

Journal of Contemporary Studies

Summer 2018
ISSN 2227-3883
Vol VII, No.1

Journal of Contemporary Studies

Summer 2018, Vol VII, No.1



Faculty of Contemporary Studies
National Defence University
Islamabad, Pakistan

Journal of Contemporary Studies

A biannual publication of Faculty of Contemporary Studies

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
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JOURNAL OF
CONTEMPORARY STUDIES

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Editor's Note

The *Journal of Contemporary Studies* is a flagship publication of the Faculty of Contemporary Studies (FCS), National Defence University (NDU), Islamabad. It started with the unequivocal objective of advancing critically oriented, inter-disciplinary academic and intellectual discourse. It is a biannual, double blind peer-reviewed journal that offers its readers in academia, government and the policymaking world in-depth and scholarly analyses diverse policy perspectives on important contemporary issues, and ongoing debates in the areas of national and international security, public policy and the wider field of world politics.

This issue of the journal comprises of five articles, two book reviews and four documents providing valuable primary information on significant international developments. The first article, titled *A Critical Appraisal of the Role of Public Diplomacy in Pakistan-China Relations*, by Dr. Afsah Qazi and Anum Babur deliberates upon the significance of public diplomacy in Pakistan-China relationship. They argue that though public diplomacy has played a limited role in their relations historically – political commitment being the main force steering the bilateral ties – it has gained importance with the coming of megaprojects like China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and needs a greater focus to overcome socio-cultural and linguistic barriers between the two countries. The paper maintains that China- Pakistan bonhomie is unique and cannot simply be measured in terms of public diplomacy campaigns.

The second article, *News Content on Private TV Channels in Pakistan: PEMRA Standards and International Best Practices on Content Regulation* by Muhammad Sajjad and Dr. Juriah Abd. Jalil explores specific contours of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) Code 2015 in comparison with media codes of conduct in the UK, Malaysia and Australia. The mandatory principles provided in PEMRA Code 2015 such as accuracy, impartiality, fairness, right to reply, etc. are for regulating live coverage - news and current affairs programmes. The authors assert that this code was designed hastily and without much deliberation and therefore, lacks structural coherence and restrictive definitions to regulate content efficiently, hence failing the criteria for complete compliance.

The third article, *Content Analysis of Hate-Speech Discourse in Religious Publications in Punjab, Pakistan* by Shaista Malik and Dr. Shafqat Munir Ahmad analyses the content of selected religious publications from

Lahore, Multan and Bahawalpur (in Punjab). The analysis looks for the biasness of these sources against other religions, sects, the education system, civil society, mainstream media and even gender. The study employs the Framing theory to signify six recurring themes in the extremist content, and draws a contrast with the religious publications that don't incite hate but focus instead on information and constructive criticism. It concludes with policy recommendations for regulating publications under the press, enacting publication and defamation laws and offering press ethics training.

The fourth article titled, *Determining the Impact of Employee Mindfulness on Job Performance* is written by Yasmine Muhammad Javaid Iqbal and Dr. Muhammadi Sabra Nadeem. The research model is based on Philip Barnard and John Teasdale's model of Interacting Cognitive Sub-systems (ICS). The study employs the 24 items Five Facet Mindfulness questionnaire (FFMQ) as a research instrument for data collection. The study found that the respondents with good performance evaluations also ranked high on the mindfulness scale. It emphasizes that the employee cognitive mindfulness has a correlation with employee job performance in assigned tasks. The study then recommends action plans to facilitate mindfulness in educators.

In the last article, *Climate Change Policies of US and China: A Comparative Analysis*, Samrana Afzal delves into the correlation of United States and China's climate change responses, with in the domestic and international socio-economic and political contexts, which are marked by a serious lack of national political will, weak adoption of strategies and low public and private business participation. It argues that under the current policy environment, a prospect for a reasonable GHG emission reduction policy is unlikely for both the states. Different domestic/internal dynamics are driving the present postures of both the major actors regarding this issue of prime concern. Global climate activism has suffered a severe blow because of President Trump's roll-back policy regarding Paris Climate Agreement and other related instruments, and have put a question mark on US sincerity vis-à-vis the issue. Any global solution to climate change will depend on the commitments agreed upon by these two main players.

I am grateful to all the contributors who have sent their articles for this issue, and the anonymous peer-reviewers whose valuable comments helped authors to improve their contributions. We hope that the study of this journal will invoke desire among readers to contribute their perspectives in the ongoing academic discourses. Contributions are invited from a broad spectrum of related fields, like political science, security studies, political economy, terrorism, politics and religion, politics of energy, feminism, media and politics, management sciences, leadership psychology, military strategy, modern history, international law, sociology, education, conflict management and resolution, urban studies,

demography, social anthropology, development studies, foreign policy analysis etc.

We are accepting articles for the upcoming issue of the Journal of Contemporary Studies based on original qualitative or quantitative research, an innovative conceptual framework or a substantial literature review that opens new areas of inquiry and investigation. Case studies and comparative analyses are also welcome. The editorial team at the journal promotes submissions from expert analysts from around the world. The Journal seeks to promote a scholarly understanding of contemporary developments and changes related to aforementioned disciplines/fields of social sciences. It intends to stimulate interdisciplinary research and writing.

Editor
Dr. Shaheen Akhtar

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A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE ROLE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN PAKISTAN-CHINA RELATIONS

Afsah Qazi* & Anum Babur**

Abstract

Public diplomacy (PD) promotes inter-state relations by means of enhanced communication, dialogue, and consensus-building amongst the general publics, thus acting as an effective tool of soft power. However, it is not a central deterministic factor in all relationships; some ties are long lasting even when public diplomacy is not very effective e.g. Pakistan-China relations. This study rationally disproves the assertion that China's influence in Pakistan is a weak one merely because it lags in terms of public diplomacy. It has been argued instead that instruments of influence may vary according to varying identities and contexts and so, generalizations are not very plausible. The significance of public diplomacy in Pakistan-China relations has increased only during the last couple of decades. However, with megaprojects like China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in the pipeline, it has a bigger role to play in the time ahead – hence the need for focused efforts to this end.

Keywords: *Public Diplomacy (PD), CPEC, Positive Image, Influence, Political Commitment*

Introduction

‘Higher than the Himalayas’ and ‘deeper than the oceans’ are the phrases commonly used to describe the bilateral relationship between China and Pakistan which is now more than half a century old. This relationship has survived several vicissitudes in regional as well as international environments and yet, unlike most other bilateral equations, has remained relatively stable. The relationship has evolved through successive phases as the two sides have held firmly to their foundations; never giving up on the basic understanding of the mutually

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beneficial and inter-linked nature of their well-being. The critics, however, view China-Pakistan relationship otherwise – for them Pak-China bilateral equation is limited to political and strategic considerations and is not very well-founded. The critics refer to the under-explored dimension of Public Diplomacy (PD) to lend credence to their argument. However, for a keen observer of the China-Pakistan relations, China's influence in Pakistan is neither weak nor limited solely to an inter-governmental level.

This article entails a critical appraisal of China's Public Diplomacy towards Pakistan and of the critique on it. It explains the uniqueness of China-Pakistan ties, which is as appreciated and acknowledged at people-to-people level as at the inter-governmental level. Focusing on China's influence in Pakistan, it elaborates how China is perceived in Pakistan rather than vice versa. The first part introduces the concept of public diplomacy and its association to the broader idea of soft power. Afterwards, it explores the reason(s) for China's strong influence/appeal in Pakistan (measured by positive public opinion) despite public diplomacy not being a much focused aspect of the bilateral equation. This case defies the usual pattern (as given in the Western-originated discourses) where creating an international appeal/influence requires massive public diplomacy campaigns for targeting publics in other states. A description of the historical record of China-Pakistan public diplomacy is followed by a discussion on emerging trends. It is suggested that China now needs to have a more planned and effective campaign for generating positive opinions in lieu of certain recent developments related to China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

Conceptualizing Public Diplomacy

Public Diplomacy constitutes an important part of inter-state relations in contemporary times and governments are allocating larger shares of budgets towards this. Given its much older existence in practice, PD's emergence as a distinct concept and as a sub-field of study in IR discourse is a relatively new phenomenon where it is often discussed in association with the idea of soft power. Just as the concept of soft power has become vital to the measurement of states' over-all influence and power equation (especially in the post-cold war era), the scope and effectiveness of their public diplomacy campaigns have become a way of gauging what share soft power has in the inter-state influence equation.¹ Additionally, as the salience of hard-power faces a downward curve, soft power - of which public diplomacy is one aspect - is being designated as the primary indicator of a strong and lasting influence. It is believed to

¹ Hwajung Kim, "Cultural Diplomacy as the Means of Soft Power in an Information Age," *Cultural Diplomacy*, December 2011, http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/pdf/case-studies/Hwajung_Kim_Cultural_Diplomacy_as_the_Means_of_Soft_Power_in_the_Information_Age.pdf.

have the potential for encouraging compliance through attraction rather than through coercion. However, even though PD is a component and indicator of soft power, the latter is not limited to PD and may have other constituents too.

This distinction is important because an obsessive concern with Public Diplomacy (PD) promotes a tendency to miscalculate the degree of influence in relationships. This means that ties which are otherwise productive and mutually beneficial might be marked as tactical, short-term and lacking influence if and only because PD is missing. This is also because hard power (including economic means), is equated to a coercive force today rather than a source of lasting influence since it may force even the unwilling actors to comply due to its threatening nature. A lasting and non-coercive influence of a state on others requires an element of soft power in modern times, of which PD is taken to be an integral component.

Public diplomacy is aimed at the public of other states with the aim of promoting positive opinions and a favourable image in the eyes of target audience, making bilateral relations more enduring. However, public diplomacy cannot always be the sole indicator of effective bilateral relationships and a state might enjoy a good image in the eyes of other state's public even when an effective PD effort is non-existent. Sino-Pakistan bilateral relationship represents a similar kind of equation.

Public diplomacy, being a recently evolving sub-field of IR, has not matured yet into a self-explanatory one. The field lacks consensus in terms of definitions, theoretical underpinnings and the practices that fall within its scope. Due to the varied contexts in which it is carried out, there exists ambiguity regarding who performs it and who takes decisions regarding this. However, there is a consensus over two things: first, that general public(s) are its main targets, and second that it has a potential to transform relations by reducing friction and tensions - these features make public diplomacy a suitable tool for mitigating conflicting tendencies and building confidence among states even when its success can't be always guaranteed.

Generalizing and defining a concept as diverse as Public Diplomacy is a hard-task. The US Information Agency has the longest experience in the field - more than 40 years. According to the US Department of State, Public Diplomacy refers to, "*Government-sponsored programs intended to inform or influence public opinion in other countries; its chief instruments are publications, motion pictures, cultural exchanges, radio and television.*"²

Hans N. Tuch, author of the book 'Communicating with the World (1990)', defined public diplomacy as, "*Official government efforts to shape the communications environment overseas in which American foreign policy is played out, in order to reduce the degree to which misperceptions and*

² "Dictionary of International Relations Terms," U.S. Department of State, 1987, 85.

misunderstandings complicate relations between the U.S. and other nations."³ Edward R. Murrow Centre for Public Diplomacy defines it as "...the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with those of another"⁴

An agreed focus on 'communicating with the foreign publics and emphasis on the 'role of government' in promoting this is evident from the definitions. Hence, PD is not a non-governmental activity as is mistakenly assumed. In the first place, it is the central governments which formulate and provide the broader policy guidelines over the matter; non-governmental channels might then be brought into use for effective implementation of those policies. Governments can choose any means at their disposal for enhancing their capacity to communicate with the public in other states. Although both traditional diplomacy and public diplomacy are aligned with states' national interests, for PD the interests are somehow associated with improved positive images and favourable public opinions – something not always a central concern for formal diplomacy.

By virtue of its commitment to bringing improvement⁵ and betterment in inter-state ties by targeting the public sentiments, public diplomacy is an effective confidence building measure that contributes towards enhancing one's soft influence too. A few precedents do exist that demonstrate PD's usefulness. US' global public diplomacy, spearheaded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) presents an accurate example. The message on the agency's insignia, "From the American People", makes its objective very clear. USAID exports a good image of the American people, and of American state as a bi-product, by engaging in activities that ensure promoting a positive US image in the minds that benefit from agency's initiatives. Fulbright scholarship program is one more instrument of American public/cultural diplomacy that influences young minds by providing them avenues for higher education and learning opportunities in the US. Hollywood is yet another tool that selectively projects American lifestyle/values to generate an ideal US image for world-wide audiences; hence the appeal for the American model.

Franco-German reconciliation after World-War II also can be taken as a Public Diplomacy success story. Elysee Treaty, which served as the

³ "What is Public Diplomacy?" *Public Diplomacy Alumni Association*, <http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/archives/1.html> (accessed July 5, 2015).

⁴ "What is Public Diplomacy?" *The Edward R. Murrow Centre of Public Diplomacy*, <http://fletcher.tufts.edu/Murrow/Diplomacy> (accessed July 5, 2015).

⁵ "About US Public Diplomacy: What Public Diplomacy Is and Is Not," *Public Diplomacy Alumni Association*, http://pdaa.publicdiplomacy.org/?page_id=6, (accessed July 6, 2015).

basis for normalization of bilateral ties had increased people-to-people contacts and interactive exchange at its core.⁶ This PD tactic led to an increased understanding and cordiality between the two sides in a relatively short span, with relations getting better ever since. German Youth organization created under the treaty has contributed to more than 8 million cross-border exchanges since its creation⁷. Around three hundred French-German Friendship associations are engaged today in promoting exchanges between the two peoples⁸, thus showing PD to be a critical facilitator in the normalization and integration process. Through these precedents, PD's potential to make inter-state relations smoother and lasting can be established.

Pakistan-China Relations

China has enjoyed a long-standing influence in Pakistan. However, the critics sometimes challenge the depth of Sino-Pak relations on grounds that inter-state strategic needs define these ties rather than deep inter-societal linkages or public to public relations. A historical recap tells that the motivating force underlying Pak-China ties has been the desire to further their respective interests and to maintain regional geo-political balance.⁹ Since the establishment of formal diplomatic relations on May 21st, 1951¹⁰, they have grown closer, friendlier as well as multi-faceted. Although strategic concerns vis-à-vis the then existing cold war strategic environment dominated the initial phases, economic and socio-cultural linkages grew with time, and are critical today for deciphering the contours of this multi-dimensional relationship.

In the military dimension, China has been and continues to be the sole reliable weapons supplier of Pakistan.¹¹ Both have engaged in joint

⁶ "Franco-German Reconciliation and Public Diplomacy," July 9, 2010, <https://pdnetworks.wordpress.com/2010/07/09/franco-german-reconciliation-and-public-diplomacy/>.

⁷ Lily Gardner Feldman, "The Franco-German Elysée Treaty at Fifty: A Model for Others?" *American Institute for Contemporary German Studies*, January 24, 2013, <http://www.aicgs.org/issue/the-franco-german-elysee-treaty-at-fifty-a-model-for-others/>.

⁸ "France in Pakistan," <http://www.ambafrance-pk.org/> (accessed August 13, 2016).

⁹ Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhri, "Strategic and Military Dimensions in Pakistan-China Relations," *Pakistan Horizon* 39, no. 4 (1986): 15-28.

¹⁰ "Chronology of Key Events in Sino-Pakistan Relations," *Xinhua News Agency*, April 5, 2005, <http://www.china.org.cn/english/2005/SouthasiaTour/124766.htm>.

¹¹ "China Top Pakistan Arms Supplier: Sipri," *The News International*, December 15, 2015, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/81991-China-top-Pakistan-arms-supplier-Sipri>

military R & D projects; modernization of Pakistan's military and strategic hardware would not be possible without Beijing's assistance. As for economics, trade relations began in the early 1950s and the first formal trade agreement was signed in 1963.¹² The conclusion of a bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA) took much longer (first of its kind with a developing South Asian state). It has proved beneficial for both sides since enforcement in 2007 - bilateral trade volume increased from around \$6 billion in 2006 to \$16 billion in 2014.¹³ Public diplomacy efforts, rooted in greater inter-governmental collaboration have increased with time, promoting greater socio-cultural interaction through expanding people to people contacts; the following section elaborates it further.

An Overview of China's Public Diplomacy in Pakistan

Talking about efforts to reach each other's public, the first Pakistan-China Cultural Cooperation Agreement and its Executive Program was signed in March 1965.¹⁴ Unfortunately, the program remained un-implemented for the next decade because of the Cultural Revolution in China (1966-1976). Things got normal only with the Chinese reform and opening-up initiated by Deng Xiao Peng. The signing of the two-year Executive Program for Cultural Exchange took place in 1979.¹⁵ Exchange visits of cultural delegations began afterwards, where the participants promoted/presented their respective cultures, values and traditions through folk songs, dances and music. These activities helped in furthering the people-to-people contacts by enabling a better understanding of each other.

For enhancing cross-cultural understanding, a number of literary writings have been translated from Chinese to Urdu and vice versa; e.g. "Analects of Confucius", "Selection from the Chinese Poetry" and "Selection from the Chinese Literature".¹⁶ Cultural ties and education diplomacy have been burgeoning; since the year 2000, bilateral education exchange programs and scholarships have unprecedentedly progressed. The

¹² Jamal Afridi and Jayshree Bajoria, "China-Pakistan Relations," *Council on Foreign Relations*, July 6, 2010, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-pakistan-relations>.

¹³ "FTA Bearing Fruit: Bilateral Trade Volume Grows, Still in Favor Of China," *The Express Tribune*, April 19, 2015, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/872227/fta-bearing-fruit-bilateral-trade-volume-grows-still-in-favour-of-china/>

¹⁴ "Survey on China-Pak Cultural Exchanges & Cooperation," January 17, 2005, <http://pk.chineseembassy.org/eng/cultureservice/t179992.htm>.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ "Speech by Ambassador Luo Zhaohui at the Publication Ceremony of the Three Chinese Books Compiled by the Pakistan Academy of Letters," June 7, 2007, <http://pk.chineseembassy.org/eng/zbqx/t328163.htm>.

number of Pakistani students pursuing higher studies in China has steadily increased as Chinese government offers ever-larger number of scholarships. From 2007-2014, there was a threefold increase in the number of Pakistani students in China from 4,450 to 13,360,¹⁷ which grew to 19,000 in 2017.¹⁸ This is critical for reducing the socio-cultural gap and promoting greater connectedness between the two peoples. Making younger minds better understand each other's way of life can bring the future generations closer.

Furthering the cultural exchanges, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari inaugurated a photo exhibition on Mohenjo-Daro in Shanghai in July 2010¹⁹ that showed Pakistan's cultural heritage. Same year in December, Premier Wen Jiabao inaugurated the 'Pak-China Friendship Center' in Islamabad - a milestone for Sino-Pak public diplomacy - a gift from people of China to their Pakistani counterparts.²⁰ On proposal of the Chinese Premier, 2011 was celebrated as the Year of China-Pakistan friendship; vigorous exchanges in all fields including culture, education, sports, etc. marked 60 years of their bilateral ties. Punjab-Jiangsu cultural center²¹ was established in Lahore as a tool of cultural exchange that teaches Chinese cuisine, painting and courses on Mandarin.

In 2010, China and Pakistan signed an MOU for the establishment of cultural centers.²² The concept of 'Sister Cities' was also employed for promoting a greater sense of identification (similarity) between the two peoples. Lahore and Xi'an were declared as sister-cities in 2009, both being the epitomes of historical and cultural heritages of Pakistan and China respectively.²³ Karachi and Shanghai, being respective industrial and commercial centers on both sides were given this status back in 1984.

¹⁷ "International Students in China," <http://www.iie.org/Services/Project-Atlas/China/International-Students-In-China#.V--4aCF97IU>.

¹⁸ APP, "19,000 Pakistani Students Studying in Chinese Universities," *Dawn*, March 2, 2017, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1317973>.

¹⁹ Mohenjo-Daro is a cultural heritage site in Pakistan and is one amongst the most ancient signs of Asian civilization.

²⁰ "Gilani, Jiabao Inaugurate Pak-China Friendship Center," *The Express Tribune*, December 18, 2010, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/91478/gilani-jiabao-inaugurate-pak-china-friendship-centre/>

²¹ Muhammad Arif and Bai Gui, "Role of Chinese Language in Pakistan China Relations," *International Journal of International Relations, Media and Mass Communication Studies*1, no.1 (April 2015): 7-27.

²² "Pakistan," *China Culture Center*, <http://en.cccweb.org/Pakistan.html>.

²³ "Introduction on Exchanges between Xi'an and Lahore," November 13, 2009, http://english.shaanxi.gov.cn/articleScity/sistercities/citylevel/cityxian/200911/11558_1.html.

Working on the Communication Gap

The communication barrier that exists despite all these efforts is a major concern when it comes to close ties between the people of two countries. The inability to fully understand and speak each other's language leaves a gap, which is then criticized as an evidence of superficial nature of ties. Chinese are in a comparatively better position to understand Pakistani culture as English is used for official communication, but Pakistanis lack this edge because it is hard to understand Chinese culture without having an ability to comprehend Mandarin. However, despite these hindrances, the inter-societal linkages have grown with time as the two sides, being cognizant of the issue have efficiently directed efforts towards minimizing this communication gap.

China has done its part to address the issue by establishing Confucius institutes. Founded by the Office of Chinese Language Council International (Hanban), these are non-profit public institutes which work for promotion of Chinese language and culture in all parts of the world.²⁴ The Confucius institutes are therefore considered an effective instrument for expanding Chinese influence across the globe.²⁵ Pakistan is no exception where the first Confucius Institute was established in 2005 in the National University of Modern Languages (NUML), Islamabad; also the first of its kind in Muslim world. The institute has been efficiently serving the purpose of its existence. Hundreds of graduating students are eligible for admission in Chinese universities and for jobs in Chinese companies operating in Pakistan. The institute has stood out three times as the "Confucius Institute of the Year", in 2007, 2008 and 2010.²⁶ Apart from Cultural activities, 27 teaching centers are functioning across Pakistan under its sponsorship, with a total enrollment of about 6000.²⁷ Impressed by this tremendous success, Premier Le Keqiang signed up for establishing a second Confucius Institute in 2013²⁸, founded in Karachi University in 2014. The third one was established at the University of Faisalabad in

²⁴ "Confucius Institute Headquarters (Hanban)," <http://english.hanban.org/>.

²⁵ Sirirat Ngamsang and John Walsh, "Confucius Institutes as Instruments of Soft Power: Comparison with International Rivals," *Journal of Education and Vocational Research*, 4, no. 10 (October 2013): 302-310.

²⁶ "Confucius Institute," National University of Modern Languages, <http://numl.edu.pk/International%20Collaboration.aspx>.

²⁷ <http://numl.info/confucius-institute-islamabad.aspx>, (accessed September 9, 2015).

²⁸ A. S. Khan, "Geo-Economic Imperatives of Gwadar Sea Port and Kashgar Economic Zone," *IPRI Journal*. 13, no. 2 (2013).

2015.²⁹

Pakistan's Government has proposed to incorporate Chinese language as a part of the education system to prepare future generations for a more fruitful interaction with China. In 2012, the 'Education and Literacy Department' of the Sindh Government initiated a Chinese language course for the in-service public-sector teachers.³⁰ Next year, the Sindh government announced plans to make Chinese courses a compulsory part of curriculum from 6th Grade onwards (though not implemented so far). Explaining the rationale, Education Minister Pir Mazhar-ul-Haq said that amid increasing multi-dimensional bilateral collaboration, our younger generation needs, "*to have command over their (Chinese) language*".³¹

It was further proposed to incentivize students for learning Chinese by giving extra scores, scholarships and foreign visit opportunities. A strategic decision was made when Chinese language courses were made a mandatory part of the Cadet Colleges' curriculum. In 2013, Sindh government decided to promote Chinese courses in Cadet College Petaro along with the ordinary schools.³² This was a significant move because Cadet Colleges serve as breeding grounds for training the potential armed forces aspirants. Therefore, such a policy would provide our future passing-out batches with personnel capable of effectively communicating with their Chinese counterparts, thus ensuring well-thought and efficient correspondence in crucial defense and security matters.

All means at government's disposal have been utilized to promote Chinese language education in Pakistan. To this end, media and education have been interlinked in the first ever private sector initiative for teaching Chinese; a joint effort undertaken by China Radio International (CRI) in China and Roots Millennium Schools (RMS) in Pakistan. Under this CRI-RMS consortium, the CRI-Roots Confucius Classroom was launched in 2011³³ for teaching Chinese language to school kids from Grade 1-7. Native

²⁹ "Chinese Confucius Institute Starts Functioning at UAF," *The Patriot*, January 13, 2015, <http://dailythepatriot.com/chinese-confucius-institute-starts-functioning-at-uafchinese-confucius-institute-starts-functioning-at-uaf/>

³⁰ Muhammad Arif and Bai Gui, 21.

³¹ "Sindh to Teach Chinese Language in Schools from 2013," *Dawn*, September 11, 2014, <http://www.dawn.com/news/656505/sindh-to-teach-chinese-language-in-schools-from-2013>.

³² "Sindh Govt. Unveils Ambitious Plan to Teach Mandarin," *The Express Tribune*, September 5, 2011, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/244885/look-whos-talking-sindh-govt-unveils-ambitious-plan-to-teach-mandarin/>

³³ "China Radio International CRI-Roots Confucius Classroom Celebrated Chinese Lunar New Year," February 2, 2014, <http://pk.chineseembassy.org/eng/zb/gx/t1128236.htm>.

Chinese teachers were invited for teaching Chinese to around 3000 students as a part of their structured academic curriculum.³⁴ Karachi Campus of the Bahria University and Edu-Tek Institute of Professional Studies also offer Chinese language for higher education in Karachi. Talking of Media's role, the Urdu Service of China Radio International broadcasts Chinese language content to listeners across Pakistan, especially appealing to those in rural areas. The role of Media and communication technology in promoting the E-learning of Chinese Language can be seen in the first-ever video-based Chinese language program, initiated by NUML, promoting distant-learning via internet.

Allama Iqbal Open University (AIU), a leading distant-learning institute has signed an MOU with Yunnan Open University of China for establishing a 'Chinese language teaching center'.³⁵ In 2014, the Pak-China Institute (PCI), in association with the Confucius institute at NUML, launched an 'Online Chinese learning program'³⁶, where lectures were transmitted through video-conferencing to universities across Pakistan. Based on its success, the two organizers signed an MOU on June 20, 2014 for institutionalizing and regularizing the whole process.³⁷ The Cultural Section of the Chinese Embassy in Islamabad has shown considerable activism for promoting public interaction. Ambassador's Wife, Bao Jiqing, who heads the Chinese Embassy Women Group, started the China Culture Camp in 2014³⁸, which attracted around 40 students to attend courses on Chinese language, music and traditional calligraphy.

Political Commitment: The Cornerstone of China's Influence in Pakistan

Although, the above-mentioned initiatives have contributed in deepening the China-Pakistan relations, these are not the sole determinants of China's influence in Pakistan as these efforts date back to recent past only, whereas, China's positive image in Pakistan is not a recent thing. Pakistanis have long held a favorable image of China and that

³⁴ Muhammad Arif and Bai Gui, "Role of Chinese Language in Pakistan China Relations," 22.

³⁵ "AIU to Establish First Chinese Language Center," *Daily Times*, June 20, 2014, <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/islamabad/20-Jun-2014/aiou-to-establish-first-chinese-language-centre>.

³⁶ "Promotion of Chinese Language," *Pakistan-China Institute*, <http://www.pakistan-china.com/promotion-of-chinese-language.php>.

³⁷ "Confucius Institute, Pakistan China Institute Sign MOU for Online Chinese Language program," *Nihao-Salam*, June 20, 2014, <http://www.nihao-salam.com/news-detail.php?id=NjYxNA==>.

³⁸ Muhammad Arif and Bai Gui, "Role of Chinese Language in Pakistan China Relations."

has been a constant trend. Opinion polls suggest that Pakistan is one of the most pro-China countries in the world³⁹. In 2008, when global opinions regarding China were generally less favorable, 76% Pakistanis viewed it positively.⁴⁰ The Pew Survey in 2010 found 85% of the respondents had favorable views about China, whereas in comparison, only 16% had similar views about US.⁴¹ More recently, in 2015, 53% of Pakistanis thought that China has or will in future replace US as the Superpower.⁴² These persistently positive perceptions of China in Pakistan cannot be attributed solely to public diplomacy, though it might have contributed its share.

Besides the strategic-economic symbiosis and the efforts at socio-cultural intermingling, it is the '*unstrained political commitment*' of Pakistan and China towards each other irrespective of changing circumstances that is the centrepiece of their relationship. A deeper analysis reveals that both have remained committed to their strategic partnership and supported each other amid tense situations; both have stood by the other's side in the hours of need, thereby showing the strength of their ties. Pakistan sided with China in 1960s and early 1970s when the latter suffered an international isolation. Pakistan also played a diplomatic conduit between China and other parties, resulting in normalization and successful negotiations in the case of US⁴³, Saudi Arabia and Afghan Taliban respectively.

Likewise, China never fell short of Pakistan's expectations in the times of need, contrary to the general 'public theatrics' that have "*been a poor indicator of the underlying substance*"⁴⁴ of these ties. China's support was there whenever Pakistan faced hardships or international pressures. China's support remained unchanged during repeated tenures of political instability in Pakistan. China was Pakistan's only reliable source of military hardware in 1990s after it faced Western sanctions because of concerns

³⁹ D. Chandra, *China-Pakistan relations: Implications for India* (New Delhi: Vij Books India Private Limited, 2016), 15-40.

⁴⁰ "Global Economic Gloom – China And India Notable Exceptions," *Pew Research Center*, June 12, 2008, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2008/06/12/chapter-3-views-of-china/>.

⁴¹ "Views of China," *Pew Research Center*, June 17, 2010, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2010/06/17/chapter-5-views-of-china/>.

⁴² "Views of China and the Global Balance of Power," *Pew Research Center*, June 23, 2015, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/06/23/2-views-of-china-and-the-global-balance-of-power/>.

⁴³ "Rapprochement with China, 1972," *Office of the Historian – United States Department of State*, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/rapprochement-china> (accessed September 23, 2016).

⁴⁴ Andrew Small, "China-Pakistan: A Strategic Relationship in the Shadows," *Yale Global*, April 7, 2015.

over its nuclear program. The MOU sanctioning the production of JF-17 Thunder was signed in 1995.⁴⁵ Also, when Pervez Musharraf toppled the democratically elected government, Premier Zhou Rongji reiterated China's unfettered support by saying that a military government would not affect Pak-China relations.⁴⁶ A decade later, when international pressures mounted against Pakistan after Bin Laden's killing on the Pakistani soil, Wen Jiabao reinforced China's commitment by saying that irrespective of the changing international situations, "*China and Pakistan will remain forever good neighbors, good friends, good partners and good brothers*".⁴⁷

Besides the inter-governmental sphere, China has successfully shown its commitment to the 'People of Pakistan' too and that seems to have made a real difference. After the earthquake in Pakistan in 2005, China was among the first countries to help with \$6.2 million provided in aid in the first week; the total package was around \$20.5 million.⁴⁸ China's help was especially appreciated by people in badly hit areas. Cabinet Secretary Ejaz Rahim stated that, "*the tremendous work the Chinese rescue team has done in Balakot*"⁴⁹ cannot be forgotten; Chinese teams saved hundreds of lives in that area in harsh conditions. When the Pakistani nation was hit by floods in 2010, China again was amongst the first ones to help. In addition to financial aid, expert medical teams were sent too. China provided \$250 million⁵⁰ in aid; the largest ever to a foreign country and one to which Chinese society and common people greatly contributed.

Apart from disaster-relief assistance China has been among the biggest investors in commercial and development projects in Pakistan. It has invested in fields critical for long-term prosperity of Pakistani people - renewable energy projects for meeting Pakistan's rising energy demands being one.⁵¹ China has tremendously contributed to research and

⁴⁵ "JF-17 Thunder-Program," *Global Security*, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/fc-1-program.htm> (accessed September 18, 2016).

⁴⁶ "Musharraf Assured of China's Support," BBC News, January 18, 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/606773.stm.

⁴⁷ James Lamont and Farhan Bokhari, "China and Pakistan: An Alliance is Built," *The Big read*, June 30, 2011, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/417a48c4-a34d-11e0-8d6d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3mgB5efHE>.

⁴⁸ <http://img.static.reliefweb.int/report/> (accessed November 1, 2015).

⁴⁹ "China's Aid to Pakistan Exceeds \$20 Million," Embassy of the People's Republic of China, October 30, 2005, <http://pk.chineseembassy.org/eng/nyddz/t219068.htm>.

⁵⁰ "China Pledges \$250m Flood Aid to Pakistan," *China Daily*, December 18, 2010, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010wenindia/2010-12/18/content_11721909.htm.

⁵¹ Sarah Oliver, "What Chinese Investment could Mean for Pakistan," *Peterson Institute for International Economics*, May 22, 2015.

development in diverse fields including fisheries, agriculture, telecommunications, infrastructure development, heavy industries, mineral exploration, and many more, ultimately affecting peoples' lives. Also Chinese companies and corporations are not restricted to specific areas; instead their collaboration has aided Pakistan's government in promoting development in far-flung and previously ignored parts of the country. Around 120 Chinese companies and 20,000 nationals are helping the government in alleviating the standard of living across the country.⁵² This is an influential factor for the people of an unevenly developed country like Pakistan, hence promoting greater appeal for China.

It is imperative to mention that all national policies are guided by national interests, and China is no exception. Believing that China intends to help Pakistan without seeking anything in return would be irrational. But the favorable public opinion that China enjoys in Pakistan shows that its interests have been aligned with those of Pakistan and its people. China has dovetailed its policies with those of Pakistan's government in regards to the well-being and sustainability of Pakistani people. Substantial Chinese investment in development-infrastructure projects like Gwadar deep-sea port, Karakorum Highway and construction of dams (strategic significance withstanding) greatly facilitate common people by providing employment opportunities, technical expertise, faster transportation etc. Such investment is central to raising the over-all standard of living in the otherwise neglected and under-developed areas like Baluchistan and Gilgit-Baltistan.⁵³

Addressing the Claims against Chinese Influence in Pakistan

All the above mentioned aspects of China's engagement with Pakistan add up to determine China's influence in the country. As discussed, Public Diplomacy has played a positive role in bridging the socio-cultural gaps by bringing the two peoples closer but it is not the sole reason for cordial relations. Instead "*unshaken political commitment*" displayed in both intangible and tangible ways such as aid, investment, disaster relief, development funds, moral/political support etc. has ensured this cordiality. Critics assert that since economic carrots and strategic incentives are main drivers of China-Pakistan ties, there are clear limits to China's influence in Pakistan; they believe it to be predominantly

⁵² Jafar Riaz Kataria and Anum Naveed, "Pakistan-China Social and Economic Relations," *South Asian Studies*, 29, no.2 (Fall 2014): 395-410.

⁵³ Anwesha Ray Chaudhuri, "India and the Pakistan-China Nexus in Gilgit-Baltistan," *Institute of Defense Studies and Analysis*, March 16, 2011, http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/IndiaandthePakistanChinaNexusinGilgitBaltistan_archaudhuri_160311.html.

coercive in nature rather than being based on China's charm offensive and popular appeal with people of Pakistan.⁵⁴

Although the evidence of positive public perception about China in Pakistan is enough to challenge the validity of these claims, they still need a detailed deliberation. Most of the arguments criticizing China's lasting and effective influence in partner countries are based on the narrow understanding of the concept of soft power. These claims say that China lacks in terms of soft power⁵⁵ because what it calls soft power does not fit Western-originated definitions of the concept – according to which Chinese influence and its appeal with other nations needs to be based on its values, culture, foreign policy and ideas⁵⁶ rather than on its economic power. This is primarily because Joseph Nye's definition categorizes economic means as hard power source. In fact, such claims are ill conceived in their ignorance to the hard-to-generalize particularities of each case.

Such claims can be countered if US soft power or global appeal is taken as a standard, it manifests that hard and soft power are not completely isolated from each other. US soft power at the end of Cold War was largely a bi-product of the country's efficient utilization of its hard power resources since the end of WW-II. After 1945, a greater part of debilitated war-torn Europe turned towards US not because of its cultural or ideological appeal or people to people contacts, but because US was able and willing to provide for their utmost needs, i.e. resources for rebuilding their societies and states. The US' ability to provide public goods gradually increased its appeal across Europe⁵⁷ and Public diplomacy only had a latent and minimal role in the process, similar to what it seems to play in China-Pakistan equation. So, US economic (hard) power had set the base for its lasting appeal/influence with people in all parts of the world.⁵⁸

This finding implies that claims over China's lack of influence do not follow a logical path of reasoning because *what, how and why influences states is not a constant for all states*. Different states get influenced by different things based on their discrete identities and

⁵⁴ Lisa Curtis and Derek Scissor, "The Limits of the Pakistan-China Alliance," *The Heritage Foundation*, January 19, 2012.

⁵⁵ David Feith, "China's Soft Power Problem," *The Wall Street Journal*, December 17, 2015, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-soft-power-problem-1450376440>.

⁵⁶ Joseph S. Nye, "Soft Power," *Foreign Policy*, no. 80 (Autumn 1990): 153-171.

⁵⁷ David Stein, "An Enduring Tradition: 'Hard Power' Support for 'Soft Power,'" *US Global Leadership Coalition*, July 2, 2015, <http://www.usglc.org/2015/07/02/an-enduring-tradition-hard-power-support-for-soft-power/>.

⁵⁸ Zachary Keck, "The Hard Side of Soft Power," *The Diplomat*, July 24, 2013, <https://thediplomat.com/2013/07/the-hard-side-of-soft-power/>

particular interests determined by these identities. So, factors influencing each state will vary with distinct identity and interests, varying from state to state. This explains why the instruments of influence differ for the developing and developed states. For instance, developed states committed to greater social welfare would prefer engagement with actors having similar ideals and normative orientation and not those offering economic dividends at the cost of the former two. Contrarily, the developing countries would have an appeal for influx of funds and aid, which contributes to their ultimate goal of greater development. So, what influences states depends on their needs and interests, which in turn are determined by their identities. That explains why China's economic diplomacy with the developing world acts as a public diplomacy tool - promoting a positive image - but its much larger economic interdependence with Japan does not contribute to that end.⁵⁹

Lastly, talking of public diplomacy in general and China-Pakistan's case in particular, it must be remembered that it is not an end in itself, rather is a means to the end. The end goal here is to have a positive image in the perceptions of your counterparts' public and durable inter-state relations as a consequence of that. As far as the employable means are concerned, public diplomacy is just one of them. Therefore, no established protocols and strict rules exist regarding its conduct; instead, a concept of 'Public Diplomacy Enlightenment'⁶⁰ is relevant in this regard. This concept considers this age of public diplomacy synonymous to that of Enlightenment, where people knew what they wanted to renounce and what to seek instead, but lacked a set pattern to that end. Therefore, actors adopted diverse ways convenient to each for seeking that end. Public diplomacy is comparable as the end goals are known but no definite blueprint exists for reaching there; so, states utilize whatever means suit them.

The above discussion shows that states are not to be blamed for not following the ideal pattern because firstly, none exists, and secondly all states have different experiences in the fields of soft power and public diplomacy. Moreover, just because economic and strategic aspects supersede the socio-cultural ones in bilateral ties doesn't mean that the ties are not durable and the public perceptions are not positive. Same is the logic behind China's influence in Pakistan, where political commitment, both material and non-material, has been the prime binding force between them. In this particular case, the longevity of the ties is seen

⁵⁹ Jean-Pierre Lehmann, "Economic Ties Won't Ensure Peace between China and Japan," *East Asia Forum*, November 3, 2015, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/11/03/economic-ties-wont-ensure-peace-between-china-and-japan/>

⁶⁰ Andrew Kneale, "The Public Diplomacy Enlightenment," *The Journal of Public Diplomacy*, (Fall 2010), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/48334309_Not_quite_the_sum_of_its_parts_Public_diplomacy_from_an_Australian_perspective.

from the fact that the two sides did not give up collaboration even in the instance of differences over certain matters.

For instance, China has been concerned about rising extremism in Pakistan which it fears can inflame the Uighur separatist movement in Xinjiang; it also publicly expressed concern over killing and abduction of Chinese citizens by Pakistani militants;⁶¹ and its stance regarding Kashmir issue has been relatively neutral. Critics point towards these differences as indicators of tactical and fragile nature of the Pak-China relations. What critics fail to see is that differences have not overshadowed cooperation, and that both sides correspond and talk over the issues for addressing the other's concerns - ensuring that minor disagreements do not downgrade the decades long amity and geniality. This shows the level of trust between the two, rooted in strong political commitment, making the two believe in peaceful intentions of the other. That China has supported Pakistan in tough times without heeding to Western criticisms shows its level of commitment to Pakistan and that is why, "*Pakistan considers China as its most reliable and time tested friend*".⁶²

Generous financial help is one part of this commitment, but not the determining aspect. If wide scale economic engagement was the main reason for influencing perceptions, appeal for the US would surpass China's since US financial aid to Pakistan outnumbers Chinese aid and investment.⁶³ The level of trust between the parties plays a role in determining such outcomes. It can thus be established that China's influence in Pakistan results from its foreign policy ideals, values and sense of commitment. Chinese principles of 'respect for sovereignty' and 'non-interference' in the domestic affairs of other states makes it easier for Pakistan and most other developing states to engage with China. These principles make China appear more open to understand constraints of developing states. Such an appearance allows China to create a larger appeal in general publics, when compared to those who spend more money but also impose their ideals upon others. Its for this reason that Senator Hussain Haqqani said that even though both the US and China are

⁶¹ "Pakistan Faces Chinese Fury over Abductions and Killing of its Citizens," *The Hindu*, February 29, 2012, <http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/pakistan-faces-chinese-fury-over-abductions-and-killing-of-its-citizens/article2946137.ece>.

⁶² T. Mahmood, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Quarterly Survey," *Pakistan Institute of International Affairs* 53, no. 2/3 (Spring 2000), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41393955>.

⁶³ Daniel Wagner, "Message to Pakistan: China Will Not Replace U.S. Aid," *The Huffington Post*, May 18, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-wagner/message-to-pakistan_b_863518.html.

crucial for Pakistan but if forced to choose, Pakistan “would probably choose China”.⁶⁴

Recent Trends: The CPEC and Public Diplomacy

Recently, Pakistan-China relations have been overwhelmed by China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) – an endeavor worth around \$46 billion⁶⁵ and considered an integral component of China’s over-all ‘Belt and Road Initiative’. To align Pakistan with this inter and intraregional connectivity belt, the two sides have signed MOUs on a number of energy and infrastructure projects spread across the entire 3000 km long corridor running from Gwadar in Pakistan to Kashghar in China’s Xinjiang province. The projects within envision setting up efficient transportation and communication infrastructure for facilitation of trade, commerce and transit activities.⁶⁶ CPEC has been widely hailed by Pakistani state and society ever since its proposal as it cautiously dovetails China’s interests with the development needs of Pakistani people and thus, has increased China’s appeal within Pakistan. CPEC is taken to be an epitome of China’s commitment to Pakistan, especially at a time when Pakistan faced severe concerns over insecure and non-conducive investment environment.⁶⁷

Efforts are underway to spread public awareness about it since the success of such megaprojects depends on public partnership. Even though the project is predominantly economic in nature, it does have an associated public diplomacy component. To that end, national broadcasting services from the two sides are cooperating for a coherent media campaign to amass public support for CPEC. CCTV news and documentary programs are being re-broadcasted in Pakistan. More than 300 officials from think-tanks and social organizations participated in the CPEC Forum held in August 2015.⁶⁸ Both sides have signed collaboration

⁶⁴ Jamal Afridi and Jayshree Bajoria, “China-Pakistan Relations,” *Council on Foreign Relations*, July 6, 2010, <http://www.cfr.org/china/china-pakistan-relations/p10070>.

⁶⁵ “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor an ‘Inspiring Model’: Pakistan PM Nawaz Sharif,” *The Economic Times*, September 27, 2015, <http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/china-pakistan-economic-corridor-an-inspiring-model-pakistan-pm-nawaz-sharif/articleshow/49124448.cms>.

⁶⁶ Tahir Dhindsa, “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: A Geo-Economic Initiative,” *Sustainable Development Policy Institute*, March 7, 2016.

⁶⁷ “No New Foreign Investor Entered Pakistan in Recent Years: OICCI,” *Dawn*, March 26, 2015.

⁶⁸ Shannon Tiezzi, “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Gets Even More Ambitious,” *The Diplomat*, August 13, 2015, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/the-china-pakistan-economic-corridor-gets-even-more-ambitious/>

agreements in diverse fields ranging from energy and power projects to trade and industry. Investing in these fields directly influences/facilitates the common people, affecting their perceptions and building a popular support for the entire initiative.

Senator Mushahid Hussain, the founding Chairman of the Pakistan-China Institute said that all parts and parties of Pakistan fully support China's initiative as generally beneficial. To ensure the peoples' participation, a Parliamentary Oversight Committee has been established to ensure transparency and participation of the local communities.⁶⁹ He believed that CPEC's success is guaranteed as it will change people's lives for better. The public has viewed CPEC very positively as it promises to promote development and prosperity in previously neglected and long-underdeveloped regions; the people really look forward towards being alleviated.

Chinese side has assured of such dividends; Ji Ping, Deputy Director of the Chinese Peace Development Foundation (CPDF) said that once completed, it would provide jobs to "the people of Gwadar"⁷⁰ as Baluchistan will become a trading hub. NGOs operating there are also trying to develop social sector. Chairman CPDF, B. Zhong, reiterated the commitment to social prosperity by promising "*quality education and health facilities*" to the people of the province⁷¹. Local representative of the people of Gwadar, Chairman Municipal Committee welcomed and reassured Chinese delegation of the public support by saying that people in the deprived port City, being happy with the work of Chinese, will welcome even greater number of Chinese firms.⁷²

CPEC is predominantly an economic connectivity project linked to the broader 'BRI' initiative, it has other distinct facets linked to people of Pakistan. For succeeding, CPEC needs a conducive environment for which local awareness and social relevance is required; its efficient completion and long-term success brings public diplomacy component into focus. In addition to building energy and communication infrastructure crucial to the needs of Pakistani people, China's investment in social services is trying to make the public a stakeholder in the entire process. The project will make the people across borders more connected, leading to positive opinion-building in the long run.

⁶⁹ "China-Pakistan Economic Corridor to Benefit all Regions in Pakistan: Pakistani Senator," *English.news.cn*, June 10, 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-06/10/c_134312003.htm.

⁷⁰ "Balochistan Development: Economic Corridor will Ensure Jobs, Says Ji Ping," *The Express Tribune*, August 1, 2015, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/930281/balochistan-development-economic-corridor-will-ensure-jobs-says-ji-ping/>

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid.

Although concerns and skepticism over CPEC and its lopsided benefits for Pakistan and China exist in parallel and are also genuine and well-thought-out ones, but these still make a fraction of the whole. At the broader-national level CPEC is believed to be a game-changer for Pakistan and its people, especially for those in Baluchistan and Gwadar. Therefore, CPEC will remain an important part of the entire China-Pakistan public diplomacy debate in future, or to say, PD is inherently linked to the success of CPEC.

Conclusion

This paper has critically evaluated the public diplomacy aspect of China-Pakistan relations in order to gauge the extent of influence that China enjoys in Pakistan. Public Diplomacy is an evolving field - not yet mature; a means to an end; and improvement and durability of inter-state relations are the ends it seeks. Public diplomacy, being a recent phenomenon, is not a determining variable in Pak-China relations as they have sustained for around five decades.

The criticisms claiming China's influence in Pakistan to be tactical and short-lived are ill-founded at best. Just because Chinese influence in Pakistan has a definitional mismatch with the Western conceptions of influence/appeal or soft power, it does not downplay China's soft power or influence in Pakistan or other states. This is because what influences states varies from state to state, as the state identities and interests vary. So, even though public diplomacy efforts have existed between China-Pakistan, the fundamental strength of bilateral equation and of China's influence lies in its *unfettered political commitment* to Pakistan and its people.

In the evolving context of CPEC, which aligns economic interconnectedness to development interests of Pakistani people, Public diplomacy needs to be interwoven with economics to generate popular support and appeal to facilitate the long-term success of the entire endeavour. Greater investment in Public diplomacy is needed to build on the political commitment that has been the main reason for Chinese influence in Pakistan so far.

NEWS CONTENT ON PRIVATE TV CHANNELS IN PAKISTAN: PEMRA STANDARDS AND INTERNATIONAL BEST PRACTICES

Muhammad Sajjad* & Dr. Juriah Abd. Jalil**

Abstract

This article addresses issues like misinformation, violent content, distorted conflict reporting, infringement of privacy, and biased coverage of elections by private Pakistani channels. Vocal media, no doubt, strengthens democratic institutions but the misuse of freedom of expression must be avoided - a freedom that comes with certain pre requisites and responsibilities. Content regulation creates a balance between rights and responsibilities of both the regulated and the regulator. It entails protection for the media from commercial interests, pressure groups or state bureaucracy; and for the public so that its right to information and privacy is guarded against misinformation, propaganda or menacing content. In this context, current Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority's (PEMRA) standards need to be re-evaluated in view of ongoing compliance related issues in news content. The article analyses PEMRA standards for news programmes in light of the modern broadcasting codes/rules/conventions to address the problem of content violations in Pakistan.

Keywords: Media Freedom, Fake-news, Media Content, Standards of Reporting, Responsible Journalism, Pakistani media

Introduction

After the establishment of Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) in 2002, the local media industry witnessed a mushroom growth of private TV channels. This massive expansion has resulted in saturation of the media market, where each TV channel is

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selling its programmes' content in a competitive environment. To increase viewership, the Channels have adopted/developed certain practices which lead the viewers to ultimately criticize the news content as being hyped, inaccurate and politically biased. There is a need for adequate regulation to curb such practices.

Private TV Channels in response argue by using the notion of 'free media', which no doubt is protected under Article 19 of the Constitution of Pakistan, with certain internationally recognized qualifications and restrictions. The Supreme Court of Pakistan, while interpreting Article 19 held that 'reasonable restrictions on reasonable grounds can always be imposed' and that '[r]easonable classification is always permissible and law permits so.'¹ The Supreme Court has established jurisprudence that media cannot publish whatever it wishes.² Right to freedom of expression and media freedom has constitutional qualifications to meet, which justify regulation.

Rationale Behind Regulating Information Content: Public Interest Considerations

A good regulatory code creates a balance between public and private interests for greater good. Inspired from the qualifications laid down in Article 19 of the Constitution, PEMRA Code provides for the protection of privacy, personal life, private communication etc., which is otherwise a restriction on freedom of media. These protections, however, may not be available where there is an overriding public interest. PEMRA Code enumerates such public interest considerations.³ This jurisprudence is a long established tradition in the leading common law jurisdictions.⁴

Despite a growing inclination towards social media in Pakistan,⁵ the role and importance of TV news will prevail for some time to come, due to its ability to influence people. Rightly observed by the Supreme Court of India, television is unique in the way it intrudes into our homes; the images and sound combined together create a tremendous impact on

¹ Engineer Jameel Ahmed Malik v. Pakistan Ordnance Factories Board, 2004 SCMR 164.

² Sheikh Muhammad Rasheed v. Majid Nizami, Editor-in-Chief, The Nation and Nawa-e-Waqt. PLD 2002, SC 514.

³ PEMRA Code, s 21.

⁴ Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," *Harvard Law Review*, 4 (1890): 193.

⁵ Rasmus Kleis Nielsen and Richard Sambrook, "What is Happening to the Television News?" *Digital News Project, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism*, London, 2016, <https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2017-06/What%20is%20Happening%20to%20Television%20News.pdf>.

millions.⁶ Hence, it participates in the democratic process.⁷ In view of these considerations, it is inevitable to provide certain standards and rules to save the viewers - as television consumers⁸ - from inaccurate, false, misleading or harmful content.

Independent regulation is also in the interest of media so it can freely serve the role of a trustworthy source of information. State-favouring regulations always have the potential to put media under pressure through licensing and sanctions to control free flow of information. Also, it is meant to protect a person's right to information and right to free speech.⁹ Protection of an individual's privacy is another important reason for regulation of informative content since television has an unparalleled ability to interfere into a person's private life.

Another justification for content regulation is increasing commercialism. Commercial news channels broadcasting news for TV consumers cannot be left unregulated, as commercial activities are likely to cause an imbalance between the interests of private TV enterprises and of the public seeking reliable information.

PEMRA Legislation and Standards

Despite PEMRA Code 2015 (PEMRA Code) being in force for the last few years, content compliance has not significantly improved in news programmes. The very first mandate of PEMRA is to improve standards of information.¹⁰ PEMRA legislation on regulation of information content is scattered in the PEMRA Ordinance, Regulations, Rules and Code of Conduct. The recent development was PEMRA Code, issued by the PEMRA at the directions of Supreme Court of Pakistan in certain Constitutional Petitions¹¹ on media related issues, in line with the PEMRA Rules.¹² As compared to earlier Code of Conduct (Schedule – A to PEMRA Rules) the present PEMRA Code is relatively more detailed. It provides certain fundamental principles requiring compliance in mandatory terms.¹³

Fundamental principles of the PEMRA Code prohibit broadcast of content that is against Islamic values, Pakistan's ideology or the founding

⁶ 1995 AIR 1236.

⁷ Eve Salomon, *Guidelines for Broadcasting Regulation*, 2nd Ed. (London: Commonwealth Broadcasting Association, 2008), 11.

⁸ Ibid., 42.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ PEMRA Ordinance, Preamble (i).

¹¹ Constitutional Petitions: No. 53/2012, 104/2012, 105/2012 and 117/12.

¹² PEMRA Rules, 2009, s 2(1)(f) and 15(1).

¹³ PEMRA Code, 2015, Section 3.

fathers;¹⁴ incites derailment of democratic set up;¹⁵ calls for arms against Pakistan's security, integrity or defence;¹⁶ is contemptuous of any religion or sect;¹⁷ is pornographic, obscene, indecent or abusive,¹⁸ or content that incites hatred on the basis of nationality, race, ethnicity, language, color, religion, sect, age, gender or any other physical or psychological disability.¹⁹ Violation of copyrights or property rights is also prohibited in the code.²⁰ Furthermore, disruption of public order,²¹ knowingly spreading false content,²² aspersions against judiciary or armed forces,²³ intimidation, false incrimination or accusations, or blackmailing²⁴ and defaming a person,²⁵ or airing statements of any terrorists are the major do-nots laid down by the Code.²⁶ As for the protection of privacy, the Code does not allow broadcast of any private information, correspondence or behavior of a person²⁷ except in compelling circumstances of public interest. The Code also prohibits airing of plagiarized content in news and requires the licensee to ensure that it gives credit to the source; sources of facts/figures are to be mentioned for ensuring credibility.²⁸

In view of public complaints, a substantial part of the Code is mandatory guidelines related to news and current affairs programmes,²⁹ live coverage,³⁰ and reporting and coverage of accidents, crimes and violence.³¹ This was done in the context of ongoing war on terrorism across the north-western borders and the acts of terrorism committed on Pakistani soil, recklessly covered by private TV channels. Similarly, the

¹⁴ Ibid., Section 3(1)(a).

¹⁵ Ibid., Section 3(1) (b).

¹⁶ Ibid., Section 3(1) (c).

¹⁷ Ibid., Section 3(1)(d).

¹⁸ Ibid., Section 3(1)(e).

¹⁹ Ibid., Section 3(1)(f).

²⁰ Ibid., Section 3(1)(g).

²¹ Ibid., Section 3(1)(h).

²² Ibid., Section 3(1)(i).

²³ Ibid., Section 3(1)(j).

²⁴ Ibid., Section 3(1)(k).

²⁵ Ibid., Section 3(1)(l).

²⁶ Ibid., Section 3(3).

²⁷ Ibid., Section 3(4).

²⁸ Ibid., Section 7(1) and 7(2)

²⁹ Ibid., Section 4.

³⁰ Ibid., Section 5.

³¹ Ibid., Section 6.

Code prohibits broadcasting of any allegations without credible evidence³² and affording him or her opportunity to reply.³³ To crosscheck the appropriateness according to the PEMRA standards on news content, this study—article has comparatively analysed it in the light of international guidelines on content regulation and recent or relevant codes of conduct in the UK, Malaysia and Australia. Selection of these jurisdictions for reference is based on the common law roots shared by the legal systems of these countries. Malaysia is more relevant as it not only has common law roots, but also shares a majority Muslim population, Islam as an official religion and ethnic diversity. In case of UK and Australia, a more liberal and advanced approach is followed in terms of media regulation, which seeks to protect media freedom.

Basic Principles and Standards: A Comparative Analysis

Detailed rules are based on guiding principles, which reflect the public policy objectives of a regulation. This approach is common in content regulations like the Malaysian Communication and Multimedia Content Code³⁴ (Malaysian Code) developed by the Communication and Multimedia Content Forum³⁵ (CMCF). The Content Code provides General Principles³⁶ followed by Guidelines on Content,³⁷ which collectively provide fundamental principles of content regulation. UK's Ofcom³⁸ also employs a principle-based approach in devising its Ofcom Code.³⁹

Accuracy

Internationally, it is acknowledged that there is requirement of accuracy and truthfulness for news content.⁴⁰ While the possibility of error is not denied in media regulation, the procedure for verification of information content, its source and correction of mistakes has to be in

³² Ibid., Section 22(1).

³³ Ibid., Section 22(2).

³⁴ The Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Content Code, <https://www.mcmc.gov.my/skmmgovmy/files/attachments/ContentCode.pdf> (accessed September 26, 2017); Section 213 of the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Act, 1998.

³⁵ Establishment of Content Forum is required by the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Act, 1998. See Section 212 of the Act.

³⁶ Malaysian Code, Part One, Section 2.0.

³⁷ Ibid., Part 2, Section 1.0.

³⁸ United Kingdom Office of Communication, <https://www.ofcom.org.uk/home> (accessed October 16, 2017).

³⁹ Ofcom Broadcasting Code, 2017.

⁴⁰ UNESCO Guidelines, 42.

place and followed by the television station. It would be unrealistic to expect from the television to guarantee the truth,⁴¹ therefore the regulation expects facts-check based on the idea of a reasonable man's due diligence in dealing with a news item.

PEMRA Code mandates that news programmes shall disseminate information in accurate manner.⁴² Though the Code does not employ the term 'fake-news', it requires the licensee to ensure that the news content is not false.⁴³ The Code introduces the term 'aspersion' which, as a kind of false news, is defined to mean spreading false and harmful allegations against a person, targeting his reputation,⁴⁴ and more specifically against the judiciary and armed forces.⁴⁵

It equally prohibits broadcast of any news known to be untrue, or for which there is a reason to believe that it may not be true beyond reasonable doubt,⁴⁶ or apparently known to be false. TV broadcaster will exercise due diligence when there is reasonable doubt about truthfulness of the content. To ensure accuracy it is imperative that editorial supervision is legally required.

To deal with a situation where inaccurate information is aired by the television, the licensee is required to acknowledge the inaccuracy and issue a correction, at the same level and magnitude at which the false information was aired, in order to reverse its harmful impact(s).⁴⁷ To ensure accuracy, the procedure, concept and practice of having editorial boards or in-house monitoring are also provided in the Malaysian and UK regulatory codes.

The UK broadcast regulator Ofcom, follows a more detailed approach by placing requirement of 'due accuracy' in the news⁴⁸ which is inspired from the Code's Principles on accuracy.⁴⁹ The UK Communications Act, 2003 puts accuracy in news among public policy considerations even in case of mergers of broadcasting enterprises.⁵⁰ The Act brought about amendment in another relevant statute to assert the

⁴¹ Julie Posettie et al., *Journalism, 'Fake News' and Disinformation* (Paris: UNESCO Paris, 2018), 22.

⁴² PEMRA Code, Section 4(1).

⁴³ Ibid., Section 7(a).

⁴⁴ Ibid., Section 2(1)(a).

⁴⁵ Ibid., Section 3(1)(j).

⁴⁶ Ibid., Section 3(1)(i).

⁴⁷ Ibid., Section 18.

⁴⁸ The UK Communications Act, 2003, Section 319(2)(b).

⁴⁹ Ofcom Code, Section 5, Principles and Rules.

⁵⁰ UK Communications Act, 2003 Section 375(1).

need of accurate news among specific considerations.⁵¹ The Malaysian Code too requires accurate presentation of news. Likewise the Australian Commercial Television Industry Code of Practice 2015 (Australian Code) also mandates accuracy in news content.⁵²

PEMRA Code, like Malaysian Code, Ofcom and Australian codes, recognizes the requirement of accuracy. However, it does not follow a detailed approach considering the margin of error and complex environment of collection of information. Ofcom employs a rather surgical approach by mandating 'due accuracy' instead of 'accuracy' allowing margin of human error with fact-check procedures and due diligence in place. PEMRA standards on accuracy can improve compliance by incorporating detailed rules in this regard and checks on internal editorial boards of television channels.

Impartiality

Impartiality may be considered too idealistic a principle for today's commercial television which is politically opinionated and focused on increasing viewership for more profits. It can be argued that since the print media has not been impartial, why television should be so (impartial).⁵³ However, there can be more convincing argument in favor of impartial news on television that, it is in the public interest that impartiality should build public trust in media. If political bias is condoned, the informative content on television will not be a trusted source for public. There is another risk which is practically there, that taking political sides may affect a television channel with the change of political governments and their policies, especially in allocation of government advertisements, licensing or renewal of licensee, availing any incentives etc. Therefore, best practices place impartiality as a principle followed by detailed rules in the regulation.

PEMRA legislation, specifically PEMRA Code, does not require impartiality in principle, except in cases where personal interests of a presenter may affect due impartiality of the content. In that case, such interest will be revealed with a disclaimer notice.⁵⁴ This requirement of 'due impartiality' applies only in cases where there is a personal interest of the journalist or presenter, which is similar to that of Ofcom Code.⁵⁵ However, it does not impose this responsibility on the broadcaster as organization, since it will also disclose conflict of interest. Secondly, this

⁵¹ Following promulgation of the UK Communication Act, 2003, Sub-Section 2A was added to Section 58 of the UK Enterprise Act, 2002 to this effect.

⁵² Australian Code, Section 3.4.1(a).

⁵³ UNESCO Guidelines, 42.

⁵⁴ PEMRA Code, Section 4(8).

⁵⁵ Ofcom Code, Rule 5.8.

requirement is not presented like a principle - which has detailed rules - like in Ofcom Code.

Ofcom Code provides a separate section on due impartiality⁵⁶ and defines *due* as adequate and appropriate to the nature and subject of a programme. It further explains that due impartiality approach does not mean allocation of equal time to each viewpoint. In fact, due impartiality when applied may vary according to the nature and subject of a programme, the expectations of viewers and the way content is presented to them. The Code lays down Rules like prohibiting a politician on television screen presenting news or reporting except when there is editorial justification and his or her political allegiance is disclosed.⁵⁷ The Australian Code also dedicates, though brief and precise, a section on impartiality.⁵⁸ The Code requires that reporting on factual matters shall be distinguishable from any commentary,⁵⁹ which is identical with PEMRA Code.⁶⁰

Impartiality, no doubt, is recognised as principle in these jurisdictions, however, detailed rules are provided only in Ofcom Code. In case of PEMRA, due impartiality as regulatory requirement with detail-oriented approach is missing in its Code, which needs to be incorporated as news on private television mostly involve reporting on viewpoints of opposing sides, on controversial and public policy matters, where private news channels are mostly driven by a biased approach. International best practices, like Ofcom Code can serve as a guide for PEMRA.

Fairness

Regulation seeks to ensure that news segments are presented in a fair manner. This is in view of the public interest that the information content on television should not be negatively affected by personal views or commercial interests of the broadcasters.

PEMRA Code, perhaps following the previous United States Federal Communications Commission's fairness doctrine (now revoked)⁶¹ requires fairness, objectiveness and unbiasedness in presentation of informative content. Fairness is second in line after accuracy in the PEMRA standards,⁶² however, when it comes to news content the term fairness

⁵⁶ Ibid., Section 5.

⁵⁷ Ibid., Rule 5.3.

⁵⁸ Australian Code, Section 3.4.1(a).

⁵⁹ Ibid, Section 3.4.1(b).

⁶⁰ PEMRA Code, Section 4(4).

⁶¹ US Federal Communications Commission implemented Fairness Doctrine for around thirty-eight years starting from 1949. It was revoked later on the grounds of public interest and being against First Amendment.

⁶² PEMRA Code, Section 4(1).

itself is not defined in the Code. Another aspect is angling in the news or current affairs programme - not defined in the Code but covered by the principle of fairness. 'Angling' implies reporting news in a way that leads to formation of viewers' opinion in a certain direction; like reporting on investigations or court proceedings in a manner that may affect them.

In jurisdictions like UK, fairness is recognized as a principle, followed by detailed rules,⁶³ which are purposed to ensure that no individual or organization is treated unfairly by a broadcaster. In Malaysia too, the present regulatory standards require fairness and objectiveness in news.⁶⁴ PEMRA Code needs to impose requirement of fairness and provide detailed rules on how fairness is to be gauged and how will it be applied by the broadcaster.

Right to Reply

Right to reply is recognized in media regulation and international instruments to ensure that any allegations made against any person do not go one sided on air. The European convention on Trans-frontier Television provides that every person, irrespective of nationality or residence, shall have right to reply in relation to a programme broadcasted by a television channel in the relevant jurisdiction.⁶⁵ The Directive Television without Frontiers⁶⁶ also protects a person's right to reply in addition to any other remedies like civil or criminal action, and requires the broadcaster to facilitate effective exercise of right to reply with appropriate timing.⁶⁷

Principally, PEMRA Code prohibits broadcast of allegations against an individual or organization without credible evidence and affording opportunity to defend,⁶⁸ or present any content as evidence against any person, unless such content can be used as evidence.⁶⁹ Thereby the legislature seeks to protect the principle of 'no one should be condemned unheard' in media regulation as per international regulatory guidelines.⁷⁰

The Ofcom, on right to reply, has incorporated the relevant terms of European Union legislation in its Code⁷¹ and recognizes that as a right,⁷²

⁶³ Ofcom Standards, Section Seven.

⁶⁴ Malaysian Code, Section 3.9(a).

⁶⁵ European Convention on Transfrontier Television, Article 8.

⁶⁶ The Directive Television without Frontiers, Article 23 (Directive No. 89/552/EEC).

⁶⁷ The same has been reiterated in Article 28 of the later European Union Audio-visual Media Services Directive (Directive 2010/13/EU), whose relevant sections have been incorporated in to Ofcom Code as Appendix II.

⁶⁸ PEMRA Code, Section 22(1).

⁶⁹ Ibid., Section 22(4).

⁷⁰ UNESCO Guidelines, page 48.

⁷¹ Ofcom Code, Appendix II.

though it is also covered by the Code under the concept of fairness with detailed rules.⁷³ In contrast, PEMRA Code lacks these details and has no well-articulated approach for dealing with cases where a person gets affected by factual programme content. The Code, while providing right to reply, has missed to lay down the time frame within which the aggrieved person will be given an opportunity to reply to the allegations against him, in a manner having same effect as that which aired such allegations. In the latter case, the Code should specify how the right to reply be manifested such that it reaches maximum viewers who might have come across earlier allegations against that person. In an active political environment like in Pakistan, it is imperative that the PEMRA Code provides rules on exercising the right to reply under PEMRA. The code also needs to elaborate upon the operation of other relevant statutes like defamation law and penal code. This is needed as otherwise, it will be double jeopardy for the broadcaster to be fined by PEMRA on violation of right to reply and at the same time pay compensation for defamation.

Protection of Privacy

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence.⁷⁴ Freedom of media and right to privacy has to be exercised in a balanced way, which is a challenging task.⁷⁵ Primarily, the justification for interference into privacy is premised on the public interest argument.

The UK Broadcasting Standards Commission Code⁷⁶ stated:

An infringement of privacy has to be justified by an overriding public interest in disclosure of the information. This would include revealing or detecting crime or disreputable behaviour, protecting public health or safety, exposing misleading claims made by individuals or organisations, or disclosing significant incompetence in public office.⁷⁷

The UK Broadcasting Act, 1996 (as amended) made it duty of the Ofcom to devise a code and standards to avoid unwarranted intervention

⁷² Ofcom Code, Rule 7.11.

⁷³ Ofcom Code, Section 7 (Foreword).

⁷⁴ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, Article 12, available at United Nation's website, <http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/>. (accessed October 10, 2017)

⁷⁵ UNESCO Guidelines, page 47.

⁷⁶ This Code came into force in 1998 and was later replaced by Ofcom Code, 2003.

⁷⁷ UK Broadcasting Standards Commission Code on Fairness and Privacy, 1998, Section 16, <http://www.mediawise.org.uk/uk-10/> (accessed on May 1, 2018)

into privacy⁷⁸ The clarification of 'warranted' in Ofcom is identical with the 'public interest considerations' in PEMRA Code. Ofcom approach seems to be inspired from the European Commission on Human Rights allowing interference into an individual's fundamental right to privacy on account of some justified grounds like national security, public safety, protection of law and order, health or rights of others.⁷⁹ This right is protected at constitutional level in many jurisdictions including Pakistan where as a fundamental right privacy of home is inviolable.⁸⁰ Under the Code, revealing a person's private life, communications or personal information is not allowed, unless there is compelling public interest.⁸¹

For the purpose of reporting on matter of public interest, PEMRA Code has laid down circumstances justifying door-stepping.⁸² First of all, door-stepping is justified only in cases of a factual programme⁸³ and not for entertainment programmes or advertisements. For factual programmes, it can take place only where a request for interview is not entertained by the interviewee but it is warranted by identifiable public interest;⁸⁴ such interview will not be imposed or attempted unless consented to by the interviewee, except when it is in the public interest.⁸⁵

In terms of protection of privacy the PEMRA Code seems to focus on the subject of door-stepping and is not as detailed as the Ofcom Code is. Further, the terms and concepts like 'factual programme', 'warranted', 'consent' employed by the PEMRA Code are not defined in the Code unlike the Australian and Ofcom codes. It also appears that the PEMRA, unlike Ofcom, has not considered other scenarios involving violation of privacy like: surreptitious recording, filming of people in emergencies (under the subject of privacy), and filming of vulnerable and underage people. PEMRA

⁷⁸ UK Broadcasting Act 1996, Section 107.

⁷⁹ European Convention on Human Rights, 1953, Article 8 (Right to Respect for Private and Family Life), https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf (accessed October 12, 2017).

⁸⁰ Pakistan Constitution, Article 14(1).

⁸¹ Op. Cit., PEMRA Code, Section 3(4) and 4(7)(d).

⁸² Door-stepping, under Section Eight of Ofcom Code, means filming or recording of an interview or an attempted interview, or announcing that a call is being recorded for the purpose of broadcasting without any warning in advance. PEMRA Code explains door-stepping in the same words under Section 11(a).

⁸³ The term 'factual programme' though used by the PEMRA Code, is not defined anywhere in PEMRA legislation. Australian Code, Section 8, defines a Factual Programme as Current Affairs Programme, Infotainment Programme or a Documentary Programme, each specifically defined there-under.

⁸⁴ PEMRA Code, Section 11(1).

⁸⁵ Ibid., Section 11(2).

Code also does not consider any special protections for privacy of children like in Australian Code, contemporaneously issued in 2015, which requires that the television broadcaster must be extra cautious before airing any content related to children's privacy and personal matters.⁸⁶

Reporting on Matters under Investigation or *Sub Judice*

Justification for regulation of reporting on *sub judice* matters has been both a legal and historical experience: the former is based on the principles of accuracy, fairness, impartiality, protection of privacy and ensuring uninfluenced conduct of inquiries, investigations and judicial proceedings. The latter is based on experience learnt from numerous cases mishandled by the media, like Richard Jewell⁸⁷ and Bush vs. Gore⁸⁸ in US and Panama leaks in Pakistan.

PEMRA Code mandates reporting on any ongoing trial or judicial proceedings in an informative and objective manner on the condition that the content is not prejudicial to such proceedings⁸⁹ and any reference to court records is correct or fair.⁹⁰ This is in line with the principle of accuracy and fairness⁹¹ as the purpose is to keep the viewers informed and not to influence the proceedings. The Code also requires the news to be distinguishable from analysis.⁹² Such rules are justifiable by the fact that

⁸⁶ Australian Code, Section 3.5.2.

⁸⁷ Richard Jewell, the security guard who alerted authorities and helped people evacuate the Centennial Olympic Park, USA was initially acclaimed as a hero by the media and later was portrayed as a suspect in the bomb-blast that took two lives. Resultantly, the Federal Bureau of Investigation investigated Jewell also and it was finally declared that he was not involved in the crime. However, the media coverage of Richard Jewell as suspect had already caused considerable pain to him and his family, which resulted in various claims filed by Jewell against the involved media organizations that painted him as possible suspect. Some of the cases were: Jewell v. NYP Holdings, Inc. 23 F. Supp. 2d 348 (SDNY) 1998; Jewell v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 5617 LAP, 1998 WL 702286 (SDNY 1998 October 7, 1998); Jewell v. Cox Enterprises Inc. which was later joined with Atlanta Journal-Constitution v. Jewell, 55 S.E.2d 175 (Ga. CT. App. 2001).

⁸⁸ Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). In USA, for the 2000-election coverage by media was sensational and politicized during the litigation, that analysts see media as deciding the outcome.

⁸⁹ PEMRA Code, Section 4(3).

⁹⁰ Ibid., Section 4(6).

⁹¹ PEMRA Code, Section 4(1).

⁹² Ibid., Section 4(4).

news channels' content is for commercial consumption, while the court proceedings are for dispensation of justice.⁹³

Ofcom Code comparatively employs more detailed approach, specifically on broadcaster's conduct while reporting on trials involving juvenile offenders,⁹⁴ and prohibits offering the case witnesses any amount for getting information.⁹⁵ Unfortunately, the PEMRA Code does not contain detailed provisions on this issue, except for general guidelines. Issues like leaking of any relevant documents which are part of any investigations or judicial proceedings, and which may prematurely affect public opinion need to be regulated through PEMRA Code. It is imperative to specify in the Code that the evidence of the case, unless allowed by the relevant judicial forum must not be aired, especially in cases involving high profile crimes, terrorism and political parties. During the trial, undue projection of any party to the litigation need also be curbed by the Code as it may drive public opinion in favour of or against one of the litigants. More particularly, reporting on investigations led by police or any other law enforcement agencies need regulation too, as it may negatively affect public opinion at the very early stage of a trial. These issues need to be addressed in the Code.

Coverage of Elections

It is admitted that regulating election coverage is a complex phenomenon, where the objective is to balance between different political parties. It is therefore imperative that the television follows a specific code of conduct so that the contesting parties get proper coverage and fair treatment on television.

The PEMRA legislation itself does not provide any guidelines on election coverage like in Ofcom Code. Practically, the issue of election coverage by private TV channels is not covered by the PEMRA Code. It is the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP)⁹⁶ that issues a code of conduct for media regarding general and local elections, including any by-elections. This shows that on elections coverage the regulation is not uniform under one regulator. The general elections in 2018 will be the first national polls

⁹³ Jessica E. Jackson, "Sensationalism in the Newsroom: Its Yellow Beginnings, the Nineteenth Century Legal Transformation, and the Current Seizure of the American Press", *Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (2005): 789. <http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp/vol19/iss2/22> (accessed March4, 2018)

⁹⁴ Ofcom Code, Section 1, Article 1.8.

⁹⁵ Ofcom Code, Section 3, Rule 3.4.

⁹⁶ Election Commission of Pakistan is a constitutional body established under Article 218 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, <https://www.ecp.gov.pk/> (accessed March4, 2018)

after PEMRA Code 2015 came into force. ECP has issued a code of media⁹⁷ (ECP Code) as one of the steps to ensure conduct of fair elections guarding against corrupt practices.⁹⁸

The ECP Code 2018⁹⁹ was for all categories of media providing that the foremost duty of media is to inform the public about electoral process and voting procedure.¹⁰⁰ Secondly, the Code obligates media to ensure impartiality, accuracy and a balanced approach in the elections coverage.¹⁰¹ In relation to news, the electronic media, television and radio will act fairly and without bias instead of favouring any particular party contesting elections.¹⁰² Duty to act fairly is in line with the international guidelines¹⁰³ and best practices. It is also required from the media to not spread any speculations concerning elections¹⁰⁴ or broadcast any hate speech.¹⁰⁵

Thirdly, the ECP Code imposes duty to promote tolerance.¹⁰⁶ At the same time, freedom of expression¹⁰⁷ and access to information before and after elections¹⁰⁸ has been protected under the Code by ensuring that there will be no restrictions on journalists in election coverage. Authorities will neither exercise any prior restraint or censor, nor interfere in broadcast of information concerning election coverage,¹⁰⁹ except when such broadcast is imminently harmful and can cause violence.¹¹⁰

The Code also mandates that all parties should be given appropriate coverage¹¹¹ depending on a party's number of candidates and the seats they contest for.¹¹² Any polls and projections broadcasted by a television channel will be presented in a fair and accurate manner with an

⁹⁷ The Elections Act, 2017, Section 233(2).

⁹⁸ Constitution, Article 218(3).

⁹⁹ Issued by Election Commission of Pakistan Notification No. F. 14(1)/2016-PR.(2) July 2, 2018 <https://www.ecp.gov.pk/PrintDocument.aspx?PressId=55366&type=PDF> (accessed April 10, 2018)

¹⁰⁰ ECP Code of Conduct for Media for the General Elections, 2018, s A(a)(i).

¹⁰¹ Ibid., Section A(b)(ii).

¹⁰² Ibid., Section A(b)(iii).

¹⁰³ UNESCO Guidelines, 43.

¹⁰⁴ ECP Code, Section A(b)(vi)(a).

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., Section A(b)(vi)(b).

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., Section A(c).

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., Section B(a)(i).

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., Section B(a)(ii).

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., Section B(b)(i).

¹¹⁰ Ibid., Section B(b)(ii).

¹¹¹ Ibid., Section A(b)(v).

¹¹² UNESCO Guidelines, 43.

explanation of their contexts and limitations.¹¹³ It is further required that the broadcaster clarifies as to who paid for the polls, the data, timing of polls, possibility of error in the results,¹¹⁴ so that viewers can evaluate their independence.

The ECP Code, like PEMRA Code¹¹⁵ recognizes a person's right to reply to any allegations levelled by a broadcaster and provides that a party or its candidate when subjected to defamatory critique will be entitled to such right or a correction to be aired by the broadcaster.¹¹⁶ Camera-coverage of voting process by designated media staff inside a polling station is permitted¹¹⁷ conditional upon the protection of secrecy of ballot. TV channels will not announce any unofficial results until one hour from the time polling ends, and that too with clear notice of unofficial results.¹¹⁸ Final results will be broadcasted by a TV channel only after the results are officially declared.¹¹⁹

The ECP Code provides a complaint addressing system by establishment of Complaint Committee headed by the Director General of Commission on Public Relations and consisting members from public, private, print and electronic media regulators (including PEMRA) and industry representatives.¹²⁰ Surprisingly, the Code neither specifies any penalties for violators nor any complaint management system explaining the procedure for handling complaints despite being cognizant of the fact that elections are time-sensitive. It is also not clear how the powers of Commission and PEMRA will be exercised on an issue common to their jurisdictions.

ECP Code is limited to general and by-elections of 2018, which means the Commission will issue another or at least re-issue the present Code in the next elections. Secondly, it does not extend to any local government elections. This reflects on how ECP Code stands isolated from media regulation in general and broadcast content regulation in particular. To the extent of electronic media, PEMRA Code needs to include rules on coverage of elections by private TV channels, and such rules can be applicable to any elections at local and national level, so that election coverage regulation is in a uniform form.

¹¹³ ECP Code, Section C(e)(i).

¹¹⁴ Ibid., Section C(e)(ii).

¹¹⁵ PEMRA Code, Section 18 and 22.

¹¹⁶ ECP Code, Section C(f)(i).

¹¹⁷ Ibid., Section C(g)(i).

¹¹⁸ Ibid., Section C(g)(ii).

¹¹⁹ Ibid., Section C(g)(iii).

¹²⁰ Ibid., Section D(b).

Editorial Oversight and Compliance Responsibility

Under the present PEMRA Code, a television licensee is required to ensure editorial oversight over the programme content, like news or documentaries etc., so that they are fully compliant with the Code.¹²¹ To this end, the PEMRA Code further obligates the licensee by requiring appointment of an in-house monitoring committee to watch over compliance with the Code. Appointment of the monitoring committee is required to be intimated to PEMRA.¹²² However, there is no requirement as such in the Code that obligates monthly or quarterly compliance report by such editorial committees. It is also prohibited for the licensee to conduct live coverage of a programme without a working delay mechanism in the interest of editorial supervision. Practically, however, this remains a cosmetic clause in the Code as the complaint statistics show inefficiency of editorial supervision. Unless there is mandatory compliance report from each broadcaster, monthly or quarterly, and strict monitoring by PEMRA, existence of internal editorial supervision will not be that effective, as such editorial committees consist of broadcaster's own employees, who are likely to be under its influence in the absence of strong monitoring by PEMRA.

The Code provides that responsibility to comply with the PEMRA standards is solely on the broadcaster.¹²³ As regards the employees of broadcasters who are involved in development and presentation of television content, the television channel will ensure that they broadcast content in full compliance with the Code.¹²⁴ A record of the programme content will be maintained by the television channel at least for a period of forty five days.¹²⁵ The broadcaster is also responsible for training of employees to assist them in complying with the Code.¹²⁶ However, the regulation does provide for professional qualifications of the employees involved in content production, or at least calls for ensuring if they have the required knowledge of content standards. As per PEMRA Code, it is incumbent on the broadcaster to ensure that the programme content is reviewed by producers,¹²⁷ though an express approval by the editorial committee would be more effective instead of review by the content producers themselves.

¹²¹ PEMRA Code, Section 4(10).

¹²² Ibid., Section 17.

¹²³ Ibid., Section 20(1).

¹²⁴ Ibid., Section 24(2).

¹²⁵ Ibid., Rule 15(4).

¹²⁶ Ibid, Section 20(2).

¹²⁷ Ibid., Section 10.

Analysis of PEMRA Content Standards

Promulgation of PEMRA content standards was not a result of any detailed deliberations. PEMRA Code was hastily issued by the regulator to comply with the orders of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. An analysis of the Code supports this argument. Lack of structural coherence is manifested by the way Code has been drafted. In any best-practices code, general-to-specific approach is followed on important content related issues; principles followed by rules. For example, on accuracy the principle is that viewers should know the accurate information.

Based on these principles, further rules are developed to ensure that the information broadcasted by the TV channel is accurate, like editorial supervision of the news content before broadcast. This approach does not coherently exist in the Code, though in the beginning certain fundamental principles are given. However, the content compliance subjects like due accuracy, due impartiality, right to privacy etc. have not been dealt in detail or in a constructive manner, unlike those in Ofcom and Malaysian codes. The informative content regulation regime under PEMRA is vague and the enforcement mechanism falls short of any specialized media judiciary.

The PEMRA Code seems to have borrowed or used certain expressions from other codes. However, it has not defined these expressions and terms. For example, the Code used the term 'factual programme'¹²⁸ but did not define it like the Australian Code does.¹²⁹ It also defines the term 'propaganda' but other than the definition clause,¹³⁰ it is no-where used in the Code to provide any rules on that. A new kind of programme 'infotainment'¹³¹ is nowhere regulated under the Code, while there are numerous infotainment programmes aired by private channels. Expressions like 'due impartiality' have been used in PEMRA Code without any definition, unlike Ofcom Code, where not only the specific meaning has been attributed to the expression but also principles and detailed rules have been laid down. The Code, unlike Malaysian Code, does not explain violence and what form it may take: physical or psychological.¹³²

PEMRA Code has not touched upon the aspect of TV content shared on internet or social media forums. As the interaction and integration of TV content with social media is growing, the regulatory challenges are increasing. According to latest statistics the number of

¹²⁸ Ibid., Section 11(a).

¹²⁹ Australian Code, Section 8, *Factual Program*.

¹³⁰ PEMRA Code, Section 2(1)(j).

¹³¹ Australian Code, Section 8 defines *infotainment programme* as a programme whose main objective is to present information in an entertaining way.

¹³² Malaysian Code, Part 4.

internet users in Pakistan has crossed 44.5million.¹³³ This makes it incumbent on the regulator to devise rules on how penetration of TV content into internet will be regulated.

In case of violations, there are no defined sanctions in the PEMRA Code except for the provisions in PEMRA Ordinance, which give it wide discretionary powers to choose which sanctions it finds appropriate. It is more realistic and fair for the private television industry that the sanctions against violations are defined by the Code. This will increase private sector confidence as well as compliance.

Pakistan has experienced sectarian violence and lack of tolerance among different sects, where sectarian harmony has to be ensured with a well-articulated code that eradicates the menace of sectarianism and disharmony among different sects and minorities.

It is important that PEMRA, in consultation with the media industry and professionals, consider an overhaul of the Code based on internationally recognised principles of content regulation and the Malaysian and Ofcom experience.

¹³³ Internet Usage in Asia, <https://www.internetworldstats.com/stats3.htm> (accessed on April 20, 2018)

CONTENT ANALYSIS OF HATE-SPEECH DISCOURSE IN RELIGIOUS PUBLICATIONS IN PUNJAB, PAKISTAN

Shaista Malik* & Dr. Shafqat Munir Ahmad**

Abstract

The study aims to explore the dissemination of hate messages and intolerant discourses in religious publications from religious seminaries originating in three key districts of the Punjab province, namely Lahore, Multan and Bahawalpur. After a thorough examination, twelve publications were selected for study and to see if they incite readers on taking extreme positions against those hailing from other sects and religions. Framing theory was employed to study various types of frames embedded in the form of hate content in religious publications. While using this theory, the study found six different frames: inter-religious hatred, sectarian hatred, criticism of mainstream media, gender bias, criticism of educational institutions, and criticism of civil society. This study confirms that there is a pattern in religious publications to have a significant amount of content, reflecting hate and discrimination based on religion and sect. However, not all religious publications incite hatred; a majority are sources of information, propagating their beliefs based on their own sectarian identity and preferences.

Keywords: *Hate Speech, Religious Publications, Punjab, Content Analysis, Media, Gender Bias, Framing Theory.*

Introduction

There is a great deal of debate on whether everyone should have the right to free speech or should there be a limit to freedom of speech? The rights of others need to be protected from harm that false statements or hate speech may cause. Freedom of speech is a crucial human right, which is important for a democratic society. It provides an

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enabling environment for free exchange of ideas and information. The Article 19 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNUDHR) states, “everyone has the right to freedom of opinions and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”¹

Pakistan and a significant number of other countries have recognized freedom of expression in their respective constitutions. Article 1 of the UNUDHR emphasizes that, ‘all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights’.² This implies that freedom of expression of one individual or a group ends at the point where the same freedom of other people starts. Freedom of expression does not allow anyone to defame other people. Similarly, it does not give an absolute right to anyone to discriminate or humiliate fellow human beings coming from other religious groups. Freedom of expression also does not permit forcefully imposing one’s thoughts on others. This freedom is in practice a proposition of tolerance to give everyone the right to express their opinions freely and based on some one’s beliefs or thoughts. One finds that in this world, the level of tolerance to listen to other’s point of view is gradually decreasing and extremist thoughts have replaced reason and the practice of debate.

The above discussion shows that freedom of expression is not absolute, as it can be limited for protection of others’ rights. Freedom of expression is a fundamental human right but there is a need to draw a line between hate speech and free speech. Hate speech can be defined as, “inflammatory language, often insulting and derisive, that targets an individual or group, and that may or may not include a call to violence.”³ Correspondingly, free speech also does not permit anyone to violate the rights of others.

It is well-established that a free and independent media is the lifeline of any society because it informs the society through news segments, talk shows and entertainment sections. Media has the ability to contribute towards peace building through direct or indirect initiatives by providing balanced and accurate information. However, the media is not allowed to promote hate speech because this type of speech serves to propagate an attitude of violence towards the marginalized segments of a

¹ David Van Mill, *Free Speech and the State: An Unprincipled Approach* (Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 11.

² Universal Declaration of Human Rights 2015, http://www.un.org/en/udhrbook/pdf/udhr_booklet_en_web.pdf.

³ United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, “Hate Speech and Group-targeted Violence - The Role of Speech in Violent Conflict,” http://www.genocidewatch.org/images/OutsideResearch_Hate_Speech_and_Group-Targeted_Violence.pdf (accessed May 27, 2017).

society⁴. However, it has also been observed that sometimes media disseminates hate speech under the guise of freedom of expression.

On the side-lines of mainstream media, there is a phenomenon of religiously angled media in Pakistan which also serves to inform its target audience about religious practices, beliefs and rituals. Religious seminaries belonging to various sects publish their magazines and publications endorsing their own sects. Since the independence of Pakistan in 1947, three hundred religious journals have been published to influence the readers' religious beliefs.⁵ Majority of these religious magazines are published from Lahore and Karachi and some of them from South Punjab such as Multan.

Some religious seminaries bring out publications under pseudonyms or anonymously because of the ban on respective extremist organizations in Pakistan. While promoting religious beliefs, such religious publications carry material that hurts the sentiments of other persons or groups based on their religious beliefs. Religious schools (madrassas) publish their own weekly, monthly, or bi-annual religious material/magazines to promote their sectarian beliefs. These religious publications tend to promote sectarianism under the guise of educating the target audience. These publications also provide information on other religions as well, but only their interpretation of that religion. The writers of these publications are mainly religious scholars and staunch believers of their respective Fiqah or sect.

Dr. Tariq Rahman, in one of his articles '*Munazara Literature*' observes that literature circulated by religious seminaries (madaris) of various sects project their '*Maslak*' (religious sect) as *Rud* (refutation) of other *Masalik* (sects). They claim that unless they refute other's beliefs or sect and create a distinction, they cannot preach for their *Masalik*.⁶ Dr. Rahman is of the view that various '*Masalik*' have been taught for hundreds of years without sectarian violence, and that is why violent extremism is not a prerequisite for preaching any *Maslak*.

These religious publications also cover topics related to politics, women, civil society organizations, mainstream media (especially TV) and educational institutions (schools, colleges and universities) and aim to portray each of these such that readers and the society at large views them as having a negative role. These negative constructs create further hatred and the students of these seminaries and other believers end up having

⁴ Katharine Gelber, *The Free Speech Versus Hate Speech Debate* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing, 2002), 1.

⁵ Fouzia Naz, "The role of religious journals before and after inception of Pakistan," *The Government: Research Journal of Political Science Supplementary*, III, (2015): 97-106.

⁶ Tariq Rahman, *Denizens of Alien Worlds: A Study of Education, Inequality and Polarization in Pakistan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 210.

extremist tendencies towards other segments of the society. This could be one of the significant reasons for growing violent extremism in the country. The extremist tendencies have given rise to an intolerant mind-set, which has harmed the country and the nation in terms of material and human losses in acts of terrorism over the years.

One of the most brutal terrorist attacks which the nation witnessed, was the killing of innocent children of the Army Public School, Peshawar in December 2014. Over the past decade, a climate of fear has emerged after the establishment of 'terror networks of militant groups in Pakistan'.⁷ At the same time, South Punjab has also witnessed a growing network for jihadist recruitment. According to a Dawn report, this network has significantly exploited worsening poverty in South Punjab by recruiting children from Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith seminaries where they were "taught 'jihadi philosophy', deployed to regional training/indoctrination centres, and ultimately sent to terrorist training camps in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)."⁸ As compared to other parts of Pakistan, South Punjab has poor human security conditions that force people to opt for extremist activities – this being one reason for having a sample from Punjab province.

As per Islamic injunctions, Muslim religious publications are supposed to take a stance based on the commonly acceptable Islamic vision of universality and humanity without discriminating or ridiculing beliefs of people hailing from other religions and sects. Religious publications do not subscribe to the principles of journalism and ethical standards of mainstream media. The mainstream media tends to give space to a certain biasness in connection to their story or article, whereas religious publications' discourse contains hate content against other sects and religions. The frames used in this study also found that religious publications are critical of formal education and civil society. The articles analyzed from selected religious publications reveal that there is thoughtless promotion of intolerance and extremism in the society which is against the spirit of Pakistan's National Action Plan 2015-a commitment against extremism and terrorism, as well as against 'Paigham-e-Pakistan 2018'-a national narrative for peace.

The study suggests that while publishing funding/charity appeals, religious publications and mainstream media need to focus on 'safe charity', asking their readers/viewers that they must double check to whom they are giving money in the name of charity, in order to discourage charity sums going to extremist groups who are creating a unpleasant image of Muslims. Every citizen needs to realize that the country and the

⁷ Musa Khan Jalazai, *The Prospect of Nuclear Jihad in South Asia: Pakistan's Army, Extra Judicial* (Algora Publisher, 2015), 67.

⁸ "2008: Extremist Recruitment on the Rise in South Punjab Madrassahs," *Dawn*, May 21, 2011, <https://www.dawn.com/news/630656>.

nation is built upon ideals that do not allow violence in the name of religion or sect. Pakistan has already lost thousands of civilians, children and soldiers. The editors and publishers need to promote this message to build a narrative of peace and peaceful co-existence.

Methodology

The study employs purposive sampling method to analyze religious publications from Punjab, Pakistan. Given the large number of the publications, it is virtually impossible to examine and analyse all the religious publications such as magazines with weekly, monthly or bi-monthly editions and volumes. To access the relevant material, a mapping exercise of existing magazines and publications originating from Lahore, Multan and Bahawalpur was done, since the majority of religious publications disseminated across South Punjab are published from these cities. In this mapping exercise, various sources (e.g. editors of newspapers) were used to access religious publications that cover topics related to all schools of thoughts of dominant Muslim sects and other religious communities.

Moreover, residents of Multan and Bahawalpur were approached to access the required material. In this mapping exercise, three issues each of forty-one religious publications/magazines (monthly or quarterly) - 123 in total - were collected. A total of 429 articles, published in 123 issues of religious magazines on various topics, were scanned and reviewed in the mapping exercise that focused on the following points:

- Identify the content that contains hateful or discriminatory material.
- The contents in the selected publications may reflect all key religious schools of thought/sects of Pakistan.

In doing so, a total of 12 religious magazines (both monthly and quarterly based on their circulation period) were selected on the basis of the above criteria.

Limitations

The contribution of the present study is limited by certain factors. A significant limitation of the study was access to religious publications, as these were not easily available in the market. Content analysis has been used in this study; it is a descriptive method that describes what frames are available in the published material and is a powerful tool for analyzing patterns in the material. However, this type of research method cannot reveal in detail underlying motives of the authors.

Analysis Technique(s)

This study conducted content analysis of the existing religious magazines and publications, either published from or circulated in Lahore, Multan and Bahawalpur. The analysis is quantitative and qualitative and examines potential dissemination of hate messages and intolerance discourses. The main focus of this study is to conduct a qualitative analysis. Qualitative content analysis technique is useful “for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns.”⁹

Content analysis was helpful in answering the main research question: “Who says what, to whom, why, and how?”¹⁰ For this purpose, qualitative content analysis via inductive category development has been applied, whereas the coding categories have been derived directly from the data comprising published material.

In addition to qualitative content analysis, descriptive analysis is employed to summarize the data in numerical form. Use of this method of analysis is useful to describe and explain the data by division in various categories.

Key Research Questions

- Do religious publications employ hate speech?
- What are different themes/frames/dimensions of hate content in the published material?
- Does the published material use conflict-oriented or favorable comments for various sects and religious communities in Pakistan?

To address the above questions, a three-step procedure was followed. First, the religious magazines were thoroughly examined to select the content that falls under the ambit of hate speech. In this process of review, the researcher found that only twelve publications¹¹ were relevant to the study as they were representative of major Muslim sects and various religious beliefs and they had relevant material to examine. With this view, twelve magazines were selected out of dozens for the review process. After this selection process, the material was reviewed and coded in the pre-designed coding sheet. In the next stage, the extraneous data was discarded and a small coding list was created. The coding form was built in a way to find out a pattern in the religious texts.

⁹ Natalie Sappleton, *Advancing Research Methods with New Technologies* (Manchester: Metropolitan University-Idea Group Inc., 2013), 232.

¹⁰ Babbie, *Social Research Counts* (Belmont: Wadsworth, 2012), 168.

¹¹ *Ahl-e- Hadees, Nida -e- Khilafat , Al-Aitisam, Mahasin-e-Islam, Tanzeel , Naqeeb, The War Cry, Khawajagan, Al-Muntazir, Al-Makhzan, Al-Khair, and Mashreb-e-naab* are the selected publications for this study.

The last step was to merge small categories into each other to create broader categories.

Theoretical Framework

Framing theory has been used as a theoretical framework in the current study. Different researchers and scholars agree that the framing theory aptly explains how mass media highlights any issue by being selective about the content, i.e. what to include or not in the story. The media also plays a role in framing a story in particular¹² by the way it limits or defines the meaning of any event, which consequently also shapes people's interpretation of that event.¹³ Chong and Druckman refer to framing as a "process by which the people develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about an issue."¹⁴ In other words, use of framing theory is significant to "select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation."¹⁵

While using framing theory, a deductive approach is used to study various types of hate content frames in religious publications. As a result, following six frames related to hate speech were generated which were found permeating the stated media/publications discourse:

- **Inter religious Hate Speech Frame:** There is no uniform definition of inter-religious hate speech. However, this study conceptualizes inter-religious hate speech as any form of communication that is intended to promote hate or violence between Muslims and other religious communities in Pakistan. This frame includes any medium of communication/speech/text through which a writer/author of religious publications expresses his/her personal bias against people of other religions or sects. The writer may be explicit or implicit in expressing his/her prejudiced views against other religious groups in the write-ups.
- **Sectarian Hate Speech Frame:** This frame deals with such discourses that deem to attack any other sect within Muslims, on

¹² Zhongdang Pan and Gerald M. Kosicki, "Framing Analysis: An Approach to News Discourse, Political Communication," *Journal of Political Communication*, 10:1 (1993) 55-75. DOI: 10.1080/10584609.1993.9962963.

¹³ Kark Hallahan, "Seven Model osf Frame: Implications for Public Relations," *Journal of Public Relations Research*, 11 (1999) 205-242.

¹⁴ Beatrice De Graaf, Goerge Dimitriu, and Jens Ringsmose, *Strategic Narratives, Public Opinion and War: Winning Domestic Support for the Afghan War* (New York: Routledge, 2015), 84.

¹⁵ Karen S. Johnson-Cartee, *News Narratives and News Framing: Constructing Political Reality* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 162.

the basis of its attributes. While doing so, the study will report any prejudiced views based on sectarian differences.

- **Opposing Mainstream Media Frame:** This frame focuses on the content that pertains to extreme views about mainstream media. In this frame, the study looks at such material wherein the authors intended to highlight the role of mainstream media in a negative tone, such as mainstream media is spreading vulgarity among youth and promoting alien cultures and traditions.
- **Gender Bias Speech Frame:** This frame highlights such discourses which intend to discriminate against females as compared to males while describing their social roles.
- **Opposing Educational Institutions Frame:** This frame covers all such aspects of the education system that have been painted as negative and full of controversy by the religious publications e.g. co-education promotes feelings of romanticism, immoral relationships etc., and such other negative perceptions.
- **Opposing Civil Society Frame:** Any text in the religious publications that is biased towards activities of civil society is included in this frame.

In addition to the explicit expression of hatred for some groups, this content analysis study also investigates the underlying meanings and motivations of hatred embedded in the alternative media discourses.

Quantitative Data Analysis

The analysis of quantitative data is presented as answers to the questions posed. First question posed is: ***Do religious publications (various Muslim Sects, Christian and Hindu) employ hate speech?***


The content analysis found that the majority of the Christian community publications such as '*Naqeeb*' and '*The War Cry*' do not employ any hate speech in their published material against any other religion. These two Christian publications contain material regarding their community's activities, seminars, religious ceremonies, training workshops, social work and community self-help programmes. The analysis shows that in some of the articles in these Christian publications, lessons regarding interfaith harmony have been incorporated. The Catholic magazine '*Naqeeb*', published fortnightly from Lahore, dwells on the Christian messages of peace and harmony. In an article, the magazine on the eve of '*Deewali*' called upon building close relations between families of Hindus and Christians.¹⁶ '*The War Cry*', an organ of the Christian

¹⁶ Bishop Sebastian Francis Shaw (Arch Bishop of Lahore), "Translation of Diwali Message by Papal Council," *Catholic Naqeeb*, November 2016, 3.

Salvation Army, promotes service to humanity on voluntary basis. There are only traces of Hindus in the areas focused on by this research, so no publication from Hindus was found in the project areas.

The content analysis revealed that the religious publications belonging to various sects of the Muslims focused on circulation of information related to their activities, and opinion pieces on their preaching wherein they invariably discriminated or rejected the point of view of their rival sects.

Graph 1: The Nature of Content from Selected Material: Informative or Opinionated




Source: Compiled by the authors.

Findings in Graph 1 show that all Muslim religious publications/magazines have opinion pieces of the writers that contain some hate or discriminatory material against their rival sects, while two Christian publications 'Naqeeb' and 'The War Cry' only published information and updates for Christian community as described above.

Graph 2 shows the nature of the information circulated through the selected samples of religious material.

Graph 2

Analysis of Publications as per Six Main Frames



Source: Compiled by authors.

The data shows that the religious magazines covered a wide range of topics, including propagation of their respective belief systems, material on sectarian and inter-religious hate speech, self-promotion of their own activities etc. The subjects covered in the self-promotion category include demands for charity, invitation to join their processions or opening ceremonies of Islamic centres, and/or advertisement of video '*Khuda Gawa Haa*' (God is a witness) prepared by *Tanzeem e Islami*. It is found that a weekly religious magazine *Ahl-e- Hadees* has a significant number of articles (9) containing self-promotion of their own activities followed by a monthly magazine '*Nida -e- Khilafat*' (7).

A comparison between the selected religious magazines indicates that the monthly '*Al-Aitizam*' published a large number of articles (9) for propagation of Islamic practices as per their respective belief system whereas '*Mahasin-e-Islam*' magazine has six articles on the same subject in its three issues. The analysis shows that '*Ahle Hadees*' and '*Al-Aitizam*' have a tendency of publishing material denoting loyalty towards their own belief system but unwillingness to accept others' thoughts. This tendency of publishing such material reflects sectarianism from the members of a particular religious sect/group inciting hatred against their rival sects.

The analysis also unearthed a frame of inter-religious hate speech, wherein writers implied hatred and hostility towards other religions. The data shows that the monthly magazine '*Tanzeel*' published inter-religious hate content in six articles whereas '*Al-Aitizam*' and '*Al-Muntazir*' had three articles in each issue containing hate speech. Three articles in '*Nida-e-Khilafat*' magazine explicitly criticized mainstream media. The frames on 'Opposing educational system' and 'gender bias' had also been used by the authors of these religious publications. The magazine '*Tanzeel*' published content on some gender biased issues and '*Nida-e-Khilafat*' had two articles wherein the writers opposed the education system in Pakistan.

The second question is: ***Does the published material make conflict-oriented or favourable comments regarding various sects and religious communities of Pakistan?***

While analyzing the religious publications, the published material was found to employ conflict-oriented framing while representing other religious communities or various sects. For instance, writers exhibited strong bias against Hindus; an author of the monthly '*Tanzeel*' hypothesized that, had Pakistan not been an independent country, there would be conflicting discourses and if he were to continue praying at mosque, the Hindu extremists would lock or destroy the mosque [as they had done in the case of *Babri* mosque (a mosque in India)].¹⁷ This particular piece presents grounds for dispute between two divergent religious groups. By doing so, these narratives construct an imaginary conflicting situation between Hindus and Muslims, wherein people may take some particular violent actions.¹⁸

Qualitative Data Analysis

The following research question are answered by the qualitative part of this analysis

The first one is: ***What are different frames of hate content in the published material?***

The analysis found six main frames, which will be treated as theme of content, embedded in the published material. Following are some samples from selective religious magazines/publications decided in themes:

Inter-religious Hate Speech

Inter-religious hate speech is a framing theme that has been identified from the content analysis. As noted above, inter-religious hate speech refers to any communication that reflects hurtful remarks towards any religious community. Analysis of discourses appearing in religious magazines indicated that inter-religious hate speech is commonly employed. The analysis shows that this material is intended to promote hatred among religious groups. Some writers not only express hate speech explicitly in their writings but they also use implicit hate speech. For example, a writer of *Al-Aitisaam*, a pro- *Ahl-e-Hadees* weekly magazine, utilizes an implied critical commentary on Christians and their holy

¹⁷ Maulana Qari Abdul Hafeez (Ed), "If Pakistan had not been an independent country then what was my future," *Tanzeel*, November 2016, 49.

¹⁸ Ibid.

scriptures.¹⁹ Additionally, the writer also expresses his explicit bias against non-Muslims as he believes that the people whose own Holy books accuse them of heinous sins cannot preach about how to give respect and love to our prophets. He further criticizes Christians by pointing out 104 versions of the Bible which are in circulation worldwide (as of 2015) whereas God had revealed only one Bible to prophet Jesus. The writer also claims that Jews are conspirators and saboteurs as well as cowards, which he demonstrates by pointing out the excessive number of surveillance cameras present outside the London Synagogue as compared to other buildings.²⁰

The analysis shows that the framing in the articles published in religious magazines construct a hostile image of other religions. The frame maintains a conflict between Islam and other religions. In doing so, this frame projects the 'Islamic society' vs. 'Western society'. For instance, a writer in a religious publication titled '*Mashir-e-Naab*' (June 2012) explicitly proclaims Jews as enemies of Muslims and Islam. The author warns Muslims against adopting the Jewish lifestyle, mind-set or act according to their school of thought or they would end up exiting the ambit of Islamic faith. He further elaborates his point that our outward appearance along with our customs, traditions, and even our food should be distinct from them lest we become like them. A contributor for the publication titled '*Ahl-e-Hadees*' expressed similar views that a Muslim should not imitate the hairstyle of *Kuffar* (non-Muslims).²¹

In this inter-religious framing, the analysis indicates that the contributors of these religious magazines construct an implied dichotomy of 'us' vs. 'them' by promoting a clash between Islam and other religions. In this sense, these findings confirm Tajfel's study (1979) proposing that people evaluate others by putting them into categories and tend to exaggerate about out-group differences and are less attentive to similarities.²² These notions of religious categorization may promote prejudiced attitudes towards other religions. The writers perceive Islam as superior to the other religions so they tend to highlight differences between religions.

The tone of the articles published in these religious publications is critical towards other religious communities. For instance, a writer of '*Al-Aitisam*', belonging to the *Ahl-e Hadees* sect, condemned the statement of a minister in the Punjab government that said that calling non-Muslim

¹⁹ Hafiz Muhammad Zubair, "Hajeet-e-Hadees Aur Inkaar-E-Hadees," *Al-Aitisam*, December 2016, 7.

²⁰ Mian Anwaarullah, "Qurani Peshgoiyaan," *Al-Aitisam*, December 2016, 31.

²¹ Ghulam Mustafa Zaheer, "Masla Sar ke Baloon ka," *Ahle Hadees*, November 2016, 12.

²² James. E. Waller, *Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 175.

Pakistanis a 'minority' discriminates against them as citizens of the country.²³ The writer keeps on saying that while making this statement, the minister only cared for the sentiments of the non-Muslims at the cost of the sentiments of the Muslims. He writes that Islam has provided the word 'Zimmi' for non-Muslims living in a Muslim society. So, instead of bridging differences between Muslims and non-Muslim under the secular and democratic agenda, the government should call non-Muslims as 'Zimmis'.

In the Islamic society, some people consider celebrating birthday parties as an un-Islamic practice. Some believe that this trend is derived from Western traditions. One of the articles from the selected religious magazine '*Tanzeel*' confirms this notion by writing that celebrating birthdays is not allowed in Islamic Shariah.²⁴ In that article the writer cites a number of religious scholars/followers of his own sect to make the article more 'authentic' according to his perspective and belief system.

While quoting a book '*al-Fatawa*', the writer recommends not attending birthdays because these are un-Islamic practices. However, the writer also proposes a number of rules in case it is inevitable to attend such celebrations. One of the rules he suggested is that people should refuse to eat cake at birthdays if they have to attend. A writer of *Nida-e-Khilafat* also gave a similar opinion about birthdays as she thinks that these customs are borrowed from the West.

Sectarian Hate Speech

The religious discourse contains a frame of inter-sectarian hate speech/content. Sectarian hate content refers to any expression of hate towards another sect. The analysis indicates that the writers of religious material in these magazines tend to show enmity to each other. One of the writers of the magazine '*Al Aitisam*' reported a conference held in the Chechen Republic supposed to counter extremism but which ended up being a platform for the participants to declare themselves '*Ahl-e-Sunnah*' and extradited and exiled others from the Sunni faith.²⁵ The writer elaborates that a person holding highly prejudiced views towards Arabs was made to chair the conference and he expressed his bias against the Wahabi sect. The chair was quoted in a video as saying, "if I see any Wahabi in my country, I will kill him."²⁶ The extremist inclinations of the Chair contributed to extreme outcomes.

²³ Hammad ul haq Naeem, "Bou Al Ajbi," *Al-Aitisam*, January 2017, 4.

²⁴ Maulana Qari Abdul Hafeez, "Aurat mein dou fitnay aur Aulad mein aik fitna hae," *Tanzeel*, November 2016, 60.

²⁵ Abu Muhammad Mohib ur Rehman, "Ahl al Nisa wal Jamaát kon?" ki haqeeqat," *Al-Aitisam*, October 2016, 19-20.

²⁶ Ibid.

A monthly magazine, '*Al Muntazir*', also provides an example of a sectarian frame. In an opinion piece, a writer criticizes a leader of the Deobandi sect for wearing a '*Burqa*' (veil) while attempting to escape the government crackdown at Lal Mosque in the heart of Islamabad on charges of 'sedition'.²⁷ He implicitly directs most of his criticism towards the Deobandi sect by stating that even though their mosques are dens of ammunition and explosives, the 'Deobandis' believe that they are superior while they attack mosques of other sects, describing them as inferior and worthy of contempt.

Gender Biased Speech

Gender bias framing is also prevalent in religious magazines. A magazine called '*Tanzeel*' is one of the religious publications, which promotes gender discrimination in its contents. One writer quotes from an Islamic text as, "I (P.B.U.H) have not left behind me any *fitnah* [temptation/problematic element] other than *women*." The writer believes that women represent two types of 'fitna': one is social and the other financial. He argues that women generate social 'fitna' as they tend to break ties with relatives. He gives examples of wives wishing to live in a separate house, so they provoke a man against his parents and family. The writer projects women as a money related 'fitna' as husbands have to do everything for fulfilling the desires of their wives whether they are just or unjust. Though the writer declares women as 'fitna', he quotes only examples of wives as women and does not talk about mothers, sisters, daughters as women. Unfortunately, he builds the narrative quoting religion out of context, to express his own bias against women.²⁸

Similarly, another contributor in an article published in '*Mahasin-e-Islam*' criticizes those women who put on makeup when going outside as he thinks that Islam does not allow such practices so, in his opinion such women should be berated.²⁹ He suggests if they do not apply makeup, thousands of families could be saved from destruction, which is a vast generalisation. Here the writer also expresses his bias against women while disregarding the need for a balanced thought process, not mentioning religious commandments for men e.g., men should not consider women as an object as Islamic teachings also urge men to keep their gaze averted to protect their own intentions when outside. This is a distorted perspective discriminating women based on their gender.

'*Al-Aitisaam*', a weekly magazine also adopted a gender biased framing under which one of its writers criticizes the women protection bill

²⁷ Malik Muhammad Baqir, "Editorial," *Al-Muntazir*, September 2016, 4.

²⁸ Abdul Hafeez, "Aurat mein dou fitnay aur Aulad mein aik fitna hae" *Tanzeel*, November 2016, 60.

²⁹ Muhammad Ishaq, "Janati Aurtain Khawand ka dil muthi mein rakhein gi," *Mahasin-e-Islam*, July 2016.

introduced in Pakistan to give protection to women.³⁰ He proclaims that there is a group of Pakistani females whose sole purpose is to unveil the Muslim woman and shroud her in garb of shamelessness, and to get her to stand shoulder to shoulder with men, which he fears would lead to abandonment of all Islamic values.

A contributor to '*Nida-e-Khilafat*' also uses a similar lens to examine the role of woman in a society.³¹ He believes that men and women should set their boundaries for if they cross their boundaries, then that is a sign of decline in any society. He proposes that the role of a female is that of a creator and sustainer of her child. He criticizes the role of professional women who choose to go outside and compete with men in public and professional life, without any valid logical argument.

Opposing Educational Institutions

The religious magazines are supposed to educate people but the analysis has found that they end up opposing educational institutions, be they schools, colleges or universities. In '*Mahasin-e-Islam*,' the writer blames universities and colleges for teaching students boldness to defy values, and claims that their graduates challenge Shariah Laws in front of religious scholars even though they do not have in-depth knowledge about Shariah Law.³²

Likewise, a writer in '*Nida-e-Khilafat*' opposes co-education system because she thinks it generates romanticism among young students. She further proclaims that people send their children to evening academies for seeking a sound education whereas the co-education destroys their ethical and social values.³³

To conclude this section, it is noted that the selected religious magazines and publications consider only the education given at the seminaries as pure - which prepares students for the life hereafter. They consider that the '*dunyawi* taleem' (worldly education) is useless and only produces those following western lifestyle and work ethic. The publications, while condemning the modern scientific education, do injustice by not recognizing the inventions of great Muslim scholars, scientists, medical specialists, chemists, biologists and mathematicians.

³⁰ Hammad ul haq Naeem, "Bou Al Ajbi," *Al-Aitisam*, December 2016 – January 2017.

³¹ Zameer Akhter Khan, "Khuwateen ka दौरہ-کار انسان سازی یا کہ ہوا بازی?" *Nida-e-Khilafat*, September–October 2016, 14.

³² Khalid Iqbal Taib, "USB," *Mahasin-e-Islam*, July 2016, 12.

³³ Amira Ahsan, "Taer-e-Din kar gya parwaz," *Nida-e-Khilafat*, November 2016, 12.

Opposing Civil Society

Jean-Louis et.al write that civil society is generally considered the third pillar of any society³⁴ followed by the state and the public sector. The civil society advocates people's rights relating to politics, economics, gender, health and the environment. However, the analysis found that religious publications present some biased ideas against the civil society. An author of '*Mashrab Nab*' opposes the prevailing system of philanthropy and charitable work carried out by the civil society.³⁵ He emphasizes that NGOs take up insignificant causes and propagate them to make a mountain out of a molehill. He further elaborates that distributing small quantities of rations, grains, or sweets is not something worthy of a media circus. The writer intends to make the Islamic concept of Jihad as a key pillar of Islam as opines that the actual meaning of philanthropy in Islam is to sacrifice your life for your faith. By expressing these views, he hints towards extremism in his interpretation of Islam. The analysis suggests that his views are more action-oriented as he seems to provoke/incite Muslims to take some extremist steps in the name of Islam instead of performing charitable deeds, which he considers insignificant sentiments.

On the topic of civil society, two authors from '*Al Makhzan*'³⁶ and '*Al-Aitisam*'³⁷ denounce the role of civil society NGOs in campaigning for social liberties, especially women rights similar to those prevailing in Western society. They posit that though civil society champions social freedom and equality, there is a clear distinction between Western and Eastern societies because of their values and customs. The writers argue that the NGOs' campaign for equal rights for men and women in all aspects ultimately promote extra-marital relations and licentiousness in society.

Opposing Mainstream Media/FM Channels

Criticism of mainstream media is also an embedded theme in selected religious publications. For instance, in one article from *Mahasin-e-Islam*, the writer declares FM radio channels as a source of evil.³⁸ He proclaims that FM Radio is an epidemic infiltrating all segments of modern life due to availability of FM receiver in every mobile device. The writer indicates that wide usage of mobile devices has become a curse, twisting

³⁴ Jean-Louis Laville, Dennis R. Young and Philippe Eynaud, *Civil Society, the Third Sector and Social Enterprise: Governance and Democracy*, (City : Routledge, 2015).

³⁵ Syed Jawad Naqvi, "Ummat Sazi," *Mashrib-e-Naab*, November 2012, 13.

³⁶ Mian Saeed, "Aurat and Azadi," *Al-Makhzan*, November 2016, 24.

³⁷ Muhammad Bashir, "Taraki me civil society ka kirdar," *Al-Aitisam*, May 2016, 16.

³⁸ Muhammad Ishaq, "Hum Kidhar Ja Rahay hain," *Mahasin-e-Islam*, September 2012, 38.

the minds of youth and filling their heads with misguided notions of liberalism - commonly considered the roots of all evils in Pakistani society.

The writer believes that people who have access to the mainstream media lack proper knowledge about Islamic teachings. He declares it the responsibility of every practicing Muslim to protect their homes and families from its influence by educating themselves about the adverse effects of mainstream media.

In another article written in '*Mashrib Naab*,' the author has critically examined the role of media.³⁹ He believes that the people who preach on media and proclaim Islam as a religion of peace have surely not studied or understood the teachings of Islam. He claims that Islam is a religion of hatred as much as it is a religion of peace. He also stresses that adherents of Islam are obligated to express hatred towards enemies of Islam and Allah; and if people do not show such hate, they do not show their love for God.

While criticizing the mainstream media, another writer of '*Mashrib Naab*' says that mainstream media analysts, instead of coming up with a concrete analysis, choose and pick conflicting ideas that create confusion while presenting their thoughts over the radio and television⁴⁰. Analysis reveals that the writer considers media analysts as hollow intellectuals having no vision and perspective, and] ignorant of prominent religious publications and intellectuals. Again, this is an example of the underlying theme of 'opposing mainstream media' while claiming to be an authority on Islamic knowledge and wisdom.

Discussion

While using framing analysis, this study examined six different frames of hate content depicted in media discourses published by religious seminaries. These frames analyzed the ideas expressed by various authors of the religious publications within the frames of inter-religious hate, sectarian hate and violence, opposing mainstream media, gender bias, opposing educational institutions as well as civil society.

A change has been observed in contents of these publications in the wake of military action against anti-state extremists and after Punjab government's crackdown on such disruptive elements. In general, some of the religious publications have toned down their expression of hate by using moderate discourses and publishing more on Islamic practices. Therefore, the previously prevalent hate against Shias is not that visible in the selected publications. However, the content still expresses author's biases against rival religious communities and sects. Although in the

³⁹ Syed Jawad Naqvi, "Watan ki fiqr karr nadaan," *Mashrib-e-Naab*, November 2012, 66.

⁴⁰ Syed Jawad Naqvi, "Ummat Sazi," *Mashrib-e-Naab*, November 2012, 13,

mapping exercise, dozens of publications originating from the Shia sect were found, but no significant hate content was found against any other religions or sects during the review. However, one of the selected and noted religious publications, '*Mashrib Naab*', from the Shia sect did oppose civil society/NGOs and mainstream media, but they did not explicitly criticize other sects.

All Muslim religious publications targeted media, civil society and the contemporary education system, scientific knowledge, and women's public and professional role in life. The content in religious publications rigorously criticizes the mainstream educational institutions and private academies for having co-education system - considered the mother of all social ills. They have criticized contemporary education system for imparting a sub-standard education and promoting boldness and openness among youth, making them fashionable and open in relationships. The impact of NGOs/civil society is vital in contributing to the development and promotion of human rights, but the religious publications still construct a controversial image of these. In this way, the discourses from religious publications undermine the role of civil society, which may raise several questions in the minds of ordinary people. There is a need to bridge the gap between religious publications and mainstream media so that the nation gets authentic information and intolerant attitudes are eliminated from the discourse as desired by the National Action Plan, 2015. These religious publications construct untrue images of professional women. This is done to indirectly glorify the role of man as a key pillar of society.

The Christian publications mapped out for this review largely focused only on providing information and updates for their community. They also promoted public service activities of various organizations for the benefit of the community. No hate material against any other religion was found. The Muslim writers used hate, both explicitly and implicitly to persuade/incite people to act against other belief systems or their followers, such as Christians, Jews, Hindus, Deobandis, Salafis, Sunnis and Wahabis.

With regard to negative constructs about various religious groups, hate and discrimination can generate 'us' versus 'them' categorization. The analysis predicts that hateful speech can escalate during poor economic conditions and political strife in the country. Instead of creating propaganda, the editors and publishers of these religious publications need to help the nation by contributing articles on Pakistani citizenship, humanity and universality, in line with the spirit of '*Misaq-e-Madina*' wherein all citizens of the city state of Madina were given the right to live in a peaceful and dignified manner without discrimination and hate.

Policy Recommendations

In the light of the above findings, a few policy recommendations are given. Since Muslim religious publications are supposed to interpret development from a common Islamic viewpoint for the wider humanity, they need to do it using Islamic vision of universality and humanity established in Shariah Law, i.e. without discriminating or ridiculing against people hailing from other religions and sects.

The government of Punjab has banned some of the publications misusing Islam to project their extremist agenda. However, an organized system is needed to monitor that the content published in religious publications is in line with press, publication and defamation laws, just as the mainstream media does to check the dissemination of discriminatory or hate content from its platforms.

It is also significant to bridge the gap between religious publications and mainstream media so that the nation gets true information to establish a tolerant discourse as desired by the National Action Plan, 2015; a code of conduct needs to be developed in this regard, so to curb the publication and broadcast of hate content against other religions or sects.

The Government of Pakistan may introduce courses for religious and mainstream media outlets, especially in Urdu, focused on 'Media for Peace and Development'. This will help training the media outlets on how to promote development, peace, and inter-faith harmony in the best interests of Pakistan by minimizing hate and discrimination. These courses may build their skills in critical thinking, objective reporting, and reducing biases in writing.

DETERMINING THE IMPACT OF EMPLOYEE MINDFULNESS ON JOB PERFORMANCE

Yasmine Muhammad Javaid Iqbal* &
Dr. Muhammadi Sabra Nadeem**

Abstract

Mindfulness is an active state of mind with cognitive presence in the present rather than being distracted by the past or future. This study aims to investigate the relationship (if any) between employee mindfulness and job performance in the Pakistani academia. The relationship's theoretical base is constructed with Objective Self - awareness (1972), Broaden and Build theory (2008) and Barnard and Teasdale model (1993). Research design is quantitative and cross sectional. Valid scales of five facet mindfulness and HEC evaluation performa have been used to measure employee mindfulness and employee performance respectively. Reliability, correlation and regression analysis have been conducted in SPSS. Findings illustrate that respondents with good performance evaluations also ranked high on the mindfulness scale. The results confirm that employee mindfulness is directly associated with high performance. The study puts forth an action plan to facilitate educators with mindfulness based exercises to sharpen their cognitive ability and improve job performance.

Keywords: Employee Mindfulness, Job Performance, Interacting Cognitive Subsystem

Introduction

A moment to moment presence in the present, awareness of one's thoughts as well as sensibility of the surrounding environment is described as mindfulness.¹ Mindfulness implies attention towards

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¹ John Kabat Zinn, "What is Mindfulness," *Journal of University of California, Berkley*, 67, no. 2 (2017)

the present environment in comparison to imagining the future or indulging in the past.² The role of mindfulness has been researched by the past researchers to gauge its impact on the individual's performance however, most of these researches focused on healthcare sector and related clinical/ psychological aspects. Due to the increasing realization of how stress, in a dynamic working environment, plays a role in distracting employees' attention and hampering performance, this concept of mindfulness crosses over from psychology into management sciences. Mindfulness based researches are the most relevant in organizational sciences right now. Evidence from recent researches confirms the significance of mindfulness for efficient human workplace behaviors in corporate sectors.³ The discipline of medicine provides enriched analysis on mindfulness and its intervening role in human psychology and functioning⁴. Such interventions are applied by the corporate sectors to measure any variations in the job performances. Positive association between employee mindfulness and performance has been observed as now a days, corporations pay attention and create conducive environment facilitating mindfulness at work.⁵ The penetration of mindfulness practices is not the same across all sectors and research has been conducted on the organisations that pursue mindfulness. This phenomenon needs to be translated and explored for all institutions, and mindfulness should be a streamlined strategy for better performance, especially at educational institutions.⁶ The instances of job performance being related to mindful practices in Pakistan especially in educational institutes are few. The gap exists and needs to be filled by research, to evaluate the relation of mindfulness with job performance for academicians. This study aims to do so for academicians specifically from public sector universities of Pakistan. Evaluating mindfulness in academicians does not only have limited benefits for academic sector, but such investigation leads to transfer of knowledge, having a potential spillover impact on the students as well.

² Ibid.

³ Darren J. Good and Christopher J. Lyddet et al. (eds.), "Contemplating Mindfulness at Work: An Integrative Review," *Journal of Management* 42, no. 1 (January 2016): 114–142.

⁴ Theresa M. Glomb, Michelle K. Duffy, Joyce E. Bono, and Tao, "Mindfulness at Work," *Personnel and Human Resources Management* 30, no. 1 (2011): 115–157.

⁵ Bradley J. Brummel, and Erik Dane, "Examining Workplace Mindfulness and its Relations to Job Performance And Turnover Intention," *Sage Publishing* 67, no 1 (2014).

⁶ Ruodan Shao and Daniel P. Skarlicki, "The Role Of Mindfulness In Predicting Individual Performance," *Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science* 41, no. 4 (2009): 195–201.

Academicians of a renowned public educational institution of Pakistan have been taken as sample for the study. The responses have been collected from newly hired faculty members as they are less familiar with the organizational policies, systems of evaluation and categories of student intellect. Also the university evaluates faculty members for the first time on the basis of their performance without any past history of evaluation. This averted any chances of bias throughout the research process and data analysis. The data collected has been analyzed using SPSS 23. Reliability of the responses was verified using Chronbach alpha. To find out correlation among the variables of the study, Pearson correlation was used. To find out the degree of variation in the dependant variable due to the independent variables, regression analysis was conducted. The regression analysis was used to find out whether job performance results are the effect of degree of variation in cognitive mindfulness or not.

Concept of Mindfulness

The psychological state of mind where one brings one's attention towards the events and occurring(s) in the present moment is known as mindfulness. The individuals engage their senses in the present rather than be distracted by the failures of the past or the approaching impediments of the unforeseen future.⁷ Objective self – awareness theory explains how to focus attention on the present by managing one's conscious.⁸ Duval & Wicklund (1972) explained objective self – awareness as a reflexive quality of one's consciousness.⁹ The theory illustrates that just as the environment is a stimulus, so is self-consciousness. A person is an object rather than a subject. When an individual is an object of its own consciousness then the direction is set from inside of its conscious rather than the environment.¹⁰ The concept of consciousness and self- awareness has been further explored in Broaden and Build theory by Freidrickson (2008).¹¹ The theory illustrates that positive emotions enhance the circle

⁷ David Creswell, "Mindfulness Interventions," *Annual Review of Psychology*, (2017): 68.

⁸ Duval and Shelley (eds.), *A Theory of Objective Self Awareness*, (New York: Academic Press, 1972).

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Paul J. Silvia and T. Shelley Duval, "Objective Self-Awareness Theory: Recent Progress And Enduring Problems," *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 5, no. 3 (2001): 230-241.

¹¹ Fredrickson and L. Barbara, "The Broaden-And-Build Theory of Positive Emotions," *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences* 359, no. 1449 (2004): 1367.

of consciousness and encourage positive actions and vice versa.¹² A disturbance in the mindfulness of a person causes a disturbance in the performance of the employee simultaneously. In light of objective self – awareness as well as Broaden and Build theories, individuals can stay focused and avert any distraction with their self – awareness and consciousness. Maintaining this moment-to-moment presence in the present is mindfulness.

Cognitive mindfulness originated in the field of education and now established businesses are practicing mindfulness interventions and exercises in their operational activities to foster profitable results, in terms of human capital and financial balance sheets. Companies like Proctor and Gamble, Apple, General Electrics and even US army is regulating cognitive mindfulness interventions at workplace.¹³ Mindfulness is inherited by default however, few studies have highlighted that it can also be adapted through rigorous sensitized trainings.¹⁴ Researchers have proven that ambiguation and stress contribute towards a distracted mental state having an impact on activities performed. Mindfulness based interventions are helpful in reducing the repercussions of stress, anxiety and establishing mindfulness.¹⁵

Mindfulness and its Evidence from Psychology

Philip Barnard and John Teasdale introduced the concept of Cognitive Mindfulness, the interactive cognitive subsystem of mind which has multiple modes. This system receives, processes and interprets new information both cognitively and emotionally. In conditions of anxiety and stress the individuals rely solely on one mode of mind while blocking the other modes which affects the tasks at hand, eventually hampering performance.¹⁶


¹² Compton and C. William, *An Introduction to Positive Psychology* (Wadsworth Publishing, 2005) 23–40.

¹³ Darren J. Good, and Christopher J. Lyddy (eds.), "Contemplating Mindfulness at Work: An Integrative Review," *Journal of Management* 42, no. 1 (January 2016): 114–142.

¹⁴ Heleen A. Slagter, Richard J. Davidson, and Antoine Lutz, "Mental Training as a Tool in the Neuro-scientific Study of Brain and Cognitive Plasticity," *Frontiers in Human Neuroscience* (2011): 65-71.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Barnard et al, (eds.), "Interacting Cognitive Subsystems: A Systemic Approach to Cognitive-Affective Interaction and Change," 5, no. 1 (1993): 1-39

Figure 1:**Teasdale and Barnard's (1993) ICS Framework** ¹⁷

It is deduced that mindfulness is the psychometrics of an individual for a quality like self-awareness. The argument is empirically supported by research conducted in Argentina to identify the psychometrics of individuals using the valid scale of Mindfulness. Five facet mindfulness questionnaire was initially used to identify the psychometric properties of Spanish speaking population in Argentina. The questionnaire is designed based upon five dimensions of mindfulness: observing, describing, acting with awareness, non-judgement and non-reactivity. The dimension of observing measures the experience of sensing the internal and external stimuli, cognition and other senses of smell, touch, and hearing. The dimension of describing measures the observations sensed in the environment. The dimension of acting with awareness measures the actions of individuals with consideration, not abruptly or absent mindedly. Non-judgement measures refrainment of an individual from his/her own emotions and cognition. Lastly, Non-reactivity measures the individuals' ability to let go of the inner thoughts and not getting carried away. The theme of analysis is: higher the scoring, higher the degree of mindfulness in the individual. The lower the scoring, the lower the level of mindfulness. The study puts forward the notion for future researchers to align mindfulness with other variables in a working environment to check the impact of mindfulness on other job related matters, including multi-tasking and adhoc operational activities.¹⁸

Work Place Stressors and Significance of Mindfulness for Job Performance

Dense workplace pressures and *ad-hoc* task functioning cause serious damages to the mental health of employees. Both the mental health and employee productivity are critical to an organization. Such

¹⁷ John Teasdale, Philip Barnard, *Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy for Stress and Depression* (New York: Guilford Press 1993) 73.

¹⁸ Anchorena, et al. (eds.), "Psychometric Properties of the Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire in an Argentine Sample," *American Board of Assessment Psychology* 7, no. 1 (2017): 29-41.

stressors are also casting shadows over employee productivity.¹⁹ Organizations taking measures to cope up with this pay high medical costs.²⁰ Furthermore chronic stress is the root cause of major cardio, respiratory, immuno and neurotic illnesses.²¹

Stressors cause low productivity where mindfulness causes the exact opposite. A study conducted in US investigated cognitive mindfulness programs' role to revive productivity, vigor and resilience in employees at workplace. A sample of 89 respondents was selected from Dow Chemical company US. The sample was divided into 2 groups. One group was assigned with mindfulness intervention programs and the second group was put on waiting list. The employees on mindfulness based interventions completed Five facet mindfulness questionnaire, vigor scale, resiliency scale and perceived stress scale. A follow up of the employees was conducted after 6 months. The findings of the study illustrate that the group involved with mindfulness based programs showed significant decrease in work place anxiety, increased resilience towards perceived stress and amplified productivity compared to the second group. This finding helped assuring mindfulness as prescription for decreased stress and increased productivity supporting Broaden and Build, and Objective Self-Assessment theory.²²

Workplace stressors are not only intrinsic but extrinsic as well. The 21st century has massively digitalized the workplace ecosystem. Work practices have moved from real world into a virtual world. Corporate offices are now structured to allow maximum flexibility using technology to facilitate productivity.²³ The digital practices where comprehend flexibility, also cast health hazards. Corporations are now moving forward to incorporate healthy working patterns within the office parameters to encourage mindfulness within their employees. Employee well-being is now a major strategic agenda item for leaders which directly backs venture success.²⁴ Digitalization is overcoming socialization. Business

¹⁹ Micah Allen, et al. (eds.), "Work Stress and Health Risk Behaviour," *Scand J Work Environ Health* 32 (2006): 473-481.

²⁰ Constance Hammen, "Stress and Depression," *Annual Review Clinical Psychology*, 1 (2005): 293-319.

²¹ Debra Umberson, "Stress and Health Behaviour over the Life Course," *Adv Life Course Res.* 13 (2008): 19-44.

²² A. Kimberly et al. (eds.), "Mindfulness Goes to Work Impact of an Online Workplace Intervention," *Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine* 56, no. 7 (July 2014): 721-31.

²³ Thomson and Peter (eds.), "Wellbeing and the Workplace," *Conquering Digital Overload*, (2018): 117-126.

²⁴ Maryanna Klatt, Steinberg, and Duchemin, "Mindfulness in Motion (MIM): An Onsite Mindfulness Based Intervention (MBI) for Chronically High Stress

leaders need to overcome this addictive habit and amalgamate mindfulness intervention programs within the daily workplace practices.²⁵

Another research was conducted in the service industry to find evidence of a relationship between employee mindfulness, job performance and employee turnover. It aimed to inquire the degree of mindfulness of employees at workplace and their intention to either stay loyal to their organization or switch. The findings illustrate a negative relationship between employee mindfulness and employee turnover. Hence when an employee is satisfied it reflects in performance, in terms of satisfaction with his job and decreased turnover for the organisation.²⁶

Positive implications of mindfulness on a person's psychological health and job performance are of great interest to managers as well to initiate mindfulness based interventions within their setups to evaluate any change in cognitive and behavioral patterns. Empirical support is provided from study conducted in Spanish public hospital on mindfulness and its fruit on job performance. Results of the exercise produce significant high levels of work engagement, happiness and productivity in job performance of staff members. Pre and post evaluation confirms mindfulness exercises as a successful preliminary steps for implementing mindfulness as a long term sustainable practice for engaged and productive workforce.

Building a New Perspective

This study provides turnkey solutions to Millennials in the education sector for the conception of mindfulness interventions at secondary and graduate levels. The reason for doing so is to build critical thinking, problem solving techniques and passion for education in students by minimizing stress and anxiety. Mastery of mindfulness in educators brings an automatic trickle-down effect. The implications are not limited to academic institutions but affect the society as well, when the mindful students function as responsible citizens.²⁷

The major portion of empirical evidence is found in the corporate sectors. Since most of the studies are conducted on the profitable private sector, the public sector remained unattended except for the education sector. Hence this study aims to determine the relationship of employee mindfulness and employee job performance in the education sector,

Work Environments to Increase Resiliency and Work Engagement," (2017): 101-113. doi: 10.3791/52359.

²⁵ Ibid.


²⁶ Erik Dane, and Bradley J Brummel, "Examining Workplace Mindfulness and its Relations to Turnover Intention," *Sage Journal,s* 67, no. 1 (2014).

²⁷ Oren Ergas and Sharon Todd, " Exploring Intersections between Educational and Contemplative Practices (Wiley-Blackwell, 2016).

specifically in a public sector university of Pakistan. With the theoretical base of Objective self-awareness theory (1972), Broaden and Build theory (2008) and Philip Barnard and John Teasdale model of interactive cognitive sub-systems, the following theoretical framework and hypothesis is formulated.

Structural Model

Figure 2:




In line with the structural theme and objective of study as mentioned above, the hypothesis has been designed so that after data analysis a significant result indicates that the hypothesis is accepted and a non-significant result declares that the hypothesis is rejected.

H1: Employee mindfulness has a positive Impact on Job performance of academicians in a public sector university of Pakistan.

An accepted hypothesis illustrates that employee mindfulness has a positive impact on job performance of academicians where as a rejected hypothesis illustrates that employee mindfulness does not have a positive impact on the given variable.

Measurement Model

Figure 2:



The above model represents the measurement scheme of the study. The two variables of study have been measured through the dimensions depicted above. The state of mindfulness of the academicians

in the university has been measured by using Baer et.al scale of Five Facet Questionnaire on Mindfulness (FFQM). FFQM measures the state of mindfulness in five dimensions given in the model above. Similarly, the job performance of the employees is measured using scores from the evaluation proforma designed by the Higher Education Commission of Pakistan. This is a standard performa used by all public and private universities affiliated with HEC for the evaluation of teachers' performance. The performa includes: the course content and organization, learning environment and teaching methods, learning resources, quality of delivery, assessments, and punctuality.

Population Selection for Data Collection and Analysis

Academicians have been taken as sample for the study from reknowned public-sector universities of Pakistan. The responses were collected from newly hired faculty members for the reasons mentioned above.

Evaluation sheets of newly hired faculty members have been collected in coordination with the quality assured department of the institute. This department works with the human resource department to collect the performances of the faculty members, evaluate it critically on the criteria as designed by the HEC Pakistan, and publish relevant scores of performance for each candidate.


The faculty members with remarkably higher evaluations and similarly, faculty members with less confident results were contacted to be part of an academic research as sample for data collection. Upon their agreeableness to share their responses to measure the respective levels of mindfulness, a FFMQ was circulated to them. This research instrument was a 24 item Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire designed by Bohlmeijer & Klooster, et al. (2011). A total of 32 questionnaires were floated. The response rate was 100 percent. The data was collected via delphi technique where the questionnaires are shared via emails to all respondents and the respondents are not aware who else is contacted for data collection. This technique maintains confidentiality and upholds anonymity.

Job Performance Evaluation

The job performance of newly hired faculty members is measured using a teacher's evaluation that is conducted by the students at the end of every semester. It is a performance indicator designed by the HEC. The criteria on which the students evaluate the teachers' performance include: knowledge of the subject (course content and organization), knowledge delivery (learning environment and teaching method), quality of delivery, punctuality, fairness in marking/assessments and practicality of teaching material. The evaluation sheets are designed in a scale manner with 1

being the lowest score and 5 being the highest score. The total sample size of the study is 32 faculty members, newly hired. All the faculty members are new and not well aware of the evaluation criteria compared to existing staff members. This assures the non-biasness of responses to be evaluated. The evaluations are then converted into percentages. 100 percent shows a complete achievement of defined criteria. The table below represents the different level evaluations of all 32 respondents in the form of a bar chart.

Table 1:
Faculty Job Performance Evaluation Based on the Level of Set Goals Achieved



The main findings from the evaluation sheets are:

- The bar chart illustrates that all the 32 faculty members had their scores above 70%. They scored 70% out of 100 in the evaluation criteria set by HEC.
- The statistics were confident and the job performance of faculty members was positive. No faculty member was at average or below average in their performances.
- A total of 6 faculty members had job performance scores between 71-80%.
- 14 of the faculty members had job performance scores between 81-90%.
- The remaining 12 of the faculty members in the sample size have their job performance calculated to be in the range of 91-100%.

The above descriptions are for the job performance status of the sample size. The next step is to measure the level of mindfulness of the same sample and compare whether the individuals ranked high in their performance are also ranked high in their mental state of mindfulness or

not. To study this theme the data collected from five facet mindfulness questionnaires (FFMQ) was analysed by using SPSS 23.

Cronbach Alpha, Pearson Correlation and Regression Analysis

The reliability of the responses from the sample was measured through Cronbach alpha. This is necessary in order to gauge the consistency of responses among the respondents. To find out any association of job performance with employee mindfulness, Pearson correlation tests were conducted. The findings of the study are as follows.

Reliability

Cronbach alpha test is used to measure the reliability, internal consistency. The reliability of the statistics of mindfulness is calculated below:

Table 2:

| Model Reliability Statistics | |
|-------------------------------------|-------------|
| Reliability Statistics | |
| Cronbach's Alpha | No of Items |
| .701 | 24 |

The acceptable value of reliability scores must be greater than 0.6. A value above this threshold is considered good, indicating a reliable data for analysis. A value below this threshold is considered poor indicating that the collected data is not reliable for further analysis.²⁸ The value of reliability statistics is 0.701. The value is positive which assures the reliability of data and consistency of the scale. The value is greater than the threshold of 0.50 indicating the data to be reliable and fit for further analysis. In order to further confirm the reliability, each dimension of the variable is measured individually. The Reliability of statistics of each dimension of employee mindfulness is reflected below:

Table 3:

Reliability Statistics of Mindfulness Constructs with Job Performance

| Reliability Statistics | Observe (OB) | Describe (DS) | Act Aware (AA) | Non-Reactivity (NR) | Non-Judgement (NJ) |
|-------------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|
| Employee Mindfulness | 0.745 | 0.801 | 0.918 | 0.641 | 0.717 |

²⁸ Darren George and Paul Mallery, *SPSS for Windows step by step: A simple guide and reference. 11.0 update* (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 2003).

The table above shows the reliability statistics of each dimension of employee mindfulness. It is noted that all scores are above the acceptable threshold of 0.6. The maximum value is of 0.918 for awareness; Describe ranks second with 0.801 score; Observe ranks third with 0.745 score, followed by non-judgement and non-reactivity with 0.717 and 0.641 respectively. All scores lie within the good acceptable range - hence proved the data to be reliable.

Correlation

The next step is to measure the existence of any relationship between employee mindfulness and job performance. Pearson correlation test is used to gauge the relationship between the two variables of the study. A perfectly positive relationship between the two variables is equal to 1. However, it is assumed that if two variables have a perfect correlation with score 1, both variables are merely the same and there exists multicollinearity. Therefore the acceptable threshold value must be less than 1.0 and greater than 0.50.²⁹ In order to find out any impact of employee mindfulness on job performance first it is necessary to identify any relationship among the two variables. Correlation analysis is conducted to gauge any relationship between two variables. The direction and strength of these two variables is identified using Pearson correlation test. The test statistics are as follows:

Table 4:
Pearson Correlation between Cognitive Mindfulness and Job Performance

| Correlations | | | |
|--------------|---------------------|------|------|
| | | JP | CM |
| JP | Pearson Correlation | 1 | .813 |
| | Sig. (2-tailed) | | .000 |
| | N | 32 | 32 |
| CM | Pearson Correlation | .813 | 1 |
| | Sig. (2-tailed) | .000 | |
| | N | 32 | 32 |

The value of correlation coefficient is calculated to be 0.813, which lies within the acceptable range as discussed above. The results show a positive direction of relationship and the strength of relationship is calculated to be strong among the variables of the study. The next step is to measure the impact of employee mindfulness on job performance and

²⁹ David Lane, "Data Analysis *Pearson Correlation*," University of West of England. (2018).

the degree of variation regression analysis is applied. The test results are tabulated as follows;

Regression Analysis

Regression analysis of the study variables shows that 79 % of variance in job performance is explained by employee mindfulness which explains that employee mindfulness is not only positively correlated with job performance rather it is significant in casting its impact of job performance as well.


Table 5:

Model Regression Analysis

| Model | R | R Square | Adjusted R Square | Std. Error of the Estimate | | |
|---|-------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------|----------------------------|--------|------|
| 1 | .790 ^a | .624 | .623 | .349 | | |
| a. Predictors: (Constant), Job Performance | | | | | | |
| Coefficients ^a | | | | | | |
| Model | | Unstandardized Coefficients | | Standardized Coefficients | t | Sig. |
| | | B | Std. Error | Beta | | |
| 1 | (Constant) | 1.548 | .083 | | 18.739 | .000 |
| | Job Performance | .563 | .024 | .790 | 23.769 | .000 |
| a. Dependent Variable: Employee Mindfulness | | | | | | |
| The f- statistics and t- statistics are also calculated to be strong with significance level of 0.000. In light of the results calculated from reliability, correlation and regression analysis it is confirmed that employee mindfulness strongly impact on job performance with a variance and 79%. The results are significant which provides the empirical evidence for the acceptance of the hypotheses. The study confirms that cognitive mindfulness has positive impact on job performance. | | | | | | |


The study further explains the levels of employee mindfulness of academicians and its relation with their respective job performances. The statistics is calculated using 5 facet mindfulness questionnaire. The results are represented in form of a bar chart as follows:

Table 6:
Mindfulness Percentages of Faculty Members Calculated from FFMQ



The bar chart explains that out of a total of 32 respondents, 8 possess mindfulness levels between 50-60 percent. 16 of them have mindfulness levels between 61-70 percent and the remaining 8 possess the mindfulness levels between 71-80 percent. No faculty member had cognitive mindfulness levels below 50 percent. To confirm the study agenda another analysis was conducted by calculating the level of mindfulness in the faculty members showing the highest levels of achievement.

Table 7:
The Level of Cognitive Mindfulness in Faculty Members with the Highest Levels of Job Performance



The faculty members with the highest performance percentages calculated from teachers' evaluation forms were counted to be 12 in number out of 32. When the cognitive mindfulness of these 12 faculty members was measured, the statistics showed that out of 12, 8 faculty members showed higher levels of mindfulness, 3 showed moderate levels and only one faculty member showed lowest levels of cognitive mindfulness. Hence, it is proved that the faculty members with highest scores of job performance also showed highest levels of cognitive mindfulness.

Employee Mindfulness and its Implications on Job Performance

The study addresses the problem statement and confirms the existence of a strong relationship between employee mindfulness and job performance. The results of the research support the theoretical base of Objective Self-Assessment, and Broaden and Build theory. The relationship is confirmed empirically with the evidence that the faculty members having greatest job performance also had highest levels of cognitive mindfulness. Similarly, the faculty members whose job performance was measured to be relatively low compared to the top performers, possessed lower levels of cognitive mindfulness. Hence, it assures that mindfulness plays a pivotal role in an employees' performance. Faculty members, who are certain of their sensory responses, observe the environment and remain controlled in their actions, are calculated to give higher scores in their duties and job performances and vice versa.

It is thus recommended for academicians to invest in cognitive mindfulness exercises to sharpen their minds and reflexes, and act in critical situations in a controlled manner. Also the cognitive mindfulness activities will help in depicting a complete picture of employees' mental mindfulness layout, showing as to which dimensions are strong in them and which need consideration. This is a cost free prescription that not only facilitates the facilitators in the enhancement of their job performances, rather also boasts their mental and physical strength.

Limitations

Where the study provides an empirical evidence for the positive relationship between employee mindfulness and job performance, it also possesses some limitations. The sample size of the study is small as the numbers of recently inducted faculty members is low in the selected institute of the study. Researchers are recommended to widen the sample size net. Futures researches can move a step ahead to conduct a longitudinal study to observe the effect of mindfulness based activities and trainings on employees who are observed to have low percentage of productivity and performance.

Implications

The study proposes the leaders and top management officials to harness mindfulness interventions for amplifying employee performance and the performance of the organization as a whole. Job performance is affected by non-monetary factors as well as the employee's state of mind. Secondly, empirical evidence suggests that higher the cognitive mindfulness in an employee, higher the job performance. Cognitive mindfulness is an effective cost-free prescription in comparison to costly job-performance-intervention standpoints.

Recommendations

Future researches are recommended to conduct research on the degree of influence of employees' cognitive mindfulness on job performance. Furthermore, it is suggested to apply a similar model on private educational institutes of Pakistan as well for generalization of results.

Academicians must pay special attention towards the strength of their cognitive mindfulness as it plays a pivotal role in achieving high ranks of job performance. Rich minds with dense cognitive mindfulness levels transfer knowledge and wisdom in an efficient manner in students, who are the most important stake-holders. Quality assurance departments, training-and-development departments, along with other training platforms are encouraged to introduce mindfulness-based trainings for capacity building of the faculty member.

CLIMATE CHANGE POLICIES OF US AND CHINA: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Samrana Afzal*

Abstract

To what extent Climate Change policies adopted by the United States (US) and China are a consequence of their respective domestic and international milieu, is this article's subject of inquiry. It compares the Climate Change policies of the US and China and argues that domestic and international socio-economic and political contexts together have helped shape the manner in which China and the US are dealing with climate change. Both powers collectively contribute about forty-five percent of global Green House Gas (GHG) emissions. Therefore, they are not only the main stakeholders in the Climate Change actions but also the 'responsibility bearers' to deal with 'Global Warming'. Both are nevertheless, failing to comply with the changing climate needs owing to the interplay of domestic and international factors that hamper the creation of efficient climate change policies by both states. Under the current policy environment, prospects for a reasonable GHG emission reduction seem unlikely for the two states.

Keywords: *Climate Change Policies, Domestic Factors, International Determinants, Socio-Economic Context, Interplay, Responsibility Bearers*

Introduction

Climate Change policy processes of developed and developing countries exhibit huge variations. These reflect upon the kind of responses that they generate to cope with the newly emerged climate change phenomenon. Whether states make commitments in this regard due to the domestic pressures or due to international influences upon their policymaking and implementation, still needs to be researched. China and the USA together emit forty-five percent of the world's carbon

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dioxide (CO₂), hence the two largest contributors to 'Global warming'.¹ Any successful global effort to reduce Green House gas (GHGs) emissions must be inclusive of meaningful contributions from both countries. Each of the actors have different kinds of political-economic interests and normative environments that translate massively into their climate change-related policy processes. Owing to the domestic-international congruence of pressures, China, with little experience in using market instruments to meet environmental goals, seems to be more responsive to the global climate change demands as compared to the US. The consistent neglect of the climate pledges under various United Nations (UN) frameworks by the US also has roots in domestic politics. The path to low carbon transition is less than half-trodden and full of challenges for both the states suggesting a gloomy picture for any future International climate policy breakthrough.

In contemporary literature, many researchers have tried to cover climate change policies of major developed and developing nations. Averchenkova and others confirm the importance of understanding the relevant economic, institutional, political and ideational factors, at the domestic level affecting countries' abilities to implement adaptation and mitigation efforts². Studies conducted by scholars like Falkner, Never, and Betz have portrayed the strong association among climate-related legislations, domestic drivers and international influences³. Also Sprinz and Weiss covered the domestic-international linkages in the climate change policymaking in countries⁴. For US, Putnam notes that domestic groups in the US compel the government to approve beneficial policies and politicians seek power by gathering support of those groups. Also at international level, these governments tend to project the interests of such groups in order to satisfy the domestic pressures.⁵ Furthermore for China, as noticed by research conducted by Averchenkova, Heggelund, Belis and David, domestic drivers of climate policy influence the decisions on

¹ 'Global Green House Gas Emissions Data', United States Environmental Protection Agency, <https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-data#Country> (accessed July 12, 2018).

² Alina Averchenkova et al., "Climate Policy in China, the European Union and the United States: Main Drivers and Prospects for the Future – in Depth Country Analyses," *The Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy (CCCEP)*, (2016): 1–96.

³ Robert Falkner (ed.), *The Handbook of Global Climate and Environmental Policy*, 2013, <https://www.wiley.com/en-us/The+Handbook+of+Global+Climate+and+Environment+Policy-p-9780470673249>.

⁴ D. F. Sprinz and M. Weiss, "Domestic Politics and Global Climate Policy," *International Relations and Global Climate Change*, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2001), 67–94.

⁵ Robert D Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics : The Logic of Two-Level Games", *International Organizatio* 42, no. 3 (2018): 427–60.

climate management, and these include : an increasing demand for energy for a growing middle class, environmental vulnerabilities, need for constant economic progress, China's global stature, and a desire for strengthening its bargaining position. Hence, this confirms the transition of China's position in relation to meeting climate change goals as set by various collective regimes. China is helplessly poised in the climate future in the wake of these problems⁶. Tann and Lee noted while comparing policies of the US and China that whereas individual states and local governments are more influential as compared to federal governments in climate policy making of US, in China the central government is a chief motivating factor in climate related activism as compared to the locals⁷. A study conducted by T. Ylä-Anttila et al. concluded that due to the changing social contexts, substantially different orientations to the global climate change policy have emerged in many countries. However, the outstanding issues related to climate change are not technical but political in nature. The effects of domestic environmental politics can spillover to international spheres having implications for international climate change policymaking.⁸ In discovering the literature gaps, one tends to find out that the studies combining the analysis of climate change responses of both US and China are limited; most of the researches have a European Union (EU) perspective or rising economies. Also, the studies which have combined the domestic and international factors in climate change policy making are minimal.

This study aims to examine both internal and external determinants and actors that influence climate-related policymaking and implementation. It analyses how domestic factors play a role in shaping climate change policies of US and China. Do international treaties, policy diffusion, and global opinions matter in formulating policies to tackle climate change? How does the interaction of both internal and external factors influence US and China's climate change policies? The study argues that domestic and international socio-economic and political contexts together have helped shape the manner in which China and the US are dealing with climate change.

⁶ Averchenkova et al., "Climate Policy in China, the European Union and the United States: Main Drivers and Prospects for the Future – in Depth Country Analyses."

⁷ Xianchun Tan and Henry Lee, "Policy Brief: Comparative Assessment of China and U.S. Policies to Meet Climate Change Targets," *Environment and Natural Resources Program, Belfer Center*, February (2017).

⁸ David B. Tindall Antilla, Tuomos Yalla, Anti Grono, et. al., "Climate Change Policy Networks: Why and How to Compare Them across Countries?" *Elsevier Energy Research & Social Science*, (2018) .

Theoretical Framework

Neo-classical Realism offers the most relevant theoretical construct in order to substantiate the argument.⁹ For neo-classical realists, the conduct of states is not entirely a product of their external calculations about power, security and balancing in a self-help world. Instead a part of the behaviour is also dependent upon the internal setup of states - most important being the perception of elites and other political actors about the situations, their cost-benefit calculations, their norms and values, the domestic power configuration, the interests of the public and ideological propositions of the states. States as a result often underbalance and cannot effectively respond to more obvious external threats or opportunity.¹⁰

Climate change offers one such grave external threat that may or may not turn into a devastating hazard depending upon the states' capacity and their will to appropriately balance against it. The growing economic aspirations of the states have heavily influenced their policies and response strategies vis-a-vis climate change problem. A transition from fossil-based pollutant industries to a more clean energy sources is the required set of actions immediately expected from states. However, states often under-balance in relation to the demands of climate change actions because of various factors, top most being the perceptions and interests of different actors.¹¹ State leaders and their perceptions play a very important role in policies and decisions related to GHG emissions. Democratic leaders only tend to pass those legislations that can satisfy the vested interests of political actors to a maximum. For instance, in US, the separation of powers and partisan politics has hindered smooth implementation of global warming mitigation policies; climate-related regulations are mostly blocked either by Congress or by Judiciary. Despite the presidential powers, climate related executive orders cannot be unilaterally applied, rather the rules have to be applied with the discretion of the State. The big businesses and large corporations may be more intrusive in climate change decisions that affect international obligations as well. The coal industrialists and oil companies such as Exxon mobile, Texaco and Shell may be good examples that exert such leverages.¹² In China, on the other hand, the Central government has the authoritative

⁹ E. Engelhaupt, "What Americans Think about Climate Change," *Environmental Science & Technology* 41, no. 13 (2007): 489–4489.

¹⁰ Ibid.,15.

¹¹ Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics : The Logic of Two-Level Games," The MIT Press Stable, <http://Www.Jstor.Org/Stable/2706785>.

¹² Sam Fankhauser, Caterina Gennaioli, and Murray Collins, "Domestic Dynamics and International Influence: What Explains the Passage of Climate Change Legislation?," *Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment*, Working Paper no. 156 (2014): 1–33.

control but different levels of government can play their role in consensus building in policymaking. Once the consensus is there, the political will is transformed into policies that are then implemented by governmental ministries and departments. To a certain level, the interests of the provincial governments are taken care of by the central governments in devising climate change policies.¹³

The second level of neo-classical realism in case of climate change looks at state specific international strategic influences such as geographical vulnerability, state's role in the global balance of power and its international image. The established powers such as US may be more sensitive to international transfer of resources to emerging economies such as China in this case. China may be taken as more willing to fulfil international climate commitments owing to International pressures, its climate vulnerability and the perception of its international image as an emerging great power.

Climate Policy of US

The United States emits about 15 percent of the World's GHGs, hence taking second position in the list of emitter countries. Due to current projected emission rates, the US is rated by Climate Action Tracker as "critically insufficient".¹⁴ The environment came in the US policy-making process in early 1970s when the US passed its first legislation to reduce conventional pollutants.¹⁵ Out of all American leaders, President Richard Nixon proved to be a staunch advocate of environmentalism, when he delivered a speech in his State of the Union address in 1969. Under his government, the US passed several environment related laws and also established Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) which is the chief policy-shaping agent driving federal research, standard-setting, monitoring and enforcement related to green environment. It was this agency which signalled the alarm for climate threats like Carbon emissions and helped declare the US as a world leader in driving environmental policy. The US was among the original signatories of the Kyoto protocol in 1997. However, for President Bush and President Bill Clinton, environment was not a priority. The Kyoto protocol was soon nullified by the Bush administration. Nevertheless, the role of President Obama's

¹³ Mark Purdon, "Neoclassical Realism and International Climate Change Politics: Moral Imperative and Political Constraint in International Climate Finance," *Journal of International Relations and Development* 17, no. 3 (2014): 301–38, <https://doi.org/10.1057/jird.2013.5>

¹⁴ Climate action Tracker, "No Title," 2018, https://climateactiontracker.org/media/documents/2018/4/CAT_2017-1106_CountryAssessment_USA_8fXxlrP.pdf.

¹⁵ Xianchun Tan and Henry Lee, "Comparative Assessment of China and U.S. Policies to Meet Climate Change Targets".

administration is much more impressive rather encouraging in this regard. He worked with both the public and private sectors to reduce carbon pollution and enthusiastically grew the clean energy economy. His three-fold contributions i.e. to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, to prepare for the impact of climate change, and to lead international efforts to address global climate change are noteworthy. The Obama administration's Climate Action Plan (CAP) was, unfortunately never fully implemented, because of the role of judiciary, which was critical to achieving the US NDCs.¹⁶

So far, plenty of laws have been introduced at the federal level. Some of these have succeeded (e.g. ones related to methane emissions), while others have failed (e.g. carbon-cap and trade-related programs). The most relevant legislations include the Clean Air Act (CAA) launched and interpreted in 2009, The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 1969, EPA in 1970, The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 1970, Obama's Climate Action Plan (CAP) in 2013 and the recently repealed Clean Power Plan (CPP) 2015.¹⁷ With the recent US withdrawal from the Paris climate agreement, President Trump clearly opposed all the green policies of his predecessor by terming the phenomenon a 'Hoax' and hence there are very few chances of new environmental legislations. The hopes of proper implementation of earlier laws and plans have also dimmed. However, many states and cities responded to the withdrawal by putting their own commitments.

Climate Policy of China

The status of China as being among the world's largest emitters (30 percent rate) is closely linked with its booming economy starting with the 1980s. The economic boom brought with it not only the benefits of poverty alleviation and better living standards but also incurred heavy costs in the form of huge environmental destruction.¹⁸ The environmental neglect along with accompanied growing population size, economic prioritization, and rapid urbanization have added complexity to the current environmental vulnerability of China, resulting in massive pollution and health hazards.¹⁹ With changed socio-economic conditions, policymakers became more attentive to the importance of low carbon

¹⁶ "US Climate Change Policy," *Economic and Scientific Department Director General for Internal Policies*, 2015, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/536321/IPOL_IDA\(2015\)536321_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/536321/IPOL_IDA(2015)536321_EN.pdf).

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ David Sandalow, "Guide to Chinese Climate Policy 2018," *Columbia SIPA*, July 27, 2018, [https://energypolicy.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/pictures/Guide to Chinese Climate Policy 7-27-18.pdf](https://energypolicy.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/pictures/Guide%20to%20Chinese%20Climate%20Policy%207-27-18.pdf).

¹⁹ Ibid.

intensive development. Now the climate policy is increasingly regarded as a tool for improving energy efficiency and technological up-gradation of industries.²⁰ While, the US is an early starter in terms of passing climate laws, China's efforts are very recent. The 11th and 12th five-year plans (2006-2010 and 2011-2016 respectively) became the hallmarks when China prioritized climate change as a greater threat. Both short and long-term policy measures for limiting carbon and other GHGs' emissions have been adopted by the Chinese government. For instance, low carbon development, coal use cuts, focus on non-fossil fuels, sustainable urbanization and climate diplomacy are notable initiatives.²¹ The National Climate Change Program (NCCP) - 2007, China's White Paper on efforts to address Climate Change - 2008, shutting down of factories and power plants - 2010, promoting seven emerging strategic industries including alternative energy, establishment of China's Climate Governance Fund (CGF) - 2015, and venturing into energy saving technologies including new energy vehicles, are among the chief climate actions taken by successive Chinese governments. China also submitted its NDCs to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in which it pledged to achieve the CO₂ emissions' peak around 2030.²² It was also an active participant of the Paris Climate Conference in December 2015.

The policy tools adopted by China are inclusive of all federal, provincial and local bodies. For instance in June 2016, as part of China's Alliance of Pioneer Peaking Cities, 23 provinces and cities have shown commitment to its peak emission targets of 2030.²³ China is also taking measures to control coal burning by banning new coal-fired power capacity, improving SO₂ controls at coal -powered plants and promoting alternatives to coal such as natural gas and hydro-solar powers. Environmental legislations and monitoring capabilities by provinces and localities have been enhanced and prioritized.²⁴ Another grooming area of Chinese policies is its emphasis on promotion of electric vehicles that have high benefits for improvement of air quality. Unfortunately, these policies have slowed but not stopped new coal plant construction in China. For instance, just 'in 2017, at least 35 GW of new coal power plants were commissioned'.²⁵ Furthermore, the focus on Chinese hydropower development growth, the construction of pumped hydro-plants, standardized administrative processes, the goal of solar capacity in China,

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Gørild Heggelund, "China's Climate Change Policy: Domestic and International Developments," *Asian Perspective* 31, no. 2 (2007): 155-191.

²² David Sandalow, "Guide to Chinese."

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

and coal to gas conversion programs have become prominent in Chinese policymaking for over a decade.

Climate Change Policies of US and China

Domestic Drivers and Actors

The climate-change-related commitment of national governments and their adherence to related international agreements is largely the bi-product of several domestic political influences which may include: legislatures, political configuration, elite' perceptions, the provincial setup, states' norms and values, interest groups, economic needs, and public opinion.²⁶

Case of US

Economic and energy interests correlate in the case of US when discussing the climate-change policy. It has significantly moved away from its traditional reliance on coal and other fossil fuels, to dependence on shale oil and gas.²⁷ However, despite US' self-sufficiency in oil and gas, it still has a need for energy imports. It has achieved a standardized economic development, having a mature market economy with comprehensive conflict management system. The economic interest groups, lobby groups, corporations, trade associations, think tanks and aristocratic class exert strong influence on climate policy orientations.

The Climate-related policymaking in the US is mostly under federal control. The Executive (President) is the sole authority in climate related decision-making.²⁸ Both houses in the Parliament, the House of Representatives and the Senate have members from different States. Bills are separately passed and approved in both houses. The final bill is then agreed upon by a jointly appointed committee, after which the President approves it.²⁹ Rather than a national comprehensive policy on climate change, multiple orientations exist based on perceptions of states and local actors. The most influential actors of environmental arena are the state governments that facilitate and motivate the climate related decision making of the federal government in a direction. The federal governments may take actions against the States missing their adhered targets, but the

²⁶ Sprinz and Weiss, "Domestic Politics and Global Climate Policy."

²⁷ Tan and Lee, "Policy Brief: Comparative Assessment of China and U.S. Policies to Meet Climate Change Targets."

²⁸ Director general for Internal Policies: Policy Department A, "US Climate Change Policy."

²⁹ Tina Ohliger, "U.S. Climate Change Policy" *Policy Department A for the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)* (2015), [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/536321/IPOL_IDA\(2015\)536321_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/536321/IPOL_IDA(2015)536321_EN.pdf).

legal disputes and congressional gridlock over implementation of plans make the environment related actions delayed unless otherwise implemented by President's own will.³⁰ Many corporations, mayors and a majority of states have pledged to reduce the overall emissions of their respective areas. Some states are more committed to adopting pro-climate policies such as energy efficiency programs, cap and trade systems etc. Regional Green House Gas Initiatives (RGGI) of the nine North Eastern states, the Western Climate Initiative (WCI), and California Global Warming Solutions Act (AB 32) are some of the widely acknowledged emission control steps.³¹ Sub-national governments and non-governmental organizations are also instrumental in the development of protocols and registries for verifying GHG emissions.

A very important and relevant domestic feature is the party politics and partisanship, because of separation of powers in the US. Republican and Democrats have their own divergent orientations giving rise to extraordinary delays in making and implementation of climate regulation policies. Usually Democrats tend to be more in favour of climate change actions as compared to Republicans who are more sceptical over the issue.³² Here, because of the absence of a national framework and the polarized perspectives on Climate Change, carbon markets have emerged in comparatively liberal states. Hence, presidential and congressional elections have profound implications for national climate change policy. The US leadership role in the international climate negotiations is severely hampered by the economic groups which increasingly view environmental regulation as contradictory to economic interests. Big business corporations spend large amounts of funds and resources to facilitate or obstruct climate-related policymaking, to sabotage climate change negotiations and to erode public understanding and support on climate change issues. For this, they adopt various means like directing public statements, lobbying, congressional verification and influencing think tanks.³³

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ United States Department of State, "U.S. Climate Action Report 2010 - Fifth National Communication of the United States of America Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change," (Washington, 2010), https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/usa_nc5.pdf.

³² Director general for Internal Policies:Policy Department A, "US Climate Change Policy."

³³ Union of Concerned Scientists, "A Climate of Corporate Control - How Corporations Have Influenced the U.S. Dialogue on Climate Science and Policy," May 2012, https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/scientific_integrity/a-climate-of-corporate-control-report.pdf.

Case of China

There are three sources of domestic challenges faced by the Chinese leadership regarding its stance towards low-carbon economy³⁴. First, addressing the energy security problem has become the top concern of Chinese government since China is one of the largest importers of oil and gas; it is greatly dependent on cheap energy supply - largely coal based.³⁵ The consumption of oil is still growing owing to the expanding transportation sector, automobile market and industrialization. By shifting to clean development mechanisms, energy demand is expected to decrease, thereby reducing dependence and enhancing energy security. There is a huge tussle between the need for low-carbon sustainable transition, and the need for continued consumption of fossil fuel for meeting economic priorities. Second, the massive quantity of low-quality coal-fuelled power plants has created massive pollution-related problems in big urban areas of China. Related to this is the booming population and resulting public pressures for standardized clean living for the current 1.38 billion Chinese, whose number is on a constant rise. This number is four times the US population.³⁶ This has created a serious politico-economic concern for the Chinese government; building public pressure puts political legitimacy in question, and therefore Climate-change policies become a necessity for maintaining political stability. Third challenge is the weaknesses of the old export-oriented economic growth model. Switching to a sustainable economic model may be more beneficial and promising to the Chinese political leadership: international recognition, improved status, and better living conditions being among the top achievements.³⁷

Climate policymaking is different in China as compared to the US. The National Leading Group (NLG) for addressing climate change assumes the leadership role that is inclusive of all members of the central government. The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)

³⁴ Anita Engels, "Understanding How China Is Championing Climate," *Palgrave Communications*, August 14, 2018, <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-018-0150-4>.

³⁵ Averchenkova et al., "Climate Policy in China, the European Union and the United States: Main Drivers and Prospects for the Future – in Depth Country Analyses."

³⁶ Katelyn Newman, "China Invests in Environment but at What Cost?" *US News & World Report*, April 2018, <https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2018-04-20/china-takes-different-approach-than-us-on-climate-change>.

³⁷ Anita Engels, "Understanding How China Is Championing Climate Change Mitigation," *Palgrave Communications* 4 (2018), <https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-018-0150-4>.

assume prime responsibility for climate governance. NDRC is responsible for policymaking in three different areas: economic development, energy policy and climate policy. This reveals how much addressing climate is vital for other priorities.³⁸ All departments coordinate extensively among themselves w.r.t. green strategies.³⁹ Provincial governments often have energy and economic interests opposed to environmental choices of the central government. Local governments' capacity building is increasingly the target of the central environmental planning. Decisions on China's climate policy are not taken in isolation from other policy issues. As environmental hazards are the consequences of industrial, transportation and agricultural activities, so any decision to reduce carbon emissions will be consequential for all these sectors. Compatibility between climate policy goals and other policy goals is required in order to have a more proactive climate policy. If they conflict with the most influential bureaucratic interests regarding various policy areas, the chances of China moving in the direction of the pro-climate policy get lesser. Unlike US, in China, business influences and interests are aligned with the interests of the State. Yet sometimes personal and organizational goals outcast national objectives. Societal influence on Climate-change policy making is very limited and not as similar as in the US. Average person is out of political matters.⁴⁰ However, the growing awareness and impacts of climate change has enhanced the vision and influence of the public opinion towards environment friendly policies. They have pressurized for clean air and healthy environment. According to a national survey in 2017, 94.4 percent respondents admitted that climate change is happening and 66 percent attributed this phenomenon to anthropogenic causes.⁴¹

Successful policy implementation depends on cooperation of subnational governments and State Owned Enterprises (SOEs).⁴² Energy and economic related SOEs are largely impacting government's decision-making. In a return of preferential treatment to these contract based enterprises, government expects a lot more contribution on their part in the environmental policies of Chinese government. The chief obstacles in the implementation may include non-cooperation and lack of coordination among key ministries, lack of resources for enforcement, conflicting

³⁸ Lisa Williams, "China's Climate Change Policies : Actors and Drivers," *Lowey Institute for International Policy*, July (2014): 9-11.

³⁹ Heggelund, "China's Climate Change Policy: Domestic and International Developments."

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Li Jing, "Does the Chinese Public Care about Climate Change?," *China Dialogue*, September 21, 2018, <https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/10831-Does-the-Chinese-public-care-about-climate-change->.

⁴² Williams, "China 's Climate Change Policies : Actors and Drivers," 12.

interests may manifest in policies, non-alignment of centre and provincial climate priorities⁴³. Overall, China faces many challenges in the climate actions despite strong political will as it lacks experience, institutional capacity, and technical support.

International Determinants of the Climate Policies of US and China

United States

Many different international factors impede on the nation's climate efforts.⁴⁴ Most relevant in the US case, is the threat of future damages due to climate change that demand huge state resources. States like to retain resources for their domestic adaptation instead of committing these to collective international efforts. Such preferences negatively implicate upon international adaptation policies since collective efforts are seen as a compromise on states' ability to support domestic Climate-change adaptation. One reason for US not becoming an effective part of international negotiations, and its reluctance to ratify global climate change regimes is its aversion to resource-transfers to developing countries, which may obstruct its domestic climate resiliency.⁴⁵

Another pertinent stimulus is provided by a state's contribution to global balance of power.⁴⁶ Status-quo oriented states struggling against rising revisionist powers are less likely to enter into universal cooperative mechanisms. They try to retain their essential wealth and resources for maintaining their hegemony and military status like the US. Diversion of additional funds to management of global warming instead of military up-gradation will affect its contribution to maintaining global balance of power.

An interesting feature in US' considerations is China's emerging status. Many argue that this may have threatened the former's 'established' power status and cautioned it to not transfer its resources and capabilities to China in the name of international climate change cooperation. International actions related to global climate response measures are seen by most policy-makers in the US as attempts to drain its material resources for benefiting rising economies.⁴⁷

⁴³ Bill Hare et al., "China and the US : How Does Their Climate Action Compare ?" (2014): 12.

⁴⁴ Mark Purdon, "Neoclassical Realism and International Climate Change Politics: Moral Imperative and Political Constraint in International Climate Finance," 2014.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Engelhaupt, "What Americans Think about Climate Change."

China

Many elements shape up the climate policy orientations of China at the International level as well. The most important aspect is its relationship with the US, which influences its decision to be pro-climatic. Even at the time of US withdrawal from Kyoto protocol, and still now in the wake of its exit from Paris climate conference commitments, China views this odd US attitude as an irresponsible behaviour. However, the traditional stance of China that if US fulfil its climate pledges on emission cuts only than China would reciprocate seems to be changing this time.⁴⁸ In the international climate change negotiations, China now is among the leading and most influential actors in the group of developing countries, and thus is a key actor for the success of global efforts to combat climate change.⁴⁹

A significant impact is also created by China's possibility of gaining access to the technical expertise and foreign aid, which has quickened its pace of taking massive climate-friendly measures. China perceives itself to be a developing country and its government argues that a larger bracket of emissions be allowed for developing its economy. It focuses on the argument that maximum responsibility for emission reduction lies on developed states and they should change their patterns of development having reached the desired level of development. Its major concern is that developing countries' compliance with UNFCCC depends upon how much developed nations cooperate and fulfil their responsibilities in terms of technology sharing and financing. China presently is the largest recipient of financial support for climate projects from many International agencies such as United Nations Development Program (UNDP), World Bank (WB) and Asian Development Bank (ADB).⁵⁰

China's approach to International environmental regimes is also affected by concern about having an international image of a 'responsible' actor. China is more aware of its rising status as a Great Power, and would be more concerned with how to retain its reputation. Many argue that, "China wants to be well regarded on the world stage, and image is increasingly important as its economy grows".⁵¹ Struggling to enhance its

⁴⁸ Heggelund, "China's Climate Change Policy: Domestic and International Developments."

⁴⁹ Ida Bjørkum, *China in the International Politics of Climate Change: A Foreign Policy Analysis*, FNI Report 12/2005, 2005.

⁵⁰ Heggelund, "China's Climate Change Policy: Domestic and International Developments"; Guri Bang, Arild Underdal, and Steinar Andresen, "The Domestic Politics of Global Climate Change: Key Actors in International Climate Cooperation," *New Horizons in Environmental Politics series*, Edward Elger Publishing, 2015, <https://books.google.com/books?hl=de&lr=&id=EraCCgAAQBAJ&pgis=1>.

⁵¹ Williams, "China's Climate Change Policies : Actors and Drivers."

soft power throughout region and the globe, emergence of climate issue on the global scale gave China an opportunity to show and reinforce its solidarity with the developing world.

Comparative Analysis of US and China Climate Change Policies: Domestic-International Interaction

Mitigating climate change is a full time responsibility of the world's two largest GHG emitters, China and the US. So far, both have not effectively delivered in this regard despite several substantive initiatives and plans. The primacy of economic growth seems to be the prominent factor setting the direction of climate policy response of the two nations. However, in developing countries such as China, the short-term costs carry more weight in the decision making rather than uncertain future costs. Energy concerns do play a role in both countries' rational calculations.

There is a huge gap between the socio-economic and politico-normative environments of the two.⁵² Thus, the policymaking regarding carbon emissions is also very much different. In the US, though the main actors who facilitate climate actions in a said direction are the States, the climate actions are mostly dependent upon federal-executive (Presidential) orders, which may sometimes lead to deadlocks with the change of President along with the policy priority. This has happened in the case of US withdrawal from Paris Climate agreement and abrogation of all Clean and Green policies of President Obama under the President Trump. On the other hand in China, the Communist Party of China (CPC) and central government sets direction for the policy. Nevertheless, Provincial governments have some discretion in interpretation of mandates assigned to them centrally.⁵³

Climate policy priorities of both the nations are domestically driven and more focused at subnational, local or regional level rather than at the national level. Climate policy action is quite active and robust at the state and local levels in the US. A majority of the GHG emissions related policies are proposed by States and adopted by others. This clearly shows that GHG emission targets are the side effects of domestic policies. The US has utilized cap and trade systems to control GHG emissions, but despite having several successful experiences, it faces multiple political challenges

⁵² David Belis et al., "China, the United States and the European Union: Multiple Bilateralism and Prospects for a New Climate Change Diplomacy," (2015) 203-18.

⁵³ Bo Wang, "Exploring China's Climate Change Policy From Both International and Domestic Perspectives," *American Journal of Chinese Studies* 16, no. 2 (October 2009), 87-104; Joanna I Lewis, "China's Environmental Diplomacy: Climate Change, Domestic Politics, and International Engagement," *China Across the Divide: The Domestic and Global in Politics and Society*, (2013, 200-221.

to adopting policies of carbon taxing as unlike traditional policies of emission control standards, it cannot hide carbon reduction costs.⁵⁴ It also manifests the political polarization of the US political system, which hinders any move towards establishing a comprehensive national cap and trade system in United States. The cap and trade components of RGGI (CAT systems in Power sector in nine North Eastern states) and California's Assembly Bill (AB32) are exceptional subnational initiatives to cut GHG emissions. China also manoeuvred such systems and it has successfully incorporated these in the 12th Five Year plan. For instance, several payment systems to incentivize private landowners to protect water resources were initiated by the government. Trading programs in provinces like Shanxi, Henan, Tianjin, and cities like Shanghai are notable.⁵⁵

The lucrative geographical advantage of the US, in terms of extractable hydrocarbons, has made fossil fuel industry heavily profitable. This has made such an industry politically active and their lobbying and effective campaigning have caused fossil fuel producing states to tilt towards anti-climate action policies.⁵⁶ Moreover, the political polarization, electoral processes, separation of powers and the vested economic interests of the big corporations have hindered any attempt of the country to take leadership role in climate-change collective actions. Since the withdrawal from Kyoto protocol, US has been showing a reluctance to join any such mechanism with full political will. It has continuously refused to commit to a legally-binding international instrument with quantitative emission reduction targets. This position of the second largest global emitter, after China has strongly affected the UNFCCC (United Nation's Framework Convention on Climate Change) negotiations. President Trump's dismissal of Obama's green initiatives and withdrawal from all International climate commitments is a manifestation of domestic-international interface.

China, as compared to the US, is perceived to be a less difficult country in climate negotiations particularly after the recent backing out of US from emission pledges and international commitments.⁵⁷ The transformed political focus on Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM),

⁵⁴ Joseph E. Aldy and Robert N. Stavins, "The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon: Theory and Experience," *Journal of Environment & Development* 2, no. 21 (2012): 152–180.

⁵⁵ Harvard Project on Climate Agreements and National Center for Climate Change Strategy and International Cooperation, "Bilateral Cooperation between China and the United States: Facilitating Progress on Climate-Change Policy," February (2016).

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Heggelund, "China's Climate Change Policy: Domestic and International Developments."

restructuring and reforming economies, sustainability transition, cap and trade programmes, and shifting technologies, all show the instances where domestic and international factors interact. This manifests that the current international climate-related cooperation by China is not just the result of commitments but some internal pressures as well. The incorporation of climate-change response in its national planning is in its own interests and fulfils internal needs. The solution of domestic environmental problems - a consequence of long-term economic growth - and the quest for sustainable economic development with secure energy supply lines are at the roots of China's climate change responses. The effective response to climate change, however, proves to be more costly as it needs a thorough overhauling of key sectors like energy, industry, transport and agriculture. The possible growing vulnerabilities to climate change along with the repeated calls for achieving full GHG peak targets have constrained China to shift quickly to a low carbon and integrated development model.

The interdependent global world is forcing a revision of Chinese policymakers' thinking-process in terms of multiple sources of costs and benefits apart from those relating to addressing the climate. Many argue that, 'the costs of choosing a non-commitment approach in international cooperation can for instance come in the form of sanctions, lost prestige or damage to a country's international image and the possibility that other states will link failure to comply with the climate-change regime to retribution on other issue-areas'.⁵⁸ Likewise, the concerns regarding image are generally expected to lead to a more proactive position; just as China appears very sensitive to criticism. It has no doubt increased its understanding of the scientific facts and impacts of climate change by continued presence in International and national scientific climate change assessments. Besides, the presence of Chinese President in the Paris Climate conference in December 2015 can be understood as an outcome of domestic cum international pressures on China to achieve sustainable economic growth. The more it engages in International climate setting, the more pressures it will face to accommodate climate goals in the development policy goals.

Conclusion

China and the US owing to their carbon emission rates are the world's biggest emitters and hence the chief responsibility bearers for resolution of this collective good problem. Any global Climate solution will largely depend on American and Chinese commitments. With respect to climate mitigation, China and the US are taking divergent paths. Whereas in case of China, economic growth, population pressure and political stability drive its present posture towards sustainable environment, in the

⁵⁸ Purdon, "Neoclassical Realism and International Climate Change Politics."

US, environmental issues get politicized. With the recent US withdrawal from the Paris climate agreement 2015 and the cancellation of many of President Obama's climate initiatives, not only global climate activism has suffered a severe blow but also the US commitment to the creation of a climate robust world is left disputed and less credible. At the crucial time of doing more at the climate forum, the US back-out and 'abrogation' of its responsibility is objectionable. Due to its internal polarization, leader's perceptions, congressional and other actors' perceptions, it has failed to meet the intended NDCs. So far, whatever the state and sub-state efforts exist, US is least likely to lead to any giant leap in emission reductions without serious national political will.

China's state-led non-participatory authoritarianism cannot effectively offer a solution to the global climate problem because of low public and private-business participation, and due to the government's adoption of strategies to secure China's global market positions. Yet, the increasing environmental vulnerabilities, the domestic landscape and the international pressures have all pushed the Chinese leadership towards adopting and developing a low carbon economy. All related departments are increasingly interacting with each other and with many think tanks, scientists and researchers. More emphasis on scientific research and inclusion of scientists at the policy level suggests a growing focus on the scientific aspect of climate change. Many critics argue that China's determinations have not matched its increased economic strength and parallel responsibility for climate change. Two possible scenarios might emerge for China: one, with increasing energy needs and lack of alternative energy sources the expected emission targets might not be met; and second, the domestic-cum-international pressures with ambitious energy efficiency goals may help China proceed towards low-carbon sustainable goals. How far China proves to be steadfast in the commitments set by Paris Agreement, particularly when 'the other' responsibility bearer is not fulfilling its promises, is yet to be seen. The answer depends on the future turn in US politics. Under the current political environment, prospects for reasonable GHG emissions reduction are unlikely for both the states.

Book Reviews

Title: **Troubled Waters: Insecurity in the Persian Gulf**

Author: Mehran Kamrava

Publisher: Cornell University Press: USA, 2018, 210.

Mehran Kamrava's book, "Troubled Waters: Insecurity in the Persian Gulf" carries the picture of grey clouds and turbulent waters on its cover which aptly reflects the subject matter of the book as to why the Persian Gulf is so chronically insecure? The author has made a well-crafted effort to answer this question through research, using different theoretical perspectives and appropriate methodology. This book is divided into five chapters covering a timeline lasting from Arab Spring till date. The author is the Director of the Center for International and Regional Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, Qatar.

The first chapter, "The Trouble with the Persian Gulf", explains the region's strategic importance and root causes of its insecurity. The first root cause is the way this security architecture is constructed, which is incomplete in its own self as it leaves out important states such as Iraq and Iran. The Persian Gulf has unstable security arrangements where none of the Gulf states have ever thought of win-win solutions and have always followed a zero-sum approach instead; Saudi Arabia-Iran as well as Iran-US equations manifest this and make the region inherently unstable. The above cause is linked with history of state formation in the Persian Gulf which remained intertwined with long-lasting oligarchies, whose demise started with the unleashing of Arab Spring in 2011; it transformed various regimes and the regional balance of power as well, resulting in a strategic race. Also, linking states' foreign policies with regime security resulted in regional insecurities. For instance, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain's power politics and the American role in the Persian Gulf's security architecture is causing different political transitions like KSA's adaptation to new pan-Arabism.

The author then uses critical security perspective and provides its multidimensional definition. He focuses on negligence of human security as the second root cause of the Persian Gulf's insecurity. He believes that the Persian Gulf states and Pentagon should move beyond state centric matters and focus over human security, migration, emancipation and environment because these are the new forms of security threats. Daesh and identity erosion are also important challenges as security threats are spilling over into racism and xenophobia in this region. He discusses the major transitions such as secular nationalism in 1950's, political Islamism of the 1970's and re-sectarianism in 2011; these gave rise to identity politics evidenced in Bahrain's national uprising. The two complementary sources of security threats are: conventional - based on military,

diplomacy and balance of power resulting in competition for hegemony and power projection, and non-conventional - based on identity politics fanned by sectarianism and the idea "us versus them". The latter ones are considered as human-centric threats which need to be added into the region's security architecture otherwise, Regional Security Complexes (RSCs) and threat perceptions are more likely to increase as in Syria.

The second chapter, "The Persian-Gulf Security Architecture" elaborates the core argument in further detail and compares the past and present security arrangements in the region. The 1980's were relatively secure due to tri-polar security arrangements of Iran, Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Today the region is unstable because of heavy American presence, vulnerability to external threats, rise of identity politics and human security problems (food, water and demographic imbalances). To explain regional actors' security dynamics, the author defines Saudi Arabia as enjoying unqualified support from Washington, with Iran responding by accelerating arms production and using non-state actors. American initiation of self-made security framework is flawed, since it overestimates American abilities while excluding Iran from the regional security arrangements. This scenario has made most of the regional states institutionally weak. Their political stability is vulnerable to revenue shocks and extremist groups. Additionally, sectarianism and identity politics are on the rise, with religious and linguistic identities beginning to influence those already having a sense of alienation vis-à-vis the state. Insufficient supplies of food and water across the region have made 1/5th of the people in Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia insecure. Lastly, the uneven security arrangements have created demographic imbalances between non-nationals and nationals, who are now less than 10 percent in cities like Doha, Abu-Dhabi and Dubai.

The next chapter, "The Belligerents" examines the third root cause of region's chronic insecurity and identifies belligerent tendencies of regional actors. He says that states' understanding of themselves as middle-powers gives them a sense of entitlement to rights of power expansion that develops instability. To explain in the terms of political science, the author sees agency and people as important, rather than the institutions, due to the emergence of new leadership. These individualist preferences overstep regional diplomacy and amalgamate with structural dynamics resulting in aggressive belligerents' behavior. However, the author believes that states like Iran and KSA lack potential because of their reliance on foreign options for shaping their policies. The author then separately explains the roles of Iran, Saudi Arabia, GCC, USA, Qatar, UAE and their conscious or unconscious contribution to the region's perpetual insecurity. For instance the United-States' basic policies vis-a-vis Iran have remained un-changed including Al-Qaida and Israel, which continue to shape Pentagon's strategies till today. Today Iran's strategic depth does not lie in the Strait of Hormuz but in the Levant where a "corridor of

resistance" is led by Iran against the US domination. GCC, since 1981, has survived despite failing in its core aims. Currently, GCC is under KSA's hegemony and suffers from interwoven dynamics of Iran-Iraq war and identity crises. It is also a victim of unequal geography, history and demography. As far as Saudi Arabia is concerned, it sees Washington as a security guarantor, Iran as a threat and GCC as an ally. UAE, which is new in regional politics, is undergoing a shift in leadership and has an insecure political climate. To project its power, it joined Washington's camp and now is an active player in the regional civil and foreign wars. Lastly, Qatar, having differences with Saudi Arabia, is pressurized to consent to GCC policies in Bahrain and Yemen against Iran. Hence, security dependency, arms lust, middle-power politics and sectarianism remain key features of states' belligerency.

The fourth chapter, "The Intractable Security Dilemma" discusses post-2011 scenario emerging as a highly competitive and unstable strategic landscape due to security-insecurity paradigm. This has resulted in arms races and has led to a vicious cycle of threat perceptions; the fourth and final root cause of the Persian Gulf's insecurity. This makes the security dilemma intractable and promotes distrust amid a volatile regional outlook determined by fears of Persians, Shiites, populist Islamic movements, sectarianism, Daesh etc. The only way out of this security-insecurity paradigm is strong diplomacy, a functional forum and self-binding unilateral initiatives.

The final chapter, "Insecurity in the Persian Gulf" summarizes earlier chapters and gives the way forward by raising such fundamental questions as: What will be the role of the US? Would it follow Obama's doctrine of sharing the region by Saudi Arabia and Iran or will it be Trumps' twin pillar Saudi Arabia -Israeli doctrine, neither of which is favourable for peace in the region. Secondly, how will Iran respond after the demise of its supreme leadership? Will the role of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) be political or militarily oriented? Thirdly, what is the future of GCC? Mehran believes that technically GCC will cooperate and politically remain divided. Lastly, will the trends of energy politics and its long-term programs continue or change? Therefore, the role of natural resources in shaping domestic and foreign policies in the Persian Gulf must be modified and labelling of Iran as evil be ended to bring down the threat perceptions. American foreign policy needs to accept Russian regional access and integrate Iran into the regional security framework. Pentagon should opt for a non-military solution and support peaceful-coexistence between Iran and American allies, as well as replace balance of power gradually by balance of interests. The "us versus them" narrative is intensifying the role of sectarianism and belligerence rather than decreasing insecurities. The region needs gradual fixes of diplomacy, dialogue and courage via GCC's empowerment.

To conclude, though the book justifies its title, a greater focus remains on identifying problems than solutions. American interests in the region have been explained at length, but Russian and Chinese role has been completely ignored. Mehran initially claims to sidestep history but later devotes a lot of space discussing history by saying that the “longer historical horizon is necessary”. Although the book employs rational reasoning, yet repetition of arguments and different terms is time consuming. The author talks about the “us versus them” narrative in the current insecurity challenges but actually the “us versus them” divide was always present in this region; the only difference today is “us” is now losing over “them”. However, his book is a good read to understand the history, present and future of Middle-Eastern politics from a new unique perspective.

Reviewed by Gulmina Achakzai, M.phil Scholar at Department of International Relations, National Defence University, Islamabad.

Title: The Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage, and Fear in the Cyber Age**Author:** David E. Sanger**Publisher:** Crown Publishing Group: USA, 2018, 357.

In the era of modern information and communication technologies, the ability to conduct cyber operations has emerged as a significant offensive capability and emerging national security threat for several countries. David Sanger's *The Perfect Weapon* delves into matters such as how the thinking of security policymakers evolved regarding cyber threats, how strategies were formulated both for offensive and defensive capabilities, and how cyber operations are serving as an alternative to military action for states – for instance, the Stuxnet attack on Iranian nuclear facility and targeting of North Korean missile program.

Similarly, the book also provides details about the counter-cyber operations launched by America's adversaries, such as the Iranian cyber operations against American financial institutions. These operations against the USA created significant national security ramifications, spreading doubts among cyberspace users regarding their privacy, and questioning America's ability to protect itself from cyber-attacks.

In the book, Sanger focuses on what he terms as the seven sisters of the cyber conflict - the United States, Russia, China, Britain, Iran, Israel, and North Korea. He claims that today, in the cyber world, we have somewhat the same situation as in World War I. He contends that as no state could imagine itself without airpower after 1918, the modern states also cannot survive without equipping themselves with cyber capabilities. Currently, more than 30 states have their own cyber forces, which have helped conducting at least 200 state-to-state cyber-attacks over the past decade or so.

To explain the future uncertainty of cyber weapons, Sanger uses the analogy of an aircraft. In 1909, Wright Brothers were show-casing their invention by undertaking first flights. Fast forward to 1945, the invention of Wright brothers was being used to drop atomic bombs in Japan. In the given context, where the aircraft underwent tremendous transformations in less than four decades, the author argues likewise for cyber weapons, where it is impossible to fully imagine how dramatically these will alter the exercise of national power. He proceeds by saying that cyber conflict remains in a grey area between war and peace - an uneasy equilibrium which often remains at the brink of going out of control.

In the first chapter, Sanger explains in detail how the USA and Israel created and tested Stuxnet- describing it as the "most sophisticated cyber weapon in history" - before deploying it against the Iranian nuclear facility. The evolution of Iranian cyber capabilities and its retaliation against the USA, including attacking several financial institutions, is largely covered in the second chapter.

Sanger says that Edward Snowden's leaks resulted in an era where, for the first time in post-World War II history, American firms made a broad refusal of cooperation towards their government. He comprehensively discusses the leaks and their repercussions in the third and fourth chapters. Evolution of Chinese and North Korean cyber capabilities and operations are covered in the fifth and sixth chapters respectively.

In the remaining six chapters, the author discusses the foreign cyber operations launched against the USA, and the American administration's responses to these attacks. Chapter 11 discusses the reasons why American Cyber Command has not been up to the task in respect of undertaking cyber operations. The chapter also details the efforts undertaken to block Chinese investments in sensitive new technologies in the USA. The last chapter focuses on American cyber operation against the North Korean missile program and its repercussions.

While explaining the evolution of perceptions regarding cyber threats in the USA, the author explains how cyber-attacks, which were mentioned nowhere in the 2007 global "Threat Assessment", have rapidly emerged as the number one threat in the annual assessment prepared for the American Congress by the intelligence agencies. For the first time since the 1949 Soviet testing of the atomic bomb, an increased number of cyber-attacks have resulted in quick revision of the threat perception in the US.

Sanger says that despite American offensive prowess in the cyber domain, the country is becoming more vulnerable with each passing day. He blames Donald Trump and his predecessors for their failure to formulate what he calls "proportionate yet effective response" to foreign cyber operations. Consequently, America's adversaries have come to know that through cyber operations they can undercut the United States without provoking a military response.

The author is concerned over the absence of debates aimed at finding geopolitical and technological solutions to the current and future threats emerging from the cyber domain. Prior to formulating solutions to the emerging cyber threats, he argues that a few realities need to be acknowledged first by the American policymakers and cyberspace users. It has to be realized that American cyber capabilities are no longer unique. Both China and Russia have equally matching capabilities in the cyber domain, whereas Iran and North Korea are very likely to be on the path of enhancing their cyber capabilities. The author recommends that a guide should be formulated to direct how the US should respond to foreign cyber operations. He further argues that USA needs to demonstrate its willingness for using cyber weapons, in case foreign cyber operations cross a pre-defined redline.

Moreover, Sanger recommends that the American policymakers should be able enough to know and publicly attribute the origins of a particular cyber operation to a particular state. He suggests that the

American intelligence services should rethink their wisdom of maintaining secrecy around cyber capabilities; the secrecy about American cyber capabilities is impeding negotiations over formulating norms of behaviour in cyberspace. This in turn has allowed American adversaries to take advantage of this situation by interfering in American systems. He asserts that following the Snowden leaks and the Shadow Brokers, "America's adversaries have a pretty complete picture of how the United States breaks into the darkest corners of cyberspace."

While shifting his focus from American policymakers to cyberspace users, Mr. Sanger advocates that the world needs to move ahead in setting norms of behaviour for cyber domain, even if governments don't intend to move forward in this regard. He presents a case study in the form of Digital Geneva Convention., proposed by Microsoft President Brad Smith. The convention primarily aim at not assisting any government in launching a cyber-attack against "innocent civilians and enterprises from anywhere." Similarly, the signatories of the convention will assist any state which faces a foreign cyber-attack.

However, Mr. Sanger points out a number of weaknesses in the proposed convention, such as the fact that no company from China, Russia and Iran were part of the initial compact. Similarly, a number of American tech companies like Google and Amazon did not intend to be part of the Microsoft-led initiative. He also proposed that cyber-security awareness be disseminated among individuals. He believes that awareness among users of cyberspace alone can wipe out about 80 percent of daily cyber threats.

The Perfect Weapon presents a comprehensive overview of the modern cyber battlefield for lay-men and cyber security enthusiasts. In the book, the author discusses in detail the prominent cyber operations from Stuxnet to NotPetya and how the most active states in the cyber domain are shaping the future landscape of the fifth generation of warfare. Sanger has rightly pointed out that the future of cyber warfare is totally uncertain. Therefore, efforts have to be made for formulating rules and norms to ensure that the cyberspace does not become hostage to a few hands who, through simple key board strokes, aim to make it a source of destruction and havoc.

Reviewed by Fahad Nabeel, M.Phil Scholar, Department of International Relations, National Defence University, Islamabad.

DOCUMENTS

Document: 1

Joint Statement of President Donald J. Trump of the United States of America and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea at the Singapore Summit, June 12, 2018.

President Donald J. Trump of the United States of America and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) held a first, historic summit in Singapore on June 12, 2018.

President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un conducted a comprehensive, in-depth, and sincere exchange of opinions on the issues related to the establishment of new U.S.–DPRK relations and the building of a lasting and robust peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. President Trump committed to provide security guarantees to the DPRK, and Chairman Kim Jong Un reaffirmed his firm and unwavering commitment to complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Convinced that the establishment of new U.S.–DPRK relations will contribute to the peace and prosperity of the Korean Peninsula and of the world, and recognizing that mutual confidence building can promote the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un state the following:

1. The United States and the DPRK commit to establish new U.S.–DPRK relations in accordance with the desire of the peoples of the two countries for peace and prosperity.
2. The United States and the DPRK will join their efforts to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.
3. Reaffirming the April 27, 2018 Panmunjom Declaration, the DPRK commits to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
4. The United States and the DPRK commit to recovering POW/MIA remains, including the immediate repatriation of those already identified.

Having acknowledged that the U.S.–DPRK summit—the first in history—was an epochal event of great significance in overcoming decades of tensions and hostilities between the two countries and for the opening up of a new future, President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un commit to implement the stipulations in this joint statement fully and expeditiously. The United States and the DPRK commit to hold follow-on negotiations, led by the U.S. Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, and a

relevant high-level DPRK official, at the earliest possible date, to implement the outcomes of the U.S.–DPRK summit.

President Donald J. Trump of the United States of America and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have committed to cooperate for the development of new U.S.–DPRK relations and for the promotion of peace, prosperity, and security of the Korean Peninsula and of the world.

DONALD J. TRUMP

President of the United States of America

KIM JONG UN

Chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

June 12, 2018

Sentosa Island

Singapore

Source: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-president-donald-j-trump-united-states-america-chairman-kim-jong-un-democratic-peoples-republic-korea-singapore-summit/>

Document: 2**Trump's Speech on the Iran Nuclear Deal, Washington, May 8, 2018.**

President Trump announced on Tuesday that the United States will withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal and is preparing to reinstate all sanctions it had waived as part of the accord. The administration is planning to impose additional economic penalties as well.

The decision unravels the signature foreign policy achievement of his predecessor, President Barack Obama, and isolates the United States from its European allies.

The following is a transcript of his announcement, delivered from the Diplomatic Room of the White House.

PRESIDENT TRUMP: My fellow Americans,

Today, I want to update the world on our efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.

The Iranian regime is the leading state sponsor of terror. It exports dangerous missiles, fuels conflicts across the Middle East, and supports terrorist proxies and militias such as Hezbollah, Hamas, the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

Over the years, Iran and its proxies have bombed American Embassies and military installations, murdered hundreds of American service members, and kidnapped, imprisoned, and tortured American citizens.

The Iranian regime has funded its long reign of chaos and terror by plundering the wealth of its own people.

No action taken by the regime has been more dangerous than its pursuit of nuclear weapons — and the means of delivering them.

In 2015, the previous administration joined with other nations in a deal regarding Iran's nuclear program. This agreement was known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or J.C.P.O.A.

In theory, the so-called "Iran deal" was supposed to protect the United States and our allies from the lunacy of an Iranian nuclear bomb, a weapon that will only endanger the survival of the Iranian regime.

In fact, the deal allowed Iran to continue enriching uranium and — over time — reach the brink of a nuclear breakout.

The deal lifted crippling economic sanctions on Iran in exchange for very weak limits on the regime's nuclear activity — and no limits at all on its other malign behavior, including its sinister activities in Syria, Yemen, and other places all around the world.

In other words, at the point when the United States had maximum leverage, this disastrous deal gave this regime — and it's a regime of great terror — many billions of dollars, some of it in actual cash — a great embarrassment to me as a citizen and to all citizens of the United States.

A constructive deal could easily have been struck at the time, but it wasn't.

At the heart of the Iran deal was a giant fiction: that a murderous regime desired only a peaceful nuclear energy program.

Today, we have definitive proof that this Iranian promise was a lie. Last week, Israel published intelligence documents — long concealed by Iran — conclusively showing the Iranian regime and its history of pursuing nuclear weapons.

The fact is, this was a horrible, one-sided deal that should have never, ever been made. It didn't bring calm, it didn't bring peace, and it never will.

In the years since the deal was reached, Iran's military budget has grown by almost 40 percent — while its economy is doing very badly. After the sanctions were lifted, the dictatorship used its new funds to build its nuclear-capable missiles, support terrorism, and cause havoc throughout the Middle East and beyond.

The agreement was so poorly negotiated that even if Iran fully complies, the regime can still be on the verge of a nuclear breakout in just a short period of time. The deal's sunset provisions are totally unacceptable.

If I allowed this deal to stand, there would soon be a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Everyone would want their weapons ready by the time Iran had theirs.

Making matters worse, the deal's inspection provisions lack adequate mechanisms to prevent, detect, and punish cheating and don't even have the unqualified right to inspect many important locations, including military facilities. Not only does the deal fail to halt Iran's nuclear ambitions, but it also fails to address the regime's development of ballistic missiles that could deliver nuclear warheads.

Finally, the deal does nothing to constrain Iran's destabilizing activities, including its support for terrorism.

Since the agreement, Iran's bloody ambitions have grown only more brazen. In light of these glaring flaws, I announced last October that the Iran deal must either be renegotiated or terminated.

Three months later, on January 12th, I repeated these conditions. I made clear that if the deal could not be fixed, the United States would no longer be a party to the agreement.

Over the past few months, we have engaged extensively with our allies and partners around the world, including France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. We have also consulted with our friends from across the Middle East. We are unified in our understanding of the threat and in our conviction that Iran must never acquire a nuclear weapon.

After these consultations, it is clear to me that we cannot prevent an Iranian nuclear bomb under the decaying and rotten structure of the current agreement. The Iran deal is defective at its core. If we do nothing, we know exactly what will happen. In just a short period of time, the world's leading state sponsor of terror will be on the cusp of acquiring the world's most dangerous weapons.

Therefore, I am announcing today that the United States will withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal.

In a few moments, I will sign a presidential memorandum to begin reinstating U.S. nuclear sanctions on the Iranian regime. We will be instituting the highest level of economic sanction. Any nation that helps Iran in its quest for nuclear weapons could also be strongly sanctioned by the United States.

America will not be held hostage to nuclear blackmail. We will not allow American cities to be threatened with destruction. And we will not allow a regime that chants "Death to America" to gain access to the most deadly weapons on Earth.

Today's action sends a critical message. The United States no longer makes empty threats. When I make promises, I keep them. In fact, at this very moment, Secretary Pompeo is on his way to North Korea in preparation for my upcoming meeting with Kim Jong-un. Plans are being made, relationships are building. Hopefully, a deal will happen, and with the help of China, South Korea, and Japan, a future of great prosperity and security can be achieved for everyone.

As we exit the Iran deal, we will be working with our allies to find a real, comprehensive, and lasting solution to the Iranian nuclear threat. This will include efforts to eliminate the threat of Iran's ballistic missile program, to stop its terrorist activities worldwide, and to block its menacing activity across the Middle East.

In the meantime, powerful sanction also go into full effect. If the regime continues its nuclear aspirations, it will have bigger problems than it has ever had before. Finally, I want to deliver a message to the long-suffering people of Iran.

The people of America stand with you.

It has now been almost 40 years since this dictatorship seized power and took a proud nation hostage. Most of Iran's 80 million citizens have sadly never known an Iran that prospered in peace with its neighbors and commanded the admiration of the world.

But the future of Iran belongs to its people. They are the rightful heirs to a rich culture and an ancient land, and they deserve a nation that does justice to their dreams, honor to their history and glory to God.

Iran's leaders will naturally say that they refuse to negotiate a new deal. They refuse, and that's fine. I'd probably say the same thing if I was in their position. But the fact is, they are going to want to make a new and lasting deal, one that benefits all of Iran and the Iranian people.

When they do, I am ready, willing, and able. Great things can happen for Iran. And great things can happen for the peace and stability that we all want in the Middle East. There has been enough suffering, death, and destruction. Let it end now. Thank you. God bless you. Thank you.

REPORTER: Mr. President, how does this make America safer? How does this make America safer?

TRUMP: Thank you very much. This will make America much safer. Thank you very much.

REPORTER: Is Secretary Pompeo bringing the detainees home?

TRUMP: Secretary Pompeo is right now going to North Korea. He will be there very shortly, in a matter of virtual — probably an hour. He's got meetings set up. We have our meeting scheduled. We have our meeting set. The location is picked. The time and date. Everything is picked. And we look forward to having a very great success. We think relationships are building with North Korea. We'll see how it all works out. Maybe it will. Maybe it won't. But it can be a great thing for North Korea, South Korea, Japan, and the entire world. We hope it all works out. Thank you very much.

REPORTER: Are the Americans being freed?

TRUMP: We'll all soon be finding out. We will soon be finding out. It would be a great thing if they are. We'll soon be finding out. Thank you very much.

Source:<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/us/politics/trump-speech-iran-deal.html>

Document: 3**Chairman's Statement of the 32nd ASEAN Summit, Singapore, April 28, 2018.**

We, the Heads of State/Government of ASEAN Member States, gathered in Singapore for the 32nd ASEAN Summit on 28 April 2018. Our discussions emphasised building a resilient and innovative ASEAN, amidst rapid changes in Southeast Asia and beyond.

2. We reaffirmed the importance of maintaining ASEAN Centrality and unity in our Community-building efforts and engagement of external partners. We welcomed initiatives that reinforce an ASEAN-centric regional architecture that is open, transparent, inclusive and rules-based. These initiatives will build upon ASEAN-led mechanisms including the ASEAN Plus One, ASEAN Plus Three (APT), East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus). We looked forward to further discussion on recent initiatives, including the Indo-Pacific concept.

3. We reaffirmed our shared commitment to maintaining and promoting peace, security and stability in the region, as well as to the peaceful resolution of disputes, including full respect for legal and diplomatic processes, without resorting to the threat or use of force, in accordance with the universally recognised principles of international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

Key Deliverables

4. We adopted the ASEAN Leaders' Vision for a Resilient and Innovative ASEAN, as an articulation of ASEAN's strategic position and intent in the context of a 2 shifting geopolitical and economic landscape. We reaffirmed ASEAN's commitment to foundational principles enshrined in the ASEAN Charter, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) and the ASEAN Community Vision 2025. We agreed on the initiatives which ASEAN, as a grouping of developing countries, will undertake across its three pillars during Singapore's ASEAN Chairmanship this year, in response to current and emerging challenges.

5. We agreed on the growing importance for ASEAN Member States to leverage on innovation and technology to improve the lives of our people. In this regard, we agreed to establish an ASEAN Smart Cities Network (ASCN) to synergise development efforts, share best practices, and catalyse more opportunities for growth, innovation, capacity-building and sustainable development. We further agreed that the ASCN would promote an inclusive approach and take into account city-specific needs, potential, local and cultural uniqueness, as well as level of development. We took note with satisfaction the finalisation of the list of 26 ASCN 'pilot cities'.

ASEAN Political-Security Community

6. We adopted the ASEAN Leaders' Statement on Cybersecurity Cooperation in recognition of the growing urgency and sophistication of transboundary cyber threats. We tasked relevant Ministers from all ASEAN Member States to closely consider and recommend feasible options of coordinating cybersecurity policy, diplomacy, cooperation, technical and capacity building efforts among various platforms of the three pillars of ASEAN. We further tasked relevant Ministers from all ASEAN Member States to make progress on discussions by ASEAN Information and Communications Technology (ICT) and Cybersecurity Ministers at the ASEAN Ministerial Conference on Cybersecurity (AMCC), ASEAN Telecommunications and Information Technology Ministers' Meeting (TELMIN), as well as other relevant sectoral bodies such as the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC), to identify a concrete list of voluntary, practical norms of State behaviour in cyberspace that ASEAN can work towards adopting and implementing, and to strengthen cooperation on personal data protection in cyberspace. We recognised the importance of strengthening a coherent and comprehensive framework for personal data protection, in accordance with the domestic laws, policies and 3 regulations of ASEAN Member States. We acknowledged the work that has been done in fostering greater regional cybersecurity cooperation and capacity building through efforts such as Singapore's ASEAN Cyber Capacity Programme, and looked forward to the launching of the ASEAN-Japan Cybersecurity Capacity Building Centre in Bangkok.

7. We underscored the importance of the ADMM and ADMM-Plus as key components of the region's security architecture, which provide platforms for strategic dialogue and practical cooperation for the defence sector. We welcomed the Joint Statement by the ASEAN Defence Ministers on Countering Terrorism in ASEAN on 8 February 2018, and discussed the need for enhanced regional cooperation in countering terrorism and preventing violent extremism. We further support the annualisation of the ADMM-Plus and welcome the conduct of the ASEAN-China Maritime Exercise. We commended the on-going work of the AMMTC in developing the ASEAN Plan of Action to Prevent and Counter the Rise of Radicalisation and Violent Extremism.

8. We appreciated the ongoing work of the Directors-General of Immigration Departments and Heads of Consular Affairs Divisions of Ministries of Foreign Affairs Meeting (DGICM) in developing the Guidelines on Consular Assistance by ASEAN Member States Missions in Third Countries to Nationals of Other ASEAN Member States, and looked forward to the finalisation of the Guidelines before the 33rd ASEAN Summit.

9. We welcomed the finalisation of the text of the Model ASEAN Extradition Treaty (MAET) at the 8th meeting of the ASEAN Senior Law Officials Meeting (ASLOM) Working Group on the MAET in Bangkok from

26 to 28 March 2018. We looked forward to the draft text of the MAET being endorsed by the ASEAN Senior Law Officials Meeting (ASLOM) and the Law Ministers at the upcoming ASEAN Law Ministers Meeting (ALAWMM) in Vientiane in October 2018. We noted that work could commence on an ASEAN Extradition Treaty as a next step, to strengthen ASEAN's resilience and capacity to combat transnational crime, and to enhance cooperation within ASEAN to ensure respect for the rule of law. We also appreciated the ongoing work of the ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (ASEAN-IPR) and noted 4 that the signing of the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the ASEAN-IPR on Hosting and Granting Privileges and Immunities to the ASEAN-IPR on 1 February 2018 was a milestone for the ASEAN-IPR.

10. We remained resolute in our shared commitment to preserve the Southeast Asian region as a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone that is also free of all other weapons of mass destruction as enshrined in the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty and the ASEAN Charter. We reaffirmed our commitment to continuously engage the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and intensify the on-going efforts of all Parties to resolve all outstanding issues in accordance with the objectives and principles of the SEANWFZ Treaty.

11. We welcomed the successful convening of the 7th ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) and 5th Expanded AMF (EAMF) in Jakarta, Indonesia, from 6 to 7 December 2017, and encouraged stronger cooperation and constructive dialogue on maritime issues of common interests and concerns. We encouraged stronger coordination among ASEAN cross-sectoral bodies and other relevant ASEAN mechanisms such as the ARF, ADMM-Plus and the EAS in enhancing maritime cooperation in the region. We looked forward to the convening of the 8th AMF and 6th EAMF this year in the Philippines. ASEAN Economic Community

12. We applauded the economic thrusts identified by Singapore for 2018, i.e. promoting innovation and e-commerce; improving trade facilitation; deepening services and investment integration; cultivating a conducive regulatory environment; and progressing ASEAN's external relations; and acknowledged their potential contribution to a stronger ASEAN Economic Community. We welcomed the early adoption of the ASEAN Joint Declaration on Cruise Tourism, and recognised the good momentum this provides towards realising the other priority economic deliverables for the year. We commended our officials for intensifying work on trade facilitation. In particular, we welcomed the live operation of the ASEAN Single Window (ASW), which includes, among its features, the readiness of five ASEAN Member States, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam, to exchange the e-ATIGA 5 Form D beginning 1 January 2018. We encouraged the remaining ASEAN Member States to exert efforts to implementing the e-ATIGA Form D and also look forward to the expansion of the ASW to include other customs and trade-related

documents. We also noted the targeted implementation of the ASEAN-wide Self Certification Scheme within the year. We welcomed the proposed study on the feasibility of the implementation of an ASEAN-wide Mutual Recognition Agreement on Authorised Economic Operators. On services, we look forward to the signing of the Protocol to Implement the 10th Package of Commitments under the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) this year. We noted with appreciation the significant progress made in the negotiations for the ASEAN Trade in Services Agreement (ATISA), and look forward to the signing of the Agreement this year. We also noted the meeting of the Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors on 6 April 2018 in Singapore and the continued commitment towards financial integration by focusing on initiatives to sustain growth, boost resilience, and foster innovation.

13. Recognising the importance of capitalising on the opportunities presented by the digital age, and the need to promote cross-border electronic commerce (eCommerce) in the region, we are also pleased with the progress made so far in concluding negotiations for an ASEAN Agreement on Electronic Commerce and look forward to its signing this year. We noted the initiative to develop the ASEAN Digital Integration Framework to monitor the progress of ASEAN's digital integration. We also welcomed the initiative to develop the ASEAN Innovation Network, which aims to strengthen linkages between innovation ecosystems to spark new collaborations and solutions, and address the demand from the increasingly sophisticated and growing consumer base in the region. We tasked officials to continue efforts to better prepare the AEC for the digital age including through strengthening cross-sectoral coordination in the implementation of the ASEAN Work Programme on Electronic Commerce 2017- 2025. We also welcomed the Leaders' announcement at the ASEAN-Australia Special Summit on 18 March 2018 on the ASEAN-Australia Digital Trade Standards Cooperation Initiative, and tasked our officials to discuss and finalise the details of this initiative in a timely manner.

14. We supported the efforts made by both Indonesia and Malaysia to address the sustainability of palm oil.

ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community

15. We welcomed the renewal of the Singapore-ASEAN Youth Fund, with a S\$5 million top-up by Singapore to support ground-up initiatives by ASEAN youths, and noted the Regional Action Plan of the Vientiane Declaration on the Transition from Informal Employment to Formal Employment towards Decent Work Promotion in ASEAN. We also expressed support for Singapore's other priority areas under the ASCC pillar, including hosting the first ASEAN eSports tournament, introducing an ASEAN Youth Fellowship programme, strengthening ASEAN's commitment to addressing climate change, affirming the importance of digital literacy and cyber wellness, and developing a more socially

responsible media in ASEAN. We reiterated the need to institutionalise a culture of prevention to address the root causes of social issues, and called on all sectors from the three pillars to continue discussions to advance the culture of prevention.

16. We recalled the signing of the ASEAN Consensus on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers and looked forward to the adoption of its action plan at the 25th ASEAN Labour Ministers' Meeting (ALMM) in August 2018. We also recalled the adoption of the ASEAN Leaders Declaration on Antimicrobial Resistance and the ASEAN Leaders Declaration on Ending All Forms of Malnutrition at the 31st ASEAN Summit in Manila, and noted ongoing efforts by ASEAN to deepen cooperation in these areas. We noted with satisfaction ASEAN's efforts to promote complementarities between the ASEAN Community Vision 2025 and the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. We also noted Thailand's efforts to develop an ASEAN Centre for Sustainable Development Studies and Dialogue, as well as Thailand's proposal for an ASEAN Centre to look into promoting healthy and active ageing for the well-being of all in the society. We acknowledged the progress made in addressing trans-boundary haze pollution, and agreed on the need to remain vigilant.

17. We discussed and received a briefing from Myanmar on the humanitarian situation in Rakhine State. We expressed continued support for Myanmar's humanitarian relief programme in Rakhine State and welcomed the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA 7 Centre)'s ongoing work with the Myanmar Government-led mechanism to deliver humanitarian assistance to all displaced persons without discrimination. We welcomed the Arrangement on Return of Displaced Persons from Rakhine State between Myanmar and Bangladesh signed on 23 November 2017. We also looked forward to the expeditious commencement of the voluntary return of displaced persons to Myanmar in a safe, secure and dignified way without undue delay, and stressed the need to find a comprehensive and durable solution to address the root causes of the conflict and to create a conducive environment so that the affected communities can rebuild their lives. We urged Myanmar to continue to implement the recommendations of the final report of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State and welcomed the establishment of the Advisory Board for the implementation of the recommendations on Rakhine State led in his individual capacity by Prof. Dr. Surakiart Sathirathai, former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand. We expressed our support for the Myanmar Government in its efforts to bring peace, stability, the rule of law, to promote harmony and reconciliation among the various communities, as well as to ensure sustainable and equitable development in Rakhine State.

Initiative For ASEAN Integration

18. We noted the active roles of the Initiative of ASEAN Integration (IAI) Task Force, and welcomed the good progress in the implementation of the IAI Work Plan III to assist CLMV countries in meeting ASEAN-wide targets and in narrowing the development gap within ASEAN.

ASEAN Connectivity

19. We noted the importance of enhancing ASEAN Connectivity to build a more competitive, inclusive, resilient and integrated ASEAN Community, and valued the continued efforts by the ASEAN Connectivity Coordinating Committee (ACCC), National Coordinators (NCs), National Focal Points (NFPs) relevant ASEAN Sectoral Bodies as well as Dialogue Partners and external parties to implement projects under the 15 Initiatives of the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC) 2025. We also welcomed the establishment of the Lead Implementing Body for Sustainable Infrastructure in March 2018, to spearhead sustainable infrastructure development in the region. We further welcomed the ongoing efforts to: (a) establish an initial list of potential priority infrastructure projects; (b) conduct a study to advance sustainable urbanisation in ASEAN which is aimed at increasing the deployment of smart urbanisation models across ASEAN, complementing the ASCN, and developing the ASEAN Sustainable Urbanisation Strategy; and (c) review how micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises are responding to challenges posed by the digital economy.

ASEAN'S External Relations

20. We reaffirmed the important role of the APT cooperation framework in promoting peace, security, stability and prosperity in East Asia. We agreed to further strengthen the EAS as a Leaders-led forum for dialogue and cooperation on broad strategic, political, and economic issues of common concern. We looked forward to further strengthening the EAS by implementing the Manila Plan of Action to Advance the Phnom Penh Declaration on the EAS Development Initiative (2018-2022), including through the promotion of practical cooperation in new priority areas such as maritime cooperation. We welcomed the commemoration of the 25th anniversary of the ARF this year, and the strengthening of its role as an inclusive forum in the AsiaPacific region for fostering constructive dialogue and cooperation on political and security issues of common concern.

21. We took stock of ASEAN's relations with external partners, and discussed ways to expand and deepen our external engagement. We welcomed the successful convening of the ASEAN-India Commemorative Summit in New Delhi on 25 January 2018 and the ASEAN-Australia Special Summit in Sydney on 18 March 2018. We looked forward to the commemoration of the 15th Anniversary of ASEAN-China Strategic

Partnership and 45th Anniversary of ASEAN-Japan Dialogue Relations, which will add momentum to strengthen these partnerships. We agreed to further strengthen our cooperation with international and regional organisations in Asia, Europe, Latin America and Africa through meetings and concrete activities.

22. We are deeply concerned over the rising tide of protectionism and anti-globalisation sentiments. We also reiterated ASEAN's continued support for the multilateral trading system and reaffirmed our commitment to uphold the open 9 regionalism principle while maintaining ASEAN centrality. We are committed to keeping the momentum towards improving ASEAN+1 FTAs and deepening our engagement with other trading partners. We encouraged the swift conclusion of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations, in line with the mandate provided by the 1st RCEP Summit and based on the Guiding Principles and Objectives for Negotiating the RCEP. To this end, we instructed Ministers and officials to exert all efforts to resolve outstanding issues to bring the RCEP negotiations to a conclusion expeditiously. We also look forward to the early implementation of the ASEAN Hong Kong, China (HKC) Free Trade and Investment Agreements, which were signed in November 2017.

Regional And International Issues And Developments

23. We reaffirmed the importance of maintaining and promoting peace, security, stability, safety and freedom of navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea and recognised the benefits of having the South China Sea as a sea of peace, stability and prosperity. We underscored the importance of the full and effective implementation of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in its entirety. We warmly welcomed the improving cooperation between ASEAN and China and were encouraged by the official commencement of the substantive negotiations towards the early conclusion of an effective Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) on a mutually-agreed timeline. We welcomed practical measures that could reduce tensions, and the risks of accidents, misunderstandings and miscalculation, such as the successful testing of the ASEAN Member States and China MFA-to-MFA hotline to manage maritime emergencies in the South China Sea, and the operationalisation of the Joint Statement on the Application of the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) in the South China Sea adopted on 7 September 2016. We discussed the matters relating to the South China Sea and took note of the concerns expressed by some Leaders on the land reclamations and activities in the area, which have eroded trust and confidence, increased tensions and may undermine peace, security and stability in the region. We reaffirmed the need to enhance mutual trust and confidence, exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities and avoid actions that may further complicate the situation, and pursue peaceful

resolution of disputes in accordance with international law, including the 1982 10 UNCLOS. We emphasized the importance of non-militarisation and self-restraint in the conduct of all activities by claimants and all other states, including those mentioned in the DOC that could further complicate the situation and escalate tensions in the South China Sea.

24. We welcomed the Inter-Korean Summit on 27 April 2018, the recent visit of Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) leader Kim Jong Un to China, the announcement of plans for a meeting between US President Donald Trump and DPRK leader Kim in the near future, as well as efforts by the Republic of Korea and all concerned parties to reduce tensions and work towards a peaceful resolution of the situation on the Korean Peninsula. We also noted the DPRK's reported commitment to denuclearisation and its pledge to refrain from further nuclear and missile tests during this period. We reiterated our support for international efforts to bring about the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner and expressed hope for a peaceful and amicable resolution to the issue.

Other Matters

25. We noted the expansive and transformative changes brought about by the Fourth Industrial Revolution. We recognised the need for ASEAN to take a holistic and long-term perspective in assessing and building its readiness for the new era, by addressing related challenges and developing capabilities to capitalise on the new opportunities presented. To this end, we look forward to the timely completion of the ASEAN Secretariat's study on ASEAN's readiness for the Fourth Industrial Revolution. 26. To enhance policy coherence, efficiency and coordination across the three ASEAN Community Pillars, we encouraged the expeditious secondment of officials from the AEC and ASCC Pillars to the Permanent Missions of ASEAN Member States to ASEAN in Jakarta. We looked forward to the completion of the construction of the new ASEAN Secretariat building in early 2019, which would not only enhance the ASEAN Secretariat's ability to host ASEAN meetings, but also reduce costs and underline ASEAN unity and centrality. We further noted the need for the ASEAN 11 Secretariat to enhance its analysis and monitoring capacity to fully support ASEAN Member States in their regional integration and Community-building efforts.

Source:<https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Chairmans-Statement-of-the-32nd-ASEAN-Summit.pdf>.

Document: 4**President Xi Jinping's speech, "Turn Our Vision into a Reality" at the Plenary Session of the 10th BRICS summit in Johannesburg, South Africa, July 26, 2018.**

Your Excellency President Cyril Ramaphosa,
Your Excellency President Michel Temer,
Your Excellency President Vladimir Putin,
Your Excellency Prime Minister Narendra Modi,

Let me begin by thanking President Ramaphosa and the South African government for their warm hospitality and thoughtful arrangements. The BRICS Summit is convened in Africa again after a lapse of five years. This is an occasion to celebrate.

The theme of this summit - "BRICS in Africa: Collaborating for Inclusive Growth and Shared Prosperity in the 4th Industrial Revolution" - is most fitting under the current circumstances. The previous three industrial revolutions were all characterized by transformative advancement in science and technology: the rise of mechanization in the 18th century, the harnessing of electricity in the 19th century, and the advent of the Information Age in the 20th century. Such breakthroughs have greatly unleashed social productivity and significantly improved people's living standards, thus profoundly reshaping the course of human history.

Today, we are experiencing another revolution in science, technology and industry, which is greater in scope and depth. Breakthroughs are being made in quick succession in frontier technologies like big data and artificial intelligence. New technologies, business models and industries are emerging one after another. Countries around the world have found their interests and future tied together like never before.

That said, we have yet to sustain global growth with new driving forces and to address the North-South imbalance and other deep-seated structural problems. What's more, constant flare-ups of geopolitical conflicts and the escalation of protectionism and unilateralism are directly affecting the external development environment of emerging markets and developing countries.

History keeps surging forward independent of people's wish. We the BRICS countries must therefore have a keen grasp of the trend of our times, deepen our strategic partnership, and consolidate our cooperation framework underpinned by economic, political and security cooperation and people-to-people exchanges. This way, we will be able to turn our vision of a second "Golden Decade" into a reality, and together build a community with a shared future for mankind.

First, we must unlock the enormous potential of our economic cooperation. Closer economic cooperation for shared prosperity is the

original purpose and priority of BRICS cooperation. It is also in the economic field that we enjoy the most promising, diverse and fruitful cooperation. We need to step up trade, investment, economic, financial, and connectivity cooperation to make this pie still bigger. At the same time, we must work together at the United Nations, the Group of 20, and the World Trade Organization to safeguard the rule-based multilateral trading regime, promote trade and investment liberalization and facilitation, and reject protectionism outright.

It is important that we continue to pursue innovation-driven development and build a Partnership on New Industrial Revolution to strengthen coordination on macroeconomic policies, find more complementarities in our development strategies, and reinforce each other's efforts in renewing economic driving forces and upgrading economic structure. In this context, China will host ten human resources development programs during which experts of our five countries will be invited to draw up a blueprint for our cooperation in the new industrial revolution. By so doing, we hope to enhance the competitiveness of not only BRICS countries but also other emerging markets and developing countries.

Second, we must safeguard global peace and security. Political and security cooperation is an important component of BRICS strategic partnership. We should stay committed to multilateralism and to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. We should call on all parties to abide by international law and basic norms governing international relations and to settle disputes through dialogue and differences through consultation. By fully leveraging the role of BRICS meetings of foreign ministers, national security advisers and permanent representatives to the United Nations, we can make our voice heard, put forth our solutions, and jointly work for a new type of international relations featuring mutual respect, equality, justice and win-win cooperation.

Third, we must expand people-to-people exchanges. We the BRICS countries boast great civilizations. When it comes to cultural and people-to-people exchanges, there is a lot we can do together. As a matter of fact, such exchanges have notably gained momentum over the last year or two. We should aim at greater people-to-people connectivity and more popular support for BRICS cooperation through extensive exchanges in cultural, educational, health, sports, tourism and other areas. China would therefore like to suggest joint touring exhibitions by the BRICS alliances of museums, art museums, national galleries, and libraries and closer cooperation in the cultural, creative and tourism industries and at the sub-national level. This way, we can spread the BRICS story far and wide to further enhance the mutual understanding and traditional friendship among our people.

Fourth, we must build a network of closer partnerships. Since the inception of the BRICS mechanism, openness and inclusiveness have remained our abiding commitment. The "BRICS Plus" approach we

adopted at the Xiamen Summit is designed to strengthen the unity and coordination among BRICS members for greater cohesion and, at the same time, to keep broadening the BRICS "circle of friends" in a joint pursuit of shared development and prosperity for all emerging markets and developing countries. We may explore "BRICS Plus" cooperation within the United Nations, the G20, and other frameworks to advance the common interests and boost the development space for emerging markets and developing countries, thus contributing more to world peace and development through broader partnerships.

Colleagues,

The future of BRICS is in the hands of our people. Let us work together with the rest of the international community for an open, inclusive, clean and beautiful world that enjoys lasting peace, universal security and common prosperity.

Thank you.

Source:<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201807/27/WS5b5a7b59a31031a351e90826.html>

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Journal of Contemporary Studies is published bi-annually in Winter and Summer by the Faculty of Contemporary Studies, NDU. Research Scholars who wish to contribute their original, unpublished articles and book reviews to the Journal may submit these by the end of March for the Summer edition and by the end of September for the Winter edition. Manuscript submitted for JCS should be original and not submitted anywhere else. Once accepted for publishing after peer review, the author cannot withdraw the article. Papers/articles should not be longer than 7000 words or less than 5500 words, with an abstract of about 150-200 words. Reviews of recent books by scholars of standing in their field may comprise 1100-1500 words. Authors are required to submit both soft and hard copies, along with their brief introduction, in MS Word format to the editor at the following address:

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Rs.350.00 annually (two issues) inclusive of postage.

Overseas: US\$10.00 per copy inclusive of postage.
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Printed by
NDU Press, Islamabad