

TRANSITION IN WORLD ORDER: AN ECLECTIC INQUIRY

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Abstract

The world order continuously evolves; therefore, it is subject to transitions. These progressions are sometimes slow or not clearly perceptible, but occasionally they are apparent in global politics. The study of contemporary world order is imperative to comprehend current trends in global politics. In the anarchical international order, both high and low politics contribute to the transition of patterns that provide the basis for a new world order. Theories of International Relations assist states in revamping and adjusting policies according to recent developments. These transitions in the world order have been more evident and swift during the second decade of the 21st century. The current changes towards a multipolar world order are multifaceted, loose, and in need of holistic theoretical investigation, which can be done using Analytic 'Eclecticism'. Analytic eclecticism employs different theories of international relations to explain a complex phenomenon. This study is an eclectic inquiry of the prevailing transitions in the world order.

Keywords: *Eclecticism, World Order, Trends, Status quo, Revisionist*

Introduction

A comprehensive study of the contemporary world order is imperative to comprehend the current trends in global politics. Understanding the current patterns in the world order requires a detailed study of changes happening in global politics. High and low politics help change the patterns that form the basis of the new world order. A scientific study of these trends is helpful in reforming and reshaping state policy in an ever-changing world. Changes in world order require a multidimensional and comprehensive theoretical examination

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that can be achieved by using analytical 'Eclecticism'. Different theories of International Relations can be used in analytic eclecticism to define various constraints and opportunities that influence states' and non-state actors' interests, behaviour, and capabilities in the world order.¹ The term eclectic means "selecting what appears to be the best in various doctrines, methods, or styles."² According to the proponents of analytic eclecticism, the existing theories of international politics (classical/neo-liberalism, classical/neo-realism, and constructivism) can only provide a particular explanation of the world order. For instance, the main focus of realists is the use of power in international politics for achieving state interests. At the same time, liberalism explains global cooperation by focusing on states and non-state actors in world politics. In contrast, constructivists claim that state behaviour is socially constructed based on identity and interest. In contrast to these particular and therefore limited/narrow lenses, analytic eclecticism helps to draw a comprehensive picture of the emerging world order. This study is an attempt to answer the three interlinked questions: what is analytical eclecticism? How various schools of thought explain the current transition in the world order? What are the patterns of the emerging world order?

Analytic Eclecticism: An Approach

According to Rudra Sil and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Analytic eclecticism is about making intellectually and practically useful connections among clusters of analyses that are substantively related but normally formulated in separate paradigms."³ They also opine that the goal of analytic eclecticism is not to synthesize or replace paradigms but to provide a means to lessen the gap between practical knowledge and the research conducted by academic disciplines.⁴ Analytic eclecticism resists a single paradigm-based study because many aspects of reality cannot be observed and described from focusing only on a single paradigm that may ignore many essential facts.⁵ According to Rudra Sil and Peter J. Katzenstein, "It is an intellectual stance that supports efforts to complement, engage, and selectively utilize theoretical constructs embedded in contending research traditions to build complex arguments

¹ Rudra Sil and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics: Reconfiguring Problems and Mechanisms across Research Traditions," *Perspectives on Politics* 8, no. 2 (2010): 23.

² "Eclectic", *Merriam-Webster's Online*. <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/eclectic>

³ Rudra Sil and Peter J. Katzenstein, *Beyond Paradigms: Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics* (Palgrave Macmillan, 31, Aug-2010), 2.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Catherine V. Scott, *Gender and Development: Rethinking Modernization and Dependency Theory* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Kumarian press, 1995), 35.

that bear on substantive problems of interest to both scholars and practitioners.”⁶ In international relations, it seeks to selectively interpret and integrate analysis on different issues given by distinct paradigms with interrelated aspects.⁷ Moreover, Larry Laudan suggests that various research doctrines can coexist, and ‘amalgamation’ of multiple approaches and theoretical paradigms is also possible.⁸ In this way, the neo-liberal perception by Tomoko Okagaki that international cooperation between egoist states is also attainable can be based on Hobbes’s source behind constructing Leviathan.⁹ Moreover, Katzenstein also perceives Joseph Nye’s philosophy as analytically eclectic due to merging of liberalism with some aspects of realism.¹⁰

In the field of International Relations, eclectic research can coalesce liberalism, realism, and constructivism.¹¹ Separately these theories can answer contrastive questions about world order such as what are the transitions in a world order based on power or distributive capabilities? or questions related to liberal world order. Still, these questions may deal with only one feature of the transition in the world order, whereas a propositional question with several contrastive aspects such as what are the changes in world order can be answered through analytical eclecticism by using different theoretical explanations.¹² Analytic eclecticism can provide the opportunity for more applied knowledge by addressing and linking all significant transitions.¹³ In this way, analytic eclecticism can generate a holistic image of emerging world order by integrating the empirical and causal observations proposed by

⁶ Sil and Katzenstein, “Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics,” 411.

⁷ Sil and Katzenstein, *Beyond Paradigms: Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics*, 10.

⁸ Larry Laudan, *Progress and Its Problems: Towards a Theory of Scientific Growth* (University of California Press, 1977), 104.

⁹ Tomoko Okagaki, *The Sovereign State, and its Conformists: Japan’s Entrance Into International Society* (University of California, 2000), 67-81.

¹⁰ P. Schouten, “Theory Talk #15: Peter Katzenstein on anti-Americanism, Analytical Eclecticism and Regional Powers,” *Theory Talks*, August 29, 2008, <http://www.theorytalks.org/2008/08/theory-talk-15.html>.

¹¹ T.V. Paul, “A Plea for Puzzle-Driven International Relations Research, Qualitative & Multi-Method Research,” *Newsletter of the American Political Science Association Organized Section for Qualitative and Multi-Method Research* 8, no. 2 (2010): 17.

¹² Jeremie Cornut, “Analytic Eclecticism in Practice: A Method for Combining International Relations Theories,” *International Studies Perspectives* 16, no. 1, (2015): 50–66.

¹³ Andrew Bennett, “From Analytic Eclecticism to Structured Pluralism, Qualitative & Multi-Method Research,” *Newsletter of the American Political Science Association Organized Section for Qualitative and Multi-Method Research* 8, no. 2 (2010): 8.

distinctive paradigm-bound theories,¹⁴ as they respectively reflect state's and non-state actor's collective measures for mutual gains, interests to gain material capabilities and conceptual aspects related to their changing identities.¹⁵ Katzenstein affirms that in eclectic research, the finest amalgamations can be of realism with constructivism and liberalism with constructivism. The merging of liberalism and realism is irrational since both have opposite normative points, whereas constructivism can fill both theories' gaps to provide a middle ground.¹⁶

Eclectic Explanation of World Order by Incorporating Realism and Constructivism

Realism is one of the prominent theories that explain international relations, and it has some conjoint points with constructivism. Realists' primary focus is on power politics for survival and to achieve other state interests. Hans Morgenthau has propagated that the international system or world order is anarchic in which states are major actors with national interests. Their vital importance is national security and survival, for which they accumulate more power that is also a critical factor in governing the relations among states.¹⁷ The states try to possess more power by improving capabilities. It defines world order based on power distribution among states and also explains their position, identity, and interests in the world order. Waltz sees capabilities as the combined material power of a state constituting of population, economic development, and military force.¹⁸

On the other hand, Constructivists argue that the world order is socially constructed. Alexander Wendt, the leading exponent of constructivism, explained that the international order could impact actor's (states or non-state) behaviour by framing their identities and interests.¹⁹ Constructivists suggest that actors construct the world order through various patterns of interactions with each other.²⁰ Wendt determined three changeable cultures of international anarchy or order, which are

¹⁴ Ibid., 3.

¹⁵ Sil and Katzenstein, *Beyond Paradigms: Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics*, 03.

¹⁶ P. Schouten, "Theory Talk #15."

¹⁷ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5th ed, Revised (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), 4-15.

¹⁸ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (MA: Addison Wesley, 1979)

¹⁹ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 248.

²⁰ Nicholas Onuf, "Constructivism: Auser's Manual," in *International Relations In A Constructed World*, ed. Armonk V. Kubalkova, Nicholas Onuf, & P. Kowert (NY: M. E. Sharpe. 1998), 58-78.

Hobbesian, Lockean²¹ and Kantian based on “how actors interpret their self (identity) in relation to others (enemy, rival or friend)²² or structure.”²³ Wendt discoursed that “only the Hobbesian structure is a true self-help system” due to persistent enmity among states,²⁴ while in the Lockean culture, enmity among states changed into only rivalry with recognition of sovereignty and right of existence of one another.²⁵ Under the Kantian culture of anarchy, states will perceive each other as friends, and there will be harmony in their interests.²⁶ Norms and knowledge are also crucial in defining the states' interests and identities, as conventional constructivists give significance to norms,²⁷ while critical constructivists emphasize on discourses.²⁸ On the other hand, realists stress on structure (distribution of power elucidated by structural realists) and functioning (balancing or domination described by neoclassical realists) of states to explain changing trends in world order within anarchical international relations and for eclectic analytic analysis they will be discussed with the incorporation of constructivism.

Changing Distribution of Power in the World Order from an Eclectic Realist and Constructivist Lens

The theory of Neo-realism or Structural Realism by Waltz helps describe and predict continuity and changes in world order structure. It can be explained by analyzing the distribution of capabilities among states, which affects nations' interaction.²⁹ Waltz proposed that all states in the anarchical situation have similar functions due to the same structural restraints of anarchy, and their capabilities or power differentiate their identity and role in the international system.³⁰ The world order and role of states within it transform with changes in power distribution such as

²¹ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 366.

²² Samuel M. Makinda, “Reading and Writing International Relations,” *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 54, no. 3 (2000): 389-401.

²³ Maja Zehfuss, “Constructivism and Identity: A Dangerous Liaison,” *European Journal of International Relations* 7, no. 3, (2001): 315-348.

²⁴ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 247.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 279.

²⁶ Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of it: the Social Construction of Power Politics,” *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (1992): 391-425.

²⁷ Karin M. Fierke and Knud Eric Jørgensen, *Constructing international relations: The Next Generation*, ed. Armonk (NY: M. E. Sharpe. 2001), 52; Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” *International Organization*, (1998): 887-917.

²⁸ Thomas A. Schwandt, Constructivist, Interpretivist Approaches to Human Inquiry, in *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, ed. N. Denzin & Y. Lincoln (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 1994), 118-138.

²⁹ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 36.

super or major powers, middle powers, and weak or small powers.³¹ Based on such power distribution, world order can be unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar. So polarity defines the number of hubs of power, whereas polarization is the inclination or coalition of states to those hubs making different poles.³² World order with multiple power hubs can have a larger polarization level as states within it can form separate blocs.³³

The post-Cold War world observed unipolar and multipolar movements, and Samuel Huntington in 1991 argued that the world is now passing from a uni-multipolar transition decade and that it will turn into a genuinely multipolar order in the 21st century.³⁴ The current world order has more characteristics of a multipolar world based on the distribution of power. New power poles are rising, which may be lacking one form of power but might hold another kind (s) of power with an active role by states at the regional level, which has reduced the U.S. hegemony on power.³⁵ Though until now the military power of the U.S. has remained unchallenged, the predictable rising states comparative to and sometimes confronting the U.S. are China, Germany, Russia, India, and Japan.³⁶

The Neorealists explain that anarchical structural constraints such as security dilemma make states struggle for more power.³⁷ So major powers generate or reject the regimes and organizations according to their interests, and due to anarchy, other states are unable to stop them.³⁸ In a uni-polar order, the hegemonic state serves its own interests and attempts to sustain the status quo. However, its power can decline with the changes in international power distribution as anarchy lets other states rise and challenge hegemonic states. As Robert Gilpin argues that:

International order at any particular moment in history is the reflection of the underlying distribution of power of states within the system, over time the distribution shifts leading to conflict and ruptures in the system, hegemonic war and the eventual reorganization of order to reflect the

³¹ Robert Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers*, (New York: Columbus University Press, 1968) : 229.

³² R. William, "Polarity Long Cycle and Global Warfare," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 30, no. 4 (December 1986): 587-615.

³³ Charles W. Kegley and Gregory A. Raymond, *A Multipolar Peace? Great Power Politics in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Matins Press, 1994): 86.

³⁴ S. Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower: U.S. Military and Cultural Hegemony Resented by Other Powers," *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 2 (1999): 35-49.

³⁵ Fyodor Lukyanov, "Russian Dilemmas in Multipolar World," 19-32. <http://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/russian-dilemmas-multipolar-world>

³⁶ Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *World Politics :Trend and Transformation* (Thomson Higher Education, 2006): 44, 106.

³⁷ John Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 2, no. 2 (1950): 157-180.

³⁸ Clive Archer, *International Organizations*, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 1992) : 85.

new distribution of power capabilities. It is the rising hegemonic state or group of states whose power position has been ratified by the result of warfare that defines the terms of the post-war settlement and the character of the new order.³⁹

Even in the multipolar world, due to anarchy, there is a constant struggle among major powers to become world hegemon. The anarchic structure explained by neorealists looks like the Hobbesian and Lockean anarchic structures given by constructivists with the similarities of self-help and security-seeker states respectively.⁴⁰ In this respect, constructivists argue that the structure of international politics is more social than material, and even material realities have value because of some normative social beliefs linked to them. So normative assumptions are directly related to world order.⁴¹ Thus based on material and conceptual factors, world order can be considered as multipolar or cooperative.

States can be categorized as a major power, middle power, or weak power as per perception and acceptance of their abilities by other actors, which gives it social plus ideational status. For example, if a state is not perceived as a major power by other states, it may lack social and conceptual factors. This perception can affect other states to have a different policy towards it other than they have for an alleged major power.

Constructivists establish that perceptions of power are inter-subjective and focus on two interrelated roles and procedures of changes in the world order. First is the role of the system that gives identity to states as major, middle and small powers;⁴² the second role of the system is shaping actors' identity and interests.⁴³ Hence, constructivists explain how states shape their identity plus interests and also how states make others perceive their defined identity, while structural realism only focuses on material factors but neoclassical realism has supported this point of constructivists.⁴⁴

³⁹ Quoted in John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and Rebuilding of Orders After Significant Wars* (Princeton University Press 2001)

⁴⁰ Yücel Bozdaglioglu, "Constructivism and Identity Formation: An Interactive Approach," *Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika* (USAK Yearbook of International Politics and Law, 1 2008): 389-412. <http://www.usak.org.tr/dosyalar/dergi/3abv06hKYpVj1fK71jEi4AP2g6ctBc.pdf>.

⁴¹ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (1992): 397.

⁴² Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 248.

⁴³ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 392.

⁴⁴ Dale C. Copeland, "The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism," *International Security* 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000): 187-212, 190.

Making and Breaking of Balance in World Order

The ordering principle of balance is not permanent in the anarchic world order. A contingent order or symmetry can be created through hegemony or balancing, both by internal and external actions of states. If a state cannot become a hegemon, it attempts to balance others' power by acquiring more power. Internal balancing is linked with increased military and economic abilities, and external balancing is referred to as alliance making.⁴⁵ Hans J. Morgenthau explicated alignment as "a necessary function of the balance of power, operating within a multiple-state system"⁴⁶ because it increases the relative power of even weak states both through bandwagoning and balancing.⁴⁷ Stephen Walt gave the concept of 'balance of threat' ⁴⁸ by modifying the realist's balance of power notion and opined that states try to balance not rising powers but perceived threats in an anarchic self-help system.⁴⁹ Constructivists also argue that states create their own security dilemmas and enmities⁵⁰ and they make alliances to balance against enemies rather than power.⁵¹

Neoclassical realists like Randall Schweller have established the 'balance of interests' notion as the third wave of realism. His two main works, "Tripolarity and the Second World War",⁵² and *Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest*⁵³ refurbished balance of power and balance of threat concepts. Schweller explained state behaviour at the unit or domestic level and at the system level. The unit-level describes the state's efforts to balance other states based on the perceptions gathered and interpreted within the framework of one's own values, norms, and judgments about its interests, identity, and the international system.⁵⁴ On domestic perception basis, Schweller categorized two types of states. First are those states which have a primary interest of security-maximizing and are considered as status-quo powers that manage the ongoing international system, like superpowers who created the existing order and can achieve more benefits from the status quo. Thus, these states try to maintain their relative advantageous positions in the system and collaborate to balance self-preservation

⁴⁵ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 69-72.

⁴⁶ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 193.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 193.

⁴⁸ Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliance* (Cornell University Press, 1990).

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*.

⁵¹ Stephen M. Walt, *The Origin Of Alliances*.

⁵² Randall L. Schweller, "Tripolarity and the Second World War," *International Studies Quarterly*, 37, no. 1 (1993): 73- 103.

⁵³ Randall L. Schweller, *Deadly imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).

⁵⁴ Alexander Siedschlag, *Realistische Perspektiv en Internationaler Politik*, ed. Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 2001): 51.

interests and to extend their views by influencing other actors.⁵⁵ If these powers observe that the order is changing and challenging their positions and interests, particularly in terms of influence, then they can make war against revisionist states, which are the second type.⁵⁶ Schweller described revisionist states as dissatisfied powers, which are opportunistic rising powers or middle powers.

The revisionist states need more power or influence for which they can use military means, alliances, or bandwagoning, and in this way, they can change the status quo or world order.⁵⁷ Schweller opined that a just distribution of capabilities could not achieve stability in international politics. Still, their use is also vital due to actions related to the balance of interests. The use of these capabilities determines whether the system will be dominated by the status quo state or will be changed by the revisionist state. Hence, the perceptions of states made at the domestic level are essential in defining interests in the world order as states can act as revisionist states according to their claims and insights in international politics.⁵⁸ On the other hand, the system rests stably when status quo powers remain more powerful than revisionist states. It can alter when revisionist states become more forceful than the status quo states with undecided gains for anyone.⁵⁹ So when there are several rising powers, the symmetry of the order depends on the balance generated by revisionist powers, and the position never remains everlasting for both revisionist and status quo states due to anarchy, which leads to changes in perceptions, interests, and capabilities of the state. In the balance of interests approach, interest determines how states pick their allies, as friends are helpful in perceptual legitimization and recognition of the state as a major power (similar to the notion of constructivists on the normative character of material realities) and supportive of the major power to maintain status quo.

The perceptions about state power can play a significant role in defining world order.⁶⁰ Schweller suggests bandwagoning as an option for

⁵⁵ Jan Triska, *Dominant Powers and Subordinate States/Dominant Powers and Subordinate States* ed. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1986) spheres of interest and informal empires often achieve Great-power cooperation in managing the system.

⁵⁶ A. Organski and Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1980): 23.

⁵⁷ Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back," *International Security* 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994): 105.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 99.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 72, 107.

⁶⁰ Barbara Kunz, "Power, Vision and Order in World Politics: A Neoclassical Realist," Paper presented at the NISA-conference, Odense, University of Southern Denmark, May 23 – 25, 2007.

states⁶¹ to balance their payoffs with other states based on security purposes. It is also to increase their ability to exert influence for achieving other objectives such as prestige, alliances, raw materials, even security. So, neoclassical realists consider influence as a feature of power and a main factor in the current world order.⁶² They also suggest that states attempt to overcome the suspicions created due to anarchy by trying to shape their outer world and enhancing their external influence through their foreign policies.⁶³ So the state's role, power, and identity in the world order can also be observed by its capacity to exert influence on other states.⁶⁴ In this way, neoclassical realists suggest that states' foreign policies made at the domestic level based on perceived information and power can affect the international system.⁶⁵ Thus for neoclassical realists, domestic politics and state capabilities are an intervening variable in foreign policy behaviour. In this way, the assumed unit-level responses could be linked with the international system's power structure as systemic-level is taken to be an independent variable.⁶⁶

The constructivists also assert similar assumptions made by the neoclassical realists that states' foreign policies are a result of national perceptions based on identity and values derived through discourses, social structures,⁶⁷ and circumstances.⁶⁸ The constructivists also propose that identity defines state interests,⁶⁹ and commands the relations among states because "an actor cannot know what it wants until it knows who it

⁶¹ Ibid., 88.

⁶² Kalevi J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*, 7th ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1995) : 118.

⁶³ Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," *World Politics* 51 no. 1 (1988) : 152.

⁶⁴ Alexander Siedschlag, *Realistische Perspektiven Internationaler Politik*, 51, 147.

⁶⁵ William C. Wohlforth, *The Elusive Power Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993)

⁶⁶ Stephen M. Walt, "The Enduring Relevance of the Realist Tradition," *Political Science, State of the Discipline* ed. Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner (New York/London: W.W. Norton & Co., 2002): 211.

⁶⁷ Ron Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," in *The Culture of National Security*, ed. Peter Katzenstein, (New York: Colombia University Press, 1996): 59.

⁶⁸ Alexander Wendt, *Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics*, 396.

⁶⁹ Mlada Bukovansky, "American Identity and Neutral Rights from Independence to the War of 1812," *International Organization* 51, no. 2 (1997): 209-243.

is.”⁷⁰ Constructivists claim that states’ identities continuously change in constitutive processes⁷¹ and define other states as friends or foes based on their interests.⁷² In this regard, holistic constructivism has bridged the international and domestic system influencing state’s identities and interests⁷³ as it “focuses on how domestic and international social phenomena interact to shape the states’ behaviour in international relations”.⁷⁴ Moreover, Wendt opined that foreign policy is an outcome of a bond of corporate identity (made at domestic level and defining itself and others) and social identities (created at the international system with others such as status quo or revisionist state) of states.⁷⁵

For balance in the world order, Robert Gilpin suggested that the multipolar system offers the most stable system because it is best to achieve a balance of power. The order changes with the new reallocation of power if the dominant states can't overcome instability and the costs of maintaining the status quo increases for the major powers. The causes of the decline of dominant powers can be internal and external. The internal reasons can be the state's weak economic conditions, which lessen its profits from the system by reducing its sphere of influence. In contrast, externally, it can face revisionist states or those challenging states for which the cost of changing the system is smaller than the benefits it can get from the transformation.⁷⁶ The principle of symmetry in hegemonic or unipolar order is domination and preservation, whereas in a bipolar or multipolar order the organizing principle is balancing. On the other hand, transformation can occur by two interrelated changes: first, shift in the international distribution of power and second, modification in domestic preferences and national interests due to change in domestic perceptions of states. Therefore, in the modern-day global system, the dominant

⁷⁰ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 231.

⁷¹ Carol Atkinson, “Constructivist Implications of Material Power: Military Engagement and the Socialization of States, 1972-200,” *International Studies Quarterly* 50, no. 3 (2006): 534.

⁷² Alexander Wendt, *Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics*, 397.

⁷³ Christian Reus-Smit, “Constructivism,” in *Theories of International Relations*, ed. Scott Burchill (New York: 2001): 220.

⁷⁴ Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, “Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and Constructivism,” *European Journal of International Relations* 4, no.3 (1998): 265.

⁷⁵ Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” *American Political Science Review* 88, no. 2 (1994): 385.

⁷⁶ Robert Gilpin, *War, and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 30-Oct-1981) 185-187.

powers have similar neo-mercantilist economic expansionist objectives and similarly influence other states.⁷⁷

Eclectic Explanation of World Order by Incorporating Liberalism and Constructivism

Liberalism explains cooperative proceedings within world order, focusing on state and non-state actors' role in international politics. At the beginning of the 20th century, liberalism in international politics was promoted by Woodrow Wilson with his designs of collective security, cooperation, and right of self-determination. The liberal principles about world order include a strong proclivity for a collectively law-oriented society of states, cooperation through international organizations, the spread of democracy, the quest for free trade, and striving for universal peace to improve human life.⁷⁸ Liberalism postulates that international actors cooperate to reduce security dilemmas and pursue shared interests by following international rules and norms. Neoliberalism began in the 1970s. Its leading proponents, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, gave a functionalist approach which argues that cooperation in one affair can 'spillover' and lead to cooperation in other matters, thus decreasing issues related to military security. In such ways, neoliberals have propagated ideas about global integration by collaboration among states. Neoliberalism clarifies the varying dimensions of cooperation and peace through liberal internationalism and liberal institutionalism. Liberal institutionalists admit that the international system is anarchic with constraints that cause difficulties for states to cooperate. Still, they also argue that states can overcome these constraints to attain cooperative mutual benefits by creating international organizations. Liberal institutionalism focuses on the importance of non-state actors such as international organizations, regimes, and institutions, which help to increase interdependence and cooperation among states and participate in lessening their conflicts in the world order.⁷⁹ According to Karl Deutsch, over time, improvement in such multinational relations and connections can lead to the establishment of "security communities" through promoting peace.⁸⁰ Moreover, Robert Keohane, in his work *After Hegemony* ⁸¹ opined that the hegemonic structure can permit the

⁷⁷ Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in International Politics*, Ch 1-5.

⁷⁸ Jennifer Sterling-Folker, *Making Sense of International Relations Theory*, ed (London: Lynne Reinner, 2006): 50-65.

⁷⁹ Stephen D. Krasner, *International Regimes* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983): 173-194.

⁸⁰ Karl W. Deutsch, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957): 45-85.

⁸¹ Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton University Press, 1984)

formation of institutions and lead to cooperation, which can keep working after the decline of hegemonic power based on functional principles.⁸² Keohane explained that in the international system, the most egoist and rational states could have reasons to be part of international institutions and regimes to achieve some ideal interests that cannot be accomplished in other ways. Therefore, international institutions help to lessen the snags like distrust and doubts among states due to international anarchy by providing forums for state cooperation.⁸³ Liberal institutionalism presents its version of a world order by proposing global governance through international organizations based on common interests and endorsing complex interdependence via several channels.⁸⁴ The concept of complex interdependence offers commercial or economic liberalism by activating a global free market through economic cooperation and integration. Complex interdependence creates a world order where economic and social issues have become important enough to lessen the differences among states with the establishment of international networks and institutions.⁸⁵ These transnational links give importance to the non-state actors in the world order, and attribute to them some power to moderate states' issues through cooperative bonds.⁸⁶ States try to construct, improve and institutionalize the liberal and cooperative identity to achieve long-term interests,⁸⁷ as "states seek to enact their identities in interstate normative structures, including regimes and security communities".⁸⁸ Identity formation at both international and domestic levels is based on domestic perceptions, which can be influenced by international institutions having fixed sets of rules to guide behavioural roles.⁸⁹ The bases of formal international institutions can be found in agreements, conventions, and treaties signed and ratified by more than one state to

⁸² Ibid.; Robert Keohane, *Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond Neorealism and its Critics* (Columbia University Press, 1986)

⁸³ Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*.

⁸⁴ Inis Claude, *Swords Into Plow Shares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization* (Random House, New York, 1971)

⁸⁵ Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, "Power and Interdependence In The Information Age," *Foreign Affairs* (1998, September/October): 81, 94.

⁸⁶ Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Transnational Relations and World Politics*, eds. (Harvard University Press, 1971).

⁸⁷ Glenn Chafetz, "The Struggle for a National Identity in Post-Soviet Russia," *Political Science Quarterly* 111, no. 4 (1996-97): 665.

⁸⁸ Ron Jepperson, Alexander Wendt and Peter Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* 33 (1996): 34-62.

⁸⁹ R. O. Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches," *International Studies Quarterly* 32 (1988): 379-396.

monitor states' behaviours and decision-making on specific issues.⁹⁰ By focusing on international institutions, liberal institutionalists emphasize soft power and cooperation under international law.⁹¹ On the other hand, non-governmental organizations provide a bridge for world society and culture⁹² as middle agents who connect all levels of society to resolve issues by assisting international and local actors and become "sticky".⁹³ They also function as mediators, activists, implementers, negotiators, promoters of progress and social changes by influencing state's policies and enhancing global governance.⁹⁴

Liberal internationalism focuses on international society's role in the world order to solve global problems by forming a rule-based system through common institutions and eliminating illiberal differences.⁹⁵ It also considers peace and cooperation as interdependent and endorses republican liberalism or democratic peace theory. John Ikenberry proposed that democratic alliances can permit and support collaboration among states to resolve world's common issues.⁹⁶ Moreover Anne-Marie Slaughter focused on intergovernmental networks formed by links of responsible governmental agencies of different states to deal with common issues on a global scale⁹⁷ helping towards social globalism by exchange of ideas and scientific knowledge.⁹⁸

Liberalism meets constructivism based on changes in identities, which are always subject to be reform and can modify world order.⁹⁹ The liberals' idea about a peaceful world through cooperation is similar to

⁹⁰ S. D. Krasner, *International Regimes* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).

⁹¹ John Donahue and Joseph Nye, *Governance in a Globalizing World*, ed. (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 150-200.

⁹² John Boli, "Contemporary developments in World Culture," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 46 (2005): 383, 404.

⁹³ R. O. Keohane, and L. L. Martin, "Institutional theory as a Research Program," in *Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field* ed. C. Elman and M. F. Elman (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003): 71, 108.

⁹⁴ K. Sikkink, "Human Rights, Principled Issue Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America," *International Organization* (1993): 411-431.

⁹⁵ S. Bulmer, "The Governance of the European Union: A New Institutional Approach," *Journal of Public Policy* 13, no. 4 (1993): 351-380 ; G. John Ikenberry, "Liberal Internationalism: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order," 72, <http://acme.highpoint.edu/~msetzler/IR/IRreadings2add/LiberalInternationalismIken.PerOnPol09.17.pdf>

⁹⁶ G. John Ikenberry, "Liberal Internationalism," 72.

⁹⁷ Anne-Marie Slaughter, *A New World Order* (Princeton University Press, 2004).

⁹⁸ D. Laouisset, *Managerial Technology Transfer* (New York: Nova, 2009).

⁹⁹ Carol Atkinson, "Constructivist Implications of Material Power: Military Engagement and the Socialization of States, 1972-2000," *International Studies Quarterly* 50, no.3 (2006): 534.

Kantian system of constructivism. Therefore, constructivism and liberalism both talk about the role of non-state actors and social interactions, which can create cooperative identities to have a cooperative structure.¹⁰⁰ Constructivists see norms given by international organizations as non-material factors of the world order impacting states' perceptions and identities by changing interests from relative to absolute gain by which peace can be attained via cooperation.¹⁰¹ Internationally, changing cooperative identities create interstate normative structures by making international organizations.¹⁰² Hence, liberals focus on the role of norms in the world order. At the same time, constructivists explain the development of these norms by postulating a norm cycle, starting from norm emergence until its internationalization or norm cascade,¹⁰³ when several states start following it and giving it constitutive effects through liberal arrangements such as human rights forums.

Patterns of Emerging World Order

According to eclectic analysis, both realist and liberalist features can be seen in patterns of emerging multipolar world with increasing international institutions, and states can collaborate on some matters. They can be against each other at the same time. For instance, since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has acted as a status quo state to maintain its hegemony, but now several revisionist states are struggling to change the world order by challenging the United States. Currently, the U.S. is facing economic, ideological, and military challenges such as the economic rise of China with single party democracy and the rise of new nuclear powers to have an operative approach for persistence against it.

U.S. hegemonic interests and its sphere of influence are also countered by the rising phenomenon of regional hegemons which are making possible a heterogeneous multipolar world order with several hierarchical regional subsystems. For example, regions founded on the basis of geographic, market, and security interests have their hegemons behaving as revisionist states. Their interactions will probably shape world politics in the future with no single world hegemon or status quo power like the U.S. All these states are trying to balance each other regarding power and interests. So the status quo efforts by the U.S. are not

¹⁰⁰ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (1992): 392.

¹⁰¹ Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security," *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* 1, no. 5 (1996): 22.

¹⁰² Ron Jepperson, Alexander Wendt and Peter Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," 62.

¹⁰³ Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* 52, (Autumn:1998): 898.

averting the change towards multipolarity in both economic and geopolitical domains even as the U.S. intervened in Asia to encircle its utmost competitor China.¹⁰⁴ This produced a direct threat to China and Russia and led them to sign a 'Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International Order'. According to the balance of power notion given by Kissinger, countries dislike and fear hegemons and in reaction try to balance its power¹⁰⁵ as done by Russia, China, and France to counter-balance the U.S. actions against Iraq.¹⁰⁶

The social identities of China and Russia, according to neoclassical and constructivist explanations, are changing to revisionist states due to changes in perceptions of states about power distribution and influence. This partnership presents the prime indication of a multipolar world. Consequently, a multipolar world order can arise with power distribution among China, Japan, Russia, India, Germany, Australia, Iran, and Brazil, which are also regional powers and new power centers of the 21st century.¹⁰⁷

The changing world order under liberal explanation can be more cooperative while restricting some state actions under the umbrella of international organizations and confirms the constructivists' view that there is no permanent hierarchy of power politics in a world order that can be changed from Lockean to Kantian order. Liberal theorists believe that multipolarity can boost international cooperation, institutionalism, and pro-democratic ideas based on economic coordination.¹⁰⁸ The multipolar world order can be liberal when numerous subsystems based on power are interconnected and become interdependent to deal with common issues. The international organizations and multinational companies influence changing international politics in several ways, such as they provide a forum for cooperation, act as mediator or arbitrator, impose sanctions on states, and help states in development. The prime international organizations are the United Nations and its agencies, the European Union, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, World Bank, Group of 8, and the International Monetary Fund. In contrast, multinational corporations include software, food, and machine producers. Increasing globalization and emerging

¹⁰⁴ Pao Yu Ching, "U.S. Dominance over Asia," *Asia Pacific Research Network*, 2006, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=4999>.

¹⁰⁵ H. Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995)

¹⁰⁶ K. Booth and T. Dunne, *Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order*, (ed.) (Houndmills, 2002).

¹⁰⁷ Sofa Jawaro, "Uni-Polarity or Multipolarity: Is There a Shift in the Global Balance of Power? (Part II)": *The Sword Of Truth*, April 7, 2009, <http://sofawarrior.blog.com/2009/04/07/uni-polarity-or-multi-polarity-is-there-a-shift-in-global-balance-of-power-part-iv/>.

¹⁰⁸ Z. Brzezinski, *The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership* (New York: Basic Books, 2004).

security challenges also make states cooperate and create world order similar to Wendt's Lockean international system with some elements of the Kantian international system under a cooperative security system. The other non-state actors, like terrorist organizations, have posed new security concerns to states, which can lead to a complex security interdependence among states. The complexity is also higher because sometimes these organizations are used by different states to achieve their interests, especially in the multipolar world order.

Moreover, critical constructivists propose that literature and discourses constitute discursive power of the state, which impacts changing social realities by influencing the perceptions related to identities.¹⁰⁹ These discourses can reflect realist and liberal perspectives with a nexus between power and knowledge, and actors try to dominate through them. The recent literature in international politics is also supporting the emergence of a multipolar world order with a significant role of non-state actors and making states develop their policies according to the imminent multipolar world. For instance, in 2009, the first speech of former President Obama in the United Nations General Assembly presented the policy of multilateralism,¹¹⁰ In the *New York Times*, historians like Paul Kennedy observed that "we're going to have a multipolar world in military terms 20 or 30 years down the line."¹¹¹

The rising multipolar world order with new alliances among status quo states and revisionist states also reflects bipolarity between blocks of revisionist powers and status quo powers. Thus, peace in the emerging world order can depend on the balance of power, threat, and interest plus tolerance and cooperation. This can be seen in the form of fluctuating coalitions of states to counter unequal distribution of power and influence in their respective regions.¹¹² Emerging world order can be both restrictive/preventive and permissive at the same time. It can be restrictive as the use of military power can be limited or not be favored due to agreements or institutions. In contrast, it can be permissive as

¹⁰⁹ Dale C. Copeland, "The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism," *Constructivism and International Relations: Alexander Wendt and his Critics* (2006): 1-20.

¹¹⁰ Ivaneishvili, "Obama Foreign Policy Doctrine, Preparing America to Succeed in Multipolar World," *Journal of Social Sciences* 1, no. 1 (2012): 27-33.

¹¹¹ Dennis Hevesi, "Connecticut Q&A: Paul Kennedy; 'The Phone Rings All the Time,'" *New York Time*, April 3, 1988.
<https://www.nytimes.com/1988/04/03/nyregion/connecticut-q-a-paul-kennedy-the-phone-rings-all-the-time.html>

¹¹² K. R. Cox and T. J. Sinclair, *Approaches to World Order* (Cambridge U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1996), ch 2-3.

states struggle for power and may use force and breach treaties to attain national interests.¹¹³

Conclusion

In the transforming world order balance of power and cooperation can act as the preservers of the order. The major powers can harmonize their strategies by agreeing to some institutions to address common problems with flexible foreign policies. The U.S. foreign policy seems to have changed from unilateralism to multilateralism, while Russia is struggling to regain its pre-eminence. China's rising economic and military capabilities are providing it more leverage in international politics. Besides, it is devoted to multilateralism and regionalism within the framework of the BRICS. The international community is also experiencing institutional revisionism due to the emergence of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which has critical, revisionist states like China and Russia as its leading members. Globalization has also improved cooperation among nations by making them more interdependent for security and economic concerns.

¹¹³ Charles W. Kegley and Jr. Gregory A. Raymond, "Preventive War and Permissive Normative Order," *International Studies Perspectives* 4, no. 4 (November 1, 2003): 385–394.

