SECURITISATION OF DETERRENCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGIC STABILITY

Abstract

The post-Cold War international strategic environment transformed into one characterized by high level of certainty and complexity. This challenged the concept and practice of deterrence, which had remained the mainstay of the Cold War strategic environment. This research employs securitization theory to evaluate the actions that nuclear-armed states (particularly the US, Russia, China, UK, and France) took in response to this shift. The research finds out that the nuclear-armed states responded with de-securitization, re-securitization and wider securitization of deterrence. By doing so, as a concept and practice, deterrence has entered into a high and extraordinary phase of politics, resulting in the construction of a response (deterrent posture) that pervades across different sectors of society/national power, including politics, society and industry. However, the research notes that this posture is based on a high risk of escalation and competitive impulse driving states into a relentless arms race. Nonetheless, the effectiveness of this posture depends on how consistent nucleararmed states are and will be in maintaining such a posture.