relations between the Global North and South by highlighting the continued influence of colonialism on modern global politics.

⁹⁵ Joao Pontes Nogueira, "Inequality," In *International Relations from the Global South*, ed. by Karen Smith Arlene B. Tickner, (London and New York: Routledge, 2020), 240–58.

STRATEGIC DIVERGENCE IN THE US-PAKISTAN RELATIONSHIP UNDER THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION

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Abstract

This study analyses the US-Pakistan relationship during the Trump administration from a neo-classical realist lens. Along with systemic influences, the analysis framework also includes the role of domestic and cognitive factors in understanding both sides' perceptions, behaviors, and preferences toward each other. During Trump's presidential term, both sides could not fritter away the mistrust and move beyond the traditional course of engagement characterized by tactical convergence based on the rewards for service rendered by Pakistan. Pakistan was not a strategic choice for Washington since the two countries had contrasting expectations on evolving global developments, emerging regional geo-political and domestic reconfigurations. Parallel to this, Pakistan's economic vulnerabilities were exploited by the Republicans to reassert their leverage in bargaining. This grey area helped the White House allure Pakistan with its carrot-and-stick approach and compelled policy planners in Islamabad to think that a strong foreign policy always rests on a strong domestic base.

Keywords: *Strategic Divergence, Modus Operandi, Economic Landscape, Tactical Convergence*

Introduction

For the last two decades, the US has viewed its relationship with Pakistan with Afghanistan. During the war on terror, Pakistan assumed the role of a major non-NATO ally for advancing the US security interests in Afghanistan. Given the gradually changing security landscape in Afghanistan with the Taliban's ascendance in power and NATO's failing military mission, the US was compelled to rethink its Afghan

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strategy. The changing approach in Afghanistan was likely meant to be a change in the US policy toward Pakistan. Naïve to the nuances of international politics, President Trump's initial years in the White House were more of the same with regard to Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, as he took a much-needed shift in his Afghanistan policy and opted for a political dialogue with the Taliban, policy planners in Pakistan were also anticipating a rephrase in the contours of the US-Pakistan relationship. This was largely because both sides were not contented but needed each other in many ways. Islamabad conceived that the non-NATO partner security role caused Pakistan more damage than it gained. At the same time, the successive US administrations had apprehensions about Pakistan's alleged connections with the Afghan Taliban. The contrasting perspectives fractured the relationship. Despite these divergent positions, the Trump era was the most important phase in which the war in Afghanistan was likely to end, and the US-Pakistan relationship was to take a new start. This phase was an inflection point where the contours of this relationship had to be reinvented. However, during the Trump years, the relationship remained wiggled from retrogression to a very low progression.

Why was this relationship fraught with myriad challenges, and unable to take a new flight? The reasons lay in systemic, domestic, and cognitive contexts. The systemic influences, including the US pronounced strategic competition with China, Indo-US growing strategic defense cooperation, and the contrasting US-Pakistan regional strategic interests, had bearings on this relationship. For Islamabad, the US objective of strategic containment of China with the help of India was bound to cut both ways for Pakistan. First, it carried implications for the Sino-Pakistan shared economic interests. Secondly, India's access to advanced and sophisticated US military technologies could disturb the regional balance of power and undermine the dynamics of strategic stability in the region. Both sides also had different expectations based on their strategic necessities, regional interests, and threat perceptions. Parallel to this, Trump and Biden needed more enthusiasm to pursue any overwhelming economic association between the two countries. To this end, Pakistan's turbulent economic and political situation did not appeal to Washington and its geo-economic motivations. The US reticence can be gauged from the fact that despite three premier-level interactions only in 2019, there was no exchange of notes beyond Afghanistan. Pakistan's unpropitious business and investment climate also deserve its share of the blame for keeping the economic relations impoverished. The US, under its new Indo-pacific framework, wanted to rejuvenate its geo-economic engagements with countries inclining toward China, but Pakistan's much-resonated geo-economic rhetoric had little substance to offer in tangible terms. Pakistan was rebalancing its trading requirements with China to some extent as there was a geographic proximity advantage. However, there was much to

gain and offer to the US, had intentions coalesced with opportunities. Economic affairs have been given no immediate priority.

The US presumed that Pakistan's dependence on the US for its security imperatives or economic development could not be ruled out. Parallel to this, Washington could use its influence on international political and financial institutions to coerce Pakistan into its geopolitical interests. This paradox of exercising leverage and overestimating its power in Washington derailed the possibility of transforming the bilateral relationship.¹ Rather than finding a middle ground, both sides opposed each other to a greater extent, where reversing things was never easy.

As for the recent trajectory of the US-Pakistan relationship, President Biden is largely following the course that Trump, his predecessor, drew for Pakistan. That is Trump Lite. It is evident from Biden's comments that Pakistan is one of the world's most dangerous nations because it possesses nuclear weapons and lacks political cohesiveness. The relationship between Washington and Islamabad is shown to be fragile and low on trust. The Biden administration sought Pakistan's help in fighting terrorism and collaboration on non-traditional security challenges. Islamabad gave back by allowing the US to use its airspace to kill Al Qaeda commander Ayman al Zawahiri in a targeted drone attack in Kabul. Helping Pakistan rehabilitate flood refugees and working together to combat international terrorism are important aspects of Pakistan-US relations. But Washington's current policies reflect Trump's policies and practices toward Islamabad. A reflection of the past is deciding the current course of the relationship. If Pakistan offers something more than words, i.e., real economic incentives, then that could make way for policymakers to look beyond the strategic aspect of the relationship. Therefore, it is pivotal to understand the domestic context and the systemic influences in Pakistan-US relations in the Trump era to redefine a clear roadmap for the future.

Conceptualizing US-Pakistan Relations in The Framework of Neo-Classical Realism

This study explains the complex relationship between the two countries in a neo-classical realist context that is a reformation of the earliest versions in a methodological sense. In the 1940s, when classical realism came into vogue, this theoretical tradition emphasized the domestic calibrations to survive in an anarchic architecture of the international system, i.e., the principle of self-help. When Kenneth Waltz published his

¹ Leverage is a multi-directional process, and not simply the prerogative of the strong. Robert M. Hathaway, "The Leverage Paradox: Pakistan and the United States", (Washington D.C., *Wilson Center*, 2017)

book, *Theory of International Politics*, in 1979,² he had put forward the idea of structural realism, an extension of realist thought that focuses more on the international architecture or systemic factors in determining the dynamics of inter-state. These two variants of realism were methodically contradictory in terms of what determines a state's behavior in the international system. To explain a relationship or determine what causes the two states to diverge strategically, individual, internal, and external factors should be used for the analysis process.. That is what neo-classical realism proposes. In October 1998, Gideon Rose, in his review article in *World Politics*, presented a new vision for a realist understanding of the world.³ This updated and revised version of realist tradition which Gideon Rose coined in his review article, Neo-classical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy, as "neo-classical realism" combines structural analysis with actor-level analysis to predict a state's behavior. Rose claimed that the actions of a state in the international system can be explained by systemic variables (distribution of power capabilities); cognitive variables (perception and misperception of systemic pressures as well as other states' intentions and threats; and domestic variables, including state institutions, decision-making processes, elites, societal actors, values, culture, and narratives.⁴ It explicitly incorporates both external and internal variables, updating and systematizing certain insights drawn from classical realist thought.⁵ In the classical and neo-realist traditions, the domestic element was absent for predicting and explaining a state's behavior.

On the other hand, domestic politics is a key point in neo-classical realism. Although national power and the state's position in the international structure are decisive factors in a state's foreign policy choices, domestic variables can also shape a state's foreign policy.⁶ Therefore, neo-classical realists argue that domestic politics and conditions of states must be considered while analyzing drivers of their behavior and not just national interests and systemic factors. Fareed Zakaria, the co-founder of neo-classical realism in his book, *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role* (1998)⁷ combines classical realism and neo-realism. He does not simply put all his weight behind systemic

² Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, (Illinois, Waveland Press: 2010)

³ Gideon Rose, Review of Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy, by Michael E. Brown, Thomas J. Christensen, Randall L. Schweller, William Curti Wohlforth, and Fareed Zakaria, *World Politics* 51, no. 1 (1998): 144–172.

⁴ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*.


⁵ Gideon Rose, Review: Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy.

⁶ Ali Abdi Omar, "Is There Anything 'New' in Neoclassical Realism," *E-International Relations*, February 13, 2013, <https://www.e-ir.info/>

⁷ Fareed Zakaria, *From wealth to power*, Princeton University Press, 1999.


variables and goes on to explain that the perception of one's place in the international system is also an important variable in determining a state's foreign policy decisions toward others. With the idea of perception, there comes a constructivist element within the neo-classical realist explanation what is believed to reduce the analytical purity of realism in explaining and predicting a state's behavior.

Figure 1:



Source: Compiled by the Author.

Figure 2:



Source: Compiled by the Author

In the context of the US-Pakistan relationship, neo-classical realism provides an encompassing understanding of strategic divergences between the two. First, it was an asymmetric relationship as Pakistan was a relatively weaker state and depended on the US in many ways. Despite China's economic rise, the US holds an unparalleled military, political, and economic clout worldwide. Pakistan, a dependent state, has always had to look to the US to define this relationship. Because the strong player defines its interest toward the weaker one, it leverages its influence, and the weaker one adjusts and accommodates. Thus, the dynamics of this relationship depended mainly on US preferences. The bilateral relations during the Trump era were lurching between deep estrangement and tactical engagement, not only because of transformed regional and global dynamics but also due to the varying role of domestic factors. At the systemic level, the global environment was in flux. Power balance had been changing fundamentally, and realignment had occurred at both global and regional levels. The predominant trend among major powers was competition and confrontation rather than cooperation, destabilizing global impact and fuelling unpredictability. During Trump's years in the White House, the overarching and defining global reality was the standoff between US and

China.⁸ Trump's America embarked on a strategy of containing China and mobilizing countries to counter Beijing's rising global power. The US-China tensions had a direct bearing on Pakistan. Though Pakistan had tried to avoid getting into the crosshairs of this confrontation, it could not dissociate itself from intensifying competition.

The Trump administration designated China as its strategic rival in its National Security Strategy.⁹ It stated, "China and Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests and attempt to erode the American security and prosperity."¹⁰ While the US was pursuing its larger ambition of containing China's expanding geo-economic prowess in different regions of Asia and preventing its allies in the Indo-pacific region from embracing China, Pakistan's relevance in the new Indo-pacific vision of Washington had not been of primary concern. The underlying rationale was that Pakistan had a historically consequential relationship with China, and this relationship assumed enhanced strategic importance after both countries signed a multi-billion mega initiative, CPEC, in 2015. Washington was cognizant that CPEC provided a lifeline for Pakistan's ailing economy and Chinese investment in different sectors of Pakistan's economy, particularly energy, at that time was needed more than ever. At that time, Pakistan's economy necessitated a major stimulus China provided in those troubling moments. This further pushed Pakistan under the patronization of Beijing.

China stood by Pakistan in those difficult times when Pakistan, especially its economy, needed a rescue, and the two countries also shared an understanding of evolving geopolitical realities. They were deeply involved in actualizing the vision of connectivity to translate a win-win reality for both. Therefore, it took much work for the US to delineate Pakistan from China. If the US resolved to counter China in the region, India was the strategic choice. This growing relationship did not concern Pakistan as much as the augmentation of India's defense and strategic capabilities did. And when the US did not consider Pakistan's apprehensions, Pakistan resolved to face the onslaught of US opposition rather than succumbing to unconditional demands.

The Trump administration did not have an exclusive and articulated Pakistan policy. Republicans did have an Afghanistan policy, but they did not have a Pakistan policy. Instead, they dealt with Pakistan based on

⁸ Fumiaki Kubo, "Reading the Trump Administration's China Policy," *Asia-Pacific Review* (2019), V. 26, no. 1, 58-76.

⁹ Bartosz Kowalski, The Elements of the China Challenge: Reading the Trump Administration's China Policy Testament, *Politeja-Pismo Wydziału Studiów Międzynarodowych i Politycznych Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego* 18, no. 73 (2021): 247-258.

¹⁰ National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017.

temporal considerations and tactical geopolitical convergences. In this context, three factors were important. First, the US had viewed Pakistan through the spectacle of Afghanistan since 2001. The Trump administration was no exception to this. Their entire approach toward Pakistan was restricted to the triangular dynamics of Pakistan-US-Afghanistan. Republicans believed Islamabad's support for the Taliban contributed to the US debacle there. This was not explicitly stated, but this was an overall perspective in the US policy circles. Second, India was an important factor in injecting the mistrust. India's procurement of military hardware under the pretext of an offshore balancing program of the US against encountering China beefed up Pakistan's threat assessments. Had the US-Pakistan found a middle ground while the US was reinforcing India without considering the security implications for Pakistan, a different situation could have emerged. Third, the US intentionally muted its response to India's unilateral actions in Jammu and Kashmir.¹¹ Despite being an influential player in the international order, Washington showed a lack of interest in considering India's sheer disregard of the UN resolutions on the issue. The Kashmir issue was very much alive in President Trump's last two years, given India's colossal human rights violations in the valley, demographic engineering, and de-internationalization of a globally recognized dispute.¹² Thus, the stands taken by the US impacted its relationship with Pakistan.

At the domestic level of analysis, the US knew that Pakistan relies mainly on China's financial investment and assistance. Islamabad lacked the capacity to rebound itself domestically from the slumping economic trajectory. Pakistan's sagging economy was showing no immediate signs of a rebound unless an external stimulus made any difference. Islamabad's overwhelming reliance on China's economic investment in the country made Republicans in Washington decouple the US economic and security relationship with the former.

With the evolving geopolitical developments, US economic assistance, as a matter of undeclared policy, has had to be followed by security assistance from Pakistan.¹³ This overconfidence of Washington made the ties limited and prone to greater risks than opportunities. The US assumed that Pakistan could only govern itself effectively and empower

¹¹ Article 370 revoked: US says it's India's 'internal matter' in a blow to Pakistan, *Business Today*, August 8, 2019, <https://www.businesstoday.in/current/economy-politics/article-370-revoked-us-india-internal-matter-blow-pakistan/story/370888.html>.

¹² Julian Borger, Rex Tillerson, 'America First' means Divorcing Our Policy from Our Values, *The Guardian*, May 7, 2017.

¹³ Musavir Hameed, Saeeda Batool, Muhammad Ibrar Aslam, and Zain Ali, "Pakistan-US Relations under Trump Administration," *Asia Journal of International Peace & Security (AJIPS)* 5, no. 2 (2021): 300-309.

itself with US support. Its falling reserves, ballooning current account deficit, business development, and management practices, and investment imperatives required the US economic interventions in varying capacities to get things done. This cold war thinking of Republicans fractured the relationship as it drove Pakistan more into Beijing's embrace and tied Pakistan's economic fortune with China. Since the US was in a position of strength and leverage in this asymmetric relationship, the Republican administration in Washington eliminated the possibility of much-necessitated transformation in relations. Interpreting it in another paradigm, Pakistan's domestic environment did not entice America to look toward Pakistan beyond the geopolitical spectacle. Pakistan was not as lucrative as Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and India, which offer a relatively favorable business environment, liberal FDI norms, and low investment risks. The cost and ease of doing business index in Pakistan were unfavorable, and unrelenting political instability further made it worst.

In the last days of President Trump, Pakistan claimed to alter its paradigm from geopolitics to geo-economics where it would be focusing more on investment and connectivity. To materialize such a transition, however, strong institutions, reduced political fracas, and improved digital infrastructure were important; they were essential for tapering off investment risks. Given China's growing economic influence in Asia, the US started to view the South Asian region from a very different angle.¹⁴ In Washington's view, South Asia has now been dissolved into the broader framework of Indo-pacific where the US was trying to strengthen economic engagements with the counties that were drifting toward China.¹⁵

For Washington, Pakistan was not a destination that could be Washington's base of growing economic opportunities in the future, given its overwhelming reliance on China. Then, the Chief Executive of the new government in Pakistan was known for his pro-Taliban and anti-drone rhetoric. Despite three meetings between him and Trump, the bilateral relationship did not improve significantly.¹⁶ The two countries had different attributes grounded in value systems, cultural backgrounds, and ideological orientations. Moreover, there were stark differences in political systems and foreign policy decision-making processes. The differences in culture and values created a dichotomy in narratives and orientations. All

¹⁴ Lin Wang, "Opportunities and Challenges of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and Implications for US Policy and Pakistan," *East-West Center*, (2017)

¹⁵ Ashley J. Tellis, "Waylaid by Contradictions: Evaluating Trump's Indo-Pacific Strategy," *The Washington Quarterly* (2020), v.43, no. 4: 123-154; Brian Harding, "The Trump Administration's Free and Open Indo-Pacific Approach," *Southeast Asian Affairs* 2019, no. 1 (2019): 61-67.

¹⁶ Arif Ansar, "Imran-Trump Meeting; US-Pakistan Relations, Afghan Peace, and Kashmir," *Defence Journal* (2019): v. 23, no. 1.

the domestic elements, therefore, point to the fact that this complex relationship was not only influenced by global and regional geopolitical developments and security incongruences but the domestic economic and political environment equally kept the ties impoverished.

If we filter systemic pressures in this bilateral relationship, domestic incompatibilities, and incongruent characteristics barred the two societies from fusing. Holistically, Pakistan's intrinsic importance was relegated, and the overestimation of the US leverage to seek Pakistan's acquiescence negatively affected the relationship that already lacked its own bilateral content and focused on focus security-related issues. This elucidates that in addition to regional geopolitical realities, systemic pressures, perceptual variances, and adverse domestic features deteriorated the relationship in the Trump years.

Contrasting US-Pakistan Expectations and its Regional Implications

Peace and stability in South Asia required sustained cooperation between the US and Pakistan. The US-India Comprehensive Global Partnership is likely to enhance India's political standing at the international level besides helping the current BJP leadership restore its credibility on the domestic front.¹⁷ The US bolstering India's defense capability has landed the region in an unending cycle of the arms race. With the US' unprecedented inclination toward India to advance its interests and downgrading relations with Pakistan, the US has brought the US-China strategic rivalry into this region. In the Sino-Indian border clashes last year, the US support for India was evident. It demonstrated its support for India by sending an aircraft carrier group into the Bay of Bengal for an exercise with the Indian Navy.¹⁸

China's economic clout in the region surpasses that of the US. It has convinced Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh to be the part of its BRI.¹⁹ Except India and Bhutan, all South Asian states are part of the corridors envisioned under the project. Even in the hostile equation with Beijing, India has over \$90 billion bilateral volume of trade with China. When it comes to Afghanistan, the US had been a key player for years with enormous military presence and diverse assistance. But as situation changed especially after 2006, Beijing also ramped up its engagement with

¹⁷ Adil Sultan, India-US Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA), *Strafasia*, October 28, 2020.

¹⁸ Paulina Song, Will US-China Competition Divide South Asia Along Great Power Fault Lines?, *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, February 23, 2021.

¹⁹ Chien-Peng (C. P.) Chung, What are the Strategic and Economic Implications for South Asia of China's Maritime Silk Road Initiative? *The Pacific Review* (2018), 31:3, 315-332.

the Afghanistan stakeholders, particularly with the Kabul regime and the Taliban. Beijing has a special interest in Afghanistan as peace in Afghanistan can unlock the opportunity to link CPEC to Afghanistan and, eventually, to Central Asian Republics. Therefore, China has tried to maintain its stakes in Afghanistan with the possibility that it would exploit the vacuum created by the US withdrawal.

Owing to Trump's tactical priorities and transactional interests in the region, China strengthened its position in South Asia. The Trump administration had also failed to influence the Taliban in developing an inclusive framework for a political settlement in post-withdrawal Afghanistan.²⁰ China and Pakistan both lamented for US' hasty and irresponsible leaving from Afghanistan. As a result, China and other regional countries will face the inevitable spillover effects of conflict, possibly for many years.²¹ The US was poised to withdraw from Afghanistan. If intra-Afghan parties cannot reach a political solution, the region could face the inevitable consequences of uncontrolled chaos.

In parallel, Islamabad finds it challenging to strike a delicate balance between its relations with China and the US. Relations with China are based on mutual understanding and forge a win-win paradigm, while the relations with the US remain grappled with decades of mistrust and disconnected orientations but tactically converged on the Afghan peace process. There is a fundamental difference between the two equations. Due to its extreme reliance on China for its economic, security, and geopolitical interests, Pakistan is unable to determine how to strike this delicate balance. It cannot choose an option that is detrimental to Chinese strategic interests.

Much of the volatility and instability in South Asia can be attributed to a lack of cooperation among the major stakeholders. While the US could have pursued tactical cooperation with China over Afghanistan and crisis management between India and Pakistan, it remained entangled in extending strategic competition with China over land and maritime domains. In the COVID-affected international environment, the US remained almost indifferent to the world and encountered domestically by the catastrophes of the COVID-19 pandemic. On the other hand, China assumed the leadership responsibility to help countries in South Asia and beyond in times of crisis.

The US status as a global leader over the past seven decades has been built not just on wealth and power but also, and just as important, on the legitimacy that flows from its domestic governance, provision of global

²⁰ Ashok Behuria, Yaqoob Ul Hassan, and Sanya Saroha, "US-Taliban Talks for Afghan Peace: Complexities Galore," *Strategic Analysis* (2019), v. 43, no. 2 126-137.

²¹ Yun Sun, China's Strategic Assessment of Afghanistan, *War on the Rocks*, April 8, 2020.

public goods, and ability and willingness to muster and coordinate a global response to crises.²² It was the greatest test of the Trump administration to show prudence at home and abroad in managing the fallout of the pandemic and come up with a concerted global response. But it failed to surpass China in providing aid and assistance to affected countries. This further waned the US's global standing and its supremacy over the global political order. This further intensified the US-China leadership competition and in this backdrop, developing states like Pakistan found themselves in the crosshairs.

Synthesizing US-Pakistan Perspectives: Rephrasing the Future

Most viably, if this troubled relationship must sustain and proceed to the smooth trajectory of progression, it is high time that both sides rephrase the contours of this relationship. After the withdrawal of the US forces from Afghanistan, both sides need to take a fresh start, moving away from the historical dichotomies and divergences. The interactions between the two premiers over the years have forecasted the notion that the US is in no urgency to move ahead with Pakistan on bilateral terms. Rather Washington would like to have an opportunity where it could possibly maintain some leverage over Pakistan.

At this moment, the immediate success of US-Pakistan relations hinges largely on how Pakistan influences the neighboring Taliban regime to re-posture and re-appropriate itself. Given the Taliban's stubborn policies last year, the gulf between the Taliban and the West has widened. Any possibility of recognition of the Taliban regime anytime soon is unlikely. So long as this phenomenon persists, the perception of policy-makers in Washington will continue to be haunted by the perceived betrayals of the past. If the Taliban wins the confidence of the US by somehow toning down their rhetoric and changing their actions toward more inclusive governance mechanisms, and somehow respecting fundamental human rights, there is a possibility that the US would ramp up its engagement with the Taliban. This will have a positive start for US-Pakistan relations, given that the US now views Pakistan synchronously with its approach toward Afghanistan. This is a window of opportunity but not a perfect option to regain the momentum of the broken relationship. Pakistani policy planners have repeatedly predicted that Islamabad does not want this relationship to proceed in a narrow bandwidth. But it does not want to be in a situation where it is seen as the potential solution for

²² Kurt M. Campbell and Rush Doshi, The Coronavirus Could Reshape Global Order, *Foreign Affairs*, March 18, 2020.

all problems and when the solution does not come it is considered the reason for all evils.²³

From a geo-economic standpoint, Pakistan is struggling with an on going political crisis where the opposition and the government persistently try to hammer each other by all means. The economy remains in a state of shambles characterized by macroeconomic instability and drying up revenue streams, high business costs, and an insecure investment climate. In such an uncertain domestic environment, why will the US endure risks when it has more to gain in neighbouring India, Bangladesh, or the booming markets of ASEAN? Although Pakistan claims to open to the world with a new thinking based on “geo-economics,” it has failed to acknowledge that mere lofty ideals do not make way but the tangibility of resourcefulness. Pakistan needs to decouple its (existential) insecurities vis-à-vis India from the broader paradigm of security that led it to “invest” in security preferences at the expense of other security dimensions. Apparently, Pakistan has no friends in the Biden administration nor any political capital on Capitol Hill.²⁴ If it offers something more than words, i.e., real economic incentives, it can make way for policymakers to manage strategic concerns not to dominate its relationship with the US.

Strategically, the US now sees South Asia as a subset region in its Indo-Pacific vision. South Asia’s independent traction has been dissolved in broader regional power politics. Within that region, the US economic focus would be less towards cash-starved countries like Pakistan and more towards technology importers and countries with unique maritime significance. That is the only way Washington could turn the table and compete with China. To keep itself relevant in the power politics of Indo-pacific, Pakistan would need to swiftly evolve as a destination of inevitable economic importance. Without this, it would be an exaggeration to think of Pakistan’s exclusive relevance in the emerging power politics of the Indo-Pacific region.

Conclusion

The erroneous calculations and overconfidence of Washington made the ties limited and prone to greater risks than opportunities. The US assumed that Pakistan could not govern itself effectively and empower itself without US support. Its falling reserves, ballooning current account deficit, business development and management practices, and investment imperatives require the US economic interventions in varying capacities to get things done. However, the cold war mindset in Washington will not

²³ Moeed Yusuf, U.S.-Pakistan Relations in the Biden Era: A Conversation with Moeed Yusuf, by Michael Kugelman, *Wilson Center*, January 21, 2021.

²⁴ Tom Hussain, How Will the US-Pakistan Relationship Evolve Under Biden?, *TRT World*, February 15, 2021, <https://www.trtworld.com>.

benefit either side: it will drive Pakistan into Beijing's embrace and tie its economic fortune with China.

To conceive a truly strategic or sustained relationship requires all aspects of the relationship to be given merited attention rather one-point or uni-focal convergence should decide the trajectory of the relationship. It should not be actor-specific, event-specific, or driven by geopolitical storms. Pakistan always wanted more of an economic, trade, and investment dimension. The US wanted Pakistan's close cooperation, more often, only with respect to Afghanistan. This is where strategic divergence emerged between the two countries. Pakistan was not willing to cooperate with the US in a narrow bandwidth instead it had always anticipated a smooth and sustained relationship that is more of an intrinsic bilateral nature. Therefore, the fundamental goal both administrations should have worked towards could have been having a truly bilateral relationship that does not look at the other side from lens A, B, and C. A relationship not seen through the Afghan prism and not seen as a time-bound partner to advance US interests in the region. Rather exercising leverage to exploit its own interests, Washington should have thought of why China has reaped all benefits of its patronage toward Pakistan which the US could not. The answer to this question is simple power matters but does not decide all matters.³

As for Pakistan, it needs to understand that extraneous factors may help us transitorily, but they also constrain it in many ways. Rather than pinning hopes on A, B, or C, it should build its reservoirs of strength and invest in untapped potentials and opportunities. A robust foreign policy rests on a solid domestic base. Countries want to be friends with countries that can do something for them. Pakistan's domestic repositioning—how it will govern itself and whether can empower itself by building a strong economy—will determine its ability to effectively conduct its foreign policy. Therefore, it must draw red lines to rein in political squabbling and institutional clash. It needs a 10-year course of action to regain its stature in the international arena through concerted efforts, harmonize internal political differences, and rebrand Pakistan as global resource provider. In this age of hybrid warfare, the more a state is vulnerable on domestic fronts, the less capable it will be of diplomatic intercourse. Therefore, Pakistan must realize that interests keep changing, but neighbours are always there. If it intends to expand the benefits of diplomatic outreach, it needs a settled relationship with its immediate neighbours. For that, it needs to mutually-reinforce the relationship with China and reset relations with India on a broader framework, unfettered by geopolitical expediencies. Of course, this would help it better manage its relations with the US.

CPEC AND GILGIT-BALTISTAN: A SOCIO-ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE

Summar Iqbal Babar* & Najeeb Alam**

Abstract

CPEC, a massive economic project under BRI, focuses on the socio-economic and political dividends in Gilgit Baltistan. It is expected to create more than half a million jobs by creating Special Economic Zones in Gilgit, imparting a boom to the tourism industry and enlarging the scope of e-commerce. Hydropower development, technical expertise, and human resources—resulting from CPEC projects—are also likely to transform the socio-economic dynamics of the region. This paper argues that the success of CPEC—considering the importance of connectivity for local markets—is likely to transform the region's socio-economic dynamics that will help promote economic and social inclusion of the people, mitigating their sense of deprivation.

Keywords: *CPEC, Gilgit-Baltistan, Socio-Economic Development, China, Pakistan*

Introduction

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a subset of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that President Xi Jinping launched in 2013. Under the BRI initiative, Beijing's investments have risen to \$3 trillion in infrastructure development in member countries.¹ The project entails more than six economic corridors that aim to connect Asia, Africa, and Europe. Its objective is to revive the old Silk Road. The initiative comprising infrastructure development and investment initiatives is expected to be vital for the economic development of participating countries stretching from East Asia to Europe. It is also expected to

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¹ Xiangming Chen, Julie Tian Miao, Xue Li, *The Belt and Road Initiative as Epochal Regionalisation*, (London: Routledge, 2021), 31.

enhance China's economic and political influence in the region and beyond.

Pakistan borders China's western province Xinjiang Province which lies in the north and thus provides China with a potential corridor through the Karakoram Highway to the seaport at Gwadar in Baluchistan on the Indian Ocean. Under China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the two countries have signed 51 MoUs for collaboration.² The CPEC route provides China with an alternative, shorter access to reach the Middle East and Europe by reducing heavy reliance on the narrow sea corridor, Strait of Malacca. It also links western China to the Gwadar Port, facilitating China by extenuating its energy security predicaments in the Indian Ocean, cementing its position in Indo-Pacific geopolitics, and safeguarding its energy provisions from the Middle East. The CPEC enables China to shrink the shipping period of 45 days to 10 days through the Persian Gulf as the 13000 km long route will be reduced to 2500 km.³ The port will also complement the presence of Chinese staff administering a number of ports all around the Indian Ocean, involving Sri Lanka, Djibouti, and Seychelles, through which China can outsmart the US bid to sustain primacy in Asia.⁴

Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) is the gateway of the China- Pakistan Economic Corridor. The CPEC passes through Xinjiang and enters GB through the Hunza district for almost 300 Km before entering Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) from the Kohistan district. The corridor is expected to be an agent for the economic development of Pakistan. A successful CPEC is also likely to open new corridors of opportunities for GB and positively contribute to addressing its political conundrum.⁵

This paper encompasses discussions on BRI's flagship project, i.e., the CPEC. It covers the geographical, political, and economic aspects of the corridor. It uses secondary sources, mainly due to lacking primary documents and feasibility studies on CPEC projects. It is divided into two parts. The first part explains the broader underpinnings of CPEC and highlights the importance of GB for the project. The next part focuses on

² Irfan Haider, "Details of Agreements Signed during Xi's Visit to Pakistan," *Dawn*, April 20, 2015.

³ Khalid Alam, Xuemei Li and Saranjam Baig, "Impact of Transport Cost and Travel Time on Trade under China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)," *Journal of Advanced Transportation* vol. 2019, <https://doi.org/10.1155/2019/7178507>

⁴ Junaid Ashraf, "String of Pearls and China's Emerging Strategic Culture," *Strategic Studies* 37, no. 4 (2017), 166-81, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48537578>.

⁵ Ahmad Rashid Malik, "The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC): A Game Changer for Pakistan's Economy," in *China's Global Rebalancing and the New Silk Road*, ed. B. R. Deepak (Singapore: Springer, 2018), 69-83.

economic prospects that may positively impact the socio-economic development of GB.

Geo-Economics, CPEC, and GB

The geo-economic capabilities of a state depend on its economic strength and geographic position in undertaking commercial activities. A study shows that the economic outlook of China under BRI is likely to impact about 70 percent of the global population and 55 percent of the global GNP.⁶ The rise of China as a major power in the international system is due to its economic growth and how it manages relations with other states. It needs economic resources, in addition to a peaceful environment which the Chinese leadership has referred to as the window of strategic opportunity, to sustain its burgeoning economy, which is a prerequisite to meet geopolitical ambitions and rank of the world power.

China needs oil and gas resources from the Middle East and Central Asia to continue its economic growth. A significant presence in the Indian Ocean, possibly through the Gwadar seaport, is vital to achieve these objectives. Otherwise, in a future confrontation with the US, the latter may block the Strait of Malacca from where 80 percent of China's energy supply is transported.⁷ CPEC offers a safe, short, and cost-effective trade route for China through Gwadar Port. In addition, the development and industrialization of Xinjiang can help suppress terrorism and ethno religious conflict in the province and promote inter-regional integration and a soft image of China.⁸

The geographic location of GB acts as an axis of regional connectivity involving India, China, and Afghanistan. The CPEC route that links Gwadar with GB thus opens new avenues of regional connectivity—depending on whether regional states can shelve territorial disputes to increase trade and economic connectivity.⁹ The project being a large development and strategic program, owes its success to a peaceful and friendly GB. The socioeconomic dividends under this project for GB may also entail adverse impacts on its clean environment leading to various forms of pollution. Thus environmental sustainability needs to be integrated into the development of the projects in the region. The

⁶ X. Pu, "One Belt, One Road: Visions and Challenges of China's Geoeconomic Strategy," *Mainland China Studies*, 59(3) (2016), 111-32.

⁷ Chen Shaofeng, "China's Self-Extrication from the "Malacca Dilemma" and Implications," *International Journal of China Studies*, vol 1:1 (2010), 2.

⁸ Mathieu Duchâtel, "The Terrorist Risk and China's Policy toward Pakistan: Strategic Reassurance and the 'United Front'," *Journal of Contemporary China*, 20:71 (2011), 543-561.

⁹ Mir Sherbaz Khetrin, "The Potential and Prospects of Gwadar Port," *Strategic Studies* 34 (2014): 70-89.

recognition of their political identity through a constitutional arrangement that puts an end to GB's constitutional limbo is a significant benefit that the people of GB expect from the initiative.

Prospects of Social, Political and Economic Opportunities through CPEC

Communication and Infrastructure Development

Accessibility, Roads and Bridges

CPEC promises infrastructure development in the region. It could have potential to improve connectivity within the region and with the outside world. The existing studies show that GB is already a beneficiary as the widening of KKH is in the last stage of completion. Under CPEC, plans for upgrading the 1254 km railway track are also considered. The core of CPEC is regional connectivity through roads and bridges for transporting goods from China. The Gwadar port can be used to transport goods from Pakistan to the Chinese and Central Asian markets. GB can be a trading centre between Central Asia and the Middle East due to CPEC. The opportunity of levying tax on containers and heavy vehicles carrying goods can also be a significant source of income for the region. It is expected that 70,000 trucks and containers will pass through the region every day.¹⁰

As per the CPEC master plan, a railway track will also be laid down from Xinjiang to Rawalpindi, opening another corridor of opportunity and accessibility. The existing Karakoram Highway (KKH) has been widened and improved, significantly facilitating GB's approach down the country for all practical purposes. Although the airport at Skardu has been declared International Airport, the facilities therein are far below international standards. Private airlines are offered incentives to operate flights to and from GB. PIA also facilitates weekly flights from Gilgit to Skardu and back. The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) is working on identifying potential sites for constructing new airports in Gilgit-Baltistan.

A road construction project has been approved, and work will likely start soon on widening and improving the Gilgit-Chitral land route via the Ghizer District expressway. Feasibility studies have been undertaken to make Khunjerab Pass and Babusar Pass operational throughout the year. Another feasibility study on Shontar Pass has been undertaken to construct an expressway between Astore and Muzaffarabad. The RCC bridges and tunnels are being constructed within GB and on KKH to overcome landslide issues and facilitate rapid and

¹⁰ Shaista Tabassum, "Deforestation in Pakistan CPEC An Auxiliary Exacerbation," *Journal of Contemporary Studies* 9, no. II (2020): 59-72.

smooth access for travellers. All the above infrastructural development measures have been necessitated by CPEC in one way or the other.¹¹

The Development of Hydro Power Potential

GB has immense hydropower potential as 27 percent of the region consists of glaciers: the largest concentration outside the Polar Regions. There are six main Tributaries of the Indus River (Suro River, Shyoke River, Shigar River, Gilgit River, Hunza River, and Astore River).¹² The average annual runoff near Diamer-Basha on the Indus River in GB is 1955 Cumec (50 MAF), which can produce up to 23,000 MW of electricity. As per GTZ-WAPDA (1993-1996) study, approximately 40,000 MW hydropower potential exists in GB, and if low-head hydropower units are placed, the generation may increase twice. However, until recently, only 170 MW of electricity was produced by Water and Power Department, GB. The table underneath illustrates the hydropower sector plans for GB.¹³

Table 1: Harnessing Hydropower Potential of GB

Sr. No.	Project Description	Type	Number	Status	Capacity (MW)
A	Currently Operational Projects in Gilgit-Baltistan	Mostly Public Sector	106	Operational	98
B	Power Potential				
2	Projects Under Implementation				
	a. Diamer-Basha Dam	Public Sector with International Funding	1	Under Implementation	4,500
	b. Bunji Hydro-Power Project	Public Sector with International Funding	1	Under Implementation	7,100
	c. Phandar Hydropower Project	Public Sector	1	Under Implementation	80
	d. Other Public Sector Projects under Implementation	Public Sector	6	Under Implementation	196
	3. Private Sector Projects	Private	3	Under Implementation	40
4	Solicited Sites	-	12	Projects with Feasibility Study Completed	534
5	Raw Sites	-		Areas Identified	8,540
	Total				20,990

Source: AKRSP, "Horizons of CPEC in Gilgit-Baltistan A Prospective Study"

Some major projects are Diamer-Basha Dam 4500 MW, Bunji Tunnel 7100 MW, YULBO 3000 MW, Thorgo Pari 2500 MW, Tungus 2100

¹¹ Islamuddin Sajid, "CPEC Transforms Pakistan's Remote Gilgit-Baltistan," *Anadolu Agency (AA)* August 18, 2020, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/>

¹² A Technical report on "Horizons of CPEC in Gilgit-Baltistan: A Prospective Study," *Aga Khan Rural Support Programme*, (2017), <http://akrsp.org.pk/wp-content/>

¹³ Ibid.

Katzara 1500 MW, etc.¹⁴ Apart from these, there are several hydro power projects, ranging from 10 MW to 1000 MW, whose feasibility studies have been conducted but physically no tangible progress is seen. However, it is the issue of investment that these resources have not been realized for the benefit of GB and Pakistan.

Avenues of Revenue Generation under CPEC

The regional grid of GB is in the implementation stage, wherein after regional connectivity, it will be connected to the national grid. The work on Diamer-Basha Dam has started and is expected to be completed in eight years. The GB government has recommended 100 MW KIU at Hunza River and 80 MW Phander—both will be constructed under the CPEC. The availability of energy is directly linked with industries related to employment, improved earnings, and quality of life. Several small-range power projects are pending due to funding issues. In this context, the opportunity lies in CPEC. It is expected that CPEC investment will initially be focused on hydropower projects. The investment in hydropower is also environmentally friendly. There is around a 3000 MW shortfall for Pakistan against the total demand of 25000 MW.¹⁵ The hydropower development in GB can address the clean energy needs of Pakistan. It may enable Pakistan to export some electricity to China as well. But that would become possible only if GB's potential is fully exploited through CPEC projects.

Green Energy Corridor

According to the Alternative Energy Development Board (AEDB), GB has country's largest hydropower potential. Despite massive hydro potential generation in Pakistan, fewer efforts and investments have been made to garner the benefits. Since fossil fuels dominate Pakistan's energy mix, it imports expensive fuels (Oil, Coal & Gas) for power generation. This negatively costs the struggling economy of Pakistan. Circular debt for the power sector reached Rs. 2476 billion by February 2022. (Rs. 2.47 trillion).¹⁶ The circular debt is the due gap between the high cost of electricity generation, dying transmission /distribution infrastructures, and actual revenue collections and the role of generous government subsidies to bridge the tariff onslaughts. The government of Pakistan has

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Muhammad Sibtain, Xianshan Li, Hassan Bashir, Muhammad Imran Azam, "Hydropower Exploitation for Pakistan's Sustainable Development: A SWOT Analysis Considering Current Situation, Challenges, and Prospects," *Energy Strategy Reviews*, Vol 38 (2021), 100728.

¹⁶ "Pakistan: Power Sector Circular Debt Surges to Rs 2.47 Trillion," *ANI News*, February 10, 2022, <https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/>

recently approved “the Alternative and Renewable Energy Policy, 2019”, wherein ambitious goals have been set. The policy intends to achieve 20 percent on-grid capacity from alternative and renewable energy technologies by 2025 and 30 percent by 2030.¹⁷ This ambitious goal can only be achieved if the hydropower potential of the GB is harnessed.

Gilgit-Baltistan still needs to be connected to National Grid but is planned to be done with the completion of the Diamer-Basha Dam. Meanwhile, a project named, “Establishment of Regional Grid in GB” is in the implementation stage which will create connectivity within GB. The nearest connection with the national grid from GB is Chitral (170 km) and Dassu (300 km). The regional grid of GB will optimise existing and planned hydropower projects for local needs, and create connectivity with the National and Xinjiang Chinese Grids in the long run. This potential area of cooperation between China and Pakistan under the CPEC framework benefits both sides, especially GB.

A Green Energy Corridor can be established by expanding/connecting GB regional Grid with Xinjiang Grid Station on one side and KP on the other. This grid connectivity may help import electricity to address the energy requirements of GB and elsewhere in the country for a shorter period. Moreover, once the hydropower potential of GB is tapped and commissioned, the electricity can be exported to China. This will bring prosperity to GB and billions of rupees to Pakistan. China has made an international commitment to shift away from fossil fuels towards clean energy sources with low carbon emissions. China has pledged to use 80 percent non-fossil energy by 2060. This is a huge area of cooperation as China’s commitment to using 80 percent non-fossil energy can be well facilitated under CPEC by establishing a Green Energy Corridor with GB at the core of it. According to a local official, “more than 50K MW explored hydro capacity, plus many unexplored including solar and wind cannot only make GB an (economic) corridor but also a producer of CGE”.¹⁸

¹⁷ “Alternative and Renewable Energy Policy, 2019,” *Government of Pakistan*, July 21, 2019, <https://www.aedb.org/images/>

¹⁸ Personal interview with a local official in GB, September 12, 2022.

Table 2: CPEC Infrastructure Projects in Pakistan

<i>Projects</i>	<i>Chinese Investment (US\$ bn)</i>	<i>Domestic Share</i>	<i>Domestic Share (US\$ bn)</i>
Energy Projects	33.8		5.9
Coal 7560 MW	8.8	20%	1.8
Wind 200 MW	0.5	20%	0.1
Hydel 1590 MW	4.2	50%	2.1
Solar 1000 MW	1.7	0%	0
Second Phase 6445 MW	9.5	20%	1.9
Mining Expenditure	9	50%	4.5
Roads	5.9	80%	4.7
Railways	3.7	50%	1.8
Mass transit in Lahore	1.6	50%	0.8
Gwadar Port	0.7	50%	0.3
China Pak Fiber Optics	0	0%	0
Total	45.7		18.1

Source: "The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC): Challenges and Prospects," *Area Development and Policy* 4, no. 4 (2019).

The 820-kilometre Pak-China Fiber Optic between Khunjerab Pass and Rawalpindi will bring 3G, 4G, and 5G to the region, improving digital connectivity, employability and economic activity in the area. It will enhance communication, promote tourism, and create trading opportunities for the locals in the area. The improvement in information technology can revolutionize the field of e-commerce.¹⁹ For instance, the educated youth of GB will have access to international online markets to earn without much ado. Improved internet access will bring about easy, cost-effective e-health and e-learning services while considering the area's topography and geography.

Moqpondass Special Economic Zone (SEZ)

Of nine Special Economic Zones (SEZs) planned under CPEC, one will be established at Moqpondass, Gilgit.²⁰ This Moqpondass SEZ will boost trade, generate employment, attract FDI, and increase economic activity in the area. Since there is no SEZ in the region, a successful zone can significantly benefit the locals small and medium-sized industries will create employment opportunities. This SEZ is expected to be a viable instrument of socio-economic development. It is not yet in place, and a land dispute over grazing rights with the government is yet to be settled. However, the site is ideally located at KKH, which may be instrumental if

¹⁹ Sarfraz Ali, "820 Km Optic Fiber Cable Project in GB to Facilitate Tourism, IT Awareness," *Daily Pakistan Global*, August 12, 2018, <https://en.dailypakistan.com.pk/12-Aug-2018/>

²⁰ Dr. Rameez Khalid, "Strategy for Developing an Effective SEZ in Gilgit-Baltistan," *Centre of the Excellence for CPEC*, Issue 2, Working Paper 21 (2018), <https://cpec-centre.pk/wp-content/uploads/>

it is linked with transferring technology to the local economy for overall development.

CPEC proponents believe that, in the long run, it will bring socio-economic development to the area and make GB an economic cradle for Pakistan. It will enhance the geo-economic and geo-strategic importance of Pakistan and play a crucial role in foreign policy decision-making.²¹ It will facilitate large and wide-scale economic development, particularly significant potential exists for small and medium business enterprises, and e-commerce will flourish with the completion of projects on optical fiber and improved internet facilities.

There are always costs associated with progress, and CPEC is no exception. There are widespread perceptions of marginalisation and exploitation because GB does not regularly participate in any CPEC-related decision-making forums like the Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC), Joint Working Group (JWG), or Technical Experts Committee.²² Moreover, without having addressed constitutional identity apprehension, it is interesting to see how the interests of local communities are safeguarded. Apart from the constitutional issue, the fear of environmental degradation and demographic changes are a matter of concern for the locals. Nonetheless, a development practitioner Sultan Abbas believes that “CPEC will enhance GB’s economic relevance and political profile within Pakistan and globally.”²³ In this context, it is important to concentrate on sectors leading to prosperity and success and to devise plans to minimize the negative impacts of CPEC projects on GB.

Enhancing Economic Development

With CPEC, it is expected that FDI will come, and the untapped resources of GB, like minerals, hydropower, and the agriculture sector will be harnessed for the larger good of the country and the region.²⁴ Tourism, which is already a flourishing sector, is seen to be thriving with the coming of Chinese and local tourists. The local business community will be able to establish partnerships with Chinese and Pakistani counterparts for the export of dry fruits, precious stones, and local handicrafts.²⁵ The region

²¹ “CPEC to Change Fate of GB,” *The News International*, May 20, 2017.

²² Seth Oldmixon and Prateek Joshi, “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: A Game Changer for Gilgit-Baltistan,” *The Diplomat*, January 28, 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/>

²³ In discussion with Sultan Abbas (Development Practitioner, AKDN), (Islamabad, April 2022)

²⁴ “CPEC: Gilgit-Baltistan Fate to be Changed,” *Times of Islamabad*, June 17, 2016.

²⁵ “CPEC ‘Game-Changer’ for Pakistan, ‘Fate-Changer’ for Region: PM,” *The Nation*, August 29, 2016.

will equally benefit like other provinces, and its fate will be changed with CPEC.²⁶

The biggest promise CPEC offers is the economic payoffs through generating economic activity. However, there currently needs to be a heavy industry in GB to produce value-added goods and services despite raw material availability. In addition, an organised system for marketing local products needs to be more effective, which can bring the region into the global limelight. CPEC can offer avenues to GB's (agricultural and minerals) products to reach national and international markets. This requires international standard certifications. The CPEC projects will likely facilitate such certification enabling local products to reach international markets. CPEC-related employment is expected to benefit the GB.²⁷ With increased opportunities for trade with China, many employment avenues will be open for the people of GB. The Phase II of CPEC is labour intensive; therefore, one may expect more employment opportunities to meet the requirements of the relocated industries.

Human Resource Development

Human Resource Development is a broader framework under which the skills, abilities, capacities, and knowledge are either improved or enhanced to meet challenging requirements. GB has good potential for the development for its human resource. The literacy rate in GB is well above 65 percent.²⁸ The good literacy rate shows that the region has good base for the development of skilled labour, professionals, and IT experts.

In GB, the CPEC is expected to pave the way for human resource development which is a dire and immediate need of the area, as without skilled manpower or required human resource development cannot be realized at all. GB must transform itself as a knowledge economy and progressively develop its skilled human resource to sustain the demands of CPEC. Aziz Ahmed Jamali, Additional Chief Secretary of Development, views that "although CPEC opens multiple arenas of opportunity and it may impact as an influencer, its game-changing impact can never be realized without meaningful investment in human capital."²⁹ CPEC, through its various contours, is likely to open new arenas of Human

²⁶ Muhammad Ismail, "CPEC and Gilgit Baltistan", *Pamir Times*, November 15, 2021. <https://pamirtimes.net/2021/11/15/cpec-and-gilgit-baltistan-2/>

²⁷ "Job, Business Opportunities to be Created in GB through CPEC," *Daily Times*, June 18, 2016.

²⁸ Abdul Rehman, Luan Jingdong, and Imran Hussain, "The Province-Wise Literacy rate in Pakistan and its impact on the Economy," *Pacific Science Review B: Humanities and Social Sciences* 1, no. 3 (2015): 144.

²⁹ In discussion with Aziz Ahmed Jamali, (ACS Development, PDD, GB), (Gilgit, April 2022).

resource development as one of the major issues in GB is the dearth of skilled human resources.

Technical and Vocational Training

Skills development and Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) are critical to job creation and sustainable economic development. A major reason for the lack of qualified and skilled manpower is the non-availability of work opportunities that limit the possibility of a large pool of skilled workforce. Skills development and transfer are possible through collective engagements under the CPEC projects. For high-tech requirements, institutions of technical and vocational education are planned. In addition, efforts are being made to link existing technical institutions with Chinese institutions so that existing learning centres can also be strengthened. *Confucius* Institutes have been established to teach Mandarin so that locals can learn the language, which will help them better understand Chinese society and the market.

Development of Services Sector

This is an area where GB can benefit the most. More than 60 percent of its population (1.502 million estimated in 2017) is young, and the literacy rate and education are higher among the youth.³⁰ This can be capitalized by producing productive human resources. If GB develops a skilled workforce, earning and employability avenues can multiply. Under CPEC, the services sector can grow significantly by systematically developing human capital, like managers, teachers, IT experts, doctors, hotel services work force, hydro power-related expertise and minerals-related skills. In this regard, the SEZ in the region will also offer a great opportunity.

Economic Inclusiveness of GB under CPEC

CPEC has increased the geo-political and geo-economic importance of GB. People from across the country, being cognizant of the ever-increasing importance of GB, are undertaking business ventures, building housing facilities, and expanding the hospitality industry, leading to an increase flow of domestic and international tourists. On the political front, mainstream political parties of Pakistan are participating in local elections, consultation on national level policies is being held, and national-level programs are extended to GB. Federal Government is investing in upgrading communication infrastructure, airlines, and tourism. On the development side, development models are being copied

³⁰ "Gilgit Baltistan at a Glance-2020," *Statistical & Research Cell (SRC)*, Accessed April 4, 2022 <https://portal.pnd.gog.pk/Content/Files/Reports>.

and implemented elsewhere in the country. National Rural Support Programme (NRSP), Sindh Rural Support Programme (SRSP), Punjab Rural Support Programme (PRSP), and Sarhad Rural Support Programme (SRSP) seek inspiration from AKRSP GB for rural development.³¹ CPEC through its various interventions has the potential to stir partnerships with a broad array of stakeholders including the private sector and civil society for the holistic development of GB based on principles of inclusivity.

CPEC can create such an economic environment wherein businessmen from other parts of the country may invest in GB. This will create opportunities for employment and profitability for the locals, thus leading to the economic mainstreaming of the local population. Economic inclusivity leads to inclusive prosperity, which is expected from the CPEC. Economic growth largely transpires by boosting the efficiency of local human resources. SEZs can enhance the skill base; knowledge may come with Chinese expertise/experience and the transfer of technological infrastructure. GB now needs a more skilled work force; this hindrance can be addressed under CPEC-related auxiliary initiatives. Human capital equipped with skills and knowledge, supplemented by technology, is a prerequisite to enable growth. Economic growth can get impetus through the inclusivity of underutilized resources, a cross-sector approach, and financial inclusion of people, assets, and places. Thus, CPEC may provide the opportunity for increased inclusivity and participation of locals in economic activity for the collective good.

Social Inclusiveness of GB under CPEC

Social inclusion promotes a sense of belongingness to a particular community and one's role in a community. Social inclusion is important for a healthy life, and its absence leads to isolation, loneliness, and low self-esteem. GB is geographically and culturally isolated from the rest of the country; even within, GB chunks live in scattered and far-flung areas. CPEC can play a critical role in bringing people and cultures together. Language and culture are tools of social interaction and integration. Cross-cultural events, cross-fertilization of ideas, and cultural exchange programs can bring people from GB and the rest of the country closer to each other.

CPEC has the potential to bring people together through improved air and land accessibility of GB and active participation of people from GB in programs under CPEC. The Confucius Institute at KIU Gilgit plays an active role in teaching the Chinese language and organizing cultural events in GB. Such programs need to be expanded to other regions by introducing GB language learning centres in the country's major universities.

³¹ Guillaume De Spoelberch, Robert D'Arcy Shaw, Richard D. Bartel, "A Model: The Aga Khan Rural Support Program," *Challenge* 29, no. 6 (1987): 26–31.

Conclusion

CPEC is important for the socio-economic development of GB. It provides a pivot for regional connectivity, an opportunity to revive the ailing national economy and needs in energy, communication, infrastructure, industrial, and information technology sectors. It is also challenging because it may create and deepen polarization within Pakistani society, cause environmental degradation, invite proxy interventions, and increase vulnerability to external debt burden and other undue pressures. The positivity and apprehensions attached to CPEC are rational, yet the dividends of CPEC, which will be fully materialized gradually over a longer period are subject to the handling of the project based on the principles of consensus and a sense of ownership among the stakeholders.

The success of CPEC is the litmus test for the success of BRI, and the success of CPEC in GB is the litmus test for the success of CPEC. This correlation between BRI, CPEC, and GB is an interdependent relationship with varying scale and intensity, yet this interdependent relationship massively enhances GB's geo-economics and geopolitical significance. The territorial jurisdiction of GB acts as a pivot and an axis of land connectivity between South Asia, Central Asia, and Western China. The area of GB is also of geostrategic importance for Pakistan concerning its strained relationship with India. The region is a linchpin regarding the soft image of Pakistan with cultural diversity, sublime natural beauty, and rich natural resources, mainly hydro and mineral resources. The systems and structures in Pakistan are not responsive enough to meet the ever-increasing needs of investments/loans under CPEC which may aggravate the situation in Pakistan. However, for the Chinese signature project (BRI) to go global, CPEC is an absolute must for China for the overland transit route to the Indian Ocean. In addition to investments/loans, Pakistan seeks afloat military ties and diplomatic support, which has consequences. Pakistan sees an opportunity in China-India border clashes/disputes coupled with China's growing interest in building/consolidating an indefatigable blue-water navy and interests in far seas. This diplomatic machination is highly dependent upon the success of CPEC in all its manifestation.

The local dynamics are equally crucial for the success or failure of CPEC in GB. The consecutive governments at the federal and provincial levels have been able to allay the misperceptions about CPEC. They are trying to disseminate a strong positive impression yet there are voices in GB who are either politically disenfranchised, or their outlook is dominated by sectarian, ethnic or nationalistic affiliations, whereby knowingly or unknowingly they act as an auxiliary to either disrupt or make the project controversial.

According to the GB government's finance department, the Government of Pakistan has pumped around Rupees 118 billion into the development of Gilgit-Baltistan from 2003-2021, and with CPEC, more social and economic benefits may be garnered. Yet reservations, indignant displeasure, and discontent persist unabatedly, and with time it is regressing into anger and deprivation. The most advocated issue in GB is the political identity crisis, a constitutional limbo status of GB since her independence from the Dogra rule in November 1947. Therefore, this study concludes that without addressing political alienation, any socioeconomic intervention would only allay the uncertainties and dissatisfaction among the people. Stakeholders in Pakistan need to realize that political identity is the fundamental right of the people of G-B, and if left unaddressed, the issue would only exacerbate. The resolution of the political conundrum and concerns of GB's population is in the interest of CPEC. The success of CPEC, which depends on GB, would be at stake if the people's political questions were ignored.

HYBRID WARFARE: EMERGING CHALLENGES FOR PAKISTAN

Hassan Jalil Shah * & Muhammad Ehsan**

Abstract

Hybrid Warfare is gaining currency and posing new challenges to military thinkers and practitioners. The changes by the technological revolution, information and psychological operations, digitisation of the battlefield, and modernisation in conventional warfare have ceased to be the standalone option for applying force. These changes envisage the application of all Elements of National Power (EoNP), projected along a continuous span of activities, stretching from stability, security, reconstruction and terminating at armed conflict. The paper explains that hybrid warfare is the instrument of choice by the challengers, primarily India, to weaken Pakistan, subjugate it and either balkanise it or make it a flaccid state as the least desired objective. With hybrid warfare as an instrument of application against Pakistan, this article has attempted to dissect its contours and impact on Pakistan.

Keywords: *Elements of National Power, Hybrid Warfare, Orchestrated Instability, Non-Contact Warfare, Grey Zone Strategies*

Introduction

Conventional war, with increased lethality, technological advancement, the threat of nuclear exchange and extension of battle¹ has become a cost-prohibitive option. The phenomenal rise of non-state actors and the violence associated with these elements vis-à-

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¹ With all the elements of national power (EoNP) now involved in the national security, the wars are not limited to conventional spaces where large scale manoeuvres used to be conducted to outwit the adversary.

vis the reluctance of the states to engage in conflicts at a massive scale has reduced the space for conventional application. There is an increasing reliance on subjugating the enemy's will through hybrid warfare. Post World War II (WWII) era witnessed more reliance on information and economic warfare. This application of hybrid warfare attains political and strategic ends and has led to the evolution of hybrid war. The term hybrid warfare owes its genesis to the fact that when the space and scope for conventional wars under nuclear overhang reduced, the states made resort to a combination of kinetic and non-kinetic means of force to exert pressure against an adversary. Thus, hybrid warfare is the product of a wide range and simultaneous application of battlefield tools in the same battle space.²

The phrase "hybrid war" was coined following the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict.³ Hybrid warfare connotes unconventional methods as part of a "multi-domain" war concept, i.e., conceptually distinct domains applied synergistically through a joint operation aimed at disrupting and disabling the adversary's response options without resorting to a full-scale conventional war. Still wanting a unified definition, various scholars have defined Hybrid warfare per their scholastic opinion.⁴ Hybrid warfare refers to unconventional methods as part of a "multi-domain." Rather than relying exclusively on conventional means of war, i.e., the application of traditional weapons and troops on the battlefield, hybrid warfare emphasises blending conventional warfare with irregular warfare. The unconventional means include political warfare, which employs political means to subdue the adversary's will. Besides cyber warfare, economic warfare, fake news, diplomacy, and lawfare are employed in hybrid war to delegitimise the opponent.⁵

The 2006 Israel-Hezbollah battle was a classic example of hybrid

² Tarik Solmaz, "Hybrid Warfare: One Term, Many Meanings," *Small Wars Journal*, February 25, 2022, <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/hybrid-warfare-one-term-many-meanings>.

³ Frank G. Hoffman, "Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars," (Arlington: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, December 2007), <https://www.potomac institute.org/>; Ilmari Käihkö, "The Evolution of Hybrid Warfare: Implications for Strategy and the Military Profession," *The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters* 51, no. 3 (August 25, 2021), <https://doi.org/10.55540/0031-1723.3084>.

⁴ Brian P. Fleming, "The Hybrid Threat Concept: Contemporary War, Military Planning and the Advent of Unrestricted Operational Art," *Defense Technical Information Center*, May 19, 2011, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA545789>.

⁵ Reid Standish, "Inside a European Center to Combat Russia's Hybrid Warfare," *Foreign Policy*, January 18, 2018, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/18/inside-a-european-center-to-combat-russias-hybrid-warfare/>.

warfare, with Hezbollah combining political movement with decentralised resistance forces that would blend with civilians.⁶ To counter the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL), the US used a combination of kinetic and non-kinetic means, including the use of force, psychological warfare operations and use of intelligence-led operations. Similarly, the Russian campaign leading to the annexation of Crimea can be cited as an example of hybrid warfare.

Pakistan has also been subjected to hybrid warfare, the most evident manifestation being the separation of East Pakistan in 1971.⁷ Post-nuclearization of the sub-continent, the space for the application of conventional means against Pakistan by India has reduced. However, hybrid warfare gives greater leverage to the adversaries against Pakistan.⁸ Since the space for conventional war has greatly reduced, hybrid warfare has gained greater currency. Besides elucidating the theoretical perspective, the rationale for carrying out this research also identifies threats posed to Pakistan and the response options thereof. This calls for a deeper understanding of all forms of hybrid warfare and the exploitable fault lines of Pakistan. This paper explores the conceptual contours of hybrid warfare to understand the existing and emerging challenges that Pakistan faces from hybrid warfare, and proposes countermeasures. It explains the factors which have caused a paradigm shift from conventional warfare to hybrid warfare and analyse the hybrid threat spectrum that Pakistan will face in the future.

Literature Review

The fusion of regular and irregular wars and technologies would create a synergetic effect for those perpetrating this kind of war against adversaries.⁹ Indian view on hybrid warfare emphasised the employment of state and non- state actors to create a synergy combining conventional and non-conventional means of coercion. The open-ended battlefield would yield much more consequences for the adversary. Dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971, causes of unrest in Karachi in 1980s, support to Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), keeping Pakistan in the Gray List of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and on-going unrest in Balochistan are

⁶ Frank G. Hoffman, "Conflict in the 21st Century."

⁷ Muhammad Ashraf Nadeem, Dr. Ghulam Mustafa, and Dr. Allauddin Kakar, "Fifth Generation Warfare and its Challenges to Pakistan," *Pakistan Journal of International Affairs* 4, no. 1 (March 29, 2021), <https://doi.org/10.52337/pjia.v4i1.118>.

⁸ Ghulam Muhammad Malik, "Weaponization of All Elements of National Power by India: Hybrid Warfare against Pakistan," *The Dialogue*, December 31, 2020.

⁹ Frank G. Hoffman, "Conflict in the 21st Century".

some of the Indian hybrid warfare strategies.¹⁰

As part of a "multi-domain" strategy for fighting a conflict, hybrid warfare is defined as using unorthodox tactics.¹¹ These means and methods are aimed at disruption and disability of opponent's actions sans engagement in open hostilities and envelopes the combination of conventional and unconventional strategies.¹² The unconventional means are more lethal and challenging than conventional warfare¹³ and encompass fake news (i.e, EU DisinfoLab) and proxies (i.e., Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)).¹⁴

Being more diverse and having wider consequences on the adversary,¹⁵ this type of warfare is also referred to as "competition short of conflict," "gray zone strategies"¹⁶ and "active measures". It is also referred to as "New Generation Warfare" since it uses more information and technology.¹⁷ Hybrid strategies have been advocated by and applied by different states with direct or indirect involvement of military instruments of the state, their intelligence agencies and non-state actors as proxies.¹⁸ Hybrid warfare is used to influence decisions and State policies with or in combination with the violent application of force. These other reasons may include acquiring land, and gaining an advantage over the adversary by applying lawfare and coercion while staying short of direct conflict and conventional warfare.¹⁹

¹⁰ Nouman Mubarik, Junaid Jhandad, and Asma Shakir Khawja, "Indian Hybrid Warfare in Pakistan: Spin off Ramifications for Pakistan's National Security," *Journal of Indian Studies* 7, no. 1 (2021): 107–22.

¹¹ Andrew Dowse and Sascha-Dominik Bachmann, "What is 'Hybrid Warfare' and What is Meant by the 'Grey Zone'?" *The Conversation*, June 17, 2019, <https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-hybrid-warfare-and-what-is-meant-by-the-grey-zone-118841>

¹² Erik Reichborn-Kjennerud and Patrick Cullen, "What Is Hybrid Warfare," *Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Policy Brief* 1 (February 26, 2016), <http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2380867>

¹³ James K. Wither, "Making Sense of Hybrid Warfare," *Connections* 15, no. 2 (2016): 73–87.

¹⁴ Waseem Ahmad Qureshi, "The Rise of Hybrid Warfare," *Notre Dame Journal of International & Comparative Law* 10, no. 2 (2020)

¹⁵ Taras Kuzio and Paul D'Anieri, "The Soviet Origins of Russian Hybrid Warfare," *E-International Relations*, June 13, 2018.

¹⁶ Hal Brands, "Paradoxes of the Gray Zone," January 2016. <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2737593>

¹⁷ James K. Wither, "Making Sense of Hybrid Warfare."

¹⁸ Christopher Paul, "Confessions of a Hybrid Warfare Skeptic," *Small Wars Journal*, March 3, 2016. <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/confessions-of-a-hybrid-warfare-skeptic>.

¹⁹ Lyle J. Morris et al., "Gaining Competitive Advantage in the Gray Zone: Response Options for Coercive Aggression below the Threshold of Major War"

There is a broad spectrum of conflicts, including grey zone, hybrid war, conventional and limited conflicts.²⁰ Many terminologies have been used to denote the notion of hybrid warfare while applying non-traditional or special war tactics. The terminologies used in these contexts include; hybrid influencing, threats, and adversaries. The instruments and means for applying the hybrid warfare method, including its most essential component, have evolved through conventional and unconventional warfare tools.²¹ Economic warfare²² against the target state is considered an essential component of this unconventional warfare. The instrument of its application includes the entire spectrum of use of force, including regular military or irregular forces.²³

Tools of Hybrid Warfare

Like conventional warfare, hybrid warfare aims to acquire dominance over the adversary. If employed prudently and in the correct permutation, the tools of hybrid war, including regular military forces, economic coercion, diplomacy, use of proxies, fanning local uprising, info warfare, and cyber-attacks can cause tumultuous effects over the hostile target state, whether domestically or internationally. By its capabilities of involving every citizen and every instrument of the adversary, warfare provides the initiator with a unique advantage of bypassing the UN Laws and Geneva conventions regarding adherence to fundamental human rights and not attacking non-combatants.²⁴

The activities while employing proxy forces range from hiring, funding and abetment of terrorist organisations are employed primarily to destabilise a target state. Fanning and accentuating the unrest locally, creating economic instability, and negative image branding, domestically and internationally, to project the target state as dangerous and unviable for business. These are a few examples of waging proxy wars against a hostile state.

These silent proxy wars have the potential to escalate into military

(RAND National Defense Research Institute Santa Monica United States, 2019). <https://www.rand.org/>

²⁰ Frank G. Hoffman, "The Contemporary Spectrum of Conflict: Protracted, Gray Zone, Ambiguous, and Hybrid Modes of War," *The Heritage Foundation*, 2016, 25-36. <https://www.heritage.org/>

²¹ Bettina Renz, "Russia and 'Hybrid Warfare,'" *Contemporary Politics* 22, no. 3 (2016): 283-300.

²² Qureshi, "The Rise of Hybrid Warfare."

²³ Wither, "Making Sense of Hybrid Warfare."

²⁴ Jerrid K. Allen, "Cognitive Depth and Hybrid Warfare: Exploring the Nature of Unique Time, Space, and Logic Frames", (Kansas: US Army School for Advanced Military Studies Fort Leavenworth United States), May 25, 2017.

action.²⁵ The intensification of the Syrian civil war during the Arab Spring is an example of hybrid war.²⁶ Fanning local unrest through proxies to create instability, leading to civil war in a targeted State, is another manifestation of hybrid warfare. The unrest in Pakistan, especially in Balochistan, is squarely attributed to the hybrid warfare capabilities of our time-tested nemesis, India.²⁷ The info domain of hybrid warfare uses mediums like social media and electronic media for perception management through false propaganda and fake news with an intent of negative image branding and sowing the seeds of dissension among the citizens against their government.²⁸

Diplomacy, an instrument of this kind of warfare, is the adroit application of statecraft to isolate and disparage a target state amongst nations. With offensive diplomatic capabilities spanning national and international politics, statecraft, and diplomacy, the initiator dominates and exploits the target state's vulnerabilities, thus creating an unfavourable environment, leading to the imposition of punitive action on a target state.²⁹ Economic sanctions, lawfare and such intentional nuisances are aimed at seriously eroding a target state's economic element of national power. Such sanctions affect a target country's international trade and severely impact the state's domestic economy. Information and IT capabilities of the aggressor state vis-à-vis the response capabilities of the target state play an important role in deciding the outcome of hybrid warfare. Information management, cyber-attacks and artificial intelligence are the key enablers and instruments of choice in hybrid warfare.³⁰

²⁵ Muhammad Nadeem Mirza and Summar Iqbal Babar, "The Indian Hybrid Warfare Strategy: Implications for Pakistan," *Progressive Research Journal of Arts and Humanities (PRJAH)* 2, no. 1 (2020): 39–52.

²⁶ OĞUZ Şafak and Kadir Ertaç Çelik, "Conflict in Syria: Is it a Proxy Warfare?," *Uluslararası Kriz ve Siyaset Araştırmaları Dergisi* 2, no. 2 (2018): 44–69. <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/uksad/issue/41747/504107>

²⁷ Mubarik, Jhandad, and Khawja, "Indian Hybrid Warfare in Pakistan"; Shakoor Ahmad Wani, "The New Baloch Militancy: Drivers and Dynamics," *India Quarterly* 77, no. 3 (2021): 479–500.

²⁸ William II Murray, "Hybrid Warfare Dilemmas in the Middle Colonies during the American Revolution" (US Army School for Advanced Military Studies Fort Leavenworth United States) July 5, 2017) : 1-43.

²⁹ Sascha-Dominik Dov Bachmann and Hakan Gunneriusson, "Eyes Wide Shut: How Russia's Hybrid Warfare Exposes and Exploits Western Vulnerabilities," *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, no. January 18 (2017) urn:nbn:se:fhs:diva-7160 ; Inam Ullah Shah, "Indian Hybrid War: Challenges for Pakistan," *Strafasia*, June 18, 2019, <https://strafasia.com/indian-hybrid-war-challenges-for-pakistan/>

³⁰ Ralph D. Thiele and Johann Schmid, "Hybrid Warfare—Orchestrating the Technology Revolution," *ISPSW Strategy Series*, no. 663, (January 2020), <https://www.ispsw.com/wp->


Though considered the least favourable option³¹, a state's kinetic application of military can help achieve the desired objective and dislocation of status quo.³²

Stages of Hybrid Warfare

The four stages that a conflict continuum in hybrid environment can be categorised include:

- Stage-1. Orchestrated Instability.
- Stage-2. Proxy Sanctum.
- Stage-3. Coercion, and the last stage denoting Coup de Grace.³³

Figure 1: Stages of Hybrid Warfare



Source: Compiled by the Author

³¹ Maaz Nisar, "5 GW and Hybrid Warfare its Implications and Response Options," Escola Marechal Castello Branco, 2018, <https://bdex.eb.mil.br/jspui/bitstream/123456789/2827/1/>


³² Gary Schaub Jr, Martin Murphy, and Frank G. Hoffman, "Hybrid Maritime Warfare: Building Baltic Resilience," *The RUSI Journal* 162, no. 1 (2017): 32–40.

³³ Williamson Murray and Peter R. Mansoor, eds., *Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present* (Cambridge University Press, 2012).

Hybrid Spectrum

The stages, design, and various tools available culminate in a hybrid warfare model, as shown in Figure-2. This hybrid spectrum is composed of an aggressor who employs multiple thrust lines to influence various components of the target state over time while transiting from covert to overt phases of hybrid warfare. These components include; Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure (PMESII). Depending on the prevailing environment, these stages could be employed in a sequence, overlapping or skipped altogether.³⁴

Figure 2: Hybrid Spectrum



Source: Compiled by the Author

Hybrid Warfare- Regional Context

The confluence of four sub-littoral systems, Pakistan’s geo-strategic location, and a turbulent regional security calculus, particularly the Afghan imbroglio, make Pakistan a prime target of multi-layered threats of hybrid warfare. The Chinese strategy of global outreach through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and China- Pakistan economic Corridor (CPEC) has further accentuated the vulnerabilities of Pakistan to the

³⁴ Patrick Cullen and Erik Reichborn-Kjennerud, “Understanding Hybrid Warfare,” *Multinational Capability Development Campaign Project*, 2016-17. 2016-17, <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/>.

hybrid dimension of warfare.³⁵

Being the victim of its geography, Pakistan has suffered the consequences of the Afghan conflict. Pakistan has been at the fore in the aftermath of more than 40 years of war, civil unrest, and insurgency, along with terrorism and foreign involvement in Afghanistan. It has borne the brunt of terrorism in the wake of 9/11. Pakistan has been persistently subjected to various instruments of hybrid warfare. The nation's resolve and numerous sacrifices by its Armed Forces have enabled it to withstand the challenges of hybrid warfare.³⁶

India views Pakistan as a roadblock to its regional and international aspirations. It has never shied away from using conventional and hybrid warfare tools against Pakistan's weak points through diplomatic means or exploitation of internal vulnerabilities. India has successfully applied hybrid warfare by making maximum use of information warfare.³⁷ India indulged in intense information warfare to justify the abrogation of Article 370 that gave autonomous status to Indian Occupied Jammu & Kashmir (IIOJK). This has been corroborated by the EU Dis-infoLab findings.³⁸

Analysis

After reviewing various components of hybrid warfare, it is appropriate to critically identify the grey areas and protective measures for Pakistan. For a long time, Pakistan has been the target of an on-going hybrid war. The main characteristic of this threat is that it is persistent, well-planned, and constantly shifts between different dimensions depending on the current geo-strategic and geo-political situation.³⁹ It has now been well reckoned by all that a purely military option is hard to generate in the first instance, and subsequently achieving desired objectives is more or less not satisfactory. However, the Balakot episode in 2019⁴⁰ has alluded to the new notion of escalation being introduced by India, whereas in the continuum of the hybrid spectrum, the war would be

³⁵ Nasreen Akhtar, Inamullah Jan, and Sumaira Akram, "Hybrid Warfare Strategy of India: Impacts on Pakistan," *Global Regional Review* VI, no. II (June 30, 2021): 64–72, [https://doi.org/10.31703/grr.2021\(VI-II\).09](https://doi.org/10.31703/grr.2021(VI-II).09).

³⁶ Sahibzada Muhammad Usman, "FATA Merges into Pakistan's National System," *South Asian Survey* 29, no. 1 (2022): 103–18.

³⁷ Mubarak, Jhandad, and Khawja, "Indian Hybrid Warfare in Pakistan."

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Muhammad Ashraf Nadeem, et al., "The Emergence of Hybrid Warfare and International Security Environment: A Case Study of Pakistan," *Pakistan Journal of International Affairs* 4, no. 3 (2021).

⁴⁰ Hassan Jalil Shah and Naseem Anwar Khan, "Nuclear Deterrence and Conflict Transformation: Assessing States Behaviour in South Asia," *MARGALLA Papers*, 2019, 53.

considered a process rather than an event. In this type of force coercion, the continuum of hybrid warfare would be applied with the rudiments of non-contact warfare,⁴¹ gaining more currency.⁴²

In contrast to what India wants the world to think about Pakistan's intention to bleed it with a thousand cuts, this gradual implementation of hybrid warfare through a thousand cuts is intended to undermine the state from within. This argument gains more weightage when viewed from South Asia's nuclearised environment, making conventional war a cost-prohibitive option for the adversary. Hence resorting to waging hybrid threats against Pakistan is a cost-effective option.

Pakistan's countermeasures would entail the employment of all elements of national power (EoNP), including Military, Economy, Diplomacy, and IT would be synergistically employed in what is denoted as the "Whole of Government Approach" to ensure returning losses to the adversary. As enunciated earlier, an effective response to the hybrid threat entails a "Whole of the Nation's Approach".⁴³ The National Security Council (NSC) neither has a law to define the criterion for its membership nor regular consultations conducted (as part of the system) for updating the response options in various spheres of national security, including hybrid threats. Additionally, carrying out threat perception and assessment by civil security-related institutions is rare. This laid-back approach entirely relies on military feedback on various core issues, including non-traditional security threats. This skewed approach towards security-related issues results in a security paradigm wholly placed in the domain of the military, which does not have the wherewithal to integrate the remaining elements of national power into the security structure of Pakistan. The 2019 crisis and Pakistan's Operation Swift Retort have made it clear that India will continue to use hybrid warfare against Pakistan for attrition, keeping the kinetic application towards the end of the spectrum.⁴⁴ The Balakot episode has resulted in the recalibration of

⁴¹ Non-contact warfare is defined as the form of warfare in which states seek to employ all elements of national power to leverage their influence across multiple domains to target adversary's population, sovereignty, governance structures and economy through non-military or military non-kinetic and kinetic means. Vivek Verma, "Non-Contact Warfare: Lessons from the US National Defence Strategy," *CLAWS Journal* 14, no. 1 (2021): 67–84.

⁴² Vivek Verma, "Non-Contact Warfare: Lessons from the US National Defence Strategy," *CLAWS Journal* 14, no. 1 (2021): 67–84.

⁴³ Murat Caliskan, "Hybrid Warfare through the Lens of Strategic Theory," *Defense & Security Analysis* 35, no. 1 (January 2, 2019): 40–58, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2019.1565364>.

⁴⁴ "US Averted Indo-Pak Nuclear War: Pompeo," *The Express Tribune*, January 25, 2023, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2397638/us-averted-indo-pak-nuclear-war-pompeo>.

national security options for pursuing strategized response options against hybrid threats.⁴⁵

Through the hybrid threats, India is making Pakistan pay a heavy price for its national security.⁴⁶ Therefore, the existing policy of keeping ambiguity in the National Security Policy would no longer be a viable option. Making national security a wholesome issue, all the stakeholders and institutions now need to be clear about their role in neutralising its adverse effects.

Social media is aggressively used for perception management and social engineering to spread discontentment and despondency in Pakistan. Its user base in India projected Pakistan as a failing state and its army as the harbinger of all the ills Pakistan faces. There is, a need to harness the potential of social media to restore the faith of the youth in the state.⁴⁷

The information domain has effectively disseminated India's narrative on domestic and foreign fronts against Pakistan.⁴⁸ With the diminishing value of objective facts vis-à-vis the false news. In the battle of narratives, the dominance of media and propaganda cannot be over emphasised to win the battle against competing narratives. The whole-of-the-nation approach would necessitate integrating media warfare with our diplomatic overtures. India has effectively built a narrative and gained acceptance at domestic and international forums. Pakistan needs to enhance its intellectual capacity to build alternative and credible narratives. All the stakeholders, state entities and the people of Pakistan must recognize that hybrid threats are not only real but also consistent and present with a rising level of complexity.

Pakistan's Specific Hybrid Warfare Model

Pakistan has strategic competition and challenges, with India posing the biggest threat.⁴⁹ Several factors have contributed to exacerbating these internal and external challenges ranging from its geo-

⁴⁵ Muhammad Husnain, Muhammad Mateen, and Asia Maqsood, "Analysis of Pakistani and Indian Media towards Warfare: Case Study of Pulwama Attack & Balakot Airstrike," *Turkish Online Journal of Qualitative Inquiry* 12, no. 8 (2021).

⁴⁶ Håkan Gunneriusson, "Nothing is Taken Serious Until it gets Serious: Countering Hybrid Threats," *Defence Against Terrorism Review* 4, no. 1 (2012): 47–70.


⁴⁷ Shahbaz Aslam, "Hybrid Warfare and Social Media: Need and Scope of Digital Literacy," *Indian Journal of Science and Technology* 13, no. 12 (March 28, 2020): 1293–1299, <https://doi.org/10.17485/IJST/v13i12.43>.

⁴⁸ Beatrice De Graaf, George Dimitriu, and Jens Ringsmose, *Strategic Narratives, Public Opinion and War: Winning Domestic Support for the Afghan War* (Routledge, 2015)

⁴⁹ Maaz, "5 GW and Hybrid Warfare its Implications and Response Options."

strategic, geo-political location to internal challenges, political instability, and economic vulnerabilities. Beyond all doubt, these hurdles need to be scaled back in order to compete with India strategically.⁵⁰ The effects of the US war on terror, Indo-US strategic convergence, and closer Pakistan-China relations, within context of CPEC have contributed to an accentuated hybrid threat to Pakistan.⁵¹

Figure 3: Pakistan Specific Hybrid Model



Source: Compiled by the Author


Pakistan continues to suffer a full spectrum of hybrid war with multiple thrust lines including Military, Economy, Diplomacy, Information warfare, Sub-conventional and Lawfare (DIME-SL). The bleeding of Pakistan through sub-conventional has been the instrument of adversary’s hybrid warfare through violent non- state actors (VNSA).

The hybrid threat against Pakistan is at two distinct levels: the overt area of open-warfare hybrid threats and the hazy covert area of grey-zone hybrid threats. Hybrid threats against Pakistan become unique when viewed in the backdrop concurrent to the application of covert grey strategies through Sub Conventional Warfare (SCW) and terrorism; the strategic challenger, India is also overtly using her military instrument. This makes the military instrument a predominant factor in Indo-Pak context.

⁵⁰ Vira Ratsiborynska, *When Hybrid Warfare Supports Ideology: Russia Today* Research Paper 133, (Research Division, NATO Defense College, 2016)

⁵¹ Hussain, “Hybrid Warfare, 5th Generation Warfare and Pakistan’s Response.”

Figure 4: Proposed Hybrid Threat Appreciation Model
Hybrid Threat Appreciation Model



Source: Compiled by the Author

The threat analysis model to be used for carrying out hybrid threat perception can be summarized through the following cardinals


- Hybrid warfare is designed to attack several areas. The proposed model's upper left box indicates the state's need to assess the hybrid warfare spectrum to identify vulnerabilities and recognize critical functions. The realistic national self-assessment process would augment endeavours to evaluate the hybrid threats across each DIME-SL domain.
- The lower left box focuses on hybrid warfare threat analysis. In this domain, the military focuses on countering the threats emanating from the 'M' (military) threats. The other ministries and civilian agencies assist with non-traditional threat analysis, dealing with economic, lawfare, diplomatic, and information.
- The hybrid warfare threat analysis helps understand how a specific hybrid warfare actor can synchronously accentuate vulnerabilities across the DIME-SL spectrum.
- The integrated national approach aims at inculcating comprehensiveness of the response achieved through synchronizing the response of the entire nation, including government, masses and the military.
- The institutionalized process of collecting and disseminating threat and vulnerability assessment will ensure an enhanced early

warning capability in hybrid warfare domain that can help in formulating an effective response.

Hybrid Warfare, being asymmetrical and having multiple instruments of power, lays an increasing emphasis on ambiguity and creativity.⁵² Those intending to subject Pakistan to hybrid warfare would endeavour to create desired effects by harmonizing all elements of national power, both horizontally and vertically, orchestrated through a series of specific activities. The hostile state can accentuate Pakistan's vulnerabilities, both horizontally and vertically. In contrast, vertical effects can be achieved by escalating one or multiple instruments of power in the horizontal plane. The effects can be achieved by activating multiple instruments of power to achieve synergized effects greater than vertical escalation alone.

The key is that the different instruments of power are used in multiple dimensions and on multiple levels simultaneously in a synchronized fashion. This allows the adversaries to use different DIME - SL means to create synchronized assault packages specifically tailored to the perceived vulnerabilities of the target domain. This proposed framework (adopted from NATO Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC) 2016-17 for countering hybrid Warfare) is based on two discrete yet interlocked categories that need to be understood in concert; the sum of hybrid Warfare is greater than each part.

Figure 5: Response Framework



Source: Compiled by the Author.

⁵² Muhammad Waqas Haider and Tahir Mahmood Azad, "Pakistan-India after Pulwama Attacks: Theoretical Assessment," *Asian Journal of International Peace and Security* (AJIPS) 5, no. 3 (Winter, 2021): 12-26.

- **Critical Functions and Vulnerabilities** These are activities or operations spread across the entire spectrum, including military, economy, politics, social, and information. These discontinuations of these activities may lead to the disruption of services that a working system like the state of Pakistan or society depends upon. These could be individuals, organisations, infrastructures and processes (i.e., legal-jurisdictional, technical or political). Pakistan has vulnerabilities in all critical functions, making it a soft target of adversaries.
- **Synchronisation of Means (Horizontal Escalation)** The ability of a hostile actor to effectively coordinate all instruments of power in time, space and purpose to create the desired effects; the key characteristics are synchronisation and simultaneity in the application of both military and non-military means. While the military aspect of the Balakot event was escalated with the informational and diplomatic aspects, efforts were made to link the issue to the FATF, synchronising the lawfare realm.

Way Forward

Specific recommendations at policy and military level are as under:

Policy Level

Being synchronized and systematic, hybrid warfare, calls for a synchronized response, which must be led and owned by nation's political hierarchy. It has to be the whole nation's approach to response mechanism.⁵³ Towards this end, the much-needed National Security Policy (NSP) has been a step in the right direction. While the NSP has declared "Economic Security" as the foremost cardinal of its policy, NSP would not yield the desired results unless duly backed up by a robust economy. An economy susceptible to internal and external shocks is a bad omen for the country's security; hence Pakistan needs to ensure a stable, progressive and robust economy.

The Clausewitzian Trinity (government, people, military) needs to respond forcefully to hybrid threats because a solid social contract between the government and its people serves as the first line of defense.⁵⁴ The nation's response calls for a stronger Government - military interface, capacity building of civil LEAs and intelligence outfits. A responsive and agile Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) and Ministry of Law are quintessential for an effective response to hybrid threats in lawfare. Pakistan adopts an aggressive stance in the war of narratives while all-out

⁵³ Sean Monaghan, "Countering Hybrid Warfare," *Prism* 8, no. 2 (2019): 82-99.

⁵⁴ Colin M. Fleming, *Clausewitz's Timeless Trinity: A Framework For Modern War* (Routledge, 2016)

attempts are made to counter and neutralise the hostile propaganda on both the domestic and global fronts.

Military Level

To respond to the altered battle space in hybrid warfare, our military instruments must ensure that they are well calibrated to respond to this form of warfare and appropriately postured to counter these threats. The Balakot event has amply demonstrated the resolve of the military instrument to deny space to the enemy for selective kinetic operations and an assured response for escalating the level of violence. The need for a credible defensive posture calls for corresponding military capabilities. The defence forces of Pakistan have robustly withstood the demands of both conventional and SCW threats. However, it must keep itself evolving to the changing nature of the threat. The defence forces would have to rely more on unconventional means, enhance intelligence and special forces capabilities and increase service interoperability.

Protect C4 Systems & Networks

Pakistan must ensure agile and configurable command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, information, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4I2SR) systems capable of making decisions to the lowest appropriate level. It must leverage technological advances to develop new capabilities and improve the existing capabilities to detect, identify, locate and engage source(s) of cyber-attacks to assure access to the flow of critical information. The need for developing offensive cyber capabilities must be considered. In the domain of concepts and doctrines, there is a need to enhance and develop offensive and defensive concepts. Similarly, strategies and legal frameworks are also to be put in place to deter, respond to and counter an attack in ungoverned areas of cyberspace and space.

Balochistan is a prime example of how hybrid warfare against Pakistan is most profitable when it succeeds in causing rifts between the public and the country's armed forces. In order to prevent our opponent from reproducing the circumstances of 1971, this strong relationship between the general public and the armed forces must remain preserved. All instruments of the state related to the battle of narrative must act in unison and synergize their efforts to thwart a powerful propaganda warfare against Pakistan.

On the diplomatic front, rather than operating in silos, all elements of national power must synergize their efforts for an effective diplomatic posture at the international level. The very effective military diplomacy in the Middle East, China, the US and Afghanistan needs to be tailored with the other instruments of diplomacy, including economic and political diplomacy, for a synergized output.

The military must take precautions to avoid being associated with extrajudicial murders, missing persons cases, or human rights violations in order to counter the negative effects of the selective application of lawfare in the form of international law against Pakistan as a tool of hybrid warfare. Military must collaborate closely with Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) to calibrate response in lawfare domain in the international arena.

Conclusion

The idea of hybrid warfare is not novel; however, the manifestation spectrum is rapidly broadening and encompassing the whole range of Elements of National Power (EoNP). Threat dynamics in South Asia are characterised by hybrid warfare, necessitating a response approach that integrates policy, doctrine, strategy, and operations. One must be cognizant that a single instrument of national power cannot win hybrid warfare. It requires harmonization of all the elements of national power and appropriate governmental 'institutional machinery,' the processes, mechanisms, people and skills to formulate an effective response. Countering hybrid threats requires a 'whole-of-government' activity, that calls for a multidimensional approach to exploit and augment existing institutions, processes and organizations where possible. Detering and responding to hybrid threats calls for a well-orchestrated planning process and implementation of measures across the DIMESIL domains using the Military, Political, Economic, Diplomatic and Information (MPEDI) levers of power.

This paper has discussed the notions of hybrid warfare and its spectrum, consisting of multiple thrust lines that an aggressor may employ against the target state. The spectrum of hybrid threats that Pakistan may face has been evaluated. The discussion served as a springboard for a proposed response framework that suggests course of action, identifying means that can prepare Pakistan to counter hybrid threats in the future. A holistic response to counter the hybrid threat would require use of all elements of national power. In light of foregoing analysis, additional research will be needed on the establishment of a National Security Organization and a Higher Defence Organization to deal with emerging hybrid threats to the security of Pakistan.

SAUDI-IRAN RIVALRY: A SECTARIAN DIVIDE OR SECURITY DILEMMA?

Junaid Jahandad* & Ali Mustafa**

Abstract

This paper examines two major drivers of conflictual relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran : sectarian schism and power politics. The protracted enmity and rivalry has been analyzed in light of uncertainty and security dilemma through the prism of constructivism. The application of the theoretical lens provides clarity and supersedes the reductionist analysis of this squabble. The inception of the Shia-Sunni schism and Saudi-Iran rivalry has been investigated in greater length. Within this context, the deterioration of relations due to Saddam Hussein's demise, the Arab Spring, Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr's execution, and the impact of Trump's administration in the US have also been examined. Conclusively, this paper argues that security dilemma and uncertainty of each other's actions is the driving force and primary cause of Saudi-Iran rivalry rather than sectarian divide.

Keywords: *Saudi-Iran Rivalry, Sectarian Schism, Security Dilemma, Constructivism*

Introduction

A detailed comprehension of the Saudi-Iran rivalry is a prerequisite for a deeper analysis of the security and political factors of the Middle Eastern region in general and of states in this region specifically. The belligerence between Saudi Arabia and Iran is categorized as a cold war, as to date, direct war has not taken place between them.¹ Nonetheless, due to the prevailing security dilemma between the two

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¹ Tali Rachel Grumet, "New Middle East Cold War: Saudi Arabia and Iran Rivalry," (Master's Thesis, Joseph Korbel School of International Studies University of Denver, 2015): 3.

sides, a continuous struggle for power or a tug of war is prevailing between them. Proxy wars in Iraq, Syria, Bahrain, Yemen, and Lebanon are the outcome of this cold war.² The most daunting query related to this rivalry is linked with its root cause: whether this enmity is an outcome of sectarian divide, which is deeply rooted in history, or is it due to the temptation of both states to attain more power? This paper investigates these perplexing queries in greater detail while stressing the role that uncertainty and security dilemma play under the umbrella of constructivism in international politics.

Before investigating the driver of enmity, this study elucidates the concepts of uncertainty and security dilemma as vital conceptual frameworks in global politics. It examines the origins of the Shia-Sunni rift as well as the cause and evolution of Saudi-Iran antagonism. This study also explores recent regional happenings, such as the US invasion of Iraq, the Arab Spring, Sheikh-al Nimr's death, and the election of Trump and then the Biden administration to the White House.

Security Dilemma

John Herz proposed the security dilemma concept in his book *Political Realism and Political Idealism*. Robert Jervis and Herbert Butterfield further elaborated this concept.³ Anarchic international system⁴ creates a security dilemma due to the anarchical system. When state A attempts to secure itself, state B interprets the actions of A as threatening and starts feeling insecure. Hence, B, as a result, enhances its security which ultimately reduces the security of A, and the continuation of this procedure creates an uncontrollable security or power cycle.⁵ This notion is quite significant in the arena of international relations as this idea elucidates the fundamental logic behind conflicts and wars between states.

John Herz accentuated, in his work, on the influence of "fear" existing in the mind of an individual regarding the action of other players or the element of fear present between two states, parties, or groups in the

² Ibid., 1-6.

³ Mohamed B. Huwaidin, "The Security Dilemma in Saudi-Iranian Relations," *Review of History and Political Science* 3, no. 2 (December 2015): 69, doi:10.15640/; Paul Roe, "The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a 'Tragedy'?" *Journal of Peace Research* 36, no. 2 (March 1999): 183.

⁴ Constructivists elucidate the ontology of anarchy differently as compared to the realists and this paper will utilize the ontology and definition proposed by constructivists to explain security dilemma and anarchy.

⁵ Mohamed B. Huwaidin, "The Security Dilemma in Saudi-Iranian Relations," 70.

creation of a security dilemma,⁶ Iran and Saudi Arabia are experiencing the same element of fear against each other. It can be taken out from the works of Jervis, Herz, and Butterfield that “anarchy” creates “uncertainty”; furthermore, uncertainty comes into play and produces “fear,” and fear eventually creates “dilemma” or “power competition” and this dilemma or power competition resultantly creates “security dilemma.”⁷ Robert Jervis has expounded security dilemma in his phenomenal work “Cooperation under the security dilemma,” that one state, in an attempt to enhance its security, deliberately or unintentionally, reduces the other state’s security.⁸

This study argues that the case of Iran and Saudi Arabia is no different. As one of them tries to enhance its security by assisting its friendly groups or regimes in the states – Yemen, Lebanon, Bahrain– in the region or by arms buildup, it reduces the security of other states and resultantly, a security dilemma lingers between their relations.

This research emphasizes a few significant features present in the work of Jervis, Butterfield, and Herz to further elaborate on the security dilemma concept. For Herz, anarchy is predominantly responsible for the production of the security dilemma, and for Butterfield, fear is mainly responsible; nonetheless, for Jervis, the structure of the international system is ultimately responsible for producing the security dilemma.⁹ Moreover, Herz and Butterfield contend that the emergence of security dilemmas is caused by uncertainty about one another’s intentions. Nevertheless, Jervis emphasizes that this uncertainty is not confined to the existing intentions; instead, future intentions also come under the ambit of uncertainty.¹⁰ For Butterfield, the origin of the security dilemma is unintentional; however, it can be intensified by psychological features and its consequences are catastrophic (including destruction or war) in nature.¹¹ According to Herz and Jervis, states have to rely on no one but their selves to secure themselves due to the presence of anarchy. Resultantly states try to attain the power to overcome the security dilemma and to secure them. Nonetheless, this attainment act indulges the states in a security dilemma, consequently entangled in an untended power struggle.¹²

⁶ Paul Roe, "The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a 'Tragedy'?" *Journal of Peace Research* 36, no. 2 (March 1999): 183.

⁷ Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30, no. 2 (January 1978): 168.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 168.

⁹ Shiping Tang, "The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis," *Security Studies* 18, no. 3 (October 2009): 587.

¹⁰ Tang, "The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis," 588.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*

For Butterfield, the security dilemma is the source of all human conflicts or wars. However, for Jervis and Herz, security dilemma can be held responsible for human conflicts and wars but not for all the conflicts and wars.¹³ After a thorough examination of the works of Herz, Butterfield, and Jervis, it can be concluded that uncertainty of intentions of others, fear, and anarchy are the predominant reasons for security dilemma. To further comprehend security dilemma concept this research examines the concept of uncertainty as elucidated by Nicholas J. Wheeler and Ken Booth. This research also explores the concept of anarchy of realists in general and constructivists in specific.

Uncertainty

As propounded by Butterfield and Herz, the creation of a security dilemma between groups, individuals, states, and parties is essentially due to the element of uncertainty. Therefore, this research examines the concept of uncertainty to comprehend why a security dilemma persists between Iran and Saudi Arabia. One of the illustrations of uncertainty is that generally, states enhance their security by acquiring weapons, but the foremost point here is that the same weapons that the states have manufactured or acquired mainly to secure themselves (for defensive purposes) can also be utilized for hostility (offensive purpose) against the rival or any state.¹⁴ Nonetheless, Uncertainty of states' actions is not restricted to accumulation of weapons only; rather all other physical or psychological actions of a state can be unreliable for the other states. Similarly, in the case of Saudi and Iran, both are uncertain of each other's actions, which is one of the significant reasons to produce a spiral of security or power between them.

Uncertainty, as per Wheeler and Booth, is an inescapable feature existing among humans and is ubiquitous in nature; existential nature of uncertainty means that it is not something which is merely occasional in fact uncertainty is something which is part and parcel of daily human life and groups.¹⁵ Furthermore, uncertainty is not constant rather it can be less or more in intensity existing between two or more states, groups, and individuals, though uncertainty is irregular in nature but eventually it is inevitable.¹⁶ In international relations' perspective "existential uncertainty" can be explained that governments or states can never foresee or comprehend the intentions of other states completely and this uncertainty is one of the primary causes for generating security dilemma

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Roe, "The Interstate Security," 184.

¹⁵ Ken Booth and John A. Wheeler, "Uncertainty," in *Security Studies: An Introduction*, ed. Paul D. Williams (London: Routledge, 2013), 133.

¹⁶ Ibid, 134.

among states¹⁷ and same is the case between Iran and Saudi Arabia where this uncertainty is further exacerbated due to statements and rhetoric being put forward by both players.¹⁸

Wheeler and Booth used the term “Other Minds Problem” while elucidating the concept of uncertainty, this “Other Minds Problem” is the reason which renders government or decision-makers of one state (for example Iran) incapable to decipher the motives or understand the mind of other state (for example Saudi Arabia).¹⁹ Besides uncertainty, another feature which is quite significant to explore the concept of security dilemma is fear on which Jervis, Butterfield, and Herz grounded their notion of security dilemma.²⁰ An interesting factor about the notion of fear is that it is not merely confined to existing intents, rather it is similarly linked to the future intents as well and due to this linkage with future intents, the notion of “future uncertainty” is derived, and a state/government feels itself insecure from the future actions of other state due to “future uncertainty,” at present time.²¹ Wheeler and Booth also emphasized on the notion of anarchy which has a fundamental role in creating uncertainty hence this paper will highlight the variation between the description of anarchy propounded by constructivism and realism, and will examine the notion of anarchy in detail.

Security Dilemma and Constructivism

Several academics, including Nicholas Wheeler and Ken Booth, Jack Snyder, Allan Collins, Paul Roe, and Alexander Wendt, have explained the idea of the security dilemma. ²² Nonetheless, this research emphasizes the elucidation of security dilemma presented by Alexander Wendt, who explicated the notion of “security dilemma” under the lens of constructivism. Thus, firstly it is imperative to elucidate constructivism concisely and then the notion of security dilemma under constructivism.

According to constructivists and realists, security dilemma endures among states due to the anarchical feature of the international arena.²³ For realists, anarchy is out there, which mean that anarchy is

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Umut Can Adisönmez, Recep Onursal and Laçın İdil Öztuğ, “Quest for Regional Hegemony: The Politics of Ontological Insecurity in the Saudi–Iran Rivalry,” *Alternatives* 48(1) (November 2022): 91-107.

¹⁹ Booth & Wheeler, “Uncertainty,” 135.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid., 138.

²² Huwaidin, “The Security Dilemma,” 70.

²³ Roe, “The Intrstate Security,” 184; Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 392.

existential ; nevertheless, for constructivists, anarchy is something that is being constructed by states by their own.²⁴ Constructivists emphasize that, besides constructed anarchy, state's identity plays a crucial part in creating animosities and amities, and this hostility, which is created due to state identity generates security dilemma among states.²⁵

Alexander Wendt put forward the example of the US, Canada, and Cuba to explain constructivism; why the US interprets the actions and activities of Cuba as intimidating while interpreting the actions and activities of Canada as being non-threatening under the same international anarchic system.²⁶ Hence, in the anarchic international system constructed state identity is the prominent feature which dictates the behavior of the states rather than the anarchy. For example, Saudi Arabia interprets the actions of Iran, regardless of the intent of Iran, either offensive or defensive, as being threatening or intimidating; nonetheless, under the same anarchic international system, Saudi Arabia, most of the time, does not interpret most of the actions and activities of Pakistan and most of the gulf states as being threatening or intimidating.

Though constructivists do not refute the existence of anarchy in the international system. However, they emphasize that anarchy has been constructed by the same states and not given in nature as propounded by realists.²⁷ According to the constructivists, present and past relations among states dictate the behaviour of the states.²⁸

Inception of Shia-Sunni Rift

Antagonism between Iran and Saudi Arabia mainly can be characterized by two foremost aspects, that is, the fact that both Iran and Saudi Arabia claim to be the true torchbearers of two contrasting branches of Islam and a constant tug of war between them to control the region.²⁹ Presently the dominant narrative is that the vendetta between Iran and Saudi Arabia is due to the sectarian schism; subsequently, it is imperative to grasp the inception and factors of Shia-Sunni schism. The split which separated the nascent Muslim nation into two main camps, Sunni and Shia, is roughly as old as the religion of Islam and can be traced back to the 7th

²⁴ Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It," 392.

²⁵ Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," *International Security* 23, no. 1 (Summer 1998): 172, accessed February 26, 2021.; Matt McDonald, "Constructivism," in *Security Studies: An Introduction*, ed. Paul D. Williams (London: Routledge, 2008), 85.

²⁶ Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It," 397.

²⁷ Matt McDonald, "Constructivism," 86.

²⁸ Roe, "The Interstate Security," 184.

²⁹ John Hall, "Sunni and Shia Muslims: Islam's 1400-year-old Divide Explained," *Independent*, January 4, 2016, <https://www.independent.co.uk/>

century.³⁰ According to Robin Wright, the ultimate division between Shiites and Sunnis was not based on the differences over theological or religious doctrines, but rather an outcome of differences over leadership, most suitable to lead the burgeoning Muslim Ummah.³¹ Soon after the demise of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), the disagreement between Sunni and Shia Muslims exploded regarding the most deserving heir of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) to lead the Muslim Ummah.³²

Consequently, the Muslims separated into two camps; according to the Shiites, Prophet Muhammad's (PBUH) successor should be Hazrat Ali (RA) and that leader of Muslims should be from Prophet's family.³³ Alternatively according to the other camp, present day Sunnis, the leader of Muslims should be selected through consensus of the noble followers and companions of Prophet (PBUH).³⁴ Nevertheless, the opinion of Sunnis succeeded and they selected Hazrat Abu Bakar (RA) as the first, Hazrat Umer (RA) as the second, and Hazrat Uthman (RA) as the third Caliph of Muslims, and finally, Hazrat Ali ibn Abi Taleb (RA) became the 4th caliph.³⁵ Two caliphs, Hazrat Umer and Hazrat Uthman were martyred before Hazrat Ali became the caliph, moreover, war erupted when Ali (RA) became Caliph and ultimately Ali (RA) was also martyred.³⁶ Subsequently, one of the sons of Ali (RA), Hazrat Hussein (RA), along with his family members and a small number of followers, was also martyred in the battle of Karbala in 680 by second Umayyad Caliph Yazid.³⁷ Nevertheless, the initial and foremost reasoning which laid stimulus for the formation of Shia or "Shi'at Ali" was that Ali (RA) is the Prophet Muhammad's rightful successor, and the second reason proved to be the martyrdom of Hussein (RA) in Karbala which further deepened the notion of "Shi'at Ali". Shiites emphasize that Hussein (RA) stood firm against the tyrant caliph Yazid

³⁰ Vali Nasr, *The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2007), 24.

³¹ Elizabeth Chuck, "What Are the Differences Between Sunni and Shiite Muslims?" *NBC News*, January 5, 2016, <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/mideast/what-are-differences-between-sunni-shiite-muslims-n489951>.

³² Geneive Abdo, *The New Sectarianism : The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi'a-Sunni Divide*, (Washington, D.C: Brookings, 2013), <https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/sunni-shia-abdo.pdf>. ; Nasr, *The Shia Revival*, 24.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Mike Shuster, "The Origins of the Shiite-Sunni Split," *NPR*, February 12, 2007, accessed February 23, 2021, <https://www.npr.org/>

³⁵ Amir M. Haji-Yousefi, "Whose Agenda is Served by the Idea of a Shia Crescent?" *Alternatives Turkish Journal of International Relations* 8, no. 1 (Spring 2009): 114, <https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/14357/uploads>.

³⁶ Shuster, "The Origins of."

³⁷ Nasr, *The Shia Revival*, 28.

and till the date this conception of standing firm against the tyrant ruler remains intact in Shia Islam, that is, Islamic revolution in 1979 in Iran against the Shah of Iran is a prominent manifestation of this long enduring conception.³⁸

Approximately, there are around 1.5 billion Muslims presently in the world, Shiites are the one who are in minority and Sunnis are in significant majority.³⁹ Almost 85-90 percent of, around, 1.5 billion Muslims are Sunnis and roughly around 15-20 percent of them which is approximately 154 to 200 million are Shiites, nonetheless, precise percentage of both these sects is missing.⁴⁰ In Syria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt, Sunni population is in majority, while in Iran, Bahrain, Iraq, and Azerbaijan Shiites are present in majority, albeit, substantial percentage of Shiites is also residing in Qatar, Yemen, Lebanon, and Kuwait.⁴¹ The foremost fact to emphasize here is that, in Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia mostly Shiites are present dominantly in the places that are rich in oil resources.⁴² As Shiites are in minority in the Muslim population, so it can be easily considered that the enmity between Sunnis and Shias is not merely political, ideological, and theological, relatively, this contention is also produced due to the instilled hate against the majority (oppressor) in the hearts and minds of minority (oppressed). Hence, it can be deduced that the presence of fear and uncertainty about each other's intentions and actions and the security dilemma between Sunnis and Shiites can be traced back in history.⁴³

Inception of Saudi-Iran Hostility

The bases of Shia-Sunni schism are present, overwhelmingly, down in the Islamic history and that the genesis of this split was, to a greater extent, political instead of theological or religious in nature. Nonetheless, the available evidence suggests that in the animosity between Saudi-Iran, this schism has largely played an insignificant role.⁴⁴ Hence, this research directs that rivalry between Saudi-Iran is mainly a competition of power in the everlasting existence of security dilemma and uncertainty and both the states, Saudi Arabia and Iran, are consuming religion (sect) as a tool rather

³⁸ Ibid, 30.

³⁹ "Sunnis and Shia: Islam's Ancient Schism," *BBC News*, January 4, 2016, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-16047709>.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Hall, "Sunni and Shia Muslims."

⁴² Shuster, "The Origins of the Shiite-Sunni Split."

⁴³ Adisönmez, Onursal and Öztığ, "Quest for Regional Hegemony."

⁴⁴ Yaroslav Trofimov, "Sunni-Shiite Conflict Reflects Modern Power Struggle, Not Theological Schism," *The Wall Street Journal*, May 14, 2015, <https://www.wsj.com/>.

than an end/objective. Moreover, enmity between Iran and Saudi Arabia can be dissected into four main fragments: Iranian revolution in 1979, departure of Saddam Hussein, Arab spring, and latest execution of Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr.

Present day Saudi Arabia, established around early 1930s, is a relatively new state, and is being ruled by Al-Saud's.⁴⁵ Saudi Arabia follows the version of Islam projected by Al-Wahhab, which is a conservative Sunni-Wahhabi state. According to the teachings of Al-Wahhab, Shiites are infidels and heretics, and he also justified the killing of Shiites.⁴⁶ Iran and Saudi Arabia's relations have gone through several stages; before the Iranian Revolution of 1979, they had a strategic alliance; today, they are embroiled in an unofficial, never-ending cold war.⁴⁷ When Shah was in power in Iran, during 1960's and 1970's, Saudi Arabia and Iran upheld a strategic coalition, that is, political, security, and military interaction.⁴⁸ During the Cold War between the US and the USSR, the West in general and the US in particular used both of them against the USSR in order to curb the USSR's growing influence in the Middle East.⁴⁹

However the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, when the country's people ousted the Shah from office through demonstrations, changed the nature of the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran.⁵⁰ The denunciation of the Saudi monarchy as being conflicting with the true teachings of Islam by Ayatollah Khomeini and his aim to spread the Islamic revolution in Iran to Saudi Arabia and other monarchies in the gulf region proved to be the foundation stone of rivalry of Saudi Arabia and Iran.⁵¹ Nevertheless, instead of the sectarian split it was this very denunciation of Khomeini that generated a security dilemma and eventually an everlasting enmity between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Hence, the relations between Riyadh and Tehran indulged in a new period of suspicion and aggression.⁵²

After the Iranian revolution the relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia started to deteriorate and due to uncertainty and fear of each

⁴⁵ David Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006)

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Khosrow Soltani, "Iran-Saudi Arabia: a Troubled Affair," *Aljazeera*, November 20, 2013, <https://www.aljazeera.com/>

⁴⁸ Ibid. ; Ariel Jahner, "Saudi Arabia and Iran: the Struggle for Power and Influence in the Gulf," *International Affairs Review* 20, no. 3 (May 2012): 35.

⁴⁹ Soltani, "Iran-Saudi Arabia."

⁵⁰ Thom Poole, "Iran and Saudi Arabia's Great Rivalry Explained," *BBC*, January 4, 2016, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35221569>.

⁵¹ Tali R. Grumet, "New Middle East Cold War: Saudi Arabia and Iran's Rivalry," (master's thesis, University of Denver, 2015), <https://digitalcommons.du.edu/cgi/>

⁵² Soltani, "Iran-Saudi Arabia."

other's actions both of them tried to attain more power in the region. Saudi power elite was and someway till date is more anxious about the perseverance of the regime, instead of sustaining or expanding Saudi Arabia's regional influence.⁵³ This is one of the foremost motives due to which Saudi Arabia tries to counter Iran's influence in the region. Saudi power elite is in fact facing two façades; internal differences and revolts inside the country, and threats from external front emanating from Iran mostly.⁵⁴ A number of events after Iranian revolution in 1979 further intensified the Saudi-Iran relations; including the support of Iraq by Saudi Arabia in Iran-Iraq war to contain the Iranian influence in the region, clashes between 402 pilgrims and police in 1987, 275 pilgrims were Iranian out of 402, this episode further intensified Saudi-Iran relations.⁵⁵

During the Iran-Iraq war, Saudi Arabia also exploited its control over oil to hurt the economy of Iran.⁵⁶ During the period of President Muhammad Khatami, Saudi Arabia and Iran also enjoyed the ease in tensions; nevertheless, after the US invasion of Iraq strains in their relations again intensified.⁵⁷ Nonetheless, it was the statement of Ayatollah Khomeini, where he denounced the gulf monarchies, which transformed both states' identities, formed a security dilemma, and proved to be a turning point in their relations. Consequently, it can be deduced that rhetoric and statements have played a significant role in even inception of the Saudi-Iran rivalry.

Saddam Hussein's Demise

After the US incursion in Iraq and Saddam Hussein's demise in Iraq, the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia was exacerbated further, as the demise of Saddam Hussein generated a power vacuum not merely in Iraq rather in the region and produced a sufficient space for both the players to augment their regional influence.⁵⁸ As per Aarts and Duijne, a triangular kind of power structure was sustaining in which three opposing forces, namely, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq, were vying with each other to

⁵³ Jennifer Williams, "Why Saudi Leaders Keep Making Bad Decisions: they're Scared," *Vox*, January 7, 2016, <https://www.vox.com/2016/1/7/10725896/saudi-insecurity-iran>.

⁵⁴ Ariel Jahner, "Saudi Arabia and Iran: the Struggle for Power and Influence in the Gulf," *International Affairs Review* 20, no. 3 (May 2016): 36.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 36.; "Factbox: Troubled History of Saudi-Iran Relations," *Reuters*, January 4, 2016, <https://www.reuters.com/article/>.

⁵⁶ Grumet, "New Middle East Cold War," 37.

⁵⁷ "Factbox: Troubled history of Saudi-Iran Relations," *Reuters*.

⁵⁸ Saleh Heba, "Sunni and Shia: Explaining the Divide," *Financial Times*, January 6, 2016, <https://next.ft.com/content/>

attain dominance in the Persian Gulf region.⁵⁹ Nonetheless, it is beyond the ambit of this research to comprehensively elaborate this complex triangular power pattern, still a concise explanation has been inculcated to shed some light on this complex triangular power pattern to emphasize on the significance of a powerful Iraq under Saddam Hussein in the region, whose departure further deepened the aspect of uncertainty between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Like zero-sum game, this triangular power pattern has diverse situations in which each power counters the other. For instance, Iran and Saudi Arabia went into a coalition when the Bath party attained power in Iraq in 1968. Likewise, Iraq and Saudi Arabia came closer during the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, and then again during the Iraq-Kuwait war.⁶⁰ Rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran was confined to a specific limit due to this triangular power pattern; nevertheless, presently, this animosity is at peak due to the elimination of an influential Iraq from the region.⁶¹

US invaded Iraq and Afghanistan under War on Terror drive after September 11, 2001 attacks and it altered the dimensions of politics of the world and specifically of Middle Eastern region.⁶² The triangular pattern ceased to exist in 2003 after the US incursion in Iraq and Saddam Hussein's demise from power and a power void was infused in the region and in Iraq.⁶³ Both the states Iran and Saudi Arabia scrambled to cover this vacuum to enhance their influence in Iraq as well as in the region, nonetheless, eventually Iran attained more influence due to this vacuum.⁶⁴ As Shias were present in majority in Iraq nonetheless was ruled by Saddam Hussein, a Sunni elite, so, after the withdrawal of US from Iraq the sectarian card was being played by Iran in Iraq and this sectarian ploy ascertained to be quite favorable for Iran.⁶⁵ Though, Iran and Saudi both players extracted benefits out of Iraq, nonetheless, ultimately Iran created plenty of difficulties for Saudi Arabia, as Iran managed to create a

⁵⁹ Paul Aarts and Joris Van Duijne, "Saudi Arabia after U.S.-Iranian Détente: Left in the Lurch?" *Middle East Policy* 16, no. 3 (Fall 2009): 65, doi:10.1111/.

⁶⁰ Ibid, 65.

⁶¹ Dr. Ali Fathollah-Nejad, "The Iranian-Saudi Hegemonic Rivalry," DGAP (German Council on Foreign Relations, October 26, 2017), <https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/iranian-saudi-hegemonic-rivalry>.

⁶² Jahner, "Saudi Arabia and Iran," 36.

⁶³ Max Fisher, "The Cold War between Saudi Arabia and Iran that's Tearing Apart the Middle East, Explained," *Vox*, January 4, 2016, <https://www.vox.com/2016/1/4/10708682/sunni-shia-iran-saudi-arabia-war>.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

compliant Shiite government in Iraq after the departure of US from Iraq.⁶⁶ As per Aarts and Duijne, Nouri-al-Maliki's government in Iraq was considered to be a puppet of Iran in the region by Saudi Arabia and disliked it.⁶⁷

With the growing Iranian influence and power in the region, the notion of Shia-Crescent was propounded by the Sunni elites: Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria mutually create a crescent of Shiites and this crescent is responsible for the creation of problems in the region for the Sunni states.⁶⁸ This imaginary notion presented by Sunni elites, was essentially the reaction of elites of Sunnis of losing their firm grip in Iraq, and a response of the advent of a friendly government, after January 2005 elections, of Iran in Iraq.⁶⁹ As aforementioned, after Saddam's demise in Iraq, Iran played the sectarian card to enhance its power in the region but this episode further intensified the sectarian loathing and this is one of major reasons due to which presently the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia ostensibly appears to be sectarian, due to Shia-Sunni split, in nature. Though, primarily centered on fear and uncertainty this enmity is more of a power competition.

Arab Awakening, Killing of Sheikh Nimr-al-Nimr, and Escalation in Tensions

After Saddam Hussein's demise, as the rift between Iran and Saudi Arabia started to ease, a plethora of new episodes smashed the Middle East, and a majority of dictators and authoritative regimes were toppled in 2011 by public upsurge.⁷⁰ Long-lasting authoritarian regimes in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt ousted by public revolts in so-called Arab Awakening or Arab Spring which eventually left behind a greater power vacuum, as compared to the one that was left behind by the demise of Saddam Hussein, in their respective countries as well as in the Middle Eastern region as a whole.⁷¹ This mammoth power vacuum further exacerbated uncertainty and security dilemma between Saudi Arabia and Iran. These revolts had a significant impact on the minds of Al-Saud rulers because

⁶⁶ Aarts and Van Duijne, "Saudi Arabia after U.s-Iran Détente," 68.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Nasr, *The Shia Revival*, 172.

⁶⁹ Bogdan Szajkowski, "The Shia Crescent," *The Copernicus Journal of Political Studies* 3, no. 1 (May 2013): 23.

⁷⁰ Frederic Wehrey, Theodore W. Karasik, Alireza Nader, Jeremy Ghez, Lydia Hansell, and Robert A. Guffey, *Saudi-Iranian Relations Since the Fall of Saddam: Rivalry, Cooperation, and Implications for U.S. Policy*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009. <https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG840.html>.

⁷¹ Jahner, "Saudi Arabia and Iran," 36; Grumet, "New Middle East Cold War,".

they were scared that a similar rebellion could also hit their country, unlike the demise of Saddam, which was planned by an outside force.⁷² This instilled anxiety in the minds of Al-Saud and is the main reason why Saudi Arabia and Iran are currently in a tense state of cold war and a security dilemma.

Iran to enhance its power in the region and some other aspects, and Saudi Arabia to overcome its fear and some other aspects, both tried to cover the power vacuum left behind after the so called Arab Awakening.⁷³ Nonetheless, during this phase Saudi Arabia and Iran had to fill in a greater power vacuum and had to face greater challenges, resultantly, this time they entangled in a quite furious power struggle paradox and spree of proxies including Houthis, Hezbollah, Kataib Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al Haq, Zaynabiyoun Brigade, and Saraya al Ashtar etc ranging from Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, Lebanon, to Iraq.⁷⁴ Both the players also utilized the Shia-Sunni card to garner further support, in the name of religion, in their particular domain of influence, so it becomes quite clear that both the states used religion (sect) as a tool or mean.⁷⁵ Iran and Saudi Arabia back conflicting parties in Yemen, Iraq, Bahrain, Syria, and Lebanon, they also back violent groups and resort to violence to formulate friendly regimes in the respective states to counter each other and increase their influence in the region, which further intensified uncertainty and security dilemma between them.

A new episode that happened after the Arab Awakening had not yet fully subsided—the Saudi Arabian killing of Shia preacher Sheikh Nimr al Nimr—led to a resurgence of hostility between Iran and Saudi Arabia.⁷⁶ Sheikh Nimr was a Shia cleric, noticeably outspoken, who eloquently highlighted the oppression of Shiites in Saudi Arabia.⁷⁷ In the wake of so-called Arab Awakening, Sheikh Nimr al Nimr was apprehended in 2012 and was accused of functioning as an agent for Iran, treason, and disobedience to the ruler was given death penalty which was executed on the starting months of 2016.⁷⁸

⁷² Ibid., 37.

⁷³ Fisher, "The Cold War between Saudi Arabia and Iran."

⁷⁴ Ibid.; Ashley Lane, "Iran's Islamist Proxies in the Middle East," *Wilson Center*, January 24, 2023, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/>

⁷⁵ "Saudi Arabia and Iran's Rivalry: The Sectarian Dimension," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, March 23, 2018. <https://carnegieendowment.org/>

⁷⁶ Greg Botelho and Ed Payne, "Iran's Rouhani: Saudi Arabia can't cover up its 'great crime' of executing cleric," *CNN*, January 6, 2016, <https://edition.cnn.com/>

⁷⁷ "Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr: Figurehead Shia cleric," *BBC News*, January 2, 2016, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35214413>.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

Most experts agree that Sheikh Nimr's murder was motivated more by internal than external considerations, i.e., Saudi Arabia's own political dynamics.⁷⁹ Yet, Iran vehemently condemned this execution; Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini claimed that it would get divine retribution while a stern statement was given by the then Iranian President Hassan Rouhani against Saudi Arabia in which he emphasized that Saudi Arabia cannot hide its crimes.⁸⁰ Besides, a Saudi embassy in Tehran was attacked by few Iranian protestors and rift between Iran and Saudi Arabia touched a new hike.⁸¹ As aforementioned, internal factors were predominantly liable for this execution, then the query arises that why a stern stance was taken by Iran in this episode. The straightforward answer is that the "fear" and "uncertainty" of each other's actions eventually created a security dilemma that inculcated fear in Iran due to this incident. Moreover, Elevation of Muhammad Bin Salman (MBS) as de-jure crown prince and de-facto king ensued in further denting the relation between Saudi Arabia and Iran.⁸² Moreover, this rivalry further exacerbated due to arrival of Trump's administration in US⁸³ as the Trump's administration was quite critical of Iran. The impact of Joe Biden's administration is yet to be seen, nevertheless, the future is not much brighter. Recent spree of GCC states of normalizing relationship with Israel and Saudi Arabia's keen interest in it⁸⁴ along with the Biden administrations attempts at restoring or renegotiating the Joint Compressive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran at the cost of Saudi objections⁸⁵ – whatever the reasons for this developments may be – will further exacerbate the uncertainty and security dilemma between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ "A gulf between them: Understanding the Saudi-Iran dispute," *BBC News*, January 10, 2016, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35251833>; Ken Bredemeier, "Iran Calls Saudi Execution of Cleric a 'Crime'," *VOA News*, January 05, 2016, <https://www.voanews.com/>

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Ben Hubbard, *MBS: The Rise to Power of Mohammad Bin Salman* (New York: Tim Duggan Books, 2020) : 83, 96.

⁸³ Daniel L. Byman, "Trump's reckless Middle East policy has brought the USA to the brink of war," *Brookings*, January 6, 2020.

⁸⁴ Omar Rahman, "What's behind the relationship between Israel and Arab Gulf states?" *Brookings*, January 28, 2019.

⁸⁵ Steven A. Cook, "A New Iran Deal Means Old Chaos," *Foreign Policy*, February 17, 2022, <https://foreignpolicy.com/>

Rivalry of Saudi Arabia and Iran under the Prism of Security Dilemma

It is easy to see from events like the fall of Saddam Hussein, the Arab Awakening incidents, the most recent murder of Sheikh Nimr, the revolt in Yemen, and declarations and rhetoric aimed at one another that the root of this war was not sectarian but rather stemmed from uncertainty, power competition, fear due to one another's activities, and security dilemma. Realists contend that because anarchy exists in the international system, states struggle for control in order to preserve their survival; however, constructivists contend that anarchy is what states make of it, that is, that it is the states who create anarchy.⁸⁶ Constructivists never deny the existence of "anarchy" in the international arena, instead they emphasize that the very states have constructed it. They further claim that as states are the one who construct anarchy then states can surely deconstruct it as well.

While the anarchic nature of the international arena and sectarian split between Iran and Saudi Arabia endured, nevertheless, their relations fluctuated from collaboration, hatred to hostility in the nearby history.⁸⁷ Evidently, it is not merely the sectarian schism or structure of the International system which instilled power struggle or animosity between Iran and Saudi Arabia. For instance, Saudi Arabia and Iran maintained a strategic alliance and cordial relations prior to the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979. Moreover, Iran's support for the Palestinian cause and for Armenia in the most recent conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan (a Shiite majority state) undermines the reductionist assertion that sect is the primary factor driving Saudi-Iran antagonism. A state's identity explains why it perceives one state's behaviour as intimidating while not viewing the identical action by another state as threatening.⁸⁸ For instance, Saudi Arabia, in the attendance of anarchic international system, does not interpret most of the actions of UAE as being intimidating but finds the same actions of Iran as being threatening. As explained comprehensively in the abovementioned sections that "anarchy" yields "uncertainty", "uncertainty" creates "fear" and "fear" resultantly creates "power competition or dilemma" and this "power competition or dilemma" as a result yields "security dilemma".⁸⁹ Same is the case with Iran and Saudi Arabia; after Iranian revolution in 1979, identity of both states altered to a

⁸⁶ Huwaidin, "The Security Dilemma," 70.

⁸⁷ Uri Friedman, "What's the Saudi-Iran Feud Really About?" *The Atlantic*, January 7, 2016, <https://www.theatlantic.com/>.

⁸⁸ Simon Mabon, *Saudi Arabia and Iran: Power and Rivalry in the Middle East* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015).

⁸⁹ Huwaidin, "The Security Dilemma," 76.

greater extent for each other and consequently a struggle for power and security dilemma thrived in their relation.

One of the reasons of all the proxies that are being managed by Iran and Saudi Arabia, from Bahrain to Yemen and from Lebanon to Syria, is the existence of security dilemma between them. Every act of Iran, whether defensive or offensive, is being identified as a threat for its security by Saudi Arabia, and Iran observes the same, subsequently, an unending and everlasting power struggle and security dilemma are prevailing between them.

Conclusion

While understanding the rationale for the Saudi-Iranian rivalry is paramount for a deeper appreciation of the complex Middle Eastern politics. The Iranian Revolution and the social construction of the enmity required due to the principles of uncertainty and security dilemma are where the roots of this animosity between the two start, which is more recent than the historical Sunni-Shia schism after the death of the Prophet (PBUH). This leads both sides to a power-maximization strategy in the ensuing power struggle within the region and beyond. These phenomena have been observed throughout the contemporary occurrences of Saddam Hussain's demise, the advent of the Arab awakening, political volatility in Lebanon, public revolts in Yemen, Syria, and Bahrain, the execution of Sheikh-al Nimr and the arrival of Trump and latest Biden at the White House.

Book Reviews

Title: **Aid, Politics and the War of Narratives in the US-Pakistan Relations - A Case Study of Kerry Lugar Berman Act**
Author: **Hussain Nadim**
Publisher: **Routledge, 2023, 125**

The author employs the decolonial perspectives to examine the politics and narratives surrounding the US Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, also called the Kerry Lugar Berman (KLB) Act.¹ The act authorised the payment of \$1.5 billion per year in non-military assistance to the government of Pakistan for the next five years, from 2010 to 2014, with a provision to extend funding for an additional five years on meeting specific benchmarks. The act was severely criticised and generated a debate in Pakistan. One of the significant differences from past practices was the inclusion of conditions aimed at increasing the Pakistani military's accountability and limiting funding use.

KLB restricted US funding to develop military capabilities against India and approved the use of funds for counterterrorism operations only. It required the secretary of state to certify that Pakistan's military and intelligence services are working in harmony with US interests and no longer assisting "extremist and terrorist" organisations and that cooperation on non-proliferation has persisted. The most contentious article was the US vow to fund democratically elected governments exclusively. This condition thwarted efforts to stage a military coup and signalled a distinct break from past practices. The Government members considered the KLB the best possible given the circumstances and success of a democratic government. The opponents regarded it as an attack on Pakistan's sovereignty that conceded Pakistan's decision-making authority and control over the expenditure of funds. Analysts saw the measure as dividing the national polity along the lines of People, Army, and Parliament on one side and the president on the other.

The author examines aid, politics, and the contest of narratives in US-Pakistan relations from a decolonial perspective. A novel mode of thinking, these perspectives criticise the Western-dominated political, social, and economic system and focus on the colonial/racial experience as a result of the issue in embodiment theories, knowledge production, and economic exploitation. Dr. Nadim employs the security-development

¹ The act was named after the two US Senators — John Kerry, a Democrat, and Dick Lugar, a Republican who authored the legislation unanimously approved by the US Congress on September 24 and signed by incumbent President Obama on October 15, 2009.

nexus, a corollary of modernity/coloniality - a fundamental notion in decolonial thought to further his argument. The dyad argues that human progress and prosperity brought about by the expansion of Western civilisation is accompanied by coloniality - a complex matrix of power historically constructed and controlled by Western men and institutions - a darker side of modernity. It emphasises the Western countries' use of redemption rhetoric cloaked in various languages to serve their objectives. Initially, the discourse of salvation centred on rescuing people by Christian conversion. The second was modernity's rhetoric to civilise people through colonialism, followed by the rhetoric of freedom and democracy and, after that, by the rhetoric of progress and development. The security-development dyad considers security and development as mutually inclusive. It contends that there can be no security without development and vice versa, beginning with the unwavering assumption that a safer world is only achievable if impoverished nations are given a genuine opportunity to grow. The author argues that Western donors and politicians use the security-development nexus to legitimise their regulatory or interventionist actions in the developing world on the pretext of protecting their national security interests against the threats emanating from underdeveloped regions. The concept has its roots in the colonial era and the cold war period.²

The book has eight chapters divided into three sections. The first section discusses the security-development nexus and decolonial perspectives to explain the politics of assistance. It argues that Western donor nations use the nexus to further their interests in the developing and underdeveloped states. In the second section, the author asserts that the US administration employed the act to transfer ownership and the burden of blame for the war on terrorism onto Pakistan. It describes how the US operationalises the dyad to accomplish its objectives through discursive and practical means: first, by creating a strategic construct within the region by combining Afghanistan and Pakistan into the AfPak discourse; and second, by influencing Pakistan's security policy through specific provision within the KLB act, including direct funding of covert operations in Pakistan. The author goes on to explain how Pakistan employed a narrative of being a weak state to maintain long-term relations with the US and created complex interdependency; and how Pakistan

² Under the Marshall Plan, the US provided \$12 billion (equivalent to \$120 billion today) in aid to reconstruct and develop Europe. The core purpose, however, was to use development as a way to secure Western interests against the spread of communism. Two agencies were established in the US the CIA in 1947 and the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) (the predecessor of USAID) in 1948 to secure American interests in Western Europe against the Soviet Union.

managed to develop its military forces and maintained a power balance with India by fighting the US war on terrorism. This section concludes that Pakistan, rather than being a passive player, played a crucial part in co-producing the nexus created by the act. Furthermore, despite the uproar over how the KLB Act affected Pakistan's policies, the military used it to preserve a military force balance with India. The final section focuses on the US use of the act to cause a domestic power shift in favour of the civilian government in Pakistan, characterising it as a precise instance of Pakistan's sovereignty being violated. According to the author, Pakistan People's Party (PPP) government supported the KLB act to achieve its political goals of achieving civilian dominance and balancing civil-military ties to its advantage. It emphasises that the act was a collaborative effort between Pakistan's government and the US administration; both deemed Pakistan Army an adversary that needed to be restrained. The KLB Act was repealed early in its third year because its goals of gaining easy access to the ground for intelligence collection, covert activities under the pretext of development, and re-engineering the nation's power structure were allegedly accomplished.

The book discusses US-Pakistan relations through a decolonial perspective to evaluate the nuanced interplay of power between the two countries. The book's central claim is that the donor and recipient nations co-produced the security-development nexus, as embodied in the KLB act, as part of a dialectical power contest. It is an interesting read for the policy maker, national security students and IR scholars to understand the discursive US-Pakistan relations. The book endeavours to de-politicise the US-Pakistan relations debate in the media and argues that Pakistan is a 'victim' of American imperialism that beguiles American gullibility. It argues that the security-development nexus established an intricate interdependency in the US-Pakistan relationship, wherein each side ensured enduring efforts to achieve their goals through cooperation. The author has made a significant contribution by illuminating the prevailing Western centrism in IR and highlighting that relevant weaker states possess the ability to exert their agency in the realities generated by the dominant discourse.

Reviewed by Syed Wajeeh Ul Hassan, PhD IR Scholar, University of Management and Technology, Lahore

Title: **Great Potential, Many Pitfalls Understanding China's Belt and Road Initiative**
Author: **Bijan Omrani**
Publisher: **Routledge, 2021, 118**

Bijan Omrani, Editor of the *Journal Asian Affairs* critically evaluates the potential as well the pitfalls of the Belt Road Initiative (BRI) trade and infrastructure project by exploring some related themes.

This edited book is divided into seven chapters, each contributed by a different author. These chapters were presented at a joint conference of the Royal Society for Asian Affairs and the Woodrow Wilson Centre. The editor has brought together these chapters for the sake of an advanced clarity on the subject. The primary data sources comprise of national and international statistics, such as the World Bank Databank, as well as governmental documents made public, including the Pentagon report.

The works of Shirley Yu, Raffaello Pantucci, Nadege Rolland, and Arif Rafiq explore the definition of the Belt and Road initiative, deconstruct the mega project and talk of a transforming global order. The author refers to the Belt Road Initiative (BRI) as a means to the ultimate end, and not an end itself, of China's alleged 'grand strategy' of establishing a new global order, such as the Pax-Sinica. However, much of this is merely based on assumptions, rather than facts and statistics. While the author rankles the reader's curiosity, it also brings about a general disbelief. The apparent lack of fact-based arguments also brings about an air of scepticism about the writings.

In "The Belt and Road Initiative: Modernity, Geopolitics and the Developing Global Order," Shirley Yu effectively breaks down the BRI project into 3 premises, which provide a reader an over lay of the motives and history behind China's grand strategy of trade dominance. This chapter also sets a theme for the remainder of the book. In my opinion, the chapters that follow are merely a repetition of the themes discussed in Shirley Yu's work, which the focus is on the concepts laid down in the preceding chapters.

Yu talks about how the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is not about economics, rather it is economics in black and white on its own. It is built on the Chinese President Xi Jinping's 'two-pronged' vision of Modernity and the other of Common Destiny. The authors of this book staunchly believe that BRI is merely an extension of these two visions of the Chinese government, if not anything more. On one hand, the Modernization vision is all about bringing economic prosperity through open trade corridors and infrastructure developing in BRI-oriented countries of the region, which would in turn lead China to establishing its economic dominance in the heartlands of Eurasia. On the other hand, the Common Destiny vision stems from archaic religious beliefs, similar to the Manifest Destiny of the

U.S. post World War II. The book argues that the Common Destiny vision is an interpretation of the Chinese believe of their natural right of supremacy and dominance over other communities and countries in the world. However, unlike the U.S policy, China is said to believe that successful implementation of this vision can only be achieved through a win-win economic situation for all countries involved in the BRI with China at the top level of the hierarchy.

Raffaello Pantucci, in his chapter "China in Central Asia: The First Strand of the Silk Road Economic Belt," talks about a major incentive in the way of the Belt Road Initiative: connectivity. The primary objective behind China's BRI project is to connect its Xinjiang region to the rest of the Central Asia in order to quell civil unrest in the province, bring about economic development and prosperity, as well as open up global trade routes for the rest of the country. To incentivize regional countries to take part in this trade and infrastructure development project, the Chinese foreign policy has a "natural overspill" into the regional politics of each of these countries. In addition to the traditional infrastructure development in the forms of rail, road, and sea ports, Chinese companies have also undertaken telecommunication infrastructure projects, such as those of fibre optics telecommunication lines, in Central and South Asia. Moreover, bilateral military exercises, exchange of military equipment, educational scholarship programs etc.

However, the pitfalls of the Belt Road Initiative (BRI) are numerous, the most influential of these being the international opposition and the domestic grievances associated with this high-speed rail of economic development. Domestic anxieties have largely been centred around economic risks, with many Chinese academics and policy officials voicing concerns that the adverse movements and fluctuations in interest rates are creating a volatile bubble of false economic security. They have warned the Chinese government time and again that unless these risks are managed and mitigated, the consequences in the near future would be dire indeed for China as well as other Belt and Road countries.

Consequently, the initial pushback has been varying in degree and manner. In the early years of its planning and development, many Western countries, especially the United States perceived the Belt Road Initiative as ill-conceived and ill-defined, giving them all the more reasons not to formulate defensive strategies against BRI in their foreign policy for over a decade. However, with alarmingly fast-paced execution of this trillion-dollar project has given the Western global circle sufficient reasons to be wary of the true intentions of China in the backdrop. The United States and the United Kingdom are staunch opponents of the BRI, criticise China for its predatory economics in the Central and South Asia due to its excessive use of debt traps for pulling developing countries of the region into its bandwagon.

In my opinion, while there is an element of truth to the allegations and criticism laid down in this book, a significant proportion of these is merely based on assumptions and hearsay. The authors fail to incorporate relevant figures and reliable information to support their arguments. While there is no denying the fact that the BRI is indeed an attempt to rival the Marshall Plan of the United States in asserting the Chinese economic dominance, the theory of the Common Destiny vision that reeks of prejudice and nepotism is not a reliable account of the steps taken to build the Belt Road Initiative from scratch. Moreover, it should be noted that a major criticism of this book is also based on the fact that the authors here frequently project BRI as an economic tool for China's world dominance and spiritual superiority. Critics of this school of thought staunchly argue that BRI should only be evaluated in economic and political contexts, and should not be seen as anything other than a mega trade project.

Reviewed by Air Commodore Sajjad Hussain, PhD Scholar at the Department of IR, National Defence University, Islamabad.

Title: Global Pakistan: Pakistan's Role in the International System
Author: Jochen Hippler and Vaqar Ahmed
Publisher: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Pakistan Office, 2022, 292.

Globalization is a complex and multi-dimensional phenomenon. The advancement in the means of communication and technology has played the role of a catalyst in intensifying international economic, social and political integration thus accelerating the process of globalization. Pakistan, a member of the global community, competes economically and on cultural, geo-political and diplomatic fronts. Jochen Hippler and Vaqar Ahmed's book, *Global Pakistan: Pakistan's Role in the International System*, explores Pakistan's role in the international system and the challenges posed to it due to globalization. The book comprises eleven chapters including an introduction by Jochen Hippler, former Country Director Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), Pakistan. The book in a broader context addresses three themes: (i) political, cultural, religious and geo-strategic impact of globalization on Pakistan; (ii) changing global geo-political landscape; and (iii) integration of state economy with the global economy.

The book assesses the religious, political and cultural impact of globalization on Pakistan including challenges of globalization faced by the country. This theme contains three chapters: (i) *Nation States in the Era of Globalization: What Pakistan can learn from others?* by Hassan Jalil Shah and Aamir Khattak; (ii) *Globalization, Islam and Culture; Lessons from Pakistan's Occluded Histories* by Feriyal Amal Aslam and Ayesha Rasheed Dar; and (iii) *Risks, Challenges and Opportunities in Globalization: Carving a Role for Pakistan* by Mustafa Hyder Sayed. They assess that in a globalized environment, several countries in the world including South Korea, Vietnam and Bangladesh have a close resemblance to the challenges faced by Pakistan. Islamabad should learn from those who have successfully traversed the difficult path and surmounted the ostensibly insurmountable challenges identical to those being faced by Pakistan (pg. 34).

Feriyal Amal Aslam and Ayesha Rasheed Dar applied Jan Naderveen Pieterse's model of hybridity and its premises that the "Muslims world is a fertile area of hybridization" for interrogating the impact of globalization on Pakistani society and culture. The authors argue that Pakistan on one hand aspires to remain a modern Islamic democracy with the commitment to modern democratic freedom and on the other hand, a theocratic tendency, inherent in the freedom movement and later co-opted in its constitutional and legal provisions by successive governments, requires a manifest adherence to Islamic laws and morality. Mustafa Hyder Sayed points out that the Foreign Office of Pakistan should have "Targeted Diplomacy" by engaging civil society, think tanks, pressure

groups and media of the host countries in shaping public opinion in the interest of Pakistan (pg. 225). In curbing the economic crisis of Pakistan, there is a need for the “Islamabad Consensus” to make a 15-20-year economic policy that is adhered to regardless of which party is in power (pg. 229).

The following two chapters discuss changing global geo-political landscape and its impact on Pakistan’s foreign policy-making process: (i) *Global Geo-Political Changes, International Political System and Pakistan* by Zahid Shahab Ahmed; and (ii) *A Rearticulation of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy in the Wake of the Twenty-First Century Challenges* by Huma Naz Siddiqui Baqai. Both authors suggest that Pakistan should try to maintain a balanced relationship with the US and China. The authors recommend that Pakistan should remain committed to “connectivity” and try to exploit CPEC and New Quad – signed in May 2021 by the US, Uzbekistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan for regional support to Afghan peace process – as golden opportunities.

The succeeding two chapters are dedicated to the impact of the global economy on Pakistan including (i) *High-quality Education to Survive in the Global Economy – Pakistan’s Perspective* by Fareeha Adil, Rabia Tabassum, and Nudrat Fatima; (ii) *Supporting Export Competitiveness in Pakistan’s Industrial Sector Amid Covid-19* by Syed Shujaat Ahmed and Vaqar Ahmed. According to international practices, several international study programme and internships can help in transforming market orientation and required skills for the students, that includes the Japanese professional development method of Lesson Study, real-world learning, use of technology, role play and video-based reflections. Syed Shujaat Ahmed and Vaqar Ahmed analyze that the pandemic has led to changes in the production, cost of trade, and quality standards demanded by international buyers. Therefore, it is important to develop rapid evidence-use systems including trade portals and commodity-wise dashboards which inform both buyers and sellers in case of disruption (pg. 269).

Apart from this, some chapters comprise miscellaneous themes including climate change, emigration from Pakistan and Pakistan’s role in the UN. The chapter on *The Effects of the Global Changes in Climate on Pakistan* by Fahad Saeed and Kashif Majid Salik, traces Pakistan’s various initiatives to mitigate the climate change impact including, the “ten billion Trees Afforestation Project”. Shafqat Munir Ahmed’s chapter, *Emigration from Pakistan – How influential is the Diaspora?* notes that Pakistani emigrants are five cents of its population, 95.70% of whom reside in Gulf countries and the remaining 4.30% are in the West, enjoying a very limited role in the decision-making process of host countries. The author suggests that the Information Ministry, Foreign Affairs and Ministries of Overseas Pakistani should come up with a comprehensive plan to use emigrants for the promotion of the best interest of the country.

Nausheen Wasi in her chapter *The Place and Role of Pakistan in International United Nations Organizations* assesses Pakistan's relations with the UN in political and developmental domains. The author underscores Pakistan's concerns about India's bid to get a permanent seat in Security Council are genuine. India's continued propaganda for placing Pakistan on FATF grey list and recently as the president of UNSC its denial to invite Pakistan to the meeting of Afghanistan, testify to Pakistan's concerns (pg. 134). Pakistan is also establishing the balance of power in South Asia by proposing a large number of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament-related initiatives through the forum of UN. (pg. 134). The author recommends that the government needs to have digital and physical infrastructure capacity and fool-proof systems for fund utilization, coordination between the center, the provincial government and UN agencies to implement agreed proposals and promotion of research culture through the US-Pakistan partnership.

The book is an interesting read with a comprehensive and balanced compilation by editors. The contributions are well-researched. Keeping in view the significance of Pakistan's geographical location, contributors recommend that the country need shift from a geo-strategic to a geo-economic one. Furthermore, they argue that Pakistan is an inward-looking country that generally focuses on the country itself or on its relationships with its immediate neighbors, needs to adopt the global approach. The authors have also pointed out the foreign policy challenges the country is facing in maintaining balance between the US and China and suggested that Islamabad should focus on geo-economic model to maximize its foreign policy objectives.

Reviewed by Safia Malik, Research Officer, Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Sindh.

Title: **The New Climate War: The Fight to Take Back Our Planet**
Author: **Michael E. Mann**
Publisher: **Public Affairs, New York, 2021, 368.**

The New Climate War" by Michael E. Mann is a comprehensive and well-written examination of the ongoing battle to combat climate change. Mann, a leading climate scientist, provides a detailed look at the tactics used by those who deny the reality of climate change and the ways in which these tactics have hindered progress in addressing the issue. He also offers solutions for how we can overcome these obstacles and effectively combat climate change.

Well-known climate scientist explains how the fossil fuel industry has spent the last thirty years avoiding blame and postponing climate change action, and offers a strategy to preserve the planet. Recycle. Fly less frequently. Avoid eating meat. These climate change indicators have been taught to us. However, a marketing strategy has successfully placed the whole burden of combating climate change on individuals, resulting in an overemphasis on human behaviour. Fossil fuel companies have adopted the blame-shifting, "guns don't murder people, people do" and greenwashing tactics of other corporations e.g., "Crying Indian" advertisements by the beverage industry in the 1970s. They have fought against efforts to limit or charge for carbon emissions, run PR campaigns to make good alternatives look bad, and avoided taking responsibility for fixing the problem they caused. The outcome has been disaster around the world.

The New Climate War, according to Mann, is not over. He puts regular people against polluters like wealthy right-wing people, fossil fuel companies along with oil funded states. He pushes for a sensible and workable solution to the problem of carbon pricing, as well as a revision of the Green New Deal, which has good intentions but is faulty, and fair competition between fossil fuels and renewable energy; dispelling the misleading narratives and arguments that have split even proponents of climate action. Overcoming pessimism and climate-mongering hopelessness.

Due to the combination of extremely powerful entrenched interests in defence of the status quo over fossil fuels, the societal tipping point will not occur unless all citizens actively and collectively participate in a march against it. The book tries to equip and educate everyone to fight for the future of our world.

One of the world's foremost climate scientists attempts to comprehend the motivations and techniques of climate change deniers by entering their minds. Mann argues that denying the existence of human-caused climate change is no longer acceptable in

this open and honest dissertation on the politics of the environment. The new climate war is a more subtle form of denial that seeks to shift accountability for climate change from corporations producing greenhouse gases to individuals through a deceptive form of deflective accountability. If one considers that Rex Tillerson, the previous US Secretary of State, served as ExxonMobil's CEO before joining the Trump administration, one will agree with Mann's assessment. While Mann agrees that individuals have a responsibility to take care of the planet, he argues that enacting the kind of sweeping change that is needed, will require massive policy-level action on the order of the Clean Air Act and the Montreal Protocol, which were passed to combat ozone depletion, respectively.

Right-wing media scare tactics regarding solar and wind energy; the dangers of "clean" coal and geoengineering; "doomism," which "leads us down the wrong path"; and "climate denial," which "leads us down the wrong path," are all addressed in detail as he leads readers through the logical fallacies of these positions. There is a sense of urgency and initiative. As an example of the dangers of rejecting research for political reasons, Mann hopes the Covid-19 pandemic will serve as a warning. In terms of action, individuals can do things like "push politicians to adopt climate-friendly government laws," while groups can work to fix the underlying problems. Expertly debunking the fossil fuel industry's propaganda and calling for public opposition.

The book provides an in-depth and detailed analysis of the culprits, in Mann's words these are the fossil-fuel sellers, strategies implemented and tactics espoused. It is enthralling to see the depths Mann has taken to in order to expose those strategies' and unearthed the non-solutions' solution to the problem like natural gas, nuclear energy, carbon capture and storage, direct air capture, and etc. Many climate advocates call such solutions "predatory-delay," and pseudo-solutions. However, at times there can be a dichotomy between his words as he goes on to push people to adapt, accepts value of direct air capture, talks in-between lines about pros of nuclear energy and carbon capture and storage. In addition, those he pitches as enemies in the climate wars under label of 'inactivism' are identified with the use of diversified terminology substituting the word 'deniers', which shows lack of clarity from the author. Additionally, as has been pointed out by several others, this places his cause within the scope of a destructive sort of support. Although his solution of systematic change advocates for promoting renewable energy and pricing carbon, there are other solutions that needs to be credited.

The book tends to be overly partisan in its approach. Mann is a vocal advocate for action on climate change, and some may argue about objectivity in his approach. Additionally, the book focuses

primarily on the situation in the United States, and may not fully consider the global context of the issue.

The most recent contributions of Mann are well-researched climate change warnings. With his optimistic outlook, he draws a picture of a new fight in uncharted climate territory. Whereas, in his bipolar universe, 'nay-sayers' to climate dangers have not been beaten, despite the fact that the world appears to have realised the reality of climate threat, they have instead adopted diversion, deception, and misdirection strategies in the continuation of climate conflicts. He eventually clamps down on their current strategies in the hopes of equipping and uniting people in their fight against climate inactivists.

Overall, "The New Climate War" is an important and thought-provoking read for anyone interested in understanding the challenges we face in addressing climate change and the ways in which we can overcome them. Mann has written a book that is not only informative but also inspiring and empowering. It is a must-read for anyone concerned about the future of our planet.

Reviewed by Mujeeb Jan Talpur, PhD Scholar at the Department of IR, National Defence University, Islamabad.

Documents

Document: 1

Joint Communiqué-SCO Heads of Government (Prime Ministers) Council Meeting, November 2, 2022

The 21st meeting of the Council of Heads of Government (Prime Ministers) of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (hereinafter SCO or the Organisation) was held via videoconference on 1 November 2022. The participants included Minister of External Affairs of the Republic of India Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, Prime Minister of the Republic of Kazakhstan Alikhan Smailov, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China Li Keqiang, Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Kyrgyz Republic Akylbek Japarov, Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Mikhail Mishustin, Prime Minister of the Republic of Tajikistan Kokhir Rasulzoda and Prime Minister of the Republic of Uzbekistan Abdulla Aripov.

The meeting was chaired by Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China Li Keqiang.

Attendees at the meeting also included SCO Secretary-General Zhang Ming, Director of the Executive Committee of the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure Ruslan Mirzayev, Chairman of the Board of the SCO Business Council Davron Vakhobov, and Chairman of the Council of the SCO Interbank Consortium Alisher Mirsoatov.

The meeting was attended by high representatives of the SCO observer states, namely, Prime Minister of the Republic of Belarus Roman Golovchenko, First Vice-President of the Islamic Republic of Iran Mohammad Mokhber, Prime Minister of Mongolia Luvsannamsrain Oyun-Erdene, Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of Turkmenistan Khodjamyrat Geldimyradov as a guest of the presiding side, as well as the Executive Secretary of the Economic and Social Commission of the United Nations for Asia and the Pacific Armida Salsiah Alisjahbana, Chairman of the Board of the Eurasian Economic Commission Mikhail Myasnikov, Secretary General of the Economic Cooperation Organisation Khusrav Noziri, Deputy Secretary General of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia Chi Fang; Deputy Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States Ilkhomjon Nematov.

The heads of delegations exchanged views on key global and regional development matters and discussed priority steps designed to strengthen trade, economic, cultural and humanitarian cooperation within the SCO in a friendly, constructive and businesslike atmosphere.

The heads of delegations praised highly the Republic of Uzbekistan's 2021-2022 SCO chairmanship and called for taking strong

action to implement the outcomes of the SCO Heads of State Council meeting held in Samarkand on 16 September 2022.

The heads of delegations expressed support for the Republic of India's SCO chairmanship in 2022-2023.

The heads of delegations stated that the world was entering a new era of rapid growth and large-scale transformations. These fundamental processes go hand in hand with increased interconnectedness and a higher pace of IT development and digitalisation.

In this regard, guided by close or overlapping assessments of the current regional and global agenda, the member states reaffirmed their commitment to forming a more representative, democratic, fair and multipolar international order based on the universally recognised principles of international law, multilateralism, equal, joint, indivisible, comprehensive and sustainable security, cultural and civilisational diversity, mutually beneficial and equal cooperation of states with the central coordinating role of the UN.

The heads of delegations stressed that, in accordance with the SCO Charter principles, the member states adhere to a policy that excludes bloc-, ideology- and confrontation-driven approaches to addressing international and regional development issues and countering traditional and unconventional challenges and security threats.

Taking into consideration the opinions of the member states, they confirmed the relevance of the initiatives to promote interaction in an effort to build a new type of international relations based on mutual respect, justice, equality and mutually beneficial cooperation, as well as the formation of a common vision of the idea of creating a community of common destiny for humankind.

The heads of delegations underscored the fact that the member states would continue to make efforts to fulfil the goals and to adhere to the principles of the SCO Charter, to promote cooperation in the politics and security, infrastructure, trade, the economy, finance and investment, and cultural and humanitarian ties in order to build a peaceful, secure, prosperous and environmentally friendly planet Earth and to achieve harmonious coexistence of humans and nature.

The heads of delegations reiterated that the SCO member states consider it important to further improve the global economic governance architecture and will consistently uphold and strengthen an open, transparent, fair, inclusive and non-discriminatory multilateral trading system based on the WTO principles and rules, facilitate the development of open global economy, and oppose protectionist actions and trade restrictions that are inconsistent with the WTO principles and undermine the multilateral trade system and threaten the global economy. They stressed that unilateral economic sanctions, other than the sanctions approved by the UN Security Council, are inconsistent with the principles of

international law and adversely affects third countries and international economic relations.

The heads of delegations confirmed that the SCO stands for increasing the effectiveness of the WTO as a key platform for discussing the international trade agenda and adopting the rules of multilateral trade. They stressed the need for an early inclusive reform of the WTO emphasising its development and adaptation to the current economic realities, as well as the effective implementation of the monitoring, negotiation and dispute resolution functions.

The heads of delegations highlighted the position of the SCO member states in favour of promoting multi-format regional economic cooperation and the creation of favourable trade and investment environment in order to gradually arrive at the free movement of goods, capital, services and technology.

Reaffirming their support for China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan noted the ongoing joint activities to implement this project, including the efforts to couple the construction of the Eurasian Economic Union and the BRI.

The heads of delegations consider it important to use the potential of the region's countries, international organisations and multilateral associations in the interest of creating a Eurasian space for a wide, open, mutually beneficial and equal interaction in accordance with the international law and with account taken of the national interests. In this regard, the heads of delegations mentioned the idea of creating a Greater Eurasian Partnership with the participation of the SCO countries, the Eurasian Economic Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and other stakeholder countries and multilateral associations.

The heads of delegations highlighted the need for consistent implementation of the Programme of Multilateral Trade and Economic Cooperation of the SCO Member States and the Action Plan for its implementation. They called for expanding and deepening cooperation in the financial, investment, industrial, transport, energy, agricultural and other areas in the interest of sustainable socioeconomic development within the SCO region.

The heads of delegations stressed the need to implement the 2021-2025 Action Plan to implement the SCO Development Strategy to 2025 (Moscow, 10 November 2020). They welcomed the adoption of the 2023-2027 Comprehensive Plan for implementing the provisions of the Treaty on Long-Term Good-Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation of the SCO Member States (Samarkand, 16 September 2022).

The heads of delegations noted the Republic of Tajikistan's proposal on developing the Strategy for the Economic Development of the SCO Region to 2030.

The heads of delegations noted the results of the 21st Meeting of the SCO Member States Ministers Responsible for Foreign Economic and Foreign Trade Activities (28 September 2022, via videoconference).

The heads of delegations consider it necessary to ensure the implementation of the Joint Statement of the SCO Heads of State on Trade Facilitation (Qingdao, 10 June 2018), as well as to develop practical steps to build reliable, sustainable and diversified supply chains, to expand trade in services and intra-regional trade in accordance with the SCO Heads of State Council's statements and other documents adopted at the Samarkand summit.

The heads of delegations noted the outcomes of the SCO Economic Forum (Tashkent, 16-17 August 2022) and the meeting of the SCO Consortium of Economic Analytical Centres (22 September 2022, via videoconference). They pressed for continuing these formats in the interest of deepening trade and economic cooperation between the SCO member states, studying the current state of the multilateral cooperation within the Organisation and its prospects.

The heads of delegations noted that the development of micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises is essential for promoting economic growth and employment. They spoke in favour of continuing practical cooperation as part of the Memorandum of Understanding to promote cooperation within the SCO in the sphere of micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises (Qingdao, 10 June 2018).

The heads of delegations spoke in favour of regularly holding, as part of the SCO, a Startup Forum and an Innovation Contest to Promote Micro-, Small- and Medium- Sized Businesses.

The heads of delegations spoke in favour of deepening cooperation in the digital economy and digital technologies in the interest of ensuring inclusive economic growth of the SCO member states in order to achieve the Goals of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Having noted the results of the Meeting of the Heads of Ministries and Departments of the SCO Member States Responsible for the Development of Information Technology (Tashkent, 25 November 2021) they consider it necessary to ensure the execution of the Action Plan for the implementation of the Concept of Cooperation of the SCO Member States in the Field of Digitalisation and Information and Communication Technology (Bishkek, 14 June 2019).

The heads of delegations noted that the creative economy could become a part of developing the parties' innovative potential. They believe that supporting creative industries will make economies more competitive, give a boost to small- and medium-sized businesses, and expand the SCO member states' job markets.

Having emphasised the importance of relations between the SCO member states' regions, the heads of delegations spoke in favour of consistent implementation of the Programme for the Development of

Interregional Cooperation of the SCO Member States (Bishkek, 14 June 2019). They noted the outcomes of a meeting of the Forum of Heads of Regions of the SCO Member States (Tashkent, 3-4 August 2022) and spoke in favour of building up cooperation within this mechanism, as well as at the China-SCO regional trade and economic cooperation's demonstration zone site, and in other formats.

The heads of delegations noted the Republic of Uzbekistan's proposal to create an Alliance of Special Economic Zones of the SCO Member States and to hold a meeting of the heads of administrations of special economic areas in Samarkand in 2023.

The heads of delegations stressed the need to provide financial support for project activities in order to fully unlock the SCO's investment potential and, in this regard, to continue consultations on creating the SCO Development Bank and the SCO Development Fund (Special Account). They noted the adoption by the interested SCO member states of a Roadmap for the Gradual Increase in the Share of National Currencies in Mutual Settlements between the SCO Member States (Samarkand, 16 September 2022) and spoke in favour of expanding this practice.

The heads of delegations gave a positive assessment of the contribution of the SCO Business Council and the SCO Interbank Consortium to the development of economic cooperation within the Organisation. They took under advisement the results of the meetings of the Interbank Consortium Council (Tashkent, 23 August 2022), and the Business Council Board (Tashkent, 14 September 2022) and advocated the effective implementation of the provisions of the Joint Action Plan of the member banks of the SCO Interbank Consortium for supporting and developing intra-regional economic cooperation within the SCO in the medium term (2022- 2027), the List of the SCO Business Council's main areas of activity for 2022-2023, and the framework principles of interaction and cooperation between the SCO Interbank Consortium banks in finance.

The heads of delegations noted the Republic of Uzbekistan's proposal to hold a Big SCO Trade Fair and create a single electronic platform on its basis, and to hold a Business Partnership Week between the regions of the SCO member states in Uzbekistan in 2023.

The heads of delegations, speaking in favour of promoting cooperation in industry and industrial cooperation, noted the results of the Meeting of Ministers of Industry of the SCO Member States (Tashkent, 15 July 2022) and the opening of the Uzbekistan-SCO Industrial Zone. They stressed the need for consistent implementation of the Programme to Stimulate Industrial Cooperation between the SCO Member States' Business Circles (Samarkand, 16 September 2022).

The heads of delegations noted the Republic of Uzbekistan's proposal to launch a broad-based New SCO Economic Dialogue.

The heads of delegations noted the Republic of Tajikistan's proposal to create an investment project data bank in the SCO member states' manufacturing industry.

The heads of delegations noted the Republic of Tajikistan's proposal concerning the development of regulations on organising within the SCO the manufacturing industry-related convention and exhibition events.

Speaking in favour of promoting cooperation between the customs services of the SCO member states, the heads of delegations noted that online sharing of information on goods and vehicles that cross the customs border, the protection of intellectual property, interaction in developing and managing risk management systems and combatting customs offences are all mandatory for deepening cooperation in the sphere of customs control. In this regard, they believe it is important to continue consultations on creating a mechanism for convening meetings of the SCO member states' heads of customs services.

The heads of delegations noted the results of the Meeting of the Heads of Departments of the SCO Member States Responsible for Plant Quarantine (Tashkent, 17 May 2022) and stressed the importance of practical implementation of the Agreement between the Authorised Bodies of the SCO Member States on Cooperation in the Field of Plant Quarantine (Samarkand, 16 September 2022).

The heads of delegations noted the growing role of digitalisation and innovative technology in promoting the SCO region's economic growth and sustainable development. They emphasised the need to implement the Concept of Cooperation of the SCO Member States in the Field of Digitalisation and Information and Communication Technology (Bishkek, 14 June 2019), the SCO Heads of State Council's Statement on Strengthening Cooperation in the Field of Science, Technology and Innovation (Dushanbe, 17 September, 2021), the Concept for Establishing the SCO Technology Parks Pool (Nur-Sultan, 25 November 2021), and the Cooperation Programme for the SCO Member States' Authorised Bodies for Promoting Digital Literacy (Samarkand, 16 September 2022).

The heads of delegations consider it important to strengthen mutual coordination and cooperation, to use the digital economy and scientific and technological innovations in order to create new impulses for progress in member states, as well as to improve economic competitiveness and the region's development potential. They spoke against discriminatory measures under any pretext that hinder the development of the digital economy and communication technology.

The heads of delegations believe that amid conditions brought on by the coronavirus pandemic, e-commerce is vastly important for improving the economies, increasing employment, and improving people's well-being in member states. They supported the Special Working Group on

Electronic Commerce's activities in a move to raise the level of electronic commerce in the region and to promote economic growth within the SCO.

In this regard, the heads of delegations noted an online presentation of streaming trade of traditional goods in SCO countries (10 January - 7 February 2022, a video conference) and a workshop on e-commerce (20-24 June 2022, a video conference).

The heads of delegations consider it necessary to take measures to implement the SCO member states' agreements regarding the creation of a Special Working Group on Startups and Innovations, an Expert Working Group on Traditional Medicine, and a Special Working Group on Alleviating Poverty (Samarkand, 16 September 2022) and to launch these groups.

Noting that alleviating poverty plays an important role in ensuring prosperity, security, and stability in the region, the heads of delegations noted the results of the meeting of the SCO member states' heads of departments on poverty reduction (Tashkent, 28 January 2022) and the International Forum on Poverty Reduction (Bukhara, 26-27 May 2022).

The heads of delegations confirmed the member states' push to achieve effective use of the SCO's transit potential, the formation of regional transport and transit corridors, and the implementation of major projects that contribute to improving transport connectivity within the Organisation. They consider it important to create new and upgrade existing international routes for road and rail transport, multimodal transport corridors and logistics centres, as well as to introduce digital, innovative, and energy-saving processes, to streamline cross-border procedures in accordance with best international practices, as well as to implement joint infrastructure projects that ensure mutually beneficial use of the SCO member states' transit potential.

The heads of delegations noted the Republic of Uzbekistan's proposal to hold a SCO Transport Forum in Uzbekistan in 2023.

The heads of delegations noted the outcomes of the 9th Meeting of Ministers of Transport of the SCO Member States (Khiva, 12 May 2022). They stressed the importance of the Concept of Cooperation between the SCO Member States for Developing Interconnectivity and Creating Effective Transport Corridors (Samarkand, 16 September 2022), which has been approved by a Head of State Council's decision, and the importance of implementing it.

The heads of delegations pointed out that stakeholder SCO member states' approaches to speed up economic recovery after the pandemic, further broaden regional economic cooperation, and unblock international production and supply chains has been included in the Statement on Ensuring Reliable, Sustainable and Diversified Supply Chains.

They noted the importance of consistent implementation of the Agreement between the Governments of the SCO Member States for Creating Favourable Conditions for International Road Transport

(Dushanbe, 12 September 2014) and regular meetings of the Joint Commission on Facilitation of International Road Transport.

The heads of delegations confirmed the SCO member states' push to continue to expand cooperation between railway authorities based on the Concept of Interaction between Railway Authorities (Railways) of the SCO Member States (Tashkent, 2 November 2019). They noted Kyrgyz Republic's proposal to develop an action plan for implementing the above concept.

The heads of delegations reiterated the SCO member states' push to continue to develop modern logistics centres and to take joint measures to coordinate and promote integration of railway infrastructure, to couple policies and regulations, scientific and technological innovation, and to build up capacity, as well as to explore specific measures to increase the number of international intermodal container trains and to further promote safe, stable, and high-quality rail transport.

The heads of delegations noted the Republic of Uzbekistan's proposal to establish, with the support of the UN, an Interregional Centre for Connectivity in Tashkent.

The heads of delegations noted the outcomes of the Meeting of Ministers of Energy of the SCO Member States (Tashkent, 24 June 2022) and stressed the importance of practical implementation of the Concept of Cooperation of the SCO Member States in the Energy Sector (Dushanbe, 12 August 2021) and the corresponding action plan (Tashkent, 24 June 2022), as well as a Statement by the SCO Heads of State Council on Ensuring International Energy Security and the Programme of Cooperation between the Authorised Bodies of the SCO Member States in Using Renewable Energy Sources (Samarkand, 16 September 2022).

The heads of delegations noted the Republic of Kazakhstan's proposal to develop the SCO energy strategy.

The heads of delegations noted the outcomes of the Meeting of Ministers of Agriculture of the SCO Member States (Tashkent, 25 July 2022). They pointed out, given the circumstances, the need for consistent implementation of the Agreement between the Governments of the SCO Member States on Cooperation in Agriculture (Tashkent, 11 June 2010), the Programme of Cooperation of the SCO Member States on Food Security (Dushanbe, 12 October 2018), the Statement by the SCO Heads of State Council on Food Security (Dushanbe, 17 September 2021), the Statement by the SCO Heads of State Council on Ensuring Global Food Security (Samarkand, 16 September 2022) and the Concept of Interaction between the Authorised Bodies of the SCO Member States in the Sphere of "Intellectual" Agriculture and Agro- Innovation (Samarkand, 16 September 2022). They noted the role of the SCO demonstration base for exchanging and training in agricultural technology in promoting agricultural cooperation within the SCO space.

The heads of delegations noted the Republic of Uzbekistan's proposal to hold the SCO International Conference on Food Security in Uzbekistan in 2023.

The heads of delegations emphasised that the COVID-19 pandemic continues exerting a serious negative influence on people's lives, health and wellbeing in all countries. The member states are developing productive cooperation in promoting healthcare and preventing and countering the spread of infectious diseases to remove the threat of epidemics in the SCO space. They consider it necessary to consistently implement the Declaration on Joint Measures to Counter the Threat of Epidemics in the SCO Space (Qingdao, 10 June 2018), the Comprehensive Plan of Joint Measures to Counter Epidemics in the Region (Moscow, 10 November 2020), the Concept of Cooperation between the Health Ministries of the SCO Member States on Telemedicine and the Roadmap on Cooperation between Medical Institutions of the SCO Member States in the Prevention and Treatment of Infectious Diseases (Samarkand, 16 September 2022).

The heads of delegations noted the results of the Session of Heads of Sanitary and Epidemiological Welfare Services of the SCO Member States (St Petersburg, 19 December 2021), the Meeting of Health Ministers of the SCO Member States (Tashkent, 8 June 2022) and the SCO Forum on Traditional Medicine (Tashkent, 7 June 2022).

The heads of delegations noted the proposal of the Russian Federation to establish an SCO Medical Association.

Emphasising the importance of environmental protection for socio-economic development, the heads of delegations spoke in favour of deepening cooperation in countering climate change, preserving and ensuring sustainable use of biodiversity, protecting and rationally managing water resources, as well as promoting low carbon technology and inclusive approaches to social development of society. They emphasized the importance of implementing the Concept on Cooperation of the SCO Member States on Environmental Protection (Qingdao, 10 June 2018) and the SCO Green Belt Programme (Dushanbe, 17 September 2021).

Speaking about the results of the Meeting of the Heads of Ministries and Departments of the SCO Member States Responsible for Environmental Protection (Tashkent, 27 May 2022), the heads of delegations supported the continuation of preparations of the Programme for the Joint Creation of a Single SCO Platform for the Exchange of Environmental Information. They noted the proposal of the Republic of Kazakhstan to form a Registry of SCO Environmental Problems.

The heads of delegations emphasised that the support granted by the developed countries under Annex II of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change should be commensurate with the actions of the developing nations on countering climate change. Provision and

mobilisation of resources on countering climate change are a commitment of the developed countries to the developing nations.

The heads of delegations pointed out that the developed countries have not yet fulfilled their obligations on climate finance, including the \$100 billion per year goal by 2023. They urged the developed countries to fulfil their commitments as soon as possible, prior to COP 27, so as to make an important contribution into establishing a new collective climate finance goal after 2025 and help the developing nations to counter climate change in the context of sustainable development.

The heads of delegations reaffirmed the commitment of the SCO member states to settle the problem of climate change and their willingness to implement the SCO Heads of State Council on Climate Change Response in order to promote cooperation in counter climate change and adapt to it. They noted the importance of cooperation on environmental protection, environmental security, prevention of negative consequences of climate change, preservation and use of biodiversity and the exchange of experience and current information on these issues.

The heads of delegations emphasised that inadequate access to a source of safe drinking water, basic sanitary services and healthy hygiene is creating serious problems. They noted the need to focus on sustainable development and rational use of water resources. The SCO member states are convinced that it is unacceptable to use the climate agenda for introducing restrictions on trade and investment cooperation. They will work towards intensive dialogue with relevant international institutions with a view to attracting investment and funding joint projects and programmes on environmental protection, introducing new eco-friendly technology and increasing the share of the green economy.

The heads of delegations noted the results of the Meeting of the Heads of Ministries and Departments of the SCO Member States Responsible for Environmental Protection (Tashkent, 27 May 2022), and the Second High-Level Conference on the International Decade Water for Sustainable Development 2018-2028 (Dushanbe, 6-9 June, 2022), as well as the seminar on the SCO Climate Agenda in the Modern Conditions (23 September, 2022, via videoconference).

Supporting the proposal of the Republic of Tajikistan to declare 2025 the International Year for the Protection of Glaciers, the heads of delegations noted the initiative to create an International Fund for the Protection of Glaciers by adopting a UN General Assembly resolution.

The heads of delegations noted the proposal by the Republic of Kyrgyzstan to draft a resolution for the 77th UN General Assembly announcing a Five-Year Period of Action for the Development of Mountainous Regions in 2023-2027.

The heads of delegations noted the proposal of the Republic of Uzbekistan to establish an SCO Climate Council.

The heads of delegations also noted the proposal of the People's Republic of China to create an SCO Database of Innovative Environmental Technology.

The heads of delegations expressed solidarity with the people of Pakistan who sustained damage from the recent unprecedented floods caused by climate change. They praised cooperation between the Government of Pakistan and the UN in overcoming the consequences of this devastating natural disaster.

The heads of delegations supported further coordination of actions by the SCO member states in preventing and eliminating the consequences of large-scale and cross-border emergencies, including regular conduct of international exercises by rescue services of the member states for upgrading skills of experts. They also backed the use of the multilateral system of coordination and exchange of information on emergencies in the SCO to upgrade the monitoring and early warning mechanisms and improve cooperation on enhancing production safety and application of relevant legislative and administrative regulations. They supported the deepening of the SCO's cooperation with the UN and other international agencies in this area.

Having emphasised the need to further develop cooperation in education and science, the heads of delegations supported consistent implementation of the Agreement on Cooperation in Education between the Governments of SCO Member States (Shanghai, 15 June 2006).

The heads of delegations noted the results of the Meeting of the Ministers of Science and Technology from the SCO Member States (Tashkent, 8 April 2022). They consider important the implementation of the Programme of SCO Cooperation in Artificial Intelligence and the SCO Action Plan on Scientific and Technological Cooperation in Priority Areas for 2022-2025 (Samarkand, 16 September 2022).

The heads of delegations consider it necessary to further deepen practical cooperation between the SCO member states in the cultural and humanitarian fields, in part, by introducing new formats of interaction in education, culture, tourism and sports.

Emphasising the importance of preserving and multiplying the unique cultural heritage of the SCO member states, the heads of delegations highly praised the results of the SCO Year of Culture, during which many concerts, festivals, contests, exhibitions, seminars, meetings and forums took place. They advocated the effective implementation of the Agreement between the Governments of the SCO Member States on Cooperation in Protecting Cultural Landmarks (Dushanbe, 17 September 2021), Regulations on the SCO Tourism and Cultural Capital (Dushanbe, 17 September 2021), the Memorandum on Cooperation between the Secondary and Higher Institutions of Professional Education in Culture and Arts of the SCO Member States (Dushanbe, 17 September 2021),

Regulations on the Gala Concert of the Arts Festival of the SCO Member States (Dushanbe, 18 August 2021) and the Memorandum between the Authorised Bodies of the SCO Member States on Cooperation in Museum Affairs (Samarkand, 16 September 2022).

The heads of delegations noted the results of the Meeting of the Culture Ministers of the SCO Member States (Tashkent, 19 May 2022) and the proposals of the SCO member countries to create an alliance of their museums, an SCO Museum Forum and other cooperation platforms.

The heads of delegations are convinced that people's diplomacy promotes mutual understanding and cultural and humanitarian ties in the SCO. In this context, they pointed to the contribution made into the development of SCO humanitarian cooperation by the SCO People's Diplomacy Forum (Tashkent, 11 May 2022), the institution of the honorary title of the SCO Goodwill Ambassador and the adoption of the relevant Regulations (Samarkand, 16 September 2022). In this context, the heads of delegations also mentioned the activities of the Chinese Committee on Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation, the SCO People's Diplomacy Centre in Tashkent, the SCO Cultural and Integration Centre in Bishkek and the SCO Friendship and Cooperation Centre in Dushanbe.

The heads of delegations consider it necessary to continue the effective implementation of the Agreement between the Authorised Bodies of the SCO Member States on Cooperation in Physical Fitness and Sports (Bishkek, 14 June 2019). They noted the results of the Meeting of the Heads of Departments in Charge of Physical Fitness and Sports in the SCO Member States (Tashkent, 20 May 2022) and a proposal of the Russian Federation to create an SCO Association of Sports Organisations under the SCO auspices and establish a working group on physical fitness and sports in the framework of the said meeting.

The heads of delegations said that the annual SCO Kunming Marathon in the People's Republic of China and the Issyk-Kul Marathon in the Kyrgyz Republic are making a positive contribution to the development of sports cooperation in the SCO.

Emphasising the active role of women in promoting friendship and understanding, the heads of delegations welcomed the results of the SCO Women's Forum and the Meeting of Businesswomen from the SCO Member States (Tashkent, 18-19 August 2022) in the context of the Beijing Declaration and the Action Plan adopted by the Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing, 4-15 September 1995).

The heads of delegations noted the results of the SCO Youth Council (Tashkent, 9-10 June 2022) as well as the SCO Youth Science, Technology and Innovation Forum and the SCO Youth Camp (Shenzhen, 31 May - 2 June 2022). They stressed the importance of implementing the Cooperation Agreement of the SCO Member States on Working with the Youth (Dushanbe, 17 September 2021).

The heads of delegations agreed to continue promoting their cooperation in tourism. They believe the announcement of the SCO Year of Tourism in 2023 and the city of Varanasi, Republic of India, the SCO's tourist and cultural capital in 2022-2023 will help tap the potential of tourism cooperation in the region.

The heads of delegations noted the results of the Meeting of the Tourism Administrations Heads of SCO Member States and the Tourism Forum (Tashkent, 19-20 May 2022). They emphasised the need to carry out the Agreement between the Governments of the SCO Member States on Tourism Cooperation (Samarkand, 16 September 2022) and the Plan of Joint Actions in the New Conditions on Implementing the Programme of Tourism Cooperation of the SCO Member States in 2022-2023 (Dushanbe, 15 July 2021).

The heads of delegations consider it necessary to develop contacts between the media, press services of government bodies and cooperation in the digital space. They believe this should be done, in part, by implementing the Agreement between the Governments of the SCO Member States on Media Cooperation (Bishkek, 14 June 2019) and the Agreement between the Governments of the SCO Member States on Cooperation in Ensuring International Information Security (Yekaterinburg, 16 June 2009). In their opinion, cooperation of the media in exchanging news and information products, joint broadcasting and technical interaction and training of personnel are facilitating the creation of favourable conditions for broad mutual dissemination of information.

The heads of delegations advocated the deepening of the SCO's cooperation with the UN and its specialised agencies and other international and regional organisations.

The heads of delegations endorsed a report by the SCO Secretariat on events and meetings conducted under the Programme for Multilateral Trade and Economic Cooperation between SCO Member States and the SCO budget for 2023. They also adopted decisions on a number of issues related to the financial and institutional activities of the SCO permanent bodies.

The heads of delegations expressed gratitude to China for excellent organisation of the meeting of the SCO Heads of Government (Prime Ministers) Council.

Next session of the SCO Heads of Government (Prime Ministers) Council will take place in the Kyrgyz Republic in 2023.

Source: <http://eng.sectsco.org/archives/20221102/922237/Joint-communicu-following-the-21st-meeting-of-the-SCO-Heads-of-Government-Prime-Ministers-Council.html>

Document: 2**Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan, Revised Draft Decision - /CMA.4, November 20, 2022.****Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan**

The Conference of the Parties,

Recalling decisions 1/CP.19, 1/CP.20, 1/CP.21, 1/CP.22, 1/CP.23, 1/CP.24, 1/CP.25 and 1/CP.26,

Noting decision -/CMA.4,¹

Guided by science and principles,

Reaffirming the outcomes of all previous Conferences of the Parties, Conferences of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol and Conferences of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement, including decisions 1/CP.26, 1/CMP.17 and 1/CMA.3 (the Glasgow Climate Pact),

Also reaffirming the critical role of multilateralism based on United Nations values and principles, including in the context of the implementation of the Convention and the Paris Agreement, and the importance of international cooperation for addressing global issues, including climate change, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty,

Noting the importance of transition to sustainable lifestyles and sustainable patterns of consumption and production for efforts to address climate change,

Also noting the importance of pursuing an approach to education that promotes a shift in lifestyles while fostering patterns of development and sustainability based on care, community and cooperation,

Acknowledging that climate change is a common concern of humankind, Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights, the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment, the right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and the right to development, as

¹ Draft decision entitled "Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan" proposed under agenda item 2 of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its fourth session.

well as gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerationalequity,

Noting the importance of ensuring the integrity of all ecosystems, including in forests, the ocean and the cryosphere, and the protection of biodiversity, recognized by some cultures as Mother Earth, and also noting the importance of ‘climate justice’, when taking action to address climate change,

Emphasizing that enhanced effective climate action should be implemented in a manner that is just and inclusive while minimizing negative social or economic impacts that may arise from climate action,

Recognizing the fundamental priority of safeguarding food security and ending hunger, and the particular vulnerabilities of food production systems to the adverse impacts of climate change,

Also recognizing the critical role of protecting, conserving and restoring watersystems and water-related ecosystems in delivering climate adaptation benefits and co- benefits, while ensuring social and environmental safeguards,

1. *Underlines* the urgent need to address, in a comprehensive and synergetic manner, the interlinked global crises of climate change and biodiversity loss in the broader context of achieving the Sustainable Development Goals, as well as the vital importance of protecting, conserving, restoring and sustainably using nature and ecosystems for effective and sustainable climate action,¹
2. *Acknowledges* that the impacts of climate change exacerbate the global energy and food crises, and vice versa, particularly in developing countries,
3. *Stresses* that the increasingly complex and challenging global geopolitical situation and its impact on the energy, food and economic situations, as well as the additional challenges associated with the socioeconomic recovery from the coronavirus pandemic, should not be used as a pretext for backtracking, backsliding or de-prioritizing climate action;

Science and Urgency

4. *Welcomes* the contributions of Working Groups II² and III³ to the

² Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 2022. Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to

Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change;

5. *Recognizes* the importance of the best available science for effective climate action and policymaking;
6. *Takes note* of the 2022 adaptation gap⁴ and emissions gap⁵ reports of the United Nations Environment Programme, and recent global and regional reports of the World Meteorological Organization on the state of the climate;⁶
7. *Reiterates* that the impacts of climate change will be much lower at the temperature increase of 1.5 °C compared with 2 °C⁷ and *resolves* to pursue further efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C;
8. *Recognizes* the impact of climate change on the cryosphere and the need for further understanding of these impacts, including of tipping points;

Enhancing Ambition and Implementation

9. *Resolves* to implement ambitious, just, equitable and inclusive transitions to low- emission and climate-resilient development in

the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. H Pörtner, D Roberts, M Tignor, et al. (eds.). Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. Available at <https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/>.

³ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 2022. *Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*. P Shukla, J Skea, R Slade, et al. (eds.). Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. Available at <https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/>.

⁴ See United Nations Environment Programme. 2022. *Adaptation Gap Report 2022: Too Little, Too Slow - Climate adaptation failure puts world at risk*. Nairobi: United Nations Environment Programme. Available at <https://www.unep.org/resources/adaptation-gap-report-2022>.

⁵ See United Nations Environment Programme. 2022. *Emissions Gap Report 2022: The Closing Window - Climate crisis calls for rapid transformation of societies*. Nairobi: United Nations Environment Programme. Available at <https://www.unep.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2022>.

⁶ See, for example, World Meteorological Organization. 2022. *State of the Global Climate 2021*. Geneva: World Meteorological Organization. Available at <https://public.wmo.int/en/our-mandate/climate/wmo-statement-state-of-global-climate>.

⁷ Decision 1/CP.26, para. 16, and decision 1/CMA.3, para. 21.

line with the principles and objectives of the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement, taking into account this decision, the Glasgow Climate Pact and other relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties and the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement;

10. *Expresses appreciation* to the Heads of State and Government who participated in the Sharm el-Sheikh Climate Implementation Summit for their support in enhancing and accelerating the implementation of climate action;

Energy

11. *Emphasizes* the urgent need for immediate, deep, rapid and sustained reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions by Parties across all applicable sectors, including through increase in low-emission and renewable energy, just energy transition partnerships and other cooperative actions;
12. *Recognizes* that the unprecedented global energy crisis underlines the urgency to rapidly transform energy systems to be more secure, reliable, and resilient, including by accelerating clean and just transitions to renewable energy during this critical decade of action;
13. *Stresses* the importance of enhancing a clean energy mix, including low-emission and renewable energy, at all levels as part of diversifying energy mixes and systems, in line with national circumstances and recognizing the need for support towards just transitions;

Mitigation

14. *Recognizes* that limiting global warming to 1.5 °C requires rapid, deep and sustained reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions of 43 per cent by 2030 relative to the 2019 level;
15. *Also recognizes* that this requires accelerated action in this critical decade, on the basis of equity and the best available scientific knowledge, reflecting common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances and in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty;
16. *Calls upon* Parties to accelerate the development, deployment and dissemination of technologies, and the adoption of policies, to

transition towards low-emission energy systems, including by rapidly scaling up the deployment of clean power generation and energy efficiency measures, including accelerating efforts towards the phasedown of unabated coal power and phase-out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, while providing targeted support to the poorest and most vulnerable in line with national circumstances and recognizing the need for support towards a just transition;

17. *Reiterates*⁸ its invitation to Parties to consider further actions to reduce by 2030 non- carbon dioxide greenhouse gas emissions, including methane;
18. *Emphasizes* the importance of protecting, conserving and restoring nature and ecosystems to achieve the Paris Agreement temperature goal, including through forests and other terrestrial and marine ecosystems acting as sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases and by protecting biodiversity, while ensuring social and environmental safeguards;
19. *Recognizes* the importance of maximizing the positive and minimizing the negative economic and social impacts of the implementation of response measures, and *welcomes* the adoption of decisions -/CP.27,⁹ -/CMP.27¹⁰ and -/ CMA.4;¹¹

Adaptation

20. *Notes with serious concern* the existing gap between current levels of adaptation and levels needed to respond to the adverse effect of climate change in line with findings from the contribution of Working Group II to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Sixth Assessment Report;
21. *Urges* Parties to adopt a transformational approach to enhancing

⁸ Decision 1/CP.26, para. 19.

⁹ Draft decision entitled "Report of the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures" proposed under agenda item 12 of the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-seventh session.

¹⁰ Draft decision entitled "Report of the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures" proposed under agenda item 9 of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol at its seventeenth session

¹¹ Draft decision entitled "Report of the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures" proposed under agenda item 12 of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its fourth session.

- adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change;
22. *Also urges* developed country Parties to urgently and significantly scale up their provision of climate finance, technology transfer and capacity-building for adaptation so as to respond to the needs of developing country Parties as part of a global effort, including for the formulation and implementation of national adaptation plans and adaptation communications;
 23. *Highlights* the role of the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund in supporting actions by developing countries to address climate change, *welcomes* the pledges made to the two Funds and *invites* developed countries to further contribute to the two Funds;
 24. *Emphasizes* the importance of protecting, conserving and restoring water and water- related ecosystems, including river basins, aquifers and lakes, and *urges* Parties to further integrate water into adaptation efforts;

Loss and Damage

25. *Notes with grave concern*, according to information in the contributions of Working Groups II and III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the growing gravity, scope and frequency in all regions of loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, resulting in devastating economic and non-economic losses, including forced displacement and impacts on cultural heritage, human mobility and the lives and livelihoods of local communities, and *underlines* the importance of an adequate and effective response to loss and damage;
26. *Expresses deep concern* regarding the significant financial costs associated with loss and damage for developing countries, resulting in a growing debt burden and impairing the realization of the Sustainable Development Goals;
27. *Welcomes* the consideration, for the first time, of matters relating to funding arrangements responding to loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including a focus on addressing loss and damage, under the Conference of the Parties and the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of

the Parties to the Paris Agreement and *also welcomes* the adoption of decisions -/CP.27¹² and -/CMA.4,¹³ on matters relating to funding arrangements responding to loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change;

28. *Further welcomes* the adoption of decisions -/CP.27¹⁴ and -/CMA.4,¹⁵ establishing the institutional arrangements of the Santiago network for averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change to enable its full operationalization, including supporting its mandated role in catalysing technical assistance for the implementation of the relevant approaches at the local, national and regional level in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, and *affirms* its determination to select the host of the secretariat of the Santiago network by 2023 through a selection process conducted in an open, transparent, fair and neutral manner in accordance with the process outlined in paragraphs 17–18 of decisions -/CMA.4¹⁶ and -/CP.27;¹⁷

¹² Draft decision entitled “Funding arrangements for responding to loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including a focus on addressing loss and damage” proposed under agenda item 8(f) of the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-seventh session.

¹³ Draft decision entitled “Funding arrangements for responding to loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including a focus on addressing loss and damage” proposed under agenda item 8(f) of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its fourth session.

¹⁴ Draft decision entitled “Santiago network for averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage under the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts” proposed under agenda item 7 of the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-seventh session.

¹⁵ Draft decision entitled “Santiago network for averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage under the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts” proposed under agenda item 7 of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its fourth session.

¹⁶ Draft decision entitled “Santiago network for averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage under the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts” proposed under agenda item 7 of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its fourth session.

¹⁷ Draft decision entitled “Santiago network for averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage under the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts” proposed under agenda item 7 of the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-seventh session.

Early Warning and Systematic Observation

29. *Emphasizes* the need to address existing gaps in the global climate observing system, particularly in developing countries, and *recognizes* that one third of the world, including sixty per cent of Africa, does not have access to early warning and climate information services, as well as the need to enhance coordination of activities by the systematic observation community and the ability to provide useful and actionable climate information for mitigation, adaptation and early warning systems, as well as information to enable understanding of adaptation limits and of attribution of extreme events;
30. *Welcomes* and *reiterates* the United Nations Secretary-General's call made on World Meteorological Day on 23 March 2022 to protect everyone on Earth through universal coverage of early warning systems against extreme weather and climate change within the next five years and *invites* development partners, international financial institutions and the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism to provide support for implementation of the Early Warnings for All initiative;

Implementation – Pathways to Just Transition

31. *Affirms* that sustainable and just solutions to the climate crisis must be founded on meaningful and effective social dialogue and participation of all stakeholders and *notes* that the global transition to low emissions provides opportunities and challenges for sustainable economic development and poverty eradication;
Emphasizes that just and equitable transition encompasses pathways that include energy, socioeconomic, workforce and other dimensions, all of which must be based on nationally defined development priorities and include social protection so as to mitigate potential impacts associated with the transition, and *highlights* the important role of the instruments related to social solidarity and protection in mitigating the impacts of applied measures;

Finance

32. *Highlights* that about USD 4 trillion per year needs to be invested in renewable energy up until 2030 to be able to reach net zero

emissions by 2050,¹⁸ and that, furthermore, a global transformation to a low-carbon economy is expected to require investment of at least USD 4–6 trillion per year;¹⁹

33. *Also highlights* that delivering such funding will require a transformation of the financial system and its structures and processes, engaging governments, central banks, commercial banks, institutional investors and other financial actors;
34. *Notes with concern* the growing gap between the needs of developing country Parties, in particular those due to the increasing impacts of climate change and their increased indebtedness, and the support provided and mobilized for their efforts to implement their nationally determined contributions, highlighting that such needs are currently estimated at USD 5.8–5.9 trillion²⁰ for the pre-2030 period;
35. *Expresses serious concern* that the goal of developed country Parties to mobilize jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020 in the context of meaningful mitigation action and transparency on implementation has not yet been met and *urges* developed country Parties to meet the goal;²¹
36. *Emphasizes* that accelerated financial support for developing countries from developed countries and other sources is critical to enhancing mitigation action and addressing inequities in access to finance, including its costs, terms and conditions, and economic vulnerability to climate change for developing countries,²² and that scaled-up public grants for mitigation and adaptation for vulnerable regions, in particular sub-Saharan Africa, would be cost-effective and have high social returns in terms of access to basic energy;
37. *Notes* that global climate finance flows are small relative to the overall needs of developing countries, with such flows in 2019–

¹⁸ See <https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/830fe099-5530-48f2-a7c1-11f35d510983/WorldEnergyOutlook2022.pdf>.

¹⁹ As footnote 5 above.

²⁰ See <https://unfccc.int/topics/climate-finance/workstreams/needs-report>.

²¹ See J0156_UNFCCC 100BN 2022 Report_Book_v3.2.pdf.

²² IPCC. 2022. Summary for Policymakers. In: H Pörtner, D Roberts, M Tignor, et al. (eds.). *Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Available at <https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/>.

2020 estimated to be USD 803 billion,²³ which is 31–32 per cent of the annual investment needed to keep the global temperature rise well below 2 °C or at 1.5 °C, and also below what would be expected in the light of the investment opportunities identified and the cost of failure to meet climate stabilization targets;

38. *Urges* developed country Parties to provide enhanced support, including through financial resources, technology transfer and capacity-building, to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation, in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention, and *encourages* other Parties to provide or continue to provide such support voluntarily;

Calls on the shareholders of multilateral development banks and international financial institutions to reform multilateral development bank practices and priorities, align and scale up funding, ensure simplified access and mobilize climate finance from various sources and *encourages* multilateral development banks to define a new vision and commensurate operational model, channels and instruments that are fit for the purpose of adequately addressing the global climate emergency, including deploying a full suite of instruments, from grants to guarantees and non-debt instruments, taking into account debt burdens, and to address risk appetite, with a view to substantially increasing climate finance;

39. *Calls on* multilateral development banks to contribute to significantly increasing climate ambition using the breadth of their policy and financial instruments for greater results, including on private capital mobilization, and to ensure higher financial efficiency and maximize use of existing concessional and risk capital vehicles to drive innovation and accelerate impact;

40. *Emphasizes* the ongoing challenges faced by many developing country Parties in accessing climate finance and *encourages* further efforts, including by the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, to simplify access to such finance;

41. *Takes note* of the report on the determination of the needs of developing country Parties related to implementing the Convention and the Paris Agreement and in this context *urges* developed country Parties to provide resources for the second replenishment of the Green Climate Fund while demonstrating

²³ See document <https://unfccc.int/documents/619173>.

progression over previous replenishments and in line with the programming capacity of the Fund;

Technology Transfer and Deployment

42. *Welcomes with appreciation* the first joint work programme of the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network,²⁴ for 2023–2027, which will facilitate the transformational change needed to achieve the goals of the Convention and the Paris Agreement, *invites* Parties and stakeholders to cooperate and engage with the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network to support the implementation of the joint work programme activities, including on technology needs assessments, action plans and road maps, *acknowledges* the findings in the final report on the first periodic assessment of the effectiveness and adequacy of the support provided to the Technology Mechanism in supporting the implementation of the Paris Agreement²⁵ and *decides* that the main challenges identified therein should be considered under the global stocktake;
43. *Highlights* the importance of cooperation on technology development and transfer and innovation in implementing the joint work programme activities;
44. *Welcomes* the forward-looking conclusions of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation to continue consideration of the Poznan strategic programme on technology transfer at its sixty-first session (November 2024)²⁶ with the aim of supporting the implementation of relevant activities, such as those identified and prioritized in developing countries' nationally determined contributions, national adaptation plans, technology needs assessments and technology action plans, and long-term strategies;

Capacity-Building

45. *Notes* that capacity gaps and needs still exist in developing countries and *calls on* developed country Parties to increase support for long-term country-driven capacity-building

²⁴ See <https://unfccc.int/ttclear/tec/documents.html>.

²⁵ FCCC/SBI/2022/13.

²⁶ FCCC/SBI/2022/L.28.

interventions to enhance the effectiveness, success and sustainability of those interventions;

Taking Stock

46. *Notes* the importance of the periodic review of the long-term global goal under the Convention and *welcomes* the adoption of decision - /CP.27,²⁷ on the second periodic review of the long-term global goal under the Convention and of overall progress towards achieving it;

Ocean

47. *Welcomes* the outcomes of and key messages²⁸ from the ocean and climate change dialogue²⁹ in 2022 and *decides* that future dialogues will, from 2023, be facilitated by two co-facilitators, selected by Parties biennially, who will be responsible for deciding the topics for and conducting the dialogue, in consultation with Parties and observers, and preparing an informal summary report to be presented in conjunction with the subsequent session of the Conference of the Parties;
48. *Encourages* Parties to consider, as appropriate, ocean-based action in their national climate goals and in the implementation of these goals, including but not limited to nationally determined contributions, long-term strategies and adaptation communications;

Forest

49. *Recalls* that, in the context of the provision of adequate and predictable support to developing country Parties, Parties should collectively aim to slow, halt and reverse forest cover and carbon loss, in accordance with national circumstances, consistently with the ultimate objective of the Convention, as stated in its Article 2;³⁰
50. *Encourages* Parties to consider, as appropriate, nature-based

²⁷ Draft decision entitled "Second periodic review of the long-term global goal under the Convention and of overall progress towards achieving it" proposed under agenda item 13 of the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-seventh session.

²⁸ Available at <https://unfccc.int/documents/615101>.

²⁹ Mandated in decision 1/CP.25, para. 31.

³⁰ Decisions 1/CP.16 and 9/CP.19.

solutions or ecosystem- based approaches, taking into consideration United Nations Environment Assembly resolution 5/5,³¹ for their mitigation and adaptation action while ensuring relevant social and environmental safeguards;

Agriculture

51. *Welcomes* the establishment of the four-year Sharm el-Sheikh joint work on implementation of climate action on agriculture and food security as well as the establishment of the Sharm el-Sheikh online portal under the joint work by decision -/CP.27;³²

Enhancing Implementation: Action by Non-Party Stakeholders

52. *Acknowledges* the engagement of non-Party stakeholders in climate action, which complements and broadens it, while recognizing the pivotal role of governments in action on climate change within the framework of the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement;
53. *Recognizes* the important role of indigenous peoples, local communities, cities and civil society, including youth and children, in addressing and responding to climate change and *highlights* the urgent need for multilevel and cooperative action in this regard;
54. *Notes* the adoption of the action plan under the Glasgow work programme on Action for Climate Empowerment by decision - /CP.27;³³
55. *Encourages* Parties to increase the full, meaningful and equal participation of women in climate action and to ensure gender-responsive implementation and means of implementation, including by fully implementing the Lima work programme on gender and its gender action plan, to raise climate ambition and

³¹ See https://www.unep.org/environmentassembly/unea-5.2/proceedings-report-ministerial-declaration-resolutions-and-decisions-unea-5.2?%2Fproceedings-report-ministerial-declaration-resolutions-and-decisions-unea-5_2=.

³² Draft decision entitled “Joint work on implementation of climate action on agriculture and food security” proposed under agenda item 3(a–b) of the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-seventh session.

³³ Draft decision entitled “Action plan under the Glasgow work programme on Action for Climate Empowerment” proposed under agenda item 3(b) of the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-seventh session.

- achieve climate goals;
56. *Invites* Parties to provide support to developing countries for undertaking gender- related action and implementing the gender action plan;
 57. *Recognizes* the role of children and youth as agents of change in addressing and responding to climate change and *encourages* Parties to include children and youth in their processes for designing and implementing climate policy and action, and, as appropriate, to consider including young representatives and negotiators into their national delegations, recognizing the importance of intergenerational equity and maintaining the stability of the climate system for future generations;
 58. *Expresses its appreciation* to the Presidency of the twenty-seventh session of the Conference of the Parties for its leadership in promoting the full, meaningful and equal participation of children and youth, including by co-organizing the first youth-led climate forum (the Sharm el-Sheikh youth climate dialogue), hosting the first children and youth pavilion and appointing the first youth envoy of a Presidency of the Conference of the Parties and *encourages* future incoming Presidencies of the Conference of the Parties to consider doing the same;
 59. *Expresses its appreciation* to the children and youth constituency for co-organizing the Sharm el-Sheikh youth climate dialogue with the Presidency of the twenty-seventh session of the Conference of the Parties and *notes* the outcomes of the seventeenth Conference of Youth, organized by the constituency and held in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, in November 2022;
 60. *Encourages* Parties and non-Party stakeholders to engage actively in the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action;
 61. *Welcomes* the leadership of the Presidency of the Conference of the Parties and the high-level champions, in particular in the context of the Sharm el-Sheikh Adaptation Agenda and the Breakthrough Agenda, and the collaboration between Parties and non-Party stakeholders, and *emphasizes* the need for continued acceleration and collaboration;
 62. *Welcomes* the recommendations of the High-Level Expert Group on the Net-Zero Emissions Commitments of Non-State Entities, launched by the United Nations Secretary- General in March 2022, which are designed to enhance transparency and accountability related to, and progress in achieving, the climate pledges of

businesses, investors, cities and regions;

63. *Invites* the secretariat to ensure greater accountability of voluntary initiatives through the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action platform;³⁴
64. *Welcomes* the convening of five regional forums led by the President of the twenty- seventh session of the Conference of the Parties and the high-level champions, in collaboration with the United Nations Regional Economic Commissions, on initiatives for financing climate action and the Sustainable Development Goals.

Source: <https://unfccc.int/documents/621908>

³⁴ See <https://climateaction.unfccc.int/>.

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