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
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INDUS AND GANGES CLASH OF VALLEYS IN ASIAN CENTURY

Aamir Cheema*

Abstract

Pakistan and India represent two distinct riparian civilisations that flourished around River Indus and River Ganges almost 4000 years ago. For last 2000 years these two valleys have been at a perpetual state of animosity. Since 1947, Pakistan and India have fought conventional wars in 1947, 1965, 1971, and a non-conventional conflict over Siachen is going on since 1982. Both adversaries have attained nuclear capabilities in 1998 and fought another war in Kargil in 1999. Since then an uneasy peace is prevailing between the two nations. This paper looks at the relations between these nations in a geo-historical perspective and is an effort to prove that it is from 'Current of History' that a logical path based upon pure reason for Asian Century is predicted.

Key Words: *Pakistan, India, Ganges, Indus, Kargil. Asian Century.*

Geography

India has two main riparian areas running from north to south, moving from west to the east. The first one is the River Indus¹ which has engulfed about seven major rivers before it falls into the Arabian Sea. It originates from an elevation of 22000 feet from Lake Mansowar in Tibet known as Sin-ka-bab (Lion's mouth). Indus Valley is 950 miles long and 700 miles wide. The slope of Indus valley goes as deep as 1:7,000 feet nearly double of the slope covered by Egyptian civilization surrounding Nile River. About 4500 years ago human development reached a striking peak in the Indus Valley cities of Harappa and Mohenjo-Daro.² All those rivers whose water falls into river Indus are part of Indus Valley, thus rivers like Gilgit, Kabul, Kurram, Kaitu, Tochi, Shaktu, Gomal and Zhob all are integral part of Indus Valley. The direction of these rivers is from west to eastwards.

Apart from Indus there are over a dozen of rivers which originate

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¹ Rob Bowden, *Celebrating Rivers through Time, Settlement of Indus River*, (Chicago: Heinmen, 2005), pp.5-6.

² *Encyclopaedia of South Asia*, (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1982), p-9.

from the deep mysterious beauty of Himalayas, the abode of snow. The other significant river is Jhelum followed by Chenab, Ravi, Sutlej, Beas, Jumna and Ganges. However, there is one mark difference among all these rivers as per flow, apart from the Jumna and the Ganges all rivers flow in a north-south direction and join the Indus forming Eastern Indus Valley.

The Jumna and Ganges flow in a west-east direction. Though, Ganges originates at an elevation of 14000 feet from a glacier where it comes out of mountains at a place called Suki and is initially called Baghiretti and it is at Allahabad that Jumna joins it after Ganges have covered a distance of 670 miles. Ganges flows for another 140 miles and at Benares, it is joined by Gumti wherefrom Ganges flow towards the east and mix with Brahmaputra forming Sunderban's delta. The total length of Ganges is 1500 miles and it is navigable for 1300 miles.

Brahmaputra is another important river as it defines the India's eastern frontier. It originates from the same source as that of Indus and Sutlej; flows in an easterly direction for almost 800 miles where it is known as Sanpu River. It takes southern route near Assam under the name of Dihang River and ultimately joins with Ganges; its total length is 1,750 miles (including 800 miles as Sanpu).³ Thus Indus Valley has no physical link with Ganges or Brahmaputra Valley but Ganges & Brahmaputra culture is hybrid in nature.

Vedas of Aryans

Contrary to the rich heritage of the Nile and Euphrates civilizations, there was nothing in India in the form of hard physical evidence till 1922. Before accidental discovery of the Indus civilization of Mohenjo-Daro and Harappa there was only an oral history of India available. This history conveys that there was a culture, a civilization that existed on the banks of the River Sindhu and inhabited by the dark skinned inhabitants who were destroyed and forced to leave the area by a superior race (Aryans) which was white in colour and much more refined than the aborigines.

Aryans had their gods, they love music and gambling and they were generally scared of their mother in laws and wives, they had a culture in which man and woman were tied in nuptial bonds, all this history comes down to us through the Vedas, (means knowledge) which are four in series the first one was composed in 11th or 12th century BC and is called Rig-Veda. Thus Rig Veda is not only a poem but a history'.⁴ The knowledge about the Aryan way of life is more or less transmitted orally;

³ George Duncan, *Geography of India*, (Madras: Higgin Brothers, 1880), pp-1-5. Also see James Burghess *Geography of India for the use of Higher Classes in Schools and Private Students*, (Bombay: Nelson, 1871) pp-5-6. Sir Alexander Cunningham, *Ancient Geography of India including the Campaigns of Alexander and the Travels of Hwen-Thsang*, (London: Trubner & Co. 1871) pp-9,11, 38, 220, 207 and 264.

⁴ Raeshwar Gupta, *The Rig Veda: a History* (Chittagong: Jogendra Nath,1904),p- 12.

they used to sacrifice human life occasionally but generally it was in the form of cattle and horses,⁵ for an Aryan his horse was the most sacred and he used it in a chariot. Vedas gives an insight into the life of Aryans and of that period which exists between 1700-900 B.C. The Vedas thus reflects on the cultural and life pattern of the Aryans and from them one can assume that Aryans were a happy and cheerful race. Aryans had no temples Aryans had many gods similar to the other two riparian civilizations.

The Vedas speak of the battles that took place between the Aryans and the Dravidians. Aryan was fond of warfare and Varuna was god of Aryans which looked after the sun and sky 'sun and stars were his eyes'. Aryan concept of creation of the earth is quite similar to the Chaldean concept as shown in the hymn of creation.

Then when was neither non-existent nor existent: there was no realm of air, no sky beyond it. What covered in, and where? And what gave shelter? Was water there, unfathomed All that existed then was void and form less: by the great power of Warmth was born that Unit.⁶

The Vedas at least made it certain that this migration was not from the east towards the west. The cultural life that has been deciphered indicates that Aryans were racial in nature and their classification of the people was initially based upon the colour or Varna; they forbade marriage outside their own clan, had small villages demarking territorial area of a clan, clans formed tribes and tribes were collectively forming the state ruled by a central ruler who was not autocratic in nature and bounded by the council of warriors. It was believed that women must enjoy freedom and respect. They were honoured and adored by their father, brothers, husbands and brothers in laws.

Dravidians are believed to be the original inhabitants among those of the Indus valley and they practiced animistic religion.⁷ Indus Valley was already in knowledge of the Persians⁸ who in fact named River Sindhu as Hindu because of the Persian language pronouncing 'S' as 'H'; it seems that whole of Indus valley was under them. The head of the Indus Valley was at Taxila or Tashkila where the Indus enters the plains from the mountains. Tashkila was the most prosperous of all the Persian cities and the revenue from here surpassed all the revenue from other cities. According to Herodotus the Indians were the most in number in terms of population in

⁵ John Keay, *India: A History*, (New York: Grover Press, 2000), p-32.

⁶ Kisari Mohan Ganguli, *The Mahabharata of Krishna-Dwaipayana Vyasa*, (Trans.) 2005 (EBook #7864), p. 5.

⁷ George Rawlinson in Manuel Komroff (Ed.) *The History of Herodotus Translated* (New York: Tudor, 1928) p-183.

⁸ Jawaharlal Nehru, *Glimpses of World History* (New York: John Day, 1934), p-104 also see Pliny *Natural History Book VI*, p-30.

all the world and the tax which they were paying was the largest and most numerous of all the Darius's twenty satrapies, they (Tashkila) were paying 360 gold dust talent⁹ whereas the Bactrian were paying 360 silver talents and the value of gold was 13th times more than the silver.

Herodotus made many other observations about India, in his observation, there existed tribes east of the Indus which had no sense of death or life and were cannibal in nature, within the tribe there were no sick people as when any person fell sick the others will take him to one side and eat him up. Men will do this to men and women to the women. In another case the person who fell sick will leave the tribe and go to an isolated place and just wait for the death.¹⁰ Darius had no power over these tribes which were probably in the south India, Herodotus mentioned another tribe which was opposite to the one described above as they ate no animal meat, and they sow no corn and were strict vegetarians. Another tribe which Herodotus has pointed out was living near the city of Caspatyrus in the country of Pactyica; these people dwell northward of all the rest of the Indians and follow the same code of life as the Bactrian's, they are the most war like tribe.¹¹ At some time in 516 B.C., Darius commissioned Skylax, a Greek seaman of Karyandu, to explore the course of the River Indus,¹² during which not only the river was explored but the people living astride were also made subjects under rule of the Persians.¹³

There is no documented tradition or evidence of civilisation existing on Ganges and Brahmaputra. Thus Indus valley is the mother of all civilisations in India and so has a notion of superiority over all others. By 5th Century BC, two distinct civilisations emerged on respective rivers with a lateral trade route. In the same time period a son was born to Suddhodana King of Magadha on Ganges at Kapila, he named his son as Sakyamuni Gautama; he is universally known as Siddhartha Buddha.¹⁴ Magadha was one of the leading and rather the most powerful kingdom of the eastern India which existed at that time. It comprehended all the Gangetic provinces.¹⁵ Thus it seems that whereas the area astride the Indus was under the Persian the Ganges plains were under the

⁹ Herodotus, *The History*, p-182, also see Olaf Caroe, *Pathan: 550 B.C.-1957. A.D.* (New York: McMillan, 1965), p-28.

¹⁰ Ibid, p-183.

¹¹ Ibid, p-184. Also see Micheal Woods, *Story of India: A video*, (London: British Broadcasting Corporations, 1998).

¹² Imperial Gazetteer of India, *Provincial series NWFP*, (Calcutta: Government of India, 1908) Vol. 20, p-13.

¹³ Peshawar belonged to the Gandharan Satrapy, see Charles Miller, *Khyber, British India's North West Frontier: The Story of an Imperial Migrane* (New York: McMillan, 1977), p-xiii-7.

¹⁴ Dough Vincent, *A Buddhist Reading*, approved but unpublished Thesis, University of Western Ontario, 2007 also see, Otto Kistner, *Buddha & His Doctrines: A Bibliographical Essay*, (London: Trubnar & Company, 1869), pp. 40-45.

¹⁵ James Cowles Prichard, *Researches into the Physical History of Mankind*, (Third Edition), Vol. IV, (London: 1844), p 113.

descendants of the Aryans from where a new social system was taking birth in the form of Buddhism.

Buddha was a revolutionary probably the first socialist of the world he was against the caste and promoted a classless society free of rituals and rites, where all were equal and this made the existing establishment his enemy and probably being the king's son saved him from destruction. Buddha died in 543 B.C., and it was almost 235 years after his death that his teachings were collected under the reign of Asoka in 200 B.C. However, later the Buddhism was divided into two main sects one is called Hinayana and other is Mahayana. Hinayana does not believe in his divinity and neither worship him in the form of images while Mahayana makes images of Buddha and considers him divine, it is Mahayana which spreads in China and in India thus the engravings of Buddha in these areas.

Emergence of Strategic Military Cultures: Indus & Ganges Valley

The invasion of India by Alexander the Great in 323 BC has been the starting point to elaborate history of the region almost by all historical inquiries. One reason for this obsession with Alexander the Great may be inaptness of Indian people to record their history themselves.¹⁶ When Alexander came in 327B.C,¹⁷ Indus Civilisation had no political unity but their valiant stand against Alexander the Great became a historical entity that stands valid even today.

It will remain a mystery of the history as to the actual cause of the Alexander's troops mutiny near Lahore, was it due to the fatigue as written or was it due to the incessant casualties being suffered at the hands of the native tribes and warriors; but the demoralising effect of constant casualties cannot be over ruled. Alexander did announce his intention to withdraw and as an Aryan has put it the only defeat he suffered was at the hands of his own decisions.¹⁸ Intriguingly for a researcher of history all the battles with/against Alexander were fought in the areas that are part of present day Pakistan.¹⁹

Alexander's campaigns in India as are written by his own countrymen, brought forward certain facts which in a way corroborate the early oral history of the India i.e. primarily the history of the Indus. The fighting character of the region is martial in nature as dictated by the constant battles offered to Alexander despite very high rate of attrition. It confirms the existence of the martial civilization on River Indus;

¹⁶ Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, (New York: John Day,1945], p-92.

¹⁷ Alexander the Great sacked Turkey in 334-333 BC, Phoenicians in 333-332, Persepolis in 331-330 and pushed into Arachosia (Afghanistan & Sogdia (Uzbekistan) in 329-328 BC, he was in vicinity of Kabul in 327 BC.

¹⁸ Aubrey de Selincourt, (Trans.) *Aryan: The Campaigns of Alexander*, (Penguin, 1971), p-194 and p-292.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, p-5, 9, and 16.

unfortunately Ganges does not enjoy the same reputation because it never had the opportunity to prove its mettle. It is this tag which haunts it even today.

Asoka - Sin of Nonviolence

The upper India came under the Chandra Gupta Maurya in 321 BC after retreat of Alexander. Maurya has been quoted by many historians to be present at the court of Alexander at Taxila along with his friend and mentor Chankya Kautalya. Chankya was a Brahmin in the court of Nanda and was reportedly insulted and in retaliation was keen to take revenge and this brought these two together. Their first attempt at creating a rebellion failed but later they succeeded to create very first Gangetic Indian empire of a magnitude. Consequently, Asoka was enthroned in 260 BC, he created his influence in the vast empire and remained commendable in the region. He was the very first Ganges ruler who detested the violence and the misery coming as an essential aftermath of conquest. His edicts, his laws and orders were engraved on the rocks in all corners of his empire and thus he has been able to preserve the history of the India.²⁰

*On conquering Kalinga the beloved of god felt remorse slaughter, death and deportation of the people is extremely grievous to the beloved of the gods this inscription of dharma has been engraved so that any sons or great grandsons ... should not think of gaining new conquests they should only consider conquests of dharma.*²¹

Over hundred thousand people were reportedly killed in this campaign of Ashoka this it was the deadliest conflict of the history in Ganges belt. The emperor felt remorse; he became a Buddhist and adopted a nonviolent policy or 'dharma' as the philosophy of his life and government. This policy seems to be the driving force of the Ganges from him onward. And India had to pay a heavy price for this, it seems to be the dilemma of humanity that abstain from violence has much more serious repercussions for the society as a whole than having the violence as way of life and this was aptly proved in the coming centuries. It will not be the out of the contest to point out that for over 1500 years the Ganges suffered from this policy of nonviolence, there is nothing wrong with this policy but this put the inhabitants in a constant peril from militant cultures. Events of history from 700AD-1800 AD are ample proof of this imbalance of ideology that existed between the Indus and Ganges Valley.

²⁰ Keay, *History of India*. p-88.

²¹ *Ibid*, p-92.

'Islamic Aryans'

The very first Islamic army had knocked on the doors of the Central Asia when they were in the hunt of the Firuz the emperor of Persia. Muslims had settled at Merv by 646 AD. Qutaibah Ibn Muslim was the governor of Khurasan the north eastern part of Persia who between 710-715 A.D., conquered the Central Asia especially the Bactra and Ferghana Valley (the heart land of the Turks). Turk was the name given by Arabs to all nomadic tribes of Central Asia, thus it does not represent any particular ethnic tribe. In 751 A.D., a decisive battle took place between the Muslims and the Turks who also had the support of the Chinese army, not only the Turks were defeated but it also put an end to the Chinese rule in the area for another thousand years. Resultantly almost all Turk tribes accepted Islam.

The embracement of Islam in Indus Valley by Aryans was in two directions; one in north and other in south. In Southern Indus Valley the Arab Muslims came under Muhammad Bin Qasim, a seventeen years old general who followed the retreating route of Alexander the Great to enter Indus Valley. The inhabitants of valley put up a traditional militant spirited fight in 712 AD before embracing Islam and by 1000 AD, there were Islamic kingdoms all along Indus from Thatta till Multan. Upper valley was under the domain of non-Muslim Aryans who were distinct from Ganges Valley nonviolent Hindus.

In North, the founder of the dynasty was Sebuktegin (977-997 A.D.) a Turk slave who rose to distinction and it was he who like earlier Aryans claimed his territory to the natural boundary of Indus. This frontier including Kabul was under Hindu Shahi kingdoms. He first invaded India and defeated the Hindu Shahis (989 & in 991 AD) who started giving tribute to Ghazna. After his death his son Mahmud of Ghazna continued the conquest (1000-1030 AD). The successive humiliation of the Hindu states year after year created a psychological impact on the overall non-Muslim population; it created a myth of geographical & ideological superiority between the plain dwellers of Ganges Valley who were ruthlessly being subdued by the Indus Valley people. The nomadic tribes and Turks were after all nothing else but part of Indus Valley. Wealth taken at will from the Hindu temples helped in creating the Ghazna culture which became the symbol of the Turkish people. On the historic note it was the culmination point of the Aryans who almost 2000 years ago had humiliated the Dravidians. Ganga-Jumna Valley in practical term was just a vassal state of Ghazna. as its very capital of Harsha empire Kanauj was sacked by Mahmud in 1018, in 1024 Mahmud's most severe psychological blow came with his almost 500 miles deep expedition to the southern Dravidian sacred temple at Somnath:

it had 1000 Brahmins, 300 barbers and 350 temple prostitutes in

*constant attendance and chief idol a huge lingam the phallic symbol of Shiva was washed in water from the sacred Ganges carried over 750 miles.*²²²²

For Hindu nation it was a knockout blow, an ultimate defeat of Dravidian culture's and religious surrender. The destruction of the myth and symbol of Brahmin and Hindu identity was a mental surrender, from this state of mind Hindus never recovered right till the end when India was divided on the religious line.

Ganges-Jumna Valley from this point onwards became subservient to the Indus Valley. The fact that Indus Aryans had accepted and embraced Islam thus bonded Indus Valley, Persia and Central Asia into one spectrum, which all has historically blood lines. On the other hand the inhabitants of Ganges became a home of non-Muslim Aryans and in southern India the Dravidians retained their ancient Dravidian culture. The line between the Brahmanism and Dravidians started becoming thinner and thinner.

Tamerlane in 1398 struck another fatal blow to the overall mind set of Hinduism when no less than 1,00,000 Hindu women, children and old men were slaughtered in a single night on the banks of Jumna.²³²³ This was the first holocaust. Later Mughuls (Arayan - Turks) descended from the same area from where their ancestors Aryans started migration; they ruled Ganges, Jumna, Indus and more importantly Brahmaputra in Far East and also establish their writ in the south of India for another 300 years from 1500 AD onwards. Mughals opted to have the capital on Ganges.

The founder of Mughal Dynasty, Zaheerudin Babur (d1530) had an ample support of Pathans in his battle against Ibrahim Lodhi who himself was an Afghan. A constant armed friction and attrition remained among the Mughals and Pathans throughout the former's rule. One source of this ill feeling was the Emperor Akbar's patronage of non-Muslims in which Maan Singh was made the governor of Kabul in 1585 A.D; the Mughal forces were inflicted humiliating defeats first in 1587 at Swat/ Bajaur than in 1620 another crushing defeat was inflicted upon the Mughals at Torah. Mughals were able to bring Peshawar under their control in 1630. Raja Jagat Singh kept Kohat & Bannu under Mughal sphere to keep communication open towards Kabul through Northern Waziristan. It was at Khyber where that Mughals faced the worst defeat when over 40,000 troops were annihilated in 1672 followed by defeat at Gandak in 1673 and

²² Woodbridge, Hilary & Frank, *A History of Asia, Formation of Civilisations from Antiquity to 1600*, Vol. 1 (Boston: Allyn, 1964), p-208.

²³ *The Islamic World to 1600: The Mongol Invasions*, the Timuri Empire. Ucalgary.ca. Retrieved 2012-05-22. "Timur's Account of His Invasion of India and Sack of Delhi". British Raj. Retrieved 11 December 2012. ^ Hunter, Sir William Wilson (1909). "The Indian Empire: Timur's invasion 1398". *The Imperial Gazetteer of India* .p. 366.

then another defeat in 1674 at Khapash. All these battles highlight the resilient culture of the Pathans. Throughout their 300 years of rule, they had much more trouble in Indus Valley than at any other part.

Brahmaputra River was the farthest extent of Mughal Empire or in other words the eastern most limit of Islam. The province of Bengal thus became a seat of Dravidian Muslims. Short in height & dark in colour, the Brahmaputra Muslims are of Dravidian descend whereas the Indus Valley Muslims are Aryans.

The British (1800-1947)

On the 31st December 1600, Queen Elizabeth granted a charter to 'The Company of Merchants of London trading unto the East Indies.' It was called British East India Company (BEIC). On 11th January 1613 the Mughal Emperor Jahangir issued a 'Farman' that allowed British to establish a factory at Seurat; later these areas became the presidencies Bombay, Madras and Bengal; each having its own army.

The political and military rivalry of European continent also had its effects on the sub continental politics, initially British had apprehensions about the Napoleon's advance towards the India which were later replaced by the Russians after the treaty of Vienna in 1815. British, in order to keep an eye on the affairs, wanted to have a friendly and a subservient ruler in Kabul which at that time was under control of a Pathan, Dost Muhammad (1793 – 1863). British marched onto Afghanistan in 1839, out of the original 16000 troops only one escaped death to narrate the events; this was the single worst military disaster that felt upon the BEIC since their formation.²⁴

Indus Valley- Sikhism

Sikhism took birth in the eastern tributaries of Indus Valley, thus they are part of it. Muslim teachings and thoughts hugely affected the Sikh thoughts; it was a Muslim saint Mian Mir who laid the foundation stone of Sikhism's most reverend shrine, the 'Golden Temple' at Amritsar. Sikhism took birth in Punjab in 1520 A.D; and despite having Muslim Sufi saints teachings as part of their religion they were treated at times harshly by the Mughals notably by the Aurangzeb not purely on religious grounds but it also had the spice of royal politics as well. Ahmad Shah Abdalli's forces on their way back after plundering Delhi were attacked by the Sikh Misl. In 1799 Sikh's under Ranjeet Singh entered into Lahore and slowly but gradually the Afghan Empire started shrinking. In 1834, Sikhs overpowered Afghans at Nowshehra and Peshawar along with Kohat came under their control. It was at Jamrud in 1837 that this tide was checked.²⁵

²⁴ Hayat Azmat *The Durand Line: its Geostrategic Importance*, (University of Peshawar, m 2000), pp. 63-64.

²⁵ Khullar, *Maharaja Ranjit Singh*. (New Delhi: Hem, 1980). pp-48-52 and pp 121-129.

British never really had a firm control over Indus Valley. After the death of Ranjeet Singh, first Sindh was annexed in 1842 and later Punjab was annexed in 1849. But this should not be taken as a surrender of Indus valley rather the later events proved its historical validity. First of all, the Sikh empire fought two brave wars where result hanged by a thread. When the British made a move towards west of River Indus they encountered the Aryan Pathan Muslim tribes. For another ninety years these tribes remained defiant and never came under the British reign. In 1947, Indus Valley achieved freedom along with the Ganges Valley. It is interesting to note that despite having numerical superiority the Ganges was unable to keep Indus Valley under its control and it had to accept that demands of Muslim League the political party which become the voice of Indus Valley.

History repeats itself (1947-2000)

Indus Valley inhabitants were the first to take initiative days after both valleys attained independence. This is not to delve into the prism of war to highlight the constitutional aspect rather the very fact that Tribes simply invaded Kashmir at their own simply to take the revenge of atrocities carried upon Muslims by Hindus and Dogras is the reflection of the bond that exists between the Indus Valley inhabitants. Pakistan was able to wrest away a sizeable chunk of territory from far numerical superior Indians. That is the military character of Pakistan that it did not subdued to Ganges under this numerical factor. For next eighteen years, Pakistan kept the notion of victory with it.

Nineteen Sixty Five (1965) was a watershed year in the history of Pakistan and its armed forces. The newly born state was able to challenge the bigger rival India for the hegemony of the subcontinent through a fine blend of diplomacy, strategic planning, deception and above all determination of entire nation. Her soldiers, airmen and sailors fought bravely against a bigger adversary.

It was Pakistan which initiated the military proceedings by challenging the existing boundary in Rann of Kutch in April 1965. It led to a series of operations with Pakistan launching Operation Gibraltar in August 1965 and subsequent Operation Grand Slam on 1st September; it nearly achieved its aim of crippling Indian forces in occupied Kashmir. India retaliated with a full scale war on 6th September but it failed short of achieving anything worth mentioning.

The separation of East Pakistan or Brahmaputra valley was a political and military misfortune. What is important is to understand the whole issue not from the angle of these two factors but in the light of historical factors. East Pakistan or Dravidian Muslims were in slight majority and West Pakistan Aryan Muslims had area superiority. Under the existing democratic system the power had to be handed over to the numerical superiors and this is one thing which has not occurred since the

Aryan invasion of Indus Valley; they have never been subservient to any of the other two riparian civilizations. Thus this historical factor in the end became more decisive than any other consideration.

Indus Valley inhabitants cannot live with other riparian's being subservience to them. Brahmaputra Civilization was more in number but mere numbers cannot subdue Indus Valley inhabitants and this has remained the pattern in sub-continent, the moment Jumna-Ganges got hold of nuclear weapons and upset the historical inferiority in same very moment the Indus Valley also conducted nuclear test there by resorting millenniums old superiority.²⁶²⁶ Ganges inhabitants despite gaining an upper hand in 1971 were not able to assert themselves over the Pakistan. Despite having a nuclear edge they could not dictate their terms. Siachen Glacier conflict which erupted in 1979 is still going on.

Kargil is another example where Pakistan Indian militaries tested their military muscles. India was unable to respond across the whole breadth of Pakistan's frontier.

Conclusion: The Asian Century

Thus Indus Valley has a notion of superiority over the other eastern riparian cultures and that was exhibited by the almost thousand years of rule of western India over the rest of India, thus creation of Pakistan in 1947 becomes a logical deduction of the parting of ways by the Indus Civilisation on equal footing retaining notion of victory. The very fact that despite having a numerical superiority outnumbering Muslims by almost double still Ganges Valley could not impose its will. It was also politically viable to reinstate the Muslim monarchy at Delhi as a constitutional head and retaining the integrity of India as a whole. In this option the two nation theory still provides ample space in Muslim dominated western and eastern provinces, however breaking and severing of all ties with Ganges were preferred.

Pakistan can live peacefully with India only on equal terms. Pakistan can never accept Indian hegemony in the subcontinent for the mere reason that for last five thousand years it has never been under the shadow of Ganges. And India must understand these historical values. Ganges flourishing depends upon the good will of Indus Valley, this is how it was in past and this is likely to remain the pattern in this century as well. Geography has always dictated fates of states and so it will and foreseeable future.

²⁶ India conducted first nuclear tests in 1974 i.e. peaceful nuclear explosion and later in May 1998. Pakistan responded with declaring its nuclear capability by conducting nuclear tests in same month.

DEBATE ON GOOD GOVERNANCE SOME THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Dr. Syed Bashir Hussain**1

Abstract

Traditional notion of market failure exists within the discourse of a democratic market economy. There are areas where market either does not deliver efficiently or not all. The text-book response is to look towards some agency of collectivity (e.g. the government) to fill in the vacuum left by the market mechanism. The Public Policy literature has tried to rationalize the role of the agency of the state to promote common good and sustainable development as popularly perceived --- the proverbial concept of welfare state. Of late however, the crisis of the welfare state has called into question the rationale for the welfare state framework. It is necessary to energize the welfare state model through social innovations like accountability, transparency, responsiveness and civil society participation. Bureaucratic hierarchy, empowerment of social organizations in decision making arenas, local identification of problems and the corresponding utilitarian solutions, etc. will be some of the highlights in this article.

Key Words: *Welfare state, good governance, accountability, transparency, utilitarian solutions*

Governance

Within the discourse of market economy under a democratic order, it is argued that there are areas and avenues where market either does not deliver efficiently or not at all traditional notion of market failure.¹ The text-book response is to look towards some agency of collectivity (e.g the government) to fill in the vacuum left by market mechanism. The Public Policy literature has taken this a step forward to

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¹ Paul Samuelson and William Nordhaus, *Economics* (19th Edn). (McGraw-Hill:/Irwin, 2009), pp. 30-39. Available at [http://hotfile.com/dl/10168563/9199491/SamuelsonNordhaus_-_Economia\(pdf\).zip](http://hotfile.com/dl/10168563/9199491/SamuelsonNordhaus_-_Economia(pdf).zip)

rationalize the role of the agency of the state to promote common good and sustainable development as popularly perceived --- the proverbial welfare state conception.² Of late however, the crisis of the welfare state in the form of fiscal deficits, lack of sustainability, ineffective and/or inefficient delivery systems has called into question the rationale for the welfare state framework. This in turn has led to two competing narratives for public policy theorists: one, to revert back to market mechanisms (e.g. privatization, public- private partnership, etc.) to achieve the objectives of efficient allocation of resources --- the neoliberal paradigm. The other is to energize the welfare state model through social innovations like accountability, transparency, responsiveness and civil society participation---the definition of good governance.

In this article an attempt is made to describe and analyze the dynamics of civil society--the people outside government and in the for-profit sector in interaction with the state structures, formal and informal, to improve upon the performance and delivery system envisaged in the welfare state model.³ Decentralization, a flattening of the bureaucratic hierarchy, mobilization and empowerment of social organizations in decision making arenas, local identification of problems and the corresponding utilitarian solutions, etc. will be some of the highlights.

Good Governance

Governance, shorn of academic niceties, really means what the government does. The issue at hand is to examine if the government delivers effectively and efficiently. In a free market system, a well-developed market working in a competitive environment is theoretically capable of achieving efficiency without non-market interventions. The proponents of the system even argue that not only efficiency but the best possible solution with the given constraints is automatically achieved as posited in the concept of pare to optimality.⁴

The social objectives of equity, human rights and empowerment of citizens are neither claimed as goals of market decision making nor are adequately addressed via the familiar and formal dynamics of market mechanism. Hence, the necessity of intervention by a legitimate agency of the people at large – generally a representative government is required. However the presumption of intervention by a customary agency of people may not lead to either an efficient or equitable dispensation. Hence, the further re-definition and invocation of the term good governance is necessary.

Good governance is invested with certain characteristics that are meant to promote the common good in terms of both equity and

² Bellinger, *Economic Analysis of Public Policy* (UK: Routledge, 2009) pp.199-135.

³ UN Report of the panel of Eminent Persons: Civil Society, *The United Nation and Global Governance*. (New York, 2004)

⁴ Ibid.

effectiveness. The common litany of main features generally includes people's participation, inclusiveness, transparency, responsiveness, effectiveness, equity, empowerment of the citizenry, protection of human rights, public accountability, efficiency and the rule of law, etc. Good governance may indeed be a fad as some have labeled it but with the people's active participation it can be turned into a fruitful exercise of prescriptive agenda in pursuit of common aspirations of a humane, dignified and sustainable life experience.⁵

Characteristics of Good Governance

It is generally posited that the advent of good governance requires, a priori, a literate populace, an independent and inquisitive media, independent and assertive judiciary, political stability, a well-trained and competent administrative structure, service oriented and people friendly attitude on the part of those in position of authority, deeply ingrained social norms of justice and fair play and a conscious and mobilized citizenry, etc. Without presuming to exhaust the list of prerequisites, suffice it neither to say that good governance does not arise instantaneously nor automatically to facilitate an efficacious social existence. It requires a process of self-conscious direction and has an evolutionary social aspect that needs to be kept in view as one goes about developing good governance practices. Good governance can be identified and gauged through many characteristics some of which are listed here in no particular order of importance.⁶

Strategic Vision

For good governance it is important that all participants have a broad and long term perspective on the ultimate objective of governance and policy formulation, socio-political development, economic growth, democratization, distributive justice, alleviation of poverty, gender rebalancing, minority inclusion, ethical realignment of social classes and ultimately a redefinition of sociality in a market society. It would also be helpful to have an understanding and appreciation of a variety of historical, material as well as cultural forces and developments that have culminated in the extant complexity of social reality. An analytical perspective and an appropriate contextualization would be enormously fruitful in delineating relevant good governance attributes and characteristics.

⁵ Cynthia de Alcantare, "Use and Abuse of the Concept of Governance" *ISSJ*, (1998), pp. 155.

⁶ Agerve, "Promoting Good Governance", Quoted in Tanzila Siddique: *Retaining National Role in Health care under 18th Constitutional Amendment*. Proposal for M.Phil Thesis on the Government and Public Policy Dept. of the Faculty of Contemporary Studies, National Defence University, Islamabad. (2000)

Ethical Considerations

While the field of ethics is rife with divergent ideologies, contradictory arguments and a diversity of views on the exact role and location of moral value in policy formulation and analysis, most philosophic considerations gravitate towards the minimalist agenda of basic human rights, freedom and equality. As a matter of fact, most public policy – including good governance – is, in some fashion or other, guided by some socially accepted norms of ethics and morality; for example the social provisioning for those unable to care for themselves like the indigent, the infirm or the invalid, etc. A clear identification and specific statement of ethical considerations embodied in particular policies could go a long way in clarifying and facilitating good governance objectives.

Participation

A fundamental requirement and a salient feature of good governance is citizen participation in all processes of policy formulation and implementation. The object of science, so to speak, (in this case the people) also needs to be an active subject in developing strategies and procedures to achieve specific goals and objectives of social policies. And it is the only way to create a sense of stewardship and voluntary observance of the norms of good governance.

Responsiveness

There needs to be a built in responsiveness in the content of envisioned policy prescriptions as well as the willingness and ability of policy proponents to adjust and accommodate evolving needs and desires of the affected segments of the populace. An ongoing process of give-and-take among different stake holders has the potential to move towards a common sense of vision and destiny. Rigid and authoritarian prescription of policy rules is generally not compatible with the practice of good governance.

Consensus Orientation

The attitude on the part of those wielding authority of laying down the law, as it were, can be a game changer in every sense of the term. To arrive at a consensus of opinion regarding actions embodied in a policy is not only likely to help succeed in achieving the particular objectives but also would be helpful in leading to social cohesion and group solidarity which in turn can enhance the efficacy of problem solving efforts. However when conflicting interests and contradictory objectives are involved, good governance needs to focus on points of broad agreement thus minimizing divergence and keeping contradictions within manageable limits.

Transparency

Transparency is widely recognized as an essential element of good

governance. It promotes trust between contending parties and clarifies the issues of ownership of social policy by making an effort to garner full cooperation of those concerned. In addition, it pierces the veil of hidden machinations in the exercise of power and authority between unequal participants in a given context. The fresh air of openness and the light of clarity of transactional details can be enormously helpful in the observation of specific provisions of contracts, etc.

Accountability

Accountability, recognized as a fundamental principle of good governance, is the key to not only delivering on the promise of good governance but making it responsive to public demands and sensitivities. Accountability as a mechanism of setting and keeping the record straight, unlike witch-hunting of adversaries, is the key to efficiency and efficacy of policy making procedures and processes. Those who are aware that they can be called to account can be counted on for good accounting in most, if not all, matters of social business affairs.

Rule of Law

This characteristic ensures fundamental egalitarianism implied in a cohesive social formation. Equal before the law, in theory as well as in practice, has the potential to highlight and accentuate the basic democratic attributes embodied in good governance. Equality of opportunity and equitable distribution of the rewards associated with particular governance policies can go a long way in establishing and promoting good governance. Once rules are established through some legitimate social process, adherence to the rule of law, in its letter and spirit, is the essence of good governance.

Equity/Inclusiveness

Discrimination and/or injustice towards the marginalized and the weaker segments of society can be a sure-shot recipe for the undoing of good governance. Inclusiveness based on a shared sense of equity can ensure a cohesive and cooperative response from most components of a polity for the achievement of collective goals; hence its critical salience in any good governance framework. And it may not be as farfetched as some might fancy that inclusion of basic human rights specifically empowering women and minorities as part of good governance would lead to a path of progress and development. Violation of human rights and exclusion of women and minorities leading to injustice, persecution and at times violence would be antithetical to any concept of good governance.

Efficiency/Effectiveness

Mainstream literature often characterizes efficiency – meaning the maximization of a set of goals and objectives with the constrained

resources at hand – as the exclusive if not the only yard-stick of good governance. The logic of efficiency or effectiveness is surely a necessary aspect of good governance but certainly not a sufficient guarantor of social optimization. While efficiency needs to be kept in center stage, it should not be allowed to trump other considerations like equity, fair play and such social exigencies as looking after the truly needy, etc. A freely functioning – as in a “perfect competition” model of text-book variety – market can at least in theory take care of efficiency but the goals of good governance require self – conscious and socially directed intervention of the collectivity.

Obstacles to Good Governance

There are myriad obstacles to good governance. Sociologically speaking, if a positive phenomenon is being blocked from affectivity over a period of time despite concerted efforts for its promotion and implementation, it stands to reason to locate and identify the relevant impediments in its way. Researchers and keen observers of the situation enlist as:

1. Absence of a speedy justice system.
2. Corruption in administration and politics.
3. Politicization of administrative cadre of the government.
4. A growing nexus amongst politicians, businessmen and the bureaucracy, etc.⁷

When justice is delayed inordinately, it creates the perception of the proverbial ‘justice delayed is justice denied’. The aggrieved parties, then, tend to find extra-judicial and extra-legal means to pursue their objectives, which in turn undermines the imperatives of good governance. Those unable to go this route tend to disconnect and disavow allegiance to the notions of a collective social order of things. This translates into a kind of passive resistance undermining the legitimacy of the very foundations of governance and the government itself. Besides, in a society with a weak law-and-order situation, fear of change, transitional stressfulness and unpredictability of future prospects can lead to violence in defence of an actual or perceived ideal and/or desirable social order. This can result in chaos and anarchy – an utter denial of any form of governance and governability.

Corruption in administrative structures and the political culture is really the flipside of good governance. In the classical development literature in a truly orientalist refrain, it was not un-common to ignore corruption or even accept a certain modicum of it as greasing the wheels

⁷ P.I, Cheema, “Good Governance and Fight against Terrorism”. *Monoograph*. National Defence University, 2008, pp.10-12.

of otherwise frigid decision making processes of bureaucracy in the less developed (read non-western) countries.⁸ What is lost in this view is the fact that corruption notably misdirects and misallocates resources and assets in the short run and tends to corrode the very framework of good governance in the long run – a truly pernicious state of affairs.

Politicization of the administrative cadre of the government is a two edged sword. On the one hand it may be desirable, at times, to induct political appointees to administer programmes and departments with a view to reflect the interests and aspirations of the people at large and to soften the cold, uncaring “steel-frame” of bureaucracy. On the other hand, politically motivated appointments reflecting nepotism and a kind of social jobbery may lead to incompetence and hurt the morale of those already serving in the trenches on the basis of some sense of meritocracy.

The growing nexus amongst politicians, businessmen and the bureaucracy can be injurious to the interests of the common citizen as those influential segments of society can usurp and misappropriate resources based not on the grounds of collective good but in keeping with the perceived necessity of pandering to individual, parochial concerns thus hurting overall growth and development of society and negating all notions of good governance. Most effective training programmes therefore aim at both capacity building as well as at consciousness-raising to promote tenets of good governance.

Role of People

The role of people in good governance is conceptualized as both central and critical. The consequences of governance, good as well as not so good, are after all borne primarily by the people at the receiving end of government policies and programmes. If good governance promotes growth and development, the people at large will receive whatever positive impact is so created. If, as sometimes postulated, good governance strengthens political institutions, empowers local administrative bodies, encourages democratic norms, facilitates a culture of level playing field, etc. It is likely to affect the quality of people’s lives. If, on the other hand, bad governance encourages corruption, inefficiency and general socio-political instability as is also variously implied, the general populace will have to bear the brunt of these negative attributes and their venal effects. It is therefore necessary to define and reflect on the category of people and their role in a given social formation.

Civil Society

There are many definitional and conceptual debates regarding the notion of civil society and civil society movements. For the purpose of this

⁸ See for example A. Argandona, *Corruption and Companies: use of Facilitating Payment and of Business Ethics*. Vol. 60. (2005).

presentation, it has been convenient to rely on the UN Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on the subject which defines civil society as referring to the associations” of citizens (outside their families, friends, and businesses) entered into voluntarily to advance their interests and ideologies. The term does not include profit-making activities (the private sector) or the governing cadres (the public sector).

Of particular relevance are mass organizations (such as organizations of peasants, women, or retired people), trade unions, professional associations, social movements, indigenous people’s organizations, religious and spiritual organizations, academic and public benefit non-governmental organizations.⁹ As is obvious and natural the concept of civil society has undergone historical metamorphosis – from, the classical notion of a good society in general, to a separate sphere of sociality distinct from the state.¹⁰

In the Hegelian framework the market social relations as such constitute civil society as distinct from the institutions and apparatuses of state. The Gramscian version holds civil society as the cultural and ideological capital supporting the hegemony of the bourgeois mode of production and a site of social problem solving. The modern currency of the term emphasizes the voluntary, collective and associational relations to promote some aspect of the common good.

Here again, the concerns are whether the concept as defined is capable of delivering all the social benefits that its proponents ascribe to it: the social trust, mutual tolerance, participatory decision-making, etc. Also when does a civil society become an antagonistic arena of competing groups geared towards rent seeking? Can a civil society movement seeking political justice become a political party vying for political power of the state and still be a civil society extension? These and many other such questions really point towards the grey areas that any typological categories have to delineate, sometimes in an arbitrary fashion for a given context. But as the context changes, it should be possible to redefine the boundaries of the term without necessarily jeopardizing the validity of the concept. The modern theoretical formulation of civil society and the related empirical evidence, nonetheless, suggest a substantive explanatory power embodied in the concept.

Considerations of Function vs. Structure

While it is helpful to enumerate and describe the characteristics of and obstacles to good governance, it is essential to analyze the sources and built-in incentives for divergence from socially fruitful aspects of governance. Take corruption for example. It is now widely understood that

⁹ UN Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons. “We the people: Civil Society UN and Global Governance”, Preamble, NY. 2004.

¹⁰ Michael Edwards, *Civil Society*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) p.ii.

corruption in the government sectors is primarily an expression of rent-seeking behavior of official functionaries in collision with and/or in support of the political classes. The etymology of rent-seeking can be traced to the tenant-landlord social relation of production in which the tenant does all the work and the landlord appropriates the larger share of the produce by virtue of the social status of landlord 'ism' rather than his contribution to the actual process of production.¹¹ Likewise, those in position of authority of decision making can demand and receive unearned and therefore underserved remuneration in the form of a "kick-back".

At times it is some organized group or a professional organization also that can lobby for extra considerations as special licenses, exemptions, subsidies or bonuses. At other times special dispensation, even though not socially warranted, can be legalized through the legislative processes in cahoots with the ruling elite. These "legal" rents can be just as promoting element of corrupt behavior as bribing "illegally" for a favor. While good governance requires that the rule of law prevail – and it should be underlined for emphasis – it also is critical that one not forget that the "golden rule" is written by those who have the "gold". So the specific function of observing rules may not be sufficient to achieve ends of good governance. One has to examine the structure of particular rules and rulings to get at the sources of the evil of social inequity to argue for deep, all-encompassing good governance. Time and again surveys have demonstrated that evasion of tax payment, for example, is practiced to avoid the burden of taxes but also there is widespread perception that the taxes are unfairly levied and once collected are disbursed for undeserving purposes.¹²

This argues for examining the functional as well as structural imperatives of a given social formation to understand and strategize for more socially optimal outcomes. Additionally the issues of hierarchy and social class need to be incorporated in a holistic analysis and presentation of problems and prospects so as to move towards a truly democratic society to optimize social cohesion and social satisfaction – the ultimate aim of good governance.

There are several levels and sites at which civil society can provide effective inputs. For example at a "functional" level the civil society organization both through identification of local problems and appropriate solutions, possibly of an indigenous variety, can streamline the efficient delivery of basic services to communities. The open and transparent operational context would tend to obviate rent-seeking behavior of government functionaries – a huge impediment to governmental efficiency

¹¹ Jamil Nasir: Rent-seeking and governance. The News International, Pakistan April 06, 2013.

¹² Asad Kamal: Tax Evasion in Pakistan – A case Study. M.Phil Thesis Department of Governance and Public Policy, Faculty of Contemporary Studies, National Defence University Islamabad. 2012.

and hence a devastating critique of governmental interventions.

At the “structural” level the civic associations can provide input and guidance as to the necessary as opposed to superfluous levels of bureaucracy and top-heavy management practices. A flattening of hierarchical decision making would tend to bring government closer to people – a desirable objective in its own right – as well as rationalize appropriate structures of administration.

It is generally agreed that a select elite get to dictate both the social goals and the methods to achieve them which may or may not promote the well-being of the people at large. The people’s role as expressed in civil society movements, in general, has given salience to the subaltern perspectives on goals and objectives and methods. The historical social evolution has of course benefited greatly from such movements both in the economic and political spheres. Even though social change can be intimidating, even at time overwhelming, the appropriate role of people, by and large, can point to the path of change towards a more democratic, humane and empowering denouement. And the role of people in economic as well as political spheres could be instrumental in this endeavor.

The Indigenous Experience

In Pakistan, like most elsewhere, volunteerism as civic engagement is rooted in custom and tradition and the institutions developed around these practices.¹³ Some of these institutions, even as evolved through history, continue to function in the present day society. The examples cited could be mausoleums of the spiritual elders, seminaries and mosques, where people come for solace, solidarity, and bread – an expanded version of human security.¹⁴ The modern form of these institutions is the community support organizations. Prominent among these are welfare and charity organizations, writers’ associations, women’s organizations, trade unions, and student organizations. The civic agendas of the organizations have varied from charity, literacy, poverty alleviation to issues of governance and sustainability.

But the sectional agendas pursued by these organizations inherently limit their scope in terms of creating a social movement for structural changes necessary for instituting and sustaining norms of good governance at large. However a new and dramatic development in the polity of Pakistan is the role being played by the Higher Judiciary of Pakistan.¹⁵ Although it is stated in the Constitution of Pakistan that “the state should be exercising powers through its elected representatives” to ensure full observance of democracy, freedom, equity and social justice”

¹³ Baqir Fayyaz, “UN Reforms and Civil Society Engagement.” Researchgate, November 2007

¹⁴ C. Candland, “Pakistan’s Recent Experience in Reforming Islamic Educations.” Education Reform in Pakistan. 2005/PP 17-19.

¹⁵ Hamid, Role of Judiciary in Good Governance. www.supremecourt.gov.pk/ijc N.D

the Higher Judiciary has, historically, employed a doctrine of necessity to justify and legitimize undemocratic interruptions in the polity as well as looked the other way in the face of administrative malfeasance. As it appears, not anymore! The current technicality of suo-moto notice at benches of the Higher Judiciary seems to be in the vigorous, proactive pursuit of public interest litigation. From kite flying to bonded labor, from loan default to fake degrees of parliamentarians and undeserved promotions and postings to qualifications of elective candidates, the Higher Judiciary is intent on enforcement of the principles and norms of 'good governance'. The Judiciary also has, to the consternation of some, started to probe the undemocratic behavior patterns of the really high and mighty. It is as if the power of pen –the judicial one of course--is about to trump all other sources of power and authority! The moral authority of the strong institution of Judiciary may finally be the midwife of good, humane governance in a poorly governed society of Pakistan. But this is a work in progress. Only time will tell how far this top down cleansing and reforming can go and ultimately to what end! And it deserves watching because the ultimate denouement of good governance leading to social development and human advancement hangs in the balance.

THE NEXUS BETWEEN TRADITIONAL AND NONTRADITIONAL SECURITY POLICY OF CHINA

Dr. Muhammad Khan* & Nargis Zahra*

Abstract

The security relations of states have always been conducted and observed through a realist lens, i.e. power politics, military alliances or competitions. The last two decades have changed dimensions of state politics in a profound way. The phenomena of globalization and war on terror with subsequent shifts in economic relations among states of different region are bound to have effect on Chinese security policy as well. This paper aims to understand the nexus between questions of traditional and non-traditional security in Chinese policy of cooperation. The regional relationship of China with its neighbours has been contentious and reserve in past. However, since the 1990s, the dynamics of socio-economic and political environment in East Asia is also changing. It is thus necessary to analyze regional and bilateral security cooperation of China comprehensively. This paper therefore explains it evaluates policy coordination through bilateral and multilateral channels against the background of overall security-political relationship.

Key Words: *Traditional security, Nontraditional security, Security cooperation, China, Globalization.*

Introduction

Military engagements among countries are as old as politics itself. Military cooperation is older than nation state itself, it is traced back to the time of Henry VIII, Persian Empire and Greek City States. The phenomena of globalization and terrorism in recent past, where on one hand have increased cooperative interdependence have, on the other hand, also made

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states to cooperate in terms of military and defence. It has become more important to curb and fight against transnational challenges of human security, natural disaster, and explosion of arms trade and beefed up military budgets. The landscape of balance of power is shifting, transforming and dramatically changing in every region.

Therefore military cooperation across the world is becoming an important aspect of the bilateral relations among states. The option of security cooperation is only possible once there is higher degree mutual trust, shared interest and will for cooperation at the political level between two or more governments besides required defence forces.

Academic approaches to study of bilateral relationship between two countries can be broadly categorized as realists and liberal institutionalists. The later advocate confidence building measures like military cooperation and military engagement. But the security cooperation of China with neighbouring countries, though interdependence is growing steady has remained modest. If one observes the interplay between management of non-traditional and traditional security in East Asia and Pacific, it seems difficult on account of overlapping adversities and cooperative policies among different actors. The traditional security involves the prevention from attacks by the state armed forces while non-traditional security means counter measures to a wider range of threats to the national and human security and counter measures.

Many analysts are of the view that the cooperation between China and its neighbours is because of non-traditional imperatives affecting state security at all these levels: domestic, regional and national, global and transnational. The interconnectivity has its cost and now states are to cooperate in every field of life, above all military engagements. The resulting cooperation helps to build a balance of relationship based upon political trust and therefore leads to enhanced international politico-security cooperation.

It is important to note that cooperation is instigated by the interlinking nature of non-traditional and traditional threats and problems. There is an important aspect to be considered: the difference between traditional and nontraditional cooperation between China and its neighbours.

The fall of Lehman Brothers in USA back in 2008 did not only mark a drastic shift in economic balance of power it also led to economic insecurity in many regions. The Asia Pacific has stepped almost smoothly and swiftly towards globalization becoming a successful part of multipolarity. Consequently it is experiencing not only cultural diversity but also a parallel development of information society. Meanwhile the urge of international community for world peace is at its peak but one feels far from living in a tranquil world, there are parallel signs of increase in hegemonic power politics and neo-interventionism. It is meant to be

suggested in previous lines that the traditional and non-traditional security challenges are interlaced and do interact not only at regional but also at the global level. It calls for regional cooperation. Competition in military is also intensifying and while non-traditional security challenges are to be taken into account, traditional/military security considerations have become more relevant than ever in a state's security agenda.

The thriving region of Asia and Pacific is now an eminent stage for the development of future world and its strategic interaction between major powers.¹ Not only the US is re-vitalising its security strategy as per Asia-Pacific the landscape of the region is also undergoing profound changes and China is the major player.²

China has used this time and space in international politics for its industrial and economic development and modernization. The standard of life in China has remarkably improved in the last decade, China now enjoys general social stability and cross-strait relations are sustaining a momentum of peaceful development. However, China still faces multiple and complicated security threats and challenges.³ China has employed its armed forces to principals of safeguarding national sovereignty, security and integrity thus supporting the state's peaceful development.⁴

The Security Environment in Asia Pacific

The non-traditional security challenges in Asia Pacific are not only of transnational nature but are non-militarised. These challenges affect security and wellbeing of states and people alike thus becoming most pivotal to the transforming security agenda in the region. As the perceptions and discourse on the agenda and normative debate of non-traditional security (NTS) is being redefined, China is becoming more and more serious to assure NTS and cooperate with its neighbours. While interdependencies between the traditional and non-traditional security realms remain obscure in Asia Pacific, the shift away from interpretation of security in pure terms of geo-politics. It is quiet apparent and profoundly visible. Moreover this shift is uniting states more than dividing them.

¹ The significant increase in Asia Pacific cooperation is one of the important factors which gave rise to the economic growth and development, hence opening new arenas of development. See Lawrence T. Woods, *Asia-Pacific Diplomacy: Nongovernmental Organizations and International Relations*, (UBC Press Canada, 2011), p-4-5.

² The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces, Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, (April 16, 2013). Accessed on January 13, 2014 at: http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/2013-04/16/content_28556792.htm

³ Graeme P. Herd (Ed.) *Great Powers and Strategic Stability in the 21st Century: Competing Visions of World Order*, (New York: Routledge, 2010), p-138

⁴ Ibid.

China has felt the pulse of changing requirements of regional security politics and has adopted a new concept in 1996. The new security concept has not only become central theme in Chinese foreign policy it is widely acknowledged at regional level also. This conceptual outlook of Chinese foreign policy based upon cooperation in both traditional and non-traditional security has become an important characteristic of rising power of China and influence in world politics that cannot be ignored.⁶ As per functionalists the Chinese government should engage with neighbours will support China's own development.

But the shift away from a military oriented understanding of security may also lead to more visible role of China in in the favour of international norms and values. This is further assumed that this engagement will also help to develop confidence and promote trust. This is not to be assumed however that there is some kind of must positive correlation between traditional and non-traditional security.

- Katherine Morton, "China and non-traditional security: Toward what end?" *East Asia Forum*, March 31, 2011. <http://www.easiaforum.org/2011/03/31/china-and-non-traditional-security-toward-what-end/>

China's firm commitment to pursue independent foreign policy, promote peace and secure its borders is helping it make a conducive security environment. China believes in advocating coordination with neighbours, thus making an imperative, comprehensive, and cooperative security.⁶ This necessitates the demand of building a systemic approach.⁷ Guarantee for national development and strategic support for national security is provided by China's armed forces. They are also making required contributions to the maintenance of not only world peace but also of regional stability.⁸

China and Regional Security Environment

In commitment to principles of non-interference and non-violence, equality and reciprocity in international relations, PLA has supported

⁶ Xia Liping, "How China thinks about national security", in *Alliances, Military Balances and Strategic Policy*, Chapter 8. Accessed on January 14, 2014 at: http://press.anu.edu.au//sdsc/rc/mobile_devices/ch09s02.html and Fu Peng, "The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces," April 16, 2013 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-04/16/c_132312681.htm.

⁷ It is very interesting to see that China, having the largest population and vast land faces the threat as well. It is due to the neighbourhood of 13 countries out of which Russia and India are the significant challengers. Having troubles with Russia and war with India it has to strive for internal stability as well as external and border threats. See Robert Ross, "Chinese Security Policy: Structure", *Power and Politics*, p. 60,

⁸ Fu Peng, "China Defence White Papers," April 16, 2013. http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/China_Defense_White_Paper_2013.pdf

navigation, open access to Asia's maritime commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea."¹² The US wants to internationalize the issue while China is averse to the idea. The Foreign

Minister of China Yang Jiechi insisted that the internationalization of the South China Sea disputes will "only make matters worse and resolution more difficult."¹³ Intriguingly the Asia Pacific region has become home/region of interest to many nuclear powers. Russia, US, China, Pakistan, India, and North Korea are having nuclear capabilities. At large level of analysis Asia is the region where three states have gone against nuclear taboos of testing and tested their weapons in recent history (India, Pakistan, and North Korea). Scrutinizing non-proliferation culture in Asia Pacific the culture of sensitivity towards non-proliferation is alarming, six among nine states have not ratified the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty i.e.: China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, US, and North Korea. The disputes in the region call for improved level of mutual cooperation and self-assumed compliance with international standards on nuclear issues and it should be maintained or improved in future.

Already the joint ventures for anti-terrorism military exercises within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) have become more organized. China has been at the forefront of this activity, taking part in nine bilateral and multilateral military exercises.¹⁴ China has been part of many exercises with the name of "Peace Mission" since 2005. For example;

- "Peace Mission-2005" China-Russia joint military exercise.
- "Peace Mission-2007" joint anti-terrorism military exercise by SCO members.
- "Peace Mission-2009" China-Russia joint anti-terrorism military exercise.
- "Peace Mission-2010" joint anti-terrorism military exercise by SCO members.
- "Peace Mission-2012" joint anti-terrorism military exercise by SCO members.¹⁵

Not only is this but SCO enhancing its capabilities through more joint deals.¹⁶ China also has responded to the demands of security and has introduced vast changes in infrastructure especially in maritime security.

¹² Hillary Rodham Clinton, "Remarks at Press Availability" (delivered during a press conference after the ASEAN Regional Forum Annual Meeting, National Convention Center, Hanoi, Vietnam, July 23, 2010. [Online] <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/07/145095.htm>

¹³ Yang Jiechi as quoted by Wu Liming and Chen Yong, "U.S. involvement will only complicate South China Sea issue," Xinhuanet, July 27, 2010. [Online] http://www.news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/indepth/2010-07/27/c_13417848.htm

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid

¹⁶ Ibid.

Joint maritime exercises and training are being expanded. In recent years, the Chinese navy has taken part in exercises hosted by Pakistan on the Arabian Sea. The PLA and Russian navies held,

- Maritime Cooperation-2012" military drills.
- Chinese and Thai Marine Corps held the "Blue Strike-2010" and "Blue Strike-2012" joint training exercises.

Among other exercises, the China also conducted multilateral maritime exercises and training sessions in areas as communication, maritime replacement, helicopter landing, surface firing, underwater and air targets, joint escort, boarding and inspection and diving with its counterparts of India, France, the UK, Australia, Thailand, the US, Russia, Japan, New Zealand and Vietnam.¹⁷ Chinese are also extending help in non-traditional staff training to their immediate as well as extended neighbours. The medical teams of PLA have held humanitarian based joint operations for medical assistance titled "Peace Angel" in a disaster-relief exercise of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Indonesia from 2009 to 2011. The health teams of PLA have also conducted and hosted joint exercises disaster relief titled as "Cooperation Spirit-2012" in October 2012.¹⁸

Border Cooperation Agreements

Borders of nation states have always marked territorial sense of security and integrity. This is the boundary wall which has to be secured and be kept safe. Till date China has concluded many cooperative border agreements.¹⁹ China has not only signed such agreements with seven neighbouring countries but has also established working border mechanisms with 12 other countries regarding defence along border. China being old civilization has inherent both wisdom and diplomatic capability to manage border disputes in a manner so that it won't affect the overall interests of the mutual bilateral relations. In the border agreement with India, it is agreed that peace and tranquility on border is foundational stone for growth of the relationship. India is not only seeking access to the Chinese markets but also wants to attract Chinese investment. The countries have also signed nine agreements including a deal to strengthen co-operation on trans-border rivers and transport.²⁰ China is already one of India's top trading partners. Both countries have

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Klaus Kunzmann, Willy A Schmid, Martina Koll-Schretzenmayr, (Eds.), "China and Europe: The Implications of the Rise of China for European Space" (New York: Routledge, 2010), p-178.

²⁰ "India and China in border defence agreement", *BBC News* (India) October 23, 2103. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-24633991>

competing strategic towards different global issues.²¹ Sino-Indian differences are considerably prominent in the areas of nuclear non-proliferation, security in Asia and in space, and cyberspace. The two regional powers agree on matters of politics of international economic system, energy security, and the environmental security. Both are facing rising energy demands at domestic front. But the border issues between two countries loom large. Sixteen rounds of talks have resulted in nothing concrete and border issues e.g. Aksai Chin remain unresolved.

Engaging two Koreas

China follows dual policy: That of friendship with North Korea and of coordination with South Korea. It has a balanced approach on the issues of denuclearization and regional stability.²² The Chinese Communist Party of China has affirmed Beijing's "consistent" policy of friendly relations to promote strategic security communication along cooperative lines between the two parties so as to expand cooperation further in various fields on global and regional issues.

China has been neutral about its policy towards both Koreas. South Korean anxieties for instance about Beijing's future North Korea policy were categorically discussed at fifth China-ROK High-Level Strategic Dialogue held on Nov. 26 2012. Following the dialogue, strategic goals of denuclearization and peninsula stability, as well as the need for frank dialogue and close cooperation were emphasized.

Cooperation with SCO Countries

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is a regional organization having neither global nor military ambitions. Though it has whole heartedly promoted and facilitated joint military exercises among its members and sponsored collaborations in the fields of defence, security and cooperation against terrorism. The organization believes in politics of non-confrontation.

More than any member of SCO, China has a special, unique sense of responsibility towards the motto of organization. More than the psychological reasons for the significance China attaches to SCO (its name after a Chinese city or its capital being in Beijing or above all China being its initiator.), the organization has been a stage to forward Chinese economic and political interests specially in Central Asia and beyond. Some call it the "NATO" of China in Asia Pacific region.²³

²¹ Ashley J. Tellis, "Crux of Asia: China, India, and the Emerging Global Order" (India: 2013), <http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/01/10/crux-of-asia-china-india-and-emerging-global-order/f0gw#>

²² Scott Snyder, "China-Korea Relations: Under New Leaderships," Council on Foreign Relations/Pacific Forum CSIS (2013): http://csis.org/files/publication/1203qchina_korea.pdf.

²³ Tyler Roney, "The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: China's NATO?", *Diplomate*

China so far has been the openly country with power to shape domestic policies of the whole of Central Asian states. Though it does upset prospects of many players in the region specially USA but then no state in the CARs is exactly democratic or free. According to Freedom House survey, among six SCO nations Kyrgyzstan is the only state that is "Partly Free." While the rest of the world looks with concern on the non-democratic situation in CARs China promotes development above all keeping itself indifferent from humanitarian intervention. But the belief among western analysts is strong that SCO is designed as a counterbalance to NATO.²⁴

Sino-Russia Bilateral Relationship

The bilateral relations of China and Russia have improved immensely after the collapse of Soviet Union. They are currently working together in the areas of diplomacy, defence, security, and above all energy. Until recently the Russo-Chinese security cooperation has seemed of only mutual statements and actions and not of intense (socio-economic) cross-border ties. But this is to note that in their mutual relationship the dependence of China is decreasing on Russia both as per energy resources and arms supply.

Not only this, China is going for more and more unilateral exercises in the Asia Pacific region.

The edge of good relationship between the two was compromised back in 2010 when Russia attacked Georgia and China strongly rejected it. Moreover China's involvement in Central Asia is considered by Russia as interference in region of Russia's interest.

China has also beefed up its budget in recent years which is additional point of concern for the Russian strategists. Owing to these development some of the Russian policymakers had reservations to extend their blessing to Moscow's involvement in the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). They had fears that this diplomatic step might posit Russia on a course of collision with China.

The main point of collusion actually is the way of managing relations. Both states have different ways of conducting their international relations with neighbours. While China stresses economic exchange and cooperation, Russia asserts its superior international status. For instance in the BRICS group of countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), or /and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). During and in pre cold war era Russia had been hostile, but the situation hanged and both became equal in their dealings.²⁵

(online), September 11, 2013. <http://thediplomat.com/2013/09/the-shanghai-cooperation-organization-chinas-nato-2/>

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Sujian Guo and Jean-Marc F. (Ed.), "Blanchard Harmonious World and China's New Foreign Policy", (USA: Lexington Books, 2008), p-92.

The Sino-Russian Political Relationship

The Sino-Russian Political Relationship; if we confine our observation to the political top-level relations and recognize how the countries eventually resolved their political disputes, since 1990s, was a success. They settled their border issues, minimized the risk of armed conflict and eventually formed a strategic partnership relationship in 1996. At that time, the rapprochement was based on a number of mutually shared solid strategic interests.

- *Firstly*, sufficient trust had emerged to enable Moscow and Beijing to tackle the complicated border and security issues.
- *Secondly*, the countries acknowledged their different modernization paths and understood that closer economic cooperation would benefit them both.
- *Thirdly*, the geopolitical and security constellations were changing for both countries.
- *Fourthly*, in the initial post-Cold War years Beijing and Moscow were very concerned about the hegemonic position and influence of the US and strongly opposed the unipolar world order of the Western countries.

Chinese Role in Afghanistan

After a prolong silence, China hinted in June 2012, that together with Russia, it would play a broader role for the stabilization of the Afghanistan. China has emphasized on strengthening of ways and means of, improved coordination and mutual cooperation in dealing with major international and regional issues surrounding Afghanistan. China has introduced new cooperation models and ways to identify new sectors as a priority for economic cooperation.

China eagerly looks forward to the reconstruction of Afghanistan, following ouster of the NATO and US forces, as already it has invested a lot in Afghanistan. Afghan government also urges to expand and strengthen relations with China. Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said in a statement in this regard that member states of SCO should boost security cooperation towards Afghanistan to safeguard regional stability. It includes stepping up the fight against terrorism, autonomy and extremism, optimizing the model for cooperation in ensuring security. Yang also called for further deepening of cooperation amid the economic downturn in the areas of trade and investment, in sectors such as finance, transport, energy, telecommunications and agriculture.

Sino-Pakistan Cooperation

Pakistan and China are ever green friends in cooperation on all major issues. The diplomatic relations between the two were established

in 1951 and ever since they have progressed immensely from having merely a good neighbourly relationship to an exemplary strategic partnership which is based on common interests, mutual trust and unequivocal support on all core concerns.²⁶ Contrary to Indian perceptions, this is mainly because of their mutually shared complementarities, as opposed to being based on animosity towards India or any other country. This is clear from the fact that Pakistan did not attack India to lift its occupation over Kashmir during Sino-India war-1962.

On its part, the Chinese military has, traditionally, been defensive in nature, though it remains combat ready at all times. Despite the huge military power of the PLA, there are no heavily guarded garrisons along the Sino-Pak frontiers.²⁷

In stark contrast to Pakistan's allies like USA, China is not just a source of conventional and non-conventional arms, but has been a provider of critical technologies that, in turn, have enabled Pakistan to develop an indigenous nuclear and missile programme. China has been a reliable supplier of conventional military equipment to Pakistan, providing, for instance, F-7 fighters and the T-85 main battle tank (the new version of which is the ZTZ96).²⁸ From 1972 to 1974, China not only provided Pakistan with \$300 million worth of military equipment but also helped in the establishment of defense factories. Even till date the time tested Sino-US military cooperation is continued as per "high-level military exchanges, structured defense and security talks, joint exercises, and training of personnel in each other's institutions, joint defence production, and defense trade."²⁹

The Defence White Paper

The Defence White Paper, 2013 describes Asia-Pacific region as pre dominant factor in Chinese military thinking. The defence white paper of China is issued to address international demands for transparency. China was facing these demands for some years now in which defence modernization programme of china could have been questioned by international community. China has shown its commitment to further its modernization programme and also to stay engaged with the international community; China has also begun using the Defence White Papers to

²⁶ "China-Pakistan Relations a Profile of Friendship," *IPRI Factfile*, Islamabad (2013). <http://www.ipripak.org/factfiles/ff60.shtml> (Accessed on July 10, 2013).

²⁷ Pakistan Times, "Pakistan, China resolve to consolidate strategic Ties; Joint Statement Issued," May 23, 2013. <http://www.pakistantimes.net/pt/detail.php?newsId=17381>

²⁸ Through a Military Deal in May 1967, China agreed to deliver military arms worth \$120 million to Pakistan, which included 100x T-59 tanks, 80x MiG-19 and 10x III-28s aircrafts, the diplomat, May 17,2017.

²⁹ Masood Khan, Ambassador of Pakistan to China, Pakistan-China friendship: a lush tree, Pakistan-China Institute. July 16, 2012. Accessed on Jan 14, 2014 at; <http://www.nihao-salam.com/article-detail.php?id=MzA3>.

publicize its own national objectives and version of world view. This paper also includes leadership's thinking on a wide range of issues like plans on role of the armed forces; probabilistic areas of conflict; significant areas of interest; and above all the extent to which China would cooperate in terms of military with foreign nations.

This paper singles out China as being significant country for influencing the process of economic development in the world and strategic interaction between major powers especially in its own region. As Beijing has showed its concern about US interference in Asia-Pacific security strategy, Japan has too. It has affirmed that the threat from the "three forces" of terrorism, separatism and extremism is increasing. The linguistic style of the White Paper 2013 is similar to the language used in the Defence White Paper of 2010. China has also reaffirmed its hard core traditional commitment to safeguard and protect its own territorial borders, coastal and territorial air security, and "protecting national maritime rights and interests" and "national security interests in outer space and cyber space".

The new Chinese leadership has realized significance of unleashing new sources of growth. This is owing to the fact that China has expanded its economy at a breakneck pace for over three decades. But even then it feels to sputtering out and burdened by industrial overcapacity. The piles of debt unknown to a common man are threatening to erode competitiveness. Deng Xiaoping while starting his reforms actually created a strong working group to face these challenges. China's gross national income per capita is now around \$5,600 in U.S. dollars which means that China has made it into the ranks of upper-middle-income countries, which brings new challenges.

China's new Leadership: Security Cooperation with Neighbours

President Xi Jinping, visualizing good neighbourly relations has sought consolidation of friendly relations and security cooperation with neighbours. China wants to achieve its own goals of prosperous and modern country by 2049, at the 100th anniversary of the establishment of PRC. While addressing the party's central committee's political bureau on Oct 24, 2013, President Xi said that dealings with neighbouring countries "should have a three-dimensional, multi-element perspective, beyond time and space."

He also said that one must understand the "trend of the time, devise strategy and plan carefully." He emphasized significance of the economic and trade links with neighbours and even hinted on unprecedented exchanges. He envisioned to develop a Silk Road economic belt and also to hasten inter-connectivity for the 21st century. China would facilitate establishment of free trade zones he said, and promote a new

pattern of regional economic integration.

He also urged that the region must promote mutual cooperation. At the level of financial economic market in the region China, he urged to promote and facilitate financial cooperation by establishing an Asian investment bank. This definitely would call for a better people-to-people exchange/relationship among China and its neighbours. And this is omnipotent for the long term development of relationships. The people-to-people exchange eventually would improve tourism, technology, and education and trans-national and sub-national cooperation.

Conclusion

This paper has proved that China has maintained and established cordial relations almost with all of its neighbours based on common interests.³⁰ Be it Pakistan, India China, SCO, ASEAN, Russia or USA in the region, China has not only managed to solve old border issues, resolved edges of antagonism but has also developed areas of cooperation with its concerned states specially in the region. China has continued to maintain a peaceful and defensive foreign policy. China has been a staunch believer of anti-terrorism strategies and warfare.

The unique element with Chinese way of managing diplomatic security cooperation is its belief in non-interference in domestic matters of the host/recipient state. The leadership of China categorically strives to create a more equal and just international system. At the same time, Beijing has become more active in promoting the idea of “win-win solutions” for countries that are willing to cooperate with China. With these new principles, Beijing aims at reassuring its neighbours and the world that the rise of China should not be seen as a threat, but rather as an opportunity. The regional and international players have their stakes, but China with its tangible actions has proved and will continue to prove itself as a steadfast force to reckon with. It will prove to be a staunch safeguard of peace and promoter of development in the region and the world alike. As the President Jiang of China has said, “We will not attack unless we are attacked; but we will surely counterattack if attacked.”³¹

³⁰ Dr Muhammad Khan, “Gwadar Port: An Economic Hub or a Military Outpost,” *Journal of Contemporary Studies*, vol. II, No. 1 (2013): 46-67.

³¹ Ibid.

GEOPOLITICS OF ENERGY IN CENTRAL ASIA NEW PLAYERS ON OLD CHESSBOARD

Muhammad Umar Abbasi**

Abstract:

The emergence of energy resourceful Central Asian states as independent republics has attracted the attention of energy seeking countries. A geopolitical rivalry has been started between the West led by USA and the East led by Russia. Pipeline politics, alliance making and use of energy entities are being employed as means for diverting energy fuels of Central Asia. In this respect, owing to respective geographical location and subsequent interests, Pakistan and India support the southern directed energy pipelines. Consequently, although the prospect of Pakistan becoming an energy corridor is ideal but the planned pipeline projects i.e. TAPI and IP are being subjected to the geopolitical rivalry of the region. The contemporary geopolitics of the region projects a balance of power shift in favor of the eastern countries i.e. Russia, and Iran, because of their geographical contiguity and the consequent influence in the region. The existing realities predict militarization of the water resources along with continuation of authoritarian regimes in Central Asian States, as these can easily be influenced by the external stakeholders for their vested interests.

Key Words: *Central Asia, Energy politics, Pipeline politics, TAPI, Authoritarian regime*

Introduction

Geopolitical significance of Central Asian landmass has always figured prominently in the strategic decision making of great powers. From defensive point of view, all great powers of the past have shown keen interest in the control of this region. Apart from Turkish and Iranian influence, the most important struggle for influence in Central Asia was

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manifested in the form of the so called great game played between Tsarist Russia and Great Britain. Extension of Russian boundaries by Kremlin across Central Asia was in fact motivated for securing its southern by territorial depth.

Between World War I and II all Central Asian Republics (CARs) were incorporated into former USSR and during previous century, these were kept aloof from the rest of world. But defeat of USSR in the cold war and subsequent independence of (CARs) attracted regional and extra regional powers towards these republics. Obvious reason for engagement in this part of the world was exploring new avenues for energy. But the geostrategic importance of the region has transformed an economic battle of energy security into geopolitical rivalry of strategic interests.

Owing to its location, the region cannot remain detached from the global strategic planning. It's located at the cross roads of Europe, Middle East and South Asia and is surrounded by China, Iran, and Afghanistan. In addition, presence of huge untapped hydrocarbons in this land locked region brings competing interests of not only great powers but also of resource deficient countries. This study is an attempt to discover the interests of all these stakeholders.

An investigation is carried out to find how concerned states tend to serve their geopolitical objectives along with securing their energy interests. Tussle among contenders for energy security in this region has often been termed as the "new great game", because in the guise of economic concerns, multiple political and strategic interests are being served, which make this game complicated and difficult to comprehend. The following section begins with the interests of great powers in the region.

The Battle of Influence between USA and Russia

Power vacuum created with the disintegration of USSR, led extra-regional stakeholders, especially the US, European states, India, and China to gain influence in Central Asian region. The additional reason that has made this region significant is its incentive of huge untapped hydrocarbon reserves. America's energy needs do not originate in Central Asia. Majority of its oil demand is met by the Middle East and maximum of its natural gas requirements are fulfilled by Canada (3.5 trillion cubic feet)¹ and Mexico (4.3 trillion cubic feet).² Yet, USA shows keen interest in the energy reserves of this region.

Europe is dependent on Russia for 26 %³ of its oil requirements

¹ Michael T. Klare, "Petroleum Anxiety and the Militarization of Energy", (Ed.) Daniel Moron and James A. Russell, *Energy Security and Global Politics* (New York: Routledge, 2009), p.44.

² *ibid.*

³ Jeff M. Smith, "The Great Game, Round Three", *Security Affairs*, No.17, Fall 2009. Available at <http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2009/17/smith.php>

and 29 %⁴ of its natural gas needs. Over dependence on Russia for energy security compromises Europe's strategic leverage vis-à-vis its cold war enemy. Therefore, Europe led by USA aims to gain access to Central Asian reserves directly and end its dependence on Russia. Securing free flow of Central Asian energy also serves a political interest for the West. Avoiding Russian route for energy transfer, oil, and gas would come directly into the open market and neither Russia would be able to manipulate prices in its favour nor would it use energy as a political weapon. Along with energy related incentives, political and strategic compulsions bring USA into the region. After the incident of 9/11, Central Asia provided USA a platform for conducting war on terror. In the year 2001, obtaining of military bases in Karshi-Kanabad (Uzbekistan) and in Manas (Kyrgyzstan) was motivated for the said purpose.⁵

Yet another reason for American physical presence in Central Asia is to counter the influence of emerging China and Iran. Mobility of US forces in and around Central Asian region and conductance of joint naval and military exercises with its allies offer strategic leverage to check the activities of both China and Iran. As compared to USA, Russian interests in the region are based on its geographical contiguity with Central Asian Republics (CARs). Being a successor state of former Soviet Union, Russia still considers these independent republics its region of influence and resists the intervention of any other power in their internal affairs. By losing these states Russian southern flank has been exposed to external threat. Therefore, its presence in this region for energy, political and military interests gives Russia a strategic and territorial depth against any external attack.

Although Russia has rich oil and gas reserves, but by utilizing its geography as a bridge between Europe and Central Asian region, Kremlin influences the political decision making in CARs because their economy becomes largely dependent on the transit fees that Russia pays to them. Secondly, Russia is also concerned over the US presence and involvement in Central Asian region, especially after the latter's support for democratic movements in some of these republics.⁶ Russian orthodox thinking believes in autocratic control of the state and it desires the same system in its former republics. Such a set up advances its influence over authoritarian regimes of the region for maintaining control over these republics.

Owing to the policy of European Union's expansion to the East, Russian interests in Central Asia vis-à-vis Europe are also significant.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ *EU Energy Policy Data, European Commission Document SEC*, (2007), p.12, The European Commission's Directorate-General of Energy and Transport, *Statistical Pocket Book 2006*. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy_transport/figures/pocketbook/2006_en.htm.

⁶ Ibid., Jeff M. Smith.

European Union (EU) has already extended up to Eastern Europe. Russia considers its strong physical presence in CARs as a hedge against further EU expansion. By striking bilateral energy deals with EU countries, Russia uses Central Asian energy as a tool for creating disunity among different states of Europe and hurts uniform policy making of EU.

Access and security of energy is not only an element falling in the economic domain. As a matter of fact, energy politics- security of supply and demand- has strategic dimensions too. The West led by USA and its counterpart Russia have political and strategic interests to secure in Central Asia, therefore, their respective strategies are not limited to economic considerations. Geopolitics of pipelines, use of military means and formation of strategic alliances are the diverse strategic tools adopted by both contenders for pulling balance of power in their favor.

Since the Cold War, Russia has been controlling oil and gas pipeline routes passing from its territory. Even after the emergence of CARs as independent states the pipeline infrastructure remained directed northwards to Russia. The West, therefore, explored possibilities of developing the western route for gaining direct access to the oil and gas of CARs. A significant effort in this direction was materialized in the form of 1000 mile long Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, which is operational since 2006.⁷ The BTC pipeline was launched to avoid both Russia and Iran.⁸ Similarly, for gaining access to natural gas two limited gas pipelines are functional. The first is South Caucasus pipeline, which runs along BTC oil pipeline and reaches Europe after passing through Greece.⁹ The other is Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE), which is limited for its supplies from Azerbaijan to Turkey. The source of these two pipelines is the natural gas of Azerbaijan, which is situated at the western shore of Caspian Sea. Azerbaijan is not a significant producer of natural gas and its lasting capacity is also limited. The fact that Europe's natural gas needs would rise in the coming decades compels the West to reach the Eastern shores of Caspian for fulfilling its future demands. According to an estimate, Europe would import over 80 percent of its natural gas needs by 2030.¹⁰ Therefore, Europe wants to gain access to the Turkmen and Kazakh gas fields, for which two other projects are in the pipeline.

First is the Trans-Caspian Pipeline (TCP) that is intended to bring Turkmen or/and Kazakhstan gas from Caspian basin to Georgia and then

⁷ Gawdat Bahgat, "Central Asia and Energy Security", *Asian Affairs*, Vol. XXXVII, No. 1, March 2006, pp. 1-16.

⁸ Amy Myers Jaffe and Ronald Soligo, "Energy Security: The Russian Connection", ed. Daniel Moron and James A. Russell, *Energy Security and Global Politics* (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 122.

⁹ Jeff M. Smith, "The Great Game, Round Three", *Security Affairs*, Number 17, Fall 2009.

¹⁰ Paul Belkin, "The European Union's Energy Security Challenges" *The Quarterly Journal*, Spring 2008. pp. 76-102.

across the Black Sea to Romania and the Balkans.¹¹ The other is Nabucco gas Pipeline project that is supposed to bring gas from Azerbaijan to Turkey and then into Bulgaria and Austria.¹²

Apart from Russian opposition, both pipelines also face technical and financial hurdles. The proposed TCP has to cross Caspian Sea bed, whose sovereignty is still conflicted among its littoral states. Russia and Iran would never allow western sponsored pipeline supplying gas from their area of influence. If TCP is materialized, it would remain hostage to disruption either by Russia or Iran in any hostile situation. Secondly, after crossing the Caspian and following a limited land route, the pipeline would again have to cross the Black Sea. A pipeline passing through two huge waterways is itself a technically dangerous project subjected to environmental concerns. Leakage in the underwater pipeline is difficult to cope with and risk of underground seismic activity remains a potential threat to the stability of the pipeline.

So far as Nabucco pipeline is concerned, its capacity is estimated to be 31 billion cubic meters (bcm)¹³ but the Shah Deniz (Azerbaijan) gas facility at the Caspian offshore can provide only 8 billion cubic meters (bcm)¹⁴ allowing the rest of 23 bcm to be supplied by some other source. The other possible sources of supply for filling the required capacity of Nabucco are either the huge gas reserves of Turkmenistan or Iran. Given its opposition to western policies, Iran would never be on the US cards and Turkmenistan's access is also problematic as it resides on the eastern shores of the Caspian Sea. And for linking its gas reserves to Nabucco either a new pipeline has to be built or the proposed facility of TCP would be utilized for this purpose. Again feasibility of both is subjected to the hurdles related to Caspian basin.

To counter the US backed pipelines and to block the direct flow of Caspian energy to Europe, Russia has proposed three pipeline projects; one is the Nord Stream Gas Pipeline which is supposed to link Russian gas to Germany via Baltic Sea, is the first project intended to bypass Baltic countries, Poland, and the European middleman Ukraine.¹⁵ For Ukraine, which has been serving as a transit corridor for European gas, it would be a great blow as the project would end its transit revenue. The deal is another manifestation of Russian energy diplomacy punishing a NATO aspirant country and halting further advancement of the US influence in its neighborhood. Poland and Lithuania have protested against Germany for undermining broader European energy security policy by dealing

¹¹ Ibid. Paul Belkin, pp. 76-102.

¹² Ibid.,

¹³ Dr. John C.K.Daly, "Caspian Sea Geopolitics: Nabucco will be the most Expensive Pipeline Ever Built", *New Eastern Outlook* ([http: www://journal-neo.com/?=node/281](http://journal-neo.com/?=node/281))

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

bilaterally with Russia.¹⁶ The project would also threaten the security of littoral countries of the Baltic Sea as Russia, for pipeline security would increase its military surveillance operations in the Baltic.

Second Russian backed pipeline is South Stream pipeline, which will bring gas from Russia to Bulgaria and then on to both Austria and Italy via Black Sea.¹⁷ The success of this pipeline will win over Bulgaria, Austria, and Romania, which are the potential purchasers of Nabucco pipeline gas. Therefore, materialization of this pipeline will serve as a serious setback to the EU and the US backed Nabucco pipeline.

Third challenge to the US backed plans is the extension of already existent Blue Stream pipeline across the Black Sea through Balkans into Hungary.¹⁸ This project would also deter Hungary and Balkan markets from receiving Caspian gas from Nabucco.¹⁹

These pipeline projects may serve two political purposes for Russia. *Firstly*, these bilateral deals with European countries are political threats to the unity of the European Union. By doing these agreements and by restricting a unified energy security approach, the EU countries would be disunited and might clash among themselves, especially in the coming decades when security of energy will be major foreign policy concern. *Secondly*, if Russian backed pipelines are materialized, these will eliminate prospects of Turkey from becoming an energy transit route to Europe.

A close scrutiny of the pipeline politics reveals a military and political aspect of energy security. As far as military aspect is concerned, it has been observed that two proposed pipelines across Black Sea (South Stream and extended Blue Stream) and one each from Baltic Sea (Nord Stream) and Caspian Sea (Trans-Caspian) would offer the stakeholders to increase their military maneuverings in these waterways. In fact some military activities are already being started by the USA, Russia, and CARs. According to a report; Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are now building up their navies with assistance from the USA, while Russia has announced a substantial expansion of its own Caspian fleet. The United States and Russia have also competing plans for multilateral fleets in the region, the Caspian Guard, and the Caspian Rapid-Development Force (CASFOR), respectively.²⁰ The US initiated partnership for peace; a military assistance program is also in line for gaining foothold in energy rich region of the Caspian and Central Asian energy resources. She is using military aid as a tool for securing energy infrastructure of Central Asia energy resources. It has been found that her financial help for revitalizing an old Soviet air

¹⁶ Ibid. pp. 76-102.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Michael T. Klare, "Petroleum Anxiety and the Militarization of Energy", (Ed.) Daniel Moron and James A. Russell, *Energy Security and Global Politics* (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 55-63.

base at Atyrau, near the giant offshore Kashagan oil field is directed to enhance Kazakhstan's capability to protect oil platforms.²¹

Yet another use of military means by the USA and Russia for securing energy and political interests is the conduct of joint naval exercises with their respective allies in the Caspian Sea. As for as political tools for gaining influence in the region is concerned both the USA and Russia have either formed or helped in the formation of regional alliances. USA has supported the creation of GUUAM,²² an informal regional grouping that includes Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. These countries are politically supported by the USA to get them away from Russian sphere of influence. In response, Russia has established Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), made up of seven former republics of the Soviet Union.

One of the chief considerations of the US interest in Central Asia has been to get the logistic platform for war efforts in Afghanistan. Although air base facility in Uzbekistan had to be closed due to US alleged involvement in rebellion against Uzbek government, but, later USA successfully gained the use of Uzbek territory as part of an overland non-military supply route to Afghanistan.²³ On the other hand, in order to counter the US influence, Russia is in progress to establish its second military base in Osh (Kyrgyzstan).²⁴

An aspect of Russian energy diplomacy is the use of its national energy entities like Gazprom and Rosneft for not only protecting Russian energy infrastructure from foreign competitive companies, but also for controlling pipelines and thereby energy resources of Central Asian countries. For instance, Kremlin has started taking control of majority of strategically important oil and gas fields for protecting Russian national interests.²⁵ Gazprom strategy is to purchase Central Asian gas at lower rates for Russian customers and then to sell its own gas at higher prices to Europe. For example, Turkmen gas is locked into the Russian economy at depressed prices of \$ 65 per 1000 cubic meters, allowing Russia to export its own natural gas supplies at over \$ 230 per 1000 cubic meters to high paying European customers.²⁶

On the basis of these findings, it can be inferred that energy security policy of the United States of America is chiefly dictated by Carter Doctrine and that of Russia by Brezhnev Doctrine. Free flow of oil from

²¹ Gawdat Bahgat, "Central Asia and Energy Security", *Asian Affairs*, Vol. XXXVII, No. 1, March 2006, pp.1-16.

²² Ibid.

²³ bid. Michael T. Klare, p.52

²⁴ Ibid. Jeff M. Smith.

²⁵ Amy Myers Jaffe and Ronald Soligo, "Energy Security: The Russian Connection", (Ed). Daniel Moron and James A. Russell, *Energy Security and Global Politics* (New York: Routledge, 2009), p.123.

²⁶ Ibid, p.128.

foreign sources of supply to the United States and its allies must be protected against hostile threats.²⁷

All political, diplomatic, and military means employed by the USA in Central Asia and the Caspian region are, therefore, reflective of this doctrine against the perceived threats of supply disruption by its enemies. The Brezhnev doctrine was initiated for keeping the Eastern and Central European states dependent on subsidized Soviet energy supplies under the control of Moscow.²⁸ In the case of Central Asia, Russia utilizes the doctrine by providing its territory for linking Central Asia to Europe and using energy as a lever by manipulating prices of oil and gas for making Central Asian states dependent on it.

Emerging Regional Powers

Along with Russia the emerging regional powers, China and Iran have great stakes in the so called new great game of energy politics in the Central Asia. The fact that both are considered potential threats to the US regional status makes their influence in the region highly significant. Apart from energy consideration both China and Iran have multiple political and strategic interests in the region.

China's Interests

China's population explosion and economic boom needs industrial development at large scale and for that it is dependent on energy. Given the fact that its resource base does not satisfy its astronomical energy demand, it has to import oil and gas. Estimate of its future energy needs shows that, in the coming decades, China would become a huge consumption market for fossil fuels. The rate of Chinese oil production is 1.7 percent a year,²⁹ and oil consumption is increasing at 5.8 percent.³⁰ It is forecasted that in future China would import 84 percent of its energy supplies by 2030.³¹

Currently, China is chiefly importing required energy via sea through Malacca Strait. Given the presence of US naval fleet around Malacca strait, China's energy supply security remains threatened. Therefore, it has been exploring land routes for avoiding sea based transport. In this respect, China has already explored Kazakhstan oil fields for its energy needs. She has launched a 1436 km³² long oil pipeline named Kazakhstan-China Pipeline (KCP), which is operational since 2006 and is

²⁷ Ibid. Michael T. Klare.

²⁸ Ibid., Myers Jaffe and Ronald Soligo, p.122.

²⁹ Rizwan Zeb, "China and Central Asia", *Regional Studies*, Vol. XXIII, No.4, Autumn 2005, pp.3-36.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Xuanli Liao, "Central Asia and China's Energy Security", *The China and Eurasian Forum Quarterly*, Vol. 4, No. 4, November 2006, pp. 61-69.

meeting about 15 percent of her crude oil needs.³³ Although the said pipeline is extremely beneficial to both countries in the short term, yet it is subjected to a potential constraint: unrest in Uyghurs dominated Xinjiang province. China is planning to divert the waters of Irtys and Ili Rivers for meeting water needs of her Northwestern region. Diversion of the said rivers can create hostility with Kazakh government as these rivers feed important agricultural and industrial sectors in Kazakhstan.³⁴

The water related conflict can uphold the smooth functioning of KCP in future because the nature of such disputes is often very harsh leading the stakeholders to war footing. The water dispute between India and Pakistan is the case in point.

Although China has enough natural gas reserves as compared to oil, still considering its future needs, it approached huge gas fields of Turkmenistan and struck a deal for laying a pipeline from Turkmenistan to China, which has started bringing 30 to 40 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually.³⁵ If materialized fully, the said pipeline would squeeze much of the gas on which USA has focused eyes for filling capacity of Nabucco gas pipeline.

For China, energy is also very important from demographic point of view. As mentioned above, majority of Chinese energy supply comes via sea, which is at the shore of its eastern land mass. Being a huge geographic country, its western part is away from the beneficial use of energy and remains industrially backward. The Western areas of China are still dependent on agriculture, where its huge population is going unemployed. China needs energy from the neighborhood of its western half to accommodate its growing population.³⁶

The Western region of China also laps a strategically, politically, and economically very important province of Xinjiang, whose development and subsequent stability is very crucial for securing its Western boundaries. The province of Xinjiang is a site for military exercises and nuclear tests but is politically unstable due to Uyghurs separatist movement for independence.³⁷ Xinjiang has an economic significance too. Its Tarin oil basin is estimated to hold 147 billion barrels of untapped oil reserves.³⁸

From ethnic point of view, a significant number of Uyghurs also live in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and similarly small Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Tajik communities live in Xinjiang.³⁹ An ethnically unstable region with

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid. Rizwan Zeb.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Charles William Maynes, "America Discovers Central Asia", *Foreign Affairs*, New York, March/April 2003, p.123.

less economic development and high unemployment threatens the political security of China. China prefers development of this region by importing energy from nearby Central Asian reserves to suppress internal rebellion.

Along with the pipeline projects China has also mobilized its state energy entities for making inroads into Central Asian states. A significant victory for Chinese energy entity, Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC) was the takeover of Petrokazakh in Kazakhstan.⁴⁰ With this deal China got full possession of the Kumkol

South oil field and a joint ownership of Kumkol North with Russia's oil company Lukoil.⁴¹ Yet another Chinese's company SINOPEC has made inroads into Central Asia by acquiring Kazakhstan North Buzachi oil field in August 2004, followed by a 50 percent equity share in three blocks nearby Tengiz and with Uzbekistan it reached a \$ 600 million oil exploration and development deed in May 2005.⁴² Also, with Uzbekneftaz (Uzbekistan), Chinese company CNPC further signed two more agreements in June and September 2006 for exploring and developing prospective petroleum deposits in five onshore blocks of the Aral Sea.⁴³

The long list of share purchasing and investment activities clearly shows the economic strength of China. By utilizing economic element of national power, China has beaten other potential competitors, especially Indian companies. As for as Russian giant Gazprom is concerned, China does not seem to be in conflicting terms with it. The obvious reason is the convergence of their interests' vis-à-vis USA. Both regional powers consider the US influence in this region as threat to their political and military security. Apprehensions about possible instigation of Chechen and Uyghurs insurgencies and the planned development of missile defense system⁴⁴ unite them against the USA on one platform i.e. Shinghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

To liquidate US threat from Central Asia, China has flexed its political muscles. Alliance formation of the SCO is very significant from Chinese point of view, as China uses its political influence within its member states and also utilizes military assistance for its interests. Under the umbrella of this regional alliance, the Central Asian States are provided security against terrorism and internal insurgencies; two significant threats to their regimes. In the absence of US backed regional security alliance, the SCO attracts the Central Asian rulers towards China and Russia, given the fact that both are geographically approximate to them.

⁴⁰ Ibid. Xuanli Liao.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Sarfraz Khan & Imran Khan, "Sino-Indian Quest for Energy Security: The Central-West-South Asian Geopolitical Turf" *Regional Studies*, Vol.XXVII, No. 2, Spring 2009, pp. 46-93.

⁴³ Ibid. Xuanli Liao.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

Through the platform of the SCO, China has formed Regional Anti-Terror Structure (RATS) in Bishkek, Kyrghsztan and held counter terror exercises with Kyrghsztan and Kazakhstan.⁴⁵

Iran's Interests

Although limited in military and economic might, still, Iran is considered as an emerging power due to its geostrategic location and regional influence. Presence of the Strait of Hormuz in Persian Gulf at its southern half and the Caspian Sea at its northern flank make Iran an ideal energy transit route from the Central Asia to the world. Its geographical contiguity with Turkmenistan-having fourth largest gas reserves- and with Azerbaijan-significant producer of oil – further enhances its economic and political importance.

Iran's energy reserves are situated at its southern part and their transfer to its underdeveloped northern region is expensive due to less developed infrastructure and difficult geographic terrain. Therefore, Iran is importing natural gas from Turkmenistan via Kurpezhe Kurt Ki (KKK) gas pipeline and has also struck a deal to launch Daulatabad-Khaniran pipeline connecting the Iran's northern Caspian region with the Turkmen vast gas field.⁴⁶ The gas from this pipeline would meet energy needs of its less developed areas and also allow it to export own gas via southern routes. Iran has also shown interest in buying Azeri gas.⁴⁷ Both these agreements serve political purposes too. By tapping gas from both Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, the US backed Nabucco project comes under strain as Nabucco is also dependent on these countries for filling its thorough capacity.

Iran is proposing two more pipelines for tapping Kazakh and Turkmen gas. The first is Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran (KTI) gas pipeline and the other is Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey (TIT) gas pipeline.⁴⁸ In case of success of these projects, Iran will become a strategically significant energy bridge connecting Central Asian reserves to the West and the South. With the former project, Iran would be controlling the flow of gas to southern route via Persian Gulf and in the latter case; it would be holding control over European gas markets.

In Iranian geopolitical calculation, Russian connection is worth considering. Allowing no one to capture European markets of natural gas, Russia is favoring Iran for becoming southern transit corridor. It has favored Iran-Pakistan (I-P) gas pipeline to alter the flow of Iranian gas to

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ James Fishelson, "From Silk Route to Chevron: Geopolitics of Oil Pipelines in Central Asia", *Vestnik: The Journal of Russian and Asian Studies*, Issue 7, winter 2007, available at http://www.sras.org/geopolitics_of_oil_pipelines_in_central_asia

eastern direction away from western markets.⁴⁹ On the other hand collaboration of Russia and Iran in the geopolitics of Central Asia is disturbing for the USA.

The confluence of Iran and Russia has the potential of instigating unrest in the Shia dominated regions of oil producing Gulf States. Eastern provinces of Saudi Arabia contain 250000 to 500000 Shia populations⁵⁰ and her petroleum company Aramco has 75 percent of Shia work force.⁵¹ Similarly, a significant number of pro-Iranian Shias are living in the oil rich southern regions of Iraq.⁵²

If Russia is blocking the US efforts of reaching energy reserves from the eastern side, it is Iran in the southern flank that is minimizing prospects of the US backed pipelines to get Central Asian reserves. The combined natural gas reserves of Russia and Iran constitute about 40 percent of the global reserves⁵³ with lasting capacity of 100 years for Iran and 84 years for Russia.⁵⁴ Considering anxiety of high oil prices, global industrialized economies would switch over to the use of natural gas if they are offered a stable and secure supply of it. The prospects of combining the gas reserves of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan with their own into a natural gas cartel, would give both Russia and Iran a dominating role in the dynamics of energy politics in the coming decades. Russian control over Western markets and Iran's hold of the South Asian and Asia Pacific supplies would make a significant alliance to reckon with.

Like all concerned states the interests of Iran in Central Asia are not limited to energy security alone. It has many political interests to serve there. The military presence of its arch rival USA in the heart of Central Asia is a constant threat to her security. To liquidate this threat, Iran plays political card with the Central Asians. Its political engagements with the Central Asian Republics are part of her diplomatic efforts that Iran pursues to end its isolation that is imposed upon by the USA. Iran has shown keen interest in becoming a member of SCO, an alliance triggered by Russia and China. Having been given observer status in the organization, Iran has offered energy collaboration from this platform. Along with Russia, Iran is opposing the US backed Trans Caspian Pipeline (TCP) and wants a uniform policy of all littoral states on Caspian reserves.

⁴⁹ Arshi Saleem Hashmi, "Politics of Sanctions: Future of Iran-Pakistan-India Pipeline", *Regional Studies*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 3, Summer 2010, pp.3-30.

⁵⁰ Amy Myers Jaffe and Ronald Soligo, "Energy Security: The Russian Connection", (Ed.), Daniel Moron and James A. Russell, *Energy Security and Global Politics* (New York: Routledge, 2009), p.131.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ *BP Statistical Review*, June 2013, pp.1-48. Available at http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/statistical-review/statistical_review_of_world_energy_2013.pdf.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

In recent past, it has used gunboat diplomacy in constraining Azerbaijan from taking independent course in the development and exploration of Caspian basin reserves.⁵⁵ Iran is against external intervention in the affairs of Caspian basin, connection, its energy related deals with China, India, and Pakistan are worth mentioning. All these countries are energy dependent and Iran is a potential energy supplier, but, with limited economic and technological capacity. For Iran, their cooperation in the energy sector especially of the USA and recommends regional solution to the Caspian related dispute.

In the face of stiff resistance from the USA, Iran has been seeking regional influence by striking deals with regional countries. In this is meaningful. With Iran, China is under a deal of 30 year's energy supply agreement worth dollar 70 billion along with SINOPEC joint venture in Iran, owing a 50 percent share.⁵⁶ India has also signed a 25 years LNG supply deal with Tehran and has also acquired development rights in two oil fields and in the north Pars gas fields.¹ Iran and Pakistan have signed I-P gas pipeline project and are also considering import of electricity from the former to the latter.

The above mentioned agreements are indicative of the fact that Iranian use of diplomatic element of national power has neutralized the negative effects of its nuclear related programs. Unlike North Korea, Iranian regime is strong and is using its regional influence even in the face of strong western pressure. The latent power of its huge energy resources and its geostrategic location has helped her break her isolation. Its possible energy related alliance with Russia for securing or emerging energy markets of Asia can give Iran dominating position in the coming decades.

India and Pakistan

The two peripheral countries that figure prominently in the geopolitics of Central Asia are India and Pakistan. India's 87 percent of energy demand is being met by fossil fuels (coal 50 percent, oil 30 percent, and gas 7 percent)⁵⁸ and since its indigenous sources are meager, it imports two third of its daily consumption, which is likely to reach three-fourth by 2025.⁵⁹ Pakistan is also heavily dependent on the use of fossil fuels.

Pakistan's primary energy demands are chiefly met by fossil fuels,

⁵⁵ Amy Myers Jaffe and Ronald Soligo, "Energy Security: The Russian Connection", (Ed.) Daniel Moron and James A. Russell, *Energy Security and Global Politics* (New York: Routledge, 2009), p.131.

⁵⁶ Ibid. Sarfraz Khan & Imran Khan.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

with a share of 51 percent of natural gas⁶⁰ is leading the rest, followed by 28 percent share of oil⁶¹ and it is estimated that in future, major share of the country's energy demand will be met by gas and oil (the share of oil and gas in 2015 would be 27 percent and 50 percent respectively.)⁶²

India lacks direct geographic link to Central Asia and is dependent on Pakistan's territory for the access of oil and gas of this region. Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) is the proposed gas pipeline that has the potential of supplying much needed energy to both countries. The TAPI gas pipeline is supposed to link the gas reserves of Turkmenistan with India and Pakistan. The proposed gas pipeline is expected to be 3000 km long of which 700 km will pass through Pakistan.⁶³ The comparative advantage goes to Pakistan as India is dependent on its territory for gaining access to Turkmen gas. This pipeline is further handicapped due to political instability in Afghanistan. Since the proposed pipeline has to pass from Herat and Kandahar, its potential of becoming a success remains in doldrums. These are Taliban dominated areas where sabotage activities involving disruption of pipelines are further enhanced given the fact that TAPI is also favored by the USA.

In the said project, it is Pakistan that might link India to the gas reserves of Turkmenistan. Overtly, India shows reluctance in joining this project due to the apparent price settlement issues. But from strategic and political point of view India's hesitancy in joining the project is based upon two considerations. *Firstly*, the gas pipeline deal would allow Pakistan to control the flow of energy to India. From Indian point of view, in case of any untoward political situation, Pakistan might use energy tool for disrupting Indian gas supply. *Secondly*, for strengthening strategic alliance with the US, India preferred civil nuclear deal with it against TAPI gas pipeline project.

A 7\$ billion Iran-Pakistan (I-P) peace pipeline deal was finalized on 13 June 2010, under which Iran will start exporting natural gas to Pakistan from 2015.⁶⁴ The projected length of the pipeline is 1000 km, out of which 907 km has already been built. If extended to India, its length will reach 2700 km, out of which 700 km will pass through Pakistan ⁶⁵

In addition to energy related interests in Central Asia both Pakistan and India have political interests too. Pakistan has been accused of considering Central Asia as a natural extension of her strategic depth

⁶⁰ Mukhtar Ahmed, "Meeting Pakistan's Energy Needs", (Ed.) Robert M. Hathaway and Michael Kugelman, *Powering Pakistan: Meeting Pakistan's Energy Needs in the 21st Century* (London: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 3-18.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid. Arshi Saleem Hashmi.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

doctrine in Afghanistan.⁶⁶ However, Pakistan's interests in Afghanistan need careful examination.

Right from its birth Pakistan's security has been threatened by an aggressive and hostile neighbor, India. India has charged Pakistan for infiltrating Jihadi elements into Central Asian Republics during the Soviet Afghan war and also blames Pakistan for instigating insurgency in Kashmir via Jihadi base in Afghanistan.⁶⁷

However, the fact of the matter is that, the phenomenon of jihad in Afghanistan was born with the support of the USA and the West for containing the Soviet expansion. The USA gathered Jihadis from all over the world and funded them for its own vested interests. After its departure from Afghanistan it left Pakistan unaided to take care of the unresolved problem of Afghanistan. It is an established fact that Jihadi elements not only infiltrated into Central Asian Republics but also entered into Pakistan through unguarded and porous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, the emergence of the war on terror created a new opportunity for India to link Kashmir struggle with terrorism.

So for, Pakistan's moves for political engagement with the Central Asian Republics are concerned, these were motivated by its security concerns and also due to the uncertainty of power vacuum created with the end of cold war in the region. Pakistan feared that a hasty the US withdrawal might leave Afghanistan in a chaos, creating further problems on its western borders. The emergence of the CARs were perceived as an opportunity to form a large regional grouping for creating a united platform for economic development and also for not allowing any extra regional power to fill the vacuum. The platform chosen for that purpose was Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO).

The strategy did not pay dividends for obvious reasons. Central Asian Republics were ruled by authoritarian leaders who were hesitant to align themselves politically with the local countries for fear of losing support of either the USA or Russia. The ECO could not come up to the expectations as it was limited to economic concerns. Economic interactions in the absence of uniform political and security policies cannot bring fruitful results.

Most of the Central Asian rulers have always looked towards Russia for their security and have aligned their countries to the Russian sponsored political alliances e.g. Common Wealth of Independent States (CIS), CSTO, and SCO.

After the incident of 9/11, India made inroads into Central Asia. The presence of India in the Central Asia is a matter of great concern for Pakistan. For bypassing Pakistan and reaching directly to the energy

⁶⁶ Meena Singh Roy, "Pakistan's Strategies in Central Asia", *Strategic Affairs*, Vol. 30, Issue 4, October 2006. http://www.idsa.in/strategicanalysis/PakistansStrategiesinCentralAsia_msro_y_1006

⁶⁷ Ibid.

resources of Central Asia, India is pursuing multiple strategies. India is heavily investing in Afghanistan for getting a foothold there. She has trained Afghan police force, constructed Afghan parliament building, provided \$ 500 million economic assistance, and given 500 educational scholarships.⁶⁸

The Central Asian Republics are interested in Indian information technology industry and its assistance in financial and banking sector.⁶⁹ India is also looking to explore Turkey as a gateway for reaching Central Asian energy.⁷⁰ Both routes, via Iran and Turkey are sea borne, having risks and insecurities. For securing sea lanes of communication naval force has to remain active with full potential and capability. Even then dangers of piracy and terrorist attacks are always present. Secondly, if Indian proposed pipelines are laid via Arabia Sea then these will be prone to seismic activities and accidental leakage resulting in environmental hazards.

Investment through its energy entities is yet another tool of controlling the flow of energy in Central Asia. Although not successful in the presence of Chinese energy companies, still, it has managed to purchase some shares in the exploration and development of oil and gas in the region. India has a 20 percent stake in SINOPEC joint venture in Iran and a 10 percent stake in Kumangazy, a joint Russian and Kazakh oil field in the Caspian basin.⁷¹

Although limited to complete success, still, Pakistan is following a few projects to get its infrastructure linked to the Central Asian States. The proposed extension of Karakorum Highway (KKH) to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, reconstruction of road linking Peshawar with Termez in Uzbekistan (involving a distance of 880 km for getting easy access to the remaining four CARs) and the land route linking Chaman with Kushka in Turkmenistan (involving a distance of 1170 km) are the projects in developmental stages.⁷² The most important of the projects that Pakistan has materialized with the cooperation of China is Gwadar port.

The port is strategically located at the cross roads of the Middle East, Central Asia and southwestern provinces of China, the regions that are rich in natural resources. It has the potential to act as a hub port not only for the natural resources of Central Asia but also for regional trade in all kind of consumer goods. The port complex would provide facilities of ware housing, trans-shipment, transit coastal trade and provision of

⁶⁸ Ramakant Dwivendi, "Conference Report: 3rd India-Central Asia Regional Conference", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 27, No. 4, Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, (New Delhi), October-December 2003, pp. 621-626.

⁶⁹ Ibid. Meena Singh Roy.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid. Sarfraz Khan & Imran Khan.

⁷² Shabbir Ahmed Khan, "Pakistan's Policy Towards Central Asia: An Evaluation Since 1991", *Central Asia*, No. 65, Winter 2006.

commercial and industrial facilities for international export, import trade particularly of CARs.⁷³

Conclusion

Findings of this study reveal that the great game of energy politics is conducted between the West and the East. Latest developments in the Central Asian region show that at present the East represented by Russia, China, and Iran are dominating energy politics. The proposed pipeline projects sponsored by the West led by the USA are not progressing as compared to pipeline routes backed by countries of the East. Nabucco and Trans-Caspian gas pipelines are subjected to financial, legal, and technical constraints. Russian sponsored Nord Stream; South Stream and Blue Stream gas pipeline projects are gaining favor among the European countries. Russian policy of striking bilateral deals with European countries is serving two pronged interests for her. On the one hand these deals are winning over those countries which are supposed to be the buyers of natural gas from the US backed pipeline projects. This ensures Russia's dominance on the European gas markets. Secondly, these deals are also causing disunity among European Union countries, serving Moscow's geopolitical interests.

The Central Asian gas supplier countries, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan, are interested in divergence of energy supply, and are striking more energy deals with Iran and China to minimize their dependence on Russia. China is getting oil from Kazakhstan and has started obtaining Turkmen gas to its western region. Despite the US sanctions, Iran is receiving Turkmen gas for its underdeveloped northern region. Although northern pipelines routes are still controlled by Russia, yet opportunities are becoming apparent for flow of the Central Asian hydrocarbons, especially natural gas via eastern pipeline routes to China and via southern pipeline routes either through Iran or Pakistan.

There seems to be an indirect energy interaction being established between Russia, China, and Iran against the USA. China and Iran are not aiming to disturb energy dominance of Russia in the European markets, but are conducting energy deals to offset US backed pipeline routes. Russia is favoring southern pipeline routes so that Iranian energy reserves flow towards south and its monopoly over European markets remain intact.

There are two main reasons for the likely success of eastern countries in the new great game of energy politics being played in the Caspian region. *Firstly*, the states of Russia, China, and Iran are regional stakeholders and have geographical connection with energy producers of the region. *Secondly*, the USA is an extra regional country and its imposed physical presence is not supported by majority countries of the region.

⁷³ Ibid.

Moreover, energy producers understand that regional countries have much communality of interests with them and these can better be served with their cooperation. Secondly, Russia, China and Iran play energy politics through their state run energy entities. There is always a uniformity of policy between their governments and energy companies. Although many American and European energy companies are doing business in the Central Asian region, but, these are not under strict control of their respective governments.

Energy politics in the Central Asian region has created security threat to all concerned countries. Almost all proposed pipeline routes have to pass through one or more seas, making militarization of the related seas certain. Secondly, Afghanistan, from where the most suitable pipeline route is supposed to pass through is also under intense military conflict that has a far reaching effect for all regional countries.

Although Pakistan is not a direct player in the energy politics of the region, still, its importance as an energy transit corridor cannot be overruled because Pakistan's territory offers the most convenient bridge to exporters and importers of energy. Why Pakistan is the ideal transit corridor and what are the geo-economic and geopolitical advantages for her in becoming an energy bridge between Central Asian region and South Asia and beyond, are the subject items of further research.

RESURGENCE OF RUSSIA IN THE WORLD POLITICS OPTIONS FOR PAKISTAN

Arshad Mahmood*

Abstract

According to the analysts of foreign policy the Pak-Russia relations have not been built upon strong pillars of understanding. The history of their bilateral relations is a tale of recurrent misperceptions and misunderstandings. Both the nations have potential core for convergence of interests on various bilateral, regional and international issues but potential for cooperation has never been availed. The changing political dynamics of/for both the states has now provided another chance to revisit bilateral relations. Among others, Pakistan and Russia can work together in the fields of energy, trade and security. By working together in these three sectors both the states not only can enhance their strategic ties but can also contribute towards the peace, stability and prosperity of the whole region.

Key words: *Pakistan, Russia, Prosperity, Energy, Trade, Security.*

I cannot forecast to you the actions of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma. But there may be a key, and that key is Russian national interest. (Winston Churchill)

Introduction

Ever since the Soviet flag lowered from Kremlin, the Russians are in search of their new role in the world politics. The academia and policymaking machinery of the country have been indicating various inclinations suggesting future place of Russia in the comity of nations. Amongst others, three main policy orientations have developed among the

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political elites, who argue as to how best Russia can define its role in the changing international politics and ensure revival of its lost glory.¹

- *Fundamentalist Nationalists*: These are of the strongest view that nothing less than their legacy of nationalism should form the basis of their image in the world.
- *Liberal Westernists*: Contrarily, they believe that the new role of Russia in world politics lies in leaving behind the old bequest of anti-West approach in its policies and advocate the initiation of a renewed relationship of peace and cooperation with the world in general and the West in particular.
- *Pragmatic Nationalists*: They however, campaign for the most balanced approach which aims at promoting peace and cooperation while safeguarding the fundamental principles of their nationalism.

There is a clear range of interests, forces and actors at work in determination of foreign policy options for Russia. However the predictable outcome of their struggles is extremely difficult due to relatively low level of institutionalism in the Russian political system.² Based upon the above given three trends, the Russian policy makers – mostly the Pragmatic Nationalists – have chalked out certain foreign policy doctrines and concepts since 1993.

These include Foreign Policy Concept – originally presented in April 1993 and revised in January 2000, Military Doctrine – first articulated in November 1993 and later revisited in April 2000, and National Security Blueprint – conceived in December 1997 and further deliberated in 2000. These foregoing concepts provide a road-map by which one can chalk out evolution of Russian thinking about the world and Russia's future place in it. They are, however, still miles away from their real strategic goal of resurgence in international arena.

It is important to note that after its inception in 1947, Pakistan due to various reasons – security being the most pronounced one – preferred to join the U.S. camp. This strategic miscalculation on part of Pakistani leadership had everlasting implications on its both domestic and international environment. Apart from other disadvantages, Pakistan also couldn't establish amiable relations to one superpower of the time, the former Soviet Union. The history did provide a number of chances to both the nations in revisiting their policies towards each other and making a

¹ Volha Charnysh, "Russia and Ukrainian Denuclearization: Foreign Policy under Boris Yelsin," *Department of Government of Smith College, Northampton* (April 3, 2008), 32, http://charnysh.net/Documents/Charnysh_Volha_HonorsProject.pdf (accessed November 10, 2012)

² Amin Saikal and William Maley (Eds), *Russia in Search of its Future* (Cambridge: University Press, 1995), p. 117.

new beginning in their bilateral ties. They, despite having numerous potentials in collaborating in various fields failed to make any break through. The account of Pak-Russia Relations is a story of misperceptions and lost opportunities.³

The legacy of Pakistan's inclination toward the West especially the U.S. has witnessed a number of ups and downs. Despite assisting the U.S. in achieving its strategic objectives in the region, Pakistan could never muster its confidence. Trust deficit remained the most prominent element in Pak-US relations. Resultantly, Pakistan has never met its security, economical as well as other goals for which it preferred a distant ally than maintaining a balanced approach between the two superpowers.

The time now demands the policymakers in Pakistan to think and analyze the prevailing international environment; and to compare it with Pakistan's security, economical and social needs in finding new alternatives. The paper is an effort in the same direction. The neo-liberalism theory, presented by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, forms the baseline for this research. Similarly, the scholarly works of Rosecrance and Mitrany, the leading neo-liberalists who believe in cooperation among states, also serve as guidance in finding the way forward in the bilateral relations between the two countries. The focus is on analyzing the foreign policy objectives of Russia in the post-Cold War era and evaluating their various doctrines, aiming at finding their new role in the global politics. This is also to examine the history of Pak-Russia Relations so as to explore new opportunities and sectors of cooperation between the two states. An attempt is made to prove that by working together in the field of energy, trade and security, Pakistan and Russia can contribute meaningfully toward regional and global peace and harmony as well social well being of their people.

Conceptual Appraisal of Russian Foreign Policy

Historic Trends

Although after the collapse of Soviet Union, its flag at Kremlin was replaced with tri-colour Russian flag, but its leadership still claims to be the legal and legitimate successor of Soviet Union. It is for the same reason that they take inspiration from their historic legacy in formulation of their foreign policy. Two trends can be prominently traced in the foreign policy of ancient Russia i.e. ideology and expansion: "*... there are the cold warriors who detect in Soviet foreign policy a combination of ideological expansionism and traditional Russian imperialism in a relentless quest for world domination.*"⁴

³ Nazir Hussain, "Pak-Russia Relations: Lost Opportunities and Future Options," *Journal of Political Studies*, (Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad), 19:1, pp. 79-89.

⁴ F.S Northedge (Ed), *The Foreign Policies of the Powers* (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1968), 69.

Both of these elements can easily be identified in the foreign policy of the former USSR and present Russia.

The analysis of former USSR from 1922 to 1991 reveals that the basic character of Soviet foreign policy (Marxism-Leninism) was based upon Vladimir Lenin's "Decree on Peace" of 1917. It encompasses both proletarian internationalism and peaceful coexistence where the former refers to the common cause of the working classes of all the countries in their struggle to overthrow bourgeois governments and establishment of communist regimes; and the later relates to the establishment of peaceful relations with capitalist states. It is, however, pertinent to note that the element of proletarian internationalism diminished gradually and virtually faded away from Soviet foreign policy but the component Marxism-Lenin ideology always remained a dominating factor in its foreign policy.

Even in 1986, when the general foreign policy goals were formulated, the emphasis remained on ensuring favourable conducive external environment to building communism in Soviet Union. As regards to the Soviet expansionist trends, it is obvious from the traces of Soviet history that it carried a natural instinct for geographical expansion. The basic difference between China and Russia – if compared for being communist states – is that the former is defensive in nature and possess a history of confinement to periphery (construction of great wall of China speaks of that), whereas the later has an account of progressive expansion of its boundaries.

Beginning to expand in 1533 the Soviet border stretched to Pacific Ocean in 1689. In 1858, Russia took advantage of the defeated Chinese in the Second Opium War and forcing the Treaty of Aigun upon China, Russia annexed some 300,000 to 400,000 square miles of Chinese land to the Russian Empire.⁵ By the end of 19th century the Soviet imprints were found touching the Afghan borders. It was, in fact, Soviet quest for warm water which compelled her to commit the strategic blunder of invading Afghanistan.

Post Cold War Policy Parameters

The study of the Russians' thinking mechanism in the post-Cold

⁵ "Russian Expansion into Asia crowds Japan," *The Christian Solution*, at http://www.google.com.pk/imgres?um=1&hl=en&sa=N&biw=1241&bih=584&tbm=isch&tbnid=U_V2aces38k8-M:&imgrefurl=http://www.thechristiansolution.com/doc2010/310_JapanMilitarism.html&docid=cRx7Rc5M8Rg0DM&imgurl=http://www.thechristiansolution.com/img/RussianExpansion.gif&w=563&h=368&ei=IZ-qUMu9MpD6sgaYroHwAw&zoom=1&iact=hc&vpx=769&vpy=279&dur=184&hovh=181&hovw=279&tx=107&ty=113&sig=101581499927652053452&page=1&tbnh=133&tbnw=204&start=0&ndsp=18&ved=1t:429,r:16,s:0,i:114 (accessed November 18, 2012)

war era identifies three major trend groups in their society defining various courses of action in Russian foreign policy. The Liberal Westernists see no external military threat to Russia and favour disarmament efforts.⁶ Fundamental Nationalists, however, pose totally opposite vision. They believe in the legacy of their lost national pride and Marxism-Leninism ideology, and strongly disregard Russia's integration in the world economy. They propose means to create a greater Russia, envisioning a rebirth of Soviet Union.⁷ Pragmatic Nationalists, however, follow a balance approach and suggest bridging gap between the East and the West while securing Russia's interests and identity. All the post Cold War doctrines (mentioned above) and concepts define Russia's new role in the changing global relations with the aim to regain its status in the post Cold War era.

Russian Strategic Objectives and Place in the World Politics

The evaluation of Russians' thinking process and available studies conducted after the fall of the Soviet Union revolve around three significant aspects related to Russia's foreign policy goals. These include their national identity, economy and security. The enduring goals pursued by Russia throughout in its foreign policy have placed primary emphasis on ensuring national security, promoting the economic well-being of the country and enhancing national prestige.⁸ Ever since Vladimir Putin assumed power, Russia set three Foreign Policy Strategic Objectives:

- To strengthen and control the Russian state and politics.
- To create economic growth and structure the Russian economy.
- To establish Russia as a power and player in international affair.⁹

The close study of these objectives reveals that they are not only closely interlinked but also have trickling effect on each other.

Russia's Foreign Policy towards South Asia

Russia's policy toward South Asia has always revolved around three factors:

- Its quest for warm water port.
- The China factor.

⁶ Ibid. Volha Charnysh, p.32

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Robert H. Donaldson and Joseph L. Noguee, *The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring Interests* (New York: M.E Sharpe, 2009),4.

⁹ Celeste A. Wallander, 'Russia's Foreign Policy Objectives and Opportunities', Russia and Eurasia Program, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (November 15, 2001) at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/sept11/wallander_001.asp (accessed November18, 2012)

- Countering the US interests in the region.

Russia, like Afghanistan, has to deal with its land-locked geography. Therefore, its quest for warm water ports is not new and has been the major cause of its numerous military conflicts with Turkey. The Crimean War and the Russian-Japanese conflict in 1903 were to get control of the Black sea and the Bosphorus - Dardanelles passage into the Mediterranean Sea. It was its historic pursuit and the "century old quest for warm water port" that forced former USSR to invade Afghanistan.¹⁰

There are no warm water ports in Afghanistan, but they were in control of the Khyber Pass (an ancient trade route to China) on the East, and one step closer to Iran and Turkey on the West and Pakistan on the South, all with warm water ports. It would be rather misjudgment on part of any researcher to believe that Russia's hunt for warm water has died down with its withdrawal from Afghanistan. Today's Russia needs it even badly for linking its world largest gas reserves to international market.

In pursuit of its long-term objectives in the region, Russian foreign policy has always been India centric. The depth of Soviet-Indian strategic partnership can be judged from Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971 and Soviet support to India in the Indo-Pak War-1971. The changing dynamics of today's geopolitical scenario have, however, brought Pakistan and Russia closer to each other. This partnership will be more meaningful in post-2014 scenario when the U.S. led NATO forces will leave Afghanistan. Acceptance of this reality has provided another opportunity to the leadership of both countries to rewrite the chapter of Pak-Russia bilateral ties.

Reappraisal of Pak-Russia Relations

The Legacy

Pak-Russia relations, viewing from a realist perspective, have not been built upon strong pillars of understanding and mutual concerns, which are most essential for establishing enduring bilateral ties. The history of Pak-Russia relation is a tale of misperceptions and lost opportunities. Pak-Russia relations have often been under-rated, despite strong potentials, mainly due to misperceived notion and mindset.¹¹ The roots of misunderstandings and misperceptions can be traced back in 1947 when Pakistan at the time of its inception decided to join the U.S. block ignoring the next-door superpower, the USSR. One can make a number of arguments in favour or against the decision of then-Pakistani elite but analyzing it from hindsight one can draw a conclusion that the decision was not based upon rationality. Under Max Weber model of

¹⁰ A. Z. Hilali, *US-Pakistan Relationship: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan* (Hants: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005), 50.

¹¹ *Ibid.* Nazir Hussain, p. 79.

rationality, Pakistan's decision making authorities at the time of its creation did not carry out correct "cost-benefit" analysis and, hence, their decision of preferring the U.S. over USSR could not be termed as a rational choice.

Ever since, there has been no warmth in relations between both the nations. Critically analyzing strategic interests of both the states, one can make out that there is no bilateral issue between them rather certain commonality of interests related to regional and world political paradigm.

The history also provided certain opportunities to both the nations to revisit their bilateral relations and take a fresh start but apart from few high level visits and undertaking few projects of bilateral-regional level, both failed to en-cash the moments. Apart from initial miscalculation in 1947, there came at least two significant moments when Pakistan could have achieved political and economical milestone not only in terms of its bilateral relations with the Soviet Union but with rest of the world community as well. First, after the 1965 war, Pakistan, during Tashkent Conference, failed to avail the chance of resolving the Kashmir issue. At Tashkent, situation was somewhat in Pakistan's favour, as India was at a weaker wicket, China was in full support of Pakistan, the U.S. was also interested in resolving the Kashmir issue, and the Soviet Union while chairing the conference would have delighted in taking the credit of resolving the long pending Kashmir issue. This would have also laid the foundation for renewed Pak-USSR relations.

Unfortunately, Pakistani leadership did not play its cards well. Later, in 1974, Prime Minister Zulifqar Ali Bhutto visited Moscow and as a result USSR established Steel Mill in Pakistan worth billion dollars. That was the second occasion when Pakistan could have mustered immense economic gains but the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan totally changed the scenario and Pakistan as the U.S. front fought a long proxy war with Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Even after the Cold War there was no breakthrough in Pak-Russia relations due to Pakistan support to Taliban regime in Afghanistan. However, since the 9/11 episode the ice has started melting down but there is still no enough cordiality in their ties.

The Question of Perception

According to Boulding, the elements like friendliness, hostility strength and weakness constitute the building blocks of image of the other.¹² The history of Pak-Russia relations is an interesting case study of political psychology. The most tragic part of Pak-Russia relations is the lack of rationality. Both the nations have evaluated each other behavior through the prism of other states' interests / concerns. Besides, one major

¹² Emanuele Castano, Simona Sacchi and Peter Heys Gries, "The Perception of Others in International Relations: Evidence of the Polarizing Effect of Entitativity," *Political Psychology*, (2003) 24:3, p.450, http://www.newschool.edu/uploadedFiles/Faculty/NSSR/Castano_PerceptionOfOther.pdf (accessed November 18, 2012)

reason of Pakistan's joining the American camp in 1947 was its security concern. Since India had already forged good bilateral ties with former Soviet Union, Pakistan in order to maintain balance of power moved closer to western security system. Due to the strong Indian factor in our foreign policy decision making, Pakistan always considered Russia as friend of India and obvious adversary of Pakistan. The rationality factor was again found missing when Pakistan joined western security system – Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), and became frontline state against war against communism. This shows that the decision making elite of Pakistan has been less “objective” and more “subjective” in making foreign policy towards former Soviet Union i.e. internalizing communist Russia as an “expansionist” state primarily as portrayed by the west.¹³

The prevailing international and regional environment and Pakistan's own political dynamics have, however, brought both nations at a converging point of their mutual relations. It is, hence, imperative to identify possible challenges which both the nations have to overcome in achieving their common objectives towards regional balance of power.

Challenges in Pak-Russia Relations

The most positive point in the mutual politics of both the state is that they have no direct bilateral issue. There are, however, certain external factors which have been effecting adversely both the nations. These challenges, their implications and possible measures/course of actions to offset these upshots are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

The US Factor in Pakistan's Foreign Policy

The U.S. role in the foreign policy of Pakistan is significantly pronounced. The joining of the U.S. camp at the time of independence and subsequently signing the West's security system (SEATO and CENTO), has never allowed Pakistan's elite to formulate some independent policy towards Russia. It is also a fact that Pakistan has always been seen as a proxy in fighting the U.S. interests in the region. Pakistan's role in Afghan war (1979-1989) is the most appropriate example of the same. Not only this, Pakistan's territory has also been used to meet the U.S. interests – quite some of them were detrimental to Russia's security concerns. In 1959, Pakistan signed an accord with the U.S. to counter communist intimidation on its western border.¹⁴ In 1962, the Soviets captured a U.S. spy plane on its territory. The pilot revealed that the plane had taken off from the Badaber Airbase, Peshawar in Pakistan. The Pak-Soviet relations

¹³ Ibid. Nazir Hussain, p.81.

¹⁴ Major General Yashwant Deva, “Deeping Fissures in Indo-US Relations,” *Indian Defence Review*, (Jan 1994), 9 : I, p.25.

deteriorated to its worst.¹⁵

Intriguingly, while communist USSR has been at secondary list for amiable relations in Pakistan's foreign policy, the communist China has been historically the best friend of Pakistan. The most significant argument for this is that Pakistan always viewed China through its own prism and been quite successful in maintaining a balance in its relations with China and rest of the world. By following the same policy, Pakistan can also lay the foundation for its relations with Russia.

The Indian Factor

As discussed above, India is a pre-dominant factor in Russia's foreign policy towards South Asia, especially Pakistan. As India was able to enjoy cordial relations with both the superpowers, Pakistan's political leadership failed to do so. However, this Indian-centralism in Pak-Russia relations has a positive aspect too. It can be argued that Pakistan had no bad intentions towards the former Soviet Union (present Russia).¹⁶ Moreover, in the post cold war and 9/11 scenario, there has been significant change in the thinking process of leaders on both the sides. Pakistan due to its geostrategic location and its role in international arena is a significant country and cannot be ignored by great powers. Hence, the Indian factor in the foreign policy of Russia towards Pakistan is no more conspicuous.

Afghanistan and Post-2014 Scenario

The period of Afghan War (1979-1989) was worst in the history of both nations which ultimately ended in dismemberment of the superpower. Even after the war, there was no much warmth in their relations due to Taliban factor in Pakistan foreign policy. However, in the post-9/11 epoch, Pak-Russian relations have shown some improvement. As the U.S. led NATO forces are planned to leave Afghanistan in 2014, the role of both Pakistan and Russia will be even meaningful in Afghan security in particular and the whole region in general.

Encouraging Developments

After of the Cold War and in the recent past there have been some positive indicators of melting ice in Pak-Russia bilateral ties.

The careful analysis of these events helps us in concluding that both the states are serious in reshaping their foreign policy objectives toward each other. Some glimpses of these are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

¹⁵ Ibid. Nazir Hussain, p.82.

¹⁶ Ibid: 81.

Bilateral Visits

In April, 1999, Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif visited Moscow, the first visit by a Pakistani Prime Minister to Moscow since that of late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's visit in 1976. Later in February 2003, President Pervez Musharraf's visited Russia, the first by a Pakistani President in 33 years. Both these visits helped in breaking the ice.

Similarly, in April 2007, Russian Premier Mekhail Fredkov reciprocated and became the first Russian leader visiting Islamabad in almost four decades. Later, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on exploring prospects in collaborating in oil sector was also signed during Pakistan Petroleum Minister to Russia in November, 2007.

Pakistan in Shanghai Cooperation Organization

In 2005, Pakistan succeeded in getting an Observer's status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) because Russia had opted not to veto Islamabad's presence. Pakistan also reciprocated the gesture by helping Russia to attain an Observer's status at the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC).

Putin-Gillani Meeting – 2010

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin conveyed his warm feelings to his Pakistani counterpart Yousaf Raza Gilani when the two met on November 25, 2010 on the sidelines of SCO summit in Dushanbe. Later on November 8, 2011 Prime Ministers of both the nations again met at the SCO summit in St Petersburg. Prime Minister Putin was quoted as saying:

*"Pakistan today is not only an important trade and economic partner of Russia, but also the most important Russian partner in South Asia and in the Islamic world."*¹⁷

The paper further commented:

*"This Russian shift in South Asia policy where India had always been Moscow's main partner is reflection of apprehensions over New Delhi-Washington relationship turning into a military-political alliance to block Russia and China's interests in the region."*¹⁸

Army Chiefs Visits

The Chief of Army Staff, General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, visited Russia thrice in the past four years i.e. 2009, 2012 and 2013.

¹⁷ "Pakistan is Russia's 'most important' partner in South Asia: Putin," *First Post*, (Online), November 14, 2011, <http://www.firstpost.com/world/pak-is-russias-most-important-partner-in-south-asia-putin-125596.html> (accessed November 13,2012).

¹⁸ Ibid.

Reciprocating the nod, the Russian Army chief visited twice in last two years: Colonel General Alexander Postnikov, Commander-in-Chief of Russian Ground Forces in May 2011;¹⁹ and Russian Army Chief Vladimir Chirkin in August 2013.²⁰ The visits focused on enhancing ties between the armies of the two countries, and matters pertaining to regional security and common interests so as to lay the foundation for a bilateral strategic relationship between both the countries.

Quadripartite Summit August-2010

A four nation summit of Russia, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Tajikistan was held at Sochi in August 2010.²¹ Sochi summit was considered as a turning point in rewriting the history of relations between two nations. The summit also gave the green signal for an inaugural meeting of the Russian-Pakistani Inter-Governmental Commission on Trade and Economic and Scientific-Technological Cooperation in Islamabad.

Arms Sales and Supply

The only Russian taboo in its relation with Pakistan is related to the sale of weapons. But that too remains an academic argument as its defence technologies have always trickled to Pakistan forces through a third country. In 1990, Ukraine supplied its main battle tank (T-80) to Pakistan which is built on Russian technology. In 2009, Russia also lifted its objections pertaining to supply of Chinese JF-17 fighter planes (powered by Russian RD-93 engines) to Pakistan. Previously, Russia had sold over forty MI-17 transport helicopters to Pakistan. Pakistan is also likely to purchase MI-35 attack helicopters to fight terrorism.

The above developments show that both Islamabad and Moscow have come miles forward during the last decade or so to embrace each other and shun differences.

Important Conclusions

The case-study of Pak-Russia relations leads us to some vital conclusions essential for formulating our long term foreign policy objectives. Some of the conclusions from Pakistan's perspective include the following:-

- Ever since the collapse of former Soviet Union, the leadership of Russia considering itself the legitimate successor of the great superpower is committed in defining its role and effecting

¹⁹ "Russian Army Chief calls on Gen Kayani, *Nation* (Islamabad), May 25, 2011.

²⁰ "Russian army chief calls on Kayani, *Nation* (Islamabad), August 6, 2013.

²¹ Smita Purushottam, "The Sochi Summit: Fresh Moves on the Grand Eurasian Chessboard," *Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA) Issue Brief*, (August 27, 2010), http://www.idsa.in/system/files/IB_Sochi_Summit.pdf (accessed November 15, 2012)

resurgence of its power in international politics.

- Amongst various trend-groups, Pragmatic Nationalists' views are considered most favoured which illustrate adopting a balanced approach of enhancing Russian interests while keeping their ideological identity and national interests intact.
- Since 1993, different concepts / doctrines spelling out Russian foreign policy objectives, military strategies and national security blueprints, have been formulated. Evaluation of these concepts and doctrines reveals that Russia, though yet not fully capable, does have a definite will of its resurgence in the international arena.
- The history of Pak-Russia relations indicates that both the nations have not built their relations upon strong pillars of a realist perception. Both the countries perceived each other's behaviour through the prism of externally built perceptions and not the internal political dynamics and bilateral ties.
- Pakistan and Russia despite having no bilateral issues possess numerous potentials of collaborations. They, however, could not en-cash a number of opportunities of rewriting their history of relations.
- Although the Russian foreign policy in South Asia has been Indian centric, but the recent international developments especially the post-9/11 scenario has projected Pakistan as a key regional and international player.
- The recent high level visits and summits between the two countries and the policy statements indicate that there is an apparent shift in Russia's South Asia policy towards Pakistan where India had always been Moscow's main partner.
- Pakistan and Russia – having convergence on their bilateral, regional and international interests, do possess potentials to collaborate in various fields. Working together in the fields of energy, trade and security, Pakistan and Russia can ensure regional and global peace, harmony and social wellbeing.

Options and Recommendations

The neo-liberalism theory presented by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye says that in international politics there are multiple channels which connect states. Similarly, the scholars like Rosecrance and Mitrany, the leading neo-liberalists, also believe in cooperation among states arguing that mutual benefits arising out of cooperation are possible because states are not always preoccupied with relative gains. They further deliberate that international relations is not a zero sum game as many states feel secure enough to maximize their own gains regardless of

what accrues to others.²²

Energy

There could be no two opinions that we require energy both for economic growth and industrialization. Abundant and inexpensive energy serves as bloodline of the modern civilization and is considered as the most important demand of today. In order to meet its domestic requirement Pakistan imports a huge quantity of oil mostly from Gulf countries. Pakistan's gas reserves are also depleting at a faster pace – making its energy situation even worse. Fortunately, Pakistan is blessed with two energy corridors which link Russia, Central Asian Republics (CARs) and Iran with international market. All these states / republics are rich in hydrocarbon resources and are considered as world future focus of attention. Russia is holding world largest gas reserves whereas Iran is second in the row.

Pakistan in order to meet its energy demand and to provide an access to these reserves to world market has initiated two pipeline projects in the region; Iran-Pakistan-India (now only Iran-Pakistan called IP) and Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) Gas Pipeline Projects. Both the projects being technically feasible and economically viable have been subjected to great powers political interests. The project of IP being most viable, both technically and financially, has bleak chances of materialization in near future due to Iranian nuclear standoff. Prospect of TAPI on the other hand enjoys backing of the U.S. and Russia both. Russia on the other hand has also shown interest in financing the project.²³ The materialization of this mega project shall not only help Pakistan in meeting its energy shortfall but shall also provide access to Russia and CARs to the west. Moreover, Pakistan has also sought Russia's assistance in coal mining and generation of coal power plants. Prime Minister Raja Pervez Ashraf during his meeting with Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov on October 3, 2012, said that Pakistan seeks to increase economic relations and benefit from the expertise of Russian Federation, especially in the energy sector where Russia has experience in coal mining and generation of coal power plants.²⁴

Pakistan and Russia have great potentials in energy sector and they can boost economies of both the countries by cooperation in this particular area.

²² Scott Burchill (et al.), *Theories of International Relations, Third Edition* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 65.

²³ Zafar Bhutta, "Contracts for IP and TAPI projects to be given to Russia," *Zone Asia-Pak*, (June 28, 2012), http://www.zoneasia-pk.com/ZoneAsia-Pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8468:contracts-for-ip-and-tapi-projects-to-be-given-to-russia&catid=47:powermanagement&Itemid=70 (accessed November 16, 2012)

²⁴ "Pak-Russi relations should be further strengthened: Ashraf," *Dawn* (Islamabad), October 4, 2012.

Trade

The second area in which the future of both the countries lies is their cooperation in trade. Pakistan and Russia despite having legacy of cool relations have discreetly been engaged in enhancing their bilateral ties in several fields including trade. It is also a fact that the bilateral volume of trade between Russia and Pakistan has surged from a paltry \$92 million in 2003 to over \$700 million in 2011.²⁵ It is expected that the cooperation in trade sector shall further improve in the years to come which would help in further promoting ties between both the countries.

Security

Academically it is believed that Russian sale of arms to Pakistan is inviolable. Whereas, there is already presence of both Russian equipment and technology in Pakistan defence forces in the shape of MI-17 helicopters and T-80 series of Ukrainian battle tanks. They are now looking for a diversified and expanded relationship in this regard. The recent visits of both the army chiefs to each other countries are being rated very high in writing new chapter in question of defence cooperation.

The role of both the nations would be even more varied in post-2014 scenario when the U.S. and NATO troops would leave Afghanistan. It is recommended that Russia and Pakistan should establish greater ties especially in the field of counterterrorism.

Pro-activism

Over the past ten years Pakistan and Russia have covered a long distance in trying to come closer to each other. It is recommended this pro-active approach in their bilateral bondage should be further exploited and regular high level visits be facilitated. There has been a delay in President Putin's visit to Pakistan which has raised concerns in various quarters. It is recommended that all prior homework should be completed evaluating all possible policy alternatives before any such visit. Postponement of visit of such stature is by no means in the national interest.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

Pakistan and Russia can even built stronger ties utilizing the platform of SCO. In 2005, Pakistan was granted observer status in SCO and in return Pakistan then reciprocated the gesture by helping the Russians get an Observer's status at OIC.²⁶ It is suggested that these forums should be exploited in building strong pillars of their association.

²⁵ "A brief recap of the troubled Pak-Russia relationship", *News International* (Rawalpindi), October 4, 2012.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

Conclusion

Pakistan and Russia are not only two important countries of the region but also have great role in international politics. At the time of creation of Pakistan, the decision making mechanism of the country failed to carry out correct cost-benefit analysis and took an irrational decision of ignoring the former Soviet Union. There was, however, requirement of maintaining equally good relations with both the superpowers as India did so very successfully.

The basis of bilateral relationship is always on the principles of trusts and corrects perception. This element too remained missing in Pak-Russia relations. The history of relations between them can truly be termed as a saga of misunderstandings and misperceptions as both the nations perceived each other through a third nation's perspective.

- Amongst all odds what both the states have experienced over the past half century, Pakistan and Russia have now realized each other's importance. The developments of the last ten years suggest that both of them have bridged some gaps in their relationship. Viewing various aspects of global and internal dynamics one can conclude that if both the countries work together in the fields of energy, trade and security, they can ensure peace, stability and prosperity of their nations.

IMPACT OF FOREIGN AID ON THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES A CASE STUDY OF THE US AID TO PAKISTAN

Yawar Abbass*

Abstract

This paper analyses the concept of foreign aid, its definitions, nature and various types. It examines effects of foreign aid and establishes that foreign aid has both beneficial as well as adverse effects on the economy of the recipient states. A case study of the aid provided to Pakistan by the US is carried out in order to study the impact of aid. The history of Pakistan's engagements with the US is discussed, especially with regards to foreign aid. The recommendations given at the end of this study outline the possible ways through which the US aid programmes can be made to result in improvement of bilateral relations.

Key Words: *Foreign aid, Third World, Pakistan, Economic development, Bilateral relations.*

Introduction

Transfer of resources from developed states of the world to the developing or under-developed states is called foreign aid. The Encyclopedia Britannica defines foreign aid as “the international transfer of capital, goods, or services from a country or international organization for the benefit of the recipient country or its population. Aid can be economic, military, or emergency humanitarian (e.g., aid given following natural disasters).”¹

According to Columbia Encyclopedia, foreign aid is “economic, military, technical, and financial assistance given on an international and

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¹ Foreign Aid, from *The Encyclopædia Britannica*, available at: <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/213344/foreign-aid>, Internet Accessed: April 1, 2010

usually intergovernmental level.”²

There are two pre-requisites for the flow of resources to qualify as foreign aid, firstly, the motive of the donor for such transfer of resources should be non-commercial and secondly, the transfer of resources should be on concessional terms, i.e. interest rate and re-payment period shall be softer than commercial rate and period.

Foreign aid may be provided by a single country, a group of countries or an International Financial Institution (IFI). Foreign aid that is provided by a single donor country to a recipient country is called bilateral aid, while aid provided by IFIs, donor agencies or group of countries to a country or countries is called multilateral aid.

Types of Foreign Aid

Foreign aid comprises of resource transfer to the recipient state which result in raising the performance of that state above the current level, at least for the short-term. There are various types of foreign aid:

- 1 Financial aid, which is the provision of convertible foreign exchange to the recipient country. Financial aid can either be tied or un-tied. If the financial aid is not tied to any project or nation, it is called un-tied aid.
- 2 Tied aid can either be nation-tied or project-tied or both, called double tied.
- 3 Nation-tied aid is conditional; the aid has to be spent by the recipient country in the donor country.
- 4 On the other hand, project-tied aid is provided for only for certain projects and the money cannot be relocated to any other project or cause.
- 5 Other types of foreign aid include loans and grants. Loan is defined as “An arrangement in which a lender gives money or property to a borrower and the borrower agrees to return the property or repay the money, usually along with interest, at some future point(s) in time”.³ The developing or under-developed country borrows foreign exchange from a developed country in order to finance its short-term and long-term projects. Loans are of two types, hard loans and soft loans. Hard loans are provided are given for a period of five years or less, they have no concessional elements, grace period is very limited and interest rate is higher. While soft loans are given for a longer period of time, their interest rate is lower and grace period is longer. Grant is also a type of foreign aid. It is the most desirable foreign assistance. It does not involve re-payment of the principal amount or the interest; rather

² Foreign Aid Columbia *Encyclopædia Britannica*, available at: <http://www.answers.com/topic/foreign-aid>, internet accessed: April 1, 2010

³ Loan, from Investorwords, available at: <http://www.investorwords.com/2858/loan.html>, Internet Accessed: April 3, 2010

it is a sort of gift from the donor given in times of emergencies or other humanitarian purposes.

- Another kind of foreign aid is Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). It is defined as “direct investments in productive assets by a company incorporated in a foreign country”.⁴ There are two different opinions about FDI. Proponents state that FDI is beneficial for the client state because it does not involve re-payment and it brings technical know-how to the host country. Opponents of FDI state that the outflow of capital, as profit for the foreign companies, exceeds the amount of repayment and the technical know-how can be procured at much lower rates on commercial basis.
- Military Aid is also included in foreign aid. It may not directly affect the economy of a country but it boosts the security of a country that may indirectly influence business activities of a country. Since it does not directly affect the economic activity of the recipient country, it is sometimes excluded from foreign aid.

Effects of Foreign Aid

Responding to world-wide developmental goals and humanitarian needs through its foreign assistance programmes is an integral part of the foreign policy of developed countries. Through their peculiar aid policy, the developed country/countries develop an association of ‘dependency’ with the client state(s). Dependency is a form of inter-dependence with an extreme form of power imbalance. This imbalance or asymmetry is the prime characteristic of dependency. The asymmetrical relationship between the donor state and the recipient is reflected by the dominance of the former over the latter. Through its foreign aid programme the donor state controls or influences the national policies of the client state by regulating the latter’s socio-political as well as economic affairs. K. J. Holsti is of the opinion that that “Needs that cannot be filled within national frontiers help to create dependencies on other states” and “dependencies are vulnerabilities and leave states open to be influenced by others”.⁵

Foreign aid has both beneficial as well as adverse effects on the economy of the client states. Scholars are divided regarding the implication of foreign aid on the recipient country. The Extensionist School of thought holds that foreign aid is provided to developing countries for their socio-political and economic development. Non-Extensionist School opposes this claim and holds that foreign aid retard growth of a country.

One of the biggest recipients of foreign aid in South Asian

⁴ Foreign Direct Investment, from Investorwords, available at: http://www.investorwords.com/2042/foreign_direct_investment.html, Internet Accessed: April 3, 2010

⁵ Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr, *World Politics: the Menu for Choice*, (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman company, 1981), p. 178.

countries is Pakistan. According to a comparative study of South Asian countries' dependence on foreign aid, Pakistan received about Rs. 192.5 billion in the year 2006, while India was least dependent on foreign aid as it received about Rs. 78.98 million in the same year; Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are also "mild recipients of foreign aid as compared to Pakistan".⁶

As far as Foreign Direct Investment is concerned, India takes the lead in South Asia, e.g. in the year 2006, FDI in India was about Rs 6.598 billion, while Pakistan did not have even half of India's FDI.⁷

Moreover, there is an interesting relationship between foreign aid allocation and poverty; only 31% of aid is provided to the ten least developed countries with 66% of the world's poorest people (see Table I):

Table I: Foreign Aid Allocations and the Poor, 1992

10 developing countries with greatest no. Of Poor People	Number of Poor (millions)	Poor as a %age of Total World Poor	Official Development Assistance (ODA) per Poor Person (U.S. \$)	ODA as a %age of Total ODA
India	350.0	26.9	7	5.2
China	105.0	8.1	28	6.5
Bangladesh	93.2	7.2	19	3.8
Brazil	72.4	5.6	3	0.5
Indonesia	47.8	3.7	44	4.6
Nigeria	46.4	3.6	7	0.5
Vietnam	37.6	2.9	16	1.3
Philippines	35.2	2.7	49	3.8
Pakistan	35.0	2.7	49	3.8
Ethiopia	31.9	2.5	41	2.9
Total	854.5	65.9	17	31.7

Source: Akhtar Hussain Shah, (Et. Al.), Is foreign aid necessary for the economic development of less developed countries with special reference to Pakistan? From *IPRI Journal*, 2005, p. 11

⁶ Muhammad Zeeshan, *Foreign aid: a boon or bane?*; available at: www.thefinancialdaily.com; Internet accessed April 10, 2010

⁷ Ibid. (Note: The examples of FDI in Pakistan are Lever Brothers, Reckitt and Colman, Bata and Philips etc.)

There are two main types of foreign aid provided to Pakistan, i.e. project aid and non project aid.⁸ Table II shows the typology of foreign aid provided to Pakistan.

**Table II: Typology of foreign aid provided to Pakistan
(1952-2002) in US\$ millions**

Plan/Year	Project Aid	Non Project Aid				Total
		Non Food	Food	BOP	Relief	
Pre Plan (1952-55)	170	48	119	-	-	337
1st Plan (1956-60)	406	244	192	-	-	842
2nd Plan (1961-65)	1209	420	765	-	-	2394
3rd Plan (1966-70)	1811	763	469	-	-	3043
4th Plan (1971-78)	2543	1299	785	1090	-	5717
5th Plan (1979-83)	3363	950	36	531	643	5523
6th Plan (1984-88)	4882	791	776	-	734	7183

⁸ Non-project aid is further sub-divided into; food, non-food, BOP and relief aid.

7th Plan (1989-93)	7643	1922	1558	413	545	12081
8th Plan (1994-98)	9564	61	1923	1139	61	12748
9th Plan (1999-03)	4991	-	502	8307	35	13835
Total	36582	6498	7125	11480	2018	63703

Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan (2002 -03); see: Ghulam Mohey-ud- Din, Impact of Foreign Aid on Economic Development in Pakistan (1960-2002), June 2005, MPRA; available at: <http://mpr.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1211/>; Internet accessed April 12, 2010

A Case Study of US Aid Provided to Pakistan

Background

Pakistan is at the forefront of the American-led War on Terror since 2001. The U.S.-Pakistan partnership is not a new phenomenon; it dates back to 1950s. Pakistan has remained a close American ally since its formative years. It will not be exaggeration to suggest that the United States owe its Cold War victory to the efforts of Pakistan.

After maintaining a few years of relative neutrality during its initial years of independence, Pakistan joined the American camp, by entering into US-led alliances against the Communist USSR. Notable anti-Communist Pacts, of which Pakistan was a member, were the South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO). Pakistan joined the Capitalist bloc due to a number of reasons.

The foremost reason was that Pakistan faced numerous economic and financial problems, to overcome which, it needed foreign aid. United States provided aid in cash, which could fuel the weak Pakistani economy. The other dilemma for the foreign policy formulators of Pakistan was security, especially from its hostile neighbour, India. For that matter, Pakistan wanted weapons and by joining the U.S. led alliances, Pakistan could get the American weapons. However, the United States did not guarantee Pakistan's security vis-à-vis India and made it clear that the defence pacts of SEATO and CENTO are Communism-specific. Still the idea lurked in the minds Pakistan's policy makers that being in alliance with the United States will protect Pakistan against any possible Indian aggression.

In 1960s, Pakistan was called the 'Most Allied Ally' of the United States. However, Pak-US relations deteriorated in the mid-1960s and US

imposed an embargo on military aid to Pakistan in 1965. In 1970s, sanctions were imposed by the Carter Administration on Pakistan which resulted in curtailment of foreign aid.

Pakistan became a 'front line state' in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Pakistan was again getting foreign aid and assistance from the United States. However, after the Soviet withdrawal, sanctions were imposed against Pakistan under the Pressler Amendment in October 1990 due to Pakistan's nuclear programme. US suspended all military and economic assistance which dropped from US \$574 million planned for fiscal year 1991 to none.

Terrorist attacks on the US soil in September 11, 2001 dramatically changed relationship between Pakistan and the United States. Interestingly, the most-sanctioned ally of United States became a 'major non-NATO ally' in the "War against Terrorism". Pakistan became one of the world's leading recipients of US aid. Pakistan's weak economy was revitalized after its alliance with the US; so far it has received around \$8.66 billion in military and economic aid.

The most recent instance of US aid to Pakistan is through the Kerry Lugar Bill, which was passed by the US congress in 2009, according to which Pakistan will receive \$1.5 billion a year for five years to improve its social and economic structures. The Bill also includes military aid of \$400 million annually for 2010-2013 with a condition that Pakistan's commitment to combat terrorism is certified.

Thus, Pakistan remains one of the biggest recipients of the US aid. The relationship between Pakistan and United States can be best understood under the structural parameters of "dependencia".

The following two tables (III and IV), depicts the foreign aid provided by US to Pakistan:

Table-III: Foreign Aid to Pakistan
(Comparison of 1970 & 1991)

Donors	(Million Dollars)	
	30 June 70	30 June 91
US Govt. and Agencies	1212.5	2974.9
US AID	1087.1	1499.3
US EXIM Bank and Others	67.7	409.6
PL 480	57.5	1066.0

Source: Mehrunnisa Ali (Ed.), *Reading in Pakistan Foreign Policy: 1971-1998*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 371.

Table IV: Direct Overt U.S. Aid and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002-Y2009 (millions of dollars)

Program or Account	FY 2002	FY 2003	FY 2004	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008 (est.)	Program or Account Total	FY 2009 (req.)
Section 1206	—	—	—	—	23	14	57	94	
Counternarcotics Funds	—	—	—	8	29	39	55	131	
Coalition Support Funds	1,1691	1,247	705	964	862	731	255	5,934	200
Pakistan Frontier Corp train & equip	—	—	—	—	—	—	75	75	
Foreign Military Financing	75	225	75	299	297	297	298	1,566	300
International Military Education	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	11	2

and Training									
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement	91	31	32	32	38	21	22	267	32
Non-proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related	10	1	5	8	9	10	10	53	11
Total Security-Related	1,346	1,505	818	1,313	1,260	1,115	774	8,131	545
Child Survival and Health	14	16	26	21	28	22	30	157	28
Development Assistance	10	35	49	29	38	95	30	286	—
Economic Support Fund	615	188	200	298	337	389	347	2,374	603
Food Aid	5	28	13	32	55	—	42	175	37
Human Rights and Democracy Funding	1	—	2	2	1	11	—	17	—
Migration and Refugee Assistance	9	7	6	6	10	4	—	42	—
Total Economic-Related	654	274	296	388	539	521	449	3,121	668
Grand Total	2,000	1,779	1,114	1,701	1,799	1,636	1,223	11,252	1,213

Source: U.S. Departments of State, Defence, and Agriculture; U.S. Agency for International Development

Impact of Foreign Aid on Pakistan's Economy

Regarding the impact of foreign aid on the economy of Pakistan, economists such as Hollis Chenery and Arthur MacEwan “express the need for foreign assistance to Pakistan for accelerated growth”⁹ Economists such as A. R. Kamal, Parvez Hasan, Pervez Tahir and Rehana Siddiqui highlighted “non-optimal utilization of foreign assistance for Pakistan and interpreted it as a sustainable and prospective factor for

⁹ Akhtar Hussain Shah, (Et. al.), Is foreign aid necessary for the economic development of less developed countries with special reference to Pakistan? *IPRI Journal*, (Summer, 2005), V:2, pp. 1-28.

higher growth, if macro and micro level efforts are made for optimal utilization of foreign assistance".¹⁰

On the other hand, Non-Extensionist School comprising Griffen and Enos, Weisskopf, Ridell, White and Pakistani economist Shahrukh Rafi Khan points towards "the existence of a negative relationship between assistance and growth".¹¹ Shahrukh Rafi Khan (1997) says that the harsher terms on which Pakistan gets aid, makes the debt trap more formidable as does the economics of aid growth nexus.¹² In order to analyze the effect of foreign aid on Pakistan's economy, examining the following Table is pertinent. The Table V shows the net resource flows and net transfers to Pakistan from all donors, including the United ;2States:

Table V: Net Resource Flows and Net Transfers to Pakistan (US\$ Million)

	1970	1980	1990	1999	2001	2002	2003
Net Flows	433	1,021	1,228	1,071	1,622	1,066	1,247
Net Transfers	369	819	778	263	525	511	596
National Income	4.3	4.0	2.9	1.5	1.7	1.5	1.5
Net Transfers	3.6	3.2	1.9	0.4	0.8	0.7	0.7

Source: World Bank. Ishrat Husain, National Economy and Impact of Foreign Aid, p. 9.

One finds out from Table V that net flows as percentage of gross national income have gradually declined from 4.3% in 1970 to 1.5% in 2003 and net transfers from 3.6% to 0.7%, which means that dependence of Pakistan on foreign assistance, as Ishrat Hussain, the former Governor State Bank of Pakistan, puts it: "is so low and insignificant that it won't make much of a difference to our national economy".¹³ Dr. Ishrat Hussain thus concludes that net flows and net transfers for 2002 and 2003 have declined as proportion of national income compared to 1999 and hence the popular assertion that the economic turnaround in Pakistan can be attributed to September 11, 2001 is a myth.

Moreover, it not only increases the debt of Pakistan but also exhausts a major chunk of Pakistan's budget in debt-servicing. US-aid also results in dependence of Pakistan on the US bail-outs, which decreases the incentive for major economic reforms and an indigenous economic development model in the country. In addition, the aid always has strings attached to it, due to which Pakistan is not able to pursue an independent economic and foreign policy, resulting in forestation among the policy-makers and the public. The US Congress reiterates that the US tax-payers'

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 15

¹¹ Ibid., p. 1

¹² Ibid., p. 19

¹³ Ibid. Ishrat Husain, p. 6.

money cannot be doled out without expecting “tangible” results. However, the wish-list or conditionality of the aid providers is unrealistically huge and outmatches the meager amount of the aid-given to comply with such “wishes”.

The US aid is also not sustainable; it depends upon the whims of the US Congress, and Pakistan usually struggles in getting aid that is pledged by the US Administration. This makes the US-aid un-reliable.

One can conclude that although the US aid may have benefitted Pakistan in the short-term, but it has failed to produce the desired effects on Pakistan’s economy in the long-term. The recommendations given at the end of this study outlines the possible ways through which the US aid programmes can be made more desirable for Pakistan and thus can result in improvement of bilateral relations.

Ghulam Mohey-ud-Din in his research work “Impact of Foreign Aid on Economic Development in Pakistan (1960-2002)” is of the opinion that there are both positive and negative effects on the economic development. As far as the positive impacts of foreign aid on economy of Pakistan is concerned, it has “helped in boosting the GDP Growth through structural transformation of the economy, laid foundations of the industrial and agricultural sectors, provided technical assistance, policy advice and modern technology, assisted in overcoming the budget deficits and the BOP deficits and has also funded the projects for the social sector development projects”.¹⁵ On the negative side, foreign aid has substituted for domestic savings and increased debt burden.

Recommendations

Following are a few steps that need to be taken by both the US and Pakistan to get better results from the F\foreign aid.

- Pakistan is being given 1.5 billion dollars as a coalition support fund as mentioned earlier in the paper. Pakistan in actual is suffering much more than it is being supported. The best way would be to assess the losses that Pakistan has incurred in the wake of support for US in the war against terrorism. This can be done through a team of experts which should include experts from both the US and Pakistan in order to assess the losses in a better way. Then after the assessment of losses, US would be in a better position to understand Pakistan’s needs and opposition from within US against any increased compensatory aid would be much less as it would be based on more objective criterion;
- There is mistrust about the proper utilization of aid between both the parties. That mistrust can be addressed if periodic auditing is

¹⁵ *Economic Survey of Pakistan (2002-03)*; see: Ghulam Mohey-ud-Din, *Impact of Foreign Aid on Economic Development in Pakistan (1960-2002)*, June 2005, MPRA; available at: <http://mpr.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1211/>; Internet accessed April 12, 2010, p. 13

done and issues and progress of utilization is reviewed by an independent auditing firm which is acceptable to both the parties. There is usually a mechanism of auditing when aid is given to a country but the auditors come from the donor country which is not very unreasonable either. But keeping in view the subtle nature of the ties between Pakistan and US, a third party auditing would be more helpful.

- Moreover, the conditionalities of the aid should be made realistic and the expected results should be achievable, given the ground realities. For this purpose representatives of Pakistan's MoFA should be invited to give their opinion during the formulation of aid conditionalities in the Congress committee that is responsible for chalking out the details of aid bill.
- Pakistan's industry is not functioning well because of severe energy crisis. US should help Pakistan through transfer of technology in the field of sustainable energy. This should be negotiated between US and Pakistan. It would only be a short-term relief which is needed by Pakistan at the moment but the only permanent solution is a vibrant and resilient Pakistani economy which would be self sufficient. A stable Pakistan is vital for regional and global peace and that can only be ensured if Pakistan's economy is put back on track.
- Another important factor that frustrates the relationship and also makes US aid appear vicious, is the scepticism on Pakistani side that lots of strings are attached with the foreign aid, Such scepticism is not beneficial for the bilateral relationship. This can be addressed by negotiating with the US and highlighting the losses incurred by Pakistan and by proposing to the US to give support fund on more liberal and flexible terms.
- The priority list, according to which the projects would be undertaken through the aid received, should come from Pakistani side and MoFA needs to negotiate this with US. That is very important because what US thinks important and urgent for Pakistan might not actually be true as Pakistan's perspective would be more reliable in this regard.
- Giving Pakistan a greater access to the US markets would also boost Pakistan's economy. This can be achieved in phases through bilateral negotiations and ultimately, the aid may be replaced by market access.

Conclusion

Foreign aid can bear positive results in the economy of a third world country like Pakistan in a number of ways. It can help to develop over-head capital and basic infrastructure, like roads, highways, canals,

railways, power stations, which in turn can lead to economic growth of the country. There have been a number of overhead capital and basic infrastructures built in Pakistan through foreign investment, that have ultimately resulted in trickling down positive impacts of the country's economy; a typical example is that of Islamabad-Lahore Motorway. Foreign aid can also help in economic growth by exploitation of untapped resources of the country. Chinese investment in Saindak and Gawadar Deep Sea Port projects are good examples of foreign assistance. Moreover, Pakistan is in need of huge investment in the industrial sector through foreign aid, because the country has not enough resources to establish heavy industries.

However, the governments of third world countries should adopt such policies that in no case can foreign aid hamper development of the country. One of the fallouts of foreign aid is the burden of debt servicing for developmental loans. Another drawback of foreign aid is the string attached to it, especially a conditionality that the given loan has to be invested in the donor country in a particular sector.

One can conclude that policy of a country is very important with regard to foreign aid. In the presence of good monetary, fiscal and trade policies, foreign aid has positive effects on growth of the country.

Book Reviews

BOOK REVIEWS

GENDER-BASED EXPLOSIONS: THE NEXUS BETWEEN MUSLIM MASCULINITIES, JIHADIST ISLAMISM AND TERRORISM CULTURE & RELIGIONS, GENDER

Author: Maleeha Aslam
SBN-10: 92-808-1208-4,
ISBN-13: 978-92-808-1208-4
Language: English
Pages: 342

Price: US\$36.00
Publisher: United Nations University Press

Written by Dr. Maleeha Aslam, a fellow of Cambridge Commonwealth Society who has worked at the United Nations Institute of Sustainability and Peace as a postdoctoral fellow, *Gender-Based Explosions: The Nexus between Muslim Masculinities, Jihadist Islamism and Terrorism Culture & Religions, Gender* has attempted to explore relationship between element of gender based mindsets and politics in the age of terror. The book has tried to answer questions like "why are Muslim men so violent? How media, culture and religious thoughts interact to form their egoistic behaviors? The book claims that Muslim men have not only faced systematic political oppression but also cyclic marginalization. They are also living with a sense of being dejected, intimidated and humiliated. Many of them have found sufficient opportunities to project themselves as honourable, masculine figure in proper cultural manner. Therefore, 'troubled they become troublesome' and many of them use militant jihadist networks as outlets to achieve self-actualization and heroism. The additional gender based urge to become a hero is what is actually manipulated by terrorist networks and makes situation complicated.

The author has carefully differentiated among the terms used throughout the book, including Muslim, Islamic, and Islamism. A Muslim, according to her is one who has "made a declaration of faith in Allah as the only Divine existence and in his Angels, Messengers, Revealed Books and the Hereafter." A Muslim may or may not engage in religious practices. Islamic refers to "whatever may be accepted at the essence of the religion of Islam . . . [and] that aspect and practice of faith that is uncontested across heterogeneous global Muslim societies and about which there are no two opinions." Aslam cites philosophy drawing on spiritualism, calligraphy in mosques, and the call to prayer, azan, which follows a familiar Arabic rhythm, as examples. All of these have been developed and used consistently for centuries and are recognized as Islamic by Muslims globally. Islamism, on the other hand, is contemporary, amorphous, and political. It is the

application by a group of people (Islamists) of their own particular interpretation of the religion of Islam to the functioning of their present-day society. Muslims may or may not be Islamists, and at any moment in time [end Page 108] a number of competing variations of Islamism may exist.

She maintains that Islamic philosophy does not permit aggression in Jihad and forbids killing and violence against opponents.

Also, there is absolutely no place for “male ego” in Islam; a religion that focuses on “human” values. The author provides details from the lives of prophets mentioned in the Quran and underlines that their behaviour effectively demonstrated and strongly advocated patience, wisdom, courage and fearfulness — but never worship of some hypothetical “male” ego.

Despite the fact that revenge is allowed in Islam it is not a prescribed behaviour. Regardless, Muslim men are increasingly becoming more revengeful. The growing trend of revengefulness is promoting extremism. It is rightly stated that because revenge is a cultural and social imperative in Pakhtun culture, hence, extremism is more rapidly growing in KPK. In this context, surprisingly women do have a role in catalysing the development of such behaviours, as they demand from men to take revenge at any cost. A price is always attached on “masculinity” that is called into action during conflict. If one is man enough, one must be able to settle scores and also defend clan and familial honour.

The author is of the view that “gender” is a foundational bedrock where Al Qaeda, the Taliban and other terrorists have to be defeated as this is wherefrom they feed their constant supply of human resource. Dr. Maleeha has aptly stated that radicalism, militancy and terrorism can only be solved through people-centred interventions. Therefore, relevant governments and civil society should promote an alternative culture of growth, self-expression and actualization for Muslim men. To achieve sustainable counterterrorism results, Maleeha recommends underlining masculinities in Muslim contexts. *Gender-Based Explosions* is divided into three parts: “Framing the Global Chaos: An Overview,” “Islam, Masculinities, and Performance,” and “Pakistani Masculinities and Vulnerable Social Groups in the Age of Terror: A Pilot Study of Muslim Men in Islamabad, Aged 18-40.” Several tables produced from the pilot study are included within the text, and a statistical profile of the research sample is included as an appendix. The author has proved in her study that dejected ordinary Pakistani youth are predisposed to terrorism by political and economic oppression, filled with masculine mindsets and ambitions for heroism, fall in hands of radical clerics; without understanding this context it will be virtually impossible to check the acts of terror that stem from their desperation and indoctrination.

Book is not only well researched but is also written in morally engaging manner. It is destined to be an important contribution both in gender and contemporary Muslim studies. The line of argument of the book though is very powerful and relevant to curb Islamist militancy but some of the findings are troubling as are beyond the traditional Western ‘security’ thinking about terrorism and conventional militancy. The analysis of this book is also relevant to

Middle East studies.

This book is going to be an excellent contribution to both the Islamic texts, often used by trainers to justify terrorist violence, and the feminist theory that has yet to find an appropriate foothold in much of the Muslim world. It is also author's sensitive and probing interview technique with Muslim men in Pakistan that separates this book from others. Her trust towards these violent militant males does not shake once she is writing on terrorism among Muslim men. She portrays humane and nuanced faces to those who see 'counter-terrorism' as merely a strategy to pacify and/or nullify 'the other'. While interrogating her own gender theory, the author has made professional use methodological considerations making book a scientific piece of work. She concludes with evidence the ways in which the policies of the non-Muslim world must dramatically shift to reduce incentives to violence among the men whose families and neighborhoods seem forever under siege.

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PAKISTAN: A HARD COUNTRY

Author: Anatol Lieven

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Price: £10.99

In post 9/11 era, Pakistan has been portrayed by the mainstream scholars as a hazardous place on the face of the earth on the basis of its deteriorating security situation, declining economic condition and social unrest in the form of street protests and strikes. The prevailing transnational threat of terrorism in the presence of nuclear weapons has associated the probabilities of nuclear terrorism to Pakistan. Henceforth, the terrorism has become a gravest threat to

Pakistan's national security. It also provided sufficient chances to its traditional rivals to consciously criticize the state's core values. Under the US led-war on terror, Pakistan has become an essential ingredient of US politics of South Asia. The Anatol Lieven's analysis foresees the future of Pakistan and its standing in the world politics.

The well-articulated research work of a London based scholar Lieven under the title of *Pakistan: A Hard Country* is a remarkable contribution in the ongoing debate on Pakistan and its allegedly continuous standing in world politics. Lieven, a former journalist of *The Times*, is presently a Professor of International Relations and Terrorism Studies at King's College London.

The analytical approach of the writer in this book describes the analysis of Pakistan's internal and external problems. The central theme of the book is constructed on the view that the state is "divided, disorganized, economically backward, corrupt, violent, unjust, often savagely oppressive towards the poor and women, and home to extremely dangerous forms of extremism and terrorism." (p. 4). The book represents Lieven's research of 20 years on Pakistan's status in the contemporary world. The debate begins with the significance of nontraditional security threat to Pakistan. The four portions of Lieven's work cover four different dimensions of state. The first portion deals with the historical foundations of the state along with its cultural, demographical and geographical characteristics.

The second part of the book emphasizes the internal structure of the state which is generally based on justice, religion, military and politics. After evaluating the internal arrangements of the state, Lieven elucidates the provincial balance of the country. Finally, the discussion ends with the calculation of Taleban's role in the politics and an assessment of state's defeating Taleban strategies. In short, the twelve chapters of this book

grounded on aforementioned outlines are well researched and insightful, because in his work, Lieven heavily relies on empirical sources by conducting interviews of diverse personalities which include: politicians, intellectuals, soldiers, intelligence officers, bureaucrats, villagers, religious personalities and general public.

The convincing argument of Lieven emphasizes the ecological disaster as a result of climate change and their regular occurrences are the potential threats to states existence and to its organized society (p. 3). In order to highlight the effects of global warming on Pakistan, the writer focuses the “floods of 2010 which brought about a major transformation of state’s system, by damaging local agricultural and infrastructure.” (p. 205).

The critical examination of Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities by international community in the US-led war on terror has mounted on Pakistan specific security concerns by turning blind eye on India’s nuclear program which not only sparked an arms race in the region but also forced Pakistan to detonate its nuclear devices.

The US deliberate ignorance of Pakistan’s role and its significance in the war on terror while signing of a civil nuclear deal with India, which escalated a new debate in the region, has underestimated Pakistan’s efforts in fighting against terrorism. Even the Pak-US alliance in war on terror has shifted Pakistan in serious political, economic and social crises. Contrary to a widespread belief, “Pakistan was not responsible for the creation of Taliban in Afghanistan,” the mainstream Madrasahs of Afghanistan started and promoted the Talibanization initially (p. 406).

This is surprisingly one of the contemporary scholarly books on Pakistan, which reveals an account of entirely unfamiliar arguments. The book defies the rationality based on false perception, incorrect evidence and flawed assumptions in the argument that Pakistan is a failing state. The work of Lieven states, Pakistan is a hard country in a struggling phase. It is a deeply troubled state which is facing presently the threats of ecological change. The greatest threat of insurgency to the state’s existence is difficult to accept as a potential threat to Pakistan.

Furthermore, the writer is of the view that at regional level, the cooperation between Washington and Beijing can safeguard Pakistan’s survival. Both the US and China should avoid the struggle to control Pakistan. Concerning the US engagement in Afghanistan, Pakistan is a vital component of US strategic calculation. Therefore, the inevitable role of Pakistan in US Afghan policy is a supporting rationale in shaping South Asian politics (p. 477). Along with US, the EU, like China as a South Asian key player, should also exert its influence in resolving the Afghan conflict while recognizing Pakistan’s legitimate goals.

The whole discussion of Lieven’s book revolves around the survey of Pakistan. It also contains few accounts of shortsighted India’s role in the region. The US could play an effective role in minimizing the toxicity Indo-Pak relations. It is appropriate for the US to limit the

India's covert involvement in Afghanistan, which could be a viable option and prerequisite for the establishment of regional peace.

Later on, the peaceful resolution of disputed territories could be helpful for the development of pleasant Indo-Pak bilateral relationship. In short, the writer tries to foresee the future of South Asia by providing sufficient options to overcome the present crisis.

The academic and journalistic attributes of Lieven represents more than two decades of analysis based on extensive travel in order to access empirical knowledge.

Therefore, balancing and convincing arguments evaluated the role of centrifugal and centripetal forces in Pakistan. It is hard to say the book introduces several new ideas while eliminating the existing prejudices regarding Pakistan's values. Moreover, the book is a complete account of politics, history, sociology and anthropology, because it has diversity in its theme.☐

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SHOOTING FOR A CENTURY

Author: Stephen P. Cohen

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Shooting for a Century is a comprehensive account on the historical, cultural, and strategic relationships between the two irresistible rivals of South Asian region; India and Pakistan. Within the mist to 35 years this rivalry will be crossing a century and the situation is still to be understood and resolved. This book is written by a renowned author on South Asian studies; Stephen P. Cohen. He is a senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution. He is considered as an expert on South Asian studies. He is the author of numerous books including *India: Emerging Power* and *The Idea of Pakistan*. He co-authored a book; *Arming without Aiming: India's military Modernization* with Sunil Dasgupta and he was also the lead author of *The Future of Pakistan*.

This book is written in very effective way. It has defined the relationship between the two countries as one of the most talked and discussed issue of all the times. The author has tracked the history and has mentioned several factors about how and why the conflict between the two is inevitable. The issues regarding Pakistan and India are the reason that the region of South Asia is always under a spot light by international community and especially media. This scenario will be completing its century in after almost thirty-five years and still the situation is not, what we can say 'stable'.

Both the countries have historical, cultural and strategic differences which make this region always in state of activity either armed conflicts or sort of cold war. The author has tried to describe the nature of rivalries and conflicts since the birth of both the states in a very critical way. The independence of both the countries might have satisfied the locals of both the states but independence of each other was way too hard to accept. After independence issues and crises are also being discussed comprehensively and has been enlightened in terms of the major causes of the rivalry between the two countries. The book is unique and good in the sense that it has provided a reader a story of both the sides/countries/people in the form of polls, opinions, diary pages speeches etc.

In chapter two; the conflicts are described including that of trade, water, Kashmir, Siachen, etc. The issues are discussed in a way that they are providing a prediction of resolution of the mentioned conflicts. Due to the social and cultural differences and also historical issues the two countries might not want to resolve it sometimes, but the solution are

there, and the issues can be resolved. Quiet and optimistic approach is being put forward. Including the smaller issues, both share some of the minor ones as well. So both the countries are rich in disputes but they hardly find any solution to those.

In chapter three; the author have talked about resolving the issue, but he also made this argument that even if the problems are solved between the two the differences might remain for much longer than expected. The religion based issues might be the root cause of that. Author has discussed about several film stars who are Muslims, and also some who have worked there and were Pakistani nationals. The hatred among people is also one of the causes that the solutions could not be made possible till now. But India, as she claims that present is not the future, so she gives little hints that in future, might be there is a process of normalization between the two countries. However, the role of certain extremist groups and individuals cannot be underestimated in this process.

Chapter four enlist the reasons Pakistan has for the long lasting conflicts with India. Ideology is the main pillar, on which Pakistan was created so there is no doubt that any sudden act that will try to diminish the essence of ideology of Pakistan will be responded back with a hard hand. The extremist groups on this side, has always been influencing and triggering the conflicts between the two. Also on this side, army has always being influential and always had its role in the decision making, be it on front or at back end. Lack of political tenure, has led Pakistan to face problems and this has also effected the normalization processes with its neighbor. However, in this book Zardari government is being praised as it completed its tenure, though faced many problems but is successful than others.

After discussing the major ideological and historical details, author has moved towards the other prominent explanations in the next (fifth) chapter. It includes the culture, state identity, minorities, strategies, and also nuclear assets that both countries possessed. After both the countries turned nuclear, they had not faced any direct war due to the balance strategically. And war does not seem to be the solution but an instigator to go wilder and more destructive.

In chapter six; it is described that not only direct conflicts but also both the countries have been engaged in indirect attacks both in terms of strategy and also through other non-conventional ways, media and propaganda more specifically. At the other hand, there are people who want to have peace and normalization between the both countries. The external, other international actors have been involved in resolving the situations between two for quiet long, but it is also said that it is just an apparent thing which in reality does not exist. And instead of normalizing the relationships, it is making all worse.

In the last chapter (seventh) of the book the author has tried to

describe the American interests and policies. Author has highlighted the support and policies of America towards both the countries. He has also described the issues like Kashmir, cooperation with Afghanistan and also the most important thing, the expected nuclear crises or risks, because in case of Pakistan and India there is almost nothing certain.

The author has described 'way forward' to address the issue of Pakistan and India. The international community especially America would do major role in normalization process between the two countries. Both the countries can cooperate under the shadow of America surrounding the case of Afghanistan in general. The book is a good read comprehensive account on the issues and conflicts of both the countries. It is also very important to keep in one's library.☐

Ms. Zoha Khalid
Research Internee
Islamabad Policy Research Institute

DOCUMENTS

DOCUMENTS

JOINT STATEMENT FOLLOWING THE VISIT TO PAKISTAN OF PRIME MINISTER OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY, H.E RECEP TAYYIP ERDOGAN

His Excellency Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey paid an official visit to Pakistan from 23-24 December, 2013, at the invitation of Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif. He was accompanied by a high level delegation including Minister of Economy and the Minister of Transport, Maritime Affairs and Communication. A large number of prominent entrepreneurs and industrialists from leading Turkish companies in the sectors of energy, construction, urban development and municipal services, public transport etc. accompanied Prime Minister Erdogan for participation in the Business Forum.

On the first leg of his tour, Prime Minister Erdogan visited Lahore where he addressed a well-attended Business Forum. Leading business community from Turkey and all across Pakistan participated in the Forum. The same evening, Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif hosted a reception for the visiting Prime Minister and his delegation.

In Islamabad, Prime Minister Erdogan called on President Mamnoon Hussain. Prime Minister Erdogan held tete-a-tete with Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif. The exclusive talks were followed by in-depth delegation level talks. Pakistan and Turkey enjoy unique relations which are unparalleled in the world. Our bilateral ties are characterized by time-tested bonds of affinity, mutual respect and solidarity and draw their strength from shared love of our two peoples. The two Prime Ministers exchanged views across the whole gamut of bilateral, regional and international issues in a warm and friendly manner. During talks, both the Prime Ministers;

- Expressed their satisfaction at the progress in our strategic partnership; Reiterated their resolve to comprehensively upgrade bilateral relations across all areas of mutual interest, especially economic and commercial;
- Emphasized their firm belief in the strength of democracy and expressed determination to cooperate to achieve democratic ideals to the benefit of the brotherly people of the two countries;
- Reaffirmed their abiding commitment for the socio-economic development of the people and to follow policies that bring qualitative improvement in the quality of life of people and prosperity to their respective countries;
- Condemned terrorism and renewed their resolve to increase bilateral cooperation against terrorism and organized crime; and Expressed their desire to enhance cooperation in social sectors especially culture, education and tourism. Improved cooperation in social sector

fields will also serve as a vehicle for greater people to people relations between the two countries.

During the visit, three MoUs and one Cooperation Protocol were signed between Pakistan and Turkey. During the visit, it was also agreed to;

- Maintain active political consultative process as well as regular exchange of high level visits alongside visits of parliamentarians, businessmen, civil society and media representatives;
- Follow up implementation of decisions taken at the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council Forum;
- Conclude Pakistan-Turkey Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) by the first half of 2014;
- Facilitate investments by the private sector in both countries. Pakistan would especially encourage Turkish private sector for investments in the key sectors of energy, especially coal, hydroelectric and wind, infrastructure including motorways, roads and airports, low-cost housing and urban development & municipal services like public transport and solid waste management;
- Encourage their respective state and private banks to open branches in Pakistan and Turkey;
- Ensure regular operations of Istanbul-Islamabad Container train for enhanced on-land connectivity between Pakistan and Turkey;
- Further strengthen our existing cooperation and partnership in security and counter-terrorism related issues;
- Further deepen our defence cooperation through exploring the possibility of joint defence production and allied Research and Development;
- Learn from each other's best practices in skill development and vocational training programs;
- Enhance cooperation between educational institutions of the two countries. The two countries agreed to increase the number of scholarships to students to pursue undergraduate, graduate and post graduate level studies in both countries in the fields of engineering, technology, medicine and management sciences;
- Promote cooperation in the field of tourism and preservation and restoration of historical and archaeological sites;
- Closely coordinate and consult each other bilaterally as well as multilaterally to promote regional peace and security.

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan invited Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif to visit Turkey which the latter graciously accepted.⁸

<http://mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?prID=1627>
December 24, 2013
Islamabad

Documents

INTERNATIONAL DAY OF PEACE STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE 68TH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT THE PEACE BELL CEREMONY IN NEW YORK 18 September 2013

Excellencies,
Secretary General,
Distinguished Guests,

Ladies and Gentlemen:

We begin this year's General Assembly- our 68th session- as we have every year since 1981, with a tribute to peace which happens to be the very foundation upon which this organization representing our family of nations is built. The annual Peace Bell Ceremony is a poignant reminder of the overarching purpose of our work to ensure a more peaceful world. The ringing of the peace bell is also an evocative statement of purpose guiding our collaborative efforts towards meeting the agenda of the 68th session of the General Assembly.

This bell rings for peace at a time when so many across the globe are struggling to eke out a living, and begin their day in the dark and end their day in dark, hungry and terrified to face the horror of another tomorrow. This bell rings for peace at time when there is still conflict and bloodshed in many parts of the world., where there are tensions and violence born of traditional and long held divisions, or stemming from ethnic and/or religious differences.

As we hear this bell ring, let us remember that it was the United Nations General Assembly that established this International Day of Peace in an effort that all member states will recognize and reflect upon the value of peace in world filled with everyday examples of bloodshed, violence and war. It is a day where any countries involved in conflict will have a day of ceasefire; where we will have a minute of silence in which we recognize and honour the victims of war and conflict wherever they are, and where we dedicate ourselves to work together to promote peace.

What makes this 2013 International Day of Peace unique is that for the first time, the Day has been dedicated by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to peace education. Let us remember that education is a path to growth and development for citizens and societies, and that education that teaches the value of peace is a key preventive means of reducing war and conflict.

One of the world's great leaders, Nelson Mandela once said, "Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world." It is therefore fitting that today we reflect on the role of education as one of the important building blocks upon which peace can be built.

Education provides an opportunity to raise the veil of ignorance that blinds us to the path of decency, respect, tolerance and the interdependence of the human family, irrespective of country of origin, religion or ethnicity. No serious business leader would fail to optimize all the resources available to them. Yet, we do exactly that when we fail to give girls and women equal access to education, healthcare and opportunity. Let us remember that when we educate our girl children, and when we empower women and young people we create a more sustainable future - one which holds the real promise of reducing poverty and ill-health and of eliminating the scourge of gender violence.

The ringing of this peace bell today summons us all to work for the broader cause of human development to which people everywhere are entitled, and to build the peace in which all people and societies can prosper. Let us not forget that peace does not occur by happenstance, it is the product of the conscious and consistent effort of people of good will acting together for the common good. And let us remember that peace that is secured by hard work, dedication and commitment is a peace that is lasting and sustainable and very much needed in this world of ours.

Thank you
H.E. Mr. John W. Ashe

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