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
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Editorial Note

The *Journal of Contemporary Studies* is flagship publication of Faculty of Contemporary Studies (FCS), National Defence University (NDU), Islamabad, and started with the unequivocal objective of advancing critically oriented academic and intellectual environment. It is a biannual peer-reviewed journal that covers contemporary debates on national security and the wider field of global politics.

This is fifth issue of the journal which contains five research articles, two book reviews and some primary documents having valuable information and analysis for academic and strategic community. The articles in the summer issue deal with variety of subjects that are of immense academic or policy concern. These range from theory of political science to stress management in students. We have also published a policy analysis of the inclusion of Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan into mainstream politics. With this broader scope of interest we hope that the *Journal Contemporary Studies* is serving purpose to enhance the development of theory, research, and practices to support scholarly debates, intellectual discourse and interest of young scholars in the field. We sincerely hope that each of these articles would provide some significant motivation to varied segments of our community of readers.

I thank all contributors, including those whose articles are being published in this issue, those whose articles are held for our next publication, and above all, the ones whose articles are returned for any reason, as per our policy. Our task was duly supported by anonymous peer-reviewers whose valuable comments helped authors to improve their contribution.

We hope that reading of the journal will invoke readers' curiosity and we will receive more contributions. Contributions are welcome from all fields which are inclusive of broad spectrum of related fields like political science, theory and security, political economy, terrorism, politics and religion, politics of energy, feminism, media and politics, management sciences, leadership psychology, military strategy, modern

history, international law, sociology, education, conflict management and resolution, urban studies, demography, social anthropology, developmental studies, foreign policy etc.

We are accepting articles for upcoming issue of *Journal of Contemporary Studies* based on original qualitative or quantitative research, an innovative conceptual framework, or a substantial literature review that opens new areas of inquiry and investigation. Case studies and works of literary analysis are also welcome. The editorial team at the journal promotes submissions from a wide range of countries. The journal seeks to promote a scholarly understanding of contemporary developments and changes related to aforementioned disciplines/fields of human sciences. The journal intends to promote interdisciplinary research and writing.

Editor
Dr. Shaheen Akhtar

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DEFENDING CAPITALISM AGAINST RENTIERS

Dr. Hartmut Elsenhans*

Abstract

Globalization creates fractures but the alternative of rejecting market regulations does not command large majorities, especially amongst the poor. Embedding capitalism is required. Capitalist profit depends on investment spending at the macroeconomic level and not primarily on productivity increases. Rising mass incomes had been a condition for capitalist growth. Capitalist expansion does not transfer its social structure to countries; it opens up through trade and investment on the basis of those economies' comparative advantage. Even today's manufactured exports of the South rarely create labour markets, which the poor are empowered on, due to their scarcity. The tendencies are rather for disempowering labour in the South and in the North. Both sides have the options of maintaining the conditions for increasing mass demand and stabilizing profit or for relying on rents. Political appropriation and limited mass demand will weaken profit and strengthen hierarchical power structures. It is, therefore, worthwhile to enquire whether at the global level forces with very different worldviews can come together on pragmatic cooperation for embedding capitalism. Such cooperation would benefit from a universal acceptance of states to follow their enlightened interests instead of having to be transformed by constructivist idealism.

Key Words: *globalization, capitalism, constructivist idealism, macroeconomic level, market regulations.*

Introduction

Probably the greatest achievement of the actual supporters of a basically power-driven model of globalization consists in gaining acceptance of its capitalist character by those who suffer from it. Capitalists claim that the actual form of globalization reflects the textbook qualities of capitalism, the discipline and controls imposed on entrepreneurs of the real economy by perfect or nearly perfect markets. The anger against actual globalization appears as lacking any practical dimension. It remains moral and is failing

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because it cannot mobilize large majorities. No large support is to be expected for those who reject in principle markets and private property.

The critiques of globalization insist on serious and really existing problems: concentration of property rights, power on markets which destroy competition, politically defined power of those in control of the means of production. The issue is, however, whether these deviations from textbook capitalism are necessary for maintaining capitalism or not. If not, they can be corrected or even have to be corrected by whatever means.

There are two positions: capitalism has to be destroyed because it cannot be corrected, and, alternatively, capitalism has to be embedded, because the separation of political power and economic property rights, including the private disposition over major parts of the economic surplus of the society, are achievements to be maintained. This implies preserving capitalism, especially with its efficiency creating mechanisms which also contribute to disempowering the haughty.

This recalls the old controversy between liberals and socialists. Liberals believed that the system would maintain itself if largely left free from state intervention. Socialists believed that state intervention basically leads to failure because economic power will carry the day against the democratic power of political majorities as long as these political majorities would not remove property rights from private hands.

This controversy has ultimately blocked any understanding of the political and social implications of the Keynesian critique on the self-maintaining role of decentralized market systems. In taking account of both critiques, liberals and socialists, the following contribution focuses, in extending Keynes, on the basic conditions of maintaining capitalism: embeddedness into socio-economic structures with empowerment of labour.

The privileged are rarely committed to empowering labour. The real conditions of capitalist growth appear to the mainstream as completely erroneous: namely, capitalism requires a limitation of surplus appropriation, in order to allow aggregate profits to grow. These conditions were realized because the powerful could not keep the underprivileged from behaving in an unruly and often seditious manner. I will select three arguments to demonstrate this theory:

1. Capitalist profit depends on rising mass incomes
2. The mere introduction of market relations will not lead to self-sustained capitalist growth, and
3. The actual globalisation can lead to the generalization of rent, but also to a world economy "safe for capitalism".

The contribution will not deal with other major challenges, especially the environmental challenges, which are difficult to manage in a market economy. The paper concentrates on its analysis of how capitalism works under perfect competition. It does not consider deviations from keeping capitalism going as ineluctable developments, as the theory of state monopolist

capitalism does.¹ According to the model, such tendencies are the expression of a weakness of labour which is unable to reduce available or potential surplus to the level of investment spending required to expand demand. The weakness of labour allows surplus which neither labour nor capital — in the form of profit — can appropriate. As capital is interested in surplus, whatever its form, it will develop non-market mechanisms, among other limits to market access, in order to appropriate surplus as rent. Therefore, the precondition for assessing capitalist structures with less perfect markets should be based on the analysis of how capitalism with perfect markets can work. This reflects the decision to keep market regulations as an achievement in the struggle against privilege and unaccountable power wherever markets operate.

1. Capitalist Profit Depends on Rising Mass Incomes

Capitalist profit is one form of economic surplus. Long before capitalism emerged, there was surplus appropriation. The glorious civilizations of Asia are examples of surplus transformed into beauty. Surplus is appropriated here openly by political means, taxes, in order to present symbols for the unity of exploiters and exploited ones. Where there is no state representing this superior unity, and the exploiting class appears as private, we speak of rent. Rent is surplus appropriated by nonmarket mechanisms, market failure, like differential rents (for example, differences in the productivity of oil wells), or open political power like land rent (and tax) which the monopolistic owner of land can extract from his tenants.

Profit is appropriated on competitive markets without political means or coercion. Profit accrues to enterprises on the basis of prices for products on perfect markets. If the owner of the factory would be expropriated, capitalist profit would still be appropriated as long as the economy is managed by markets where private enterprises compete.

Let us suppose an economy composed of a department for the production of consumption goods and their inputs and owned by entrepreneurs. All households buy consumption goods. The entrepreneurs also buy consumption goods. There is no incentive to enlarge the production and hence nobody buys additional machinery (no net investment). Total demand for consumption goods corresponds to total wages handed out to the workers (including management compensation for the owners of the enterprises). There may be conflict on distribution of how much the manager-owner should get in relation to different workers according to their skills or the work effort but there is no profit appropriated on an anonymous market.

Now let us suppose that some people innovate. They want to escape tedious work or increase their production. They order investment goods in

¹ Horst Hemberger, Lutz Maier, Heinz Petrak, *Imperialismus heute. Der staatsmonopolistische Kapitalismus in Westdeutschland* (Berlin: Dietz, 1965); 823 S.

order to realize the innovation. As long as the investment goods have not gone on-stream, their production creates employment for workers, who buy consumption goods in order to survive with their families, but during this time do not contribute to the availability of consumption goods. The consumption goods available will be sold to more workers who together have more money for buying the same amount of consumption goods as before. The total sale proceeds of the producers of consumption goods increase by the amount of income households earn through investment goods production (including their inputs).

If there is a constant flow of innovation, which leads to investment goods production, investment goods producers also have to earn a surplus above their costs of wages. As they are familiar with the technologies applied in consumption goods production, they would produce consumption goods, if market prices do not allow such a surplus. As profit in consumption goods production equals the wages paid in investment goods production, total profit in the two departments corresponds to the value added consumption goods production and investment goods production.

We have left out possible contributions of government and the rest of the world. But the rest of the world cannot buy more than it sells, as indebtedness has to be avoided. Additionally, the government can increase demand only for some time by accepting high indebtedness.

Where can the additional demand come from which induces entrepreneurs to buy additional machinery in order to produce more or to produce with lower costs? We have already excluded government and foreign trade as long-term solutions to this problem. Lenin² like bankers argue that the capitalist process of growth creates its own demand, as entrepreneurs invest the money they earn, not having other possibilities of using their money. Already in 1907, Bortkiewicz³ showed that under conditions of capitalist regulation a new technology can be introduced only if it reduces unit costs. Costs are the incomes of the workers at all levels of production, so that the reduction of unit costs means that the quantity produced increases in relation to the incomes. Hence there will be overproduction if no income category increases in real terms.

If the innovation serves the introduction of totally new products, which do not substitute other products, then this new product can be sold only if wages or profits increase.

Innovations are dependent on increasing demand. As entrepreneurs are under competition and kept from luxury consumption with the threat of losing their competitiveness and going bankrupt, increases in demand on the basis of entrepreneurs' incomes increases are possible only if the entrepreneurs can use additional incomes for investment goods which allow

² Wladimir Iljitsch Lenin, *Die Entwicklung des Kapitalismus in Rußland* [1899]. Lenin Werke 3 (Berlin: Dietz, 1972).

³ Ladislaus von Bortkiewicz, "Wertrechnung und Preisrechnung im Marxschen System (3)," *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, 25, 2 (1907): 445-489, esp. 456.

productivity or production increases in relation to demand on their markets. If all increases go to entrepreneurs who invest them totally, the capacity of production grows with exponentially growing rates of growth of these capacities (accelerating from period of reporting to the next period) implying rates of growth far beyond the possibilities of the real economy.⁴

The contemporary supporters of financialization of capitalism have argued that the increase in wealth of the wealthy would lead to increases in their consumption. Rosa Luxemburg,⁵ not a very staunch supporter of capitalism, earlier insisted on the progressive character of capitalist competition which threatened capitalists with bankruptcy if they indulged in wasteful luxury consumption. An increase of demand through increases in the consumption of the rich implies a decline of competition (barriers in the education system, relations as a condition for access to some careers), as otherwise higher incomes attract other people who develop the necessary skills for acceding to the respective jobs. The massive rise of people from relatively poor origins to middle class positions in Western capitalist countries during the 20th century and the decline of income advances of middle classes in relation to average incomes show that Luxemburg was right, as do the new tendencies to inequality based on relations.

The only solution for increasing demand in line with productivity lies in increasing mass incomes. Capitalism requires for its growth rising mass incomes. Mass incomes are earned on the basis of employment. In the transition to capitalism people accept to give up pre-capitalist bonds, like the protection by a landlord, if they are reasonably sure that they will survive on the basis of their work time. The expulsion of the rural folks through enclosure did not occur in the heartland of the industrial revolution.⁶ Many societies where wage labour existed demonstrate that poor people prefer to return to relations of legal dependency from lords if there are no reasonable employment perspectives. The doubly free proletariat of Marx becomes possible when employment expectations are relatively good.

The mechanism of capitalist growth can hence be characterized as

⁴ Indeed, such processes become unstable, if the relation between the value of capital invested and production does not decrease, because in that case explosive growth has to occur until the share of consumption in total income tends to zero. If a decline in the efficiency of capital (relation between stock of capital and production) is admitted, the consequence is a slowly decreasing relation between value of capital and profit which leads to the famous tendential fall of the rate of profit of Marx. See more detailed presentation of the argument in Hartmut Elsenhans, "Rent, State and the Market: The Political Economy of the Transition to Self-sustained Capitalism," *Pakistan Development Review*, 33, 4 (December 1994): 393-428, esp. 401-405.

⁵ Rosa Luxemburg, *Die Akkumulation des Kapitals [1912]* (Berlin: Vereinigung internationaler Verlagsanstalten, 1923), chap. 6.

⁶ Only some authors: Mark Overton, *Agricultural Revolution in England: The Transformation of the Agrarian Economy, 1500-1850* (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 204; James D. Chambers, "Enclosures and Labour Supply in the Industrial Revolution," *Economic History Review*, 27, 3 (1953): 319-343, esp. 328; Arthur Redford, *Labour Migration in England 1800-1850* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1964), 189.

follows: rising mass incomes trigger off investment. Incremental technical learning brings initially only imagined products in the range of realization (sewing machine, plus bicycle, plus motor = car). High demand leads to high employment, so that innovative enterprises can hire workers for new productions only by offering higher wages which they are able to pay because the newness of their products allows them to charge high prices. Old branches have to reduce production and shed labour, but some of the older branches can retain workers because at lower levels of production they can charge higher prices. Without any productivity increases, incomes of these workers increases (e.g. income increases over the past centuries in the last 500 years for hair cutters). This leads to relatively homogeneous situations of the mass of the population. It is the basis for the emergence of a working class and its social and political organizations.

The rise in mass incomes in both innovative and non-innovative branches reduces the potentially available surplus, so that among the many innovations only those promising high rates of return are realized. In a tit-for-tat process, which the critiques of capitalism call its 'crises,' accumulation and consumption increases are kept in balance. Neoclassical economists call this the golden rule of growth, where the capital stock and real wages grow in line with each other.⁷

Rising mass incomes are, therefore, not a concession of the powerful to the poor, as they may have been in pre-capitalist or bureaucratically managed economies, but they are a necessary condition for capitalist growth.⁸ It is realized by the selfish behaviour of the two main social classes, capital and labour, however not without temporary imbalances which may topple into a major crisis if not properly addressed.

This fragile arrangement is the result of "accidental" power relations and not of a politically arrived at master plan. When power relations change, it is threatened. The entry of new societies into the international division of labour may change the power relations if this entry is not accompanied by the transformation of the new participants into equally capitalist ones.

2. Capitalism is Expansive, but not Contagious

If market relations were sufficient to characterise capitalism, then capitalism had to exist since millennia. There were exchange, money, internal and foreign trade, all without capitalism. After monopolistic long-distance trade in rare products, trade followed the rule of comparative advantage. The exporting country specialized on those products where its expense on scarce

⁷ J. von Neumann, "A Model of General Economic Equilibrium," *Review of Economic Studies*, 13, 34 (1945): 1-9, esp. 8.

⁸ Hartmut Elsenhans, "Rising Mass Incomes as a Condition of Capitalist Growth: Implications for the World Economy," *International Organization*, 37, 1 (1983): 1-38.

labour is lowest in relation to the price it can fetch abroad. Ricardo's⁹ innovation consists in showing that such specialization is also in the interest of a leading country. Assume that Germany can buy 100 computers from East Asia for one Mercedes car costing 4,000 hours of work or the equivalent of the German labour input for 80 computers. Germany will specialize on Mercedes cars, even if East Asia is less productive in computers and in cars. It is sufficient that the degree of lesser efficiency is different: East Asia uses 100 hours of work per computer and 10,000 hours for the 100 computers, but 12,000 hours for the home production of the equivalent of a Mercedes car. Already small groups like hunters will specialize according to what advantages different members relatively, even if not better than other members of the group who may be totally occupied in activities where their superiority is even greater.

Historically, the rich civilizations of the South got specialized initially on their highly refined artisanal products, like cottons or china. Europe copied these products and introduced massive protectionism. The process of industrial growth in the West led to the cumulative discovery of innovations with totally new products like the railway, the car, the aeroplane, consumer durables for the household etc. These were initially luxuries which partially replaced the sophisticated luxuries of Asia, not only on the world market but also in Asia.

Asia was reduced to the same pattern of specialization as the technically much less developed societies of sub-Saharan Africa, South America and Oceania. They acquired comparative advantage only in natural products i.e. raw materials.

Europe and North America were well-endowed with mineral raw materials. Inevitably, European industrialists exploited first the rich deposits near their industrial centres, so that the rich deposits were gradually depleted. Facing the alternative of exploiting mineral deposits such as ores with lower mineral content or coal in greater depth on the one side, or searching for still rich deposits abroad, the cheaper solution was often not exploitation abroad, and it was on this basis that technology developed in the struggle against the deteriorating qualities of the deposits at home. The South got comparative advantage in minerals, but not in the related technologies. Its minerals were exploited with imported technology. Jobs were created only for a relatively small number of often relatively privileged workers.

The number of jobs was higher in agricultural raw materials which European industry (cotton, fats), or increasingly better-off customers in the West (coffee, tea, cocoa), demanded in increasing quantities.

The rise in raw material demand, however, is always lower than the increase in total income because consumption becomes more sophisticated requiring more labour and competition forces capitalists to save on raw materials. This leads to pressures for lower prices of raw materials. The

⁹ David Ricardo, *On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation [1817]* (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 1951), 135 ff.

complaint of the South about its deteriorating terms of trade as the basic cause of its underdevelopment remains one of the most controversial issues in the West-South debates. It was on this basis attempts were made to unite the South after political decolonisation in an alliance of “the wretched of the Earth.”¹⁰ It was the core argument in the attempts to introduce a “New World Economic Order.” At least in the case of oil, 1960-founded OPEC was able to reverse the deterioration of the terms of trade decisively, providing enormous financial resources. The subsequent failure to achieve self-sustained industrial growth in the oil countries once more demonstrated development did not depend on the availability of financial resources, as assumed when capital accumulation was identified as the cause of development. Nevertheless, the debate revealed rents were available in the form of factor incomes in the export branches as factor incomes were much higher here than in the rest of the economy, so that any shift from export dependent to internal market-oriented development implied the possibility of diminishing financial resources.

Continued underdevelopment in most countries of the South can be explained by the dependence of profit on mass incomes, and ultimately, the empowerment of labour. Neither specialization on capital-intensively produced mineral raw materials nor the increasing export of labour-intensively produced agricultural raw material led to levels of employment where labour became empowered. Where social structures limited the supply of labour, smaller segments of the mass of the population were achieving relatively high incomes without constituting a large internal market. Where labour scarcity became a real obstacle, the West did not hesitate to employ violence: the Atlantic slave trade and slave labour in the Americas, forced labour, and arbitrary taxing in the second wave of European colonialism especially in sub-Saharan Africa, show that those in power in Europe had no interest in transferring capitalist forms of regulation of labour when they wanted to increase exploitation. In some places they could dispense with violence, as the local societies offered surplus labour.

In pre-capitalist societies with limited technical development, agriculture dominates as poor people’s consumption is more than 50 per cent spent on food. The large majority of the populations of the South had lived until colonialism in highly hierarchical political systems which some call ‘tributary modes of production,’ others the ‘old agrarian empires.’ Whenever population increases, the emergence of such empires is nearly inevitable. People have a larger number of children than required for simple reproduction of the community, certainly for many reasons, but one overriding motive: parents cannot know how many children will survive, and need their children to look after them in old age. When population increases, the complementary resource of agriculture becomes scarce. Groups fight for increasing their shares. Regardless the mechanisms to maintain equality, land distribution tends to

¹⁰ Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 1965).

become unequal as some families acquire special reputation and special functions, such as judges who distribute scarce resources (the lords of the land, the lords of the water).

Groups with lower shares have more limited land and fall earlier into the trap of diminishing returns: if they increase the input of labour time into their land, production increases but at increasingly lower rates. The total amount of production per head decreases. Additional production per additional worker decreases and may become lower than the needs of subsistence per person. Some households have no other choice than offering their services to the better off. As they don't have material resources they can offer only political support (including muscle power).

The process of rising inequality may imply many supplementary processes like conquest of resident populations by invaders, the submission of arriving migrant populations to previous incumbents who claim that the land had been given to them by God or their ancestors, and many more. With the onset of such inequality, the deepening of inequality is inevitable. Those who have resources will use them in order to increase their dependents by conquest, by persuasion, and also by imposing their ritual power.

The surfacing of tributary modes of production is inevitable. Their basic characteristics are a surplus of resources and dense population, which tends to grow, so that the marginal product becomes lower than the cost of an additional worker. There is a surplus of resources (for luxury and public works) but also a surplus of labour which becomes visible when those in command of land try to maximize surplus. In the anti-colonialist literature, this is described as the destruction of the ancient social networks of solidarity by the invading capitalist patterns of behaviour, especially capitalist surplus maximization.

Development economics, which emerged in the 1950s, can be described as the discipline which deals with the mobilization of a surplus of resources, appropriated by political means, taxes or rent collecting, and the use of these resources for investment which is intended to increase employment and subsequently improve the economic situation of the mass of the population.¹¹

Today's situation has been created by the failure of the secular elites. They had led the anti-colonialist liberation movements, won independence, and developed a model of economic and social restructuring where the newly erected states played a central role. They had been able to take power, because the withdrawing colonial powers preferred secular nationalists with ties, even when indulging in a Marxist discourse, to the cultural nationalists who were already present and whose heritage is claimed today by the new cultural-

¹¹ P.N. Rosenstein-Rodan, "Problems of Industrialization of Eastern and South Eastern Europe," *Economic Journal*, 53, 210/2011 (1943): 202-211; William Arthur Lewis, "Economic Development with Unlimited Supply of Labour," *Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies*, 22, 4 (May 1954): 139-191.

identitarian movements (the Islamists, the Hindu nationalists, etc.¹²).

The secular nationalists took hold of the state and became state classes, based on the appropriation of surplus by means of the centralized state.¹³ Their development project failed basically because of their inefficiency as state classes with increasingly wasteful behaviour (including corruption). In this development model, high international prices for one's own labour were the result of the goal of having an exchange rate as favourable as possible in order to buy abroad a maximum of technology. The richer the economy, it allowed more technology and more sophisticated technology to be imported. The basic mechanism of development, namely the learning of how to produce technology for initially relatively simple and standardized products by using growing markets and increasingly the cost savings from large-scale production (economies of scale), was neglected.

Even if there was a discourse which stressed the necessity of improving the lot of the poor, the decreasing availability of resources because of privileges for the state classes and inefficiency of the newly built industries, ultimately led to impoverishment of the majority and limited mass markets. The capitalist mechanism of growth could not be transferred. Talk that capitalism existed because there was undeniably exploitation demonstrates the ideological resistance against understanding how capitalism works where it succeeded.

The pre-Keynesian theory of capitalism, whether liberal or Marxist, was proven wrong: resources and accumulation of resources mattered less than social organisation, ultimately egalitarian distribution of chances and opportunities. The theory of imperialist exploitation did not explain the persistence of underdevelopment and became an excuse for those among the local "elites" who indulged in exploitation whether by inefficiency or simply by greed.

The capitalist West could deal rather easily with two important consequences of this configuration: firstly, the state classes showed success in some areas to increase the rents they could take from raw material exports, the brightest example being OPEC; secondly, the West also had no problem to absorb the loss of its credits to the state classes which had been handed out lavishly in a period where even the capitalist West expected success of rent-financed industrialization in the South. The debts were ultimately paid by the Western taxpayers.¹⁴

The South becomes a problem for the West, however, when by changes in its development strategy, the South becomes economically efficient and

¹² Hartmut Elsenhans, Rachid Ouaisa, Sebastian Schwecke, Mary Ann Tetreault, *The Transformation of Politised Religion: Zealots Turned into Leaders* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2014).

¹³ Hartmut Elsenhans, *State, Class and Development* (New Delhi: Radiant, 1996).

¹⁴ Hartmut Elsenhans, "Les contribuables ont payé, les banques sont sauvées et le tiers monde s'engouffre dans la dette. Comment on gère une crise en gestation," Pierangelo Catalano, Abdelkader Sid Ahmed (eds.), *La dette contre le développement* (Paris: Published, 2003), 323-343.

competitive on the world market without becoming capitalist via empowerment of its own labour.

3. Globalization Threatens Capitalism in the Centre and in the Periphery

The roaming around of large financial masses has nothing to do with capitalism, but as will be shown, is just one manifestation of the weakening of capitalism. These financial masses result from reactions to the core process of globalization: a new competitiveness of production sites in the South which leads to inappropriate adjustment strategies in the West and in the South.

Dealing with the challenges of globalization has to start with the issue of the causes of the new competitiveness of production sites in the South: there is a new pattern of comparative cost advantages and a new capacity to transform comparative cost advantages into competitiveness.¹⁵

Even if capitalism starts only in a small area of the world, productivity increases are higher in some branches than in others. Comparative advantage changes in relation to any region, even areas where no technical progress has taken place at all. Changing comparative advantage does not need productivity increases in the areas which become newly competitive.

The new pattern of comparative advantage of the South is probably less due to improvements in skills and infrastructure. There have certainly been improvements due to education and training, particularly some investments in import substituting industrialization. Such improvements occurred, however, in many places where we did not observe a new competitiveness. All successful export-oriented industrialization occurred in countries which did not dispose of rent earned from rich raw material exports. Deteriorating terms-of-trade for raw materials removed a major obstacle to comparative advantage in manufactured exports, and the West was quite successful in reducing raw material rents of the South outside of world oil.

Transforming comparative advantage into cost competitiveness requires adjusting the prices of one's own factors of production, i.e. lowering the international price of the relevant factors of production, especially labour. Low international labour costs are not necessarily the result of low real wages. The poor of the world are not in China, South Korea, Taiwan, or Vietnam, but concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa, as well as in South Asia. Low international labour costs are the result of the capacity to devalue, and in the case of the successful exporters of manufactures, to devalue below purchasing power parity (recently with special reference to Pakistan.¹⁶)

Devaluing the currency below purchasing parity and increasing employment in export-oriented manufacturing because of cost

¹⁵ Hartmut Elsenhans, "Macroeconomics in Globalization: Productivity, Wages, Profits, and Exchange Rates in an Era of Globalization," *Brazilian Journal of Political Economy*, 22, 85 (January-March 2002): 53-78.

¹⁶ Meekal Ahmed, "An Export-led Growth Strategy," *Criterion Quarterly*, 5, 4 (2010): 97-106.

competitiveness, implies that there is an increase in the number of salaried workers in the export industry, income which can be used for buying wage goods for these workers from abroad. Devaluation below purchasing parity means that the international purchasing power of incomes is lower than their purchasing power in their home market. The demand in real terms of these additional incomes on the local market is higher than the additional supply in goods received from the world market. In the 1990s, a Chinese household could buy four times as much in a Chinese supermarket than in a Canadian supermarket after conversion of its income into Canadian dollars (not considering non-tradables like housing).¹⁷

The basket of goods the workers in an export branch can buy locally, in relation to what can be imported for them, has to be produced by somebody inside the economy. The composition of household demand of the lower income groups indicates the supply requirements: 50 per cent of the income is spent on food, and until a doubling of these incomes the additional income is also used at 50 per cent for food. The rest goes in an equal share to textiles, furniture, simple household equipment, different items of local origin, and the last 10 per cent to relatively high technology products. But also here the local share can be high, as most of these consumer durables (refrigerator, TV set, bicycle and probably motorcycle, cell phone) are produced in most of these countries. Their local production ultimately depends on the surplus local agriculture can generate and the capacity of the local small-scale and often informal sector to transform food into labour power which initially produces basic industrial products for mass consumption. The condition for devaluation and subsequent export-oriented manufacturing is the same as the condition for self-centred, so-called 'alternative development'.

Self-centred development required costly planning because of the social (not technical or managerial) inefficiency of the managing personnel. Devaluing the currency in order to grow through export demand works as if the country had accepted low export prices (exploitation) in exchange for a (imported) mechanism of regulation which renders better results than its own middle classes. This holds as long as these middle classes are bureaucratic and cannot be forced to accept the constraints and disciplines which perfect markets would impose on them.

There are two constraints on devaluation: the availability of an agricultural surplus and the availability of a labour surplus.

The agricultural surplus is a result of the Green Revolution. With the exception of the two city states (Hong Kong and Singapore), no country is among the successful exporters of manufactures where the Green Revolution did not succeed (sub-Saharan Africa). Nobody will turn back to the low yields of Asian agriculture before the 1950s. Only massive population increases, or an ecological catastrophe can remove the possibilities of devaluation-driven

¹⁷ Haichun Chen, M.J. Gordon, Yan Zhiming, "The Real Income and Consumption of an Urban Chinese Family," *Journal of Development Studies*, 31, 1 (1994): 201-213.

industrialization.

When high levels of employment are achieved, export enterprises luring away workers by offering higher wages will increase wages, also in the rest of the economy. The economy reaches a turning point.¹⁸ Scarcity of workers leads to inflationary pressures as in West Germany in the late 1950s. China is now entering a similar phase and tries to cope with it by mobilizing labour in its Western provinces and by appreciating its currency in a controlled manner.

The challenges of actual globalization can be described, therefore, as follows: allow the catching-up economies to become truly capitalist by shortening the process of transition until high levels of employment are reached. This requires markets in the industrialized countries to remain open and expanding. The leading economies refrain from wage repression and accept, like Britain in the 19th century, balance of trade deficits. They solve their employment problems by expanding their home demand, accepting rising wages as wage repression is useless for maintaining competitiveness. The competitiveness of the catching-up economies depends on their exchange rates. The catching up economies maximize multiplier effects of their exports especially by increasing the real incomes of the poor. Income increases of the poor do not harm competitiveness as competitiveness depends on the exchange rate. Income increases for the poor allow them to direct local factors of production to the production of goods for their own needs and withdraw them either from unemployment or the production for the rich.

4. Converging Tendencies for a Possibly Unintended Weakening of Capitalism

The example with cars and computers shows that specialisation according comparative advantage does not necessarily allocate the branches which provide the highest learning effect to economically leading countries. A leader may enjoy productivity advances in innovative products on the basis of experience in production (learning by doing). The past experience may convey to the leading economy an advance in productivity. It is, however, doubtful that this advance in a branch, where both economies have not yet any experience, is as high as in the previously leading branch where the leading economy has more experience than the catching up economy. The leading economies not only fear losses of jobs, but also being overtaken in high-technology specialization by the catching-up economies. The Vernon¹⁹ product cycle model is a special case, not the norm.

The reaction of the industrially leading countries to the new competitiveness of the South consists in attempts to increase competitiveness,

¹⁸ Moo-Ki Bai, "The Turning Point in the Korean Economy," *Developing Economies*, 20, 2 (1982): 117-140.

¹⁹ Raymond Vernon, "Comprehensive Model-Building in the Planning Process: The Case of the Less Developed Countries," *Economic Journal*, 76, 301 (1966): 57-69.

especially by fighting wage increases and subsidies for improving their technical innovation systems. This leads to job losses because productivity increases more rapidly than production. Because of a lack of demand and wage pressure, only those innovations are realized which are cost-cutting to such a degree that they reduce production costs, even its wages do not increase. Defensive investment characterized by high spending on investment goods against rising labour costs is not undertaken.

Investment is low because of slow wage increases and sluggish demand. As surplus has increased however, there are financial resources which do not find outlets for profitable investment in the real economy. They have to turn to the financial markets. As in the late 1920s in the United States, the disproportionate growth of the financial markets is the consequence of underconsumption due to an increasingly unequal distribution of income. The increasing inequality can be for some time protected from the destruction of high incomes by an economic downturn if income appropriation on financial markets is defended by political means. The saving of the banks in the actual financial crisis is a government rescue through which fake money created by the credit system is transformed and protected and has become now a real asset, in the form of a liability of the taxpayers. This is basically a rent channelled to fake capitalists who do not earn money because of their competitiveness on anonymous markets of the real economy.

Tendencies to increased rent appropriation are also important in the catching up economies. Devaluation is costly and state financed improvements in technical competencies can limit rates of devaluation. In the 1970s, Korea forbade the further import of textile machinery when its textile exports had become very competitive. Korean textile exporters had to turn to local suppliers of spare parts who provided textile machinery at a higher cost. The economic effect is not different from an oil country taxing already cost competitive oil exports and using this income for subsidizing industrial diversification. However, the administrative management of the Korean method is much more efficient as the customers are the machine producers who are better extension agents than bureaucrats for their machinery suppliers.

The alternative is either to accept the turn of governments to rent appropriation and then enact political and administrative regulation, or to counter the tendencies to disembed capitalism in a period of transitional weakness of labour. I do not exclude that this process of re-embedding capitalism will lead to lasting reductions of the sphere regulated by the market in the societies of the West and of the South, which I cannot discuss here.²⁰

The global political situation is not favourable for such an endeavour. It is characterized by heterogeneity and fragmentation, even polarization of the

²⁰ I think of the increasing importance of the environment, the growing importance of needs which do not lead to immediate spending, like old age provisions, but may lead to demand reducing savings in the actual period, Hartmut Elsenhans, *Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists* (New Delhi: Sage, 2014).

political forces which oppose the strategies of business and finance capital. They do not even dispose of common discussion arenas at a global level. These forces comprise of a much larger spectrum than the reanimated traditional critiques of capitalism who want to abolish it on grounds of their understanding of humanitarianism, Marxism, environmentalism, or other rejections of the market.

It is difficult to numerate the forces which could engage in such an alliance for embedding the world economy in order to keep it capitalist and therefore to reduce financialization and rent. There is no doubt that from the Western perspective, the critical centre-left, often social democratic or Christian Democratic forces, should play a role. In the South, some of the secular nationalist movements have coped with the crisis of the state classes and their import substituting industrialization. There is a re-emergence of the left in Latin America side-by-side with rising populist and indigenous movements. In Asia, the successors to communist parties have engaged in economic opening, rejected political liberalization (democratization) but used their political monopoly increasingly for shifting to policies for rising internal mass incomes. Despite a strong nationalism, the rise of China is managed with a clear acceptance of the necessity of international cooperation. It looks like China has carefully studied the mistakes of the previous challenger of Anglo-Saxon hegemony: Germany.

In North Africa, West, South, and South East Asia, the secular nationalists have not been entirely unsuccessful but nevertheless unable to keep their old political dominance because of promises which were not kept. Despite their achievements, especially in the area of education, they have to contend with the rising cultural nationalists who have gained large audiences.²¹ Where they have become powerful, they succeeded in adding to the topic of cultural identity the demands of the private business sector and the rising salaried middle class (created by the extension of education). Increasingly, electoral success depends on the capacity to promote equitable growth: the AKP in Turkey, the recent new tendencies in the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the electoral victory of Narendra Modi in India are linked to the commitment for a mixed economy which pragmatically combines market and state.

The main arguments of Keynesians and the new cultural-identitarian movements are close: the market at the service of the people, limits may be necessary, even in property rights, and state responsibility in removing market failure, especially with respect to the integration of the most disfavoured groups into production and social life, are all themes they share.

There is no doubt that these are different forces that cannot come together if they do not limit their commitments to the question of the

²¹ Hartmut Elsenhans, "The Rise of New Cultural Identitarian Movements in Africa and Asia in the Emerging Multipolar System," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, 32, 3 (2012): 642-661.

management of the international economy. Ambitions would have to be limited. Taking the balance of power as the appropriate instrument for protecting peace would reduce claims partners in the international system have on each other, respecting more the level of political struggle which is the state: This would lead to acceptance that states and political cultures are different and not to pretend that peace requires remodelling the culture and the civil societies following one's own order.²² The actual state of international relations is not really favourable for such an endeavour. Political realism in international relations is not liked in the Western centre left public. Its philosophy is that the world is safe and peaceful if the Western concepts of human rights and democracy are universally accepted.²³

As long as this agenda is maintained and the economic basis of the transnational NGO world depends, to a large extent, on this agenda, then a meaningful debate between forces of totally different cultural backgrounds on their convergences in economic praxis is difficult to achieve. The absence of international labour, so different from this other phase of globalisation at the end of the 19th century, adds to this problématique.²⁴

There are various battlefields from which confidence-building behaviour can be expected. Those who are in favour of embedding capitalism will closely look at the European Union's capacity to complete its relative success in the management of the financial crisis by having the banks paying for the received support, in order to reduce the weight of financial capital and the degree of financialization. In the Arab world, Islamists can create confidence of Western publics by showing that they have a respectable role internationally and domestically and a reasonable concept for economic policy. The Mursi experience has shown at least that the respectable role could exist. In the Mediterranean region, bold initiatives by the European Union could allow the Arab world to engage in export-led manufacturing on the basis of neutralizing the oil rent in its impact on the exchange rate. This would demonstrate significantly the possibility of mass demand led growth.²⁵

For the public in the West, all strategies have to demonstrate that by correcting the market they have no wish to abolish capitalism but simply to make it work. I suppose that for large segments of public opinion in the South,

²² Zahra Nargis, "The Realist State and Deglobalization," *Policy Perspectives*, 8, 2 (2011): 33-52.

²³ Better: 21st century limited democracy, where democracy is no longer used for correcting property rights like in the 19th and early 20th centuries: Mario Sznajder, "Transition in South America: Models of Limited Democracy," *Democratization*, 3, 3 (1996): 360-377; Atilio A. Boron, "The Truth about Capitalist Democracy," *Socialist Register*, 42 (2006): 28-58; David Collier, Steven Levitsky, "Democracy with Adjectives. Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research," *World Politics*, 49, 3 (1997): 430-51.

²⁴ Michael Huberman, Christopher Meissner, "Riding the Wave of Trade: The Rise of Labor Regulations in the Golden Age of Globalisation," *Journal of Economic History*, 70, 3 (2010): 657-685.

²⁵ Hartmut Elsenhans, "Comment approfondir la coopération entre rive nord et rive sud de la Méditerranée : Un renouveau économique tenant compte des effets de la rente sur le Sud de la Méditerranée," *L'Année au Maghreb*, 9 (2013).19-38.

especially in the post-dictatorial societies, the same applies. Alliances which include the bulk of the middle classes will not be possible without such a commitment. The vocal critiques of those who use the crisis for the argument that the time is ripe for abolishing capitalism scare these moderate opinions. It is therefore urgent that those who want change make clear that their only aim is not just to save capitalism from the capitalists, but also that their concepts are applicable for succeeding in this endeavour. One important goal is therefore to deconstruct the claim of the monopolists, the financial speculators, and the other rentiers, that they somehow represent capitalism or that their power-based rent economy resembles is capitalism.

INDO-US RELATIONS IN CHANGING REGIONAL CONTEXT OF POST-9/11 EVENTS

Dr. Mussarat Jabeen*

Abstract

Bilateral relations between India and the United States emerged against a background of major shift in American security requirements and emerging economy of India. During much of the Cold War era, India was not an important factor in American thinking of international security due to its anti-American approach and inclination towards the former Soviet Union. However, the post-Cold War period transformed the old rivalries into a new strategic partnership due to certain reasons, including the disintegration of the Soviet Union and China's emergence as a rival regional power. Indian military power was also significant for American presence in the Persian Gulf and the East Asia, which led the latter to conduct a serious dialogue with India. India's fourth largest army and powerful navy with the largest submarine fleet further increased its importance for the US-led war on terror. This situation provided more solid basis for cooperation on foreign policy issues than its need in the earlier decades. The study has assumed that the US has recognized the significance of a stronger relationship with India in the changing regional scenario. The relationship between the two states is a partnership rather than an alliance. The paper purports to highlight the relations between the two countries, focusing the post-9/11 era.

Key words: security, terrorism, military cooperation, economy, ally, shared interests, region.

Introduction

The last decade of the 20th century witnessed the tectonic shifts in international affairs as drastic changes occurred in global politics. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc ended the bipolarity weakening the balance of power and leading to a unipolar world. Start of the 'New World Order' and the status of the sole superpower were considered as

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American victory, but strategic uncertainties surfaced due to shattering of bipolarity. Changing scenario enhanced the intrusive involvement of the United States for containing China's emerging power, making India a balancer for maintaining strategic balance. In this situation it was not surprising that the US shaped its security doctrine and global role in the light of this new position. Exploring the various areas of convergence of interests, the US built a strategic partnership with India for gaining certain objectives.¹ These goals were:

- The US has vital strategic interests in the world's largest reserves of energy lying in the Middle East, the Gulf region and South Asia. India occupies the strategic location linking the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean.
- Another common value is the freedom of the high seas, particularly the sea-lanes venting from the Hormuz Straits and branching out in the West and the East. Occupying the base facilities in the region, the US military tried to secure its interests in South Asia.
- Chinese military power in the Asia Pacific, a region with the largest energy reserves, is taken as a challenge to American dominance. India also perceives China as a security threat to its vital interests owing to the latter's preponderance of nuclear weapons and military might. For India, Chinese assistance to Pakistan for missile development has strengthened Pakistan's position in South Asia.
- In global politics, geo-economics and geo-strategic considerations are very crucial and cooperation in this direction can enhance the strength of nations. Indo-American strategic partnership is to increase the multiple interests. For India, the US offers strategically rich options for making it a powerful nation, while India is supportive of the US for countering the emerging threats in the region.²

All the above mentioned factors led the two countries to seek a closer relationship with expanding cooperation in the wider field of interests including defence and security, health and education, commerce and investment, high-technology, cyber security, civil nuclear energy, information technology etc. Exchange of high-level officials' visits further vitalized and strengthened the bilateral relationship with bipartisan support in both the countries. The remarkable transformation in political economy, trade structure and investment patterns brought new alignments between the two nations. Meanwhile, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 changed the scenario dismantling this development as it led the US to develop a unilateral approach

¹ Mussarat Jabeen, & Ishtiaq Ahmed, "Indo-US Nuclear Cooperation", *Journal of South Asian Studies*, vol. 26, no. 2, July-December, 2011.

² Subhash Kapila, "India-US Strategic Partnership: The Advent of the Inevitable," *South Asia Analysis Group*, December 2006.<<http://www.saag.org/papers2/paper120.html>>, Accessed on 31 December 2006.

towards global politics shifting its priority from non-proliferation to terrorism. The doctrine of preemption, preventive military operations and bypassing of the United Nations became the prevailing features of US foreign policy. In the changing situation, New Delhi did not lose its importance with readjusting and re-evaluating its external relations. It began to work with the collaboration of Washington. Former secretary of state Colin Powell stated that "India has the potential to keep the peace in the vast Indian Ocean area and its periphery. We need to work harder and more consistently to assist India in this endeavor while not neglecting our friend Pakistan."³

Changing Position of Indo-US Relations

In the post-Cold War period, the first interaction of the high-level military officers of the US and India was in New Delhi in January 1992. In this meeting, military cooperation was discussed, as the US showed its concerns about the rise of 'Militant Islam' in South Asia.⁴ Viewing the South Asia as the most volatile part of the world, India was the only option for the US to secure its interests in the Islamic Crescent stretching from Turkey to Malaysia. A Joint Steering Committee of the two navies was also established, which conducted joint naval exercises in 1992. In January 1995, 'Agreed Minute on Defense Relations' was signed to conduct joint military exercises and trade cooperation. India began to receive military and economic aid under this agreement.⁵

The present shift in Indo-US relations occurred during the second term of President Clinton as well as Indian election of 1997 when the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) came into power. The BJP strove to redefine the Indo-US relationship and broke itself from the traditional foreign policy patterns that prevailed between the two nations for the five decades. Previously, the relations between the two states could be ascribed as satisfactory or reasonable. Major reason of these tense relations was the structure of the Cold War, which kept India in the Soviet's camp and this alignment dragged it indirectly against the US that was seeking regional allies against the communist threat. In fact, India wanted to be a global player and charted a largely autonomous course since its independence in 1947. The end of the Cold War changed the nature of relations, and a growing awareness of India's strategic potential led the US to a serious re-evaluation of its policy towards New Delhi. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 did not push it back. As the *Washington Post* commented that New Delhi became important to Washington not only for larger markets and information age goods, but also for countering terrorism, managing proliferation and containing China, which enhanced its worth.⁶ About the past position, William Saxbe, a former US ambassador to India,

³ Colin L. Powell, "Confirmation Hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee", January 17, 2001.

⁴ Afzaal Mahmood, "A Strategic Defense Pact," *Dawn*, (Karachi), July 9, 2005.

⁵ Ghayoor Ahmed, "India's Defense ties with US." *Dawn*, (Karachi), July 7, 2005.

⁶ *Washington Post*, (Washington) March 22, 2001.

recalled that he met the then-US secretary of state for final instruction before leaving for India and Henry Kissinger said, "the less I hear from you and the less I hear about India, the happier I will be."⁷

Perceiving India as an opportunity, Pakistan was dropped from the agenda. Following the Kargil conflict and military coup in 1999, the US gradually took Pakistan as a problematic and troublesome country, if not a failed state. Contrary to this, the contents of Indo-US relation were indicative of a constructive and constant bilateral engagement, directing towards partnership based on 'increasingly overlapping national interests.' This move towards warm relation determined the future course of common objectives from the agenda.⁸

India: A Choice of George W. Bush

The entrance of George W. Bush in presidency brought a dramatic shift in bilateral relations. He emphasized that his administration had high expectation for India. One day before the terrorist attacks, a US official was reading a brief for Congressional staff about the Bush administration's plans to suspend all nuclear related sanctions on India, while leaving in place many on Pakistan to limit the aid.⁹ Richard Boucher, Assistant Secretary of the State for Public Affairs, stated that "the transformation in Indo-US relations, interests and evolution from 'estranged democracies' to 'engaged democracies' was a remarkable change in bilateral relations."¹⁰

George W. Bush came to office with the perception that India was more an asset than a responsibility, and planned to create a comprehensive economic, political, and defence relationship with New Delhi. His motives were high, but complex due to India's emergence as a potential balancer to a rising and threatening power of China. He had been interested in Indian technology since the days of his governorship of Texas.¹¹ Bush considered bilateral assistance and foreign aid as a ladder to get access to the new era of globalization, as open markets and free trade were to expand the circle of development in opening societies, building the infrastructure of democracy. America's vital, enduring and growing interests in Asia transformed the relations into a strategic partnership.¹²

⁷ Rober M. Hathaway, "The US India Courtship: from Clinton to Bush" in Sumit Ganguly, Ed., *India as an Emerging Power*, (London: Frank Cass, 2003), p.6.

⁸ Ashly J. Tellis, C. Christine Fair and Jamison Jo Medby, "Limited Conflict under the Nuclear Umbrella," RAND, Santa Monica, 2001, pp.9-12.

⁹ Lee Feinstien, "When Policy Priorities Converge: US Relations with India and Pakistan after September 11th" Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, Working Paper, No.27, May7, 2002. <<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications>>

¹⁰ Richard Boucher, "New Directions in U.S Indian Relation," US Department of State, Washington: Press Statement, June 19,2001.

¹¹ Stephen Philip Cohen, "A Deal Too Far?," *ORF Brookings Paper*, February28, 2006.

¹² George W. Bush, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," Washington: The White House, September 17, 2002, <[http://www.nationalsecuritylaw.net/Article.National%20Security%20Strategy%20\(White%20House%202002\).pdf](http://www.nationalsecuritylaw.net/Article.National%20Security%20Strategy%20(White%20House%202002).pdf)>

The National Security Strategy 2002 was the guiding document for transformation of Indo-US relations. It elaborated the need and intention of the US to pressurize other nations to accept American definitions of democracy, human rights, free trade and good governance, which were simultaneously considered as universal values and cornerstones of US foreign policy. These values were taken as a vehicle to grasp the forces of freedom in the foreseeable future and to create a balance of power favourable to human sovereignty. In these conditions, all the nations and societies have a choice for themselves to get rewards as well as challenges of political and economic liberty.¹³ The US concluded that India is undoubtedly a pivotal power in South Asia with a corresponding interest in maintaining regional stability. It is also a status quo power without irredentist claims on its neighbours. It does appear to act as the security manager in the region, but largely in a benevolent fashion.¹⁴

Bush termed his policy towards India as “distinctly American internationalism” even before becoming a president. Being Governor of Texas, he argued in 1999 that the US had overlooked India in its strategic calculations and must work to ensure that India was a force for stability and security in Asia.¹⁵ He saw India as a potential counterweight to China, which till 9/11 ranked high on the list of newly designed possible enemies of the US.¹⁶ India became a natural choice of the Bush administration to secure the Indian Ocean sea-lanes from Suez to Singapore, a route for the flow of the enormous amount of oil and trade. The security of these routes on a long-term policy was not easy for the US through its 7th Fleet in the Pacific or 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean. A local power was required to guard it properly and India was attractive for the US due to its location. In addition, China’s enormous military advantage on the mainland facing Taiwan can also be neutralized, if India keeps the Chinese military reserves busy in Central China. These plans were to strengthen American dominance in the contemporary geo-strategic scenario, however, the process became a little slower due to the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

Terrorist Attacks and Indian Position

The terrorist attacks on 11 September in US were the most brazen attacks since Pearl Harbour when Japanese planes attacked at American fleet on 7 December 1941 and dragged it into the World War-II. In response to 9/11 attacks, the American policy suddenly became the South Asia- and Middle East-centric with an objective to remove the perpetrators of this crime from power at both places. A new America emerged flexing its muscles and letting no one to

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Bhabani SenGupta, “India in the Twenty-First Century”, *International Affairs*, vol. 73, no.2, 1997, pp.308-310.

¹⁵ Ashley Tellis, “Testimony to Senate Foreign Relations Committee,” June 2004. <<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications>>

¹⁶ C. Raja Mohan, “A Paradigm Shift Towards South Asia,” *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 2002-3, vol. 26, no.1, p.144.

block its way to avenge this heinous act. The US launched an attack on Afghanistan, the haven for the alleged mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, and subsequently Iraq, citing the similar reasons. Much of this was done unilaterally without waiting or delaying to get international approval. India was located in the region where this global problem established order in a failed state. New Delhi had high expectations and tried extremely hard to make the US drop Pakistan as its ally in favour of India inducting it into the high table of diplomacy. India offered unconditional and ambivalent support for the success of the American agenda.¹⁷

Efforts to counter terrorism had already been the subject of a pragmatic and productive Indo-US dialogue before 9/11, and a long-term bond was constituted between the two countries. Explaining South Asian region as the prime source of terrorism, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee stated in his address to the American Congress that “no country has faced as ferocious an attack of terrorist violence as India has in the past two decades: 21,000 were killed by foreign-sponsored terrorist in Punjab alone and 16,000 had been killed in Jammu and Kashmir.”¹⁸ Nevertheless, Indo-Pak crises placed greater stress on this aspect of the bilateral relationship, and Washington avoided overt support to India. This dispute with its nuclear dimension was intensified in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11. India offered full cooperation and this was unexpected in the background of its decades-long non-alignment policy. It eagerly offered transit and refuelling facilities to the US ships and aircrafts from its bases in the war against Afghanistan. Such an offer was unthinkable a few years earlier arguably. For obvious reasons, the US preferred the base facilities of Pakistan for its special forces and aircrafts due to logistic and strategic reasons. The US got extra leverage over Pakistan because of the military regime and this kind of cooperation could never be expected from India, even under a fawning BJP-led special consideration. It was expected that the US would craft anti-terrorism policies in a manner that would never undermine the territorial integrity of other nations particularly the victims of this scourge.¹⁹

New Delhi assessed that decisive moment in the world affairs had arrived and must be seized firmly. However, the American move to enlist Cold War allies and building partnership with them, particularly with Pakistan, was resented by the several Indians. The Bush administration lifted sanctions and provided economic support and legitimacy to General Musharraf’s regime in Pakistan, which had never been expected before. India viewed the renewal of Pak-US relations as the supreme irony in reference to anti-terrorism, which was the basis for new American involvement in Pakistan. India claimed to be one of the principal countries to support the anti-terrorism campaign;

¹⁷ Jabeen & Ahmed, ‘Indo-US Nuclear...’,

¹⁸ Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Address to Joint Session of US Congress, Washington D.C. Embassy of India, September 14, 2000.

¹⁹ Mussarat Jabeen, “Either You are with US or against US”, *Journal of South Asian Studies*, vol.24., no.2, July-December 2009.

moreover, it looked at Pakistan as the main source of Indian problems of terrorism before.²⁰ There were a series of major incidents in India after 9/11 and first of them happened on 1 October 2001 in Srinagar, capital of Kashmir, when an attack was made on the state assembly, in which 38 people were killed.²¹

The second was an attack on the Indian Parliament on 31 December 2001. In the subsequent weeks, tension escalated and all types of communications, including air, train and bus services, were terminated between India and Pakistan. The military buildup between the two countries, followed by the bombing further tensed the situation. India withdrew its high commissioner from Islamabad for the first time after the 1971 war. American Secretary of State Colin Powell remained in contact over a period of several weeks that might represent the most intensive involvement of any US official in a South Asian issue. Powell made his second trip to the region within three months 'to cool it down.' Bush made a telephonic call to Vajpayee convincing him to be patient, emphasizing on the positive role of his administration with no intention of ignoring Indian concerns.²² The third incident took place at Kaluchuk (Jammu) on 14 May 2002. This attack claimed 31 lives, including army personnel and their family members. India alleged that all the three terrorists killed in this incident were identified as Pakistani nationals.²³

After these events, the US urged Pakistan to take action against the terrorist groups responsible for attack on the Indian Parliament. Pakistan took certain actions, but those were termed cosmetic in nature by India. India alleged that it might suite to Musharraf to concentrate on Jammu & Kashmir after the fall of the Taliban in order to placate domestic discontent arising out of his role in Operation Enduring Freedom, a US-led war in Afghanistan to counter terrorism. It might also be in American interest to bail out Pakistan for its services, which the former still required for anti-Taliban and anti Al-Qaeda campaign, but it was never acceptable to India, a long-time so-called victim of Pakistan's sponsored terrorism.²⁴

There have been several other instances of terrorist attacks in India over the last decade, including Mumbai attack of November 2008, that have badly affected the relations and brought the two countries to a point of suspending all types of diplomatic ties. India blamed Pakistan for all such activities and wanted the US to take concrete measures to address the challenge of terrorism, dismantling their safe havens and disrupting all financial and tactical support to them.

²⁰ Mohan, "A Paradigm Shift...", pp. 142-44.

²¹ Dugger Celia, "Pakistan asks India to Revive Talks Aimed at Bringing Peace to Kashmir." *The New York Times*, 9 October 2001.

²² Hathaway, "The US India...", pp.17-18.

²³ Ministry of External Affairs (Govt. of India), "Kaluchak Massacre", May 14 2002.

<<http://www.mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18990/Kaluchak+Massacre+14+May+2002>>

²⁴ Mohan, "A Paradigm Shift...",

Terrorism Card and Indian Demand

Since 9/11, India has been insisting the US to play the terrorism card effectively in its favour and wanted Washington to ask Islamabad to withdraw its support for terrorists in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Ambassador David Mulford stated that India's challenges were not merely economic, but they were strategic, because all around its periphery were growing threats of terrorism, failing states, insurgency and drug trafficking. There are nearly fourteen terrorist and separatist movements "of varying rigour and intensity," other than the violence in Jammu and Kashmir.²⁵ Washington showed reluctance to accept New Delhi's allegation that terrorism emanating from Afghanistan had links with the insurgency in Kashmir. No doubt, President Bush promised an all-out war against terrorism and those states that are harbouring terrorists, but he avoided to agree with India on Srinagar events and gave a deaf ear to the demand of equating alleged Pakistani-backed terrorism in Kashmir with global terrorism. India also tried to persuade the Bush administration to force Pakistan for closure of the training camps and logistic support and other assistance to 'terrorism in Kashmir.'

American approach to combat terrorism somewhat dampened Indian hopes, as the Bush doctrine of pre-emption did not correspond with Indian demands. India assumed that both countries had similar views on Islamic fundamentalism, but the US only showed its concerns with the terrorism directed against it. To eliminate the terrorism, it is not necessary to take the lives of the terrorists, where and when they appear or are found, but it has to be rooted out. As the "trustee of global stability," it is imperative for the US to recognize this and act accordingly.

Despite bombing in New Delhi and the reaction of other events on American public opinion, Bush insisted better relations between India and Pakistan because long-time antagonism between the two neighbours was against the US interests and the war on terror. However, Bush's vision of India did not change and his administration made only strategic accommodation with Pakistan to counter the terrorism. The former US ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill, made it clear that Bush had envisioned a long-term relationship with New Delhi.²⁶ India tried to persuade the US that Osama bin Laden was not the sole challenge, but there were several other terrorist groups in Kashmir that were allegedly sponsored by Pakistan. India also blamed the intelligence agencies and attempted to draw the world's attention in the same manner as it did in December 1999, when an Indian Airlines plane IC-814 carrying 178 passengers was hijacked in Kathmandu (Nepal), refuelled in Lahore (Pakistan) and flown to Kandahar (Afghanistan). It was alleged that the plane was hijacked by Pakistan-based organization, Harakat-ul-Mujahideen, which was designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the US Department

²⁵ "India's Many Wars," *Jane's Foreign Report*, December 16, 2004,
<<http://www.janes.com/subscribefrp/doc>>

²⁶ Cohen, "A Deal too..." p.8.

of State in 1997.²⁷ The hijackers demanded to release 35 Kashmiri prisoners, including Maulana Masood Azhar, a Pakistani cleric, Ahmed Omer Saeed Shaikh, a British national of Pakistani origin and Mushtaq Ahmed Zargar of Jammu and Kashmir in exchange of the passengers. On Indian government's refusal to concede the demands, the hijackers wounded several passengers and killed a newly-wed person, who was on his honeymoon trip with his wife. This act created panic and passengers' relatives pressurized the Indian government to yield the demands. New Delhi commented that President Musharraf had shown neither the interest nor ability to control the activities of terrorist organizations that were supporters of these elements. Furthermore, India implicated Pakistan in this event, lobbying the Clinton administration to declare Pakistan as a "terrorist state." Indian press reports suggested that army-terrorist links had been growing stronger since the tension in Kashmir.²⁸

Pakistan as a Factor in Indo-US Relations

Pak-US relations were always a major irritant in Indo-US ties. It was believed that Republican administrations were generally soft to the Cold War allies and this perception strengthened the idea that Pakistan would be a beneficiary of this policy since it had been a Cold War ally. This notion was further strengthened in Bush era when he announced that Clinton administration was too critical to Indonesia over the military-backed violence in East Timor and the Moluccas.²⁹ The US friendly policy towards Pakistan and showering of money, military hardware and diplomatic niceties were also part of this policy, but at the same time, these favours were not digested by India.

Pakistan's support to the US in the war against terrorism and America's increasing relations with India to deter the potential threat of China, a 'Great Power' of the future, are two different lines. India is continuously showing its resentment over the US assistance to Pakistan as it views the latter as 'supporter of terrorism in India.' The Indians are inflexible and want the US to avoid lumping it with Pakistan in all policy decisions. India perceives itself in a different status with no match to Pakistan. It expects the US to follow the same policy as it did in the case of China and Taiwan. Each of them was dealt with independently and separately. On their own level, Indian politicians have found the solution of this issue. To them, blocking economic assistance and increasing defence budget would neutralize all the advantages that Pakistan might have with new American alignment.³⁰ In November 2001, Robert Blackwill, the then American ambassador, viewed India as victim of terrorism showing his

²⁷ The US Department of State, Chapter 6: Foreign Terrorist Organizations, Country Report on Terrorism 2011, July 2012, <<http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2011/195553.htm>>

²⁸ M. Saleem Kidwai, *US Policy Towards the Muslim World: Focus on Post 9/11 Period*, (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America 2010)

²⁹ Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalanp, "Indo-US Relations in the Bush White House," *Strategic Analysis*, vol.25, no. 4, July 2001, pp.546-47.

³⁰ Hari Sud, "India and US Relations: Ground Realities," January 1, 2005, p.10. <http://www.indiacause.com/columns/OL_050101.htm>

country's pledge that the war against terrorism would not over until terrorism was ended against the two countries. Answering to a question about 'Pakistan-supported' militants in Kashmir, he said that a terrorist was a terrorist, not a freedom fighter. No country would be permitted to provide sanctuaries to terrorists.³¹

The war on terrorism has provided the US an opportunity to have a decisive and positive impact on South Asia. Washington is in the position to solidify a long-term relationship with India without bracketing it with Pakistan and to prevent another regional war by addressing the Kashmir dispute. Indian emerging economy, skilled workforce, and democracy have made it Asia's third power, which is attractive for the US. India has set its professional military under firm civilian control. New Delhi also entertains the conviction that the US would give it access to highly sophisticated military equipment as had already been in the case of Phalcon system. Americans offered the sale of F-16s and F-18 'Hornets' to India when they announced the sale of F-16s to Pakistan. But the Indian army has always been very reluctant to purchase American equipment due to the fickleness of the US Congress, which is quick to accuse its clients of misconduct and impose sanctions on them and hence stop delivery of spare parts, as it repeated this practice in the case of Pakistan in the past.³² A former Indian Air Force chief Anil Tipnis and former Army chief Shankar Roy Chowdhury had separately showed their opposition to the government, in general, and the defence minister, in particular, for such a military procurement. But the civilian government did not bother these objections and was ambitious about the US technology transfers that allow manufacturing of aircrafts in India.³³ A Rand report stated that American calculation about India and Pakistan giving priority to India decoupling Pakistan. It elaborated the important role of Indian economy and technological capabilities, which were making it a major Asian power.³⁴ Despite the closer relations with the US and recognition of India as an emerging soft power, New Delhi still shows concerns over Pak-US relations as American position is still vague on the Indian interpretation of terrorism in Kashmir.

In changing position, the US is not only supporting the Indian stance on terrorism in Kashmir, but also sharing sensitive information with New Delhi about activities at terrorist bases throughout South Asia, particularly in Kashmir, Bangladesh and Nepal.³⁵ The US also openly supported Indian allegation regarding the series of bomb blast in Mumbai and Kashmir. Richard

³¹ Ravi Tomar, "India-US Relations in a Changing Strategic Environment", *Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group*, June 25 2002, <http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp0102/02RP20>

³² Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1947-2005: A Concise History*, (Karachi: Oxford University press), 2007.

³³ Christophe Jaffrelot, "India, the United States' new Ally in Asia," July 2005. <http://www.columbia.edu/cu/alliance/Papers/Paper_Christophe-Jaffrelot-2005.pdf>

³⁴ Rajagopalan, "Indo-US relations..." p.548.

³⁵ B. P. Khanna and Lalit Sethi, "Different Hemispheres, Common Foe," *Armed Forces Journal*, December 2004, p.37.

Boucher seconded Indian allegations and opined, “we all know that terrorism in South Asia and some of the terrorist groups that have design against India still have place in Pakistan.”³⁶ This was the first time, when the US accused Pakistan, insisting it to break relations with accused militant groups and take the New Delhi’s terrorism problem seriously and formally acknowledge the links between terrorism in Kashmir and groups operating in Pakistan. President Bush stressed the international community to stand united against terrorism and declared unequivocally that there was no justification for the vicious murder of innocent people.³⁷ Recently President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh condemned the terrorist attack in Samba (Jammu) and Kashmir on 26 September 2013. Both reiterated their commitment for countering terrorism in all its forms, eliminating their safe havens and infrastructure. Both leaders called for Pakistan to work for bringing the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks (2008) to justice.³⁸

This all led India to a meaningful relationship with the US for building a pragmatic partnership. India views that a strategic partnership, strictly speaking, is between the two equals and partnerships offered to India cannot be extended to Pakistan. Owing to an unequal status between Pakistan and the US, India suggested Islamabad to be careful in its engagement with America and find ways to overcome this asymmetrical relationship. On the other hand, Pakistan is alarmed about the close Indo-US relationship and support in nuclear technology. Pakistan has re-examined American sale of sophisticated weapons to India that have earlier been opposed by India for Pakistan. In the ultimate analysis, the US does not want and cannot afford to have an unfriendly India.³⁹

China factor in Indo-US Relations

China factor has played an important role in materializing Indo-US strategic partnership. The US policy in Asia is not only preferring India for counter terrorism but also using it as a lever for containing China to achieve its goals in Asia. In the post-Cold War era, Asia emerged as the world’s new centre of gravity and Washington wanted a pivotal role in the region, perceiving China as a strategic competitor rather than a strategic partner like India. It cultivated India to strengthen it vis-à-vis Chinese power. During the Cold War era, the US tried to maintain friendly relations with China but the later embarked upon the policy of modernization of its market economy. While the end of the Cold War made China a future contender of America with a very high rate of economic

³⁶ Kidwai, “US policy towards...”

³⁷ Saroj Bishoyi, “International Terrorism and Religious Extremism: Challenges to US and India”, in Kidwai (ed.), *US Policy towards...*, pp. 280-81.

³⁸ The White House, “U. S.-India Joint Statement,” September 27, 2013, <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/27/us-india-joint-statement>>

³⁹ “Bush’s Second Presidency and its Implications for Indo-US Relations”, p.5, <http://orfonline.org/cms/export/orfonline/modules/policybrief/attachments/py050204_1162551077859.pdf>

growth and modernization of its armed forces. China is also on the path of expanding its influence in the Pacific region where America had vital security and economic stakes.

For both India and the US, China is a common threat, while Japan also shows concerns on China's rising economic and strategic power in the region. Japan was previously a strategic ally of India, and in changing regional paradigm, strategic cooperation escalated between the two. In East Asia, the US is closer to Japan and the Japanese are also worried about a nuclear North Korea.⁴⁰ President Bush appeared to be more realistic about China as compared to Clinton or even his father Bush Senior. He was not under the influence of multinational cooperation and followed a policy of conengagement (a term used in a RAND study for a mixture of containment and engagement) and insisted China to stop missile cooperation with Pakistan.⁴¹

Bush took several steps to curtail China at regional and world level. In his State of Union Address on 29 January 2002, he enlisted China with seven states that had been singled out as a possible target, in the context of any future conflict across the Taiwan Straits. China strongly protested the US for listing it explicitly as one of the targets for a nuclear strike along with other rough states.⁴²

Another proof of American policy of containment of China is the sales of the military hardware to India, which can be used against China, including the PC Orion maritime reconnaissance aircraft that are used to trace submarines and would be helpful in the Indian Ocean against Chinese submarines. With the use of the Aegis radar system, Indian naval vessels are in a position to monitor Chinese military movements while operating in the Malacca Straits.⁴³ These threats occupy US strategic thinking and its military officers confirmed that China occupied their policy towards India. For example, range of new Indian *Agni-II* missile is in the position to hit targets across Central and East Asia including mainland China. But India's reluctance to test the *Agni-III* is to preclude China from entering into a missile race with it.⁴⁴

The growing economic power of China in South Asia is accelerating cause for cherished Indo-US relation. The analysts believe that Indo-US defence pact is developed to assist India in becoming a 'key global power in the 21st century to contain China.' The same view is shared in a Pentagon Report that China might come into view as a strategic challenger to the US.⁴⁵ It is also observed that senior American officials, including former defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and CIA Director Potter Goss, have shown their

⁴⁰ *News International*, October 10, 2006.

⁴¹ Muhammed Ayoob, "South Asia's Danger and US Foreign Policy," *Orbis*, Winter, 2001.

⁴² Rajagopalanp, "Indo-US Relations...", p. 549.

⁴³ Raghu, "Indo-US Defense Agreement, Partnership or Entrapment," *The Marxist* 21, no.2 & 3, April-September, 2005.

⁴⁴ Baldev Nayer Raj and T. V. Paul, *India in the World Order: Searching for Major-Power Status*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 2003.

⁴⁵ Ghayoor Ahmed, "India's Defense Ties with US." *Dawn*, (Karachi), July 7, 2005.

apprehensions about the multiplying power of China. It seems that American imperative interests in South Asia are being threatened by China and in this situation India is a hope to help US out to contain China. Pakistan is a close partner of China, which cannot fit in this triangle.

Indo-US Cooperation against Global Terrorism

Expressing cooperation on terrorism, Jaswant Singh, former Indian foreign minister, and Colin Powell, former US Secretary of State asserted in New Delhi on 17 October 2001 that India and the US are natural allies and would stand shoulder to shoulder in the war against terrorism fulfilling the responsibility as the world's largest multi-ethnic democracies. It was expected that collaborative work would improve the situation. The two sides asserted that the prospects of cooperation between India and the US have never been as bright as currently.⁴⁶ Similarly, Indian former foreign secretary Kanwal Sibal in his address to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in February 2003 observed:

We both are targets. The epicenter of terrorism is in our region and we have a common stake in eliminating it. Both of us rejoiced in the downfall of the Taliban and support the Government of President Karzai in Afghanistan. Both of us focus on stability in Central Asia and elimination of the fundamentalist threat in this region. Our common experiences and suffering make us natural partners. As democracies, the challenge we face is acute. Free and open societies like ours have to find answers to the inadequacies of existing law enforcement and crime prevention mechanism dealing with terrorism, while preserving their high standard of the rule of law, judicial process and transparency.⁴⁷

Combined military functioning of the US and India have been continued through different agencies, including the Joint Working Group (JWG) on Counter-terrorism since 2001. This group was established in early 2000 and it "proved to be a useful mechanism for exchange of information, intelligence sharing, anti-terrorism training programmes and strength-based international links between crime prevention agencies in both the countries."⁴⁸ In January 2002, JWG met in New Delhi under the leadership of former security adviser Mishra and US Ambassador Francis Taylor, a key person of State Department on terrorism. Both officials talked to finalize the project of the sale of American

⁴⁶ *Dawn*, October 18, 2001.

⁴⁷ Kanwal Sibal, "India-US Partnership in Changing Security Challenges", Washington DC.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 4, 2003, <<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications>>.

⁴⁸ Embassy of the United States of America, "People, Progress and Partnership: the Transformation of India US Relations", New Delhi: Embassy of the United States of America, 2001.

electronic sensors, which could be used along the Line of Control (a boundary line that divides Indian and Pakistani occupied Kashmir). India claimed that this outcome was evidence of an official American recognition of Pakistan's support for "terrorist" infiltration across the border.⁴⁹ The JWG is an attempt to explore the "advanced methods for exchange of information, especially reviewing of threat perceptions, early warning, coordination in administrative and judicial matters to prevent terrorist activities, and to facilitate the actions against perpetrators of such acts".⁵⁰ As a result of cooperation through JWG, the war on terror strengthened the political dialogue. The frequent meetings of JWG are to show cooperation on terrorism. These meetings brought qualitative changes in bilateral relations. In addition to this, both armies are conducting joint military exercises. 'Yudh Abhyas' is an annual exercise, which started in 2004. 'Cope India', an air force exercise, is also part of 'Yudh Abhyas', which is being conducted bi-annually. Last time, it held in October 2009 in Agra-India focuses on mobility operations for humanitarian aid. The US remains committed to a broad defence trade relationship that enables transfer of nuclear technology.⁵¹

A new Counterterrorism Cooperation Initiative was signed in 2010 to increase mutual counterterrorism activities like information sharing and capacity building.⁵² President Obama announced Homeland Security Dialogue during his visit to India in November 2010, and his Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano toured India in May 2011 for the first round of dialogue.⁵³ The next meeting held in May 2013 in Washington. The dialogue has several sub groups in different areas and it reviews their engagements with each other. In December 2013, New Delhi organized an Indo-US Police Chief Conference.⁵⁴

The 9/11 led to other initiatives for bilateral working and US-India Cyber Security forum was founded in 2002. Its purpose was to launch an extensive programme of action addressing the cyber-terrorism and security information.⁵⁵ It held its first meeting in New Delhi in April 2002 and second in Washington in November 2004. Indo-US Defence Policy Group also became active after 9/11 and expanded its scope to cover military-to-military

⁴⁹ "India, US hold Anti-Terrorism Talks with Focus on South Asia," *Agence France Presse*, January 21, 2002, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.

⁵⁰ L. K. Advani, "Address by Deputy Prime Minister of India L.K. Advani in the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, June 12, 2003.

⁵¹ Embassy of India, "Brief on Indo-US Relations." Washington, D.C.: Embassy of India, July 2014, <<https://www.indianembassy.org/pages.php?id=41>>

⁵² Embassy of United States, "Ambassador Roemer signs U.S.-India Counterterrorism Cooperation Agreement," July 2010, <<http://newdelhi.usembassy.gov/pr072310.html>>

⁵³ US Department of Defense, Report to Congress on U. S. -India Security Cooperation November, 2011, <http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/20111101_NDAA_Report_on_US_India_Security_Cooperation.pdf>

⁵⁴ Embassy of India, "Brief on Indo..."

⁵⁵ Ministry of External Affairs, "The India-U.S. Cyber-terrorism Initiative," *India News*, April 30, 2002.

cooperation in counter-terrorism. It was established during the Clinton administration to facilitate the dialogue on issues of mutual interest, particularly the defence. This group enhanced cooperation between the two navies against piracy and terrorism, providing transit facilities to American ships in the Malacca Strait through Indian naval escort.⁵⁶ The preferred areas of DPG are maritime security, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and counterterrorism. There are seven subgroups under it to discuss and defend the defence trade, technical cooperation, and technology security. In 2011, all the three forces held 56 cooperative events with the American forces and India never conducted such exercises with any other country.⁵⁷

Maritime Security in Oceans

The US and Indian Navies have been working in collaboration since 1991 when Kickleighter Proposals were designed by the American General Claude Kickleighter to increase navel relations. The proposals sought to expand defence cooperation through joint military training and exercises apart from other measures. The joint Executive Steering Groups (ESGs) of Army, Navy and Air Force were established to increase collaboration in the high seas. After setting up the Naval ESG, the first joint exercise was held in May 1992.⁵⁸ However, Indian nuclear tests of 1998 disrupted their regularity and naval interaction was resumed in 2002 after changing situation. Joint operations of both navies were conducted on four separate occasions. First was Indian Navy's security for American ships transiting the Strait of Malacca after 9/11. Second was disaster relief work for victims of the tsunami in the Indian Ocean in 2004-2005. Third was non-combatant evacuation operations in Lebanon in 2006 and last was counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden in 2008.⁵⁹

President Bush identified India's potential in both the Indian and Pacific oceans during his visit of March 2006 and proposed a maritime security framework. The 2006 Indo-US Framework for Maritime Security Cooperation was intended against a wide range of maritime threats, including: transnational crime like piracy, trafficking and smuggling as well as safety of navigation, search and rescue were also included. The issues of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, environmental degradation and natural disasters were enlisted in the framework. Naval cooperation led to conduct four exercises annually: Malabar, Habu Nag (naval aspects of amphibious operations), Spitting Cobra (explosive ordnance destruction focus), and Salvex (diving and salvage). Malabar is the highest annual bilateral maritime exercise to reinforce maritime tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) of the two countries.

⁵⁶ Bishoyie, "International Terrorism..."

⁵⁷ US Department of Defence, "Report to Congress..."

⁵⁸ Ministry of Defence (Govt. of India), Annual Report 2003-04, <mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/...2745.../India++2004.pdf>

⁵⁹ Ninan Koshy, "India: Linchpin of the Pivot? The Strategy of rebalancing U.S. Security in Asia," September 24, 2012, <www.theepochtimes.com>.

Malabar is conducted in alternate years and has been a multinational exercise, including the navies of Singapore, Japan and Australia. Habu Nag is also important and being conducted on a larger scale. These exercises are enhancing professional cooperation between the two navies making them familiar with high-end naval warfare, including anti-surface warfare, missile defence, anti-submarine warfare, and naval special warfare.⁶⁰ Apart from this, Pacific Fleet-Indian Navy Executive Steering Group is conducting regular annual meetings engaging naval bilateral staff talks, mutual port visits, and personnel exchanges of all ranks. The US Coast Guard is taking measures with the assistance of the Departments of Defence and Homeland Security to engage Indian Coast Guard. The *Counter-terrorism Cooperation Initiative (CCI)* was signed on 23 July 2010, further engaging the two coast guards and navies of two countries to enhance exchanges on maritime security against piracy and terrorism.⁶¹

The Obama administration equally weighted the mutual relations, viewing India as a security provider in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The US president commented that “one of the defining partnerships in the 21st century – is a priority for the US Government and for the US Department of Defense.”⁶² Obama’s visit to India in November 2010 further enhanced the thickness of the bilateral relations as the president appreciated the shared vision of peace and stability prevailing in the Indo-Pacific region and Asia. His Defence Secretary Leon Panetta also recognized the strong strategic and defence relationship of the two countries that would be a “lynchpin” in defence strategy, balancing the two forces in the Asia-Pacific.⁶³ The same viewpoint was expressed by his predecessor, Robert Gates in June 2010 in Shangri-La Dialogue. About 35 percent of global energy resources pass through IOR and many nations are concerned to a stable and secure route. More than ninety percent of global trade by volume having 77 percent of value passes through this ocean with 100,000 ships carrying 700 million gross tons weight every year.⁶⁴ President Obama also welcomed India’s decision to participate in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) naval exercise hosted by US Pacific Command in 2014.⁶⁵

Despite the American enthusiasm, the maritime relations between India and the US have not accessed a high trajectory owing to certain factors. The Indo-Iranian trade relations have become a diverging point as the US is pressurizing India to reduce them bringing to a minimal level particularly in oil

⁶⁰ US-India Military Exercises have grown dramatically: Pentagon, November 2, 2011.<<http://defence.pk/threads/us-india-military-exercises-have-grown-dramatically-pentagon.138184/#ixzz3A0ppA1wx>>

⁶¹ US Departments of Defense, “Report to Congress...,”

⁶² Embassy of India, “Brief on Indo...,”

⁶³ Hari Sud, “India and US Relation...,”

⁶⁴ Rani, Sudes. India-US Maritime Co-operation — Whither Bound? *National Maritime Foundation*, 2013,<<http://www.maritimeindia.org/article/india-us-maritime-co-operation-%E2%80%94-whither-bound.html>>

⁶⁵ The White House, “U. S.-India Joint...,”

imports. Hillary Clinton, the former secretary of state, appreciated India for the reduction of oil imports from Iran during her visit to India in May 2012. She expected further reduction of imports. On the other side, India imports 80 percent of its crude oil from Iran and depends on 12 percent on other imports.⁶⁶ Other divergent factor is the American export control policy and laws for transfer of high-end technology, which require multiple-levels of bureaucratic procedures while India is seeking access to high technology without constraints. These two factors have become irritants in Indo-US relations hindering the bilateral cooperation.

Increased Relations and Development of Strategic Partnership

Under the new relationship of 'natural allies,' India strengthened its case for gaining cooperation in all types of energy needs, particularly in the area of nuclear energy. To materialize this cooperation, negotiations succeeded and an agreement was signed in January 2004 with the name of the "Next Steps in the Strategic Partnership" (NSSP). President Bush announced and Vajpayee endorsed it. It was to "expand cooperation in three areas: civilian nuclear activities, civilian space programs, and high-technology trade. In addition, it was suggested to expand dialogue on missile defense."⁶⁷ The NSS (2002) defined the contours of this partnership stating that "the US had undertaken a transformation of its bilateral relationship with India based on a conviction that US interests require a strong relationship with India."⁶⁸

In the second term of George W. Bush, the strategic dialogues were taken to the next level and strategic partnership was signed on 18 July 2005 during the Indian Prime Minister's visit to Washington. India was taken as a "responsible state with advanced nuclear technology." In the joint statement, President Bush ascribed the significance of partnership for nuclear energy attributing it a source for provision of "cleaner and better environment."⁶⁹ This agreement ended the three decades of American opposition to Indian nuclear programme and Washington made civilian nuclear cooperation as the centrepiece of its policy. India availed of the opportunity and took full benefit of the US offer. This event shed the burdens of the past leading to a new era. Strategically, the July 2005 agreement was the most important event having far-reaching impacts. It established Indian relationship with the US recognizing it as a de facto nuclear power and there was the possibility of American favour

⁶⁶ "India to cut Oil Purchases from Iran following US Pressure," *The Telegraph*, May 15, 2012. <<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/india/9267337/India-to-cut-oil-purchases-from-iran-following-us-pressure.html>> (Accessed in January 2014).

⁶⁷ Fact sheet on the NSSP (2004), <<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2004/36290.htm>..

⁶⁸ Bush, "National Security Strategy 2002...,"

⁶⁹ Joint Statement between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, *White House Press Release*, Washington, D.C., July 18, 2005, <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/07/20050718-6.html>>.

to it for becoming a global power and permanent membership in the Security Council with veto power.⁷⁰ This agreement removed the 30-year-old technological sanctions and provided multi-layered cooperation of powerful economy of the world. It also offered energy options in nuclear area and made it a viable source for Indian flourishing economy. Strategically, this agreement ensured India's security in its neighbourhood vis-à-vis Pakistan and China. The US amended its domestic laws and tried to accommodate India by persuading the members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to resume nuclear cooperation and trade with India. However, India was directed to cover three steps, first was to negotiate its specific safeguards with IAEA, second was for the US to persuade NSG to amend its guideline and made India an exception to its mandate, and finally, the US Congress had to pass the agreement to incorporate the IAEA and NSG requirements.⁷¹ In Indian case, the most difficult step was to meet full scope safeguards' requirements that were compulsory due to India's status of non-nuclear weapon state under the rules of NPT, as it tested nuclear device after 1 January 1967 (Sec. 123 a. (2)).⁷² In accomplishment of the agreement, the US forgot the fact that it was a direct challenge to its non-proliferation policy and did not bother to take enough guarantees from India in declaring its nuclear assets or freezing the weapons programme. President Bush's statement provided further leverage to India enhancing the fears of neighbours when he said that the US would make efforts to make India a great power. This opinion is against American non-proliferation policy and restrictions on nuclear programme as the US is taking measures to halt the nuclear weapons programmes of other states.⁷³ Marching on this path, the US is ignoring opinion of those diplomats who held numerous failed talks with India to persuade it to join the NPT or signing the CTBT. In the past, the president went to the extend stating that the US was not going to pressurize India for signing CTBT.⁷⁴ Furthermore, the US Ambassador Joseph called this deal as "a substantial net gain for nonproliferation, a win for our strategic relationship, a win for energy security, and a win for nonproliferation." He added that he was "convinced that the nonproliferation regime will emerge stronger as a result." A large number of American investors

⁷⁰ Lalit Mansingh, "Indo-US Strategic Partnership: Is We there Yet?", September 2006, <http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/439796419IB39- Accessed 08-12-2009>.

⁷¹ Chari, R. P. (ed.), *Indo-US Nuclear Deal: Seeking Synergy in Bilateralism*, New Delhi: Routledge, 2009.

⁷² 42 USC 2153 a.(2). Section 4 (b) of the NNPA specifies that all other terms applied in the NNPA are not defined in Section 4 "shall have the meanings ascribed to them by the 1954 Act, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 and the Treaty [NPT]." S. Rept. 95-467 further clarified that under the NPT, the five nuclear weapon states are the U.S., U.K., China, the Soviet Union, and France, *U.S., Code Congressional and Administration News, 95th Cong., 2nd sess., 1978, 3, 329.*

⁷³ Chari, "Indo-US Nuclear...,"

⁷⁴ Rajagopalan, "Indo-US Relations...,"

have been supporting this agreement in their private meeting since its inception, as they viewed opportunity of investment in India.⁷⁵

India and US have intensified and expanded their strategic consultations in current period through dialogues covering East Asia, Central Asia and West Asia. Both parties have given consent for strategic consultations in the matters of Latin America, Africa and the IOR.

Conclusion

India's central place in South Asia with its strategic location and emerging economy has given it an influential status in global politics. The US kept India at its priority agenda in the post-Cold War era for strengthening its changing role as sole superpower, which was not free of challenges particularly in Asia where China was emerging as the countervailing power. The events of 9/11 pushed India further closer to the US without imposing hegemonic designs of the latter. The US engagement with Pakistan is different as the latter is compelled to work for the former's interests in a subordinate manner. Furthermore, the US policy reflects the dehyphenation of India from Pakistan in changing global environment. The strategic partnership has further strengthened the Indo-US ties as it has brought them closer to each other removing the dust of decades. India and US acknowledged and celebrated their partnership in their official circles because it has ended the legacy of suspicion and mistrust. The high-level exchanges between the two governments have indicated increasing cooperation on economic, security, nuclear technology and foreign policy areas between the US and India. The US is calculating India as a natural ally rather than a tactical partner. The Indian location at the crossroads of major sea-lanes has further strengthened this bond strengthening the US designs in the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions. India also occupies a central place in international community with its huge market and location.

On the issue of terrorism, the establishment of new agencies and invigoration of existing cooperation showed that a structure of enhanced relationship has taking roots in both places surpassing all obstacles. The issuance of policy statements of the leadership for mutual cooperation on terrorism are indicators of their similar views. Apparently, the US claims an even-handed policy towards India and Pakistan but cooperation through working groups, joint military exercises and other bodies that encompassed maritime security, intelligence sharing, trade & economic relations, defence & technology transfers, and joint counter-terrorist activities are sufficient evidences of American priority for India. The uses of Pakistan's territory, including ports and air bases, and its logistical support to US and NATO forces

⁷⁵ Paul K. Kerr, "US Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress," *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress*, November 3, 2008, <<http://www.coherentbabble.com/CRS/CRS-OCRL33016.pdf>>

have not equated it with India. Instead of recognizing it in appropriate manner, conflicting signals are coming from Washington. There are a few differences between the US and Pakistan that surface from time to time but over all they enjoy strong relations, as the study explored their cooperation on multiple levels. India's aspiration for a seat in the UN Security Council also requires American support. Indian position is not a satellite or a junior partner that subordinates its foreign policy for securing American interests but it is working as equal partner. India's past record also rejects this notion, as it never joined American or Soviet camps to become an ally or satellite. In 1974 and 1998, India did not bother any superpower while conducting the nuclear tests. At present, India refused to send its troops to Iraq and turned down American request. About Indo-US relations, it is concluded that changing regional perspective has strengthened the relations between the two countries extending a recognition to India's large size, huge markets and strategic location ensuring that both are marching to the road suitable to their mutual interests.

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

Ehsan Mehmood Khan*

“War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied.”

– Sun Tzu¹

Abstract

Theoretical analysis of the war of ancient eras is as important as that of the modern and postmodern eras. Analysis of the primal, primitive, primordial and prehistoric wars shows that, by and large, they were driven by the same motives. The wars of the Hellenistic and the Greek era, too, have been as comparable. The Peloponnesian war fought from 431 BC to 404 BC between two main alliances of the Greek era — the Peloponnesian League, led by Sparta, and the Delian League, led by Athens— provides a lot for great analysis. It gives insight not only into the political affairs of the Greek era, but also an invaluable case study for the policymakers and theoreticians for drawing pertinent lessons for today’s international, regional and national environments. Theoretical analysis of the Peloponnesian War provides for study of the war in the light of a host of theories. However, as Thucydides upholds, the war in question was a mirror image of honour, interest and fear as a motive, and thus was fought in the theoretical folds of Realism. However, Balance of Power Theory, Just War Theory, Asymmetric War Theory, Hegemonic Stability Theory, Power Transition Theory, The Rubicon Theory and certain other theories can be found at its analytical foundations.

Key words: *alliances, balance of power, asymmetric war, just war, power transition, hegemonic stability*

Overview

The Peloponnesian War dates back to 5th Century BC. It was a protracted military conflict in Ancient Greece which dragged on from 431 BC to 404 BC. This war transformed the political environment of Greece and enfeebled the archetypal system of Greek city states, which had dominated the

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¹ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. and intro. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 63.

region for over three centuries before this war. The war was recorded by Thucydides, an Athenian General, who wrote a book *The History of the Peloponnesian War*,² which is read even today and bears relevance in military history both for theoretical analysis and strategic lessons.

Thucydides is known as the father of scientific history for his reliance on first-hand accounts, or primary sources.³ Thucydides often inserted dialogue into his account based on his own memory.⁴ Melian Dialogue is one of such examples. However, this also provides a chance for good theoretical analysis of the socio-political environment of the Greek era and the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides, also known as the father of the school of political realism, noted:

“It will be enough for me, however, if these words of mine are judged useful by those who want to understand clearly the events which happened in the past and which (human nature being what it is) will, at some time or other and in much the same ways, be repeated in the future. My work is not a piece of writing designed to meet the taste of an immediate public, but was done to last forever.”⁵

Thus, Thucydides wanted to see his work as universal. He succeeded indeed. Even twenty five centuries after he wrote the book, it is being read and analyzed.

These conflicts led to heavy casualties from all sides including civilians. By the end of war, the Athenian state fell. The entire region faced pervasive poverty, disease and human insecurity in various forms.

The Alliances

Athens and the Delian League: It was well-resourced NATO-like alliance led by the Athenian imperial democracy, whereto the member states paid tribute or contributed forces. Being major sea power of the continent, the alliance had the strength of 3,000 ships and 30,000 troops. The Athenian city walls allowed Athens to avoid land battles, permitted to leave the lands undefended and provided access to resources from the sea even when surrounded by the enemy on land.

The Athenian “Long Walls” were built after King of Persia Xerxes' invasion of Greece (480-479 BC). Figure-1 illustrates.⁶


² Thucydides, *The History of the Peloponnesian War* (New York: Barnes & Noble Classics, 2006) is of the many editions of the book.

³ Deborah Vess, *SAT World History* (Piscataway, New Jersey: Research and Education Association, 2006), 87.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Quoted in Matthew H. Nitecki and Doris V. Nitecki, ed., *History and Evolution* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 22.

⁶ “The ‘Long Walls’ of Athens,” *LIVIOUS: Articles on Ancient History*, <http://www.livius.org/lo-lt/long_walls/long_walls.html> (accessed on 25 November 2013).



Sparta and the Peloponnesian League: It was a major land power, led by the Spartan oligarchy. Some 90 percent of population consisted of the helots as against only 10 percent Spartans. Helots were a subjugated class of agricultural labourers who were held as virtual serfs by the Spartans and others throughout much of the history of ancient Greece.⁷ They were intermediate in status between slaves and citizens.⁸ It was a loose collection of oligarchic states and tied by a treaty to Sparta. The main purpose for formation of the Peloponnesian League was to guarantee the Spartan security and domination of Peloponnesians.

The neutrals: There were three important neutrals including Argos; Corcyra (Corfu); and Persia.

Figure-2 shows the two alliances and the neutrals on map.

Causes of war

The narratives of the cause of war are contested. There are contending views:


- **View-1:** Sparta resolved to destroy Athenian power. This view has been mainly argued by de Ste Croix.⁹

⁷ Junius P. Rodriguez, *Encyclopedia of Slave Resistance and Rebellion - Volume 1* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2007), 246.

⁸ Concise Oxford Dictionary.

⁹ George Cawkwell, *Thucydides and the Peloponnesian War* (Abingdon: Routledge, 1997), 26.

- **View-2:** Athens under the Pericles' leadership sought to embark on war to destroy Sparta.¹⁰
- **View-3:** This is Thucydides' view that 'the truest explanation' was that the growth of Athenian power made the Spartans afraid and forced them to go to war.¹¹ Thucydides also cited grievances and disputes as the real reason for war.



As matter of fact, there was a sort of power struggle in the region. Athens treated the Delian League city states as if they were their empire. Besides, Athens used the Delian League funds for projects in the city of Athens (statues, etc.). On the other hand, Sparta was shrinking and they could sense their own influence waning. Sparta feared that Athens was getting too powerful seeing that most of the Greece was already subject to them, and sought to check it.

A retrospective analysis shows the causes of war as follows:

- Mutual feeling of insecurity by the two leading states i.e. Athens and Sparta.
- Fear of compromise of interest and power.
- Power struggle.
- Swinging balance of power.

¹⁰ Ibid.


¹¹ Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, trans. Martin Hammond (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 486.

The Conduct of War

The Peloponnesian War was conducted in three main stages or phases including: (Figure-3 illustrates the conduct of war).¹²

Stage-1: The Archidamian War (431-421 BC) — During this stage of war, Sparta invaded Athens and the adjoining area. Both endeavoured for supremacy in Attica for about a decade, finally signing the *Peace of Nicias* in 421 BC.

Stage-2: The Sicilian Expedition (421-413 BC) — Soon after the Peace of Nicias, Athens invaded the city of Syracuse on the island of Sicily, sparking a new round of conflict. During the Athenian assault on Syracuse, the Athenians suffered a number of defeats. This led to the next phase of war.



Stage-3: The Decelean War or the Ionian War (413-404 BC).

During the Decelean War, the Spartans also promoted violence within Athens by instigating Athenian subjects to rebel. So Athens found itself

¹² "Peloponnesian War: Alliances at the Start and Contrasting Strategies," University of Massachusetts Boston, <http://www.faculty.umb.edu/gary_zabel/Courses/Phil%20281b/Maps/peloponnesian_war_alliances.gif> (accessed on 25 November 2013).

attacked from within as well as without. This turned disastrous for Athens, which gave up in 404 BCE.

Outcome

Though Sparta won, yet no side was clearly triumphant. The drawn out conflict ended into extensive deaths and diseases. Both states faced economic devastation. Greece became socially as well as politically weaker. The Delian League was dissolved. Sparta emerged as the hegemonic power.

Theoretical Analysis

Levels of analysis: Since the primary aim of this paper is to carry out theoretical analysis of the Peloponnesian War, therefore, it is imperative to first have a look at the pertinent theories. To start with, it is important to glance over the levels of analysis. Kenneth Waltz (1959) suggested three “images” of war: the individual, the state/society, and the system, and used these to categorize the causes of war.¹³ The attributes of Waltz’s images are as follows: Individual – biographical, personality and psychoanalysis; State and society – geography, regime, economy and macro-social; and System – anarchy, distribution of power (hard, soft, polarity, alliances).¹⁴ Figure-4 illustrates comparison of three main schools of thought in the light of Waltz’s images.¹⁵

		Realism: Machiavellians	Rationalists: Grotians	Revolutionists: Kantians
Waltz's Images	First Image: The Individual	<i>Human nature is violent</i>	<i>Some people are good some bad</i>	<i>People are good or can become good</i>
	Second Image: The State	<i>States are self-regarding</i>	<i>Some states good some are bad</i>	<i>States can become good</i>
	Third Image: System/Society of States	<i>The states system is self-help</i>	<i>The society of states has a degree of order</i>	<i>The system can become good and transcended</i>

Figure-4: Waltz’s Images of War.
Source: E-IR.

¹³ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ A.C. McKeil, “Waltz, Wight and Our Study of World Politics,” *e-International Relations*, <<http://www.e-ir.info/2013/03/23/waltz-wight-and-our-study-of-world-politics/>> (accessed on 26 November 2013).

J.D. Singer (1961) referred to these as “levels of analysis.”¹⁶ Singer explained the levels as follows:

The Individual Level:

It focuses primarily on human nature and on individual political leaders and their belief systems, psychological processes, emotional states and personalities.¹⁷

The Nation-State or National Level

It includes factors such as the type of political system (authoritarian or democratic, and variations of each), the structure of economy, the role of interest groups, ethnicity and nationalism.¹⁸

The International System Level

It includes the anarchic structure of the international system, the distribution of the military and economic power among the leading states in the system, patterns of military alliances and international trade.¹⁹

Applicability to the Peloponnesian War

The Individual Level

The politico-military leadership on both sides did affect the initiation, conduct and thus the outcome of war. Pericles, the Athenian political and military leader pronounced impact. He was known for his passionate, emotional and fiery speeches. In his speeches, he used to glorify the achievements and bravery of the Athenian people, which often fuelled the passions of the people with the consequence that the war went on for decades.

The Nation-State or National Level

The Peloponnesian War was fought between the two alliances led by two most powerful states of the era. As a matter of fact, it was a clash of interests between the Athenian imperial democracy and the Spartan oligarchy, the two political systems that were antithesis to each other. Yet again, at the root of it, it was perpetuated by imperialistic desire and design of the two powerful states.

The International System

International system was equally responsible for causing the war. Marked by bipolarity, the regional environment paved the way for contest at the level of alliance. The Persian Empire, the most powerful political entity, was located nearby. Persia, too, had its interest. It had the imprints and legacy of the Greco-Persian Wars fought from 499 to 449 BC, and was thus naturally inclined towards Sparta. Persia not only encouraged Sparta and the

¹⁶ J. D. Singer, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations,” *World Politics*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (October 1961):77-92.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

Peloponnesian League to wage war against Athens and the Delian League, but also supported physically during the final phase of the war i.e. the Decelean/Ionian War (413-404BC).




Figure-5 contains theoretical matrix of the Peloponnesian War as conceptualized by the writer.

Realism

Realism refers to *Realpolitik* which literally means politics based on real and practical rather than ethical or ideological considerations. It refers to a ruthlessly realistic and opportunist approach to statesmanship, rather than a moralistic or legalistic one. Realism is the oldest and most adopted theory of International Relations. It is the tradition of analysis that stresses the imperatives that states face to pursue power politics of national interest.²⁰ The tenets of realism go back several centuries and appear too many over time as eternal truths. Main assumptions of the theory of realism include the following:

- States are most important actors.
- Unitary-rational decision-making (by the states).
- International system is anarchic.
- All states must maximize power.
- States balance against threats.
- Morality has no place in international politics.
- International politics is more important than domestic politics.
- Human Nature: selfish, egocentric, drive for power and the will to dominate.

²⁰ Scott Burchill et al, *Theories of International Relations*, 3rd Ed (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 30.

Inter alia, prominent realist thinkers include: Sun Tzu (Ancient China), Thucydides (Ancient Greece), Machiavelli (Medieval Italy), Thomas Hobbes (civil war-torn England), Mao Tse Tung (Communist China), Hans J. Morgenthau (USA 1950s), and Kenneth N. Waltz (USA 1950s, the founder of Structural Realism). Other than the minor difference, they have all come to similar conclusions about the characteristics of the international system that can be grouped together as the theory of realism.

Applicability to the Peloponnesian War

Realism can aptly be applied to the Peloponnesian War. The details of the war have travelled down the history of over 2.5 millennia through Thucydides, an Athenian General, who wrote a book *The History of the Peloponnesian War*.²¹ Thucydides, himself, analysed the war in the light of the key assumptions of Realism. In first place, the human nation did have a strong role to play in the initiation and outcome of war. Honour, interest and fear, the fundamental human stimuli fuelled the causes and conduct of war. Human nature played its role both at the levels of leadership and the populace. The leadership stimulated by its personal motives fuelled jingoism in the masses who in turn acted as pawn on the politico-strategic chessboard of the region.

States remained to be the most important unitary-rational and decision-making actors during all stages of war. Sparta and Athens had made 'rational' choices to go to war to fulfil the national interests. The anarchic nature of international and regional system presented a zero-sum setting wherein victory of one of the two alliances could lead to defeat and devastation of the other, as it eventually transpired. Insofar as the pursuit of power by the states and struggle for survival are concerned, the nature of the Peloponnesian War, *per se*, bore evidence to it.

As a matter of fact, Realism is one such theory that is wholly applicable to the Peloponnesian War. In other words, the Peloponnesian War is a mirror image of the theory of Realism. Certainly, some postulates of various other theories are also applicable, as discussed in the succeeding paragraphs. However, no other theory is as applicable to this war in totality as is the theory of Realism. Thucydides' analysis and the essence of the Melian Dialogue also bear testimony to it.

Balance of Power Theory

The balance of power is a key postulate of both classical and structural realism. However, due to the very nature of this tenet, it is also considered by some as an independent Balance of Power Theory. Balance of power, if maintained in a regional or international politico-strategic setting, counteracts against onset of an interstate war. If disturbed it may lead to war. According to Kenneth Waltz, founder of neorealism, "balance-of-power politics prevail[s]

²¹ Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*...

wherever two, and only two requirements are met: that the order be anarchic and that it be populated by units wishing to survive.”²² Keith L. Shimko has well explained the theories as follows:

Balance of power theory predicts that states will do exactly what the theory’s name suggests – balance against the power of the other states. In order to prevent any one state or alliance from achieving dominance, states can do only two things; increase their own power or band together with other states. These options are sometimes referred to as *internal* and *external* balancing.²³

Applicability to the Peloponnesian War

The Balance of Power Theory, too, fittingly applicable to the Peloponnesian War in that it was all about power that the two most powerful states were trying to attain, retain and maintain. They tried to maximize power through internal and external resources. Failing this, they strove to attain internal and external balance, especially by means of alliances. The strategic balance was lost in a manner that over time Athens developed into a major maritime power of the region, whereas Sparta evolved into a major land power. In addition, due to the size, economy and expanding power of the Delian League, Sparta feared that Athens was getting too powerful seeing that most of the Greece was already subject to them, and sought to check it – to put right the balance of power. Thus, the swinging and indeed disturbed balance of power became one of the key causes of war.

Power Transition Theory

Power Transition Theory (PTT) also falls in the folds of Realism. According to Alfred Organski, “an even distribution of political, economic, and military capabilities between contending groups of states is likely to increase the probability of war; peace is preserved best when there is an imbalance of national capabilities between disadvantaged and advantaged nations; the aggressor will come from a small group of dissatisfied strong countries; and it is the weaker, rather than the stronger; power that is most likely to be the aggressor.”²⁴

Applicability to the Peloponnesian War

Power Transition Theory can be appositely applied to the Peloponnesian War in that the power was somewhat correspondingly, if not evenly, distributed among the two opposing alliances. This indeed became a bone of contention between the two. Both Sparta and Athens wanted to

²² Quoted in Keith L. Shimko, *International Relations: Perspectives, Controversies and Readings*, 4th Ed, (Stamford: Cengage Learning, 2012), 64.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Alfred Organski, *World Politics*. 2nd Ed. (New York: Knopf, 1968), 364–367.

dominate the region and maintain hegemony. Let us take the example of the Delian League. Despite grievances of some of the League members with regard to excesses by Athens, not even a single one of them rebelled or waged a war against Athens as it was too powerful. The case of the Peloponnesian League was not much different insofar as the alliance structure was concerned. However, when it came to the level of the two leagues, vying for power they collided in the hope to win and dominate the other.

Hegemonic Stability Theory

Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST) suggests that the international system is most stable and functions impeccably in case there is one dominant world power, which can assert itself.²⁵ The idea of hegemony and thus *Hegemonic Stability Theory* can be divided into two schools of thought- the realist school and the systemic school. Both can be further subdivided. Two dominant theories have emerged from each school. The term 'Theory of Hegemonic Stability' was introduced by Robert Keohane. A.F.K. Organski's *Power Transition Theory* is yet another approach to the realist school of thought. *Long Cycle Theory*, advocated by George Modelski, and the *World Systems Theory*, popularized by Immanuel Wallerstein, are the two dominant approaches within the systemic school of thought.²⁶

Applicability to the Peloponnesian War

Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST) is inversely applicable to the Peloponnesian War in that there was no hegemon on the international arena and thus could not play a role in ensuring stability in the region. The regional politico-strategic landscape was made up of two powers which led to a perfect bipolar system at least to the extent of the zone of war. The Persian Empire, which was certainly the most powerful and the largest political entity on the globe during the times of Peloponnesian War did not act to assert itself as a hegemon. At best, it acted as an accomplice, supporter, facilitator or sponsor – more like an ally – for Sparta during the culminating stage of the war. To be sure, the Persian support led to the conclusive victory by Sparta. However, in final analysis, the Persian involvement, too, does not bear an evidence for applicability of HST.

Asymmetric War Theory (AWT)

A war marked by asymmetry between the belligerents in power, resources, military system, war strategies, tactics and methods, is called an Asymmetric War. It may differ from 'normal' or 'symmetric' war only in the sense that one state is significantly weaker than the other; or it may involve

²⁵ Joshua S. Goldstein, *International Relations*, (New York: Pearson-Longman Publishers, 2005), 83-107.

²⁶ Terry Boswell and Mike Sweat, "Hegemony, Long Waves, and Major Wars: A Time Series Analysis of Systemic Dynamics, 1496-1967," *International Studies Quarterly* (1991): 124.

one side not being a state or even a politically recognized body; or it may involve tactics of unconventional warfare.²⁷

Applicability to the Peloponnesian War

The AWT is not aptly applicable to the Peloponnesian War because there existed a general level of symmetry between the belligerents. Both were alliances led by the powerful states. Both had similar models and methods of waging war. However, asymmetry existed in one aspect: the form of military power. Athens was a major maritime power and was relatively weaker in land forces. On the other hand, Sparta was a major land power and was comparatively weaker in naval forces. A general atmosphere of symmetry existed virtually in all other fields.

Just War Theory

The Just War Theory (JWT) was originally introduced as the Just War Doctrine by Saint Augustine (354-430 AD).²⁸ The concepts of *Jus Ad Bellum* (Justice for resorting to war), *Jus in Bello* (Justice in conduct of war) and *Jus Post Bellum* (justice at the end of the war) take their roots from writings of Aristotle and Cicero. Since Saint Augustine's writings seem to be influenced by Cicero, there is a long winded debate on this theory. Later, Machiavelli venerated the war in *The Prince*: "every war that is necessary is just."²⁹ Put simply, JWT refers to the right of self-defence of a state or a party. Just war is fought as a last resort when all other efforts have failed and the proportional use of force is opted as a last resort.

Applicability to the Peloponnesian War

The JWT is applicable to the Peloponnesian War to the extent that both sides considered themselves to be morally just having reasonable motivations to wage war. However, finger could be pointed towards Sparta for being the initiator or aggressor. Athens' response is certainly based on JWT in that it acted in self-defence. However, Sparta, too, could claim to be morally right as it acted to check increasing power of Athens, which it feared would eventually be used against Sparta and the Peloponnesian League. The intervention by the Persian empire also was "just" in Persia's right to support an ally so that Athens, a potential enemy, with whom Persia had fought a 50-year war i.e. Greco-Persian War (499 -449 BC) could be defeated.

²⁷ Greg Cashman, *What Causes War: An Introduction to Theories of War*, 2nd Ed, (Maryland, Rowman and Littlefield publishers, 2013), 277.

²⁸ Albert L. Weeks, *The Choice of War, The Iraq War and Just War Tradition* (Santa Barbara, ABC-CLIO Publishers, 2010), 15.

²⁹ Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince* (Boston, Harvard Classics, 1909-14) p.15.

The Rubicon Theory

According to the Rubicon Theory of Psychology, it is emotive behaviour of the individuals and a sort of “over confidence on the eve of war [that act as a] primary causal factor in the decision for war.”³⁰ This way, it is linked with the behaviour, personality makeup and attitude of the leadership, populace and in turn the political entity they belong to.

Applicability to the Peloponnesian War

The Rubicon Theory can be applied to the Peloponnesian War in case of both belligerents. On the one hand, the leadership of both key states i.e. Athens and Sparta was imbued with height of confidence to win and thus seize power. On the other hand, the populace had also been inflated with similar confidence. On the whole, political entities i.e. the states and the contending alliances, though not monoliths, were also instilled with the same level of confidence.

Conclusion

The phenomenon of war needs to be analysed with comprehensively taking into account all facets. War studies are important in all forms and dimensions, and all kinds of war. The interstate wars are even more important because they affect the entire regional and, at times, the global system. Analysis of wars needs to be done holistically so as to bring out the relevant and significant lessons for applicability to today’s postmodern day environment. The Peloponnesian War is but one such case with one of the most important sets of theoretical lessons embedded in it.

³⁰ Greg Cashman, *Ibid.*, 97 – 98.

HOW PERCEIVED STRESS CAN INFLUENCE ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE: ANALYZING THE ROLE OF SOME CRITICAL STRESSORS

Dr. Muhammad Zia-ur-Rehman* & Ms Rabia Sharif*

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to assess the impact of stressors on academic performance of students of management sciences. Though researchers have explored stress from different aspects, yet more work is required to explore this issue in management sciences' students of developing countries like Pakistan. This study tries to make an in-depth investigation into impact on academic performance due to four stressors i.e. financial stressors, course load, time management and social support. A quantitative approach has been adopted. The sample consists of 155 students from three universities located in Islamabad out of which response rate was 94 per cent. Results indicate that two main stressors of course load and social support affect the academic performance of students of management sciences.

Key Words: *stress, academic performance, management sciences, social support, course load*

Introduction

It has been portrayed in many movies that university life is very ideal and there is a lot of fun and freedom in it. In reality the university life is a very challenging phase. But why do some intelligent students cannot give due attention to their studies and lag behind others in the university? Why the retention ratio of intelligent students is declining in university? What are the main factors due to which upcoming generation of university students seem to be more stressful than ever before? What steps can be taken to help university students in making themselves more successful academically? This research paper aims at helping university students, university administrations and

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society in increasing understanding about some of the main stressors that influence university students' successes and failures. This paper examines the impact of stress on academic performance of students of management sciences in Pakistan, which is measured by GPA. Though different researchers have explored stress in different dimensions, yet many of them have concluded that still research gap exists and more work is required in different other dimensions of stress.¹

In academic institutions, stress can have positive or negative impact if it cannot be managed properly.² Symptoms, causes and consequences of stress in academic institutions are different from non-academic ones, as their work-setting is different.³ It is a right of each individual to learn and acquire the necessary knowledge and skill. Individuals having knowledge play a great role in development of the general economy of any nation. However, the students are facing different challenges due to intricate academic environment⁴. Similarly, students also have to face some environmental challenges that affect their academic performance.

University students have great concern about their lower Grade-Point Average (GPA), as people get benefit on different levels i.e. socially, economically, and personally, from their academic success or higher GPA. It is thus very important to determine the factors that create impact on academic performance. Stress and academic success of students are negatively related⁵. Therefore, it is important to study how stressors affect academic performance of university students. This paper aims to explore stressors affecting students of Business Administration and impacting their academic success.

Research questions

1. To establish how poor time management acts as a stressor for university students?
2. To what extent financial constraints create stress among university students?
3. To find out what is impact of stress on university students' academic performance?

¹ C.J. Rees, D. Redfern, "Recognizing the perceived causes of stress", *Training and development perspective* 32, no.4 (2000): pp.120-127.

² A. Smith, "The scale of perceived occupational stress", *Occup. Med.* 50, no. 2 (2002): pp.294-8.

³ A. Elfering, S. Grebner, N.K. Semmer, D. Kaier-Freiburghaus, S. Lauper-Del Ponte, I. Witschi, "Chronic job stressors and job control effects on event-related coping success and well-being" *Journal of Occupational Organizational Psychology*, 78, no. 1 (2005): pp.237-52.

⁴ K. Danna, R.W. Griffin, "Health and wellbeing in the workplace: a review and synthesis of the literature", *J. Manage.* 25 (1999) p.357.

⁵ N. Shields, "Stress, active coping, and academic performance among persisting and Non-persisting college students", *Journal of Applied Behavioral Research*, 6, no.2 (2001): pp.65-81.

Research objectives

The research objectives are based on the inquiry about the main stressors due to which upcoming generation's university students seem to be more stressful than ever before. Main objectives are as follows:

- To identify various aspects causing the stress, and their symptoms.
- To identify the steps which help university students manage stress.
- To help students become more successful academically.

Research Gap and Significance of the Study

It is observed that the various studies have been conducted on many dimensions but still there exists a gap to be researched on related to stress in academic institutions⁶.

Stress is considered positive as well as negative related to managing itself. There are causes, indicators and results, on which more research is needed especially in academia. Elfering⁷ is of the opinion that in academic institutions, these causes, results and symptoms can be different from institution to institution, therefore, providing the ground for further research in this area. As it is considered that success and stress are negatively related in academia, it is necessary to find out in what way stressors create impact on the students' academic performance. Therefore, it is of utmost significance to do further research in this field for identifying different challenges faced by the students in the academic environment, because this leads to overall academic performance.

Literature Review and Theoretical Justification

University life is considered to be a blissful time, but it can be very stressful and challenging for many students. According to Newton, students suffer from anxiety or stress. Though lot of researchers had tried to explore stress, yet they defined it in different ways. According to some researchers, stress is a stimulus and a hypothetical state.⁸ This study defines stress from psychosocial perspective, and has not touched physical and/or physiological stress. According to Lazarus & Launier⁹ a person becomes stressful when he

⁶ Rees, p.123.

⁷ A. Elfering, S. Grebner, N.K.Semmer, D. Kaier-Freiburghaus, S. Lauper-Del Ponte, I. Witschi, "Chronic job stressors and job control effects on event-related coping success and well-being", *Journal of Occupational Organizational Psychology* 78, (2005): pp.237-52.

⁸ R. Fleming, A. Baum & J.E. Singer, , "Toward an integrative approach to the study of stress", *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 46 (1984): pp.239-949.

⁹ R.S. Lazarus, & R. Launier "Stress-related transactions between person and environment. In L.A. Pervin & M. Lewis (eds.), *Perspectives on Interactional Psychology*, (1978): pp.287- 327, (N.Y.: Plenum Press).

finds that his/her relationship with the environment is threatening, as he/she perceives that adaptive resources are lesser than environmental demand.

According to Fleming and Baum no situation or event is generally stressful.¹⁰

According to researchers¹¹ stress is due to incongruity between environmental requirements (stressors) and individual competency to accomplish these requirements. So, when an individual faces a scenario that he/she perceives as destructive and cannot deal with it, he/she will be under stress. Stress can also be due to constructive or destructive experience; Cox & Brockley¹² have an observation that stress is an insight occurrence, which results from a gap between the demand set and capability of an individual to accomplish the mission fruitfully. Thus, due to unsteady circumstances, the person experiences stress which eventually leads into stress reaction.

Different researchers like Ross, Niebling, & Heckert,¹³ support the fact that university environment places numerous demands like increased academic workload, pressure to attain and maintain good grades, establishing good relationships with new faculty members and new friends, efficient time-management, and increased independence from families, which need to be adapted by students. If students cannot meet these demands, they might suffer from stress that may have adverse impact on their self-esteem, result in poorer mental health, poorer processing of information, and weekend memory. Stanley and Manthorpe¹⁴ explored that nowadays there is more public concern in different societies about stress as evidence have shown that university students are exposed to poor mental health.

Previous researchers have identified high level of depression and anxiety among university students globally.¹⁵ Facts have proved that most of the college students are less able to complete complex academic tasks, as they experience high levels of psychological distress.¹⁶ Thus different researchers have explored different aspects of stress. Up-till now researchers, exploring students' stressors, focused on some specific sectors of the student population, i.e. medical students¹⁷, students practicing or studying law¹⁸, hospitality

¹⁰ R. Fleming, A. Baum, & J.E. Singer, "Toward an integrative approach to the study of stress", *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 46 (1984): pp.239-949.

¹¹ Fleming, p.240 (ref 9).

¹² T. Cox, and T. Brockley "The Experience and Effects of Stress in Teachers", *British Educational Research Journal*. 77, no 2 (1984): pp.139-145.

¹³ Ibid. Cox, pp.140.

¹⁴ N. Stanley, J. Manthorpe, "Responding to students' mental health needs: impermeable systems and diverse users", *J. Mental Health*, 10, no1 (2001): 41–52.

¹⁵ A. Adewuya, B. Ola, O. Olutayo, B. Mapayi, O. Oginni, "Depression amongst Nigerian university students — Prevalence and socio-demographic correlates" *Psychiatr. Epidemiol.* 41: (2006): pp.674–678.

¹⁶ R. Barclay, "Counseling services annual report". *Ypsilanti: Eastern Michigan University* (1994).

¹⁷ S. Pryjmachuk, & D. A. Richards, "Predicting stress in pre-registration nursing students", *British Journal of Health Psychology*, 12, (2007): pp.125-144.

students¹⁹, psychology students²⁰, and social work students²¹. Some other researchers have developed some generalized measures of perceived stress²².

Still research gap regarding stress exists in one sector, which is Business Administration or the field of management sciences and the students related to this discipline especially in a developing country like Pakistan. The business management education helps in improving leadership and entrepreneurial qualities of individuals, which ultimately leads towards helping in development of the economy in which they perform. In the professional education of management sciences, students have to be exposed to many challenges.

As university students are victim of stress, therefore, researchers have identified numerous stressors. In previous studies few stressors that have been identified by scholars include a lot of projects and reports, rivalry between classmates on getting good grades, failures, inadequate pocket money or financial resources, lack of social support from classmates or unfriendly relationship with faculty members (resource persons), family or domestic problems²³. Stressors related to university/institution working environment include congested classrooms/halls²⁴, semester system, and scarce resources to carry out academic work efficiently. Some of students perceive stress due to increased pressure to perform well in examinations and quizzes or due to their poor time management skills. The fact that Lack of Social Support Act (LSSA) as a stressor is being supported by numerous other researchers as well, who stress student's attachment to another individual/student/mentor that provide consultation. Adult attachment occurs when students feel themselves safe in adult attachment association and seek consultancy from that adult, especially when they are under stress. Individuals, who have secure adult attachment relationship (AAR), can easily adapt themselves to environmental changes and uncertainties. Thus they become more competent academically and socially,

¹⁸ L.A. Gilbert, & C.K. Holahan, "Conflicts between student professional, parental, and self-development roles: a comparison of high and low effective Copers", *Human Relations* 35: (1982): pp.630-648.

¹⁹ G. Jogaratnam, & P. Buchanan, "Balancing the demands of school and work: Stress and employed hospitality students", *International Journal of Contemporary Hospitality Management*, 76, no 4 (2004): pp.237-245.

²⁰ F. Mchie, M. Glachan, & D. Bray, "An evaluation of factors influencing the academic self-concept, self-esteem and academic stress for direct and re-entry students in higher education," *Educational Psychology*, 27, no. 4, (2001): 455-472.

²¹ P. J. Tobin , & J. Carson, "Stress and the student social worker", *Social Work & Social Sciences Review*, 5, no. 3, (1994): pp.246-255.

²² S. Cohen, T. Kamarck, & R. Hermelstein, "A global measure of perceived stress", *Journal of Health and Social Behavior* 24, (1983): pp.385-396.

²³ K. Fairbrother, J. Warn, "Workplace Dimensions, Stress and Job Satisfaction", *J. Managerial Psychology*. 18, no.1: (2003): pp.8-21.

²⁴ H. Ongori, JE. Agolla, "Occupational Stress in Organizations and Its Effects on Organizational Performance", *J. Manage* 8, no.3: (2008) 123-135.

and have better ego strength, so importance of social support cannot be denied²⁵.

Similarly, many researchers have explored financial stressors affecting students. Students feel themselves stressful due to lack of financial resources as well. Some of financial stressors identified by students include unavailability of computers, books, or congested classrooms/halls, as unavailability leads to failure. Lack of financial resources creates depression and decreases quality of life in individuals. Children belonging to poor family or of lower class, mostly become victim of psychological problems, depression, lonesomeness, and become very sensitive emotionally. Research also supports that academic workload creates stress in some students. In one of the studies related to students' stress in Israel found that some of academic stressors include too many assignments or examination fever²⁶. Mostly female students get stressful due to ineffective time management. Research also explored that individual's perception of control over time is one of sources of student stress²⁷. This view is supported by researchers who found that individuals having perception that they can control time or it is in their hands, are less stressful²⁸.

In summing up over the last two decades, researchers have identified that daily life hassles are better predictors of self-reported adjustment difficulties than the key life events²⁹, for instance, person get irritated due to daily life issues such as losing things or financial apprehensions.³⁰

Academic success is usually measured by, Grade-Point Average (GPA) and course completion³¹. It is observed that stress has a negative effect on students' quality of life³² and also with students' academic performance³³. Some researchers have explored the impact of stress on student's performance with respect to change in time period and identified that initially there exists a positive relationship between stress and students' performance to some

²⁵ T.A. Sheppard, "Social Interaction and Academic Performance", *Education Research and Perspectives* 5, (1976): pp.3-15.

²⁶ A. Shirom, "Students' stress", *Higher Education* 15, no. 6 (1986): pp.67-676.

²⁷ S. A. Nonis, G. I. Hudson, L. B. Logan, & C. W. Ford, "Influence of perceived control over time on college students' stress and stress-related outcomes". *Research in Higher Education*, 39, no. 5, (1998): pp.587-605.

²⁸ T. H. Macan, C. Shahani, R. L. Dipboye, & A. P. Phillips, "College student' time management: Correlations with academic performance and stress", *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 82, (1990): pp.760-768.

²⁹ A. De Longis, J.C. Coyne, G. Dakof, S. Folkman, and R.S. Lazarus, "Relationship of daily hassles, uplifts, and major life events to health status", *Health Psychology* 1, (1982): pp.119-36.

³⁰ K.R. Blankstein, G.L. Flett, and S. Koledin, "The brief college student hassles scale: development, validation, and relation with pessimism", *Journal of College Student Development* 32, (1991): pp.258-64.

³¹ N. Shields, p.67.


³² K. Danna, R.W. Griffin, "Health and wellbeing in the workplace: a review and synthesis of the literature", *J. Manage* 25 (1999): p.357.

³³ R. Rust,, "Epidemiology of mental health in college", *Journal of Psychology* 49 (1960): 235-248.

specific limit after which stress impacts performance negatively³⁴. Cahir and Morris explored the impact of emotional, financial and academic stressors of graduate psychology training on students, and found that female students had higher stress scores than males³⁵. From literature, it is evident that stress has an impact on students' performance, and variety of factors creates stress among university students.

This paper explores stressors affecting students of management sciences in a developing country like Pakistan. Fig 1 illustrates the model depicting the relationship between stress and academic performance.

Figure 1



Independent variable of study is a stress among students, which is measured through four stressors including financial constraints, social support, time management, and academic load. Academic performance is affected by stress as shown in literature, so academic performance is dependent variable for this study, which is measured by GPA of students taken from exam cells of a university. On the basis of the above theoretical justification, the following logical conjectures were proposed:

Hypothesis 1: Students' financial status has an impact on their level of perceived stress.

³⁴ R.A. Brymer, "Stress and your employees", Cornell Hotel and Restaurant", *Administration Quarterly* 23 no. 1, (1982): 61-6.

³⁵ N. Cahir, and R.D. Morris, "The psychology student stress questionnaire", *Journal of Clinical Psychology* 47 no. 3, (1991): pp.414-17.

Hypothesis 2: Students' social status has an impact on their perceived stress level.

Hypothesis 3: Students' academic load affects stress level.

Hypothesis 4: Students' time management capabilities have an impact on their stress level.

Hypothesis 5: The stress affects academic performance of students.

This is a basic research and nature of study is descriptive, as it is undertaken to understand the factors that create stress. It is correlational study, conducted to check relationship among variables. The researchers' interference is minimal because questionnaires were given to the students and they filled them according to their own behaviour and choice. While conducting the study, there were no more disturbances in their normal work-routine than just spending some time in filling these questionnaires. The research has been done in the non-contrived and normal settings i.e. in the natural environment (environment of Business Administration Department). The unit of analysis is an individual student and the study is cross-sectional or one shot.

Research Methodology

The population is comprised of the students of higher education or university in twin cities of Islamabad and Rawalpindi. We have taken students from the departments of Business Administration or Management Sciences of three universities of the twin cities randomly including Bahria University, National University of Modern Languages and Preston University, as a case study for our sample. Sample size was 155 out of which 147 respondents gave back their filled questionnaires. So the response rate was considered as 94 per cent.

The questionnaires employed in this research, used the Likert's five-point scale (Likert, R, 1967). The study used 26-item questionnaire and these items evaluate four main dimensions; the first is the financial stressors among students (4 items), the second is the social support (8 items), the third is the academic workload (11 items) and fourth is time management factor (3 items). The instrument used items from questionnaire earlier used by Ying Ming Lin (2009) and Burge (2009).

Thus this study uses a questionnaire with twenty-one items from academic stress inventory questionnaire (ASIQ) developed by Ying Ming Lin & Farn Shing Chen (2009), which fulfil the reliability and validity requirements. For reliability testing, researchers carried out the Cronbach alpha test and the α (alpha) value obtained was between 0.85-0.92. An alpha (α) value of the overall academic stress questionnaires was 0.90. The reliability of the questionnaire achieved the levels required by the estimation standards of George and Mallery (2003). Pearson's correlation analysis was also conducted to obtain the significant level of related coefficients of various factor components (Ying Ming Lin & Farn Shing Chen, 2009). Six items related to measure time management stressors and financial stressors have been taken

from university stress scale developed by Burge (2009), which is also a reliable and valid instrument to measure university students' stress and its impact on their performance.

Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 19 was used to conduct analysis of the data gathered. The 26 items in instrument were loaded into SPSS for analysis to test correlation and regression as shown below in Table 3 and 4. Table 1 shows the demographic characteristics of respondents.

Table 1
Demographic Characteristics of Respondents n=147

Demographics	Frequencies n=147	Percentage
Gender		
Male	104	70.7
Female	43	29.3
Age group		
18-21	14	9.5
22-26	115	78.2
27-30	16	10.9
31-35	2	1.4
Over 35	0	0
GPA		
1.5-2	30	20.4
2-2.5	2	21.8
2.5-3	52	35.4
3-3.5	51	34.7
3.5-4	12	8.2
Course load		
>3 or 3	15	10.2
4	30	20.4
5	83	56.5
<5	19	12.2

Descriptive Statistics

The descriptive statistics results for this study showed a neutral response of respondents to perceived stress and their academic performance. Mean values range 3.59 as highest value and lowest value of 2.97. The results for time management showed the highest concurrence (Mean 3.59 and standard deviation 1.05), course load (Mean 3.28 and standard deviation .74). Social-support with the mean of 3.15 and standard deviation .84, financial stressors with mean of 2.98 and standard deviation of .67 and GPA with the mean 3.299 and standard deviation of .89.

Table 2

Descriptive Statistics				
	N	Mean		Std. Deviation
	Statistic	Statistic	Std. Error	Statistic
GPA	147	3.29	.073	.89
Course load	147	3.27	.061	.74
Social support	147	3.15	.069	.84
Time management	147	3.59	.086	1.05
Financial stressors	147	2.97	.055	.67

Correlation Analysis

Correlation among the constructs/elements of stressors has been checked through correlation analysis. The result indicated that most of variables have statistically significant relationship at ($p < .01$). Course load has strong positive significant relationship with social support. Time management has strong positive significant relationship with social support. Also time management has strong positive relationship with the course load. GPA has negative significant relationship with the social support, course load and time management.

Table 3

Correlations among elements of stressors					
	Social support	Financial stress	Course load	Time management	GPA
Social support	1				
Financial stressors	-.013	1			
Course load	.548**	-.016	1		
Time management	.551**	.068	.523**	1	
GPA	-.433**	.091	-.492**	-.279**	1

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Regression Analysis

The results of regression analysis based on independent variables (Financial stressors, time management, social support and course load) are

shown in Table 4. The overall model fit for regression equation was determined by F-statistics. This model has shown positive, and statistically significant results having $F=14.2$ and $p = .000$. The regression analysis results show that 28.9% of variance in dependent variable is due to these independent variables (R square = .289). Course load has highest beta of $-.38$ and social support the second highest beta of $-.253$ showing that they have negative relationship with students' performance.

Table 4
Regression analysis of independent variables with students' academic performance

Constant	Standardized Coefficients Beta	Significance 000
Social support	-.253	.007
Financial stressors	.078	.280
Course load	-.380	.000
Time management	.054	.552
R square: 0.289 F-value: 14.204		

Discussion

The results of study show that university students experience stress, which has impact on their grades. The two main factors, which lead to their stress, are course load and social factors. Students of Management Sciences perceive highest stress due to Business Administration course load. This finding is consistent with previous findings of Agolla, 2008³⁶. Students showed that they feel assignments and projects given to them are sometimes very difficult and excessive. One reason due to which students put high weight on academic load as stressor is that in Pakistani education system, up till college life assignments and quizzes carry no marks in final result or grade as according to Federal Board of Education of Pakistan Policy, and just the marks of final exam impact the students' grade. But when they come into university they feel it very difficult to do a lot of assignments and prepare quizzes for each subject. Unlike their previous studies in universities internal evaluation carries 20-30 percentages of final grades. As they are not accustomed to doing these assignments and projects, they feel themselves under stress when they have to do multiple activities such as to go to the field to collect data for projects so on and so forth in order to complete set tasks. Students feel social support as another major factor, which affects their stress level.

³⁶ J.E. Agolla (2008), "Occupational Stress in Organizations and Its Effects on Organizational Performance, J. Manage. Res. 8(3): pp.123-135.

The findings are consistent to earlier findings³⁷, there can be different reasons for this as well e.g. in Pakistan up to college levels there is very little concept of co-education and in university they find it difficult to communicate with other gender. They feel shy to participate in class. Also up-to college life there is very little emphasis on grooming the oral communication skills of students. They are not in practice of giving presentations or participation in discussions while in university especially in Business Administration programmes the main emphasis and weightage is given on presentations and group discussions. So most of students become victim of stage fright, they feel that if they cannot speak well thinking their class fellows may laugh at them. They cannot communicate well with other fellows and even with teachers, so they cannot take extra counselling or guidance on topics or concepts from their fellows and teachers. Another factor, which leads to lack of social support, can be that some students come from different cities to complete their degrees and thus they have new relation and they face communication gap. In some families even parents set high expectations, which can be another source of stress. In the study, financial stressor has not been proven to have a significant impact on students' performance. This finding is inconsistent with the finding of previous study by Fairbrother K, Warn J (2003)³⁸. There can be multiple reasons for this. One factor can be that the study sample consists of universities of Islamabad, and in these universities most of students who come in Business Administration programmes are from middle or upper middle class having affordability to pay university dues and for them finance is not a main issue. Also time management was not found to have significant impact on performance.

Conclusion

University students' academic performance is affected by the stress mainly by the two main sources as identified in this study, including course load and social support. By identifying these main factors, which lead to stress among business administration students of universities, the study could provide better insights to the academic administrators for initiating efforts to reduce the intensity of academic stress. The study can be furthered to other educational institutions in order to test the research model for generalization.

Questionnaire

Instructions: Respond to each item using the scale below, and indicate your response number on the line by each item

Strongly Disagreee	Disagreee	Neither Agree Nor	Agree	Strongly Agree
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³⁷ E. F. Topper, (2007), Stress in the Library, *Journal of New Library*, 108(11/12): pp.561-564.

³⁸ K . Fairbrother, J. Warn (2003), "Workplace Dimensions, Stress and Job Satisfaction", *J. Managerial Psychol.* 18(1): pp.8-21.

	Disagree	
1	2	3
	4	5
1.	I feel that the assignments and projects given by some teachers are too strict	_____
2.	I feel that the assignments and projects of some teachers are excessive	_____
3.	I feel that I do not understand a lot about some teacher's teaching content	_____
4.	Some teachers provide too much data which causes me to be unable to finish studying and to understand the knowledge.	_____
5.	I feel a lot of pressure because all subjects use foreign language books	_____
6.	I feel that I am not able to adapt to teaching methods of some teachers'	_____
7.	I feel that once I got in university, I could not keep up with the pace of the teachers' Instruction	_____
8.	I do not get good enough sleep at night because I worry about quizzes and exams.	_____
9.	I stay up late before all the big and small quizzes and exams.	_____
10.	I feel that the assignments and projects of some teachers are difficult.	_____
11.	I often face problems as how to share work with my classmates when some exercises or reports require group work.	_____
12.	When group work is required to complete a project, I worry that I will not be able to find a suitable group member.	_____
13.	When I give a presentation, I worry that my classmates will laugh at my inability to perform well.	_____
14.	I feel that my parents feel that I am not serious with my studies.	_____
15.	I worry that my academic results will not meet expectations of my parents.	_____
16.	When I want to study on my own in class, I am affected by my classmates' chatting.	_____
17.	I feel that there is open rivalry and veiled struggles among classmates due to academic performance.	_____
18.	I feel that I am unable to schedule the time between academic and social activities effectively.	_____
19.	I feel it difficult for me to find a balance between my academic and social activities.	_____
20.	I feel that the social activities and student association affect my academic work.	_____
21.	I feel confident about my ability to support myself financially	_____
22.	I feel pressured as I can't manage my weekly budget.	_____
23.	I can't get money I need to pay for my university dues.	_____
24.	I feel that it is difficult for my parents to earn enough money to pay for my university dues.	_____
25.	I feel difficult to give time for my family.	_____
26.	I feel a lot of pressure due to lack of clarity about assessment task requirements.	_____

FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREAS (FATA): FROM NO-MAN'S LAND TO POLITICAL MAINSTREAMING

Hamid Iqbal* & Saeed Khan*

Abstract

The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Fata) was a 'no man' zone for political activities and freedom of thought and expression thus resultantly making it a real threat for the country's survival and security. Since long, the people of Fata have been deprived of basic human rights and other socio-economic opportunities existing in the rest of Pakistan. As a consequence of lingering problem and seclusion from the State and mainstream politics Fata remained a governance nightmare, where instability and lawlessness is rampant. The current system of governance, the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) that governed the area, was introduced by the British rulers for their own colonial aims in the region. The same system remained and continued even after the reassignment of the area from British majestic administration to Pakistan. Under the Constitution of Pakistan, the President is the only authority to enact laws for Fata. In mid-2011 President Asif Ali Zardari issued two orders regarding Amendments in the FCR and Extension of the Political Parties Order to Fata, planning to endorse administrative, judicial and political reforms in the tribal areas of Pakistan. The prolonged lack of political activities along with other issues makes any development and reforms agenda in the area (Fata) both unique and challenging.

Key Words: *fata, fcr, political reforms, political parties, election.*

Introduction

The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Fata) has a very important geo-strategic position, where it shares borders with Afghanistan and the settled areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). Fata consists of seven agencies and six Frontier Regions (FRs). Seven agencies include Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, North Waziristan, and South Waziristan. While regions are: Peshawar, Kohat,

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Bannu, Lakki Marwat, Tank, and Dera Ismail Khan. Estimated population of Fata is 3.5 million.¹

Currently, Fata is the most volatile region of Pakistan. American President Bill Clinton has phrased the area as the 'most dangerous place on earth'.² Tribal belt of Pakistan is known for its unique structure of governance that have prevalent since centuries. The current administrative system of governance was established by the British rulers for their vested interests on the gateway to South Asia from the North West of India.

To make certain their control over the area, the colonial rulers enforced a series of laws in 1870s. One of these laws was the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR). The FCR, especially designed for the tribal areas, was different from the criminal and civil laws that were in force elsewhere in British India. In 1893, the British government elevated a demarcation with Afghanistan, called by Durand Line. In 1901, the British rule issued a new FCR that expanded the scope of earlier regulations and awarded wide powers to administrative officials (*Maliks*— tribal elders).³

The British administration deeply relied upon the local support. For this purpose various steps were taken to gain the sympathies of the tribal people. In this regard certain reforms were introduced including Maliki system and FCR. The people of Fata were deprived of political, judicial, social and other reforms, introduced in other parts of the country. The well-established excuse for this denial was the traditional set up and conservativenature of the people.

The same situation continued even after the withdrawal of British colonial administration from the Indian subcontinent. Pakistan exactly followed the same system of administration inherited from the British. Unfortunately, this system more or less is even continuing today. The mechanism of accession, signed in 1948, contracted the tribal areas a special administrative status. The tribal areas were allowed to preserve their semi-autonomous status, exercising administrative authority based on tribal codes and traditional institutions like Jirga. This exclusive system even falls into place in Pakistan's Constitution of 1973. Political parties have had a *de facto* presence in the region since the 1970s. Some political factions even managed to get their candidates

¹ Sarfraz Khan, "Special Status of FATA: Illegal Becoming Licit", *Research Journal of Area Study Centre*, University of Peshawar, 2009, p.2. As well <http://www.asc-centralasia.edu.pk/Issue_63/02-SPECIAL_STATUS_OF_FATA.html>, accessed December 15, 2013.

² Syed Waqar Ali Shah, "Political Reforms in Fata: Will It End the Current Militancy", Heidelberg Paper in South Asian and Comparative Politics, *Working Paper No. 64*, 2012.p.7.

³ Ibid.

elected to the National Assembly and the Senate of Pakistan. But they could not take part in elections as representatives of Pakistan's political parties and were considered to be independent candidates.

Under the Constitution of 1973, the President of Pakistan is the only authority to enact laws for Fata. In mid-2011 President Asif Ali Zardari issued two orders regarding Amendments in the FCR and Extension of the Political Parties Order to Fata, with an aim to endorse administrative, judicial and political reforms in the tribal areas of Pakistan.⁴ In the course of these reforms, certain amendments have been made in the FCR. Keeping in view the prolonged lack of political activities along with other issues, any development and reforms agenda in the area (Fata) is both unique and challenging.

This paper is an attempt to examine the 2013 general election in Pakistan and the emerging new trends in the country, in general, and in the tribal areas of Pakistan, in particular. It is an attempt to address some major questions which surfaced in the wake of fast deteriorating law and order situation in the country, and especially in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Fata. These questions are: How the inhabitant of Fata viewed the election? What was Taliban's reaction to the election? How people responded to the threats of Taliban? Which major political parties participated in the election? What political reforms were introduced and how did it work for stimulating political activities in Fata? What was the voters' turnout? Why religious parties lost their influence in tribal areas? What major new trends were observed in Fata in 2013 election?

State Indifference towards Fata

Since long, the people of Fata have been deprived of basic human rights and other socio-economic opportunities existing in the rest of Pakistan. As a consequence of lingering overlook and seclusion from the state, intense poverty, instability and lawlessness define Fata. Due to the absence of proper governmental setup and weak state writ, Fata has become a sort of safe haven for hostile groups and individuals who have successfully taken advantage of prevailing circumstances i.e. poverty, illiteracy, state neglect and institutional isolation. They have cashed in on these weak points of the area to gain local support and ultimately established a state within a state.

⁴ "Major Changes Made in FCR: Fata People Get Political Rights", *Dawn*, (Islamabad), August 13, 2011.

The partition plan of June 3, 1947 resulted into the creation of Pakistan on 14th of August 1947. In many parts of the Indian subcontinent, referendums and plebiscites were held in order to allow the masses to choose their future either as part of India or Pakistan. In this regard the inclusion of NWFP (recently renamed as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and Fata in Pakistan was one of the most cumbersome problems.⁵

Although some local leaders at that time had raised the issue of Pakhtunistan and were striving for an independent Pakhtun state, yet their efforts remained unsuccessful, as the British simply rejected the idea. A greater part of the masses tended towards the Muslim League and joined their efforts for creating a separate homeland for the Muslims. As far as association with Pakistan is concerned, a *Grand Jirga* was held in tribal agencies in 1947 in which all the tribes unanimously confirmed their support in favour of Pakistan. All the tribes declared and confirmed in written statements their loyalties towards Pakistan, and in return asked to maintain the same relations with central government of Pakistan as they had with the British.⁶

Though the tribal people were given the same status as they were enjoying in the British rule, the federal government of Pakistan could not remain unconcerned about the sense of seclusion of tribal areas for a long time. The first Governor General of Pakistan, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, made a trip to the NWFP (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) in April 1948. During his visit he also managed to meet the tribal representatives and other elders. In his official address to the tribal representatives at the Governor House, Peshawar, he made it clear that "Pakistan has no desire to unduly interfere with your internal freedom. On the contrary, Pakistan wants to help you and make you, as far as it lies in our power, self-reliant and self-sufficient and help in your educational, social and economic uplift, and not be left as you are dependent on annual doles, as has been the practice hitherto which meant that at the end of the year you were no better off than beggars asking for allowances, if possible a little more. We want to put you on

⁵ Dr Claude Rakisits, "Pakistan's Tribal Areas: A Critical No-Man's Land", (Paper delivered at Webster University Forum, Geneva), April 25, 2008, p.4. Available on <http://www.geopoliticalassessments.com/Pakistan_s_Tribal_Areas.pdf>, accessed January 22, 2013.

⁶ Sayed Wiqar, "Political Reforms in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan", p.7, available online at <http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/13063/1/Heidelberg_Papers_64_Ali_Shah.pdf>, accessed January 19, 2013.

your legs as self-respecting citizens who have the opportunities of fully developing and producing what is best in you and your land".⁷

After the death of Quaid-i-Azam, the federal government of Pakistan did nothing to change the policy towards the tribal areas and unfortunately the same inherited policies were continued to deal with the tribal people. The successive governments also ignored the situation and no basic changes were observed in their policies towards Fata. Like the British, the central government of Pakistan ruled the tribal people indirectly. In this indirect ruling system the political agents (PAs) were the main source of communication between the central government and the people of Tribal Areas. They gave allowances to the people through the political agents. They never contacted the people directly at the grassroots level.⁸

This situation remained unchanged and the indirect system of communication continued for a long. No initiatives were taken to introduce political, legislative or electoral reforms in Fata. The Political Parties Act of 1962 functioned in the rest of the country, whereas the Fata was denied of this right for reasons well known to the federal government of Pakistan. One reason of not allowing political activities in Fata might probably be the fear of popularity of the Pakhtun nationalist parties, it can be said, due to the demand of Pakhtun State at that time, which was un-acceptable to the federal government. These nationalist groups had the sympathies of Afghanistan government for their vested interests. Any miscalculation on the part of Pakistan could cause great damage to the national integrity and could result into serious security threats for the rest of the country.

Like their predecessor (British) Pakistan continued to deal with local tribal chiefs (maliks) through the political agents instead of establishing contacts with the people at grassroots level.⁹ In short, Fata remained separate from the mainstream though it was a part of Pakistan. It resembled like a colony whose population lived under the shadow of old laws and other managerial arrangements that were quite different from the rest of administrative setup of Pakistan. The whole credit goes to the successive federal governments. They did not try to bring Fata region into the mainstream like the other parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan.

⁷ Ibid., p.11.

⁸ Rashid Ahmed Khan, "Fata After Independence: 1947-2001" in Noorul Haq, Rashid Ahmed Khan, Maqsoodul Hasan Nuri (edt.), *Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan* (Islamabad, Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2005), p.33.

⁹ Noor ul Haq, Rashid Ahmed Khan and Maqsoodul Hasan Nuri, "Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan", *IPRI Paper* 10, Asia Printers Islamabad, March 2005, p.25.

The people of Fata have joined Pakistan and affirmed the tribal areas as a part of Pakistan and have guaranteed to offer any help to the country if need arises. They have shown their loyalties and also made it clear “to be peaceful and law abiding and to maintain friendly relations with the people of the settled districts”.¹⁰ In return they got nothing but the old administrative setup which they have witnessed during British times. No fundamental changes are made in the policy of the government towards the administration and political structure of the tribal areas. They have continued with the old inherited colonial administration. The only system that governs the area is the FCR, which is cruel in nature. It is known as *Kala Qanon* (Black law) among the people of Fata.

Political Reforms in Fata

Since independence, the Fata has been dealt through special laws and regulations. The people of the area do not enjoy any political and other socio-economic rights as the other people do. The major reason at the back of this is the absence of a variety of legal arrangements necessary for the Fata inhabitants to use their basic rights as preserved in the Constitution of Pakistan. One of these legal arrangements, which have not been extended so far to the tribal areas, is the proper political setup in the area.

Keeping in view the miseries of the people and lawlessness prevailing in the area, the federal government has realized the fact that unless major changes are introduced in the Fata, it is difficult to eradicate militancy from the area and to govern it properly. For this purpose, some reforms have been introduced by the previous government of Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) in a hope to bring some positive changes in Fata. Though, previously, successive governments had introduced certain reforms in Fata, yet they were not properly implemented.

The adult franchise, which is a political right of every mature adult man and woman, has not been extended to Fata since independence. For about fifty years the people of Fata have been deprived of basic constitutional rights which are practiced in other parts of Pakistan. In late 1996 the federal government announced to extend the right of adult franchise to Fata. Till then the system of limited franchise was working in the Fata. In this system only the chosen people

¹⁰ Ibid.

who were *Maliks* and other notables, had the right to cast their vote. Common local people had no such rights (the right to vote).¹¹

Until the introduction of adult franchise in 1996, an electoral college of some 35,500 *Maliks* selected representatives to the National Assembly, usually under the influence of some political stakeholders.¹² Thereafter, in the 1997, 2002 and 2008 polls, Fata legislators were directly elected to the lower house of Parliament of Pakistan. This legislative body from the agencies was purely elected on a non-party basis.¹³ The election of 1997 is considered the first of its type held in Fata in which 12 members were directly elected to the Parliament. People of Fata had been demanding introduction and proper functioning of adult franchise in their area for a long, but this right was denied to them by the successive governments due to some reasons mentioned earlier in this paper. In the Constitution of Pakistan Fata is considered as a federal subject, and due to this reason it has no representation in the provincial legislature. However, despite intense opposition from the *Maliks'* side and other paid proprietors, tribal people demanded that as Fata territory was part of Pakistan then why it was not considered as a part in real senses. They also demanded extension of all those privileges and other civil rights to Fata which existed in other parts of Pakistan.¹⁴

During President General Pervez Musharraf's regime some amendments were made in PPO (1962) and it was replaced as the PPO (2002), but again Fata region was specifically excluded from the jurisdiction of this act. In 2002, General Musharraf's government created a separate governor's secretariat for Fata. In 2006, it was reorganized as the Fata secretariat. But having limited resources and low capacity it was mostly dependent on its Khyber Pakhtunkhwa counterpart for proper functioning.

Another change was observed in Fata in 2002 general elections. These elections were held under the patronage of the military establishment in which the liberals were marginalized and the mullahs managed to win. In these elections, six-party religious coalition, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), won seven of Fata's 12 National Assembly seats.¹⁵

The 2008 elections were somehow different from that of 2002 election. These general elections brought some positive change in Fata

¹¹ Sayed Wiqar, "Political Reforms," p.12.

¹² "FATA Political Reforms", <<http://waziristanhills.com/FATA/PoliticalReforms/tabid/135/language/en-GB/Default.aspx>>, accessed May 28, 2013.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Sayed Wiqar, "Political Reforms," p.12.

¹⁵ "FATA Political Reforms".

and one of them was representation of major political parties. Candidates affiliated to the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and Awami National Party (ANP) took part in the election and managed to win some seats in Fata. Unlike the past, religious parties manage to win only a single National Assembly seat.¹⁶

Subsequently, in 2009, the PPP government took initiatives and President Asif Ali Zardari pronounced some political and administrative reforms for Fata. These reforms also included freedom of political activities in the tribal areas of which this region was kept deprived for long. With the introduction of such reforms tribal people were now given the right to appeal during trial which they did not have previously. Similarly, those women and children who were under sixteen were exempted from the collective responsibility section of the FCR.¹⁷ Now the political parties were given freedom to operate freely in the tribal areas and carry out their political activities and present their party manifestos and other agendas. While introducing the PPO, the government aimed to offset the growing wave of militancy and to weaken the destructive movement of the militants of exploiting the simple headed people of Fata.¹⁸

These were the first-ever positive steps taken by the federal government. These reforms resulted into positive developments in Fata. This fact was observed in 2013 election which was unlike any other elections in the history of the region. The governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has termed these reforms a watershed in bringing the unstable and conflict-ridden tribal areas into the mainstream political system of Pakistan.¹⁹

In this regard the Fata Committee, comprised of members of all major political parties of Pakistan, met on March 14, 2013. The purpose of this get-together was to give its estimation of the pre-election situation in Fata and to give certain suggestions for the future course of action, mainly political development of the area. They proposed some recommendations which are:

- The two regulations — amendments in FCR and extension of PPO to Fata — should properly be implemented.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Syed Irfan Zia, "Far-reaching Fata reforms unveiled", *Dawn*, (Islamabad), August 14, 2009.

¹⁸ "Major Changes Made in FCR: Fata People Get Political Rights", *Dawn*, (Islamabad), August 13, 2011.

¹⁹ "Fata Political Reforms".

- The government should ensure all the political parties to properly and freely operate in tribal areas without any restrictions.
- The government should establish reserved MNA seats for women of Fata. Women should be given the right to vote fully and for that purpose separate polling stations for women should be set up in all agencies and Frontier Regions.
- The role of media during election days is important. For that the government should provide security to the media so that they can cover all the activities and events in Fata.
- The Government should ensure free and fair elections in Fata and in the rest of the country.
- All these suggestions should be implemented without any delay before the 2013 general elections.²⁰

Views of Fata's People Regarding Political Reforms

The first thing in this regard is that we have totally misunderstood Fata, its people, its tribal structure. From the very start the government of Pakistan intentionally or by mistake romanticized the situation wrongly. Since 1947 the government of Pakistan never tried to understand the ground realities existed in Fata. "The very term *Azad Qabayl* (free tribes) used for Fata is wrong in its very essence. The fact is that the people of Fata were never Azad (free). How can they be free when FCR like laws and regulations were there and are still in use over there?"²¹

There is a misperception and exaggeration of the fact that the people of Fata wanted to retain their own tribal system and did not want assimilation with the rest of the country. It is completely wrong and exaggerated. "When the people of Fata voted for Pakistan—in a referendum held after independence— and showed their loyalties towards the state of Pakistan then why Fata was dealt differently, why FCR and other inhuman regulations were retained by the government, why no development took place, and why people were deprived of their basic human and political rights?"²²

²⁰ "Shortcomings of political parties act. FTA politicians call for quick reforms before polls" <<http://tribune.com.pk/story/521534/shortcomings-of-political-parties-act-fata-politicians-call-for-quick-reforms-before-polls/>> as well <<http://www.thefrontierpost.com/article/212461/>>, accessed May 30, 2013.

²¹ A local running a medical store in Mohmand Agency, interview conducted on February 23, 2014.

²² Naureen Nasreen, Lecturer of Political Science, University of Peshawar, interview.

During an interview, a man belonging to North Waziristan while commenting on the current situation in Fata expressed his views this way, "The fact is that the people of Fata are fed up with their miserable life. They want change in true sense. They want the same laws that are prevailing in the rest of the country. They want the same judicial system, mainstreaming in Pakistan, education for their children and basic rights discussed in the constitution of Pakistan".²³ In a session with Ijaz Khan he expressed his views that, "No society is static and it goes through changes with time. In British time the circumstances were different and those laws were fit for running the affairs of tribal belt at that time. To continue with the same policies was a big mistake on the part of Pakistani state".²⁴

Hamayoun Wazir, who participated in 2013 general elections as a candidate from Fata, sharing his views said, "During the elections campaign in different areas I observed that how people were happy with this election. Every day was like Eid day. I felt the thrust among the people for the candidate and for the other political activities i.e. casting of votes and other political participation. The situation of Fata would have been much different if such and other reforms had been introduced on time and a little bit attention had been given to the development of Fata by the federal government of Pakistan".²⁵

The reforms introduced by the PPP government have changed the course of history of tribal areas and are appreciated by the people. These reforms have somehow reduced the hatred and anger which the people of Fata have about the federal government. "Since independence the people of Fata have been treated like aliens. The current reforms have brought some hope to the people that change is possible if the government takes some positive steps like this. The 2013 general elections day is considered as a new dawn in the history of Fata".²⁶

While commenting on the administrative system of Fata local people shared their views this way: "The social structure of Fata was not because of FCR. The FCR was because of the social structure. In the past the people were not that much aware, they had no exposure to the external world, no proper education and no economic boom, but now they are not like the past. The FCR like regulation is no more valid in Fata. This regulation was introduced in the 19th century and now we are living in the 21st century. Is it

²³ A local, belonging to North Waziristan, interview, conducted on February 17, 2014.

²⁴ Ijaz Khan, Professor of International Relations, University of Peshawar, interview.

²⁵ Hamayoun Wazir, belonging to North Waziristan, who participated in the 2013 general elections as a candidate for National Assembly seat, interview, conducted on January 26, 2014.

²⁶ A local belonging to Khyber Agency, interview, conducted on February 10, 2014.

justice that such an outdated regulation is still running the affairs of Fata? If amendments are proposed and made in the constitution of Pakistan time to time to go with the pace of time, needs of the people and changing circumstance and conditions, then why such things are not possible in FCR? The moment FCR was introduced, at that time the situation was different but now it has very much changed.”²⁷ “To bring changes and amendments in FCR look like a joke. The only change the government can do is to abolish FCR and to introduce alternative laws or extend the laws of Pakistan to Fata”.²⁸ “If FCR is such a good law then the federal government of Pakistan should introduce it in the whole country, otherwise it should be abolished in Fata through a presidential act”.²⁹

Elections 2013 in FATA: A Voyage towards Mainstreaming

The 2013 election in Fata was a momentous day in its history. For the first time in history people of the tribal areas had the chance to use their right to vote. A great number of people happily and enthusiastically took part in the election and voted for twelve deats of Fata for the National Assembly of Pakistan. Under the Constitution, Fata is allowed only 12 seats in the National Assembly and none in the Provincial Assembly. In this regard, Bajaur has two seats, Mohmand one, Khyber two, Orakzai one, Kurram two, North Waziristan one and South Waziristan has two seats. The frontier regions of Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, Tank and Lakki Marwat form a single constituency, NA-47.³⁰ The total registered voters in Fata are 1,738,313, including 596,079 women.³¹

Latest steps and reforms taken by the government are leading Fata to positive changes. One may not be wrong to say that the 2013 general elections in Fata have proved a harbinger and a good omen for the area. These elections were important in so many ways. Especially the women participation and awareness among the masses is something very positive and encouraging. Some new positive trends observed are given bellow:

Political Awareness and Enthusiasm in Fata

It should be understood that all the dwellers of Fata are not militants. The majority of the people living over there are peace loving,

²⁷ A man running medical store in Bajaur Agency (Bazar), interview, conducted on February 12, 2014.

²⁸ A local of North Waziristan, interview, conducted on February 25, 2014.

²⁹ A student belonging to Orakzai Agency, interview, conducted on February 26, 2014.

³⁰ Zulfiqar Ali, “Elections in Fata: A Daunting Challenge”, Dawn News, May 5, 2013.

³¹ Ibid.

patriotic and sensible citizens of Pakistan. There is a need to differentiate them from militants and other such groups and to treat them differently other than those creating troubles and disturbances. The tribal areas of Pakistan are considered as the most dangerous place in the world by both regional actors and the international community but the people of Fata have proved it wrong. Despite Taliban's threats and uncertainty in the area, they positively participated in the 2013 general elections. All main political parties visibly campaigned in Fata during the election. Out of 339 candidates contesting for 12 National Assembly seats from Fata, 81 candidates represented different political parties. It was observed during the election days that different parties' flags were flying on rooftops, trees, shops and markets. The parties' banners and posters were displayed everywhere. Even though Taliban had threatened the people that democracy was un-Islamic and those participating in the elections would be targeted, contestants of different parties held street meetings, rallies and opened campaign offices in different parts of Fata.³²

People wore badges and logos of their respective parties on their chests. Similarly, vehicles were decorated with posters, flags and stickers of different parties. It was observed that a large number of people thronged the election offices of their respective parties including Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and other prominent religious parties. The level of enthusiasm was such high that during election days people were served with delicious foods like rice and meat along with green tea.³³

Shift from Independent to Party-backed Candidacy in Election

Political parties were supposedly there in Fata during the 1970s general elections and some factions even manage to get their candidates nominated to the National Assembly and the Senate. But these candidates were not backed by political parties and were considered as independent candidates. With the extension of the PPO to Fata, now political parties have the right to legally carry out political activities in the tribal areas.³⁴ Traditionally, members of parliament from the region were independent, and tended to support whichever government was in power, in order to have access to patronage of state resources. Another

³² "FATA Tribesmen embrace historic polls", available at <http://dunyanews.tv/election/index.php/news_detail/172194-FATA-tribesmen-embrace-historic-polls>.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Afrasiab Khattak, "Reforms in Fata", Dawn News, October 25, 2011.

striking feature of this election was the number of candidates per constituency - there were, for example, 40 candidates for NA-36, a constituency in Mohmand Agency, while the national average was between 10 and 20 candidates per constituency.³⁵

Since the introduction of free campaigning and the entry of political parties into the race, as well as the large numbers of independents, it is clear that old electoral trends, observed in the past, may no longer exist. This time there was a totally changed situation where different parties' nominees and their supporters had freely raised their respective parties' flags and were carrying out political activities with no major disruption. Despite security reasons major political parties were organizing meetings and rallies in different parts of Fata.

Women Participation in Election Changes the Contour of History

Though women were banned to vote in some districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa i.e. Dir and Buner, election campaign in Fata was of different kind. Like other settled areas of Pakistan much excitement and enthusiasm was observed among the women of tribal areas. Despite Taliban threats and other social taboos women in Fata went to the polling stations to exercise their right to vote. This was seen for the first time in the history of tribal areas that women voted for their respective party's candidates. Apart from exercising their right to vote some women contested election as a candidate for National Assembly seat. This was a good and positive trend which would further improve socio-political conditions in Fata.

According to some political analysts, the wind of change is promptly taking place in Fata mainly because of two factors. In their view, political environment of Fata has changed mainly after the extension of PPO to the region. All political parties including major religious parties encouraged and mobilized women voters. In this regard JUI (F), Jamaat-e-Islami and JUI (S) were actively involved to raise their vote bank against other political competitor. According to a survey out of 1,616,601 (more than 1.6 million) registered voters in tribal areas, the number of women voters is 552,794 with highest number of women voters registered in Bajaur Agency (132,366) followed by the lowest (11,704) registered women voters in North Waziristan Agency.³⁶ In this regard Khyber Agency is ranking second where registered votes of

³⁵ Zalan Khan, "Fata: An election unlike any other", the writer is the founder of the website *Qissakhwani* and tweets under @qissakhwani.

³⁶ Maqbool Malik, "Women's role can change Fata election results", *Nation*, (Islamabad) May 3, 2013.

women are 125,268.³⁷ While commenting on women participation in 2013 election Aftab Khan Afridi from Khyber Agency stated that, “despite Taliban threats and social taboos women are determined and willing to use their right to vote for the first time in history for changing their destiny”.³⁸

Women participation in 2013 election was not only limited to casting their votes. They participated in the election as a candidate as well and contested for National Assembly seats reserved for Fata. For instance, Badam Zari from Bajaur Agency stood as a candidate and contested election against 25 male candidates, who are considered highly influential and powerful figures in Bajaur Agency. Although she did not win the election in her respective constituency, yet, being the first woman in Fata to take part in the elections, she paved the way for the other women in the future elections in the agency. Her participation in the election is no doubt something very positive and is really an encouraging step and can prove a turning point for the bright future of the area.

The women participation in elections bore fruits when Aisha Gulalai from South Waziristan Agency and became the Member of National Assembly (MNA) on a reserved seat for women. She started her career as a human rights activist from South Waziristan. Due to her active role PPPP gave her a party ticket in the 2008 election, but she did not manage to compete because she was too young at that time. Subsequently, she decided to join the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and was selected as a member of the party’s central committee. In 2013 elections she managed to contest for a seat reserved for women on a PTI ticket.³⁹

The youngest woman MNA (Gulalai) from tribal areas was determined that she would discuss the issue of reserved seats for women from Fata in the National Assembly of Pakistan. She stated that, “Fata has no such quota, and I will raise the issue on the floor of the house as this is a discrimination against women.” She further added, “Fata should be demarcated as a separate province with its own governor and chief minister”.⁴⁰ On another occasion she stated that

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Fauzee Khan Mohmand, “Aisha Gulalai: First Female MNA from Fata”, available at <<http://thespokesman.pk/index.php/history/item/5567-first-female-mna-from-fata>>, as well as at <<http://tribune.com.pk/story/556256/making-history-vernal-parliamentarian-set-to-shine-on-political-stage/>>, accessed June 01, 2013.

⁴⁰ Mureeb Mohmand, “Making history: Vernal parliamentarian set to shine on political stage”, *Express Tribune*, (Islamabad), May 30, 2013.

tribal people are highly potential and talented. She mentioned the example of Maria Toorpakai, a female Pakistani squash star who also belongs to South Waziristan. For this purpose people of Fata need education to uplift their potential, talents and energies. Gulalai clearly stated that, "people of Fata are now fed up with indiscriminate activities of the militants, daily bomb blast and killings. People are ready now to send their daughters to school and for this purpose there is a need to open schools and universities for higher education in tribal areas."⁴¹

Religious Parties' role and Influence

Before the introduction of PPO in Fata, the political parties were not allowed to carry out political activities. At that time some religious groups had dominated the whole region. Due to their religiosity people were tending towards them and they had followers everywhere in tribal areas. They easily managed to organize political activities as they had sympathizers among the militant groups as well. Other political parties were not allowed in the area and that is why they were very influential. With the passage of time they lost their role and popularity. The main reason was their close affiliation with the militant groups. The brutal activities of the militants led to a chaotic situation in Fata where people were living a miserable life. People had seen the real faces of these elements. As some of the so-called religious parties had affiliations with militants, the people of tribal area blamed them for their agonies.⁴²

While commenting on the fast deteriorating situation in Fata a former MNA from Swat, Adnan Aurangzeb, said, "When for the first time adult franchise was extended in 1996, people in Fata were thinking that more was coming but nothing happened. In 2002 general elections, which were conducted under military patronage all the liberals were marginalized, and the religious parties managed to win. This was the most important factor where militancy rose into full swing".⁴³ In these elections, those affiliated to the Musharraf-sponsored six-party religious alliance, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), won seven of Fata's 12 National Assembly seats.⁴⁴ The 2008 elections were somehow different from that of 2002 elections. These general elections brought some positive change in Fata as they had political representation of major political parties. Similarly, in 2013 elections religious parties managed

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Afrasiab Khattak, "Reforms in Fata", *Dawn News*, (Islamabad), October 25, 2011.

⁴³ "Political Reforms in Fata", available at <<http://waziristanhills.com/FATA/PoliticalReforms/tabid/135/language/en-GB/Default.aspx>>.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

to win only one National Assembly seat. This was an emerging new trend in Fata where people were fed up with violence and brutal suppression by the militants. People of Fata want a change and are looking for a bright future.

Record Voters Turnout

Another positive aspect observed in 2013 election in Fata is the record voters' turnout. The 2013 election is seen to be different from that of 2008. All major political parties participated in the election and carried out their activities freely. The most remarkable side of the election was the record voters' turnout. This really showed that there is political awareness among the people and they are no more naïve like the past. According to an estimate in 2013 election voters' turnout in Fata was 37%.⁴⁵

Voters' turnout would have been different if all the votes had polled timely and properly. The issue of Internally Displaced People (IDPs) was counted the major reason for the low turnout. Candidates in tribal areas were facing serious problems of reaching out to voters that had migrated to different parts of the country in search of safe places. This had made the political parties agitation extremely tricky and time-consuming. Had there not been the issue of IDPs the result would have been amazing and interesting.

People of Fata Voted for a Change

People of Fata have suffered immensely in all walks of life. Uncertainty and insecurity are the prevailing features of the area. Continuous crises and sufferings both on the part of militants and collateral damages due to military operations against these militants have torn down the very social fabric of the tribal areas. Indiscriminate killings, beheadings, bomb blasts have turned the area into a turmoil. A large number of people have left their homes and huts and migrated to other safe areas due to clashes between militants and security forces. Now they want change and an end to their miseries.

People responded positively to the 2013 election in hope that it would bring change to their area. During an interview to the AFP, a doctor, named Miraj Ali from the Mohmand Agency, said, "People want change. They want change in system not just change of faces".⁴⁶

⁴⁵ "Election in Fata: A Special Report", A special report on general elections in Fata published by the Shaheed Bhutto Foundation (SBF) on May 16 and later updated on June 6, 2013, available at <<http://www.slideshare.net/fatanews/special-report-aprilelections-2013-in-fata>>.

⁴⁶ "FATA tribesmen embrace historic polls", available at <http://dunyanews.tv/election/index.php/news_detail/172194-FATA-tribesmen-embrace-historic-polls>.

Similarly, people from Khyber, Bajaur and Waziristan agencies while talking to the AFP blamed the previous governments for their miseries and bad law and order situation in their areas. They added that due to military operations hundreds of people have been displaced from their home and towns. Another man from Fata, named RaqeebUllah, during an interview expressed his views in a very harsh way. He said, "Our former leaders have sold us in return of US dollars and they were more like wolves. Now we want change, a revolution which would purge all these corrupt politicians".⁴⁷

Conclusion

For decades people of Fata had been deprived of basic human and political rights. In the absence of proper governmental setup a vacuum was created in Fata which was filled by the militants and other such affiliated groups. Their indiscriminate activities turned the tribal areas into turmoil where state writ was almost zero. Initially the people of the tribal areas had sympathies with such elements but with the passage of time their real face and bad intentions were no more a secret. Keeping in view the miseries of tribal people and the rapid spread of militancy, the federal government finally woke up to the fact and decided to introduce certain reforms in Fata. In this regard the PPP government introduced some reforms and amendments to FCR. People of Fata welcomed and appreciated such positive moves and they demonstrated it in May 2013 general elections. People of Fata enthusiastically participated in the election and deemed it a good omen for the brighter future of their respective areas.

No movement whether it's political or religious can become a success story without local support. Same is the case with Fata. People have rejected militants and their support base is gradually decreasing in Fata. Such support base of the militants can further decrease if there is growing awareness among the common people. Such awareness is possible by establishing a network of political organizations in the tribal belt.

Keeping in view the intensity of the problem of militancy and chaotic law and order situation of the region, bold steps are needed to meet this challenge properly. The government should introduce other reform packages on the same footing as were initiated by the previous PPP government. There is a need to implement these reforms on immediate basis with no further delay.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

The federal government should initiate developmental projects for the uplifting of socio-economic conditions of the area. Poverty and lack of education are among the other reasons which compelled the poor people of the tribal areas to look for an alternative which was provided to them by the militants. Last but not least, it is extremely important that the government must seriously engage itself in winning the battle of minds and hearts of the people of the turbulent area without which no durable peace can return to the area. There are misunderstandings and misperceptions among the people of Fata which have been cultivated in their minds by different hostile elements. All this can come to an end if the federal government properly pays heed to this issue and bring this turbulent area into the mainstream.

Book Reviews

THE EVOLUTION OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN SOUTH ASIA

Author: Tughral Yamin

Publisher: The Army Press, Islamabad 2014

Pages: 272

ISBN: 978-969-9982-00-2.

South Asian nuclear patterns always force the proponents of nuclear nonproliferation regime to discuss the nuclear issues of the region by adopting critical examining standards. A number of scholars have tried to discuss nature of South Asian nuclear muscles from difference perspective. The global critical standards, exclusively for Pakistan's nuclear capabilities, are constantly evaluating the nuclear ambitions of India and Pakistan in belligerent style. The varying arguments of scholarly debate attempt to present a logical and rational analysis of Indian and Pakistani nuclear capabilities by adopting a combination of supporting and opposing approaches. The writer Tughral Yamin's in his book titled *The Evolution of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia* strives to provide a survey of regional nuclear efforts of Islamabad and New Delhi.

The eight chapters of Yamin's investigation is a comprehensive and brief account of changing model of South Asian nuclear desires. Yamin, a former brigadier, is presently an associate dean of the Centre for International Peace & Stability, National University of Sciences & Technology (NUST), Islamabad. He has served in National Defence University (NDU) after completing his doctorate from Quaid-i-Azam University (QAU). While having his PhD in Defence and Strategic Studies (DSS), Yamin has introduced his intellectual wisdom at countless national and international forums. His contribution in the ongoing nuclear debate of South Asia attempts to formulate a Pakistani perspective about the regional nuclear race and the role of deterrence in the deteriorating Indo-Pak bilateral relations. The erudite work on nuclear dimensions of South Asia is lacking in Pakistan's intellectual community. Thus, the worth of Yamin's reading over regional nuclear debate is appreciable, because the subsections of Yamin's research revolve around the conceptual evolution of deterrence and its significance in minimizing the threats of war between nuclear powers.

The central theme of the book is a comparative endeavour of the author who offers a study of proportional analysis between South Asian and Cold War's nuclear deterrence. The debate in eight sections of book provides a link between US-Soviet hostility during the intense period of Cold War and Indo-Pak antagonistic relations. The relative examination of the deterrence forces between Moscow-Washington and New Delhi-Islamabad, and their position in the intense period antagonistic relations between the states are the innermost idea of this study. The author, in his investigations identifies several aspects

coupled with the dynamics of the prime factors which supported the main rivals of the Cold War to establish a robust deterrence against each other. The end of the Soviet-US tensions shifted the deterrence model of Cold War to South Asia where the regional competitors, India and Pakistan, were seeking appropriate time to publicize their military-oriented nuclear programmes. In this way, the nuclear deterrence in South Asia became one of the significant facets of the world politics.

The entire volume covers the issues of strategic stability, Cold War, arms control and disarmament. Furthermore, it also envelops the nature of South Asian dispute, initiation of nuclear age between New Delhi and Islamabad. Additionally, the efforts of the writer try to forecast the future of nuclear South Asia in the presence of rapidly emerging conventional and non-conventional military capabilities of India and Pakistan by highlighting the salient features of South Asian strategic environment. The nuclear race between New Delhi and Islamabad was inaugurated by India when it introduced its 'Smiling Buddha' in world politics in 1974. Later the chortle of Buddha dragged Pakistan to proclaim its nuclear standing in the region in 1998. Essentially, the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE) of India and its clandestine involvement in East Pakistan along with 1998 nuclear tests forced Pakistan to introduce its nuclear standings to the international community. The writer, Yamin, in his study, elucidates the historical, theoretical and strategic dynamics of the South Asian nuclear deterrence by adopting the historical lenses.

The first two chapters of the book highlight the historical and theoretical dimensions of the nuclear deterrence and its relevance to the Cold War after formally launching a debate of introduction. In the third and fourth chapters, the writer emphasizes the major strategic developments of the Cold War by studying the detailed record of Soviet-US resentment against each other. The rest of the volume debates the South Asian nuclear race in the presence of Indo-Pak hostile relations. The South Asian portion starts from Chapter Five where the writer roots out the seeds of conflict between New Delhi and Islamabad. Yamin accentuates the list of issue and the circumstances which developed the South Asian region into a nuclear flashpoint. Furthermore, the South Asia portion of the book not only covers the features of nuclear politics, but also discusses the existing nuclear capabilities, the nuclear doctrines, role of extra-regional powers (US, China, etc.), and the position of international community in managing the conflicted Indo-Pak relations. Besides the nuclear potential of India and Pakistan, the writer offers an exhaustive review of conventional forces of both the states. At the end, Yamin tries to envisage the future of South Asian strategic and conventional forces in the presence of Indo-Pak incompatible official conduct. The concluding section of the work attempts to hypothesize the four probable future scenarios which can appear in the region. The scenarios include the Terrorism Related Incidents, Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) Spiralling into War, Blatant Ceasefire

Violation along the LoC/Hostile Manoeuvres IB Leading to War, and Renewed Nuclear Tests.

The South Asian nuclear deterrence, on one side, developed the region strategically stable by making the war less likely between India and Pakistan, on the other, the opposing national standings of the authorities from New Delhi and Islamabad translated the clash into low intensity conflict in the post nuclear era. According to author, the South Asian nuclear deterrence has its genesis in Cold War where the realist conjecture of the Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) played a significant role.

The work of the writer, based on more historical and less analytical approach, is lacking a non-traditional aspect of South Asian nuclear deterrence which is essential to construct in the contemporary nuclear discussion of world politics. The addition to the existing debate of South Asian nuclear deterrence, Yamin's participation is commendable. The laudable intellectual contribution of Yamin cleared the Pakistan's position and its major concerns in the South Asian nuclear politics. Moreover, the balanced approach of Yamin, in his book, provides rational and logical survey of the issue and reasons which are responsible of Pakistan's nuclear programme.

It's a comprehensive study to know the nature of South Asian nuclear deterrence and its historical strings. It is hard to comparatively evaluate the work of Yamin with the existing intellectual district of South Asia due to its worth of analysis and the systematic techniques of scrutinize the strategic history of South Asian and its connections to the Cold War which is utterly a non-traditional and cogent level of analysis. The writer's style of examining the Cold War model of deterrence in the South Asian context demonstrates the impressive thoughts of his intellectual potential which has added a chapter to the unending strategic history of India-Pakistan.

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HUMAN SECURITY IN PAKISTAN

Author: Ehsan Mehmood Khan
Published: (Narratives, Islamabad 2013)
Pages: xvi + 361
ISBN: 978-969-9645-29-7

Human security is an evolving scholarship that links various domains such as academia, intelligentsia and policy spheres. Although there have been some arguments on human security since the end of World War II, yet the demise of Cold War saw an extended discussion on the subject. Today, it has evolved into a sort of independent discipline of social sciences, and has also found some applicability in a few states. However, this concept is somewhat new to Pakistan's academic and policy domains. *Human Security in Pakistan* by Ehsan Mehmood Khan is the first comprehensive book on this issue in the country. It has added significantly to the ongoing international debate on the concept of human security, which is far from over.

The author has taken up the task to highlight the significance of human security, which the academia has least focused on. Ehsan asserts that ostensibly the state security overrides human security. By spending extravagantly on armaments to strengthen traditional security, it looks hard to spare resources for human security. That is why the act of state sometimes becomes challengeable. Nevertheless, he notes, these foremost facets of security i.e. state security and human security can and must complement each other. He dexterously knits the relationship between human security and human rights (p.24). In support of his argument, the author has used valid and persuasive parameters to unveil disastrous situation of human security in Pakistan.

Ehsan Mehmood Khan's theoretical approach by incorporating Copenhagen School's Securitization Theory punctuates that the challenges to the individuals and communities emanate not only from external threats but also from the internal conflicts, human rights abuses, diseases and epidemics, natural calamities, poverty and malnutrition, which endanger the human security (p.27). The discussion on the Islamic Construct of Human Security (p.37) provides a robust building block to the theoretical and conceptual frame of the book. The author notes, "The first universal and comprehensive Charter of Human Security can be found in the Last Sermon of the Holy Prophet (PBUH). It laid down the basic concept and sound parameters of security of life, honour and property irrespective of colour of skin, caste or creed, or community of a people. It also includes personal security, women security and economic security of everyone, whether male or female, minor or adult, and rich or poor, irrespective of religion."

To determine the extent of human security, the constitution of a country provides the best index or yardstick at national level, and the United Nations Charter at international level. Pakistan's Constitution has enough

articulation about human security but the situation on ground is totally different (p.49). Ehsan contends that the people still do not enjoy the civic amenities in their daily life. His narration of the plight of Pakistani people, that masses have been exploited since 1947 in the name of modernization, Islamization, democracy and development, is pretty precise. Pakistan's debt-trapped economy and public sector enterprises (PSEs) are immersed in loss and surviving.

While formulating the human security framework for Pakistan (Chapter 2), the author's fine-tuned variance of Human Security in Pakistan into political security, economic security, health security, education security, energy security, gender security, children security, community security and environmental security. These are the areas where the country is faced with serious challenges to its profile and practice of human security. This framework is both instructive and normative. It can be applied to other developing countries, too. This country-specific frame is an extension of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)'s human security paradigm, which has found detailed and deliberate discussion in the book.

Pakistan came into being as a result of politico-constitutional struggle by the people. This struggle has continued through the years of independence, and is virtually spanned over seven decades, but has not been able to attain the desired mark of political security. The author pinpoints the role of various players, structures and human agencies in obstructing the political progression of Pakistan, which eventually led to a weak democratic archetype. The role of ghost voters and rigging in elections is but one of the sore issues.

Economic security of a majority of citizens is at the low ebb due to widespread poverty, stagflation, price-hike, lower buying power and increasing unemployment. The extremely destitute people are compelled even to sell their children and body organs such as kidneys. The author rightly presents extremism in Pakistan on the basis of religion, language and race. Sectarian strife and inhuman killing of minorities have shaken the pillars of state structure. Islam treats all men equally irrespective of caste, creed, colour of skin or belief. However, there is a deeply ingrained caste system in the country, which has socio-economic as well as political security implications for the weaker communities (p.125). He aptly reveals the plight of women in the Pakistani society and presents the human rights index to validate that Pakistan ranks among the countries where violence against women is rampant.

Children security is affected by several factors. Children are trafficked to some of the Arab states to use them as child jockeys. While the Constitution of Pakistan notes that no child below the age of 14 years shall be engaged in any factory or mine or any other hazardous employment, the reality on ground is totally different (p.149). Ehsan narrates Pakistan's multiple crises engulfing the food security e.g. sugar crisis, wheat crisis, rice crisis, cotton crisis, fertilizers crisis and many more that erupt often, but the successive governments repeatedly failed to cope with these crises. Food security is also affected by economic insecurity, environmental insecurity and lack of modern

tools and techniques of agriculture. Other areas of security like education and health are not different from the already mentioned subsets of human security.

In the concluding chapters, Ehsan Mehmood Khan adroitly proposes remedies to cope with all the challenges that have plagued Pakistan's human security. The author's use of statistics from credible sources, and insightful analysis of deteriorated situation of human security in Pakistan makes this book valuable. It is recommended that this precious work should be included in the curriculum for students, and must be studied by scholars, researchers, security analysts, military and civil services officials, as well as the policymakers.

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DOCUMENTS

Document 1

STATEMENT BY HIS EXCELLENCY MR. MUHAMMAD NAWAZ SHARIF, PRIME MINISTER OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN DURING THE GENERAL DEBATE OF THE SIXTY-NINTH SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

New York,
September 26, 2014

Mr. President,

I congratulate Mr. Sam Kutesa over his election as the President of this Assembly. I assure him that his priorities – revitalization of the General Assembly, sustainable development, climate change and peaceful settlement of disputes – are also our priorities. Our delegation will extend its support to him, to achieve these objectives.

I also pay tribute to Mr. John Ashe for his effective leadership of the past session of the General Assembly.

We commend the Secretary General's efforts to find diplomatic solutions to complex challenges to international peace and security. We appreciate his leadership in hosting a Climate Summit.

Mr. President,

Extreme weather patterns are disrupting world economies. In Pakistan, we have directly experienced such a calamity only recently. The monsoon floods in Pakistan have killed hundreds of people, displaced millions, destroyed and damaged homes, livelihoods, infrastructure, cattle and crops. We are mobilizing all our resources and ingenuity to provide relief and to ensure recovery.

The international community should intensify its efforts to move from awareness to commitments to actions on climate change, which is playing havoc with the economies, particularly in the developing countries.

Mr. President,

This is a defining moment for the United Nations, as it embarks on the task of transforming the lives of billions of people, by investing in sustainable development in the next fifteen years.

We are setting ourselves a vital target of eradicating poverty by 2030. To do that, we need to go beyond the Millennium Development Goals. We need a new approach to eliminate conflict and violence and reduce inequality within and among nations. Only then, we will be able to ensure healthy lives, empower women and girls, improve quality of education, create jobs and guarantee supply of affordable energy.

The time is ripe for such ambition and action. The sustainable development goals crafted so far, must be woven in an overarching framework. We must prioritize them. First things should come first. Peace, stability, and inclusive economic growth – all come first.

Mr. President,

At the national level, we have launched our Vision 2025, which puts people first. This is inspired by our founding father, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah's vision of a welfare state, based on the principles of justice, equity and responsibility.

In the coming decade, we will develop human and social capital through investment in education, health and gender parity; stimulate sustained economic growth; prioritize energy, water and food security; modernize public sector, and encourage private sector-led entrepreneurship.

We have determined that regional peace and security, political stability in the country, the rule of law and social justice are absolutely crucial for the realization of these goals. Above all, we will continue to work for the promotion and protection of human rights.

Energy is the key to economic development. Pakistan Co-Chairs the Group of Friends of UN Secretary General's initiative on Sustainable Energy for All. The objectives of this initiative are also our national goals.

Mr. President,

It is my government's aspiration and effort to build a peaceful neighborhood by pursuing a policy of constructive engagement.

In South Asia, our people have missed opportunities for prosperity because of unresolved conflicts. We have a choice today: continue with the status quo or to seize the moment to resolve all outstanding issues and free up our shared energies for cooperation. To take this course of high statesmanship, we need more, not less, dialogue and diplomacy. We need to respect each other's rights and sensibilities. We must have relationships based on equality, mutual respect and transparency.

We were disappointed at the cancellation of the Foreign Secretary-level talks by India. The world community, too, rightly saw it as another missed opportunity.

Pakistan is convinced that we must remain engaged in the dialogue process for settling disputes and building economic and trade relations. Let us not ignore the dividends of peace.

Mr. President,

More than six decades ago, the United Nations passed resolutions to hold a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir. The people of Jammu and Kashmir are still waiting for the fulfillment of that promise.

Many generations of Kashmiris have lived their lives under occupation, accompanied by violence and abuse of their fundamental rights. Kashmiri women, in particular, have suffered immensely.

For decades, attempts have been made, both under UN auspices and bilaterally in the spirit of the Lahore Declaration, to resolve this dispute.

The core issue of Jammu and Kashmir has to be resolved. This is the responsibility of the international community. We cannot draw a veil on the issue of Kashmir, until it is addressed in accordance with the wishes of the people of Jammu and Kashmir.

Pakistan is ready to work for resolution of this issue through negotiations. Our support and advocacy of the right to self-determination of the people of Jammu and Kashmir is our historic commitment and a duty, as a party to the Kashmir dispute.

Mr. President,

Afghanistan is going through momentous security, political and economic transitions. As always, Pakistan stands in solidarity with the fraternal Afghan people. I congratulate the people of Afghanistan over the successful completion of the electoral process and offer our warm felicitations and good wishes to the new Afghan leadership.

It is our earnest hope that these landmark processes would culminate in the emergence of a stronger, more stable, and unified Afghanistan. We also hope that the process of inclusive Afghan-led and Afghan-owned reconciliation would move forward, contributing to greater harmony, stability and prosperity in Afghanistan.

Pakistan remains committed to forging a deeper bilateral relationship with Afghanistan on the basis of equal security and shared prosperity. Our two nations confront common challenges, which call for greater cooperation and understanding.

Afghanistan should become a pivot of strategic cooperation, rather than of rivalry. In the past year and a half, we have consciously reached out to Afghanistan to address difficult issues and build on convergences. We have made headway in this effort.

Pakistan continues to host, for the past 30 years, millions of Afghan refugees on its soil. This is the largest refugee caseload in the world. The international community must maintain and enhance support for the repatriation of these refugees and provide for their reintegration in Afghanistan.

To stem drug trafficking, it is important to pursue a comprehensive approach to eliminate poppy cultivation, reinforce border security, and interdict criminals. Pakistan is mainly a victim of drugs transit and trafficking. Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan and other states in the region, together with the UN, should step up their efforts to fight this menace.

Pakistan has launched a massive operation to eliminate terrorism. Complementary counter-terrorism measures on the Afghan side of the border are essential to achieve optimal results.

Mr. President,

This past summer, the people of Gaza were subjected to mass atrocities by Israel. We condemned the indiscriminate killings of civilians – which amounted to genocide. From this platform, I once again convey Pakistan's condolences and sympathies to the people of Palestine over their continuing plight.

We welcome the ceasefire between Gaza and Israel. But next steps must also be taken. The blockade of Gaza must be lifted, Palestinian prisoners freed

and illegal settlements halted. The United Nations should facilitate a just and lasting solution of the Palestinian issue, based on the relevant UN resolutions.

We call on all parties in Syria to renounce military and militant means and hold dialogue to restore peace and stability in their historic land.

The emergence of new militant entities in the Middle East once again illustrate that terrorism is a global threat. This primitive force in Iraq and Syria is an aberration, which has no sanction of any religion. It must be countered with unified and resolute will.

Mr. President,

We condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. We are fighting terrorism planted on Pakistan's soil. Our valiant soldiers are laying down their lives to take out terrorists and tear down their evil networks. The entire nation is behind them.

In the past thirteen years, as a frontline state, we have given enormous sacrifices in blood and resources. Tens of thousands of civilians have been killed and injured. Our economy too has lost hundreds of billions of dollars in direct costs and denied investment opportunities.

Yet, in this fight, each time a soldier falls, another takes his place proudly. It is the resolve of our nation to fight this scourge to the finish.

At the same time, we have made a plan of action for the relief and rehabilitation of nearly one million internally displaced persons. This includes a strategy to prevent return and resurgence of militancy and creation of a safe environment for the local population.

Mr. President,

It is important to counter the narrative of extremists. Inter-racial tensions and defamation of religions provide fertile ground for conflict. Constructive and serious dialogue among religions is essential to promote understanding, tolerance and harmony. We remain committed to the UN-led efforts to support these objectives.

Mr. President,

Pakistan's strong commitment to peacekeeping is rooted in our foreign policy and in our belief that every nation should contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. Inspired by this ideal, Pakistan has maintained high levels of participation in the UN peacekeeping, becoming the largest troop contributing country. We are contributing more than 1,100 troops to the Central African Republic, despite the dire situation there.

Mr. President,

As a responsible nuclear weapon state, we will continue to support the objectives of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation; and pursue a policy of nuclear restraint and credible minimum deterrence.

Pakistan is not participating in any arms race in the region. Yet we cannot be oblivious to the emerging security scenarios and buildup of armaments. We too, have the obligation to maintain a robust and reliable deterrence.

I would reiterate the need for an inter-linked mechanism for pursuing nuclear restraint, conventional equilibrium and conflict resolution. To promote stability, we are prepared to explore new Confidence Building Measures.

Mr. President,

Pakistan has maintained the highest standards of nuclear safety and security. At the last Summit at The Hague that I attended, Pakistan's recent nuclear measures, especially the establishment of a Centre of Excellence, were appreciated.

Pakistan is a State with advanced nuclear technology, with an experience of more than 40 years. We are a mainstream partner in the international non-proliferation regime. Pakistan also has a stringent national export control system that is fully harmonized with international export control regimes. Though a non-member, we are abiding by their guidelines.

Pakistan ought to be a part of these export control regimes, especially the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Pakistan also qualifies for full access to civil nuclear technology, to overcome its energy shortages and spur economic growth.

Mr. President,

The ongoing UN reform must be comprehensive. We support a reform of the Security Council that would reflect the interests of all members' states – small, medium-sized and large – and not the ambitions of a few. There should be no new permanent seats in the Council. This will be contrary to the democratic character of this world body. We want the Council to become more representative, equitable, accountable and transparent.

Mr. President,

We meet here today on the cusp of a new era for the international community. Never before has the United Nations embraced such lofty goals to banish poverty, stimulate development, protect environment and foster peace, as it will during this session. The future of our planet hinges on our decisions. Let us deliver them with full responsibility and wisdom. Pakistan will assist this Assembly and the United Nations as a whole, to make this world a better place for all mankind.

I thank you.

<http://www.mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?prID=2258>
September 26, 2014

Document 2**TEXT OF PRESIDENT OBAMA'S 2014 ADDRESS TO THE UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL ASSEMBLY**

September 24, 2014

New York City, NY

Mr. President, Mr. Secretary General, fellow delegates, ladies and gentlemen: we come together at a crossroads between war and peace; between disorder and integration; between fear and hope.

Around the globe, there are signposts of progress. The shadow of World War that existed at the founding of this institution has been lifted; the prospect of war between major powers reduced. The ranks of member states has more than tripled, and more people live under governments they elected. Hundreds of millions of human beings have been freed from the prison of poverty, with the proportion of those living in extreme poverty cut in half. And the world economy continues to strengthen after the worst financial crisis of our lives.

Today, whether you live in downtown New York or in my grandmother's village more than two hundred miles from Nairobi, you can hold in your hand more information than the world's greatest libraries. Together, we have learned how to cure disease, and harness the power of the wind and sun. The very existence of this institution is a unique achievement – the people of the world committing to resolve their differences peacefully, and solve their problems together. I often tell young people in the United States that this is the best time in human history to be born, for you are more likely than ever before to be literate, to be healthy, and to be free to pursue your dreams.

And yet there is a pervasive unease in our world – a sense that the very forces that have brought us together have created new dangers, and made it difficult for any single nation to insulate itself from global forces. As we gather here, an outbreak of Ebola overwhelms public health systems in West Africa, and threatens to move rapidly across borders. Russian aggression in Europe recalls the days when large nations trampled small ones in pursuit of territorial ambition. The brutality of terrorists in Syria and Iraq forces us to look into the heart of darkness.

Each of these problems demands urgent attention. But they are also symptoms of a broader problem – the failure of our international system to keep pace with an interconnected world. We have not invested adequately in the public health capacity of developing countries. Too often, we have failed to enforce international norms when it's inconvenient to do so. And we have not confronted forcefully enough the intolerance, sectarianism, and hopelessness that feeds violent extremism in too many parts of the globe.

Fellow delegates, we come together as United Nations with a choice to make. We can renew the international system that has enabled so much progress, or allow ourselves to be pulled back by an undertow of instability.

We can reaffirm our collective responsibility to confront global problems, or be swamped by more and more outbreaks of instability. For America, the choice is clear. We choose hope over fear. We see the future not as something out of our control, but as something we can shape for the better through concerted and collective effort. We reject fatalism or cynicism when it comes to human affairs; we choose to work for the world as it should be, as our children deserve it to be.

There is much that must be done to meet the tests of this moment. But today I'd like to focus on two defining questions at the root of many of our challenges- whether the nations here today will be able to renew the purpose of the UN's founding; and whether we will come together to reject the cancer of violent extremism.

First, all of us - big nations and small - must meet our responsibility to observe and enforce international norms.

We are here because others realized that we gain more from cooperation than conquest. One hundred years ago, a World War claimed the lives of many millions, proving that with the terrible power of modern weaponry, the cause of empire leads to the graveyard. It would take another World War to roll back the forces of fascism and racial supremacy, and form this United Nations to ensure that no nation can subjugate its neighbors and claim their territory.

Russia's actions in Ukraine challenge this post-war order. Here are the facts. After the people of Ukraine mobilized popular protests and calls for reform, their corrupt President fled. Against the will of the government in Kiev, Crimea was annexed. Russia poured arms into Eastern Ukraine, fueling violent separatists and a conflict that has killed thousands. When a civilian airliner was shot down from areas that these proxies controlled, they refused to allow access to the crash for days. When Ukraine started to reassert control over its territory, Russia gave up the pretense of merely supporting the separatists, and moved troops across the border.

This is a vision of the world in which might makes right - a world in which one nation's borders can be redrawn by another, and civilized people are not allowed to recover the remains of their loved ones because of the truth that might be revealed. America stands for something different. We believe that right makes might - that bigger nations should not be able to bully smaller ones; that people should be able to choose their own future.

These are simple truths, but they must be defended. America and our allies will support the people of Ukraine as they develop their democracy and economy. We will reinforce our NATO allies, and uphold our commitment to collective defense. We will impose a cost on Russia for aggression, and counter falsehoods with the truth. We call upon others to join us on the right side of history - for while small gains can be won at the barrel of a gun, they will ultimately be turned back if enough voices support the freedom of nations and peoples to make their own decisions.

Moreover, a different path is available – the path of diplomacy and peace and the ideals this institution is designed to uphold. The recent cease-fire agreement in Ukraine offers an opening to achieve that objective. If Russia takes that path – a path that for stretches of the post-Cold War period resulted in prosperity for the Russian people – then we will lift our sanctions and welcome Russia’s role in addressing common challenges. That’s what the United States and Russia have been able to do in past years – from reducing our nuclear stockpiles to meet our obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to cooperating to remove and destroy Syria’s declared chemical weapons. And that’s the kind of cooperation we are prepared to pursue again— if Russia changes course.

This speaks to a central question of our global age: whether we will solve our problems together, in a spirit of mutual interests and mutual respect, or whether we descend into destructive rivalries of the past. When nations find common ground, not simply based on power, but on principle, then we can make enormous progress. And I stand before you today committed to investing American strength in working with nations to address the problems we face in the 21st century.

As we speak, America is deploying our doctors and scientists – supported by our military – to help contain the outbreak of Ebola and pursue new treatments. But we need a broader effort to stop a disease that could kill hundreds of thousands, inflict horrific suffering, destabilize economies, and move rapidly across borders. It’s easy to see this as a distant problem – until it isn’t. That is why we will continue mobilizing other countries to join us in making concrete commitments to fight this outbreak, and enhance global health security for the long-term.

America is pursuing a diplomatic resolution to the Iranian nuclear issue, as part of our commitment to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and pursue the peace and security of a world without them. This can only happen if Iran takes this historic opportunity. My message to Iran’s leaders and people is simple: do not let this opportunity pass. We can reach a solution that meets your energy needs while assuring the world that your program is peaceful.

America is and will continue to be a Pacific power, promoting peace, stability, and the free flow of commerce among nations. But we will insist that all nations abide by the rules of the road, and resolve their territorial disputes peacefully, consistent with international law. That’s how the Asia-Pacific has grown. And that’s the only way to protect this progress going forward.

America is committed to a development agenda that eradicates extreme poverty by 2030. We will do our part – to help people feed themselves; power their economies; and care for their sick. If the world acts together, we can make sure that all of our children can enjoy lives of opportunity and dignity

America is pursuing ambitious reductions in our carbon emissions, and we have increased our investments in clean energy. We will do our part, and help developing nations to do theirs. But we can only succeed in combating

climate change if we are joined in this effort by every major power. That's how we can protect this planet for our children and grandchildren.

On issue after issue, we cannot rely on a rule-book written for a different century. If we lift our eyes beyond our borders – if we think globally and act cooperatively – we can shape the course of this century as our predecessors shaped the post-World War II age. But as we look to the future, one issue risks a cycle of conflict that could derail such progress: and that is the cancer of violent extremism that has ravaged so many parts of the Muslim world.

Of course, terrorism is not new. Speaking before this Assembly, President Kennedy put it well: "Terror is not a new weapon," he said. "Throughout history it has been used by those who could not prevail, either by persuasion or example." In the 20th century, terror was used by all manner of groups who failed to come to power through public support. But in this century, we have faced a more lethal and ideological brand of terrorists who have perverted one of the world's great religions. With access to technology that allows small groups to do great harm, they have embraced a nightmarish vision that would divide the world into adherents and infidels – killing as many innocent civilians as possible; and employing the most brutal methods to intimidate people within their communities.

I have made it clear that America will not base our entire foreign policy on reacting to terrorism. Rather, we have waged a focused campaign against al Qaeda and its associated forces – taking out their leaders, and denying them the safe-havens they rely upon. At the same time, we have reaffirmed that the United States is not and never will be at war with Islam. Islam teaches peace. Muslims the world over aspire to live with dignity and a sense of justice. And when it comes to America and Islam, there is no us and them – there is only us, because millions of Muslim Americans are part of the fabric of our country.

So we reject any suggestion of a clash of civilizations. Belief in permanent religious war is the misguided refuge of extremists who cannot build or create anything, and therefore peddle only fanaticism and hate. And it is no exaggeration to say that humanity's future depends on us uniting against those who would divide us along fault lines of tribe or sect; race or religion.

This is not simply a matter of words. Collectively, we must take concrete steps to address the danger posed by religiously motivated fanatics, and the trends that fuel their recruitment. Moreover, this campaign against extremism goes beyond a narrow security challenge. For while we have methodically degraded core al Qaeda and supported a transition to a sovereign Afghan government, extremist ideology has shifted to other places – particularly in the Middle East and North Africa, where a quarter of young people have no job; food and water could grow scarce; corruption is rampant; and sectarian conflicts have become increasingly hard to contain.

As an international community, we must meet this challenge with a focus on four areas. First, the terrorist group known as ISIL must be degraded, and ultimately destroyed.

This group has terrorized all who they come across in Iraq and Syria. Mothers, sisters and daughters have been subjected to rape as a weapon of war. Innocent children have been gunned down. Bodies have been dumped in mass graves. Religious minorities have been starved to death. In the most horrific crimes imaginable, innocent human beings have been beheaded, with videos of the atrocity distributed to shock the conscience of the world.

No God condones this terror. No grievance justifies these actions. There can be no reasoning – no negotiation – with this brand of evil. The only language understood by killers like this is the language of force. So the United States of America will work with a broad coalition to dismantle this network of death.

In this effort, we do not act alone. Nor do we intend to send U.S. troops to occupy foreign lands. Instead, we will support Iraqis and Syrians fighting to reclaim their communities. We will use our military might in a campaign of air strikes to roll back ISIL. We will train and equip forces fighting against these terrorists on the ground. We will work to cut off their financing, and to stop the flow of fighters into and out of the region. Already, over 40 nations have offered to join this coalition. Today, I ask the world to join in this effort. Those who have joined ISIL should leave the battlefield while they can. Those who continue to fight for a hateful cause will find they are increasingly alone. For we will not succumb to threats; and we will demonstrate that the future belongs to those who build – not those who destroy.

Second, it is time for the world – especially Muslim communities – to explicitly, forcefully, and consistently reject the ideology of al Qaeda and ISIL.

It is the task of all great religions to accommodate devout faith with a modern, multicultural world. No children – anywhere – should be educated to hate other people. There should be no more tolerance of so-called clerics who call upon people to harm innocents because they are Jewish, Christian or Muslim. It is time for a new compact among the civilized peoples of this world to eradicate war at its most fundamental source: the corruption of young minds by violent ideology.

That means cutting off the funding that fuels this hate. It's time to end the hypocrisy of those who accumulate wealth through the global economy, and then siphon funds to those who teach children to tear it down.

That means contesting the space that terrorists occupy – including the Internet and social media. Their propaganda has coerced young people to travel abroad to fight their wars, and turned students into suicide bombers. We must offer an alternative vision.

That means bringing people of different faiths together. All religions have been attacked by extremists from within at some point, and all people of faith have a responsibility to lift up the value at the heart of all religion: do unto thy neighbor as you would have done unto you.

The ideology of ISIL or al Qaeda or Boko Haram will wilt and die if it is consistently exposed, confronted, and refuted in the light of day. Look at the new Forum for Promoting Peace in Muslim Societies – Sheikh binBayyah

described its purpose: “We must declare war on war, so the outcome will be peace upon peace.” Look at the young British Muslims, who responded to terrorist propaganda by starting the “not in my name” campaign, declaring – “ISIS is hiding behind a false Islam.” Look at the Christian and Muslim leaders who came together in the Central African Republic to reject violence – listen to the Imam who said, “Politics try to divide the religious in our country, but religion shouldn’t be a cause of hate, war, or strife.”

Later today, the Security Council will adopt a resolution that underscores the responsibility of states to counter violent extremism. But resolutions must be followed by tangible commitments, so we’re accountable when we fall short. Next year, we should all be prepared to announce the concrete steps that we have taken to counter extremist ideologies – by getting intolerance out of schools, stopping radicalization before it spreads, and promoting institutions and programs that build new bridges of understanding.

Third, we must address the cycle of conflict – especially sectarian conflict – that creates the conditions that terrorists prey upon.

There is nothing new about wars within religions. Christianity endured centuries of vicious sectarian conflict. Today, it is violence within Muslim communities that has become the source of so much human misery. It is time to acknowledge the destruction wrought by proxy wars and terror campaigns between Sunni and Shia across the Middle East. And it is time that political, civic and religious leaders reject sectarian strife. Let’s be clear: this is a fight that no one is winning. A brutal civil war in Syria has already killed nearly 200,000 people and displaced millions. Iraq has come perilously close to plunging back into the abyss. The conflict has created a fertile recruiting ground for terrorists who inevitably export this violence.

Yet, we also see signs that this tide could be reversed – a new, inclusive government in Baghdad; a new Iraqi Prime Minister welcomed by his neighbors; Lebanese factions rejecting those who try to provoke war. These steps must be followed by a broader truce. Nowhere is this more necessary than Syria. Together with our partners, America is training and equipping the Syrian opposition to be a counterweight to the terrorists of ISIL and the brutality of the Assad regime. But the only lasting solution to Syria’s civil war is political – an inclusive political transition that responds to the legitimate aspirations of all Syrian citizens, regardless of ethnicity or creed.

Cynics may argue that such an outcome can never come to pass. But there is no other way for this madness to end – whether one year from now or ten. Indeed, it’s time for a broader negotiation in which major powers address their differences directly, honestly, and peacefully across the table from one another, rather than through gun-wielding proxies. I can promise you America will remain engaged in the region, and we are prepared to engage in that effort.

My fourth and final point is a simple one: the countries of the Arab and Muslim world must focus on the extraordinary potential of their people – especially the youth.

Here I'd like to speak directly to young people across the Muslim world. You come from a great tradition that stands for education, not ignorance; innovation, not destruction; the dignity of life, not murder. Those who call you away from this path are betraying this tradition, not defending it.

You have demonstrated that when young people have the tools to succeed –good schools; education in math and science; an economy that nurtures creativity and entrepreneurship – then societies will flourish. So America will partner with those who promote that vision.

Where women are full participants in a country's politics or economy, societies are more likely to succeed. That's why we support the participation of women in parliaments and in peace processes; in schools and the economy.

If young people live in places where the only option is between the dictates of a state, or the lure of an extremist underground – no counter-terrorism strategy can succeed. But where a genuine civil society is allowed to flourish – where people can express their views, and organize peacefully for a better life – then you dramatically expand the alternatives to terror.

Such positive change need not come at the expense of tradition and faith. We see this in Iraq, where a young man started a library for his peers. "We link Iraq's heritage to their hearts," he said, and "give them a reason to stay." We see it in Tunisia, where secular and Islamist parties worked together through a political process to produce a new constitution. We see it in Senegal, where civil society thrives alongside a strong, democratic government. We see it in Malaysia, where vibrant entrepreneurship is propelling a former colony into the ranks of advanced economies. And we see it in Indonesia, where what began as a violent transition has evolved into a genuine democracy.

Ultimately, the task of rejecting sectarianism and extremism is a generational task – a task for the people of the Middle East themselves. No external power can bring about a transformation of hearts and minds. But America will be a respectful and constructive partner. We will neither tolerate terrorist safe-havens, nor act as an occupying power. Instead, we will take action against threats to our security – and our allies – while building an architecture of counter-terrorism cooperation. We will increase efforts to lift up those who counter extremist ideology, and seek to resolve sectarian conflict. And we will expand our programs to support entrepreneurship, civil society, education and youth – because, ultimately, these investments are the best antidote to violence.

Leadership will also be necessary to address the conflict between Palestinians and Israelis. As bleak as the landscape appears, America will never give up the pursuit of peace. The situation in Iraq, Syria and Libya should cure anyone of the illusion that this conflict is the main source of problems in the region; for far too long, it has been used in part as a way to distract people from problems at home. And the violence engulfing the region today has made too many Israelis ready to abandon the hard work of peace. But let's be clear: the status quo in the West Bank and Gaza is not sustainable. We cannot afford to turn away from this effort – not when rockets are fired at innocent Israelis, or

the lives of so many Palestinian children are taken from us in Gaza. So long as I am President, we will stand up for the principle that Israelis, Palestinians, the region, and the world will be more just with two states living side by side, in peace and security.

This is what America is prepared to do – taking action against immediate threats, while pursuing a world in which the need for such action is diminished. The United States will never shy away from defending our interests, but nor will we shrink from the promise of this institution and its Universal Declaration of Human Rights – the notion that peace is not merely the absence of war, but the presence of a better life.

I realize that America's critics will be quick to point out that at times we too have failed to live up to our ideals; that America has plenty of problems within our own borders. This is true. In a summer marked by instability in the Middle East and Eastern Europe, I know the world also took notice of the small American city of Ferguson, Missouri – where a young man was killed, and a community was divided. So yes, we have our own racial and ethnic tensions. And like every country, we continually wrestle with how to reconcile the vast changes wrought by globalization and greater diversity with the traditions that we hold dear.

But we welcome the scrutiny of the world – because what you see in America is a country that has steadily worked to address our problems and make our union more perfect. America is not the same as it was 100 years ago, 50 years ago, or even a decade ago. Because, we fight for our ideals, and are willing to criticize ourselves when we fall short. Because we hold our leaders accountable, and insist on a free press and independent judiciary. Because we address our differences in the open space of democracy – with respect for the rule of law; with a place for people of every race and religion; and with an unyielding belief in the ability of individual men and women to change their communities and countries for the better.

After nearly six years as President, I believe that this promise can help light the world. Because I've seen a longing for positive change – for peace and freedom and opportunity – in the eyes of young people I've met around the globe. They remind me that no matter who you are, or where you come from, or what you look like, or what God you pray to, or who you love, there is something fundamental that we all share. Eleanor Roosevelt, a champion of the UN and America's role in it, once asked, "Where, after all, do universal human rights begin? In small places," she said, "close to home – so close and so small that they cannot be seen on any maps of the world. Yet they are the world of the individual person; the neighborhood he lives in; the school or college he attends; the factory, farm or office where he works."

The people of the world look to us, here, to be as decent, as dignified, and as courageous as they are in their daily lives. And at this crossroads, I can promise you that the United States of America will not be distracted or deterred from what must be done. We are heirs to a proud legacy of freedom, and we are prepared to do what is necessary to secure that legacy for

generations to come. Join us in this common mission, for today's children and tomorrow's.

Washington Post (Washington) September 25, 2014
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/full-text-of-president-obamas-2014-address-to-the-united-nations-general-assembly/2014/09/24/88889e46-43f4-11e4-b437-1a7368204804_story.html

Document 3**STATEMENT H.E. NARENDRA MODI, PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA, GENERAL DEBATE OF THE 69TH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY**

September 27, 2014
New York

Mr. President and distinguished delegates,

Let me first congratulate you on your election as the President of the 69th session of United Nations General Assembly.

It is a truly a great honour to address you for the first time as the Prime Minister of India. I stand here conscious of the hopes and expectations of the people of India. I am also mindful of the expectations of the world from 1.25 billion people. India is a country that constitutes one-sixth of humanity; a nation experiencing economic and social transformation on a scale rarely seen in history.

Every nation's world view is shaped by its civilization and philosophical tradition. India's ancient wisdom sees the world as one family. It is this timeless current of thought that gives India an unwavering belief in multilateralism. Today, as I stand here, I am equally aware of the hopes that are pinned on this great assembly. I am struck by the sacred belief that brought us together.

An extraordinary vision and a clear recognition of our shared destiny brought us together to build this institution for advancing peace and security, the rights of every human being and economic development for all. From 51 nations then, today 193 sovereign fläysflv at thiÿhope.

We have achieved much in the past six decades in our mission in ending wars, preventing conflict, maintaining peace, feeding the hungry, striving to save our planet and creating opportunities for children. The 69th UN peacekeeping missions since 1948 have made the blue helmet the colour of peace.

Today, there is a surge of democracy across the world; including in South Asia; in Afghanistan, we are at a historic moment of democratic transition and affirmation of unity. Afghans are showing that their desire for a peaceful and democratic future will prevail over violence. Nepal has moved from violence to peace and democracy; Bhutan's young democracy is flourishing. Democracy is trying to find a voice in West Asia and North Africa; Tunisia's success makes us believe that it is possible.

There is a new stirring for stability, progress and progress in Africa. There is unprecedented spread of prosperity in Asia and beyond, rising on the strength of peace and stability. Latin America, a continent of enormous potential, is coming together in shared pursuit of stability and prosperity, which could make it an important anchor of the world. India desires a peaceful

and stable environment for its development. A nation's destiny is linked to its neighbourhood. That is why my Government has placed the highest priority on advancing friendship and cooperation with her neighbours.

This includes Pakistan. I am prepared to engage in a serious bilateral dialogue with Pakistan in a peaceful atmosphere, without the shadow of terrorism, to promote our friendship and cooperation. However, Pakistan must also take its responsibility seriously to create an appropriate environment. Raising issues in this forum is not the way to make progress towards resolving issues between our two countries. Instead, today, we should be thinking about the victims of floods in Jammu and Kashmir. In India, we have organized massive flood relief operations and have also offered assistance for Pakistan Occupied Kashmir.

India is part of the developing world, but we are prepared to share our modest resources with those countries that need this assistance as much as we do. This is a time of great flux and change. The world is witnessing tensions and turmoil on a scale rarely seen in recent history. There are no major wars, but tensions and conflicts abound; and, there is absence of real peace and uncertainty about the future. An integrating Asia Pacific region is still concerned about maritime security that is fundamental to its future. Europe faces risk of new division. In West Asia, extremism and fault lines are growing. Our own region continues to face the destabilizing threat of terrorism. Africa faces the twin threat of rising terrorism and a health crisis.

Terrorism is taking new shape and new name. No country, big or small, in the north or the south, east or west, is free from its threat. Are we really making concerted international efforts to fight these forces, or are we still hobbled by our politics, our division our discrimination between sanctuaries on their territory or use terrorism as instruments of their policy.

We welcome efforts to combat terrorism's resurgence in West Asia, which is affecting countries near and far. The effort should involve the support of all countries in the region.

Today, even as seas, space and cyber space have become new instruments of prosperity, they could also become a new theatre of conflicts. Today, more than ever, the need for an international compact, which is the foundation of the United Nations, is stronger than before.

While we speak of an interdependent world, have we become more united as nations?

Today, we still operate in various Gs with different numbers. India, too, is involved in several. But, how much are we able to work together as G1 or G-All? On the one side, we say that our destinies are inter-linked, on the other hand we still think in terms of zero sum game. If the other benefits, I stand to lose.

It is easy to be cynical and say nothing will change; but if we do that, we run the risk of shirking our responsibilities and we put our collective future in danger.

Let us bring ourselves in tune with the call of our times. First, let us work for genuine peace, No one country or group of countries can determine the course of this world. There has to be a genuine international partnership. This is not just a moral position, but a practical reality.

We need a genuine dialogue and engagement between countries. I say this from the conviction of the philosophical tradition that I come from.

Our efforts must begin here - in the United Nations. We must reform the United Nations, including the Security Council, and make it more democratic and participative. Institutions that reflect the imperatives of 20th century won't be effective in the 21st. It would face the risk of irrelevance; and we will face the risk of continuing turbulence with no one capable of addressing it.

We should put aside our differences and mount a concerted international effort to combat terrorism and extremism. As a symbol of this effort, I urge you to adopt the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism. We should ensure that there will be peace, stability and order in the outer space and cyberspace

We should work together to ensure that all countries observe international rules and norms.

We should energize the noble task of UN Peace Keeping; we should involve troop contributing countries in the process of decision making Let us continue redouble our efforts to pursue universal global disarmament and non-proliferation.

Second, we must pursue a more stable and inclusive global development Globalisation has created new poles of growth; new industries; and new source of employment.

At the same time, billions live on the edge of poverty and want; countries that are barely able to survive a global economic storm.

There has never been a time when it has seemed more possible than now to change this.

Technology has made things possible; the cost of providing it has reduced. We no longer are totally dependent on bricks and mortars. If you think of the speed with which Facebook or Twitter has spread around the world, if you think of the speed with which cell phones have spread, then you must also believe that development and empowerment can spread with the same speed.

Each country must of course take its own national measures; each government must fulfil its responsibility to support growth and development. At the same time, we also require a genuine international partnership. At one level, it means a better coordination of policy so that our efforts becomes mutually supportive, not mutually damaging. It also means that when we craft agreements on international trade, we accommodate each other's concerns and interests.

When we think of the scale of want in the world - 2.5 billion people without access to basic sanitation; 1.3 billion people without access to

electricity; or 1.1 billion people without access to drinking water, we need a more comprehensive and concerted direct international action.

In India, the most important aspects of my development agenda are precisely to focus on these issues. The eradication of poverty must remain at the core of the Post-2015 Development Agenda and command our fullest attention.

Third, we must seek a more habitable and sustainable world. There are debates and documents on these issues but we no longer see – forests, birds, and animals, clean rivers and lakes and blue skies.

I want to say three things. One, we should be honest in shouldering our responsibilities in meeting the challenges. The world had agreed on a beautiful balance of collective action - common but differentiated responsibilities. That should form the basis of continued action. This also means that the developed countries must fulfill their commitments for funding and technology transfer. Second, national action is imperative. Technology has made many things possible. We need imagination and commitment.

India is prepared to share its technology and capabilities, just as we have announced a free satellite for the SAARC countries. Third, we need to change our life styles. Energy not consumed is the cleanest energy.

We can achieve the same level of development, prosperity and wellbeing without necessarily going down the path of reckless consumption. It doesn't mean that economies will suffer; it will mean that our economies will take on a different character.

For us in India, respect for nature is an integral part of spiritualism. We treat nature's bounties as sacred.

Yoga is an invaluable gift of our ancient tradition.

Yoga embodies unity of mind and body; thought and action; restraint and fulfillment; harmony between man and nature; a holistic approach to health and well being. It is not about exercise but to discover the sense of oneness with yourself, the world and the nature.

By changing our lifestyle and creating consciousness, it can help us deal with climate change.

Let us work towards adopting an International Yoga Day.

Finally, we are at a historic moment.

Every age is defined by its character; and, each generation is remembered for how it rose together to meet its challenges.

We have that responsibility to rise to our challenges now. Nowhere is this more pronounced than in this great assembly.

I, next year we will be seventy, we should ask ourselves whether we should wait until we are 80 or 100.

Let us fulfill our promise to reform the United Nations Security Council by 2015. Let us fulfill our pledge on a Post-2015 Development Agenda so that there is new hope and belief in us around the world. Let us make 2015 also a new watershed for a sustainable world. Let it be the beginning of a new journey together.

Thank you.

September 27, 2014
Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations
235 East 43rd Street, New York, NY 10017

Document 4**SECURITY AND DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN**

September 30, 2014

Preamble

The United States of America (hereinafter, "the United States") and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (hereinafter, "Afghanistan"), hereinafter referred to collectively as "the Parties" and singularly as a "Party;"

Recognizing the Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, signed May 2, 2012, (the "Strategic Partnership Agreement") and reaffirming that, as recognized in that Agreement, the Parties are committed to strengthen long-term strategic cooperation in areas of mutual interest, including: advancing peace, security, and stability; strengthening state institutions; supporting Afghanistan's long-term economic and social development; and encouraging regional cooperation;

Confirming the recognition in the Strategic Partnership Agreement that cooperation between the Parties is based on mutual respect and shared interests;

Emphasizing also the Strategic Partnership Agreement's recognition that the Parties will go forward in partnership with confidence because they are committed to seeking a future of justice, peace, security, and opportunity for the Afghan people, as well as the reaffirmation of the Parties' strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and national unity of Afghanistan;

Recognizing the enduring partnership between the United States and Afghanistan, and affirming the mutual intent of the Parties to expand, mature, promote and further elevate their security and defense cooperation based on this Agreement;

Desiring to continue to foster close cooperation concerning defense and security arrangements in order to strengthen security and stability in Afghanistan, contribute to regional and international peace and stability, combat terrorism, achieve a region which is no longer a safe haven for al-Qaida and its affiliates, and enhance the ability of Afghanistan to deter threats against its sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity; and noting that the United States does not seek permanent military facilities in Afghanistan, or a presence that is a threat to Afghanistan's neighbors, and has pledged not to use Afghan territory or facilities as a launching point for attacks against other countries;

Recalling the Chicago Summit Declaration on Afghanistan, issued on May 21, 2012, by the Heads of State and Government of Afghanistan and Nations Contributing to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and specifically, the participants' renewed firm commitment to a sovereign, secure, and democratic Afghanistan and acknowledgment that ISAF's mission will be concluded by the end of 2014 and that their close partnership will continue beyond the end of the transition period including through NATO and Afghanistan's mutual commitment to work to establish a new NATO-led Mission to train, advise, and assist the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), and noting here that such a mission will also need to be provided with the necessary authorities, status arrangements, and legal basis;

Reaffirming the continued support of the Parties for regional cooperation and coordination mechanisms, with a goal of increasing security and stability by reducing tensions, uncertainty, and misunderstanding;

Recalling the 2013 Loya Jirga's recognition that this Security and Defense Cooperation Agreement between the United States and Afghanistan is important for the security of Afghanistan;

Desiring to develop further the means of defense and security cooperation between the Parties, based on the principles of full respect for the independence, sovereignty, and integrity of their territories, and non-interference in the domestic affairs of each other, in order to promote security and stability in the region, and to combat terrorism;

Agreeing on the importance of cooperative relationships between Afghanistan and its neighbors conducted on the basis of mutual respect, non-interference, and equality and calling on all nations to respect Afghanistan's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to refrain from interfering in Afghanistan's internal affairs and democratic processes; and

Affirming also that the Parties' cooperation is based on full respect for the sovereignty of each Party, the purposes of the United Nations Charter, and a shared desire to provide a framework for defense and security cooperation between the Parties; and reaffirming their strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and national unity of Afghanistan, as well as respect for Afghan laws, customs and traditions;

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

Definitions

1. "United States forces" means the entity comprising the members of the force and of the civilian component, and all property, equipment, and materiel of the United States Armed Forces present in the territory of Afghanistan.
2. "Member of the force" means any person belonging to the land, sea, or air services of the United States Armed Forces.
3. "Member of the civilian component" means any person employed by the United States Department of Defense (DoD) who is not a member of the force. However, "member of the civilian component" does not mean

persons who are permanently resident in Afghanistan or Afghan nationals who normally reside in Afghanistan.

4. "Executive Agent" means DoD for the United States and the Ministry of Defense (MOD) for Afghanistan. The Executive Agent serves as the principal contact for its respective Party for the implementation of this Agreement.
5. "United States contractors" means persons and legal entities who are supplying goods and services in Afghanistan to or on behalf of United States forces under a contract or subcontract with or in support of United States forces.
6. "United States contractor employees" means the employees of United States contractors.
7. "Agreed facilities and areas" means the facilities and areas in the territory of Afghanistan provided by Afghanistan at the locations listed in Annex A, and such other facilities and areas in the territory of Afghanistan as may be provided by Afghanistan in the future, to which United States forces, United States contractors, United States contractor employees, and others as mutually agreed, shall have the right to access and use pursuant to this Agreement.
8. "Afghan National Defense and Security Forces" or "ANDSF" means the entity comprising the members of the security forces under the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defense of Afghanistan and, as appropriate, the National Directorate of Security, and other entities as mutually agreed.
9. "Taxes" means all taxes, duties (including customs duties), fees, and similar or related charges of whatever kind, imposed by the Government of Afghanistan which, for the purposes of this Agreement, means by governmental authorities of Afghanistan at any level, including provincial and district levels, and by the agencies of such governmental authorities.

Article 2

Purpose and Scope

1. The Parties shall continue to foster close cooperation to strengthen security and stability in Afghanistan, counter-terrorism, contribute to regional and international peace and stability, and enhance the ability of Afghanistan to deter internal and external threats against its sovereignty, security, territorial integrity, national unity, and its constitutional order. Unless otherwise mutually agreed, United States forces shall not conduct combat operations in Afghanistan.
2. To that end, the United States shall undertake supporting activities, as may be agreed, in close cooperation and coordination with Afghanistan, to assist ANDSF in developing capabilities required to provide security for all Afghans including as may be mutually agreed: advising, training, equipping, supporting, and sustaining ANDSF, including in field

engineering, countering improvised explosive devices and explosive ordinance disposal; establishing and upgrading ANDSF transportation and logistics systems; developing intelligence sharing capabilities; strengthening Afghanistan's Air Force capabilities; conducting combined military exercises; and other activities as may be agreed. The Parties will continue to work on the details of ANDSF development as set forth in the Afghan Program of Record, at the Chicago Summit in 2012, and in the context of the Security Consultative Forum.

3. The Parties recognize that ANDSF are responsible for securing the people and territory of Afghanistan. The Parties shall work to enhance ANDSF's ability to deter and respond to internal and external threats. Upon request, the United States shall urgently determine support it is prepared to provide ANDSF in order to respond to threats to Afghanistan's security.
4. The Parties acknowledge that U.S. military operations to defeat al-Qaida and its affiliates may be appropriate in the common fight against terrorism. The Parties agree to continue their close cooperation and coordination toward those ends, with the intention of protecting U.S. and Afghan national interests without unilateral U.S. military counter-terrorism operations. U.S. military counter-terrorism operations are intended to complement and support ANDSF's counter-terrorism operations, with the goal of maintaining ANDSF lead, and with full respect for Afghan sovereignty and full regard for the safety and security of the Afghan people, including in their homes.
5. In furtherance of the activities and operations referred to in this Article, and for other purposes and missions as may be mutually agreed, and consistent with the authorizations as detailed in this Agreement, United States forces may undertake transit, support, and related activities, including as may be necessary to support themselves while they are present in Afghanistan under the terms of this Agreement, and such other activities as detailed in this Agreement, or as may be mutually agreed.
6. This Agreement, including any Annexes and any Implementing Agreements or Arrangements, provides the necessary authorizations for the presence and activities of United States forces in Afghanistan and defines the terms and conditions that describe that presence, and in the specific situations indicated herein, the presence and activities of United States contractors and United States contractor employees in Afghanistan.

Article 3

Laws

1. It is the duty of members of the force and of the civilian component to respect the Constitution and laws of Afghanistan and to abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this Agreement and, in

particular, from any political activity in the territory of Afghanistan. It is the duty of United States forces authorities to take necessary measures to that end.

2. The Parties' respective obligations under this Agreement, and any subsequent arrangements, are without prejudice to Afghan sovereignty over its territory, and each Party's right of self-defense, consistent with international law. Cooperation and activities relating to implementation of this Agreement shall be consistent with the Parties' respective commitments and obligations under international law.
3. United States forces shall not enter Afghan homes for the purpose of military operations and searches except under extraordinary circumstances involving the urgent risk to life and limb of U.S. nationals, United States forces shall not arrest or imprison Afghan nationals, nor maintain or operate detention facilities in Afghanistan.

Article 4

Developing and Sustaining Afghanistan's Defense and Security Capabilities

1. With full respect for Afghanistan's sovereignty, the Parties recognize Afghanistan's current requirement for continued international security assistance, and share the goal of Afghanistan taking increasing and, ultimately full, responsibility for funding its defense and security needs and sustaining ANDSF.
2. Afghanistan shall make, consistent with its political and economic stability and its general economic condition, the full contribution permitted by its manpower, resources, and facilities to the development and sustainment of its own defense and security forces. Afghanistan shall take all necessary measures to develop and sustain its defense and security capacities.
3. So long as the Strategic Partnership Agreement so provides, and guided by the pledges set forth at the Chicago Summit in 2012, the United States shall have an obligation to seek funds on a yearly basis to support the training, equipping, advising and sustaining of ANDSF, so that Afghanistan can independently secure and defend itself against internal and external threats, and help ensure that terrorists never again encroach on Afghan soil and threaten Afghanistan, the region, and the world. The United States shall consult with Afghanistan regarding the amount of funding needed to accomplish the purposes of this Agreement, keeping in mind pledges made in Chicago, and shall take the results of those consultations into consideration in executing this obligation. Taking into account Afghanistan's annual priorities, the United States shall direct appropriate funds through Afghan Government budgetary mechanisms, to be managed by relevant Afghan institutions implementing financial management standards of transparency and accountability, and procurement, audit, and regulatory oversight in accordance with international best practices.

4. The Parties recognize the importance of ANDSF having the necessary equipment and materiel to secure Afghanistan. To that end, the United States shall continue to cooperate with Afghanistan on providing equipment and materiel for ANDSF.
5. Afghanistan and the United States may cooperate and coordinate with other countries to strengthen ANDSF, as may be mutually agreed, including on equipping ANDSF.
6. In order to contribute effectively to the security of Afghanistan and the region, the United States agrees to cooperate with Afghanistan to continue the development of ANDSF capabilities consistent with Afghanistan's status as a Major Non-NATO Ally.
7. The Parties recognize the benefits for Afghanistan's defense and security to be derived from developing defense capabilities and systems that are consistent with NATO standards and that promote interoperability with NATO. The Parties shall coordinate in the development of Afghanistan's defense and security forces, equipment, materiel, facilities, operational doctrine, and institutions to achieve standardization and interoperability with NATO, in order to promote further the effective utilization and maintenance of defense and security assistance provided to Afghanistan, and to maximize the benefits of cooperation between ANDSF and United States forces. This coordination shall not preclude Afghanistan from procuring independently equipment and material for ANDSF from non-NATO countries with its own resources.

Article 5

Defense and Security Cooperation Mechanisms

1. The Parties agree to direct the United States - Afghanistan Working Group on Defense and Security Cooperation, established under the Strategic Partnership Agreement, to:
 - a. Develop appropriate measures of effectiveness for the analysis and strengthening of Afghanistan's use of available defense and security resources, consistent with the purpose and scope of this Agreement;
 - b. Complete semi-annual assessments of actual performance against these measures to inform the Parties' respective resource allocation decisions and their cooperation in developing and sustaining Afghanistan's defense capabilities;
 - c. Develop a process consistent with the purpose and scope of this Agreement, for making timely, accurate, and effective cooperative assessments of internal and external threats to Afghanistan; and
 - d. Make specific recommendations on enhancing information and intelligence sharing and evaluation.

2. The Parties share the objective of continuing to improve their ability to consult on such threats, including considering how to establish secure or dedicated channels of communication.

Article 6

External Aggression

1. Afghanistan has been subject to aggression and other uses of force inconsistent with the United Nations Charter by foreign states and externally based or supported armed groups. In the context of this Agreement, the Parties strongly oppose such uses of armed force or threats thereof against the territorial integrity or political independence of Afghanistan, including in this regard provision to armed groups of support, such as sanctuary or arms, by any state or other armed groups. The Parties agree to cooperate to strengthen Afghanistan's defenses against such threats to its territorial integrity, sovereignty or political independence.
2. The United States shall regard with grave concern any external aggression or threat of external aggression against the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Afghanistan, recognizing that such aggression may threaten the Parties' shared interests in Afghanistan's stability and regional and international peace and stability.
3. On a regular basis, the Parties shall consult on potential political, diplomatic, military, and economic measures that could form part of an appropriate response in the event of such external aggression or the threat of external aggression against Afghanistan. Consultations shall seek to develop a list of political, diplomatic, military, and economic measures.
4. In the event of external aggression or the threat of external aggression against Afghanistan, the Parties shall hold consultations on an urgent basis to develop and implement an appropriate response, including, as may be mutually determined, consideration of available political, diplomatic, military, and economic measures on the list developed pursuant to paragraph 3, in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures.
5. The Parties shall develop comprehensive procedures to promote the effective accomplishment of such regular and urgent consultations.
 - a. Such comprehensive procedures shall recognize consultations involving the participation of the United States Secretary of State and Afghanistan Foreign Minister, the United States Secretary of Defense and Afghanistan Defense Minister, and respective Ambassadors in Kabul and Washington, D.C. as primary channels to initiate urgent consultations in the event of external aggression, or threat of external aggression.

- b. Such comprehensive procedures shall not, however, limit or prejudice the Parties' ability to consult each other in other channels or through other mechanisms, as urgency or exigency may require.
6. The Parties agree to direct the United States - Afghanistan Working Group on Defense and Security Cooperation to promote the effective implementation of this Article, including development of such comprehensive procedures, and review on a regular basis the list of measures developed pursuant to paragraph 3.

Article 7

Use of Agreed Facilities and Areas

1. Afghanistan hereby provides access to and use of the agreed facilities and areas, as defined in paragraph 7 of Article 2, solely to implement the purpose and scope of this Agreement, taking into account locations of ANDSF and the local Afghan population. Access to and use of such agreed facilities and areas for other purposes shall be as mutually agreed by the Parties.
2. Under this agreement, Afghanistan hereby authorizes United States forces to exercise all rights and authorities within the agreed facilities and areas that are necessary for their use, operation, defense, or control, including the right to undertake new construction works. United States forces may carry out such construction works with members of the force and the civilian component or by contract.
3. Afghanistan hereby authorizes United States forces to control entry to agreed facilities and areas that have been provided for United States forces' exclusive use, and to coordinate entry with Afghan authorities at joint-use agreed facilities and areas, for the purposes of safety and security. Upon request, the United States shall provide to relevant authorities of Afghanistan access to any agreed facility or area that has been provided for United States forces' exclusive use. The Parties shall establish mutually agreed procedures regarding Afghan authorities' access to any agreed facility or area that has been provided for United States forces' exclusive use. Such procedures and access shall be established with due respect for United States forces operations and security requirements. Acknowledging that United States forces may conduct force protection activities at and in the vicinity of agreed facilities and agreed areas as are necessary, the Parties agree to coordinate and integrate their respective plans for force protection to ensure the safety of United States forces, with full respect for Afghan sovereignty and with full regard for the safety and security of the Afghan people. In furtherance of this objective, United States forces shall not target Afghan civilians, including in their homes, consistent with Afghan law and United States forces' rules of engagement.

4. In pursuit of the purpose and scope of this Agreement, in particular United States efforts to train, equip, advise, and sustain ANDSF, Afghanistan shall provide all agreed facilities and areas without charge to United States forces.
5. United States forces shall be responsible for the construction, development, operations, and maintenance costs for agreed facilities and areas provided for their exclusive use, unless otherwise agreed by the Parties. Construction, development, operations, and maintenance costs for agreed facilities and areas provided for joint use, or otherwise used jointly by United States forces and ANDSF or other entities, shall be shared on the basis of proportionate use, unless otherwise agreed.
6. The United States confirms its commitment to respect relevant Afghan environmental and health and safety laws, regulations, and standards in the execution of its policies. United States forces operations and activities on agreed facilities and areas shall be conducted with due regard for the protection of the natural environment and human health and safety, with due respect for applicable Afghan laws and regulations, and in accordance with applicable United States laws and regulations and applicable international agreements.
7. United States forces operations and activities on agreed facilities and areas shall be conducted with full respect for Afghan laws and regulations for the protection of sites or artifacts of historic and cultural heritage. United States forces shall notify and consult immediately with appropriate Afghan authorities through the Joint Commission when sites or artifacts of historic and cultural heritage are discovered on an agreed facility or area.

Article 8

Property Ownership

1. United States forces shall return to Afghanistan any agreed facility or area, or any portion thereof, including buildings, non-relocatable structures, and assemblies connected to the soil, including those constructed, altered, or improved by United States forces, when no longer needed for United States forces' use. United States forces shall keep the requirement for such agreed facilities and areas under periodic reassessment with a view toward such return. The Parties or their Executive Agents shall consult regarding the terms of return of any agreed facility or area. The Parties agree to pursue a preventative rather than reactive approach to environmental protection and human health and safety. The Parties recognize that the policies and practices of the United States are designed to avoid such damage and endangerment and to apply the more protective of either Afghan or United States standards. In accordance with United States forces policy, United States forces shall take prompt action to address a substantial impact to human health and safety due to environmental

- contamination that is caused by activities of United States forces and is located on an agreed facility or area.
2. All buildings, non-relocatable structures, and assemblies connected to the soil at the agreed facilities and areas, including those constructed, used, altered, or improved by United States forces, are for the exclusive use of United States forces, United States contractors, and United States contractor employees, and for others as mutually agreed. All such buildings, non-relocatable structures, and assemblies connected to the soil built by United States forces or provided to United States forces for their access and use may be modified by United States forces, and United States forces may use them exclusively until they are no longer required by United States forces.
 3. United States forces and United States contractors shall retain title to all equipment, materiel, supplies, relocatable structures, and other movable property they have installed in, imported into, or acquired within the territory of Afghanistan in connection with the presence of United States forces and United States contractors in Afghanistan. The Parties shall consult regarding the possible transfer to or purchase by Afghanistan of equipment determined to be excess, as may be authorized by United States laws and regulations.

Article 9

Positioning and Storage of Equipment and Materiel

1. Afghanistan authorizes United States forces to position the equipment, supplies, and materiel of United States forces within agreed facilities and areas, and at other locations as mutually agreed. United States forces shall maintain title to and control over the use and disposition of such equipment, supplies, and materiel that are stored in the territory of Afghanistan and shall have the right to remove such items from the territory of Afghanistan.
2. The United States confirms its commitment to respect relevant Afghan safety laws, regulations, and standards. United States forces shall take all necessary measures to protect and safely store equipment, supplies, and materiel of United States forces that are of a hazardous nature in accordance with applicable United States laws and regulations. In accordance with United States forces policy, United States forces shall take prompt action (1) to clean up spills located on an agreed facility or area; and, (2) to address a substantial impact to human health and safety due to environmental contamination that is caused by activities of United States forces and is located on an agreed facility or area.
3. The United States, taking into account its obligations under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, done at Paris on January 13, 1993, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of

Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction done at Washington, London and Moscow on April 10, 1972, agrees that chemical and biological weapons shall not be stored in the territory of Afghanistan. The Parties affirm that the United States will not position or store nuclear weapons in the territory of Afghanistan.

Article 10

Movement of Vehicles, Vessels, and Aircraft

1. Afghanistan has full sovereignty over its airspace, territory, and waters. Management of Afghanistan's airspace and transportation shall be exercised through relevant Afghan authorities.
2. With full respect for Afghan sovereignty and consistent with the purpose and scope of this Agreement, Afghanistan authorizes United States government aircraft and civil aircraft that are operated by or exclusively for United States forces to enter, exit, overfly, land, take off, conduct aerial refueling, and move within the territory of Afghanistan. United States government aircraft and civil aircraft that are operated by or exclusively for United States forces shall not be subject to payment of overflight or navigation fees, or landing or parking fees at government-owned airfields, or other charges. United States government aircraft shall be operated with full respect for the relevant rules of safety and movement in Afghanistan, including notification requirements. Civil aircraft being operated by or exclusively for United States forces are subject to notification requirements regarding their entry into and exit from the territory of Afghanistan as required by the civil aviation authorities of Afghanistan.
3. With full respect for Afghan sovereignty and consistent with the purpose and scope of this Agreement, Afghanistan authorizes United States government vessels and vehicles and other vessels and vehicles that are operated by or exclusively for United States forces, to enter, exit, and move within the territory of Afghanistan. All such vessels and vehicles shall be operated with full respect for the relevant rules of safety and movement in Afghanistan. Members of the force and of the civilian component have a duty to respect Afghan motor vehicle regulations when operating official vehicles.
4. United States government aircraft, vessels and vehicles shall be free from boarding without the consent of United States forces authorities. United States government aircraft, vessels, and vehicles shall be free from inspection, regulation, or registration requirements within Afghanistan, except as otherwise provided in this Agreement or as otherwise agreed by the Joint Commission.
5. United States forces shall pay reasonable charges for services requested and received for United States government aircraft, vehicles, and vessels, free of taxes or similar charges.

6. The Parties agree to establish procedures to implement this Article. The Parties shall review and update, as appropriate, such procedures, and shall address any issues immediately through the Joint Commission that may arise regarding such procedures.

Article 11

Contracting Procedures

1. United States forces, in accordance with United States laws, may enter into contracts for the acquisition of articles and services, including construction, in the territory of Afghanistan. Afghanistan recognizes that United States forces are bound by the laws and regulations of the United States in the solicitation, award, and administration of such contracts. United States forces shall strive to utilize Afghan suppliers of goods, products, and services to the greatest extent practicable, in accordance with United States laws and regulations.
2. United States contractors are subject to registration in Afghanistan, via an expedited process that shall include issuance of a business registration license valid for three years and payment of a reasonable, standard, one-time service charge to the Afghanistan Investment Support Agency as required by the laws and regulations of Afghanistan. United States contractors shall otherwise be exempt from all other Afghan licenses and similar requirements in relation to their entry into or execution of contracts and subcontracts with or on behalf of United States forces.
3. Recognizing the importance of transparency, including through the sharing of information and consultations as may be mutually agreed, United States forces shall give due consideration to concerns and disputes expressed by Afghan authorities regarding United States contractors. The Parties will work together to improve transparency, accountability, and effectiveness of contracting processes in Afghanistan with a view to preventing misuse and bad contracting practices.
4. Upon the request of either Party, the Parties shall consult immediately through the Joint Commission concerning any issues, including issues concerning the activities of United States contractors and United States contractor employees, that may arise regarding implementation of this Article.

Article 12

Utilities and Communications

1. United States forces may produce and provide services including but not limited to water, electricity, and other utilities for agreed facilities and areas and for other locations as mutually agreed. The production and provision of such services shall be notified to and coordinated with the Joint Commission on a periodic basis. United States forces and

United States contractors may use Afghan public water, electricity, and other Afghan public utilities on terms and conditions, including rates or charges, no less favorable than those paid by ANDSF, less taxes or similar or related charges, unless otherwise mutually agreed. United States forces' or United States contractors' costs shall be equal to their proportionate use of such public utilities.

2. Afghanistan recognizes that United States forces shall use the radio spectrum. The Afghan side shall allocate Afghan owned frequencies based on relevant Afghan regulations. The United States shall be allowed to operate its own telecommunications systems (as telecommunication is defined in the 1992 Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union), including the use of such means and services as required to ensure full ability to operate telecommunications systems, and the use of radio spectrum allocated by appropriate Afghan authorities for this purpose. Use of radio spectrum shall be free of cost to the United States.
3. United States forces, in recognition of Afghan ownership and allocation of frequencies within Afghanistan and in the interest of avoiding mutually disruptive interference, shall coordinate with appropriate Afghan authorities for the allocation of frequencies for United States forces present in Afghanistan. United States forces shall respect frequencies in use by or reserved for local operators.
4. Use of telecommunications by United States forces shall be done in a manner that avoids interference with use of radio spectrum or other telecommunication equipment operated by the Afghan government and other organizations the Afghan government has granted permission to use radio spectrum and/or telecommunications equipment.

Article 13

Status of Personnel

1. Afghanistan, while retaining its sovereignty, recognizes the particular importance of disciplinary control, including judicial and non-judicial measures, by the United States forces authorities over members of the force and of the civilian component. Afghanistan therefore agrees that the United States shall have the exclusive right to exercise jurisdiction over such persons in respect of any criminal or civil offenses committed in the territory of Afghanistan. Afghanistan authorizes the United States to hold trial in such cases, or take other disciplinary action, as appropriate, in the territory of Afghanistan.
2. If requested by Afghanistan, the United States shall inform Afghanistan of the status of any criminal proceedings regarding offenses allegedly committed in Afghanistan by the members of the force or of the civilian component involving Afghan nationals, including the final disposition of the investigations, or prosecution. If so requested, the United States

- shall also undertake efforts to permit and facilitate the attendance and observation of such proceedings by representatives of Afghanistan.
3. In the interests of justice, the Parties shall assist each other in investigation of incidents, including the collection of evidence. In investigating offenses, United States authorities shall take into account any report of investigations by Afghan authorities.
 4. The United States recognizes the critical role that Afghan law enforcement officials play in the enforcement of Afghan law and order and the protection of the Afghan people. Relevant Afghan authorities shall immediately notify United States forces authorities if they suspect a member of the force or of the civilian component is engaged in the commission of a crime so that United States forces authorities can take immediate action. Members of the force and of the civilian component shall not be arrested or detained by Afghan authorities. Members of the force and of the civilian component arrested or detained by Afghan authorities for any reason, including by Afghan law enforcement authorities, shall be immediately handed over to United States forces authorities.
 5. Afghanistan and the United States agree that members of the force and of the civilian component may not be surrendered to, or otherwise transferred to, the custody of an international tribunal or any other entity or state without the express consent of the United States.
 6. Afghanistan maintains the right to exercise jurisdiction over United States contractors and United States contractor employees.

Article 14

Bearing of Arms and Wearing of Uniforms

1. When present in Afghanistan under this Agreement, members of the force and of the civilian component may possess and carry arms in Afghanistan as required for the performance of their duties and as authorized by their orders. When issuing such orders, United States forces authorities shall consider relevant Afghan officials' views regarding appropriate locations for the presence of arms, including considerations of public safety. In consideration of such views, United States forces shall not, for military operations, enter mosques or other sites of religious significance being used for religious purposes. Members of the force may wear uniforms while in Afghanistan. United States forces authorities shall take appropriate measures to ensure that members of the force and of the civilian component are mindful of their presence in public areas, including in the carrying of weapons.
2. The Parties agree that United States contractors and United States contractor employees are not permitted to wear military uniforms and may only carry weapons in accordance with Afghan laws and regulations.

3. United States contractors performing security services in Afghanistan are subject to all relevant requirements of Afghan laws and regulations.
4. Upon the request of either Party, the Parties shall consult immediately through the Joint Commission concerning any issues that may arise regarding implementation of this Article.

Article 15

Entry and Exit

1. Members of the force and members of the civilian component may enter and exit Afghanistan at agreed facilities and areas at locations listed in Annex A, at official points of embarkation and debarkation as listed in Annex B, and at other areas as mutually agreed, with identification cards issued by the United States, and either collective or individual movement orders. Passports and visas shall not be required. Such personnel shall be exempt from Afghan law and regulations on registration and control of foreign citizens.
2. United States contractors and United States contractor employees may enter and exit Afghanistan at the places of entry and exit described in paragraph 1 of this Article. Passports and visas shall be required in accordance with Afghan law. If a visa is required, and requested by a United States contractor or a United States contractor employee, it shall provide for multiple entries and exits and shall be valid for a period of not less than one year. The appropriate Afghan authorities may issue or decline to issue required visas expeditiously. In the event Afghanistan declines to issue such visa, the appropriate Afghan authorities shall notify the person concerned and United States forces authorities. For exceptional situations as may be agreed through the Joint Commission, Afghanistan shall seek to put in place and make available to United States contractor employees a process for the issuance of visas upon their arrival in Afghanistan.
3. The United States recognizes the sovereign right of Afghanistan to request the removal of any member of the force or member of the civilian component from Afghanistan. United States forces authorities shall take appropriate measures to expeditiously remove such persons from Afghanistan upon request by proper Afghan authorities.
4. The Parties agree to establish procedures to implement this Article. The Joint Commission shall periodically review and update procedures for appropriate Afghan authorities to process members of the force and of the civilian component who arrive at or depart from the places of entry and exit described in paragraph 1 of this Article, including coordination and inspection of documentation. Afghan authorities may develop lists of members of the force and of the civilian component entering and exiting Afghan territory at the agreed facilities and areas, as necessary.

Article 16*Importation and Exportation*

1. United States forces and United States contractors may import into, export out of, re-export out of, transport, and use in Afghanistan any equipment, supplies, materiel, technology, training, or services. The authorizations in this paragraph do not cover the activities of United States contractors that are not related to the presence of United States forces in Afghanistan. Identifying documents shall be provided to indicate that such equipment, supplies, materiel, technology, training, or services being imported by United States contractors are for United States forces' purposes and not for any private commercial purposes.
2. Members of the force and of the civilian component, United States contractors, and those United States contractor employees who are not Afghan nationals, may import into, export out of, re-export out of, transport, and use in Afghanistan personal effects. The imported quantities shall be reasonable and proportionate to personal use. The property referred to in this paragraph may not be sold or otherwise transferred in Afghanistan to persons who are not entitled to import such items duty free unless such transfer is in accordance with agreed procedures, including on payment of any taxes or fees due as a result of such transaction, established by the Joint Commission.
3. United States forces authorities, working with relevant Afghan authorities, shall take appropriate measures to ensure that no items or material of cultural or historic significance to Afghanistan are being exported and that, as provided in United States Central Command General Order Number 1, no alcohol, pornography, illegal narcotics, or privately owned firearms, or other contraband or items as may be mutually agreed, are being imported using the authorizations provided in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article.
4. The importation, exportation, re-exportation, transportation, and use of any articles brought into Afghanistan pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall not be subject to restrictions, such as licensing, inspection or verification, except as provided in this Article, or taxes and customs duties or other charges assessed by government authorities in Afghanistan within the territory of Afghanistan. If Afghan authorities suspect the abuse of the privileges granted in paragraph 2 of this Article to United States contractors and United States contractor employees, then relevant Afghan authorities reserve the right of inspection of such personal effects when arriving or departing from civilian airports in Afghanistan or in personal vehicles at border crossings.
5. The relevant Afghan authorities reserve the right of verification of any container imported by United States contractors and United States contractor employees containing items for United States forces' purposes in Afghanistan or for personal use, as authorized in

paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article. Without causing undue delay, and upon presentation by the relevant Afghan authorities of information to United States forces authorities that a United States contractor is abusing the authority granted in paragraphs 1 or 2 of this Article, United States forces authorities shall open and verify suspected shipments or containers intended for import in the presence of the Afghan authorities. Afghan authorities shall consent to the security requirements of United States forces and upon request by United States forces authorities permit such verifications to take place within agreed facilities and areas or other areas as mutually agreed.

6. Sharing the common goal with Afghanistan of preventing the improper entry into Afghan markets of items imported into Afghanistan under the terms of this Agreement, United States forces authorities shall take measures to prevent abuse of the authorizations in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, and shall conduct inquiries and assist the relevant Afghan authorities in the conduct of inquiries and the collection of evidence relating to the suspected improper importation, exportation, re-exportation, transfer, or disposition of goods by members of the force, members of the civilian component, United States contractors, and United States contractor employees.
7. Items imported into Afghanistan or purchased in Afghanistan pursuant to this Article may be disposed of in Afghanistan with due respect for Afghan laws and regulations.
8. Upon the request of either Party, the Parties shall review and consult immediately through the Joint Commission concerning any issues that may arise regarding implementation of this Article.

Article 17

Taxation

1. The acquisition in Afghanistan of articles and services by or on behalf of United States forces shall not be subject to any taxes or similar or related charges assessed within the territory of Afghanistan.
2. United States forces, including members of the force and of the civilian component, shall not be liable to pay any tax or similar or related charges assessed by the Government of Afghanistan within the territory of Afghanistan.
3. United States contractors shall not be liable to pay any tax or similar or related charges assessed by the Government of Afghanistan within the territory of Afghanistan on their activities, and associated income, relating to or on behalf of United States forces under a contract or subcontract with or in support of United States forces. However, United States contractors that are Afghan legal entities shall not be exempt from corporate profits tax that may be assessed by the Government of Afghanistan within the territory of Afghanistan on income received due to their status as United States contractors.

4. United States contractors are subject to Afghan requirements regarding employer withholding of personal income tax from United States contractor employees who normally reside in Afghanistan and from United States contractor employees who are Afghan nationals for payment to Afghanistan as required by the laws and regulations of Afghanistan.
5. United States contractor employees who do not normally reside in Afghanistan and United States contractor employees who are not Afghan nationals shall not be liable to pay any tax or similar or related charges assessed by the Government of Afghanistan within the territory of Afghanistan on their activities, and associated income, relating to a contract or subcontract with or in support of United States forces.
6. United States contractors and United States contractor employees are not exempt under this Agreement from paying taxes assessed by the Government of Afghanistan within the territory of Afghanistan on their activities in Afghanistan that are not associated with supplying goods and services in Afghanistan to or on behalf of United States forces under a contract or subcontract with or in support of United States forces.

Article 18

Driving and Professional Licenses

1. Afghanistan agrees to accept as valid, without a driving test or fee, driving licenses or permits issued by United States authorities to members of the force or of the civilian component, United States contractors, and United States contractor employees for operation of vehicles, vessels, aircraft, or other equipment by or for United States forces within the territory of Afghanistan.
2. Afghanistan agrees to accept as valid all professional licenses issued by United States authorities to members of the force or of the civilian component and United States contractors or United States contractor employees in relation to the provision of services as part of their official or contractual duties.
3. United States forces authorities shall endeavor to ensure that members of the force or of the civilian component, United States contractors, and United States contractor employees have current, valid driving licenses and permits for operation of vehicles, vessels, aircraft, or other equipment by or for United States forces within the territory of Afghanistan. The Joint Commission shall establish mechanisms to exchange information on United States licenses and permits. In response to requests from Afghan authorities, the United States shall seek to verify the validity of such licenses.

Article 19*Motor Vehicles*

Afghanistan agrees to accept as valid the registration and licensing by United States forces authorities of the official vehicles of United States forces. Upon the request of United States forces authorities, Afghan authorities shall issue, without charge, license plates for United States forces' official, non-tactical vehicles. United States forces' official, non-tactical vehicles shall display official Afghan license plates that are indistinguishable from other Afghan license plates, upon their provision by Afghanistan.

Article 20*Service Support Activities*

1. United States forces may directly or through contract establish and operate at agreed facilities and areas service support activities, including military post offices, banking services, military service exchanges, commissaries, recreational service areas, and telecommunications services, including broadcast services. It is not the United States' intention for broadcasting, media, and entertainment services to reach beyond the scope of the agreed facilities and areas. Taking into consideration Afghan laws, traditions, and customs, United States forces may continue to make available television and radio broadcast services such as media and entertainment programming for the purposes of morale, welfare, and recreation of United States forces and other authorized recipients located on agreed facilities and areas.
2. United States forces shall take appropriate measures to limit broadcasting, television programs, media, and entertainment services to authorized recipients and to agreed facilities and areas.
3. Access to service support activities shall be in accordance with United States regulations. United States forces authorities shall adopt appropriate measures to prevent the abuse of such service support activities and the sale or resale of goods or services to persons who are not authorized to patronize such service support activities or providers.
4. No license, permit, or inspection shall be required by Afghanistan for activities connected with such service support activities.
5. The activities, and any organizations undertaking the activities referred to in this Article, are integral parts of United States forces and shall be accorded the same fiscal and customs exemptions granted to United States forces, including those provided in Articles 16 and 17 of this Agreement. Such organizations and activities shall be maintained and operated in accordance with applicable United States regulations. Such activities shall not be required to collect or pay taxes or to pay other fees related to their operations. Access to these service support activities shall be restricted to members of the force, members of the

civilian component, United States contractors and United States contractor employees, and others as may be authorized.

6. Mail shipped within the United States Military Postal Service transportation system shall be exempt from inspection, search, or seizure by Afghan authorities.
7. The Joint Commission shall periodically review the service support activities and resolve by mutual agreement questions arising in the course of implementation of this Article.

Article 21

Currency and Exchange

The Parties agree to establish procedures regarding currency and exchange. The Parties shall review and update, as appropriate, such procedures and shall address any issues immediately through the Joint Commission that may arise regarding such procedures.

Article 22

Claims

1. Each Party waives any and all claims (other than contractual claims) against the other for damage to, loss of, or destruction of its property or injury or death to members of United States forces or ANDSF, and their respective civilian components, arising out of the performance of their official duties in Afghanistan.
2. For claims not excluded under paragraph 1 of this Article, United States forces authorities shall pay just and reasonable compensation in settlement of meritorious third party claims arising out of acts or omissions of members of the force and of the civilian component done in the performance of their official duties and incident to the non-combat activities of United States forces. Such claims shall be expeditiously processed and settled by United States forces authorities in accordance with the laws and regulations of the United States and seriously considering the laws, customs, and traditions of Afghanistan.
3. In settling third party claims, United States forces authorities shall take into account any report of investigation or opinion provided to them by Afghan authorities regarding liability or amount of damages.
4. The settlement or adjudication of contract claims shall be carried out in accordance with the terms of the contracts.
5. Upon the request of either Party, the Parties shall consult immediately through the Joint Commission concerning any issues that may arise regarding implementation of this Article.

Article 23*Annexes*

Any Annex appended to this Agreement shall form an integral part of this Agreement, and may be amended by written agreement of the Parties.

Article 24*Disputes and Implementation*

1. Any divergence in views or dispute regarding the interpretation or application of this Agreement shall be resolved through consultations between the Parties and shall not be referred to any national or international court, tribunal or other similar body, or any third party for settlement.
2. The Parties, or their Executive Agents including through the Joint Commission, may enter into Implementing Arrangements and procedures to carry out the provisions of this Agreement.
3. Cooperation under this Agreement is subject to the relevant laws and regulations of the respective Parties, including applicable appropriations laws.
4. United States forces authorities shall pay reasonable, fair market charges, minus any taxes, for goods or services they request and receive.

Article 25*Joint Commission*

1. The Parties hereby establish a Joint Commission to oversee implementation of this Agreement. The Joint Commission shall be co-chaired by representatives of the Executive Agents. The Joint Commission may include other governmental representatives requested by the Executive Agents and appointed by the Parties.
2. The Joint Commission shall determine its own procedures and arrange for such auxiliary organs, including the establishment of Working Groups and administrative services, as may be considered appropriate. Each Executive Agent shall bear the costs of its participation in the Joint Commission.
3. The Joint Commission shall coordinate and exchange information, as appropriate, with the United States - Afghanistan Working Group on Defense and Security Cooperation established under the Strategic Partnership Agreement.

Article 26*Entry into Force, Amendment, and Termination*

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on January 1, 2015, after the Parties notify one another through diplomatic channels of the completion of their respective internal legal requirements necessary

for the entry into force of this Agreement. It shall remain in force until the end of 2024 and beyond, unless terminated pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Article.

2. This Agreement, upon its entry into force, shall supersede the exchange of notes dated September 26, 2002, December 12, 2002, and May 28, 2003, regarding the status of United States forces in Afghanistan. This Agreement shall also supersede any prior agreements and understandings which the Parties mutually determine, through a subsequent exchange of diplomatic notes, to be contrary to the provisions of this Agreement.
3. This Agreement may be amended by written agreement of the Parties through the exchange of diplomatic notes.
4. This Agreement may be terminated by mutual written agreement or by either Party upon two years' written notice to the other Party through diplomatic channels. Termination of any Annex to or Implementing Arrangement under this Agreement does not result in termination of this Agreement. Termination of this Agreement in accordance with this paragraph shall, without further action, result in termination of all Annexes and Implementing Arrangements.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Kabul, this 30th day of September 2014 in duplicate, in the English, Pashto, and Dari languages, each text being equally authentic.

FOR THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
FOR THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN:

ANNEX A

List of Locations in Afghanistan of Afghan Facilities and Areas Provided by Afghanistan for United States Forces Access and Use (“Agreed Facilities and Areas”)

- Kabul
- Bagram
- Mazar-i-Sharif
- Herat
- Kandahar
- Shorab (Helmand)
- Gardez
- Jalalabad
- Shindand

Agreed facilities and areas also include other facilities and areas, if any, of which United States forces have the use as of the effective date of this Agreement and other facilities and areas at other locations in Afghanistan as may be agreed and authorized by the Minister of Defense.

Annex B

Official Points of Embarkation and Debarkation

- Bagram Airbase
- Kabul International Airport
- Kandahar Airbase
- Shendand Airbase
- Herat International Airport
- Mazar-e-Sharif Airport
- Shorab (Helmand)

Land Ports:

- Toorkham, Nangarhar Province
- Spinboldak, Kandahar Province
- Toorghundi, Herat Province
- Hairatan, Balkh Province
- Sherkhan Bandar, Kunduz Province
- Other official points of embarkation and debarkation as may be mutually agreed.

<http://mfa.gov.af/en/news/bsa>

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Faculty of Contemporary Studies 2014

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