

Journal of Contemporary Studies

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Editor's Note

The *Journal of Contemporary Studies* is a flagship publication of the Faculty of Contemporary Studies (FCS), National Defence University (NDU), Islamabad. The journal offers its readers in academia, government and the policymaking world in-depth and scholarly analyses, diverse policy perspectives on important contemporary issues, and ongoing debates in the areas of national and international security, public policy and the wider field of world politics.

This issue of the journal comprises of five articles, three book reviews and four documents providing valuable primary information on significant international developments. The first article *The Role of Artificial Intelligence in the Enhancement of Cyber Security of Pakistan* by Zeeshan Javed examines the potential of AI based cyber security architecture over traditional cyber security approaches as a response to rising cyber-attacks in the world over. Using Pakistan as a case study, it argues that by preferring an AI-based architecture over a traditional cyber-security approach, the national decision makers can enhance its cyber-security against impending cyber-attacks.

The second article *Revisiting Blue Economy: Challenges and Prospects for the Maritime Sector of Pakistan* by Rutt Syed and Ayisha Safdar maps out the potential of blue economic growth for Pakistan. Drawing upon international shift from Green economy to Blue economy, it argues that country needs to gear maritime sector for the economic development. For that, there is a need to securitize the Blue Economic concept in Pakistan that will not only ensure human security of the coastal population of Pakistan but also help in the economic progress of the country.

The third article *Maternal Influence on Youth Radicalization – A Case Study of District Multan* by Shaista Malik and Salma Malik analyses the underlying reasons of teenage radicalization and posits that the mother-child relationship is at the core of the child's resistance to such radicalization. Using John Bowlby's Attachment theory, the study demonstrates social status, education, and religious beliefs of mothers significantly influence teenage radicalization, and their inclination towards extremist views and behaviour.

The fourth article *Pak-Afghan Border: Demarcation and Management* by Lutf ur Rehman relying on primary sources discusses the history of demarcation of Durand Line contested by Afghanistan and

argues that it has complicated the border management and affected the relationship between the two countries. The study argues that an Integrated Border Management System can secure border from illegal border crossing and smuggling.

The fifth article, *Covid-19: Shifting Global Socio-Economic Dynamics and Foreign Policy Decision-Making; Second Image Reinforced* by Maliha Zeba Khan explores the relationship between Covid-19 and global socio-economic dynamics and their impact on the foreign policy making of the states. Using Kenneth Waltz's level of analysis approach within structural realism the research reinforces the importance of second image (Second Level) and argues (using the case studies of USA and China) that in the post Covid world, the relevance of second image in states' foreign policy making is reinforced.

I am grateful to all the contributors who have sent their articles for this issue, and the anonymous peer-reviewers whose valuable comments helped authors to improve their contributions. We are accepting articles for the upcoming issue of the *Journal of Contemporary Studies* based on original qualitative or quantitative research, an innovative conceptual framework or a substantial literature review that opens new areas of inquiry and investigation. The editorial team at the journal promotes submissions from expert analysts from around the world. The Journal seeks to promote a scholarly understanding of contemporary issues pertaining to traditional and non-traditional security, peace studies, public policy and human resource development. It intends to stimulate interdisciplinary research and writing.

Editor
Prof. Dr. Shaheen Akhtar

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THE ROLE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE ENHANCEMENT OF CYBER SECURITY OF PAKISTAN

Zeeshan Javed*

Abstract

With rapid advances in technology related to Artificial Intelligence (AI), there has been an increase in the use of AI-based algorithms in automating processes. In terms of the cyber domain, there has also been the development of new architectures that utilize AI-based programming. This article seeks to understand what is the potential of current AI-based cyber-security architecture and what benefits does it present over traditional cyber-security approaches. It uses Pakistan as a case study to justify the use of an AI-based approach. And it argues that by preferring an AI-based architecture to a traditional cyber-security approach, Pakistan can bolster its cyber-security when it comes to defence against cyber-attacks.

Keywords: Artificial Neural Networks, Artificial Intelligence, Cyber-security, Hacking, Malware, Cyber Kill-Chain

Introduction

Cyber-attacks have become a common occurrence in the modern world. With the ever-increasing digitization, the menace of cyber-attacks have also increased manifold. However, a difficult aspect of cyber-attacks is their nature of anonymity and their ability to cause disruption on a wide scale. An example of this is the ransomware attack on Colonial Pipelines in the US, causing widespread fuel shortages in the country.¹ Similarly, data breaches are also an aspect of cyber-attacks where the aim is to sabotage or gather intelligence against an adversary in the cyber domain. With cyberspace being termed as a new global

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¹ Grace Segers, "Cyberattack Prompts Major Pipeline Operator to Halt Operations," *CBS News*, May 9, 2021, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news>

common,² such attacks in the cyber realm may bring about disruption and uncertainty in the near future.

Pakistan is not immune to such cyber-attacks. A recent report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) suggests that India's offensive cyber capabilities are more Pakistan-focused and that Delhi is increasing its offensive capabilities through modern technologies, shared by its international partners.³ Recently, India-based espionage in Pakistan has also been uncovered. The revelations of the "Pegasus" program, a spyware designed to tap into mobile phones, shed light on the use of offensive cyber capabilities to conduct espionage on domestic as well as foreign elements. The chief among which were Pakistani politicians.⁴

Such offensive policies are reflected in an increase of cyberattacks on Pakistan in the form of government and military websites being hacked. After the Pulwama attack, Indian hackers took down over 200 Pakistani websites.⁵ The modern-day attacks have become even more dangerous because they have directly targeted the financial institutions of Pakistan through offensive cyber capabilities.⁶ With the increased digitization of the banking sector in Pakistan, this may pose a considerable threat and create widespread disruption and financial losses. India has also militarized its cyber capabilities by raising a tri-service command under the name "Defence Cyber Agency". This agency is responsible for Indian military's offensive cyber capabilities.⁷ Therefore, one may argue that India is likely to increase cyberattacks against its adversaries, in particular Pakistan.

Besides, there are Non-State related cyber-security threats. Social media accounts of Pakistani embassies in Serbia and Argentina were

² Binu Joseph and Mohanan B. Pillai, "The Cyberspace as a Distinct Domain of the Global Commons: An Analysis of Cyberspace Governance," *Global Commons: Issues, Concerns and Strategies* (SAGE books, 2020), 125.

³ International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Cyber Capabilities and National Power: A Net Assessment*, (2021), <https://www.iiss.org/blogs/research-paper/2021/06/cyber-capabilities-national-power>.

⁴ News Desk, "Pegasus Snooping: Pakistan Probes whether PM Khan's Phone Hacked," *Aljazeera*, July 20, 2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/20/>

⁵ News Desk, "Pulwama Attack: Pakistani Websites Hacked, Here's the List," *Times of India*, February 18, 2019, <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/gadgets-news/>

⁶ News Desk, "Cyberattack Disrupts National Bank of Pakistan Services," *Dawn*, October 31, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1655059>.

⁷ News Desk, "Agencies take Shape for Special Operations, Space, Cyber War," *The Times of India*, June 12, 2019, <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india>.

hacked.⁸ These hacks could be due to an insider but they present a cybersecurity threat to Pakistan. Due to the anonymous nature of the cyber domain, it is difficult to identify the origins of the attack and therefore the authorities can hardly distinguish a state-based attack from a Non-State Actor (NSA) originated attack. Thus, Pakistan faces multiple challenges to its cyber-security.

This study uses Pakistan as a case study to understand the potential advantages of AI-based cyber-security architecture. It uses an exploratory approach to investigate the potential of AI-based cyber-security models and their efficacy in dealing with threats. The research findings would provide guidelines for Pakistani policymakers and help developing an understanding about the future of Pakistani cybersecurity - using AI and ANN based cybersecurity. The reason why AI may be suitable is the fact that AI has the ability to recognize patterns in vast amounts of data. Through the utilization of data mining techniques, AI has now become a staple in modern cyber development. Many websites utilize AI to streamline their data usage and understand consumer patterns that is useful in developing an effective marketing strategy to cater to those patterns.⁹

Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) are AI models that rely on the use of various computational nodes integrated into connections much like those found in the biological brain.¹⁰ These "artificial neurons" resemble the working of a biological brain and are aggregated in the form of layers.¹¹ Through these layers, data is computed and translated into information. The ANN models are unique because they take inspiration from the biological working of the human brain and try to recreate the neural pathways digitally.¹² These artificial neurons act as a filtration layer and are responsible for extracting a specific set of data from the data set and then the final layer is responsible for deducting a result.¹³ This allows ANNs to have the ability to reproduce and even model complex non-linear

⁸ Mateen Haider, "Twitter Account of Pak Embassy in Belgrade Hacked," *The Nation*, December 4, 2021.

⁹ Michael Negnevitsky, *Artificial Intelligence A Guide to Intelligent Systems* (Essex: Pearson Education, 2007) 26.

¹⁰ Marcel Van Gerven and Sander Bohte, "Editorial: Artificial Neural Networks as Models of Neural Information Processing," *Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience* 11 (2017): 12.

¹¹ Utku Kose, "An Artificial Neural Networks Based Software System for Improved Learning Experience," *2013 12th International Conference on Machine Learning and Applications*, 2013, 7.

¹² Kose, "Artificial Neural Networks," 8.

¹³ Ibid.

tasks and processes.¹⁴ Due to such properties, ANNs are used effectively in various fields from pattern recognition¹⁵ to face identification¹⁶ to medical diagnosis¹⁷ to visualization.¹⁸ Such vast applications of the ANNs allow them to be a versatile solution to a various problems.

What has really allowed AI to become a revolution in the field of cybersecurity is its unique aspect of automation and self-sufficiency. The AI models, particularly the ANNs, have the potential to develop a complex machine that can predict and recognize patterns of attack and devise counterstrategies to combat the threat. This is done in an automated manner allowing for a fast, efficient and optimized response to the attack. Already ANN based models are used to predict electricity prices based on consumption and user patterns.¹⁹ Through such models, there is a possibility to monitor and predict cyber-attacks on the infrastructure and formulate an effective response. ANNs can be designed to differentiate between authentic and malicious cyber activity and then take appropriate actions if the activity is deemed malicious.²⁰

Traditional cybersecurity models have been designed for the involvement of humans in a large manner. Unfortunately, such models have their limitations. Human errors caused due to factors like fatigue either delay the response or are incapable of recognizing and predicting the attack. Such challenges may be countered through the development of a cyber-security architecture centered on an effective AI algorithm that monitors and contains threats as well as launch counter offensives.

In Pakistan, AI and in particular ANN-based cyber-security models may provide a more adept solution. In this regard, three research questions are important to answer. First, what are the traditional cybersecurity methods that are currently incorporated? By understanding these traditional models, the authorities can establish a premise of the advantages and disadvantages of the traditional approaches of

¹⁴ Guang-Bin Huang, Qin-Yu Zhu, and Chee-Kheong Siew, "Extreme Learning Machine: Theory and Applications," *Neurocomputing* 70, no. 1-3 (2006): 493.

¹⁵ Nandini Sengupta, Md Sahidullah, and Goutam Saha, "Lung Sound Classification Using Cepstral-Based Statistical Features," *Computers in Biology and Medicine* 75 (2016): 121.

¹⁶ Sengupta, Sahidullah, and Saha, "Lung Sound Classification," 122.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Sam Schechner, "Facebook Boosts AI to Block Terrorist Propaganda," *The Wall Street Journal*, June 15, 2017.

¹⁹ Hong Chen, C.A. Canizares, and A. Singh, "ANN-based Short-Term Load Forecasting in Electricity Markets," *2001 IEEE Power Engineering Society Winter Meeting. Conference Proceedings (Cat. No.01CH37194)*, 56.

²⁰ Robin Nix and Jian Zhang, "Classification of Android Apps and Malware using Deep Neural Networks," *International Joint Conference on Neural Networks (IJCNN)*, 2017.

cybersecurity. The also provides an understanding of how modern cyberthreats manifest themselves. The second question deals with the potential of AI in cybersecurity models. It helps us understand the potential that AI can have when it comes to the detection, prevention and response to threats in the cyber realm and what are advantages of AI-based cybersecurity models compared to traditional cybersecurity approaches. Finally, the question that this research will attempt to answer is that why should an AI-based cybersecurity model be implemented in Pakistan, and if it is to be implemented what can be the future trajectory? The final question serves as a policy-relevant finding for the decision makers of the country and it will help to provide an executable model. It also provides an assessment of the cyber eco-system of Pakistan and helps us understand whether it is relevant to employ AI-based cyber-security architecture? To answer these questions, this study uses scientific literature to establish the premise of AI and ANNs to provide technically relevant research to the scope of cybersecurity.

Traditional Approaches to Cybersecurity and Cyberthreat

Cybersecurity has emerged as an important facet of security in the non-traditional paradigm. The conventional security tools employed in the initial stages of cybersecurity were designed to locate and identify viruses based on their signatures and to deny their execution. This meant, they would attempt to negate them before they did any damage to the target system.²¹ However, with the advance in technology, states have enhanced the ability to provide effective security options. These systems are designed to provide a wide area of coverage and to ensure the protection of the systems from cyber threats. This is important, because with the widespread usage of computers in today's world, it has now become even more important to ensure that these systems are protected. Nonetheless, the threats have also evolved. Modern cyber threats comprise a variety of attacks and intend to harm a variety of target systems.

To ensure a more comprehensive coverage in the face of evolving cyber threats, the threat response needs to evolve as well. Conventional cybersecurity methods can be slow and inflexible in their response to these threats.²² To that end, the modern role of AI can help bolster the strength of cybersecurity response to these threats. A modern cyber-attack consists of multiple phases that an attack goes through to ensure its

²¹ Nadine Wirkuttis and Hadas Klein, "Artificial Intelligence in Cybersecurity," *Cyber, Intelligence, and Security* 1, no. 1 (January 2017): 109.

²² Amjad Rehman and Tanzila Saba, "Evaluation of Artificial Intelligent Techniques to Secure Information In Enterprise," *Artificial Intelligence Review* 42, no. 4 (December 2014): 22.

success. This is termed the *Cyber Kill-Chain*, a term coined by Lockheed Martin.²³ The Cyber Kill-Chain is designed and aimed at systematically finding the opposition's weakness and inflicting maximum damage in the cyber domain. The Cyber Kill-Chain may consist of the following phases:²⁴

- **Reconnaissance** – Attacker locates gaps and vulnerabilities of target system
- **Weaponizing** – Based on the weaknesses found, the attacker creates a targeted malicious code
- **Delivery** – The transfer of the malware/virus to the intended system
- **Exploit** – Execution of the malicious code
- **Install** – The attacker installs their malicious code into the target system
- **Control** – The attacker now has control of the target system and uses it for malicious intent
- **Counteraction** – The target system realizes that an attack is taking place and takes action to prevent damage or even counterattack

It is noteworthy that cybersecurity is unique as compared to other forms of traditional security because there are a variety of threats emanating from different sources and each source brings with it, its own unique challenges. In the modern era, non-governmental organizations, governments and even individuals carry out cyber-attacks.²⁵ Moreover, there are no geographical boundaries to threats, suggesting that everyone is potentially at risk of cyber-attack from different entities. Reasons for these cyber-attacks can also vary from financial, military to political domains.

Keeping in view the Cyber Kill-Chain, attempts have been made to provide a more holistic approach to cybersecurity, like introduction of the Integrated Security Approach (ISA). The ISA aims to provide early warning by essentially installing systems that create awareness of a possible intrusion in the system.²⁶ In the Kill Chain, the ISA aims to limit the damage and access of the malicious entity. If early detection of the security breach is not possible, the ISA model implements damage containment and counteraction steps. Along with this, the ISA model aims to roll back the data to its initial state to negate any damage that the intrusion might have done.²⁷

²³ "Cyber Kill Chain," Lockheed Martin, <https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/capabilities/cyber/cyber-kill-chain.html>.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Rehman and Saba, "Evaluation of Artificial Intelligent Techniques," 19.

²⁷ Ibid., 20.

The ISA framework is a comprehensive and holistic framework designed to ensure cybersecurity. The emphasis of this model is on preventing attacks and ensuring early detection of intrusions. The aim of the ISA model in the first three phases of the Cyber Kill-Chain is to ensure a timely detection and alert of an intruder in the system. Once it is detected, the aim is to limit the damage caused by the attack and disable the malicious hack's execution. Considering Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) under the ISA framework, the aim is to deconstruct a cyber-attack to uncover clues and patterns that make one aware of the nature and purpose of attack. Using this, the ISA model can be made more robust in order to ensure that in the future such attacks are detected much earlier and neutralized without even giving a chance to reach the exploit stage. These *data tracks* are what enable cyber investigators to ascertain the motive of the hackers and the tools used to achieve those motives. To ensure an effective ISA,²⁸ it is important to have a robust method of cyber intelligence, which requires the monitoring and collection of data that identify potential threats and weak areas in a system. However, gathering cyber intelligence is not as easy and straightforward as it may seem.

The collection of information from data is a complex and time-consuming process. It is not easy to extract useful information from a vast data set: in fact, the complexity increases during cyber intelligence. Due to the vast use of computers and the proliferation of the cyber realm, data has grown exponentially.²⁹ This means, to locate data tracks, an extensive combing of vast amounts of data sets, which is a tall order, given the massive array of data sets. This problem is further complicated by the lack of homogeneity in the dataset.³⁰ Due to the different systems being used to achieve different objectives, there is no uniformity in the data that is being produced. Topology and different behaviours of systems on networks also mean that there is a diverse array of data is being produced. This means that there is not only a massive amount of data but also diverse array of data. Finally, another issue in gathering cyber intelligence is the high data velocity, meaning the rate with which new data is being produced and processed. High data velocities indicate that there is a constant stream of data coming through at a higher rate and that means that there is more strain on the data collection system because it has to keep up with a constant stream of new data and then process it and convert it into useful intelligence.³¹

²⁸ Selma Dilek, Huseyin Cakir, and Mustafa Aydin, "Applications of Artificial Intelligence to Combating Cyber Crimes: A Review," *International Journal of Artificial Intelligence & Applications* 6, no. 1 (2015): 23.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 24.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ *Ibid.*

The challenges of data collection in the cyber domain indicate that there is a need to have a system in place that can constantly evolve and adjust to be more efficient in data collection and gathering intelligence. To achieve this objective, the development of Intrusion Detection Prevention Systems (IDPS) is an important facet. IDPS, in essence, is a tailor made hardware/software that is designed to protect networks and systems from intrusions by looking at the data that is gathered.³² There are two main approaches to develop IDPS: the *Anomaly Detection Approach* and the *Misuse Detection Approach*--both approaches are designed on the similar approach of recognizing patterns. The patterns that these approaches recognize vary. The Anomaly Detection Approach primes IDPS to recognize and identify normal network or system behaviour.³³ Once the baseline is established, the IDPS then looks for patterns that are not similar to the baseline and immediately flags them. The Misuse Detection Approach, on the other hand, establishes a baseline of malicious activities by highlighting the patterns of malicious activity in a network or a system. If such a pattern is recognized by the IDPS, then that activity is flagged.³⁴ In both approaches, cyber experts identify the patterns on the basis of their practical knowledge of modern cyber threats. These methods are primed to use pattern recognition to determine threats and the nature or severity of these threats. However, a crucial issue that remains with IDPS is the fact that cyber threats are constantly evolving and changing. Newer threats are constantly emerging which may not be programmed in these IDPS as a pattern to raise alarms. IDPS is more of a traditional approach towards cybersecurity; it is designed to pre-program cyber threats and has systems constantly checking against these baselines. The main problem with these traditional approaches is that they rely on the existing body of knowledge and are not prepared or designed to innovate or be proactive.³⁵

These systems are designed around pre-set patterns and programmed cyber threats, which creates issues regarding their ability to detect genuine threats. An IDPS' detection is based around the idea of detecting abnormalities or signatures of malicious software. However, this also leads to many cases being false negatives because of the IDPS' inability to recognize newer cyber threats³⁶ and conversely, it also creates false positives because of the erroneous definition of normal working

³² Enn Tyugu, "Artificial Intelligence in Cyber Defense," *Proceedings of 3rd International Conference on Cyber Conflict (ICCC)*, June 2011, 99.

³³ Xiao-bin Wang et al., "Review on the Application of Artificial Intelligence in Antivirus Detection System," *Cybernetics and Intelligent Systems*, 2008, 506.

³⁴ Wang, 506.

³⁵ Tyugu, "Artificial Intelligence in Cyber Defense," 99.

³⁶ Ibid.

patterns in a network.³⁷ This creates another major issue and that is scalability of the systems. As these systems are designed to operate on pattern recognition in large data sets, this means that IDPS are slow and unable to be replicated in large networks with a much larger traffic flow. The biggest issue with the IDPS is the lack of automation. These systems are not designed to learn new patterns by themselves or adapt to a change of the cyber domain. Instead, they rely on their programming to function as an effective ISA. From pattern recognition to error messages, everything has to be updated manually.³⁸ This means that a large number of manpower and time is required to maintain and update these IDPS and keep them effective in a large network. Thus, traditional IDPS require a large amount of human and financial resources to operate optimally and even then, they are slow and tend to produce false results.

The Role of AI in Cybersecurity

With the constant evolution and development of cyber systems, there has been an increase of their usage in modern businesses and infrastructure needs. From water filtration plants to nuclear plants, vast computer networks are now in place in various forms and functions. It is noteworthy that this vast computerization has enhanced coordination among different nodes of basic facilities. This phenomenon is not simply limited to government organizations but is also evident in the interaction of private businesses and corporations. With such a vast array of different networks communicating and coordinating with each other, there is the development of an intrinsic form of an ecosystem with a varied array of demands and potential threats.

Thus, the main issue with IDPS is that they are not autonomous and rely on humans for their optimum functioning, which is a time-consuming process. Ensuring cybersecurity in a system or a network requires a basic form of intelligence and cognizance that, unfortunately, traditional IDPS cannot provide due to their pre-programmed nature. In this regard, AI can provide a breakthrough to ensure an autonomous, holistic and robust network defense. AI, has demonstrated the ability to identify and recognize patterns much more quickly than their human counterparts. Moreover, IDPS are designed to function around the premise of pattern recognition to flag and thwart cyber-attacks. Therefore, the integration of AI into a cybersecurity model provides a reactive and flexible model that is autonomous and can effectively prevent and counter cyber-attacks. AI vastly improves data acquisition and can limit the effects of variables such as the amount of data or the velocity of data. These features allow cybersecurity experts to develop a much more adept and

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

efficient system at dealing with cybersecurity threats emanating in various domains.

The incorporation of AI based components in the shape of an autonomous cognitive entity can ensure internal decision-making and act against cyber threats in a timely fashion.³⁹ These components are designed to be decentralized and of an interacting nature so that they can detect malicious activity and counterattack quickly. The Artificial Immune Systems (AIS) are a form of such a model incorporating the role of AI. The AIS sees the implant of detection agents and counterattack agents. The purpose of detection agents is to monitor network and system traffic for any anomaly and once such an anomaly is spotted, the counter attacking agents are mobilized to infiltrate the attacking system and launch a counterattack.⁴⁰ This whole function of detection and counterattack takes place autonomously without any human involvement. This means system's response against cyber threats is much more coherent and efficient than the traditional method of detection and response.⁴¹

ANNs and Cybersecurity

The ANNs are designed to imitate the human brain's structure and are designed to solve real-world problems with a flexible algorithm. Rather than having a rigid algorithmic structure to the ANN, it is based on a statistical learning model, which allows the system to *learn* and improve its ability to solve problems.⁴² ANNs have been used to create cyber security models. By incorporating ANNs in the ISA model, these cybersecurity models have been used to monitor traffic and to raise flags regarding possible intrusions. By utilizing ANNs in the cybersecurity model, malicious activity can be detected in the delivery stage of the Kill-Chain, well before any attack occurs.⁴³ This has always been one of the objectives of designing any form of a cybersecurity model, to be able to detect any malicious activity before it even has a chance to cause damage. Along with this, ANNs can learn the activity patterns and previous attacks on the system or network.

³⁹ Xia Ye and Junshan Li, "A Security Architecture Based on Immune Agents for MANET," *International Conference on Wireless Communication and Sensor Computing*, 2010, 3.

⁴⁰ Ye and Li, "Immune Agents for MANET," 3.

⁴¹ Alessandro Guarino, "Autonomous Intelligent Agents in Cyber Offence," *5th International Conference on Cyber Conflict*, 2013, 13.

⁴² Christian Bitter, David A. Elizondo, and Tim Watson, "Application of Artificial Neural Networks and Related Techniques to Intrusion Detection," *World Congress on Computational Intelligence*, 2010, 950.

⁴³ Linda Ondrej, Todd Vollmer, and Milos Manic, *2009 International Joint Conference on Neural Networks* (Atlanta, 2009), 1829.

The biggest advantage of using the ANN model learning on its own can be coupled with the traditional IDPS models to ensure a robust security model. As IDPS models are designed on pattern recognition, one of their major strengths is that they can learn and recognize patterns and simultaneously appreciate the changing dynamics.⁴⁴ Given that such a model is completely autonomous, it also means a significant increase in efficiency and speed, with remarkable accuracy. Not only are ANNs only compatible with IDPS, but they can also be utilized in other facets of network security such as firewalls, network hubs, or even intrusion detection systems. There have also been advances in ANNs and now Deep Neural Networks (DNN) are being utilized to create a more elaborate and comprehensive mesh of network security. DNNs are computationally intensive form of networks, but given the massive improvements in hardware designs and capabilities over the years, DNNs are now quickly becoming a reality and are implemented in network security. Through the use of DNNs, the aim is not only to prevent cyber-attacks but to also predict any incoming cyber-attacks.⁴⁵

The future of the modern cybersecurity architectures may see the development of an IDPS system incorporating ANNs and DNN to update the pattern recognition of these systems. Such systems would recognize patterns and update logs automatically and would require minimal to no human intervention. An advantage of this approach may be the swiftness of detection and then the appropriate response. Therefore, the AI may be able to replace or minimize the role of human operators in the IDPS. For it to be an optimal system, a few factors may need to be taken into consideration such as the size of the network, the sensitivity of data, and the threat environment of the system. By considering these factors, network administrators may be able to determine how much autonomy to be given to the AI-based architecture versus the human operators. There may also be a possibility that AI-based section of the network be given less autonomy due to organizational inertia. However, if the system can prove its capabilities versus the threats, it may be given more autonomy in the future.

In addition to this, using such dual layer architecture the victim network may also be able to launch an effective counter attack against the intruder. The aim of the counterattack, in cybersecurity, is to stop or in some cases, slow down the enemy's intrusion into the network. If the victim is unable to counterattack, the aggressor may occupy key nodes in the network and seize essential network functionality. Therefore, an AI-based IDPS may be able to recognize an attack faster and then launch effective counterattacks to stop the enemy from gaining hold of key functionalities of the network.

⁴⁴ Bitter, Elizondo and Watson, "Applications of Artificial Neural Networks," 950.

⁴⁵ Guarino, "Autonomous Intelligent Agents," 13.

Findings

The developments in the field of AI and ANNs provide Pakistan an opportunity to develop a tailored-made framework for its security environment. Instead of relying on foreign IDPS, Pakistan can now design robust and comprehensive cybersecurity architecture. Even though, countries like Pakistan have not seen a vast utilization of computers and network systems in the delivery of basic services, the fact remains they are still used in these fields. As the goal of these organizations moves towards automation and optimization, the usage of computers and network systems will only increase.

At the same time, Pakistan is prone to vulnerable spots in its cyber ecosystem. For instance, the citizen data generated and stored by NADRA can be hacked and misused, which may pose a threat. A similar attack has already happened on the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) database, where hackers were able to break into the Hyper-V software by Microsoft and eventually crash the website.⁴⁶ This may become a threat, as the FBR is responsible for housing the financial data of Pakistani citizens. Another example of such attacks is the selling Pakistani telecom users' data on the dark web. The sale of a massive data dump consisting of 115 million Pakistani citizens and their personal details (name, identity number, address, tax number, region, etc.) was uncovered on the dark web.⁴⁷ Similarly, malicious software can be used to interfere with the electrical grids and cause a massive blackout in the entire country, leading to a failure of infrastructure and facilities. Even though, Pakistan does not currently rely on automatised electric grids, with the inclusion of an increasing number of bi-directional electrical systems, there is a possibility that Pakistan will look towards upgrading their electrical grids to Smart Electrical Grids, which are digitized largely. There is also the issue of sensitive locations such as nuclear reactors, where the presence and execution of malicious software can be catastrophic. This is especially true in the military domain. Malicious software can be used to cause a communications blackout, or to hack into servers to steal critical information. Not only that, but in recent times, most of the Pakistani websites have come under constant attack from Indian originated hacks.⁴⁸ Considering these, one may assume that Pakistan is at risk of a plethora of cyber threats. These threats are not only limited to private individuals but also government organizations. The attacks use increasingly sophisticated

⁴⁶ Shahbaz Rana, "FBR Reels under a Major 'Cyberattack'," *Express Tribune*, August 15, 2021.

⁴⁷ News Desk, "115 Million Pakistani Mobile Users Data Go on Sale on Dark Web," *Rewterz*, April 10, 2020.

⁴⁸ News Desk, "Check out the List of Pakistani Websites Hacked by Indian Group over Pulwama," *Outlook India*, February 17, 2019.

architecture to cause a breakdown of services. If such an attack becomes successful, there could be a serious national security issue, as was the case in the Colonial Pipeline Ransomware attack in the US.⁴⁹

In this context, Pakistan's strategic security policy makers must ensure and design a cybersecurity architecture that is most closely related to their needs and can ensure a robust line of defense in the face of any malicious activity. To achieve this, Pakistani authorities have to realize the importance of AI in the context of cybersecurity. ANNs and AI are now a niche field in Computer Science and are being constantly evolving and developing. Pakistani institutes are also researching and developing cybersecurity models that utilise these techniques. For Pakistani authorities, especially those involved with sensitive installations, there is a need to incorporate these institutes and present to them their need to develop a custom network security architecture that can plan and execute these network security protocols. Furthermore, an AI based cybersecurity model is a relatively cheaper option than the traditional IDPS because IDPS require a large work force to keep an effective cybersecurity response. On the other hand, an AI based model requires lower work force as it is automated. What it does need, however, is extensive computational power. With the constant advances in technology and improvement in processing speeds, hardware requirements are also getting cheaper and it becomes a much more financially feasible option to maintain an AI based security architecture.

Financial institutions are one of the most vulnerable systems in the Pakistani cyber eco-system. Therefore, these systems may be categorized as the most vulnerable and the ones that may pose a threat to the deterioration of cybersecurity architecture of Pakistan. It can be argued that this approach is also seen in the governmental and private financial institutions.

The development of an ANN based security model as a pilot case can be considered. By incorporating this pilot case in a Pakistani organization, the results can be analysed and further modifications can be made to ensure that an accurate and safe option is developed in terms of cybersecurity. A pilot case, to enhance the cybersecurity of financial institutions, may be envisioned. Evidently, Pakistani financial institutions have been at risk of cyberattacks from adversaries. Additionally, such cyberattacks pose a detrimental risk to the overall financial architecture of Pakistan. Therefore, a pilot study may develop, incorporating the double-layered cybersecurity architecture in a select few financial institutions, both government and private. A governmental committee, including renowned cybersecurity experts, may oversee the progress of such financial institutions under this two-layer approach. The findings of this

⁴⁹ Grace Segers, "Cyberattack Prompts Major Pipeline Operator to Halt Operations," *CBS News*, May 9, 2021.

project may be discussed with the relevant stakeholders and an executable policy maybe formulated, which may be applicable to wider institutions.

If AI and ANN-based cybersecurity are to be incorporated in military organizations or other sensitive organizations, a two-step approach may be opted for. The first line of defense may be an ANN based cybersecurity model that allows for the prediction of future attacks and then an ASI model be designed so that an effective counterattack is launched. In addition to this, these systems can be more oriented towards Whitelisting rather than Blacklisting.⁵⁰ Whitelisting offers an advantage as it may limit an unwanted or probing attempt at the network and the system.

It is worth mentioning that the Pakistani government has recently announced a Cybersecurity Policy that advocates for the establishment of “...national Cyber Security forensic and screening setups” that will be used to safeguard against advanced cyber threats in an AI driven environment.⁵¹ However, the policy fails to provide any concrete steps or measures to include AI and ANN in its security architecture to protect against incoming cyberattacks. Although it is a step in the right direction, aspects related to cybersecurity are lacking, especially when providing a blueprint for the future inclusion of AI and ANN-based systems in the security ecosystem.

Finally, the federal and provincial governments must realize the importance of having an effective AI based cybersecurity organization. This can be initiated by developing an autonomous government body dedicated to developing cybersecurity in Pakistan. This department should be in constant touch with the AI programs in universities. Through this, the government department can either fund particular projects of the universities or induct their best students into their own department so as to further the development of cybersecurity architecture in Pakistan.

Conclusion

As is the case with most of the technologies, there will always be potential threats designed to exploit the weaknesses of the enemy. The cyber realm is one such area of exploitation. Given the fact that there is a constant change and evolution in cyber technologies, it is of no surprise that the threats are constantly evolving as well.

Modern cybersecurity architecture is heading towards autonomy and self-sustenance which is a blessing but at the same time a major threat

⁵⁰ In a blacklisting architecture, the default is to allow access to entities. The focus is to stop malicious or suspicious entities. In whitelisting, the aim is to block access to all entities except for those that are allowed access.

⁵¹ Ministry of Information Technology and Telecommunication, *National Cyber Security Policy 2021*, (Government of Pakistan, 2021).

for cybersecurity experts. The exponential nature of modern technologies is playing the role of a catalyst in the evolution of such threats. In essence, the advent of AI and ANNs has resulted in the creation of algorithms that can adapt and change their program codes to pose a greater threat to the security checks. By systematically probing and challenging the cybersecurity architecture, such algorithms can find weaknesses at a much greater speed than any human. Therefore, this requires a change in approach in order to counter the threat of these emerging threats.

AI and ANNs have offered a toolkit to combat these threats and deal with these issues consistently and efficiently. These technologies offer a lot of potential due to the fact that they can learn on their own. In essence, they offer complete automation and develop robust and comprehensive security architecture with a minimum need for human involvement. Through the utilization of ANN and DNN, the world is now moving towards a more secure and encrypted form of communication. However, as solutions continuously evolve, so too do the threats. That, in essence, means that there is always the risk of newer threats coming to the fore and by emerging, can potentially challenge the comprehensiveness of the AI based security models as well.

Pakistan embracing the digital revolution taking place in the world. The digitization of various aspects of the government is a testament to this fact. This has made the job of policy makers a lot easier in terms of collecting data and service delivery. However, at the same time it has also created vulnerabilities in the cybersecurity ecosystem. If such vulnerabilities are not strengthened through the use of modern toolkits, this can create nationwide issues for the country in a few hours. The only way for Pakistan to counter such challenges is to create a proactive policy that caters and allows for the development of an effective AI based cybersecurity system that can be incorporated with the existing cybersecurity architecture. It must be kept in mind that the modern development path is that of automation, which also applies in cyber-attacks. Therefore, for Pakistan to keep such attacks at bay, it is necessary that effective steps must be taken to counter the ingress of automated attacks.

REVISITING BLUE ECONOMY: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS FOR THE MARITIME SECTOR OF PAKISTAN

Rutt Syed* & Aiysha Safdar**

Abstract

The need for sustainable development amidst an ever-expanding global population and diminishing resources on land has engendered a worldwide shift from Green/Brown economy to Blue Economy. The economists estimate that the ocean economy can increase the assets up to US \$24 trillion and can be healthy for the ecosystem as well. In this aspect, Pakistan can extract maximum gains from the growth of its Blue Economy because it has an 'untapped maritime potential' that offers multiple opportunities. To securitize the significance of Blue Economy is therefore imperative for Pakistan, not only for economic dividends but also for ensuring human security of the coastal population of Pakistan. Hence, this research focuses on the Blue Economic potential of Pakistan and the opportunities and challenges that lie in this sector.

Keywords: *Blue Economy, Pakistan, EEZ, UNCLOS, IMO*

Introduction

The oceans and seas of the world are arguably the nature's greatest gift to mankind and the most significant natural resource. Every year, the ocean economy has an estimated turnover of between US \$3 and \$6 trillion globally. This includes employment, ecosystem services provided by the ocean, and cultural services. It is also estimated that fisheries and aquaculture contribute US \$100 billion and about 260 million jobs to the global economy per year.¹ Many states are benefiting from

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¹ Asaf Humayun, and N. Zafar, "Pakistan's 'Blue Economy': Potential and Prospects," *Policy Perspectives* 11, no. 1 (2014): 57-76, <https://doi.org/10.13169/polipers.11.1.0057>.

marine resources given the globalization of science and technology. At the same time, however, the advancement in technology and over-exploitation of the natural resources is causing environmental degradation and resource depletion too. This threatens the future generations. Many developing states have already started paying for this threat. For this reason in 2012, United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (UNSCD) concluded that the participating countries must work on the concept of Blue Economy.²

The concept of Blue Economy was first coined by Gunter Pauli in 2010 and later discussed in detail in his book *The Blue Economy: 10 Years, 100 Innovations and 100 Million Jobs*. Pauli emphasised the shift of society from scarcity to abundance with everything what is available in the oceans and seas of the world.³ Blue Economy is now a popular concept that revolves around safeguarding oceans and seas and using water resources in an efficient way for sustainable growth and development. Pakistan also can gain maximum from investing in its blue economy given its 'untapped maritime potential' that offers multiple opportunities. Pakistan can proactively focus on some key areas that can help improve its Blue Economy such as: ports and rail-road infrastructure, the fishery sector, marine pollution and quality human resources extraction on the international shipping. It is high time for Pakistan to revisit its "National Maritime Policy" for incorporating the idea of sustainable socio-economic growth using marine sources. Pakistan's National Maritime Policy, revised in 2014, was never approved by the government. To deal with the challenges of sustainable development, Pakistan needs to internalize the concept of Blue Economy in its National Maritime Policy, which calls for securitization of the Blue Economy against internal and external challenges.⁴

This study is descriptive, analytical and exploratory, based on secondary sources: books, articles and reports. There are three possible perspectives to discuss Blue economic growth in Pakistan: international political economy, governance framework and management frameworks. However, given the untapped potential of blue economy in Pakistan, there is a dire need to build a strategy that is comprehensive and includes all the possible dimensions of blue economy frameworks. Consequently, Pakistan needs to securitize the issue to enhance prospects of blue economic development. Thus, this study analyses challenges and prospects for

² K. H. Lee, J. Noh and J. S Khim, "The Blue Economy and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals," *Researchgate*, (January, 2020), <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/339067077>.

³ Gunter Pauli, *The Blue Economy: 10 Years, 100 Innovations and 100 Million Jobs* (Paradigm Publications, 2014), 59-61.

⁴ Anjum Sarfraz, "Maritime Power of Pakistan- Prospects for Enhancing Economic Development," *Journal of Current Affairs* 51(August, 2020): 63-69.

Pakistan in blue economy through the lens of securitization theory as purported by Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver.⁵ It argues that securitization of blue growth will not only ensure human security of the coastal population of Pakistan but also contribute to economic progress of the country.

Revisiting Blue Economy: Opportunities through Sustainability

Blue Economy gained global significance in 2012, during the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (UNSCD). Initially, green economy was considered a long-term solution for sustainability of land resources. Green economy's relevance was questioned by the Island states, asserting that world's oceans and seas required more attention and coordinated action to preserve and utilize them. Hence, it was decided that efforts be coordinated for sustainable utilization of 'ocean and sea resources' as a long term solution to the sustainable development. Alongside, the UNDESA expert group meetings continued to work towards promoting the sustainable development through oceans and seas, at the international level. The work of Global Partnership for Oceans and Global Ocean Commission holds a lot of significance in this regard along with UN five-year Action Agenda 2012-2016 that emphasises oceans and sea resources.⁶

Defining the Concept of 'Blue Economy'

World Bank defines Blue Economy as the sustainable utilization of ocean resources for preserving livelihoods and creating more job opportunities along with the protection of environment by reducing pollution (World Bank, 2017). It originated from the Rio+20 where the participants, representing their states, pledged that they would 'protect and restore' the health of the ocean ecosystems. The UN General Assembly defines, Blue Economy as a long-term strategy aimed at supporting sustainable economic growth through oceans-related sectors and activities, while improving human well-being and social equity and preserving the environment.⁷ The UN 2030 agenda for Sustainable Development Sustainable, Goal 14 emphasises 'Conserve and sustainable use the seas, oceans and marine resources for sustainable development'.

Many countries now consider the 'Blue Economy Model' as a significant tool for promoting development and creating more jobs. The scientific development, innovation, and technology are central to

⁵ Barry Buzan, O. Weaver and J. de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998).

⁶ "Human Development in Pakistan, UNDP," UNDP Report 2019, <http://www.pk.undp.org/content/pakistan>.

⁷ Ibid.

promoting Blue Economy. Traditional maritime activities like fisheries, coastal tourism, aquaculture, shipping and mineral resource extractions can surely contribute to generating blue economy. However, non-traditional sectors like construction and transportation of more ships, sustainable ocean wave and tidal current energy, laying communication cables as well as construction of pharmaceutical industries can be efficiently exploited to expand blue economy.⁸

The total potential for the blue economy or the ocean economy is approximately US \$ 24 trillion whereas the humanity is exploiting roughly US\$ 600 billion.⁹ South Asian states like India and Bangladesh are earning billions of dollars from the blue economy but Pakistan has been able to utilise only about US\$ 450 million with only a major focus on fish exports and fish products. Other aspects of Blue Economy have been ignored over the years. The actual potential of Pakistan with respect to blue economy is more than US\$ 100 billion. Out of the 142 coastal states in the world, Pakistan is ranked 74th in terms of the coastal length with coast to area ratio of 1:36.¹⁰

Pakistan is trying to enhance its marine resources and sea trade to benefit from the sea resources. Since 95 percent of Pakistan's trade with other countries is carried through the sea and almost all resources and minerals are imported through maritime routes, the sea trade can be said to be the jugular vein of the Pakistan's economy.¹¹ Pakistan's maritime area of responsibility encapsulates the coastline of Pakistan and includes all the maritime regions of Pakistan. The division of these maritime zones is shown in the Table 1 and Fig 1 below. It is evident that the economic model of the blue economy is feasible and needs some pragmatic measures to benefit from it. However, there are some challenges that can be assuaged through robust planning and execution.¹²

⁸ Naghmana Z. Bhatti, "Blue Growth: An Emerging Paradigm of National," *National Institute Of Maritime Affairs Policy Paper* (May, 2019), <https://bahria.edu.pk/>

⁹ Ashna Mehmood, "Blue Growth Initiatives by Pakistan: Moving towards a Sustainable Future," *Centre for Strategic and Contemporary Research*, December 13, 2021, scr.pk/explore/themes/trade-economics/blue-growth-initiatives-by-pakistan-moving-towards-a-sustainable-future.


¹⁰ Dost S. Muhammad, Muhammad A. Brohi and Najeeb Ullah, "The Pakistan's Untapped Blue Economy Potential," *Journal of Global Peace and Security Studies*, vol. 2, no.1 (2021): 63-73.

¹¹ Muhammad Azam Khan, "Maritime Doctrine of Pakistan: Preserving Freedom of Seas," Pakistan Navy, Government of Pakistan, December 2018.

¹² A. Basit and M. A. Alam, "Blue Economy : Pakistan's Untapped Potentials," *The News International*, July, 2020, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/688791>

Table 1: Different Sea Zones of Pakistan

Sr. No	Type of Zone	Range (Nautical Miles)
1	Territorial Waters	12
2	Contiguous Zones	24
3	Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)	200
4	Extended Continental Shelf	350

Figure 1: Area of Maritime Responsibility of Pakistan¹³

Theorising the Significance of Blue Economy in Pakistan

Blue economy is central to sustainable development and thus scholars across the globe have deployed different models for theorising its use and to tap its potential. Models of technological and macroeconomic management have been used to reap its benefits.¹⁴ Some have employed governance frameworks to deal with challenges of blue growth in Indian Ocean Region as well. Since blue economy is about extracting economic benefits, the international political economy models for inclusive and sustainable economic growth from marine resources have also been relevant.¹⁵

For a developing state like Pakistan, there is a need to develop a framework that is inclusive of the strengths of all the tested models

¹³ PMSA, "Area of Responsibility," *Pakistan Maritime Security Agency*, February, 2021, <http://pmsa.gov.pk/area-of-responsibility>.

¹⁴ C. Sanae and Cornelia E. Naune, "Successful Blue Economy Examples with an Emphasis on International Perspectives," *Marine Sciences Frontiers*, (June, 2019): 42-56, <https://doi.org/10.3389/fmars.2019.00261>.

¹⁵ Ibid., 44.

employed for benefiting from Blue Economy. However, prior to focusing on devising an appropriate model, what is direly needed is that the idea of blue economy, its need and significance be appropriately securitized within Pakistan's development and security discourse. For theorizing why ocean-based economy is to be brought into the security discourse, Buzan's conception of comprehensive security greatly helps.¹⁶ Pakistan can gain a lot, by internalizing comprehensive approach to security. In the twenty-first century, the traditional concept of security could not deal with all the challenges of the globalized world. There was a need to broaden the concept of security to multi-dimensional approaches emphasizing on newer sectors that might threaten states' well-being in addition to the military sector. Copenhagen school of thought took to address the challenge where primary source for their ideas was Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver 1998 work titled, *Security: A new Framework for Analysis*.¹⁷

Buzan viewed five different sectors of security as highly intertwined to each other, where none may be relegated for signifying the other. This approach actually sought to alter the state-centric and narrow view of security, by bringing in other sectors (the economic, the societal, the military, the political and the environmental) that play an important role in the well-being of states. Including these sectors was justifiable due to their direct impacts on humans and societies residing within state boundaries. As economic development is central to national security, so is economic survivability a pre-requisite for societal security – one of the five sectors of security. Copenhagen school actually diversified the possible answers to the question, "Security from Whom?" by creating space for recognition of non-traditional threats. This is first step that identify the threat and is referred as the "Securitization move". The second step is considering humans as the referent object of security.¹⁸ Giving the non-traditional security threats an importance previously attributed only to traditional threats, allowed the security experts to give due consideration to human security without relegating state security. Internalizing comprehensive security would pave the way for securitization of 'blue economy as a dire need of the hour', not only for the country's sustained economic growth but also for human development and security.

¹⁶ S. Kedia and P. Gautam, "Blue Economy Meets International Political Economy: The Emerging Picture," *Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India*, Vol 16, Issue 2, (2020): 46–70.


¹⁷ Barry Buzan, O. Weaver and J. de Wilde, "Security: A New Framework for Analysis."

¹⁸ Sezer Ozcan, "Securitization of Energy through the Lenses of Copenhagen School," *WEI International Academic Conference Proceedings* (March, 2013), <https://www.westeastinstitute.com/wp-content/uploads>.

Human Security and Maritime Security linkage

The securitization concept correlates Human Security and Maritime Security. As maritime security, focuses on the UNCLOS of 1982 that regulates the law of seas to concentrate on the conflict resolution and dispute settlement in seas and oceans. Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) discusses the threats against illegal fishing, smuggling and piracy in the developing countries, highlighting, both traditional and non-traditional threats. All these factors also impact human security. This means human security also requires maritime dimension to safeguard the livelihoods of the coastal population and create more opportunities for them.¹⁹ This inter-relation of the blue economy with the economic development and human security that feed ultimately into national security is shown in the following diagram:

Figure 2: Blue Economy, Security and Development Linkage²⁰



Maritime securitization requires civil-military coordination with special consideration and an active role by Pakistan Navy. It requires naval diplomacy, naval warfare and capacity building in the maritime sector of Pakistan.

Prospects for Blue Economy in Pakistan

Pakistan is a resource rich country but the management of these resources has not been done to its full potential. It has not been able to exploit its enormous rich resources. In order to provide human security to the people that will also help achieve sustainable economic growth of the country, there is a dire need to focus on the prospects of Blue Economy in Pakistan. There are many prospects for blue growth in Pakistan. It needs

¹⁹ Ibid., 31.

²⁰ Ibid., 32.

to take advantage from maritime resources. There are multifaceted opportunities for Pakistan that can be achieved by improving technology in the maritime sector; Ports Infrastructure, Shipping, Fishing and Seafood, Maritime Tourism, Ship Breaking and Water Sports. These are discussed below:

Ports Infrastructure

The most significant part of the economic might from the maritime resources is the ports infrastructure. Ports provide a state with ability to get a locality where ships can be docked and various types of cargo is managed. In this perspective, the hinterland connections of these ports and harbours are also crucial. The infrastructure should be managed in such a way that there are strong rail and road networks that can take the cargo to the destinations.²¹ The development of these ports provides great growth opportunity and can help people come out of the economic plight through enormous employment opportunities. There are three main commercial ports of Pakistan:

- a. Karachi Port
- b. Bin Qasim Port
- c. Gwadar Port

The port of Karachi is the oldest port of Pakistan and has been in a functioning state since 1887. The authority that governs the Karachi Port is Karachi Port Trust (KPT). There are a total of 33 berths at the Karachi Port. Out of these, 30 are meant for the handling of the containers and solid cargo while 3 are specified for the managing of liquid cargo such as molasses and oil.²²

From 2018-2019, the cargo at Karachi port declined mainly due to shifting of the coal cargo Port Qasim and decrease in the imports of the country.²³ Bin Qasim Port is also located in Karachi. The functional work on this port started in 1960s but due to political instabilities, the development of this port gained momentum only in 1973. The docking capability of the port is almost equivalent to that of Karachi Port. From 2017-18 to 2018-2019, there has been an increase in the cargo shipment of this port due to the shifting of coal cargo from Karachi to Port Qasim. It has extra space where at any time of need, new berths can be prepared. It also shares cargo of Afghanistan and Central Asian States.

Gwadar port is the third port of Pakistan. It has gained the spotlight after the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) initiatives. It is the first port in Baluchistan located on the south western Arabian Sea

²¹ Glyn Ford, Lindsay Walker, and Chris Niblett, *The Future for Ocean Technology* (London: Frances Pinter Publishers, 1987), 28-56.

²² Ibid., 12.

²³ Karachi Port Trust, "Port Statistics," July, 2019, <http://kpt.gov.pk/pages/Default.aspx?id=50>.

coastline. The distance of Gwadar from Karachi is 635 km and distance of Iran is 120 km. The strategic importance of the Gwadar is that it is in the proximity of the Persian Gulf. It is a deep port which is useful for docking purposes. The phase 1 of the port with worth US\$ 280 million started in 2007. It is now a fully functional sea port with three, multipurpose berths. These berths are 200 meters in length and 14.5 meters in depth. Hence, the infrastructure development of these ports is a necessity for Pakistan.²⁴

Shipping

There is enormous potential for shipping in Pakistan but there is only one flag carrier company that is operating in Pakistan i.e. Pakistan National Shipping Corporation (PNSC). PNSC comprises of 11 vessels that are of different types and sizes. The total dead weight tonnage (DWT) of these vessels is about 831,711 million tonnes (MT), but PNSC lifted the cargo of about 11.09 MT in 2021 that was about 8.437 MT less than in 2020. This is equivalent to about 10.06 percent of country's total 110.271 MT seaborne trade by volume. In terms of revenue, in the year 2018 Pakistan National Shipping Corporation has generated about 10,070 million rupees. It has been materialized by focusing on the profitable projects. There is a global competition that is responsible for creating pressures in freight rates in the global market. The freight rates have been on decline in recent years.²⁵ The Covid-19 situation however, drastically increased freight rates. For the year (2020-2021), the statistics of Pakistan sea trade and PNSC's share in that is shown in the table 2 below.

Table 2: PNSC Share in Sea Trade of Pakistan-2020-21²⁶

	Dry Bulk		Liquid Bulk		Total	
	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020
Pakistan Sea Trade	77.968	66.585	32.303	27.736	110.271	94.321
PNSC's share	1.544	1.533	9.554	7.257	11.099	8.808

The annual freight bill of the Pakistan as per United Nations Convention on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) is estimated to be US\$ 4 to 5 billion. Such huge amount of money for compensation of freight bills adds troubles to the balance of payment issues. Thus Pakistan should have maximum Pakistan flagged vessels that can reduce such compensations.

²⁴ Ibid., 4.

²⁵ Pakistan National Shipping Corporation, PNSC Annual Report (2018), <https://pnsc.com.pk/financials/pnsc-fy-2017-2018.pdf>.

²⁶ Ibid., 21.

Increased number of vessels will grow the shipping industry and enhance the sea trade automatically. Moreover, there will be more employment opportunities for the seafarers. Thus, international trade can pace up the growth of blue economy through shipping industry.²⁷

Fisheries and Seafood Industry

Fishing and seafood comprise the key components of blue economy and sustainable economic growth. They aim to achieve the economic growth through accomplishment of the Sustainable Development Goal-14 (SDG-14). Pakistan is 5th on the list of the most populous states in the world with a total population of 213 million (2017 census). Although the poverty rate is on decline as compared to previous decades but the human development indicators, present a poor situation of the country in key social sectors such as health, education and nutrition value. The fishing sector of the country is a major source of nutrients and food in the country. In Pakistan, the fish industry is valued at US \$1.2 billion and has created almost 1.8 million jobs.

The indirect contribution to providing the living comes mainly through transportation and retailing. Besides this, the fisheries component of the sea food also forms an important part of the export commodities of Pakistan. The global demand for fish and sea food has increased over the years and it is estimated that the sector will grow further by 50 percent in next 15 years. The price of fish is 2.5 dollars to 2.75 dollars per kilogram in Pakistan against the regional price of 7 dollars.²⁸ Pakistan is exporter of fish to many European states as well as key exporter of seafood to China but due to poor techniques, it generates less revenue because of poor quality of the seafood products. In terms of GDP, the fisheries department contributes only 0.4 percent of the GDP. Pakistan should enhance its exports in sea products and increase its share in exports sector by focusing on the key importers of the fisheries that include western states. There is some depletion in the biodiversity of the seas due to climate change that needs to be addressed on immediate basis.²⁹

Maritime Tourism

The data from the World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC) shows that the contribution from the tourism sector in the global GDP has mounted to 10.4 percent and there are 10 percent of the global

²⁷ Syed Khawar Ali Shah and Kanwar Muhammad Javed Iqbal, "Protection and Promotion of National Flag Carrier – PNSC: Policy Options for Pakistan," National Institute Of Maritime Affairs, January, 2019, <https://bahria.edu.pk/nima/wp-content/uploads/>.

²⁸ World Fish Publications "Fish Demand and Supply Projections," World Fish Center, 2019, <http://www.worldfishcenter.org/content/>.

²⁹ Ibid., 14.

employment opportunities associated with this sector in the year 2018. It is equivalent to 8.8 trillion dollars of revenue. Thus, tourism forms a large part of the economic sector of the GDP for many countries. According to World Travel & Tourism Council, travel and tourism sector contributed 10.4 percent to global GDP and accounted for one in four of all new jobs created across the world in 2019. On the contrary, in the case of Pakistan, this sector contributed only 3.3 percent to country's GDP indicating a wide margin of growth.³⁰

The incumbent government is keen on widening the scope of the maritime tourism for Pakistan. The revenue from the coastal tourism was only 1 percent for Pakistan in 2017 out of the total revenue generated by marine tourism. There is a great potential for Pakistan in marine tourism; Hingol National Park, Mud Volcanoes, Beach Lagoons, Beach sports and Cruise ships encapsulate a large amount of economic potential for Pakistan. To get advantage from this sector, there is a dire need for identification of key stakeholders in the form of public-private partnership and other ventures. The tourism sector must regulate through comprehensive policy and infrastructure development. There is a need to learn from Thailand and Maldives who have registered victories in the arena of marine tourism.³¹

Ship Breaking

Ship breaking, also known as ship demolition is a process of recycling that has contributed enormously to the maritime economy of Pakistan due to cheap labour, low price of steel and employment. Pakistan is the leading country in this sector after India and Bangladesh. The data for the top countries in the ship breaking sector is given in the Table 3. Pakistan has got the potential in this sector due to long beach, heavy tides and environmental conditions. The shipbreaking industry also acts as source of raw material for the steel as ship is made of steel. In addition to this, the essence of this sector is that it is a labour intensive sector, and there is more and more direct and indirect involvement of the labour. The data from Pakistan Shipbreaking association shows that 20,000 people are directly involved in shipbreaking industry in Pakistan.³²

³⁰ Gilad Goren, "Travel & Tourism: A Force for Good in the World," *The Guardian*, April 1, 2015, <https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business>


³¹ Ibid., 1-56.

³² Mark J. Spalding, "The New Blue Economy: The Future of Sustainability," *Journal of Ocean and Coastal Economies* 46 (February, 2016):23-45..

Table 3: Detail of Ship Breaking in Different Countries (million tons)

	India	Bangladesh	Pakistan
Oil Tankers	1934	3245	0
Container Ships	1750	890	750
Dry Bulk Carriers	1060	1460	2526
Offshore Vessels	320	57	77
Total (Including all)	6323	6260	3459

Source: UNCTAD, 2019.

Figure 4: Ship Breaking Industry in Pakistan³³

Water Sports

The coastal area of the sea can also open up many arenas for sports as well. The water sports forms the backbone of the maritime tourism for many maritime states. It is done to enhance the canvass of maritime tourism and sea sports are an effective tool for tourism attraction. According to data, in developed states, the sea sports comprise 1 to 2 percent of the GDP acquired from sport tourism.³⁴ The major sports in this regard are diving, surfboards, swimming, scuba diving and fishing. Pakistan has been unable to tap the true potential from maritime sports

³³ Ibid., 24.

³⁴ Majid Rahmani, Mojtaba Ghadiri Masoum, and Mehdi Hajiloo, "Investigating the Potentials Role of Water-Sports Tourism in Attracting Tourists in Rural Areas," *Advances in Environmental Biology* 43 (January, 2014):56.

economy. The country is house to one of the largest youth population and it can benefit from sports tourism. So, by creating an arena for water sports, a lot of opportunities can be created for Pakistan. It will not only provide them with a chance to get employment but also enhance the citizen productivity. Thus, there is a need of evaluation in this sector on the principles of sustainable economic growth and blue economy.³⁵

Key Challenges in the way of Blue Economy for Pakistan

Although, the year 2020 was declared by the government as the “Year of Blue Economy” but apart from publishing a recycled version of previous shipping policy, no productive effort has been done in his regard. There is no doubt that Pakistan has got enormous potential in blue economy and the recent shift of the governing class is centred on the blue economy but there are some grave challenges to the growth of blue economy in Pakistan. These challenges are posed from different perspectives and must be addressed on account of comprehensive policy measures. Some of these challenges are discussed below.

Global Perspective

From a global perspective, piracy and armed robbery have existed since the discovery of sea routes. Though, there are fewer occurrences of these types of threats in the Indian Ocean, the region is vulnerable to such type of threats. Moreover, illegal immigration and other maritime security threats do exist in this region. Maritime terrorism is another important threat in this regard due to growing US-India connivance in the region. Thus, there is a need of comprehensive policy to address these issues of maritime security.

Inter-provincial Differences

Pakistan’s approach towards exploiting blue economy has remained blind, but it was magnified after the 18th amendment. The constitutional amendment passed in 2010 enhanced the provincial autonomy for the regions that were in their jurisdiction. National Maritime Policy currently in vogue is that of 2002.³⁶ A new draft policy is awaiting Government’s approval for the past several years but it also needs to be reviewed. The reason for this delay is the inter-provincial row and lack of efforts to resolve those disputes. There are also some disputes between the provinces particularly Sindh and Baluchistan regarding fishing rights, which should be addressed at the utmost priority to extract maximum benefit from blue economy.

³⁵ World Travel and Tourism Council, “Travel and Tourism Economic Impact,” *World Travel and Tourism Council 2019*, <http://www.wttc.org/-/media>.

³⁶ Naureen Fatima, “Policy Gaps for Maritime Tourism,” *Pakistan Observer*, February, 2020, <https://pakobserver.net/policy-gaps-for-maritime-tourism/>.

Infrastructure Barriers

There are some grave issues surrounding blue economy of Pakistan due to poor infrastructure and governance set up and the sole reason behind it is “Maritime Blindness”. This has led to the lack of willingness by the government to focus on the key sectors which could help cure the challenges in the way of Blue Economy. Some of the prominent aspects of these barriers are highlighted below:

- The greatest challenge to marine economy and marine biodiversity is millions of tons of untreated sewage that spills into Arabian Sea and our shores on daily basis. As a result, marine ecology, mangroves and other natural resources are destroyed rapidly. Also, sea level rise and intrusion inland in Indus delta have serious impact on marine biodiversity.
- There is a lack of infrastructure and assets required for exploiting the true potential of the blue economy. Pakistan is unable to control sedimentation issues in and the by-product of the sea resources due to such dearth of infrastructure.³⁷
- Pakistan clearly lags behind others in terms of technology, research and development. There have been energy potential in the tides of seas but due to poor technological progress, Pakistan is unable to get advantage from these prospects.
- There is lack of awareness among the masses regarding such huge arenas of development and opportunities. Poor education techniques in fishing are responsible for reduced amount of revenue for Pakistan.
- Different human activities in the sea shores and coastal areas have caused the destruction of coastal ecosystem. Many sea animals are on the edge of extinction and there has been no focus on such aspects.

Furthermore, unregulated fishing, over fishing, use of illegal nets and bull trawling, lack of fish processing and other products etc. are some other huge challenges.³⁸

Internalizing External Threats against Blue Economy

The Maritime sector of Pakistan needs to internalize all the above threats and challenges against the Blue Economy of Pakistan. It requires an efficient role of the regulatory agencies like the transport, trade, fisheries and several legal agencies as well involving border guards, coast

³⁷ Muhammad Usman Askari, Muhammad Tahir, and Nafisa Shaheen, “Blue Economy of Pakistan: Challenges and Prospects,” *Journal of the Punjab University Historical Society* (December 14, 2020): 45-67.

³⁸ Irene Banos Ruiz, “Blue Economy: Not just for Fish,” *Deutsche Welle (DW)*, March 7, 2018, <https://p.dw.com/p/2tnP6>.

guards to ports security and other police and intelligence services. All these agencies could work as maritime security providers to the Blue Economy of Pakistan creating many opportunities for it through sustainable socio-economic growth producing natural capital and safeguarding food security as shown in the following figure:

Figure 5: Opportunities from Blue Economy



Source: Compiled by the authors.

Lessons from other States

The blue economic potential varies according to the resources of any country. Therefore, it is difficult to formulate a one-size-fits all formula for the blue economic growth. However, Pakistan can learn lessons from the countries that are somewhat similar to its geography. In this regard, some of the examples are given below:

India

Indian policy think tanks have made several adjustments to the naval vision. They started a consultation process for defence and internal security for integration. In this process, target deadline was 15 years. Hence, long term policy was initiated. They decided to highlight the status of India as a strong Maritime nation: they aimed to highlight its potential to become a big blue economic model in the world. In this regard, they also took the partnership of Mauritius, Sri Lanka and Maldives. Their focus was on the socio-economic and environmental development. They also signed a project, Sagar Mala to help increase the African maritime capacities. For the research and sharing of information they have formed 'blue economy

forum'. Pakistan can have a lesson from this adventure.³⁹

Mauritius

Mauritius consists of the 1.96 million square kilometres economic zone and 2.3 million square kilometres of the maritime zone. Their continental shelf is of 392,000 square kilometres. It is co-managed by Seychelles as well. Their vision is to transform the nation towards a maritime state through propagation of ocean economy. Their government has developed the ministry of the maritime affairs. This step enhanced the knowledge and awareness regarding the fish farming and other blue economic resources. For example, they announced an eight year tax holiday to attract the industrial fishing investors. For the general harbour, they are also taking tree plantation measure.⁴⁰

Bangladesh

Bangladesh is keen in the blue economy. Bangladeshi officials formed an Oceanographic Research Institute in the maritime university. It was done to meet the agenda of the sustainable development goals. Moreover, Bangladesh also adopted a National Adaptation Program of Action for better governing of marine resources and development of strategy. It has also formed a climate change resilience action plan. All these activities are designed to help the marine economic activities. Blue economy provides sustainable and inclusive growth and provides opportunities for the maritime sector of Bangladesh.⁴¹

Blue Growth Initiatives

The goal of the blue economy and blue growth is to kick start sustainable approaches to the economic growth and conservation of marine resources. For sustainable ocean-led development, a clear and adaptable model that can be used is shown below.

³⁹ R. Aparna, "Blue Economy in the Indian Ocean: Governance Perspectives for Sustainable Development in the Region," *Observer Research Foundation*, January 18, 2019, <https://www.orfonline.org/research>.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 41.

⁴¹ M. Islam, "Blue Economy and Bangladesh: Lessons and Policy Implications," *Researchgate*, April, 2019, <https://www.researchgate.net/publication>.

Figure 6: Blue Growth Initiatives

Source: Compiled by the authors.

Enabling Conditions

Any framework for sustainable growth through blue economy is linked with the enabling conditions. These conditions include policy formulation, legislation, setting short-term and long term goals and identifying the key stakeholders. It also includes streamlining the implementation process of such growth model. Since capacity development is centred on skill development and use of technology, it is pertinent to focus on these enabling conditions while developing the model of blue economy in Pakistan.

Pakistan developed a policy of Fisheries and Aquaculture in 2007 which was revised and renamed as Deep Sea Policy in 2018. But, constitutionally, fisheries is a federal subject while aquaculture is a provincial subject, hence, there is need of a comprehensive legislative framework that is foundational for any blue growth initiative in Pakistan. Moreover, Pakistan Merchant Marine Policy was formulated in 2001 but there are no clear discussions regarding shipping and shipbreaking. These two sectors are an important part of blue economy. Thus, there is a clear need of policies that formulates comprehensive policy for the shipping industry. To increase the number of flagships, private sector must be encouraged to invest in the shipping industry.⁴²

Platforms for Sustainability

The growth model of any domain in the blue economy requires a transition. Blue growth is an environmental platform of sustainable growth. It can be achieved only through input-output channel. The

⁴² A. Basit, and M. A. Alam, "Blue Economy: Pakistan's Untapped Potentials."

subsequent changes in the input manners are likely to influence the output from the resources. The products developed from the blue growth initiatives are placed in the international market for the trade purposes. Moreover, the trade activities are interlinked among various sectors.

For example, the last platform of the blue growth initiatives is the social platform. The blue economy model is focused primarily on the identification of key holders and the community development; the marginalized groups are streamlined through the blue growth initiatives. They are also a source of food and nutrition for the coastal inhabitants. Blue community platform will enhance the awareness among the people to work in an effective manner for the marine resources and avoid any misuse of these resources.⁴³

Pillars for Sustainable Development

The current age is an era of sustainability. The increased population of the world and the depleting natural resources demand a strong urge to use blue economy as a source of sustainable growth. There are three pillars of the blue economy: economic pillar, environmental pillar and social pillar.

Economic Pillar

To formulate evidence-based policies, the statistical data is very important. This data not only helps to formulate a good policy but also assist in the implementation of that policy. For Pakistan, there have been no published databases for the marine sources, which is a drawback for their resources. All the developed countries are utilizing total economic value of the marine sources to help in predicting the true revenue from the marine sources. Total economic value is based on two types of predictions i.e. both market based and non-market based. These types of indicators help in predicting the true value of the tradable blue resources.

Pakistan should analyse the coastal and marine sources in terms of their contribution to the national economy. European Commission presented a report on Blue Economy in 2019 in which they mentioned established economy sectors. These sectors include Marine Living Resources, Coastal Tourism, Port Activities, Shipbuilding and Marine Extraction for Oil. Furthermore, these established sectors employed 7.2 percent more people as compared to 2009, similarly, it accounted for increase of 8 percent in terms of Gross Value Added (GVA).⁴⁴ Similar kinds

⁴³ Amin Ahmed, "Blue Revolution to Enhance Fisheries Production," *Dawn*, July 2, 2018, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1417342>.

⁴⁴ Fredrick Scholaert, "The Blue Economy: Overview and EU policy Framework," *European Parliamentary Research Service*, January, 2020, <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData>.

of measures are required from Pakistan to lift the sector in terms of economy.

Environmental Pillar

Another important dimension of the marine resources is the marine environment. The oceanic environment consists of many types of ecosystems. These are responsible for linking up the living as well as non-living components of the environment. And they are beneficial for the ecosystem services. These services are defined as the flow of advantages from the nature towards the populations. These services comprise nutrient recycling, carbon sinking, protection from coastal erosion and assimilation of the wastes. The dilemma with these types of resources is that they are intangible and are not included in the market values. Therefore, like economic pillars, these environmental pillars must also be monetized to get benefits from them in terms of blue economy.

Social Pillar

Apart from the pillars described above, there are many resources that are un-tapped and can boost blue growth as a source of socio-economic potential. Pakistan is a signatory of the sustainable development goals (SDGs) within the radar of ministry of Maritime Affairs and Pakistan Navy. There is a great focus on the social, economic and regulatory agendas to pursue the 2030 agenda of SDGs.⁴⁵ The SGD 14 in particular that discusses Marine Pollution and threats to life under water can be dealt through the aspects of Blue Economic growth through different aspects of Blue Economy.

Framework for Blue Economic Growth in Pakistan

In light of the above discussion, it is important to formulate a framework for the growth of blue economy in Pakistan. The framework is based on three levels of analysis: state level, domestic level and individual level. It will help in putting blue economy into perspective. The three levels of analysis have been described below.

Level I: State level

The state level path consists of many tasks. The most important of which is the securitization of the blue economy. Through securitization, Pakistan will be able to mainstream the arena of blue growth in the country. To make securitization moves, it is important to analyse the perceived threats that are being produced as a result of neglecting this sector. It will help in creating awareness regarding this issue. The last step will be the propagation of securitization moves. These moves must be

⁴⁵ Ibid., 14.

placed towards the masses through speech acts. In this way, blue economy will be securitized and the perceived threats will help in taking extraordinary measures. To materialize this, Pakistan needs to build a comprehensive policy framework and remove discrepancies in existing policies. There is need to build management model with good approach to securitize the issue of blue economy. These measures in turn lead to the blue growth.⁴⁶

Level II: Domestic Level


At domestic level Pakistan needs to build the infrastructure of the different sectors of blue economy. It will need a lot of investment. Foreign direct investment in this regard can play a vital role. But to attract foreign investors, there should be a clear sign of affirmation from the domestic stakeholders and proper internal security measures must be made. These investments will not only boost the blue growth but will also lead to research and development in the sector. The research and development in the blue economy sector can help Pakistan utilizing the human resource of the country which is widely ignored.

Creating mass awareness among the popular class is compulsory for blue economy growth. It can be made through media, education, trainings and workshops. The government must formulate a clear and a transparent policy and legislations on this sector so that the people realize the true potential of this sector.

Level III: Individual Level

At individual level, it is the ruling elite who have to take the bold step. To do so, there is a dire need to understand the untapped resources of the blue economy. A proper study and survey must be carried out in form of monetizing the blue resources. In this way, the leadership will be able to make long term policy visions. Once the policy visions are clear, the state level and domestic level tasks will become very easy.

⁴⁶ Aneel Salman and Amjad Ali, "Mission Possible – Transforming to Blue Society," *Maritime Study Forum*, January, 2021, <https://www.maritimestudyforum.org>.

Figure 7: Framework for Blue Economy Growth in Pakistan

Source: Compiled by the authors.

Conclusion

The foregoing discussion provides evidence that Pakistan has the potential to excel in this field of blue growth through various mechanisms, but it also faces several challenges. The foremost challenge is the lack of willingness by government to focus on this sector. The government must realize that Blue Economy can act as a parallel option for economic development of Pakistan. Other than this, Pakistan has cheap labour but there is a lack of skilled manpower and proper technology that can be utilized to extract maximum benefits from the various aspects of Blue economic growth.

Pakistan has always remained an agrarian based economy because it has a major part of its land area which is 97.14 percent. Most of the infrastructural developments have also been carried on this land area and less concentration is given to its coastal areas. The main reason for this was the state of 'Sea Blindness' as the policy makers did not realize the benefits that could be gained from sea and ocean resources. Secondly, Pakistan also lacked the infrastructure and resources to take advantage from its waters resources. In the recent times, the development at Gwadar is a ray of hope for Pakistan's sinking economy in presence of internal and external challenges. It has also created a hope for Pakistan to contribute more to the Blue economic growth of the country.

The need of the hour is to incorporate this concept of Blue Economy into the Maritime Policy of Pakistan in order to exploit the untapped ocean resources. In this respect, it is important for Pakistan to securitize its Blue Economic growth against all the external and internal challenges whether that is the economic crisis and lack of mass awareness

or lack of technology. Pakistan needs to securitize its Blue Economy which can ensure Human security through Maritime dimensions to safeguard the livelihoods of not only the coastal population but also boost country's economy.⁴⁷

Recommendations

Following recommendations may be considered to promote Blue Growth in Pakistan:

1. The Government of Pakistan needs to prioritize its Blue Economic policy because without a policy, different sectors will not be able to formulate particular strategies in their respective domains for the progress in Blue Economic Growth.
2. Maritime Tourism requires particular infrastructure also like Pakistan must launch ferry services for the foreigners landing in Karachi to go to other areas like Pasni or Gwadar.
3. Pakistan should add more tankers, containers and LNG ships into its own National Flag which can help in increasing the imports and exports of the countries at low cost.
4. The Economic Survey of Pakistan must have a separate section for the Maritime sector of Pakistan and the Government at Federal level must allocate separate resources for Blue Economic growth.
5. Pakistan can learn from the policies adopted by other states for promotion of Ocean based economy within the region like India, Bangladesh and Mauritius and also from Hong Kong and EU Conventions which adopted the recycling strategy.
6. After the accident at the Gadani shipbreaking yard, the ships demolition number is drastically decreasing. Hence, the Government must ensure the health of the labour working in this sector because this can help in increase of annual income upto 4-5 billion per year.
7. The need of the hour is to revisit the National Maritime Policy of Pakistan and incorporate Blue Economy into it.

⁴⁷ Rita Floyd, "Securitization and Security Studies," *Journal of International Relations and Development* 9, (2019):46-88, <http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/1082/>.

MATERNAL INFLUENCE ON YOUTH RADICALIZATION – A CASE STUDY OF DISTRICT MULTAN

Shaista Malik* & Salma Malik**

Abstract

Recruiting teenagers by extremist and violent non-state outfits became more prominent in the post 9/11 scenario in Pakistan. Several factors have contributed to radicalization and luring youth into extremist and militant organizations, i.e. illiteracy, growing inequality, and poverty. District Multan in South Punjab remains one of the areas identified over the years as the breeding and recruitment ground of extremism. Given the alarming level of youth radicalization in South Punjab, this paper highlights mother-child relationship as vital to respond to and pre-empt extremist influences. Though difficult to analyse the complete process leading to radicalization, however, by applying John Bowlby's Attachment theory (1958), the study demonstrates social status, education, and religious beliefs of mothers' significantly impacting teenage radicalization, and their inclination towards extremist views and behaviour. Furthermore, it corroborates grievance leading to anger, which may develop due to lack of resources, deprivation, and poverty as one of the drivers of violent extremism.

Keywords: *Radicalization, Attachment Theory, Teenagers, NAP, Violent Extremism*

Introduction

The dominant international security discourse analyses aspects, such as radicalisation, either through the traditional security or socio-political lens. However, such complex notions can be viewed and analysed through multiple lens, which at the individual level, may include the influence of family, kinship relations, social upbringing where the role

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and influence of mothers as the first seat of learning in a child's life cannot be emphasized enough.

A mother not only influences a child's behaviour but also has a deep impact on the children's orientation and patterns of social interaction. This study explores the relationship between mothers and teens in preventing and countering violent extremism within the district of Multan as a case study, given the latter's significance as a sectarian hotbed. To accomplish this aim, the study investigates the association between socio-economic attributes of a mother and attitudes of teens (aged between 15 and 17) towards violent extremism. Pakistan has been facing enormous challenges relating to various kinds of conflicts. However, since 2019, terrorist attacks have "decreased by around 13 percent as compared to 2018, and the number of people killed in these attacks plummeted by 40 percent."¹

This declining trend might be attributed to joint efforts made by Pakistan government and military against violent extremism. The 2015 National Action Plan (NAP) prepared to curb violent extremism was a result of a national consensus among all stakeholders including political leaders, state institutions, religious scholars and faiths' leaders, military, and civil society. Several actions were suggested in the NAP including, "disallowing armed militias to function, ending hate speech and regulating madrassas."² These actions played an important role in fighting and contributing a downward trend in violent extremism, yet the underlying root causes of extremist activities persisted.

The study focuses specifically on the role mothers play in countering violent extremism as a reference to the extent to which she is involved in a teen's day-to-day life based on the former's demographic profile. The study applies the Alabama Parenting Questionnaire used in several related studies,³ as a tool to explore a meaningful relationship between teens' conduct issues and parenting problems. There appears an

¹ Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies (PIPS), "Pakistan Security Situation 2019," *Research Journal of Conflict and Peace Studies* 12, no. 1 (Jan - June 2020):11, <https://www.pakpips.com/web/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/sr2019.pdf>

² Marvin G. Weinbaum, "Insurgency and Violent Extremism in Pakistan," *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Taylor & Francis Group, UK [Preprint], (2017): 49.

³ K. K. Shelton, P. J. Frick, & J. Wootten, "Assessment of Parenting Practices in Families of Elementary School-Age Children," *Journal of Clinical Child Psychology* 25, (1995):317-329; P. J. Frick, R.C. Christian, and J.M. Wootton, "Age Trends in the Association Between Parenting Practices and Conduct Problems," *Behaviour Modifications* 23,(1999):106-128;C. A. Essau, S. Sasagawa, and P. J. Frick, "Psychometric Properties of the Alabama Parenting Questionnaire," *Journal of Child and Family Studies* 15, (2006):595-614,<https://doi.org/10.1007/>

agreement among scholars including Dadds,⁴ Dishion⁵ and Prinz & Jones⁶ on the role of various factors such as ineffective parenting in “the development and persistence of conduct problems such as aggressive, intolerant, and antisocial behaviour.” While the target population of the present study is from the Multan district (Southern Punjab) with distinct socio-cultural attributes, the Alabama Questionnaire was applied with minor alterations to address the following research questions in this study:

1. What is the possible link between religious belief of a mother and non-violent attitudes of teens to prevent radicalization in the Multan District?
2. What has been the role of mothers in countering violence and extremist tendencies among teens (mainly aged 15–17)?
3. To what extent do variables such as education, socio-economic status and religious belief of mothers impact teens’ attitude to be non-violent in order to prevent and counter violent extremism?
4. What is the causal relationship between mothers’ education and non-violent attitudes among teens in countering violent extremism?

Tracing the History of Extremism in Pakistan

Gleaning through history it is observed that madrassas in Pakistan existed prior to independence “as welfare institutions providing free education, boarding and lodging to the needy students who otherwise could not afford joining formal education schools.”⁷ Until the 1970s, these religious seminaries contributed positively in the socio-economic uplift of Pakistan.⁸ However, by the late 1970s, these institutions were used effectively to sponsor jihadis (militants) against Soviet invasion in

⁴ Mark Dadds, *Families, Children, and the Development of Dysfunction*, (New York: Sage Publishers, 1995)

⁵ T. J. Dishion, G. R. Patterson, M. Stool Miller, & M. L. Skinner, “Family, School, and Behavioural Antecedents to Early Adolescent Involvement with Antisocial Peers,” *Developmental Psychology* 27, (1991):172–180.

⁶ R. J. Prinz, & T. L. Jones, “Family-Based Interventions,” in C. A. Essau (Ed.), *Conduct and Oppositional Defiant Disorders: Epidemiology, Risk Factors, and Treatment*, (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2003): 279-298.

⁷ Muhammad Ramzan, “Sectarian Landscape, Madrasas and Militancy in Punjab,” *Journal of Political Studies* 22(2), (2015):428.

⁸ Umbreen Javaid, “Pakistan’s Struggle against Extremist Onslaught, Assimilating Women in Pakistan’s Counter-Extremism Efforts; A Critical Appraisal,” *Journal of Political Studies*, (2018): 25(1) http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/pols/pdf-files/7%20-%20RAMZAN_v22_2_wint2015.pdf.

Afghanistan and then later for the Kashmir conflict.⁹ During that time, religious schools not only grew rapidly in numbers “but they also had exposure to Jihad (armed struggle).”¹⁰ Several factors contributed to the dramatic growth of radicalization in Pakistan during the late 1970s to 1980s including the Iranian Revolution, the Soviet occupation and resulting war in Afghanistan.¹¹ As a result, the country has witnessed a mushroom growth of madrassas since the 1970s.

Coupled with charities set up by local philanthropists, these “madrassas were reportedly funded by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and some friendly, conservative Muslim countries as well.”¹² A prime decision of General Zia ul Haq was to boost the growth of Islamic schools in order “to expand the growth of Islamic extremists,”¹³ who would be ready to fight against the Russians. Among other places of Pakistan, South Punjab (in particular Multan district) became a “hub of madrassas and most of the terrorist activities have been carried out by members of these madrassas”¹⁴ as well as “a base and recruiting ground for militant outfits”.¹⁵

While looking at extremist structures in South Punjab, Multan district is at the top position with such 1,108 religious institutions compared to other cities of South Punjab where they were “taught ‘jihadi philosophy’, deployed to regional training/indoctrination centres”.¹⁶ Other than madrassas, teens have also been vulnerable to radicalisation, driven by several factors including “socio-religious, politico-economic and

⁹ Swati Parashar and W John, *Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Implications for South Asia* (New Delhi: Pearson Education India, 2005).

¹⁰ M. A. Raheem, *A Comparative Study of the Attitudes of Students Attending Urdu Medium, English Medium and Seminary Schools in Pakistan*, (University of Glasgow, 2015): 63.

¹¹ Swati Parashar, and W. John, *Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Implications for South Asia*.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Shaista Malik, and Z. Iqbal, “Construction of Taliban Image in Pakistan: Discourse Analysis of Editorials of Dawn and the News,” *China Media Research* 7(2), (2011): 23.

¹⁴ Zille Z. Naqvi, and S. Riaz, “Women in Pakistan: Countering Conflicts and Building Peace,” *Asian Journal of Women's Studies* 21(3), (2015): 334.

¹⁵ *Countering Violent Extremism*, Institute of Social and Policy Sciences, Pakistan, (2019): 11, http://i-saps.org/upload/report_publications/docs/1632132634.pdf

¹⁶ Shaista Malik, and Shafqat Munir, “Content Analysis of Hate-Speech Discourse in Religious Publication in Punjab, Pakistan,” *Journal of Contemporary Studies* 8 (1), (2018).

cultural-psychological” aspects.¹⁷ It is vital to see various other factors responsible for driving people towards violent extremism such as the overpopulation of the Multan district, which has increased rapidly from 3,116,851 in 1998 to 4,745,109 in 2017.¹⁸ Another major component for the development of radicalization can be poverty that may inevitably lead to violence as social and economic deprivation propel people to be part of violent activities. The World Bank estimates that Pakistan had 31.3 percent national poverty ratio in June 2018,¹⁹ which jumped to 39.3 percent by 2020-21.²⁰ Likewise, a similar trend can be noticed in Multan district where 38.9 percent inhabitants are living below the poverty line.²¹ Rehman revealed that “out of 37 percent poor households’ 29 percent urban and 71 percent rural households are poor.”²²

These socio-economic indicators of Multan district show that poor living standards is one of significant contributors towards nurturing of radicalization. Correspondingly, low economic status has been a strong driving force for “drifting the social fabric from tolerant to extremist trends as the locals are getting inclined to the radical elements operating in the region.”²³ It has also been observed that people from underdeveloped areas are willingly adopting extreme ways and agenda of radical organizations.²⁴ However, it is erroneous to make a general statement concerning the effects of poor socio-economic conditions on the lives of the residents of the Multan district.

With regard to religious beliefs, no official data on sectarian division has been gathered by the census organization of Pakistan “as the

¹⁷ Khurram Iqbal, and Zahid Mehmood, “Emerging Trends of On-Campus Radicalization in Pakistan,” *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism*, (2021), <https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2021.1902551>.

¹⁸ Faiza Mazhar, “Population Growth & Distribution Pattern in Punjab, Pakistan (1998-2017): A Geospatial Approach,” *International Journal of Innovative Science and Research Technology*, (2018): 510.

¹⁹ Muhammad Amir Rana, “The Evolution of Militant Groups in Pakistan,” *Conflict and Peace Studies*, (2014).

²⁰ “Overview, *The World Bank in Pakistan* (2021),” World Bank, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/pakistan/overview>.

²¹ Iram Khalid, and Mina Ehsan Leghari, “Radicalization of Youth in Southern Punjab,” *South Asian Studies* 29, no. 2, (2014): 537-551, <http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/csas/PDF>.

²² Saeed ur Rahman, Imran Sharif Chaudhry, and Fatima Farooq, “Gender Inequality in Education and Household Poverty in Pakistan: A Case of Multan District,” *Review of Economics and Development Studies* 4 (1) 2020, 115-26, <https://doi.org/10.26710/reads.v4i1.286>.

²³ Khalid and Leghari, “Radicalization of Youth in Southern Punjab.”

²⁴ Ibid.

state prefers not to make any distinction on sectarian basis.”²⁵ However, officials from provincial and local government estimate that Multan has a population with variant sects. Multan has the largest sect of Barelvis with 53.13 percent followed by the population of Deobandis with 25.93 percent then Ahle-e-Hadith with 10.08 percent while believers of Shia sect have 8.50 percent cohort in Multan. All maintaining their own seminaries where their specific interpretation of religion is taught.²⁶ Deobandis emphasize on receiving in depth knowledge of hadith, and consider teachings of Sufis and saints as Bida’ah (innovation).²⁷ In comparison, the Barelvis, a moderate sectarian group, believe that “the saints (Sufis and Pirs) act as mediators between believers and God.”²⁸ Ahle Hadith is also a hardliner group that has been engaged in various sectarian clashes, and known for distribution of hate material against other groups such as Barelvis and Shias.²⁹ Within this framework of sects, the study also considers multiple ‘religious beliefs’ associated with the population of Multan particularly women’s beliefs.

Mothers as Agents of Change

The common belief is that women irrespective of their sectarian belief system remain peaceful without exhibiting any extremist behaviour, even if they are rigid in their religious practices. In connection with the significance of mothers on teen radicalization, several attempts have been made to study mothers as the best source to identify early warning signs of radicalization. Schlaffer, Laura and Kropiunigg in a 2018 study asserted that the responsibility of mothers is crucial as they witness every stage of a child’s development.³⁰ Women as mothers are generally considered “the first to observe the early sign” of extremist thoughts and behaviour of their children.³¹ Mothers possess a distinctive capability to realize “early

²⁵ Muhammad Ramzan, “Sectarian Landscape, Madrasas and Militancy in Punjab”.

²⁶ Muhammad Arslan Raheem, *A Comparative Study of the Attitudes of Students Attending Urdu Medium, English Medium and Seminary Schools in Pakistan*, PhD thesis, (2013) <https://theses.gla.ac.uk/6425/1/2013RaheemPhD.pdf.pdf>

²⁷ Nahid A. Kabir, *Young British Muslims: Identity, Culture, Politics and the Media* (Edinburgh University Press, 2012).

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ E. Schlaffer, L. Laura, and R. Kropiunigg, *Mothers Preventing Violent Extremism: The Example of Mother Schools in Macedonia from Philosophy to Practice*, NATO/IOS Press, (2018).

³¹ E.R. Royce, *Hearing on Women’s Education: Promoting Development, Countering Radicalism; and Mark-up of H.R. 3583, Malala Yousafzai Scholarship Act: Convened before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of*

warning signs of radicalization in their children enabling them to play a key role in curtailing violent extremism” as studied by the McKinsey Institute.³² Subedi also discusses benefits and issues of “Early Warning and Early Response (EWER) system from the field of conflict prevention to the CVE domain.”³³ For instance, he argues that though mothers are an insignificant source of preventing radicalization and violent extremism, they can play a valuable role to “identify early warning indicators of radicalization in their social and cultural contexts, and have, in turn, contributed to preventing youth from being engaged in extremist violence.”³⁴ Moreover, mother’s perspective on radicalization can influence development of children’s behaviour. Similarly, where mothers can shape and influence attitudes of young generation and help counter harmful influences from the surrounding environment, such as violent extremist ideologies from religious seminaries, they can also be the main force behind children’s involvement with extremist groups.

Similarly, Kropiunigg highlights that mothers are deeply associated with factors responsible for defining their children’s identity, particularly related to attributes of personality formation process.³⁵ In this process, mothers as an effective agency help in determining the elements “that influence adolescents’ personality and are the best placed to understand what might prompt their descent into violence.”³⁶ Furthermore, Zeiger, Alonso and Herrera state that the role of women has been seen as an agent of “positive change in preventing extremism.”³⁷ At the same time, many studies i.e., Bloom and d’Estaing, found that females and mothers do not necessarily serve in a positive role in moderating extremism. Bloom discusses women’s participation in extremist activities with examples from Northern Ireland, Iraq, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Russia, etc.,³⁸ stating

Representatives, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, Second Session (U.S. Government Printing Office, 2014), 33.

³² Gregory Treverton, *Intelligence, National Institute Council, Global Trends: Paradox of Progress* (U. S. Government Printing Office, 2017), 225.

³³ DB Subedi, “Early Warning and Response for Preventing Radicalization and Violent Extremism,” *A Journal of Social Justice* 29 (2017): 136–143, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10402659.2017.1308185>.

³⁴ Ibid, 139.

³⁵ Ulrich Kropiunigg, “Mothers’ Agency as an Alternative to the War on Terror,” *Security Informatics and Law Enforcement series* (2019)

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Sara Zeiger, Rogelio Alonso, Jose Herrera, and Lilah El Syed, *Enhancing Women’s Roles in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE)*, IOS Press (2019): 38.

³⁸ Mia Bloom, *Bombshell: The Many Faces of Women Terrorists*, (London: Hurst Publishers, 2011)

that females were engaged in suicide attacks for more than 230 cases during 1985 to 2008.³⁹ Likewise, d'Estaing brings two contrasting positions that women can engage in extremist roles such as "recruiters, propagators, mobilizers, suicide bombers, and targets," but can also be deterring agents in the role of "leaders working on de-radicalization, counter-messaging, and peacebuilding".⁴⁰

Lombardi also notes several contradictory opinions on mothers' role in CVE.⁴¹ For instance, the study quotes from experts' opinion that families can be supportive to their younger generation for engaging in violent activities.⁴² In contrast, Lombardi also suggests that parents can be the reinforcing force for morals and values learned from educational institution.⁴³ It can be argued that women can play either a positive or negative role in case they have to deal with radicalization among youth leading to violent extremism on the basis of various factors such as education, religious affiliation, and social status. As mothers, women may transmit their religious beliefs to their teenagers. As suggested by Clark, religious beliefs can be transmitted to adolescents through three types of variables: demographic, family, and religious relationship. Similarly, several other factors such as peer pressure, educational institution etc., tend to be responsible for transmission of religious practices to teens.⁴⁴

Qadeem in a 2018 study also explored the agency of mothers' access to extremist youth and role in their de-radicalization in multiple phases.⁴⁵ The author argued, "ethno-sectarian clashes in some parts of Pakistan can only be resolved by well equipping mothers and youth with tools of conflict transformation at the community level."⁴⁶ She emphasised the need to develop an integrated approach for women to combat violent extremism. However, the study does not highlight the preventive measures employed by her institution PAIMAN for female empowerment to deter against radicalization to violent extremism.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Sophie G. d'Estaing, "Engaging Women in Countering Violent Extremism: Avoiding Instrumentalization and Furthering Agency," *Gender & Development* 25(1) (2017): 103–118.

⁴¹ Marco Lombardi, et al. *Countering Radicalisation and Violent Extremism Among Youth to Prevent Terrorism*, IOS Press, (2014).

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Clark, et al. "The Transmission of Religious Beliefs and Practices from Parents to Firstborn Early Adolescent Sons," *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 50(2) (1988): 463–472.

⁴⁵ Musarrat Qadeem, *Engendering Extremism: Women Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan* (London: Centre for Women, Peace and Security, LSE, 2018).

⁴⁶ Ibid.

Methodology

Like all other domains of life, the Covid-19 pandemic has made the collection of primary unbiased data for this study challenging. At the same time, given the risk and consequences associated with the topic of research, it was crucial to use multiple methods to robust the data collection of this study.

Moreover, the intergradation of multiple methods was indispensable in understanding the clear in-depth picture of the relationship between mother and teens, as the study assumes that it has a significance to address radicalization in society. With this notion, 'triangulation' was used to address the research questions of this study, and data was collected in three stages: 1) online/paper survey, 2) focus group discussions (FGD) and 3) key informant interviews. With these methods, study employed both qualitative and quantitative data analysis to answer the research questions.

Methods of Data Collection

Initially it was planned to conduct online survey to gather primary data. However, due to limited access to internet among respondents from Multan (i.e. mothers and their teens of aged between 15 and 17), both means, i.e., online as well as paper survey was used for collecting data. Moreover, prior to conducting focus group discussions and key informant interviews, it was crucial to collect quantifiable data at the first stage of data collection e.g. demographic characteristics (i.e. educational attainment, socio-economic class, religious beliefs) of mothers in Multan district in order to determine whom to invite for the focus groups and the key informant interviews.

At the second stage, a total of five FGDs each with mothers as representative of the sample groups from the Multan District were conducted.

- | | |
|---|-----|
| 1. Educated Women (minimum undergraduate) | (1) |
| 2. Rural women | (1) |
| 3. Urban Professional women (college-educated adult with well-paid professional job and who lives and works in or near Multan district) | (1) |
| 4. Women with diverse religious beliefs | (1) |
| 5. Women (uneducated or low level of education) | (1) |

The focus groups allowed the researcher to examine broader context of mothers with variant social status based on education, socio-economic condition and religious beliefs and their response to their children in curtailing the radicalization.

The third stage was the collection of qualitative data from key informants through a series of 12 interviews from religious clerics, community leadership, government officials, experts on CVE, policymakers, and researchers were conducted. The main purpose of these interviews was to gain a detailed description as to how mothers can serve as change makers in a society while supporting their families in preventing and countering extremism.

The researchers used various approaches to invite the participants from Multan district and also sought local assistants for collecting the data. For example, the researchers used a direct approach mechanism to approach community/social groups in the Multan district. Moreover, social media (such as Facebook) was used to gain the attention of the participants from Multan. As one of the researchers has working experience in South Punjab, her own contacts were used to gain responses from the target population. The data was collected from student of madrassahs (male and female) and their mothers to examine the relationship between mothers' religious belief and teens' attitudes to be non-violent to prevent and counter violent extremism. Similarly, madrassah teachers were contacted to collect qualitative and quantitative data. For sufficient responses, a university teacher and a student from Multan was also approached to connect with local people. The data was collected from May 2020 to November 2020.

Methodological Limitations

The research employed random probability sampling because of time and cost considerations. Thus, the key limitation of this study is the small sample size of five focus group discussions and 12 interviews with key informants and the survey. Another limitation of this study concerns the research tools for the online survey. The research tool involved several questions related to violent extremism, which might be difficult to understand, particularly for teens and mothers with low education levels or those who are uneducated. Therefore, the research tool was translated into their native language (Urdu) and a research assistant from the local community was hired to explain the questions in the local language to them as for better understanding while collecting the data.

Table 1: Demographic Attributes of Survey Respondents

Items	Frequency	
	No	%
Gender (Teens)		
Male	232	65.20%
Female	124	34.80%
Income (PKR/Monthly)		
Under 10,000	64	18.00%

10,000-30,000	224	62.90%
30,001-50,000	44	12.40%
Over 50,000	24	06.70%
Educational Qualification (Teens)		
No education	16	4.5%
Can read and write	12	3.4%
Primary	64	18.00%
SSC & HSSC	124	59.6%
Educational Qualification (Mothers)		
No education	112	31.50%
Can read and write	20	05.60%
Primary	109	30.61%
Higher Degree	115	32.30%
Mothers Occupation		
Housewife	284	79.8%
Private & Public Sector	56	15.8%
Working in Fields	4	1.1
Sales and Services/Dr/Eng/IT	8	2.2%
Religious Affiliation (Mothers)		
Ahle Hadith	44	12.35%
Barelvi	144	40.44%
Shia	56	15.73%
Deobandi	112	31.46%

Source: Primary Quantitative Data Collected for the Study

According to quantitative data, the survey respondents declared themselves in three categories of economic status: lower class (92: 25.8 percent), Middle class (244: 68.50 percent), and Upper class (20: 5.6 percent). The larger portion of survey participants (67.40 percent) recognized that they had only one earning member at home. Mothers of the rest of the participants (32.6 percent) were working professionals in various fields.

Results

The following section presents three themes emerged through qualitative data derived from focus group discussions and key informant interviews around research question of the study: *The role of a mother's education in managing influences on their teenagers to counter violent extremism.*

The qualitative data indicated that educated women have more confidence in their ability to manage all forms of influences on their teenagers, which they considered as protective factors for them. The majority of the educated FG participants described maternal bond as key aspect in the formation of teens' attitudes to be non-violent. In contrast, less educated women appeared less confident and less equipped to manage these factors.

Majority of the educated FGD participants confirmed that mothers are integral to an enabling environment that is a friendly and protective space where teens easily share and discuss their problems. Educated mothers stressed upon the importance of everyday routine measures to strengthen relationship with their children to combat violent extremism. Provision of an enabling environment that is perceived both friendly and protective, teens easily share and discuss their problems. Moreover, friendly conversations provide an opportunity for them in expressing thoughts, ideas or any negative occurrences. Such an environment also helps build and maintain confidence and trust among teens and their family. Mothers can create a favourable environment for children by discouraging violent or aggressive behaviour among them through several interventions, such as developing trust and maintaining consistent communication, as identified by the participants in the group discussions. This helps mothers in engaging with and recognizing early warning signs of radicalization in teens.

Consequently, mothers can potentially shape attitudes of their children, especially teens towards tolerance, non-violence, and socially pluralistic approach through friendly conversation that encourages them to think and act for their own and others' security.

M (Educated Woman): It is important to have friendly communication with the kids on daily basis. As it strengthens your bond with them and they gain the confidence to share their problems with you.

M (Educated Woman): We keep our relationship strong by talking, playing games of their interest with them, feeding them, asking them their routine when away from me.

M (Educated Woman): they (teens) are very expressive in their emotions as they feel comfortable enough to express themselves to me.

The above statements show that mother participants understood drivers of radicalization and violent extremism, as they seemed to believe in various factors increasing chances of youth to be engaged in extremist acts including social, psychological and personal reasons.

As defined by Schmidt, "good mothers" are those "who are socially engaged and know what their children are doing."⁴⁷ A CVE expert also reiterated that mothers could play an important role by knowing their children's whereabouts, their out-of-home activities, their company, and their thoughts through having close interaction and friendship with their children. Mothers who participated in the discussion also self-validated about some similar good practices for preventing their children from engaging in any extremist activity.

⁴⁷ Rachel Schmidt, "Duped: Examining Gender Stereotypes in Disengagement and Deradicalization Practices," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, (2020): 10.

M (Educated Women): My elder son is not involved in any such activities. I always keep an eye on him and also I have a strong connection with his school teachers. If in the case in the future, I find him in any such acts of violence I have a dialogue with him or punish him.

Apart from the above stated preventive measures, the selection of an educational institution is an important decision for a family, particularly for parents as they wish to safeguard their children from radicalization and violent extremism. With regards selection of school, participants gave diverse opinions. In comparison to other groups, mothers from Bareilvi madrassah affirmed that they preferred to choose a religious school or college where their teens could learn religious values as well as attain general/secular education.

M (Urban professional): I chose the school which can fulfil the needs of education of current era without imposing any extra burden on them. The school I feel is also capable to educate them about religious teachings.

M (Rural women/uneducated): As we belong to the Sunni sect so we wish our children follow the same.

M (Uneducated group): My kids go to the private English school although we are uneducated we wish them to have good schooling.

M (Educated woman): We have chosen the best school in terms of not only academics but ambiance as well.

M (Low Social Status): I chose an average school, neither too much expensive nor too low.

Rehman stated that most parents prefer to choose “the best possible educational environment.”⁴⁸ However, this selection is dependent on several factors such as economic, social, and cultural aspects. With a growing number of students being exploited by extremist groups,⁴⁹ it seems imperative to invest in educational institutions where children can gain knowledge, leadership skills, healthy minds, and good values. It is also crucial to choose an education system that encourages students to embrace diverse faiths, multiple ethnicities, and cultures, and educate young people to endorse collective prosperity, peaceful coexistence, and inclusiveness for all.

Without distinction, sports have and can also be a useful tool for boys and girls to achieve peace, inclusion and social cohesion. Sports and physical activities help in personal development of teens and inculcate

⁴⁸ Rahman, et al. “Gender Inequality in Education and Household Poverty in Pakistan: A Case of Multan District |Review of Economics and Development Studies,” *Review of Economics and Development Studies*, (2018): 4, <https://publishing.globalcsrc.org/ojs/index.php/reads/article/view/286>

⁴⁹ Zahid Shahab Ahmed And Qamar A Jafri, "Drivers Of Violent Extremism In Higher Education Institutions of Pakistan," *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict* 13(3), (2020):230-244.

values that inspire and show respect for fellow competitors. As a result, these healthy activities guide children to accept diversity and talents of companions and competitors. They refrain from indulging in extremist activities as they develop positive sportspersons' positive strengths, and they tend to prevent themselves and others from indulging in negativism that may lead to hate and discrimination and ultimately extremism. Although, sports and cultural activities do not directly counter or prevent violent extremism⁵⁰ but they create enabling conditions for social learning and inclusion among teenagers, which is a basic tool useful for prevention of violent extremism. In the same spirit, educated mothers were of the same opinion. *"I used to arrange games for them in which whole family took part at home. And I also encourage my kids to take part in healthy extra-curricular activities at school,"* stated one of the educated mothers. Whereas another stated, *"Exactly I prefer to engage my kids in extracurricular activities that can keep them relaxed, active and energetic as well as improve their mental health."*

Unlike educated mothers, the qualitative data rendered that women from religious madrassas (Islamic seminaries) did not consider sports and physical activities as a potential source for preventing violent extremism. Therefore, they did not discuss the importance of out-of-school activities of children or they did not encourage their boys and girls to participate in sport-based interventions.

Social Status of Mothers and Teens Aptitude to Violent Extremism

The responsibility of mothers hailing from low socio-economic groups to countering extremist tendencies among their teens sometimes becomes challenging. This is due to being least empowered and having least resources to meet educational and recreational needs of the teens that can help prevent them from violence and extremist elements. Yet these mothers do play a role while dealing with their children. They have the least resources, but they at least instruct their children on what to do and what not to do. Hence, these mothers still maintain some degree of influence over their children and can play a role in imparting them the right direction so that they can refrain from indulging in extremist activities.

Participant mothers from educated group and urban professionals generally accepted the impact of financial hardship on mother-child relationship as they seemed to believe that in such circumstances, children could easily be exploited by violent extremist entities even just by offering and meeting their basic needs. Although this is also true that teenagers

⁵⁰ Lombardi, et al. *Countering Radicalisation and Violent Extremism among Youth to Prevent Terrorism*.

from any socio-economic class may adopt violent extremist beliefs, but children from poor families are more vulnerable to accepting beliefs that may lead to violent extremism. Lack of basic facilities of lives may push teenagers to become prey to hate mongers who lure them to certain ideologies by incentivising them with money.

On a similar point, an agreement can be seen among participants with varied background that children must be provided an opportunity to live with respect and have peaceful growth.

M (Urban Professional): I give them pocket money, preferably purchase new dresses and most importantly, I am greatly interested in their good health.

M (Rural woman from lower economic group): we do provide them all their necessities according to our own financial capacity

M (Educated Woman): I take care of all the needs of my children, as I want to see them perfect in their life.

M (Religious group): I manage to meet the basic needs of my teens as per my sources of income; such as their personal care, food, shelter and health care.

The key informants also expressed a consensus on the role of low social class of mothers in children's inclination to extremism. In particular, a CVE expert noted: "one of the drivers of violent extremism could be grievance leading to anger which is developed due to lack of resources, deprivation and poverty. It is much likely that the children hailing from the poor families become a breeding population that accept extremist views out of their deprivation that generates anger against social and economic injustices". An academic also asserted that economic factors are one of the key factors though not the only reason for violent extremism, as the latter is multifaceted. One could argue that mothers in their perpetual quest to protect their children provide them with all kind of basic amenities like education, healthcare, considering it their responsibility. However, lack of access to basic needs may develop insecurities among teenagers, which may push them into violent activities.

Mothers' Religious Beliefs and Impact on Teen's Views and Behaviours

While teens need enabling environment for sharing their thoughts and day to day experience, most mothers interviewed were concerned about communication of their religious values effectively to the teens. Such teachings from mothers may equip teens with an understanding to identify differences within a society based on varied faiths and beliefs. Many scholars have observed that religious diversity has positive association

with a tolerant society and absence of religious conflict.⁵¹ In such manner, it is important that mothers should teach mutual respect and tolerance for those with different beliefs in order to build a peaceful society. With such teachings, teens may perceive religious diversity as a strength, which could help them in becoming part of a pluralistic environment where people can live peacefully.

Ignorance amongst women is another important factor that supports extremism. For instance, women's participation in unsafe charities have directly or indirectly facilitated extremist groups' action. As Qadeem narrated the incident of a Begum from Swat who donated her own jewellery along with other relatives and friends' jewellery to Taliban as charity.⁵²

M (Rural women/uneducated): They (children) get their religious education from Qari Sahab. I keep on doing my daily chores while they are having the Quran lessons.

M (Religious background): Our religious education is very important to us so we used to sit with children to teach them our religious beliefs.

Mixed voices were heard from key respondents on the role of mother's religious beliefs in children's involvement in extremism. Children in a highly patriarchal society may be totally separated or isolated from their mothers and the father mainly influences their intellectual formation. Mothers teach children lessons from the religious beliefs they themselves subscribe to and are reflect from their behaviour. However, the probability of a change of mind-set as the children grow up and have other learning spaces available (educational institutions they study in and social groups they interact with, etc.) cannot be ignored. Such exposures may provide teens with opportunities to reorient their thoughts and beliefs and as a result, they may become moderates or further extremists. Similarly, if mothers happen to be moderate, the children may learn that from them but once they will have other learning spaces available, they may turn extremists or further moderate.

Quantitative Analysis


It is commonly known that parental supervision is inevitable to build young people's resilience to violent behaviour. However, the survey data delineates that over 50 percent of young participants had lack of parental supervision. The data also identified four types of attitudes

⁵¹ Robert A. Dowd, "Religious Diversity and Religious Tolerance: Lessons from Nigeria," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 60, (4) (2014): 617-644, <https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0022002714550085>

⁵² Qadeem, *Engendering Extremism: Women Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan*.

among respondent teenagers in Multan based on their differences in responses related to their belief system including 1) violent extremist, 2) hard liner practitioners, 3) moderate and 4) liberal. This grouping is based on teens' self-reporting wherein teenagers may tell lies for presenting themselves as sympathetic to others' best interest.

Graph 1: Types of Teens' Attitudes



Source: Primary Data Collected from Online Paper Survey for this Study

The above graph establishes that more than half (52.4 percent) of the respondents were tolerant citizens. Although the result also hinted an interesting fact that teens provide social acceptance of violence. For example, the quantitative data represents that nearly one-third teens from Multan (32.6 percent) expressed tendency towards violence extremism based on 19 item/attitudinal statements related to social, cultural and religious aspects. Such as just under a half (49.4 percent) of survey respondents agreed to the survey statement "Taliban who are fighting against law enforcing agencies are Mujahideen (holy warriors)". These teens' thoughts might be influenced by their mothers, being too intimate to them, as mothers are the first learning platform for teens who hardly have any independent analytical thoughts. In fact the data results also indicated that teens largely structure most of their thoughts from the their mothers' thought. This relationship can be seen by the response of a question of this study that around a half of the respondents (49.4 percent) identified that their mother taught them that Islam permits Muslims to fight against the enemy (holy war). Moreover, almost two-fifths (40 percent) survey teenagers reported that their mothers do not allow them to make friends with those who belong to different sects. Furthermore 29.2 percent) teens gave their opinion that their mothers asked them to change their physical appearance as per their religious beliefs. This

discussion indicated an association between teens religious beliefs and mothers' teachings.

With quantitate data the research also examined the effects of religious beliefs of women participants and tendency of development of extreme behaviour among teens. The Chi-Square result presents that the religious affiliation of mothers is supportive of inclination of extremist attitudes among teens (Value= 57.618, df= 10, P= .000). This means the research has confirmed that mother's religious beliefs have an important association with teens' inclination towards adopting extremist views and behaviours.

The quantitative data also replicated the same result of qualitative data that educated mothers can act as a mean to prevent building violent extremist ideologies among teens. To examine it, the result of the Pearson Chi-Square revealed that there is a statistically significant association (Value= 8.975, df= 4, P= .062) between mother's education and children's thinking and views in terms of acceptance of violent extremist beliefs. This result indicates that educated mothers can act as a mean to prevent building violent extremist teachings among teens.

Children from poor families may likely be vulnerable to accepting extremist beliefs that may lead to violent extremism. Lack of basic facilities of lives may push teenagers to become prey of hate mongers who give them money, and identity with certain ideology. While following earlier studies, it is validated from quantitative data of this study that economic factors such as mother as a source of income and children's perception towards violent extremism have significant relationship (Value= 45.584, df= 06, P= .000). This result hinted towards justification of violent extremist behaviour of teens on the grounds of poverty. The following Table explains the religious beliefs, social status and education of mothers and teenagers inclination towards extremist views and behaviour.

Table 2: Religious Beliefs, Social Status, and Mothers' Education and Teenagers Inclination towards Extremist Views and Behaviour

	Value	Df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Mothers' Religious Belief	57.618	10	.000
Mothers' Education	81.419	22	.000
Mothers' Social Status	45.584	06	.000

Conclusion

This study has been exploratory research in nature to investigate various aspects of upbringing dynamics that influence the process of radicalization as well as de-radicalization amongst teens from the city of Multan. The historic city/ division of Multan has been a hot bed of

sectarian radicalism, yet there has been little focus on how the youth especially teens are affected by radicalisation, starting from their homes. There is also a dearth of sufficient theoretical knowledge on the topic.⁵³ To build the theoretical base, this research analysed data using Bowlby's 'Attachment theory.' The research undertaken extended Bowlby's work by investigating three important features; economic status, education, and religious beliefs of mothers in terms of their tendencies to deal with violent extremism in teens from the Multan district. On this subject, the statistical findings cohere with the theoretical foundation and provide initial support to the 'Attachment theory' for examining the maternal bonding with teens explicitly significant in promoting resilience to radicalization.

The results demonstrated that mothers' education has a significant influence over children's thinking, orientation and views about violent extremism. The findings also signalled that an educated mother can herself acquire knowledge and also share knowledge on any issue (e.g., exploitation by any extremist group) faced by her children. In contrast, an uneducated mother may not herself comprehend and therefore unable to explain such issues, so that her children could learn about a complex subject as countering violent extremism. Hence, mothers need to be taught and made aware of these issues according to their circumstances. Although orientation and awareness programmes do exist in the country, they need to be tailored as per requirements of the specific target groups such as mothers who are in the process of upbringing their young children. This can only be possible if a need assessment is carried out on capacity and knowledge building of mothers on processes of radicalization and how to counter such tendencies among their children.

A well-informed and knowledgeable mother can help children in shaping their mind-set. Simultaneously this relationship requires a participatory approach to alleviate the negative effects of social disadvantages on teens such as violent extremism. The analysis also suggested that an educated mother is likely to understand the importance of this participatory approach. Therefore, a positive connection between mothers and teens is crucial to deter and prevent radicalization among teens from occurring in the first place. Making educated mothers better placed in being compassionate towards people hailing from different religious denominations, contributing towards a tolerant society can help countering violent extremism.

In line with the qualitative analysis, statistical results showed that a mother's own religious views and thoughts might influence children's thinking and views about violent extremism. In addition, both the

⁵³ Elga Sikkens, "Parental Influence on Radicalization and De-radicalization According to the Lived Experiences of Former Extremists and their Families," *The Hague, Netherlands*, NCTV, (2015): 198.

qualitative and quantitative data unfolded that a child must be provided with basic needs that is an opportunity to live with respect and peaceful growth. This will be possible if parents equally share their parental responsibilities including financial support to their teens, taking responsibility for their education, health and safety. A mother's financial empowerment not only raises the status of women in the family through financial support to their family members but the exposure and working experience educate mothers to take an active role in safeguarding their teens.

Based on the findings, this study has identified several good practices as CVE interventions that may strengthen communities particularly mothers to counter violent extremism. However, rigorous evaluation with extensive field work is needed before implementation of these interventions.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are based on findings of the study.

- Multi-stakeholders including civil society, community leaders, government, multinational corporations should take steps to launch special training programmes and free counselling centres for women of low-socio-economic status especially in radicalised societies such as Multan to educate them about their role as real change makers. This is significant for educating children not to hate or discriminate against fellow citizens hailing from other religions and faiths by promoting interfaith harmony. Such programmes must also orient mothers about psychological issues of adolescence and teenagers and various ways to deal with these difficult issues. These trainings can be useful for women to recognize early signs of radicalization among teens and how to discuss it with their children. Through these trainings, women may learn various methods to help their children to handle unwanted situations.
- Increasing access to education can also be helpful in achieving the target of building a peaceful society. Teachers in Multan's schools need to be trained to integrate de-radicalization through peace education. Therefore, special curricula for all age groups and exclusive trainings for teachers in Multan should be initiated. The main objective of these educational initiatives would be to build critical thinking among young people which is important to improve their skills to resist violent extremist narratives.
- There is also a critical need to engage youth in healthy activities such as foreign/local exchange programmes, sports, extracurricular activities, art and literature, research, scientific activities, exhibitions and competitions. It is a known factor that when youth is given

opportunities to spend time in sports and extra-curricular activities, they channelize their energies positively.

- At the same time, awareness of women's rights and their participation in efforts to respond to violent extremism in Multan can strengthen community resilience. Women's participation in decision-making processes at various levels including family, community and national levels should be increased. Evidence based research exclusively in South Punjab on gendered dynamics of violent extremism is critical to reverse the growing trend of radicalization in society. Media particularly social media can play a vital role in countering extremism in Multan through setting up and deploying counter narratives and by providing alternative vision to young people on the basis of equality and human dignity.

PAK-AFGHAN BORDER: DEMARCATION AND MANAGEMENT

Lutf ur Rehman*

Abstract

Pak-Afghan relations have many drivers but the foremost have always been security issues, sovereignty concerns, border dispute, and connectivity. The two countries have had a fragile relationship for the last seven decades owing to the Durand Line dispute. The border dispute has been a source of constant deliberation and mostly contested by Afghan politicians, policy makers, and scholars. Controversies and uncertainties are therefore prevalent about the border. This research is based on the analysis of primary documents to address the issue academically, and discusses the detailed history of demarcation and issues in border management. Islamabad has launched Integrated Border Management System to secure its border from illegal border crossing and smuggling. Afghanistan has not formulated such a strategy. It continues to oppose the existence of Durand Line, which makes cooperation between the two sides—vital to overcome the menace of terrorism and other serious issues—difficult.

Keywords: *Durand Line, Demarcation, Management, Fencing, Afghanistan, Pakistan*

Introduction

Being immediate neighbours, friendly relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan are vital for peace, stability, and economic development of the region. But this is not the case and except for the brief period of the Taliban regime (1996-2001), Islamabad-Kabul ties have suffered frequent hiccups. They have divergent views about the status of their border (Durand Line). It is the cause of disagreement between the two since 1947 and Kabul has so far not recognized it. The border experienced tough time and was closed on several occasions even prior to the war on terror. The new [Taliban] government is also following the footsteps of former Afghan governments. Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, former Taliban Ambassador to Pakistan, claims that Islamabad tried three

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times during the Taliban's previous regime to convert the boundary line into a permanent border, but it did not receive a positive response.¹

Afghanistan also resists the fencing of the border.² It claims that any construction work by Pakistan along the border is against international norms.³ Kabul argues that fencing the border is violation of Durand Treaty.⁴ Fencing is also a contentious matter for Taliban. Their Acting Minister for Culture and Information, Zabiullah Majahid says that fencing has divided families.⁵ (The Taliban removed fence on Pak-Afghan border in Mohmand district in December 2021.) But Islamabad argues that it is doing construction work on its soil and Kabul has nothing to do with it.

Pakistan under its Integrated Border Management System (IBMS) has taken steps to keep the border open for trade but secure from terrorists and smugglers. So far, Afghanistan has not prepared any such system. It is not cooperating in the border management due to its historical stance. It looks difficult to find a solution to the dispute in the near future. This study explains demarcation, fencing, legal status, and management of Pak-Afghan border. It will help policymakers and scholars on both sides to understand the nature of the border and issues related to its management.

Perceptions about Pak-Afghan Border

The status of Pak-Afghan border is controversial from the Afghan point of view. Kabul does not recognize it as an international border and opposes its fencing. But it is a settled matter from Pakistani perspective. Islamabad argues that fencing of the border is not violation of international and Durand Treaty as the construction work is being carried out on Pakistani soil. In fact, Pak-Afghan border is surrounded by myth,

¹ "Pakistan Tried Three Times to Formalize Durand Line during Taliban Regime," *Khaama Press*, February 26, 2016, <http://www.khaama.com/pakistan>.

² Ousama Khurshid Khan, "Regional Peace through Border Management," *Center for Strategic and Contemporary Research*, December 7, 2016. <http://cscr.pk/analysis-and-opinions/regional-peace-border-management/>.

³ Javed Hamin Kakar, "Afghanistan-Pakistan Border Gate Dispute Ends," *Pajhowk Afghan News*, April 15, 2013, <https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2013/04/15/>.

⁴ Sarwat Rauf and Shakeel Ahmad, "Pak-Afghan Border Management: Development and Controversies," *Journal of Contemporary Studies*, vol. VIII, no. I (Summer 2019), 37.

⁵ Baqir Sajjad Syed, "Border Spat with Taliban Resolved: Official," *Dawn*, Islamabad, December 25, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1665630>.

fiction, and imagination.⁶ Therefore, there are several, contending positions on the legitimacy of the border. For instance, G. Rauf Roashan, an Afghan scholar argues that this border has not been demarcated.⁷ Jakob Rosel claims that the border is not visible on the ground.⁸ Jules Steward argues that it has not been demarcated in a proper way, and the boundary pillars are constructed far away from each other.⁹

Ousama Khurshid Khan argues that Kabul opposes fencing the border based on its historical claims.¹⁰ The Afghan authorities argue that the construction work by Pakistan along the border is against international norms.¹¹ Sarwat Rauf and Shakeel Ahmad contend that management of the border is violation of Durand Agreement.¹² Seen from an Afghan perspective, apparently, there is no solution to the dispute.¹³ And this is a serious issue.¹⁴

Despite its significance, Pak-Afghan border is one of the most under researched topics.¹⁵ There is a gap in the available literature. Proceedings of the boundary commissions constituted from time to time to demarcate the border are also not available. Therefore, this study addresses the questions about demarcation, fencing, legal position, and management of the border. It uses primary data besides books and journals. There are three steps vital in border making: an agreement between the parties, demarcation, and management. The first two steps were taken by the British India and the last one is being carried out by Pakistan. This research explores nature of Pak-Afghan border with the help of documents.

⁶ Magnus Marsden and Benjamin D. Hopkins, *Fragments of the Afghan Frontier* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2012), 1.

⁷ G. Rauf Roashan, "The Unholy Durand Line, Buffering the Buffer," *Institute for Afghan Studies*, August 11, 2001, retrieved May 17, 2011, <http://www.institute-for-afghanstudies.org/Contributions/Commentaries>

⁸ Jakob Rosel, "Ancient Regions, New Frontier: The Prehistory of the Durand Line in Baluchistan," *Internationals Asian Forum*, vol. 44, no. 1/2 (May 2013), 8.

⁹ Jules Stewart, *The Savage Frontier: the Story of the North-West Frontier* (Stroud, Sutton Publishing Ltd.: 2007), 99.

¹⁰ Ousama Khurshid Khan, "Regional Peace through Border Management."

¹¹ Javed Hamin Kakar, "Afghanistan-Pakistan Border Gate Dispute Ends."

¹² Sarwat Rauf and Shakeel Ahmad, "Pak-Afghan Border Management: Development and Controversies," 37.

¹³ Michael Kugelman, "Danger on the Durand Line," *Foreign Affairs*, March 2, 2017, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2017-03-02/danger-durand-line>.

¹⁴ Faisal Khan, "Why Borrow Trouble for Yourself and Lend It to Neighbors? Understanding the Historical Roots of Pakistan's Afghan Policy," *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, vol. 37, no. 4, (2010), 178.

¹⁵ Elisa Giunchi, "The Origins of the Dispute over the Durand Line," *Internationales Asian Forum*, vol. 44, no. 1-2 (2013), 25.

Demarcation of Durand Line

Before formulating opinions on legitimacy of the border, it is important to analyse the agreements signed between the British (and later Pakistani) and Afghan authorities. In this regard, arguably the most important agreement is the Durand Treaty. On the question of border demarcation authorities, Article 4 of Durand treaty says that the border will be demarcated by joint commissions.¹⁶ Demarcation refers to practical work or lying of the boundary line on the ground, and physical structure like pillars.¹⁷ Pak-Afghan border has been demarcated by three joint commissions: the Baluch-Afghan Boundary Commission (BABC), the Afghan-Waziristan Boundary Commission (AWBC), and the Asmar Boundary Commission (ABC).

Baluch-Afghan Border Commission

Demarcation in Baluchistan was divided in two sections i.e., Domandi-Chaman and Chaman-Koh-i-Malik Siah. It was mutually agreed between the British and Afghan authorities that Domandi-Chaman section would be demarcated first. The length of this section is 330 miles.¹⁸ Amir Abdur Rahman appointed Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan, *Naib Salar Mulki* or Deputy Chief of Khost province, as the Afghan commissioner for demarcation of this section. The Indian government assigned this task to a distinguished army officer and diplomat, Captain Arthur Henry (A.H) McMahon. He had to demarcate the entire Baluch-Afghan border-Domandi to Koh-i-Malik-Siah, located at a tri-junction point at Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan border.¹⁹ For demarcation, 678 camels, horses and mules were hired.²⁰

Domandi-Chaman Section

Domandi is located on the border of South Waziristan and Baluchistan. Members of the joint commission had to travel in difficult terrains and a terrible desert.²¹ A. H. McMahon and Sardar Gul Muhammad

¹⁶ C. U. Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads relating to India and Neighbouring Countires*, vol. XIII (Calcutta: Government of India, Central Publication Branch, 1933), 257.

¹⁷ A.H. McMahon, "International Boundaries," *Journal of the Royal Society of Arts*, vol. 84, no. 4330 November 15, 1935), 4.

¹⁸ A.H. McMahon, *Report on the Demarcation of the Indo-Afghan Boundary, Baluchistan Section, from Chaman to Koh-i-Malik Siah* (Simla: The Government Central Printing Press, 1896), 1.

¹⁹ A.H. McMahon, "Recent Survey and Exploration in Seistan," *The Geographical Journal*, vol. 28, no. 3, September, 1906, 209.

²⁰ A. H. McMahon, *Report on the Demarcation of Baluch-Afghan Boundary, Domandi-New Chaman Section* (Quetta: Government of Baluchistan, 1895), 3.

²¹ A. H. McMahon, "The Southern Borerlands of Afghanistan," *Geographical Journal* no. 4, April, 1897, 394.

Khan held talks at Domandi on June 1, 1894. They agreed that the Kunder and Kundil rivers form a natural border and, therefore, actual demarcation was not necessary between Domandi and Prekare. They demarcated the border up to Khwaja Amran range. A dispute surfaced about the borderline near Pasha Kotal. A. H. McMahon gave concession to Afghanistan, and both sides demarcated the border from Domandi to Chaman on February 18, 1895. Agreement to this effect was signed on February 26, 1895. After the agreement, both sides also exchanged maps.

Chaman-Kohi Malik Siah Section

A. H. McMahon and Sardar Muhammad Umar Khan, who had replaced Sardar Gul Muhammad as the commissioner, held initial talks at Chaman on February 3, 1896.²² They held negotiations in Persian because A. H. McMahon was fluent in that language. He also understood and spoke Urdu and Pashto. The Afghans wanted to have control over an outpost, Reg Thana near Chaman. It was located on the Indian side of the border but was given to Afghanistan. They demarcated about 30 miles border between Chaman and Ghwazha until April 22, 1895. Further progress became difficult due to the growing Afghan claims.²³ Deadlock continued for nine months. McMahon under directives from the viceroy handed over Itaz Karez area to Afghanistan. This enabled them to demarcate 60 miles border from Sarlat to Kani; pillars were erected near Partos Nawar where the boundary line enters *Registan* or desert. However, no pillars were constructed in a 38-mile zone, from Partos Nawar to Kani, due to shifting of sand dunes. Pillar No. 156 is located at the one end and pillar No. 157 at the other. Construction of pillars in this area was useless and the parties agreed that straight line between the two places would be treated as the boundary line.²⁴

Now demarcation became more problematic as the commissioners had to identify the boundary line for nearly 200 miles in a desert. Rising temperature, wildfire, and scarcity of water were major obstacles. The commission found water at seven places in 270 miles area. It was extremely salty and unfit for drinking.²⁵ Despite slow work, the commission left nothing undone and demarcated 470 miles frontier from Chaman to the Iranian border. At one point, the border was pushed 70

²² A. H. McMahon, *Letters on the Baluch-Afghan Boundary Commission of 1896* (Calcutta: Baptist Mission Press, 1909), 8.

²³ A. H. McMahon, *Report on the Demarcation of the Indo-Afghan Boundary, Baluchistan Section, from Chaman to Koh-i-Malik Siah*, 3.

²⁴ Letter from the Viceroy to Amir Habibullah Khan, December 8, 1906, Directorate of Archives, Baluchistan (DABQ), *Basta* (Bag) 01, File Afghanistan 1909, AGG/V. 106, 21.

²⁵ A. Alcock and F. Finn, "An Account of the Reptilia Collected by Dr. F. P. Maynard, A. H. McMahon, and the Members of the Baluch-Afghan Boundary Commission of 1896," *Asiatic Society*, vol. 65, no. 4, April, 1897, 551.

miles inside Baluchistan as a concession. The entire work was completed on April 16, 1896 when the last pillar, No. 186 was constructed at Kohi Malik Siah. The commissioners signed an agreement (in both English and Persian) on May 13, 1896 and exchanged maps. Inhabitants of Baluchistan cooperated in this whole process.²⁶

In December 1898, the Afghan government demanded construction of boundary pillars between Partos Nawar and Kani.²⁷ The viceroy suggested construction of some subsidiary pillars along the straight line. It was feared that the regularly moving sand dunes might soon obliterate pillars.²⁸ Kabul gave up the idea. Afghanistan also returned Chagai in May 1896, according to a provision of Durand Treaty. Afghan troops had occupied it several years ago and the then chief of Chagai, Sardar Ali Khan Sanjrani took refuge in Nushki which was part of British India.²⁹

Afghan-Waziristan Boundary Commission

The Indian government asked Commissioner Derajat Division, Richard Isaac Bruce to demarcate this section. Lucas White King and H. A. Anderson, Deputy Commissioners Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu respectively, assisted him. This portion of the border was divided in four sub-sections. The first section (Domandi to Khawaja Khedar) was to be demarcated by Lucas White King, the second and third sections (Khawaja Khedar-Charkhel and Charkhel-Laram) by H. A. Anderson, and the fourth (Laram-Sikaram) by J. S. Donald. From the Afghan side, Sardar Sherin Dil Khan, Deputy Governor Khost, and another official, Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan, were collectively responsible for demarcation of all the sub-sections. As the area was mostly hilly, Amir Abdur Rahman suggested that there was no need to mark the boundary line on high mountains.³⁰

Sikaram-Laram Section (Kurram)

Sardar Sherin Dil Khan and J. S. Donald demarcated the border between Sikaram and Kharlachi on June 8, 1894. But the differences surfaced over the question of a watershed near Ucha Margha. They again

²⁶ Richard Isaac Bruce, *The Forward Policy, and Its Results: Or Thirty-Five Years Work Amongst the Tribes on Our North-Western Frontier of India* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1900), 140.

²⁷ Letter from Political Assistant Chagai to the First Assistant to the Governor General in Baluchistan, December 31, 1898, DABQ, *Basta* 01, File Afghanistan 1901, AGG/V., 103.

²⁸ Letter from the Viceroy to Amir Habibullah Khan of Afghanistan, December 8, 1906, DABQ, *Basta* 01, File Afghanistan, 1909, AGG/V., 106.

²⁹ R. G. Sandeman, *Dispute regarding British Afghan Boundary in the Vicinity of Chaman*, DABQ, *Basta* 01, File Boundaries, 1889, AGG/V., 111.

³⁰ Letter from Amir Abdur Rahman to the Indian Foreign Secretary, April 15, 1894, Bundle 11, EX-DD 1098-B, KPDAL, Peshawar.

met on July 3 and demarcated the boundary line near Jaji Maidan. Sardar Sherin Dil Khan wanted extra territorial concessions, and this brought demarcation to standstill. But his move was foiled.³¹ The two commissioners then demarcated the border up to Laram.³² They inked an agreement at Kotkai on November 21, 1894.³³ Maps were also signed and exchanged; later, the Amir and Viceroy ratified the agreement and maps.³⁴

Domandi-Laram (North and South Waziristan)

The British members of Waziristan Boundary Commission arrived at Wana, the headquarters of South Waziristan in the third week of October 1894. The AWBC was unable to initiate the demarcation due to hostile attitude of Mullah Powindah, a local religious figure. He gathered a tribal *lashkar* (force) and ambushed the British camp. Lt. Percy John Frederick Macaulay, the officer of Royal Engineers, Lt. Herbert, Lt. Thomson, surgeon Major Saig, and Cap. Lang were killed during the ambush. Lt. Percy John Frederick Macaulay had the credit of preparing all the four maps of Durand Line exchanged in Kabul in November 1893. The demarcation began on March 7, 1895, and completed within two weeks.³⁵

Asmar Boundary Commission

The Indian government appointed Richard Udny, Commissioner Peshawar Division, to demarcate the border between Chitral and Sikaram.³⁶ The Amir appointed Commander-in-Chief, Ghulam Haider Khan as the Afghan Commissioner. They met in Jalalabad on August 21, 1894, but the talks did not progress because Ghulam Haider Khan made a claim to Arnawai or Bashgal valley, and Nasrat district. His assertion was contrary to Article 3 of Durand Agreement whereby Afghanistan was entitled to retain Asmar and the valley above it, as far as Chanak and not beyond that point. The impasse continued for about four months. In December 1894, Richard Udny once again visited Jalalabad. He and Ghulam Haider Khan proceeded to Nashagam, but Ghulam Haider Khan did not change his policy and claimed Sao. Richard Udny rejected his plea.

³¹ Letter from the Viceroy to Amir Abdur Rahman, November 7, 1894, Bundle 11, EX-DD 1076, KPDAL, Peshawar.

³² Letter from Commissioner Peshawar to Chief Secretary Punjab, December 14, 1894, Bundle 11, EX-DD 1339, KPDAL, Peshawar.

³³ J. S. Donald, *Report on Demarcation in Kurram* (Lahore Punjab Government Press, 1968), 6.

³⁴ Letter from the Viceroy to His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan, September 9, 1895, Bundle 13, EX-DD 1352, KPDAL, Peshawar.

³⁵ H. A. Anderson, *Report on the Delimitation of the Charkhil-Khwaja Khidar portion of the Indo-Afghanistan Boundary* (Simla: Punjab Government Branch Press, 1895), 1.

³⁶ Indo-Afghan Boundary: Khaibar [Khyber] Bajour [Bajaur] and Mohmand, Bundle 11, Ex-DD 1067, KPDAL, Peshawar.

All three areas were parts of Chitral since long, but Afghanistan and Umra Khan of Jandul were also claiming it. The British Agent at Gilgit, George Scott Robertson, advised the British Commissioner to give these areas to the strongest party, Afghanistan.³⁷ Thus, Richard Udny accepted all demands of his counterpart that paved the way for signing of the Nashagam Agreement on April 9, 1895.³⁸ It defined the border from Nawa Kotal to Hindu Kush that buttresses the Pamir range. The ABC demarcated 210 km long border. Of this, 75 miles border was surveyed. Border from the Hindu Kush to Shawal Pass was already surveyed during Colonel Lockhart Mission to Chitral in 1885-86 and the ABC adopted that survey report. Maps were also exchanged, highlighting the borderline with a red colour.

Richard Udny violated Durand Treaty by allowing Afghanistan to occupy Nasrat, Sao, Birkot, and Kafiristan. Earlier, it was agreed during Mortimer Durand Mission to Kabul that the Afghan border in Kunar would be at an average distance of four miles south of the Kunar River until it crosses the Katkot Dara [valley] leading to Barawal.³⁹ Richard Udny and Ghulam Haider Khan pushed this border for 70 miles toward Dir and Bajaur. The British Commissioner demonstrated extreme flexibility with the hope that Ghulam Haider Khan would cooperate in demarcating rest of the border. But the situation became more complicated when the Afghan commissioner claimed that Mohmand District belonged to Afghanistan. Richard Udny refused to accede to it and further work stopped.

Issues in the Border Demarcation

The border except in Mohmand and Khyber was demarcated, but it could not settle border related issues permanently. New challenges emerged that included the Afghan invasion and annexation of Bashgal Valley and Dokalim. Similarly, Wakhan Corridor was also handed over to Kabul against the wishes of the ruler of Wakhi people, Ali Mardan Shah.

Invasion of Bashgal

Amir Abdur Rahman wanted to conquer Bashgal prior to Mortimer Durand's visit to Kabul. Mr. Durand had cautioned about this in 1885.⁴⁰

³⁷ Letter No. 3 from British Agent at Gilgit to Richard Udny, February 11, 1895, File No. 65, Budlaff Library Gilgit.

³⁸ Richard Udny, *Report of the Asmar Boundary Commission* (Simla: Punjab Government Press, 1895), 9.

³⁹ Demi-official from H. Daly, Assistant Foreign Secretary to H. C. Fanshawe, Chief Secretary Punjab, January 19, 1894, Bundle 11, EX-DD 1098-B, KPDAL, Peshawar.

⁴⁰ Schuyler Jones, *Men of Influence in Nuristan: A Study of Social Control and Dispute Settlement in Waigal Valley, Afghanistan* (London: Seminar Press, 1974), 2.

The Afghan troops invaded the valley in 1895, occupied it, and massacred thousands of its residents.⁴¹ The area was then renamed as *Nuristan* or the land of light.⁴²

Bashgal was an integral part of Chitral since long and the British officers used to visit it with the consent of Aman ul Mulk, *Mehtar* (ruler) of Chitral. William Watts McNair paid a visit to the valley in 1883.⁴³ Colonel Lockhart went to Bashgal in 1885 with the permission of Aman ul Mulk.⁴⁴ George Scott Robertson twice visited Bashgal, - in 1889 and 1890- 91. The last visit became possible after he gave a written undertaking that if he encountered any mishap during the trip, the *Mehtar* would not be responsible for that.⁴⁵ George Scott Robertson then wrote a book (*The Kafirs of the Hindu Kush*), which is still considered a masterpiece about the history, geography, and culture of Bashgal.

The former *Khan* or ruler of Asmar, Ghulam Khan liberated his khanate, Asmar from Afghanistan for a brief period in 1928.⁴⁶ This induced *Mehtar*, Shuja ul Mulk to reunite Bashgal, Sao, Nasrat (Narai), and Birkot with Chitral, which were occupied and merged with Afghanistan amid unfavourable circumstances.⁴⁷ The Political Agent Dir, Swat and Chitral, Major J. W. Thomson Glover warned him to refrain from this venture.⁴⁸ But people of Chitral did not give up the hope to regain their lost territory. The Pakistan Muslim Working Committee Drosh (Chitral) passed a resolution in July 1956, demanding return of all those areas that Chitral had lost to Afghanistan.⁴⁹

Wakhan Corridor

The strategic Wakhan Corridor is a remote district of Badakhshan

⁴¹ Amin Saikal, *Modern Afghanistan: A Struggle of History and Survival* (London: I. B. Tauris and Co Ltd. 2004), 8.

⁴² Wilfred Thesiger, A Journey in Nuristan, *The Geographical Journal*, vol. 123, no. 4, December, 1957, 457.

⁴³ William Watts McNair, "A Visit to Kafiristan," *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society and Monthly Record of Geography*, vol. 6, no. 1, 1884, 14.

⁴⁴ W. S. Lockhart, General Narrative, In S. W. Woodthorpe, *Gilgit Mission: 1885-86* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1889), 271, 324.

⁴⁵ Geogre Scott Robertson, *The Kafirs of the Hindu-Kush* (London: Lawrence and Bullen Ltd. 1900), 45.

⁴⁶ Letter from the Mehtar of Chitral to the Assistant Political Agent Chitral, January 10, 1929, Bundle 405, Chitral 14, Tribal Research Cell (TRC), Peshawar.

⁴⁷ Letter from the Mehtar of Chitral to Political Agent Dir, Swat and Chitral, January 22, 1929, Bundle 405, Chitral 14, TRC, Peshawar.

⁴⁸ Letter from Political Agent Dir, Swat and Chitral to the Chief Commissioner North-West Frontier Province (now renamed as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or KP), January 22, 1929, Bundle 405, Chitral 14, TRC, Peshawar.

⁴⁹ Extract from Weekly Summary No. 28, Government of Pakistan, 14th July 1956, Bundle 405, Chitral 14, TRC Peshawar.

province, Afghanistan. It touches the Himalaya, Hindu Kush, Karakorum, and Pamirs ranges. It separates Tajikistan from Pakistan. When the British and Tsarist Russia were expanding their frontiers during the "great game," there was a threat of military confrontation between the two powers. To avoid this, the British decided that Wakhan should be merged with China or Afghanistan.⁵⁰ When China declined to have Wakhan, the British offered it to Amir Abdur Rahman who also rejected the offer.⁵¹ But he accepted the proposal when the British promised him a subsidy of Rs. 50,000 per annum to smoothly run administration of Wakhan.⁵² The ruler of Wakhan, Ali Mardan Shah was ignored in this process. He fled to Chitral when the Afghan troops occupied Badakhshan in 1883.⁵³ Ali Mardan Shah wanted the merger of his khanate with Chitral. The British did not favour the idea as the merger of Wakhan with Chitral meant to have a direct border with Russia that was not in the British interest.⁵⁴ The British then appointed Ali Mardan Shah the Governor of Ishkoman valley (Ghizer District of Gilgit) and fixed a monthly stipend of Rs. 100 for him.⁵⁵ The British and Russia exchanged a note in March 1895 deciding their sphere of influence in the region. The British pledged:

...the territory lying within the British sphere of influence between the Hindu Kush and the line running from the east end of Lake Victoria to the Chinese frontier shall form part of the territory of the Amir of Afghanistan; that it shall not be annexed to Great Britain; and that no military posts or forts shall be established in it.⁵⁶

Post 3rd Anglo-Afghan War Border Demarcation

The British made efforts to demarcate the border in Mohmand and Khyber in 1896-97, but Amir Abdur Rahman did not express any enthusiasm. He died in 1901 and was succeeded by his son, Habibullah Khan who wrote a letter to the viceroy in July 1903, expressing his willingness to demarcate the remaining border. The viceroy appointed Political Agent Khyber, Major George Roos-Keppel, as the British

⁵⁰ Sophie Ibbotson and Max Lovell Hoare, *Tajikistan: the Bradt Travel Guide* (New York: The Globe Pequot Press Inc., 2013), 11.

⁵¹ Memorandum of conversation between Sir Mortimer Durand and the Amir at Kila-i-Hashim Khan in Kabul on October 29, 1893, File Afghanistan 336, TRC, Peshawar.

⁵² C. U. Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties*, 220.

⁵³ William Stephen Alexander Lockhart, "General Narrative," in *The Gilgit Mission 1885-86*; William Stephen Alexander Lockhart, R. G. Woodthorpe and Surgeon Giles (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1889), 290.

⁵⁴ Kenneth Mason and H. L. Crosthwait, "Colonel Sir Thomas Hungerford Holdich," *The Geographical Journal*, vol. 75, no. 3 (1930), 212.

⁵⁵ Standing Order to Governors Yasin Ishkoman and Kuh-Ghizer, File No. PLG.55, Budlaff Library Gilgit.

⁵⁶ Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties*, 271.

commissioner. But he could not start practical work due to hot weather and prevalence of cholera in the region.

Demarcation in Khyber

It was after the Rawalpindi Treaty that solid steps were taken to demarcate the border between Nawa Kotal and Sikaram. Article No. 5 of Rawalpindi treaty, provided for an ex parte demarcation by a British commission. Sir H. Grant assured that the ex parte demarcation would not be used as a pretext for territorial expansion.⁵⁷ John Maffey demarcated the border from Kafir Dara Sar instead of Tsatsobi Kando because of the difficulty and risk involved. He demarcated the border to Palosi area of Mohmand from August 23 to September 2, 1919. General Ghulam Nani Khan of Afghanistan witnessed proceedings of the commission. It demarcated over 88 miles out of the total 100 miles border between Nawa-Kotal and Sikaram. Under the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 22nd November 1921, the Afghan border was advanced about 700 yards in Khyber towards Peshawar.⁵⁸ In this way, over 99 per cent border was demarcated on different occasions, leaving only 22 miles of the border yet to be demarcated.

Dokalim Dispute

Dokalim is a small area located near Arandu, Chitral. Kabul occupied it in 1912.⁵⁹ The Indian government lodged a protest with Afghanistan, but this did not work. The issue lingered for more than two decades. At last, the British admitted the Afghan point of view and the Afghan Foreign Minister Sardar Faiz Muhammad Khan and the Kabul based British Minister Sir Richard Roy Maconachie signed a treaty on February 3, 1934.⁶⁰ The treaty was registered with the League of Nations.

Demarcation of the border was a great achievement from diplomatic and strategic point of view. But it failed to control cross-border crimes. People living on both sides of the frontier especially in Kurram and Waziristan continued to indulge in kidnapping and taking away cattle. The British and Afghan government agreed in October 1902 to constitute a joint commission to settle criminal cases. The British commissioner, J.S. Donald, and his Afghan counterpart, Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan, met in

⁵⁷ R. P. Maconachie, *A Precise on Afghan Affairs: From February 1919 to September 1927* (Simla: Government of India Press, 1928), 192.

⁵⁸ Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties*, 293.

⁵⁹ Letter from Denys Bray, the Indian Foreign Secretary to Chief Commissioner NWFP, March 22, 1926, file Chitral 593, Bundle 21 A, TRC, Peshawar.

⁶⁰ Afghanistan, Treaty Series No. 25. *Exchange of Notes between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, and the Government of India and the Government of Afghanistan in regard to the Boundary between India and Afghanistan in the neighbourhood of Arnawai and Dokalim* (London: United Kingdom: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1934).

Kurram in March 1903 but their recommendations were disregarded. A similar commission was formed in April 1910 but it failed to settle the problem. Therefore, a biennial commission was established. It held meetings in 1933, 1936, 1938, and 1940 but their efforts proved just wastage of time and resources.⁶¹

Band-i-Chandan

The British started construction of levy posts at Band-i-Chandan and Amirzai-ka-Banad, Baluchistan in 1899 to monitor the entry of unwanted elements from across the border. Sardar Muhammad Aslam Khan, Governor Kandahar opposed establishment of the posts and pleaded that both the areas belonged to Afghanistan. The British responded that the areas were far away from the border and no interference with construction of the posts would be tolerated.

In December 1900, Amir Abdur Rahman wrote a letter to the Viceroy claiming Band-i-Chandan. The British informed the Amir that Band-i-Chandan was not in his dominion and located more than 10 miles away from the border. The Afghan officials in 1906 threatened to occupy Zahro, Darzai, Isa Chah and Band-i-Chandan. The British told Amir Habibullah Khan that the areas were located within their territory and to desist from making unsubstantiated claims.⁶² The British established new check posts along the border besides strengthening the existing ones to foil the Afghan designs. They accomplished the task despite the Afghan opposition. Kabul continued its policy of making claims.

Destruction of Boundary Pillars

The British did their best to protect sanctity of the border and boundary pillars were repaired on annual basis since 1896.⁶³ The Afghan authorities destroyed Pillars No. 76 and No. 158 on Baluch-Afghan Boundary in 1903 and 1906 respectively. They erected new pillars inside Baluchistan but the British took prompt action by destroying the new pillars and reconstructed the old ones at their original sites. When Pakistan came into being, nobody cared about the boundary pillars. Except few, all others were dismantled. Houses and mosques were also constructed right at the border with ulterior motives.

⁶¹ W. C. Leeper, *Kurram-Khost Commission 1938* (Simla: Government Press, 1943), 5.

⁶² Letter No. 21, P.O, from the Viceroy to Amir of Afghanistan, December 6, 1906, Foreign Department, Simla.

⁶³ Letter No. 894 from C. E. Yate, Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan to Secretary Foreign Department, January 28, 1901, File AGG/V. 106, Directorate of Archives, Quetta.

Management of Pak-Afghan Border

With the emergence of Pakistan in 1947, Kabul started a vigorous campaign to recover the territories it lost to Sikh ruler, Ranjeet Singh, and the British. Tension in Pak-Afghan ties resulted in closure of the border in 1950s and 1960s. Kabul was the centre of Pashtun and Baluch nationalists in 1970s and 1980s.⁶⁴ King Zahir Shah demanded creation of an ethnic state, Pakhtunistan.⁶⁵ It was on the top agenda of Afghan foreign policy and domestic politics.⁶⁶ Afghanistan claimed 190,000 square miles of Pakistani territory from Chitral to Baluchistan.⁶⁷ It also used coercive means and the Afghan troops attacked Baluchistan in September 1950. Pakistan repulsed the aggression.⁶⁸

In 1955, Pakistan took steps to consolidate control over its tribal areas. The Afghan Prime Minister Sardar Mohammed Daoud criticized this policy and anti-Pakistan protests were held in Kabul, Jalalabad, and Kandahar. Pakistani national flag was removed from its Embassy in Kabul and Pakhtunistan flag was hoisted on the building. The two countries recalled their ambassadors, and full diplomatic ties were restored after two years. In September 1960, Afghan troops attacked Bajaur. Pakistani jet fighters targeted the intruders. Some were killed and others fled.

In May 1975, Afghanistan launched military training and equipping a terrorist organization, *Zalmay Pakhtun* (Pakhtun Youth) to carry out subversive activities in Pakistan.⁶⁹ Afghanistan also provided shelter to Al-Zulfiqar Organisation that hijacked a PIA plane in 1981. In retaliation, Pakistan allowed the Afghan Islamist leaders to stay on its soil.

Durand Line as a Soft Border

Durand Line has served a soft border for about 120 years. The British permitted Afghan nationals living within 20 miles of the border, to enter India without visas as a gesture of goodwill. Kabul reciprocated in the same way and allowed the British subjects to visit historical places and shrines in Afghanistan. Border authorities of both the countries were

⁶⁴ Rahimullah Yusufzai, "Juma Khan Sufi-Nationalist Seeking Recognition," *The News International*, June 23, 2008.

⁶⁵ Nick Cullather, "Damming Afghanistan: Modernization in a Buffer State," *The Journal of American History*, vol. 89, no. 2, September, 2002, 519.

⁶⁶ Faridullah Bezhan, "The Pashtunistan Issue and Politics in Afghanistan, 1947-1952," *Middle East Journal*, vol. 68, no. 2, Spring, 2014, 205.

⁶⁷ S. M. Qureshi, "Pakhtunistan: The Frontier Dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan," *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 39, no. 1/2, Spring-Summer, 1966, 99.

⁶⁸ "Invaders Out, Pakistan Says," Associated Press, October 5, 1950.

⁶⁹ Juma Khan Sufi, *Faraib-e-Natamam*, (IPS Press: 2020)118, 307, <https://www.ips.org.pk/faraib-e-natamam/>

authorized to issue permits for this purpose. Permits were usually valid for one year.

Kabul and Islamabad continued this practice even in bad times of their bilateral relations. Trade continued between the two countries without any regulation. Kabul used to import food items, medicines, electric home appliances, stationery, etc. from Pakistan. It exported fresh and dried fruits to Pakistan. Smuggling was also prevalent; drugs, foreign goods including cloths, vehicle spare parts and electronics were smuggled into Pakistan and markets in tribal area of Khyber and Baluchistan were flooded with it.

Easement Rights

There is no documentary proof about the easement rights.⁷⁰ However, Article 4 of Durand Agreement says that the border would be demarcated "...having due regard to the existing local rights of villages adjoining the frontier."⁷¹ The word "rights" has not been elaborated. The subsequent Anglo-Afghan treaties are also silent about it. Agriculture, forests, and pastures rights of the tribes living on both sides of the border were protected during the demarcation process.

Peshawar-Kabul Bus Service

Passenger buses were plying between Peshawar and Kabul in the decades of 1960s and 1970s. Two buses one each from Peshawar and Kabul were plying daily. The Aryana Bus and the Pakistan Express Bus used to carry passengers from one country to the other. This service was terminated during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Then Peshawar-Jalalabad Bus Service was launched in 2006 and people with passport and visa were allowed to avail the service which continued until 2016. Kabul and Islamabad are trying to restore the service in 2022.

Pakistan's Friendly Visa Policy

Despite tension in Pak-Afghan ties, people of the countries used to cross the border without travelling documents. But the war on terror changed the whole scenario. Pakistan paid a heavy price (both in human and material losses) due to terrorism. It gradually introduced border restrictions. The terrorist attack on Army Public School, Peshawar in December 2014, compelled Pakistan to tighten security at the border. Terrorists based in Afghanistan carried out the attack. Only those Afghans can now enter Pakistan who have valid travel documents. But Islamabad is following friendly visa policy for Afghanistan and Afghans can easily get

⁷⁰ Letter No. GS/F/(S)/PS-2/491 of Governor's Secretariat (FATA) Peshawar, July 14, 2005.

⁷¹ Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties*, 257.

multiple entry visit visas. They can also get e-visa which is processed in a week. Afghan patients are issued visas at the border.

Pakistan has permitted about 350 Afghan students, studying in schools in Khyber District, to cross the border in the morning without visa and go back to their homes in Afghanistan in the evening. Free healthcare is provided to Afghan nationals at Friendship Hospital established at Zero Point in Torkham. The border crossing point at Torkham is open 24/7 since 2019 to boost trade and business between the two countries. Kabul has also changed its policy and Pakistani nationals cannot visit Afghanistan without visas.

Post 9/11 Border Management

Terrorists used tribal districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as safe havens after the US launched war against Taliban in 2001.⁷² Members of al-Qaeda including Arabs, Uzbeks and Chechens fled Afghanistan and took refuge in these areas.⁷³ Pakistani troops conducted several successful operations and cleared it of terrorists. There was no mechanism to tackle the problem of unauthorized border crossings. It created a major security concern for Islamabad.⁷⁴ Realising gravity of the situation, the former President General Pervez Musharraf put forward the idea of fencing the border in September 2005. Afghanistan rejected the proposal.⁷⁵ But the US supported the move and spokesman of the State Department Sean McCormack asked Kabul to take up the idea.⁷⁶ Islamabad started fencing the border unilaterally in March 2017 and it would be completed in 2022. Surveillance cameras and infrared detectors have also been installed on the border. The entire project was to be completed at a cost of about \$ 500 million.⁷⁷

It is a double layer fence: 11 feet high on Pakistani side and 13 feet high on the Afghan side besides a gap of 6 feet between the two fences. There are 200 crossing points on the border. Islamabad is erecting gates on all main entry and exit points. Three gates—one each at Torkham, Angoor Ada and Chaman—have been completed. Four more gates one

⁷² Bijan Omrani, "The Durand Line: History and Problems of the Afghan-Pakistan Border," *Asian Affairs*, vol. 40, no. 2, July, 2009, 189.

⁷³ Pervez Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir* (London: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 237, 263, 268.

⁷⁴ Huma Qayum et al, "Conflict and Cooperation in Pak-Afghan Relations to Reconcile the Mistrust in Bilateral Relations," *Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities*, vol. 57, February, 2019, 143.

⁷⁵ Amina Khan, "Pak-Afghan Border: A Case Study of Border Management," *Strategic Studies*, vol. 37, no. 3, Autumn 2017, 28.

⁷⁶ "US State Department Supports Fencing of Pak-Afghan Border," *Business Recorder*, Islamabad, September 14, 2005.

⁷⁷ Ayaz Gul, "Pakistan Says Afghan Border Fence Nearly Complete," *Voice of America*, December 4, 2020, <https://www.voanews.com/>

each will be constructed in Mohmand, Kurram, North and South Waziristan. Pakistan handed over the newly constructed border crossing facility at Angoor Ada, South Waziristan to Afghanistan.⁷⁸ But Kabul demanded at least 10 km of territory inside Pakistan.

Afghanistan has termed the Pak-Afghan border as an imaginary line.⁷⁹ The former Afghan President Hamid Karzai repeatedly declared that Kabul would not recognize this border.⁸⁰ Kabul is also opposing the fencing. It objected construction of a check post on *Tor Kamar* (Black Stone) hill near Dokalam stating that this will make Afghan houses visible to Pakistanis. On contrary, Afghanistan has already established a check post on *Sor Kamar* (Red Stone) hill which is close to Dokalam village as compared to *Tor Kamar* which is far away from residential area. The border fencing averted influx of Afghan refugee after the fall of Kabul to the Taliban on 15th August 2021. It may be recalled that more than four million Afghan refugees entered Pakistan after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.⁸¹ It created socio-economic problems in the country.

Integrated Border Management (IBM)

Integrated Border Management can be defined as cooperation among all relevant departments at national and international level to ensure coordinated, efficient, and effective mechanism to keep the borders open and secure. Border related issues among members of the European Union (EU) gave birth to the concept of IBM in 2002.⁸² The IBM is aimed at enhancing trade among the adjacent states besides maintaining the highest level of border security.

The concept of IBM is based on three pillars including intra-service cooperation, inter-agency cooperation and international cooperation. Intra-service cooperation means that all wings of the concerned department or ministry should work as a team by having close interaction and support. Similarly, inter-agency cooperation is aimed at establishing robust coordination among all the departments dealing with border

⁷⁸ Sailab Mehsud "Afghanistan closes Angoor Adda Border Crossing," *Dawn*, May 25, 2016, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1260454>.

⁷⁹ Rahimullah Yusufzai, "Durand Line or Border," *The News International*, Islamabad, June 26, 2016, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/tns/detail/561207-durand-line-border>.

⁸⁰ Naveed Siddiqui, "Afghanistan will Never Recognize The Durand Line: Hamid Karzai," *Dawn*, March 5, 2017, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1318594>

⁸¹ Amnesty International, "Afghanistan's Refugees Forty Years Of Dispossession," June 20, 2019, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/06/afghanistan-refugees-forty-years/>.

⁸² "Integrated Border Management," *Budapest Press*, <https://www.budapestprocess.org/integrated-border-management-in-the-silk-routes/164-integrated-border-management>, retrieved December 26, 2021.

management. The last pillar is international cooperation whereby the concerned states inform and seek help from other countries and global organizations to make the border management strong and reliable. The IBM focuses on implementation of four measures to achieve the desired goals. It includes measures within the country, in the border regions, cooperation with the neighbouring states, and measures to be adopted in a third country or countries.

According to the Budapest Process Secretariat, and Regional Coordinator for the Silk Routes Region, there are six prerequisites for effective IBM at the national level.⁸³ These are:

1. Providing legal cover for cooperation and exchange of information.
2. Developing institutional framework for IBM.
3. The required process and procedures for cooperation.
4. To Arrange full time staff and to equip it with IBM tools and techniques.
5. Quick and accurate exchange of information.
6. Supply of necessary tools to ensure coordination at every level.

Pak-Afghan IBMS

Pakistan has evolved the IBMS to evade future acts of terrorism, control illegal border crossing, and smuggling. Under this system, data of every person entering the country by air, sea, and land route, is verified and shared with relevant stakeholders. The IBMS database is linked to the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA), Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) and Airport Security Forces (ASF), etc. to ensure effective border management.⁸⁴

Kabul is yet to formulate any strategy for border management. As weak border management creates problems for the countries concerned but global community, the European Union is funding Integrated Border Management in the Silk Routes (IBM Silk Routes) project to enhance security and prosperity through strong border management in Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. It has trained border control officers in Afghanistan and Pakistan to detect forged documents, maintain profile of passengers and further investigation. It is hoped that the Taliban regime will take this issue seriously and cooperate with Pakistan, and international community to streamline management of Pak-Afghan border. Islamabad cannot afford that Afghanistan may remain a breeding ground for terrorism. The Tehreek Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Islamic State Khorasan IS-K) are direct threats to its security. Effective border

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ "Integrated Border Management System," NADRA, <https://www.nadra.gov.pk/local-projects/national-solutions/integrated-border-management-system/>, retrieved December 15, 2021.

management is required to tackle these issues on scientific lines.

International Law

The argument that Pak-Afghan border is imaginary is not valid from legal point of view. Border means an imaginary line that separates the territory of one state from another. Within the territory, a state can erect structures for its security. In the 20th and 21st centuries, most of the states took measures such as fencing the borders, increasing security, and building walls to secure their borders. States make arrangements on their border because the negotiated settlements allow them such measures. As for international law, it does not prohibit states from tightening control over their borders. As a general practice, every state has a sovereign right to control the entry of foreigners in its territory.⁸⁵ Several European countries—Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Macedonia, Slovenia, etc., have erected about 800 miles of fences since 2015 to prevent unauthorized migration.⁸⁶ Some states are building walls to control the entry of illegal immigrants. If fencing and construction of walls are against international law, why the UN and International of Court Justice (ICJ) do not act against the violators?

In this backdrop, two points are important to consider. One, Durand line Agreement does not refrain states from fencing their borders. Thus, it is Pakistan's legal right, as a successor to the British Empire, to fence the border with Afghanistan. Second, international organizations such as the UN and ICJ frequently highlight the practices that are not in accordance with international law. In the case of Pak-Afghan border, no reputable international agency has so far criticized Pakistan's actions from a legal perspective that ultimately affirms Pakistan's position.

Conclusion

Pak-Afghan border controversy has long affected the relationship between the two sides. It has limited the ability of both sides in cooperating with each other and contributing to regional cooperation, stability, and prosperity. In addition to material disadvantages, the controversy—resulting from contending positions—has impacted the younger generations of nationalists in both countries. The mutual feelings of animosity were not ordained, but Afghanistan's leadership in the late 1940s and early 1950s missed an opportunity to forge friendly relations with a newly created Muslim neighbour and brought about insecurity.

It is important that Islamabad and Kabul should jointly manage the

⁸⁵ "Pushbacks at the EU's External Borders," *Think Tank Europe Parliament*, March 8, 2021, <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/>

⁸⁶ Denise-Marie Ordway, "Building Border Walls and Barriers: What the Research Says," *Journalist's Resource*, February 15, 2020, <https://journalistsresource.org>

border, which is vital for elimination of terrorism, drug trafficking, smuggling, and other unlawful activities. The two countries can benefit from experience of the International Boundary Commission (IBC), which is managing the US-Canadian Border. This commission is responsible, since June 1908, for making, marking border, building, and replacing damaged boundary poles, other boundary monuments and reports to their respective governments.⁸⁷ Islamabad and Kabul should also get support from the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which is helping the international community to strengthen border management.⁸⁸ Pakistan should persuade the Taliban to recognize the border and cooperate in its management. Acceptance of the border and cooperation in border management should be a pre-condition for recognition of Taliban regime; otherwise, the issue will never resolve. Islamabad can use its soft power for this purpose. It is presumed by a number of scholars working on the bilateral relations that Pak-Afghan border has not been demarcated. However, they tend to ignore the fact the border was demarcated by three joint Indo-Afghan commissions in 1894-96. The border in Khyber and some areas of Mohmand was demarcated 1919. Only a small portion in Mohmand is un-demarcated that can be demarcated by governments in both countries. The Pak-Afghan frontier is one of the most well-defined borders in the world. Thus, instead of complete re-demarcation, the border needs proper management and some areas where confusion lies can be re-demarcated without going through the laborious process of complete reversals.

Pakistan has so far unilaterally fenced the border to control terrorism, illegal border crossing and smuggling. Fencing the border is not a violation of the international law—according to Durand Treaty and other Anglo-Afghan treaties. In this regard, Kabul and Islamabad should sort out a workable solution to the dispute. The two countries can no longer afford hostility. They must coordinate efforts to promote trade, business and people-to-people contact. They should join hands to eliminate the menace of terrorism and other unlawful activities. The two countries have the potential to change destiny of their poverty-stricken people. As Helen Keller says that we can do so little alone, but we can do so much together.⁸⁹

⁸⁷ "International Boundary Commission Joint Annual Report (2018)," *International Boundary Commission*, [www.internationalboundarycommission.org/uploads/joint annual reports](http://www.internationalboundarycommission.org/uploads/joint%20annual%20reports), accessed April 19, 2021.

⁸⁸ "Integrated Border Management," International Organization for Migrants, <https://www.iom.int/integrated-border-management>, retrieved April 19, 2021.

⁸⁹ Joseph P Lash, Helen and Teacher: The Story of Helen Keller and Anne Sullivan Macy, 1980.

COVID-19: SHIFTING GLOBAL SOCIO-ECONOMIC DYNAMICS AND FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING; SECOND IMAGE REINFORCED

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Abstract

COVID-19 did not take long in transforming from an epidemic to a pandemic, and affected countries in unprecedented and undocumented ways. Socioeconomic dynamics, which play significant role in policy making in any society, have been considerably affected, unearthing the flaws of policy making process. This research studies the relation between the pandemic and global socioeconomic dynamics, and their impact on the foreign policy making of the states. Kenneth Waltz's level of analysis approach within structural realism provides the basis to analyse the role of second level i.e, the state - mentioned as second image by Waltz. This research reinforces the importance of second image and argues (using the case studies of USA and China) that in the post Covid world, the relevance of second image in states' foreign policy making is reinforced.

Keywords: Covid 19, Socioeconomic Dynamics, Decision Making, Waltz Second Image

Introduction

Covid-19, has caught the world by surprise when mankind was dealing with challenges of globalization and human development. The pandemic has reinforced the fear of the unknown. The impacts of pandemic on domestic and international environment vary from simple to complex. The massive outbreak of Covid-19 has exposed unpreparedness of states despite all the scientific and technological advancement. Besides, inconsistencies of foreign policy decision making of states with regard to addressing the non-traditional security threats have been exposed. States have traditionally understood national security as being synonymous to military security and to some extent, relating to

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economic and political stability. There has been lesser focus on non-traditional security i.e., epidemiological, environmental, mechanical, and cyber threats. Hence, the outbreak of Covid-19 has forcefully brought out the limitations of states' traditional approach to national security. This research argues that the spread of Covid-19 has emerged as a non-traditional security challenge for states at global level with multiple consequences for states. Waltz, level of analysis approach presents an effective tool for ascertaining states' priorities in foreign policy decision making.

This is a qualitative research based largely on secondary data sources. A remarkable volume of research on almost every aspect of pandemic has surfaced since its outbreak. These have covered purely economic features, medical aspects and research policies related to Covid-19 or have given policy recommendations to deal with emerging challenges. Nonetheless, there are several related issues that need to be addressed. One important research gap lies with regard to the analysis of states' varied foreign policy decision making during pandemic despite the similar context- an anarchic pandemic-stricken international system. The research studies the relation between Covid-19 and global socioeconomic dynamics in the first place, and then the impacts of those dynamics on foreign policy decision making of states. This research uses Waltz's levels of analysis approach to ascertain the impact of pandemic on foreign policy decision making of states. The approach has been used as a framework to study the role of these images in foreign policy decision making of states since the outbreak of pandemic. The research is significant as it enhances our understanding on long-term effects of pandemic on foreign policy decision making.

Waltz' Levels of Analysis Approach

Theories, as basis for scientific inquiry, provide direction to research. Kenneth Waltz propounded a levels of analysis approach to explain causes of wars. These three levels of analysis have been identified by Waltz as 'images' i.e. the individual, the state, and the system. Though these images were identified as a framework to determine the reasons of wars, later these images were used by researchers and academics from different disciplines to study causality of different phenomenon. Consequently, Waltz' three images or levels are used widely to analyse issue areas and to seek answers to research question as a research approach.

The first image that Waltz identifies is 'individual' about which classical realism assumes that individual behaviour is selfish and strives for self-interest resulting into increased anarchy.¹ Whether war or peace,

¹ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, December 2018), 16.

Waltz tries to seek explanation of certain behaviours,² and links it with individuals. The second image talks about states and their role and behaviour, since it is state which decides about its foreign relations and even about use of military in case of conflict.³ And the third image is international system which is anarchic and conflict prone. It encompasses analyses of every phenomenon taking place within or due to international system like policy or behavioural changes, formulation or dissolution of coalitions, power configurations, formal political institutions, and norms and culture.⁴ Singer, who has devised his own levels of analysis approach following Waltz, says that third image of international system is better suited to study overall interactions taking place between international system and its resulting environment. However, Singer, after reviewing Waltz' approach of three images endorses that state remains 'dominant – if not the sole-actor' in political arena.⁵

In Waltz' levels of analysis, first two levels or images reflect the 'forces that determine policy' while third image is inevitable to analyze the cause or impact of the policy. This opens vistas for using these images by setting priorities as per requirement, that which image would be focused during what times. If this is considered as an established reality then it gives flexibility to organization of variables while applying the three images as methodological tools, simultaneously providing a ground within neorealism.

In essence, this school of thought determines that pressure either comes from outside or is reflected by the anarchic international system due to which states behave in certain manner, i.e., self-interest, making it outside-in approach; whereas considering it flexible would not mean that approach could be changed. The emphasis over any one image is flexible, but the order of approach would be the same as outside-in. If individual or state, anyone of first two images is put on first place and their role is prioritized similarly, this change in order would make it reflective of inside-out approach. This would mean that states' behaviour of being selfish makes international system anarchic, which not only jeopardizes neorealist thought but also drains realist thought its explanatory potential. Therefore, neorealism functions as outside-in approach in which emphasis on images could be changed, but working order remains same.

² Ibid., 29.

³ Ibid., 125.

⁴ J. David Singer, "The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations," *World Politics* 14, no. 1 (1961): 79-81, *The International System: Theoretical Essays*, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009557>.

⁵ Ibid.

Outbreak of Covid-19 and State's Response

Coronaviruses was first identified by scientists in 1965. There are several strands of animal and human related coronaviruses of which seven are identified as infecting humans.⁶ The world had witnessed outbreak of SARS with etiology of pneumonia caused by coronavirus in 2003, which spread to 65 countries starting from China. Another contagion MERS caused by coronavirus emerged in 2012 in the Middle East. The recent deadly spread of coronavirus started in December 2019, from an animal market in Wuhan, China, and soon became a pandemic.

Covid-19 shocked the world by swamping countries at rapid pace despite advancement of medical sciences and technology. It compelled the world to halt businesses, trade, industries, educational activities, religious gatherings, sports, and social events. This in turn led to other challenges and shifts at global levels. Covid-19 forced the states to revisit their foreign and security and shifting their focus traditional to non-traditional challenges.

States which were already being influenced by international system, regional geopolitics and preferences of individual leaders had now to deal with additional consideration caused by the pandemic. Many of the important stakeholders (domestic level) in state decision making had to take a back seat so as to protect lives of the people. Foreign policy is an extension of domestic interests which determine the scope and nature of states' external relations. When pandemic caused an upheaval for states at domestic level, foreign policy choices also changed. Economy being the sector worst-hit by this pandemic, further affected the existing patterns of socio-economic development. This foreign policy-economy linkage became a major reason for a shift in state's approaches and practices in the wake of Covid-19.

The pandemic has hit countries at both domestic and international levels. Domestically, states have faced disrupted economic activity, unemployment, increased debts, decreased trade and commercial activities. The collapse of informal employment sector has posed the greatest challenge. On other hand, at international level, the countries have suffered from decreased tourism, supply and demand decline, cancellation of trade orders, over pricing of raw materials, increased prices of crude oil and fuel, and decaying financial investment and remittance inflows. All of these have had adverse effects on states economies, impacting their interests, preferences, and choices. According to Baldwin and Weder di Mauro, "(E)conomies are connected – not physically –by beliefs. All these things (goods, services, knowhow, people, financial capital, foreign direct investment, international banking, and exchange rates) are also

⁶ Linda Rath, "Coronavirus History: How did Coronavirus Start?" WebMD (2020), accessed on April 12, 2021, <https://www.webmd.com/lung/coronavirus-history>.

mechanism for the propagation of economic shocks, or economic contagion”.⁷ Keeping in view the gravity of emergent issues, different perspectives can be used to determine “scale of socio-economic and geopolitical ramifications”⁸ which have intensified competition between states in many ways. For example, the price war between the USA and Saudi Arabia emerged due to decreased demand of fuel caused by ‘the cessation of industrial and transport activities’.⁹ As an aftermath, societies too have been affected in a complex manner. Issues ranging from psychological problems due to social isolation and constricting resources; from closure of industries, businesses and work places due to lockdowns to massive unemployment and resultant rise in violence and crime rates, and border closures have best the world.

The pandemic has altered the patterns of interaction among people and states, and different measures were taken to improve the domestic and foreign policies. Travelling, political and diplomatic activities, exchange of students, social gatherings were restricted or banned, and even health and medical treatment protocols were modified. Since then, the world is facing successive waves of variants of the virus and disease. There are number of efforts underway to deal with Covid-19 at global level, and vaccination for earlier variants has either been completed or is in process in majority of the states. This pandemic should be considered as a warning against redundancies present within states’ decision making choices and priorities vis-a-vis traditional and non-traditional challenges, at both domestic and foreign policy levels. It is time to recognize the changing realities. It will take time for countries to achieve immunity for their population against the disease. This is high time when states must start working on revising their traditionalist policies, and revisit their decision-making choices. Since states have undergone major challenges particularly related to economy – further affecting the social structures, the pandemic has brought a major shift in socioeconomic dynamics at global level, and has emerged as the gravest non-traditional challenge to national security.

Shifting Socio-economic Dynamics at Global Level

Historically contagious diseases and epidemics like malaria, cholera, plague, Spanish flu etc. have brought significant changes to

⁷ Richard Baldwin and Beatrice Weder di Mauro, eds. *Economics in the Time of COVID-19* (London: CEPR Press, 2020), 18.

⁸ Rizwan Rasheed, Asfra Rizwan, Hajra Javed, Faiza Sharif, and Asghar Zaidi, “Socio-Economic and Environmental Impacts of Covid-19 Pandemic in Pakistan-An Integrated Analysis,” *Environmental Science and Pollution Research* 28, 19926-19943 (2021), <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11356-020-12070-7>.

⁹ Ibid.

socioeconomic conditions of states; even major political shifts, and wars could be noticed in post-epidemic eras in the past. Covid-19 too, has brought a major shift in socioeconomic dynamics globally. Understanding this shift is pivotal for effective foreign policy decision making of states. The shift in global socio-economic dynamics follow as:

Increased Focus over Public Health and Immunity

According to Hanming Fang, “The tradeoff between health and economy is real and needs to be discussed front and center”.¹⁰ Covid-19 has challenged states’ sustainability and preparedness regarding all kinds of threats, bringing more attention to public health and immunity. Public health has become a prime concern amidst this pandemic due to the vulnerability of the health care system. The medical staff including health workers, doctors, paramedics, and even ambulance staff and drivers meant to provide assistance, support and medical treatment also became prey to this deadly disease. This made human security more precarious issue for states. Given these vulnerabilities in health sector, providing Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), treating the affected and preferential vaccination of health workers has been prioritized at global level.

Now that vaccines are there, it is being expected that within couple of years, a major proportion of world population would be vaccinated. This entire situation has underscored the need to work on measures to deal with such unprecedented public health emergencies in future. The outbreak of Covid-19 has identified public health as a flash point and an important socioeconomic dynamic, previously overlooked – now states are paying special attention to public health and immunity knowing the cost of ignorance. Public health has emerged as a vital issue-area on foreign policy decision making agenda for states. This trend has ensured the extension of scope of foreign policy making into the field of public health which has become a common discussion point within and among states. Furthermore, putting foreign relations and diplomacy to use for dealing with similar medical or public health emergencies in future has evolved into the new normal.¹¹

¹⁰ Interview with Hanming Fang quoted by Kristen De Groot, “Covid-19 and Lesson for Public Health,” *Penn Today*, April 14, 2020, <https://penntoday.upenn.edu/news/covid-19-and-lessons-public-health>.

¹¹ African countries have been feeling neglected by the world for not being provided with support in immunization against Covid-19 which has resulted in the next variant starting from South Africa and now spreading across the world. According to a report by the Economist published in August 2021, Africa which is dependent on Covid-19 vaccines from abroad has “received only 103m doses for a population of almost 1.4bn.” “Why are African Countries Destroying Covid-19 Vaccines?” *The Economist*, August 12, 2021, <https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/>.

Productive Capacity Enhancement

Covid-19 has caused major economic crisis as forced work stoppages in form of overall or smart lockdown have left serious implications on economic sustainability of states¹² regardless of their socio-economic development. This economic crisis is a core cause of numerous challenges facing societies, reflecting lapses in states' policy decision making processes at all levels. The economic insecurity caused by Covid-19 has serious implications for states' wellbeing. Statecraft is therefore now more focused on building capacity in all areas of public good. Productive capacity¹³ is a fundamental component of socioeconomic growth, which contributes to economy on the whole. Productive capacity relates to and envelops all kind of activities including political support, industrial production, trade and commercial goods, agriculture related planning, and human capital development. Investing in health, education, skill development, social services and commodities, infrastructure and access to markets, all cumulatively enhance the productive capacity.

It has become imperative for states to explore all means for enhancing productive capacity, ranging from investing on human capital to enabling people deal with unexpected changes such as sudden rise in unemployment, especially in informal sectors (domestic help, labor, unskilled workers, daily wagers or people with no job security). Focus on productive capacity enhancement for people in a country has now become a cornerstone of a dynamic and efficient foreign policy decision making.

Shifting Socio-economic Trends

Covid-19 has brought major socioeconomic dynamism at global level and new trends are now replacing traditional ones. A significant change is the evolving tool-kit for performing routine activities like education, businesses, seminars and conferences. Interactions, which were once considered unimaginable to take place without physical presence of relevant people, have been replaced by electronic means and virtual platforms. Hybrid classes and business meetings, online shopping and economic activity, webinars and online events are being held while participants sit isolated in their homes explains this change. Since Covid-19, it has been accepted as new normal and such activities are being performed mechanically and electronically.

On one hand established businesses have regressed and several newly established ones have been swept off by recession and insolvency. On the other hand several opportunities have emerged in the shape of e-

¹² Khurram Iqbal and Muneeb Salman, "Impacts of Covid-19 on Comprehensive Security in Pakistan," *The Journal of Political Science* 38 (2020): 181-2.

¹³ Adam Szirmai, "Socio-economic Development," Youtube Video, June 15, 2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MDr9u7xiY3Y>.

commerce trends. E-commerce involves less foot traffic and more electronic and cyber connectivity.¹⁴ It has opened up newer enterprises bringing dividends to initiatives like online shopping of food, groceries and things with longer shelf life. The pandemic has also rocketed both innovation and earning in cottage and regular industries like protective gears, masks, gloves, ventilators, pharmaceutical industry, to fulfill medical requirements, hygiene and preventive equipment. Lifestyle and recreation industry have seen novelties like vlogs related to cooking, travel, beauty, gym equipment etc., and content writing.

Number of traditional employment sectors have gone obsolete leaving space for innovations. The UK has observed massive number of startups, more than 407,510 taking grounds during 2020.¹⁵ It is a shift from manual to digital domain. Import and export would now be functionally related to IT and Computer infrastructure including supporting machines, computers, laptops, smart phones, bluetooth enabled ear-pods, headphones and microphones, smart boards, and other digital services. These will all eventually change the socioeconomic dynamics that is a determining force in foreign policy making.

Newfangled Domains for Research and Development Vis-à-vis Non-Traditional Security Challenges

Pandemic has induced a shift in traditional research and development agenda. The traditional research agenda was primarily focused on high politics. However, the pandemic has brought the non-traditional threats and related challenges to the forefront in research. Since the outbreak of pandemic, non-traditional security threats like infectious diseases and viral infections have been given weightage, as strategies and policies are being formulated to deal with them. Besides public health and hygiene, immunology and epidemiology, and several other non-traditional security challenges directly or indirectly linked to pandemic have got prominence. These include food security, hunger and poverty, entrepreneurship, training and skill development, utilizing untapped resources to enhance economic activity, psychological issues, vulnerability of various segments of population, water insecurity caused by depleting fresh water resources, and environmental degradation's adverse effects on human existence. Dealing with all these domains needs research and development.

¹⁴ "Why Some New Businesses are Springing up during Covid-19," *Financial Post*, May 05, 2020, <https://financialpost.com/personal-finance/taxes/why-some-new-businesses-are-springing-up-during-covid-19>.

¹⁵ Aisha Zahid, "Covid-19: 'Record Number of Businesses' Predicted as UK Comes out of Coronavirus Lock Down," Sky News, March 06, 2021, 2021, <https://news.sky.com/story/>.

Similarly, there are opportunities having economic potential like the wider business of healthcare technologies, equipment to provide health related assistance, online medical appointments for basic diagnosis, e-pharmaceutical supplies, boosting of fintech (financial technology) industry involving digital money (like ethereum, cryptocurrencies, non-fungible tokens (NFTs)), and block-chain mechanisms as basis of digital economy. Sustainable progress in all these sectors requires effective policy making as developing states are not attuned to these innovative ideas. Developing states need to learn to deal with these emergent non-traditional challenges and opportunities in the socioeconomic domain and might lag behind if policies for ensuring inclusiveness are not properly placed. Thus the need for newer knowledge is the key to manage such challenges and so shall these dynamics be reflected in foreign policy decision making.

Enhanced Role of Non-State Actors

One important shift ever more visible globally is enhanced role of non-state actors like multinational companies and global tech, shipping and pharmaceutical giants. These actors are heavily investing into digital marketplaces, pharmaceutical businesses, and related logistics like extended supply chains or cold supply chains through modified shipping industries. International organizations and their humanitarian efforts aimed at providing assistance and support to conflict or disaster affected areas is also a case in point. Simultaneously, there emerged another impression of IOs becoming a part of international competition or geopolitics as evident from US allegations of WHOs being a Chinese stooge. Additionally, the role of transnational organised criminal groups is also increasing and another dimension has been added to their illegal, undocumented businesses, e.g., smuggling and trafficking. Due to border closure or lockdowns, some areas faced shortage of commodities which provided opportunity to organised criminal groups. Challenge of these non-state actors has reinforced the role of socioeconomic dynamism on foreign policy decision making.

Analysis of Foreign Policy Decision Making of USA and China in the Pandemic Era

The outbreak of Covid-19 has put the state-system's sustainability to test. At the same time, it has given world several opportunities as well. In age of globalization where the world has been connected, the epidemic too has gone globalized and infectious viruses permeate the borders no matter how far they are located on the map, turning a localized outbreak into a pandemic. The most evident impact of pandemic has been on states' resolve to fight against disease and for this purpose, almost all states have

been seen re-formulating their public policies, i.e., domestic policy and foreign policy.

Since neorealism talks about structural pressures coming from international system making states behave accordingly, the process of foreign policy decision making during pandemic has proved an outside-in approach in which pandemic and its consequences shape states' behaviour. The things have gone worse given the absence of any regulatory authority at international level which even reflected anarchy during this epidemiological crisis. Subsequently states need each other to deal with challenges emerging from Covid-19; effective contribution of diplomats matters "to drive international collaboration and data sharing."¹⁶ Foreign policies of states are a core instrument to communicate and extend these cooperative objectives to others and thus encouraging all states to realize the significance of cooperation through revising their foreign policies. For studying foreign policy decision making during and post pandemic eras, Kenneth Waltz' levels of analysis approach is helpful to understand nature of decision making, through viewing the process using all three images (levels).

The first image, individual, is the most complex level of analysis. It involves multitude of facets and approaches to interpret human behaviour, and to understand reasons due to which individuals behave in a certain way. From family background, including educational and financial history, to psychology and cognitive behaviour, to impact of diseases, medications, addictions, and several others are to be brought into analysis to establish personality of individuals who have role in foreign policy decision making. Their decisions are reflection of their overall personality and cognitive behaviour. Predominantly the US decision making under President Trump depicts the role of first image.

In Pandemic's first year, approximately 27 million COVID-19 cases were documented, and at least 471,000 people lost their lives in the USA; it is believed as undercounted tallies.¹⁷ As soon as Covid-19 outbreak occurred, American sentiment about Trump's poor role and incompetence to handle crisis became intense. This was because instead of taking timely measures, Trump started giving misinformed statements regarding safety measures to stop spread of disease. He also encouraged people to not use face mask or hygiene care which caused careless attitude in public regarding pandemic which made the USA as one of the worst hit countries.

¹⁶ Bill Gates, "Responding to Covid-19: A Once-in-a-Century Pandemic?" *The New England Journal of Medicine*, February 28, 2020, <https://www.nejm.org/doi/full>.

¹⁷ John Haltiwanger and Aylin Woodward, "Damning Analysis of Trump's Pandemic Response Suggested 40% of US COVID-19 Deaths could have been Avoided," *Business Insider*, February 11, 2021, <https://www.businessinsider.com/>.

Since Trump was skeptical and distrustful of World Health Organization (WHO), he even threatened to stop its funding on account of being favourable to China.¹⁸ That skepticism hindered rationality-based decision making and the USA could not take appropriate measures to deal with challenges of the pandemic. Trump's focus had been on blaming China for spreading virus, and irrational blaming of WHO had put masses in opposite camp. The shortcoming of Trump's decision making left the USA in trouble, which further reflected that individual incompetence can have serious implication for states.

This implies that the role of first image in fighting Covid-19 and effectively structuring post pandemic foreign policy to deal with unprecedented challenges requires intense pondering. As Gates stated about leaders' two responsibilities: to "solve the immediate problems and keep it from happening again", it is leadership who has to take responsibility to make right decisions at the right time and to include state machinery and public sentiment in his considerations.¹⁹ Therefore, it can be established that first image can be useful in foreign policy decision making if individual approach could be regulated or guided through some mechanism.

The state (as second image) and foreign policy decision making are inseparable, rather they are directly related to each other. The role of second image is core of statecraft, and statecraft is highly dependent on effective foreign policy. This decision making is one prime responsibility of states through which states establish and maintain their foreign relations. It is done as a coherent process based on few major factors like: type of government or political culture of state, actors involved in decision making, stake holders and their influence over policy making, and role and preferences of different departments and organizations. Domestic factors fundamentally determine the features of foreign policy of the state. The foreign policies are receptive to influences coming from ideology, geography, culture, nature of government, political/opposition parties, parliament, civil and military bureaucracies, and interest groups from domestic as well as international system.

When pandemic broke out, states' policy decision making was questioned everywhere. It came under immense pressure not only from international environment, but inside pressures too were difficult to handle. States' capabilities in terms of military, economic, or political influence went useless in terms of the capability to deal with non-traditional challenges, i.e., Covid-19. The unpreparedness and the level of responsiveness to the challenge became Rorschach test for states. Even USA had to face questions regarding its late response or irresponsible

¹⁸ "Donald Trump Threatens to Suspend US Funding to WHO," *Teller Report*, April 08, 2020, <https://www.tellerreport.com>.

¹⁹ Gates, "Responding to Covid-19."

decision making about treatment and precautions. The Trump administration eliminated big sums of money meant for health and global-disease fighting in Spring 2018 along with suspending 'Pandemic Response Chain of Command'. US \$30 million Complex Crises Fund of government and US \$15 billion of national health budget were disregarded too, whereas global-disease fighting operational budgets of the CDC, NSC, DHS, and HHS were cut down.²⁰

All these budget eliminations and dismantled system of pandemic response were criticized by people which decreased operational preparedness of the country quite significantly. The wrong policy decision making left the US administration in murky waters at domestic front, and its citizens paid heavy price for its poor choices. On other hand, China which was origin of pandemic was praised due to its fast and effective strategic response, including 'placing some 100 million citizens under lockdown, shutting down a national holiday, building enormous quarantine hospitals in days' time, and ramping up 24-hour manufacturing of medical equipment'.²¹ Not only that, but for rest of world, it extended help and support to handle the crisis.

China's humanitarian aid to Italy - when it was facing wrath of Covid-19 and its EU and its partners were reluctant to sell protective gear and life-saving medical equipment - was one example of China's robust foreign policy. It not only brought global acknowledgement of China's soft power; but also shifted Italy's public opinion in China's favour.²² After successfully developing its vaccine, China launched it on lower cost in comparison to those by other countries. This can also be seen as Chinese attempt to use its soft power as essential approach to reinforce its image as an efficient decision maker, impressing others. China's foreign policy since Covid-19 breakout has not only reflected its global responsibility through "pandemic diplomacy", but has also created economic opportunities through increasing its production of required medical equipment and drugs which proved a supporting factor to its population in the times of economic crisis.

Comprehensively, it is the state which has responsibility and skills to make foreign policy based on national interests. Particularly after one year, states should have rearranged their priorities and this reorganization would task the foreign policy decision makers to act profusely now in post pandemic era to repair the damages keeping in view the recent experiences. Second image, the state, has immense role to play in this

²⁰ Laurie Garrett, "Trump Has Sabotaged America's Coronavirus Response," *Foreign Policy*, January 31, 2020, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/31>.

²¹ Garrett, "Trump Has Sabotaged America's Coronavirus Response."

²² British Council, "Covid-19 and Soft Power," August 2020, <https://www.britishcouncil.org/research-policy-insight/insight-articles/covid-19-and-soft-power>.

dimension, and foreign policy decision making must address all socio-economic and non-traditional security challenges in this age.

The level of international system is third image, also a tool of analysis for this research. On the whole, it is dominant power(s) which shape international system and try to run world affairs according to that order. But the pandemic has exposed a major faultline within international system making it more anarchic and conflict prone. This image, as discussed earlier has capability to act as a methodological tool to analyse cause or impact of policy at interface of first two images with international system. Soon after the dawn of new century, world entered into difficult phase of violence, terrorism, wars, and geopolitics by and large, but by end of first decade of new century, international system was showing signs of imbalance of power. Soon features of power transition started getting clear proving Organski right in his approach. Organski had predicted about rise of China and based the power transition theory on this proposition in 1958. Organski deliberated about dynamics of war between the USA and China as result of transitioning power from declining USA toward rising People's Republic of China as challenger.²³ Kim and Gates establish that Organski has linked power transition with Chinese strategy to work on its internal development, and that 'international system is decisively shaped by the dominant nation, the hegemon',²⁴ and this is the point from where conflict arises. The USA which had established international system under its order after the end of Cold War has felt challenged by China's continuous yet strategic rise in economy, politics and military, which are influencing states in international system. It took another turn when China got blamed for the outbreak of epidemic, and then Trump accused China to vie for influence over WHO to neutralize the US-role from organization. That portrayed true picture of anarchy within system as the third image, and the way it can disseminate conflict and competition over non-traditional security challenges.

Conclusion

Covid-19 pandemic has adversely affected world at large. One big insinuation has been the shift in socio-economic dynamics which are an unavoidable factor determining the effective foreign policy decision-making. Global socio-economic dynamics have been varied covering different dimensions. Among these, five significant dynamics have been identified for this research: 'increased focus over public health and immunity,' 'productive capacity enhancement,' 'shifting socioeconomic trends,' 'newfangled domains for research and development vis-à-vis non-

²³ A. F. K. Organski, *World Politics* 2nd edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), 338-76.

²⁴ Woosang Kim and Scott Geoffrey Gates, "Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China," *International Area Studies Review* 18, no. 3 (2015): 219-26.

traditional challenges,' and 'enhanced role of non-state actors.' The foreign policy decision making in the right direction to attain national interests and objectives is inescapable for states, and it would only be possible if identified socio-economic dynamics could be incorporated with the right image ascertained to play leading role in the process, which is state, the second image for all the right reasons.

Foreign policy is multi-dimensional as it not only deals with diplomacy but also includes issues involving economy, trade and commerce, culture and religion, education, politics and many more. Knowing their own strengths and weaknesses, states decide their course of action and adopt foreign policy according to their needs. State as second image has ability to focus, evaluate, and structure its timely response related to significant issues, which is known as statecraft. If state loses its focus and does not perform its responsibility effectively at the right time, it will be on losing side on power quotient of the world. Nevertheless, second image is at a pivotal position in foreign policy decision making which needs to be reinforced in the process. This pivot balances first image, international system's anarchy and the defective approach of third image: it brings in individuals too, whether leaders, small group members, people from bureaucracies, and other stake holders.

The pandemic as a non-traditional challenge has become a reason for further deliberations over dealing with unprecedented challenges. This has empowered states to make effective choices while formulating foreign policies aimed not only to maximize gains, but to adopt strategies which enable them to handle the most uncertain conditions and unprecedented challenges. This is time to reinforce second image to sustain the external pressures of international system and to counter nuisances of individuals having stakes in foreign policy decision making. Post pandemic foreign policy particularly needs increased role of states, and reconfiguration of policy objectives too would be vital to deal with multiple socioeconomic challenges unfolding with great magnitude. Without reinforcing second image, states would remain vulnerable to these non-traditional security challenges.

Book Reviews

Title: Nuclear Reactions: How Nuclear-Armed States Behave
Author: Mark S. Bell
Publisher: Cornell University Press, 2021, 214.

Ever since the advent of nuclear weapons, scholars have deliberated upon the effects of nuclear weapons on strategy and policy. By virtue of being an unchallenged mecca of nuclear scholarship, the United States has, apart from driving nuclear politics as well as the instruments of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, introduced and shaped the theoretical contours of nuclear weapons in a bid to dissect their implications. The theory of nuclear deterrence, for instance, became both an academic phenomenon and one of the most attractive policy choices. That said, the discourse related to nuclear weapons was enriched by many a scholar. After Bernard Brodie's rudimentary yet powerful ruminations, the literature was adorned by the works of Thomas Schelling, Herman Kahn, Glenn Snyder, and Robert Jervis, to name a few. These giants of the U.S. academy rightly were and are associated with some of the most compelling theories that explain the impact of nuclear weapons.

Be it Schelling's 'threats that leave something to chance', or Kahn's 44-rung escalation ladder, all theoretical disquisitions factor in the colossal destructive capacity that a nuclear device has. This scale of destruction that nuclear weapons can cause is one of the principal elements that underlie the theory of the nuclear revolution. After writing *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution* in 1989, Robert Jervis became a veritable leader of the nuclear revolutionaries, whose thoughts continue to be challenged by new scholarship and the very many developments that are taking place in the realms of technology and strategy. Jervis and his fellow travellers repose confidence in the deterrent power of nuclear weapons, and argue that the deterrence-induced security will keep nuclear-armed states from becoming belligerent and challenging the status quo. They contend that nuclear weapons make the world safer and peaceful. Perhaps there is good reason to agree with this assertion given that nuclear dyads have avoided wars while going through what John Lewis Gaddis called the "Long Peace." However, the critics of the theory are in harmony with the makers of the non-proliferation regime, fearing the reactions of those that could acquire nuclear weapons. It is the reactions to nuclear acquisitions that Mark S. Bell theorizes and explains in his new book entitled *Nuclear Reactions: How Nuclear-Armed States Behave*. Bell, an Assistant Professor at the University of Minnesota, investigates how the acquisition of nuclear weapons affects the foreign policies of states that acquire them.

Bell offers a fresh critique of the nuclear revolution theory. Acknowledging the contribution and utility of the theory, Bell's academic

response hinges on answering this question: "how do the states that acquire nuclear weapons respond to that additional security?"(p.3). Bell answers this question by introducing the theory of *nuclear opportunism*. As opposed to the theory of the nuclear revolution, Bell's theory argues that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by states facilitates a range of foreign policy behaviours. Bell identifies six foreign policy behaviours that states did not find tenable before possessing nuclear weapons but become viable after they go nuclear: *aggression, steadfastness, bolstering, independence, expansion, and compromise*. Bell's characterization is befitting, to say the least, for these broad approaches link a state's behaviour with both the goal(s) it wants to achieve and the power it has within and outside of an alliance. That said, some of these behaviours could overlap and feed into each other. For example, showing steadfastness may entail being aggressive, depending on what is required of a state to show resolve in safeguarding its interests.

While the theory of the nuclear revolution does not account for variations in the responses of states to nuclear acquisitions, Bell does a good job in adding three critical variables to his theoretical mix. To Bell, the strategic environment in which a country finds itself affects what combination of behaviours it adopts. He writes:

The crux of the theory is that different states find different combinations of these behaviours attractive depending on the strategic circumstances in which the state finds itself. In particular, the nature of the threats the state faces, its position within its alliances, and whether it is increasing or decreasing in relative power all affect which combinations of these behaviours the acquiring state finds attractive (p.9,10).

Bell's choice of these three variables, as opposed to the others to further explain his theory, is reflective of how he privileges the security factor, much like the nuclear revolutionaries do, in states' nuclear decision-making equations. While Bell does not nullify the fact that nuclear weapons enhance a state's security, he does argue that the security garnered through nuclear-possession gives a state more freedom to pursue its goals. He tests his theory by looking at the differences between the pre and post-nuclearization behaviours of the United Kingdom, the United States, and South Africa. Bell's research-laden work brings to the fore visible, nuclear weapons-driven changes in the behaviours of London, Washington, and Pretoria. However, as oftentimes acknowledged by the author, it is rather difficult to single-out the effects of nuclear weapons on a country's foreign policy approach and the changes it undergoes. If anything, it would be prudent to see the impact of nuclear weapons in tandem with that of other potential sources of change. Further, while the theory of nuclear opportunism fares fairly well in apprising readers that nuclear weapons bring with them a plethora of previously-unfeasible choices for their possessors, it falls short in fully dealing with their deterrent effects, especially when a state has to face a nuclear-armed

actor. Will a new nuclear power be able to pull off a series of aggressive actions, or become more indomitable, if its nemesis has a robust deterrent in place? This is where Jervis and others stage a resounding comeback. Bell's theory rightly outlines how nuclear weapons open up this set of options. However, it is the deterrent power of the bomb, as emphasized by the revolutionaries, that will deter states from treading those paths, primarily because a similar set of choices will be available to their adversaries too.

The behaviours that could be facilitated by baring one's own teeth, also depend on how leaders in possession of nuclear weapons look at them. Bell has correctly termed it as a variable worth incorporating in future research. If a leader believes that their country's nuclear weapons have a limited, defensive role to play, it is least likely that they will 'use' nuclear weapons to unleash aggression.

However, since the theory convincingly argues that the possession of nuclear weapons increases the basket of relatively lucrative action-items, it is reason enough to dub it useful. The theory certainly offers a new way to look at nuclear weapons. Policymakers, especially those that grapple with non-proliferation and disarmament issues, will find this theory critical in identifying an array of proliferation propellants. Bell's mapping of the likely behaviour of future proliferants is noteworthy. If anything, this theory warns against adopting across-the board, inflexible approaches to dealing with prospective proliferants. It is, however, important to note that even though the theory of nuclear opportunism is a cogent counter to the theory of the nuclear revolution, the latter's powerful explanatory power at some levels, challenges the former. Taken together, these two theories firmly situate nuclear weapons within the wider canvas that is global politics.

***Reviewed by Dr. Rabia Akhtar, Director and Head of the Department,
School of Integrated Social Sciences at the University of Lahore.***

Title: **The Power of Geography: Ten Maps that Reveal the Future of Our World**
Author: Tim Marshall
Publisher: Elliot & Thompson Limited, 2021,302.

The Power of Geography is a comprehensive geopolitical analysis in the light of geographical, topographical and demographical realities of regions where the Big Three i.e. the USA, Russia and China have numerous stakes. The author has assumed probable scenarios that could pave the way for great powers to dominate each other in those regions. He suspects a major competition among them in Space that is bereft of globally-agreed international regulations as yet.

Australia, with copious natural resources, fears blockade as it's an island continent. It's connectivity with East Asia via narrow straits is highly vulnerable to blockade—nightmarish for the Aussies as their energy sector would crumble. The author underlines the expanding diplomatic influence of China in the Southwest Pacific states: Vanuatu, Fiji, Kiribati and other archipelagos that jeopardises the position of Australia in its neighbourhood. He unveils Australia's foreign policy goal of making alliances with major sea powers that could aid and protect her. The trilateral partnership among Australia, the UK and the US, AUKUS, announced in September 2021 for provision of nuclear submarines to Australia is *in sync* with that foreign policy objective.

Iran confronts multiple domestic and foreign policy challenges not least the economic downturn, surging unemployment, and insurrection against the central government in the south-west and south-east provinces. Iran's limitation in reaching the Indian Ocean through the Strait of Hormuz hinders it from becoming major sea power as it can be easily disconnected; however, closure of the strait from Iranian side can have substantial impact on global oil market. The author suggests normalization of US-Iran relations under the Biden Administration as the regime change, under the Bush Doctrine, is no longer demanded now.

The author discusses the 1945 meeting between President Roosevelt and King Ibn-Saud that laid the foundation of "oil in return of security" consensus between them. The era of oil is waning but Saudi Arabia will need security as its access to the Indian ocean is restricted by two narrow straits in the east and the south. The diversification of economy and Saudification of manpower are gigantic tasks but may fall victim to delay despite Crown Prince's ambitious Vision 2030 plans including construction of \$500billion Neom City.

The United Kingdom's opportunity for getting a lead-role in Northern Europe has been described. Russia's aggression in Eastern Europe and the USA's declining interests in security of Europe, after its pivot to Pacific, can engender a grand alliance among the Nordic and the Baltic states supported by Central European states like Poland and

Romania under supervision of the UK. But the UK's integrity is gravely threatened by probable independence of Scotland. This will drastically undercut the existing strategic deterrent of the UK—the lost facilities in independent Scotland would be highly difficult to replicate elsewhere.

The frosty relations between two Mediterranean states: Greece and Turkey have been explicated at length. Besides centuries of animosity, conflicting claims over various island states in the Aegean Sea and discovery of massive natural gas reserves in the eastern Mediterranean have exacerbated the situation. The author questions the role of NATO forces if one of its member countries attacks another member. Greece earmarks a significant portion of its limping economy over defense expenditures at the altar of socio-economic development—a trend likely to continue owing to existing state of Greece-Turkey relations.

Turkey's foreign policy objective of independence, outside the domain of NATO and towards gaining the glory of Ottoman era, has been spelled out. Its acquisition of S-400 surface-to-air ballistic missile defense system from Russia in 2019 is in stark deviation from its commitments with NATO. The "Blue Homeland strategy envisages the Turkish state as a dominant power in three seas: The Black Sea, the Aegean Sea and the eastern Mediterranean. Turkey has strengthened its domestic defence production industry, opened its military bases abroad and is unconcerned if ejected from NATO alliance. Turkey's absence from NATO will magnify Greece's role as the southern-most flank of NATO.

The vast reserves of minerals, particularly rare elements used in electronic gadgets, in Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad and Sudan collectively called as "The Sahel" are of immense geopolitical importance for the Big Three. The Sahel is the site of world's fastest-growing insurgency where the American and French forces have been conducting counter-terrorism operations. Central government's feeble authority and unimpressive military offer the control of security matters to the USA and France for securing their interests, otherwise China and Russia will fill the gap. The word insurgents, and not Islamists, would have been used in the relevant chapter.

The potential of Ethiopia, situated along the Horn of Africa, has been holistically explained. Ethiopia confronts multiple challenges: ethnic riots, devastating impacts of climate change and dearth of sea route after secession of Eritrea are few major ones. The real power and leverage of Ethiopia is its water resources, twelve lakes and nine rivers, that could transform its destiny. The Grand Ethiopians Renaissance Dam, GERD, could head off the flow of Nile River into Egypt. The geography of Ethiopia vis-a-vis Egypt supports the former as it cannot be subdued should a water war begins between them.

Catalonia, located in the Northeastern tip of Spain, offers a platform to Russia and China in the Western Mediterranean. Referendum in 2017 supported the independence of Catalonia but was quashed by

Spain's Supreme Court. The UK is in precarious position as its support for an independent Catalanian state can raise similar voices in Scotland. An independent Catalonia, without EU's umbrella, would link the Western Mediterranean port city of Barcelona with China's Belt and Road Initiative. Spain's wishful thinking of getting back Gibraltar from the UK will highly fortify its defence posture if happens in reality.

Space is now of cardinal consideration in geopolitical domain of the Big Three as full spectrum deterrence strategy encapsulates dominance in space technology also. The author highlights opulence of mineral reserves in Space that are indispensable for our posterity and could herald a new race among the Big Three. There could be two major flashpoints in Space: Low Orbit region, upto 2000 kilometres for placing military satellites and libration points where the satellites can stay without utilising fuel as the equal but opposite gravitational pull of the Earth and the Moon cancel each other.

The author has missed Russia's natural gas pipeline networks, especially 1,230 kilometres long Nord Stream 2 project, that is laid from Russia to Germany via the Baltic Sea, circumventing the Central and Eastern European (CEE) states. The much-debated pipeline will dramatically transform the Russia-Europe natural gas trade relations. The gas supply to Western European states will be concentrated from Nord Stream System, through the Baltic Sea, at the expense of loss of transit fees to the CEE states once Nord Stream 2 becomes up-and-running.

The book is an interesting read for policy makers, strategists, politicians, students of geography, international relations and avid readers. The topographic and geographic exposition through maps in every chapter marvellously enthralls and engages the readers in unique creation of this world.

Reviewed by Tariq Asad, Civil Servant Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Islamabad.

Title: **India's Evolving Deterrent Force Posturing in South Asia: Temptation for Pre-Emptive Strikes, Power Projection and Escalation Dominance**
Authors: Dr. Zulfqar Khan and Dr. Zafar Khan
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021, 359.

The book discusses the prospects of Indian force posturing in South Asia, predominantly under the umbrella of nuclear upheaves. It also focuses on its induction of sophisticated weapon systems, incorporate competing military strategies and reshuffling of deterrence force posture. The book makes a critical addition to indigenously strategic force posture of India and its adverse behaviour against the regional powers, especially China and Pakistan. This volume is a comprehensive account of counterforce strategy of India under the umbrella of nuclear revolution.

The book is divided into ten chapters to elucidate India's evolving force posturing. The first chapter highlights the integrated concepts and elaborates the main argument of the volume. It presents the rationale of discussing India's force posturing and its relevance with the strategic stability of the region. The significance of this research work and its impact is presented in this chapter. The second chapter of the book provides conceptualization of the essential factors of nuclear revolution. This chapter further elaborates the theoretical discourse of South Asian nuclear revolution and induction of new technologies viz-a-viz sophisticated delivery systems by the nuclear rivals' i.e. Pakistan and India. The chapter delves into the testing of theory of nuclear revolution while analyzing vulnerabilities of deterrent forces of Pakistan and India. It builds the relevance of the nuclear revolution theory to the nuclear environment of South Asia where competing military strategies increase the chances of conflict. Since there are chances of serious conflict between the nuclear rivals, the chapter predicts that both the South Asian states may not indulge into the risks of escalation despite competing military strategies due to the WMD threat and having mutual vulnerabilities.

The third chapter discusses that the prospects of conflict escalation and crisis instability between Pakistan and India are progressively increasing with the passage of time. Although chances of full-scale war or all-out war are comparatively less than the limited war-fighting options. The South Asian security environment is being destabilized due to the evolving military strategies of the region and thus, chances of conflict are multiplied. Although it is a risky choice as Pakistan has opted for the nuclear option considering asymmetrical power balance with India in order to maintain credible deterrence. Interestingly the chapter provides a comprehensive illustration of the risky CSD and "Full-Spectrum" nuclear option of Pakistan and determines that both these strategies curtails the risk of full-scale war. The fourth chapter examines

the existing dynamics of Pakistani and Indian asymmetry in economic, geo-political and military field keeping in view the development of dual-use sophisticated technologies, global political scenario and the stability-instability paradox of South Asia. The chapter proposes that these emerging trends will lead towards a critical situation where the security dilemmas between both the states will exacerbate.

The fifth chapter traces to the main contours of Indian maritime strategies in the Indian Ocean, its endeavours of power projection as well as escalation dominance. The contemporary Indo-Pacific politics and emergence of the concept of "Sea Power Dominance" has also impacted South Asian politics. This transformative era is a landmark for Indian growing industrial, military, geo-economic and maritime potential in collaboration with the US as a strategic partner as well as its regional/global allies in the Indo-Pacific political scenario. The sixth chapter provides Pakistan a framework to counter the up-coming internal challenges in societal, geo-economic, technological and military fields. Pakistan needs to incorporate innovative technologies of the modern age that are sophisticated and meet the requirements of the future warfare techniques will ultimately neutralize the recent 5th generation warfare challenges.

The seventh chapter determines that the Indian missile system have certain implications particularly on Indian force posture and generally on South Asian deterrence stability. The chapter critically examines the military strategies of South Asian nuclear rivals that can lift unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests, destabilize nuclear taboo and trigger large arms race between both the rival states. Thus, the chapter presumes that the risk of miscalculation, misperception and inadvertent war becomes higher.

The eighth chapter elucidates the incident of Pulwama in detail and considers it as a case in point where limited strike options were practiced and immediate retaliation was evident. The said crisis proves that both the rival states can cross the Line of Control (LOC) in order to inflict damage to the other side. The chapter comprehensively analyses the whole scenario and identifies that any serious crisis between Pakistan and India has the potential to escalate towards the nuclear option if not managed wisely. The ninth chapter proposes to revisit the South Asian Strategic Restraint Regime (SRD) proposal while analysing the current challenges as well as the opportunities available for the South Asian nuclear rivals. It states that despite preventing nuclear weapons usage in the region, Pakistan and India failed to prevent the epidemic of limited conflict and this conflict, by all means, may escalate towards nuclear crisis. There is a need to vigilantly draw strategic force posturing to counter the risk.

The last chapter of the book concludes the whole debate by embarking upon India's deterrent force posturing coupled with several

other conventional viz-a-viz nuclear force modernization plans and its impact on South Asian politics. However, the mediating role of third parties may play a significant role in crisis management of both the rivals to bring strategic stability in the region.

The book is an interesting account of the entangled dynamics of the Indian force posturing along with the bilateral issues between the South Asian nuclear rivals and role of regional, as well as extra-regional, link factors where the vicious circle of the regional security dilemma is disturbed due to the advent of sophisticated technology, BMD system development, maritime expansion and geo-economical conflicting interests in the region. The book is worth reading for the academicians, policy-makers, students of International politics and security studies. Although numerous literature discusses the discourse of strategic stability in South Asia, yet this volume addresses a significant research gap that delves into the impact of evolving strategic force posturing of India and the authors provide an insight of the up-coming challenges in the region as well as recommends that third party mediation may address the issues of inadvertent war in the South Asian Region.

Reviewed by Dr. Rubina Waseem, Assistant Prof. Department of Strategic Studies, National Defence University, Islamabad.

Documents

Document: 1

Remarks by President Biden on the End of the War in Afghanistan, August 31, 2021.

THE PRESIDENT: Last night in Kabul, the United States ended 20 years of war in Afghanistan — the longest war in American history.

We completed one of the biggest airlifts in history, with more than 120,000 people evacuated to safety. That number is more than double what most experts thought were possible. No nation — no nation has ever done anything like it in all of history. Only the United States had the capacity and the will and the ability to do it, and we did it today.

The extraordinary success of this mission was due to the incredible skill, bravery, and selfless courage of the United States military and our diplomats and intelligence professionals.

For weeks, they risked their lives to get American citizens, Afghans who helped us, citizens of our Allies and partners, and others onboard planes and out of the country. And they did it facing a crush of enormous crowds seeking to leave the country. And they did it knowing ISIS-K terrorists — sworn enemies of the Taliban — were lurking in the midst of those crowds.

And still, the men and women of the United States military, our diplomatic corps, and intelligence professionals did their job and did it well, risking their lives not for professional gains but to serve others; not in a mission of war but in a mission of mercy. Twenty service members were wounded in the service of this mission. Thirteen heroes gave their lives.

I was just at Dover Air Force Base for the dignified transfer. We owe them and their families a debt of gratitude we can never repay but we should never, ever, ever forget.

In April, I made the decision to end this war. As part of that decision, we set the date of August 31st for American troops to withdraw. The assumption was that more than 300,000 Afghan National Security Forces that we had trained over the past two decades and equipped would be a strong adversary in their civil wars with the Taliban.

That assumption — that the Afghan government would be able to hold on for a period of time beyond military drawdown — turned out not to be accurate.

But I still instructed our national security team to prepare for every eventuality — even that one. And that's what we did.

So, we were ready when the Afghan Security Forces — after two decades of fighting for their country and losing thousands of their own — did not hold on as long as anyone expected.

We were ready when they and the people of Afghanistan watched their own government collapse and their president flee amid the corruption and malfeasance, handing over the country to their enemy, the Taliban, and significantly increasing the risk to U.S. personnel and our Allies.

As a result, to safely extract American citizens before August 31st — as well as embassy personnel, Allies and partners, and those Afghans who had worked with us and fought alongside of us for 20 years — I had authorized 6,000 troops — American troops — to Kabul to help secure the airport.

As General McKenzie said, this is the way the mission was designed. It was designed to operate under severe stress and attack. And that's what it did.

Since March, we reached out 19 times to Americans in Afghanistan, with multiple warnings and offers to help them leave Afghanistan — all the way back as far as March. After we started the evacuation 17 days ago, we did initial outreach and analysis and identified around 5,000 Americans who had decided earlier to stay in Afghanistan but now wanted to leave.

Our Operation Allied Rescue [Allies Refuge] ended up getting more than 5,500 Americans out. We got out thousands of citizens and diplomats from those countries that went into Afghanistan with us to get bin Laden. We got out locally employed staff of the United States Embassy and their families, totaling roughly 2,500 people. We got thousands of Afghan translators and interpreters and others, who supported the United States, out as well.

Now we believe that about 100 to 200 Americans remain in Afghanistan with some intention to leave. Most of those who remain are dual citizens, long-time residents who had earlier decided to stay because of their family roots in Afghanistan.

The bottom line: Ninety [Ninety-eight] percent of Americans in Afghanistan who wanted to leave were able to leave.

And for those remaining Americans, there is no deadline. We remain committed to get them out if they want to come out. Secretary of State Blinken is leading the continued diplomatic efforts to ensure a safe passage for any American, Afghan partner, or foreign national who wants to leave Afghanistan.

In fact, just yesterday, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution that sent a clear message about what the international community expects the Taliban to deliver on moving forward, notably freedom of travel, freedom to leave. And together, we are joined by over 100 countries that are determined to make sure the Taliban upholds those commitments.

It will include ongoing efforts in Afghanistan to reopen the airport, as well as overland routes, allowing for continued departure to those who

want to leave and delivery of humanitarian assistance to the people of Afghanistan.

The Taliban has made public commitments, broadcast on television and radio across Afghanistan, on safe passage for anyone wanting to leave, including those who worked alongside Americans. We don't take them by their word alone but by their actions, and we have leverage to make sure those commitments are met.

Let me be clear: Leaving August the 31st is not due to an arbitrary deadline; it was designed to save American lives.

My predecessor, the former President, signed an agreement with the Taliban to remove U.S. troops by May the 1st, just months after I was inaugurated. It included no requirement that the Taliban work out a cooperative governing arrangement with the Afghan government, but it did authorize the release of 5,000 prisoners last year, including some of the Taliban's top war commanders, among those who just took control of Afghanistan.

And by the time I came to office, the Taliban was in its strongest military position since 2001, controlling or contesting nearly half of the country.

The previous administration's agreement said that if we stuck to the May 1st deadline that they had signed on to leave by, the Taliban wouldn't attack any American forces, but if we stayed, all bets were off.

So we were left with a simple decision: Either follow through on the commitment made by the last administration and leave Afghanistan, or say we weren't leaving and commit another tens of thousands more troops going back to war.

That was the choice — the real choice — between leaving or escalating.

I was not going to extend this forever war, and I was not extending a forever exit. The decision to end the military airlift operations at Kabul airport was based on the unanimous recommendation of my civilian and military advisors — the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and all the service chiefs, and the commanders in the field.

Their recommendation was that the safest way to secure the passage of the remaining Americans and others out of the country was not to continue with 6,000 troops on the ground in harm's way in Kabul, but rather to get them out through non-military means.

In the 17 days that we operated in Kabul after the Taliban seized power, we engaged in an around-the-clock effort to provide every American the opportunity to leave. Our State Department was working 24/7 contacting and talking, and in some cases, walking Americans into the airport.

Again, more than 5,500 Americans were airlifted out. And for those who remain, we will make arrangements to get them out if they so choose.

As for the Afghans, we and our partners have airlifted 100,000 of them. No country in history has done more to airlift out the residents of another country than we have done. We will continue to work to help more people leave the country who are at risk. And we're far from done.

For now, I urge all Americans to join me in grateful prayer for our troops and diplomats and intelligence officers who carried out this mission of mercy in Kabul and at tremendous risk with such unparalleled results: an airma- — an airlift that evacuated tens of thousands to a network of volunteers and veterans who helped identifies [identify] those needing evacuation, guide them to the airport, and provided them for their support along the way.

We're going to continue to need their help. We need your help. And I'm looking forward to meeting with you.

And to everyone who is now offering or who will offer to welcome Afghan allies to their homes around the world, including in America: We thank you.

I take responsibility for the decision. Now, some say we should have started mass evacuations sooner and "Couldn't this have be done — have been done in a more orderly manner?" I respectfully disagree.

Imagine if we had begun evacuations in June or July, bringing in thousands of American troops and evacuating more than 120,000 people in the middle of a civil war. There still would have been a rush to the airport, a breakdown in confidence and control of the government, and it still would have been a very difficult and dangerous mission.

The bottom line is: There is no evacuation- — evacuation from the end of a war that you can run without the kinds of complexities, challenges, and threats we faced. None.

There are those who would say we should have stayed indefinitely for years on end. They ask, "Why don't we just keep doing what we were doing? Why did we have to change anything?"

The fact is: Everything had changed. My predecessor had made a deal with the Taliban. When I came into office, we faced a deadline — May 1. The Taliban onslaught was coming.

We faced one of two choices: Follow the agreement of the previous administration and extend it to have — or extend to more time for people to get out; or send in thousands of more troops and escalate the war.

To those asking for a third decade of war in Afghanistan, I ask: What is the vital national interest? In my view, we only have one: to make sure Afghanistan can never be used again to launch an attack on our homeland.

Remember why we went to Afghanistan in the first place? Because we were attacked by Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda on September 11th, 2001, and they were based in Afghanistan.

We delivered justice to bin Laden on May 2nd, 2011 — over a decade ago. Al Qaeda was decimated.

I respectfully suggest you ask yourself this question: If we had been attacked on September 11, 2001, from Yemen instead of Afghanistan, would we have ever gone to war in Afghanistan — even though the Taliban controlled Afghanistan in 2001? I believe the honest answer is “no.” That’s because we had no vital national interest in Afghanistan other than to prevent an attack on America’s homeland and their friends. And that’s true today.

We succeeded in what we set out to do in Afghanistan over a decade ago. Then we stayed for another decade. It was time to end this war.

This is a new world. The terror threat has metastasized across the world, well beyond Afghanistan. We face threats from al-Shabaab in Somalia; al Qaeda affiliates in Syria and the Arabian Peninsula; and ISIS attempting to create a caliphate in Syria and Iraq, and establishing affiliates across Africa and Asia.

The fundamental obligation of a President, in my opinion, is to defend and protect America — not against threats of 2001, but against the threats of 2021 and tomorrow.

That is the guiding principle behind my decisions about Afghanistan. I simply do not believe that the safety and security of America is enhanced by continuing to deploy thousands of American troops and spending billions of dollars a year in Afghanistan.

But I also know that the threat from terrorism continues in its pernicious and evil nature. But it’s changed, expanded to other countries. Our strategy has to change too.

We will maintain the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan and other countries. We just don’t need to fight a ground war to do it. We have what’s called over-the-horizon capabilities, which means we can strike terrorists and targets without American boots on the ground — or very few, if needed.

We’ve shown that capacity just in the last week. We struck ISIS-K remotely, days after they murdered 13 of our service members and dozens of innocent Afghans.

And to ISIS-K: We are not done with you yet.

As Commander-in-Chief, I firmly believe the best path to guard our safety and our security lies in a tough, unforgiving, targeted, precise strategy that goes after terror where it is today, not where it was two decades ago. That’s what’s in our national interest.

And here’s a critical thing to understand: The world is changing. We’re engaged in a serious competition with China. We’re dealing with the challenges on multiple fronts with Russia. We’re confronted with cyberattacks and nuclear proliferation.

We have to shore up America’s competitive[ness] to meet these new challenges in the competition for the 21st century. And we can do

both: fight terrorism and take on new threats that are here now and will continue to be here in the future.

And there's nothing China or Russia would rather have, would want more in this competition than the United States to be bogged down another decade in Afghanistan.

As we turn the page on the foreign policy that has guided our nation — our nation the last two decades, we've got to learn from our mistakes.

To me, there are two that are paramount. First, we must set missions with clear, achievable goals — not ones we'll never reach. And second, we must stay clearly focused on the fundamental national security interest of the United States of America.

This decision about Afghanistan is not just about Afghanistan. It's about ending an era of major military operations to remake other countries.

We saw a mission of counterterrorism in Afghanistan — getting the terrorists and stopping attacks — morph into a counterinsurgency, nation building — trying to create a democratic, cohesive, and unified Afghanistan -- something that has never been done over the many centuries of Afghans' [Afghanistan's] history.

Moving on from that mind set and those kind of large-scale troop deployments will make us stronger and more effective and safer at home.

And for anyone who gets the wrong idea, let me say it clearly. To those who wish America harm, to those that engage in terrorism against us and our allies, know this: The United States will never rest. We will not forgive. We will not forget. We will hunt you down to the ends of the Earth, and we will — you will pay the ultimate price.

And let me be clear: We will continue to support the Afghan people through diplomacy, international influence, and humanitarian aid. We'll continue to push for regional diplomacy and engagement to prevent violence and instability. We'll continue to speak out for basic rights of the Afghan people, especially women and girls, as we speak out for women and girls all around the globe. And I've been clear that human rights will be the center of our foreign policy.

But the way to do that is not through endless military deployments, but through diplomacy, economic tools, and rallying the rest of the world for support.

My fellow Americans, the war in Afghanistan is now over. I'm the fourth President who has faced the issue of whether and when to end this war. When I was running for President, I made a commitment to the American people that I would end this war. And today, I've honoured that commitment. It was time to be honest with the American people again. We no longer had a clear purpose in an open-ended mission in Afghanistan.

After 20 years of war in Afghanistan, I refused to send another generation of America's sons and daughters to fight a war that should have ended long ago.

After more than \$2 trillion spent in Afghanistan — a cost that researchers at Brown University estimated would be over \$300 million a day for 20 years in Afghanistan — for two decades — yes, the American people should hear this: \$300 million a day for two decades.

If you take the number of \$1 trillion, as many say, that's still \$150 million a day for two decades. And what have we lost as a consequence in terms of opportunities? I refused to continue in a war that was no longer in the service of the vital national interest of our people.

And most of all, after 800,000 Americans serving in Afghanistan — I've travelled that whole country — brave and honourable service; after 20,744 American servicemen and women injured, and the loss of 2,461 American personnel, including 13 lives lost just this week, I refused to open another decade of warfare in Afghanistan.

We've been a nation too long at war. If you're 20 years old today, you have never known an America at peace.

So, when I hear that we could've, should've continued the so-called low-grade effort in Afghanistan, at low risk to our service members, at low cost, I don't think enough people understand how much we have asked of the 1 percent of this country who put that uniform on, who are willing to put their lives on the line in defense of our nation.

Maybe it's because my deceased son, Beau, served in Iraq for a full year, before that. Well, maybe it's because of what I've seen over the years as senator, vice president, and president traveling these countries.

A lot of our veterans and their families have gone through hell — deployment after deployment, months and years away from their families; missed birthdays, anniversaries; empty chairs at holidays; financial struggles; divorces; loss of limbs; traumatic brain injury; posttraumatic stress.

We see it in the struggles many have when they come home. We see it in the strain on their families and caregivers. We see it in the strain of their families when they're not there. We see it in the grief borne by their survivors. The cost of war they will carry with them their whole lives.

Most tragically, we see it in the shocking and stunning statistic that should give pause to anyone who thinks war can ever be low-grade, low-risk, or low-cost: 18 veterans, on average, who die by suicide every single day in America — not in a far-off place, but right here in America.

There's nothing low-grade or low-risk or low-cost about any war. It's time to end the war in Afghanistan.

As we close 20 years of war and strife and pain and sacrifice, it's time to look to the future, not the past — to a future that's safer, to a future that's more secure, to a future that honors those who served and all those who gave what President Lincoln called their "last full measure of devotion."

I give you my word: With all of my heart, I believe this is the right decision, a wise decision, and the best decision for America.

Thank you. Thank you. And may God bless you all. And may God protect our troops.

Source:<https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/08/31/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-end-of-the-war-in-afghanistan/>

Document 2:**India- Russia Joint Statement Following the Visit of the President of the Russian Federation, New Dehli, December 6, 2021.****INDIA-RUSSIA: Partnership for Peace, Progress and Prosperity**

1. At the invitation of Prime Minister of India Shri Narendra Modi, President of the Russian Federation H.E. Mr. Vladimir Putin paid a working visit to New Delhi on 6 December 2021 for the 21st India–Russia Annual Summit.

2. The completion of 5 decades of the 1971 Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation and 2 decades of Declaration on Strategic Partnership is symbolic of the long standing and time-tested India-Russia relations characterized by mutual trust, respect for each other's core national interests and similarity of positions on various international and regional issues.

3. The Sides reaffirmed their commitment to the Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership between India and Russia. They underscored that as major powers with common responsibilities, this important relationship continues to be an anchor of global peace and stability.

4. The Sides positively assessed the multi-faceted India-Russia relations that span various areas of cooperation including political and strategic, economy, energy, military and security, science and technology, culture and humanitarian cooperation. They noted that while the traditional areas of cooperation are being further strengthened, new drivers of growth have led to diversification and expansion of bilateral cooperation.

5. The Leaders highly appreciated the sustained momentum in bilateral ties despite the negative impacts of the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic. They acknowledged that the Annual Summit could not be held in 2020 due to the Covid-19 pandemic. The Sides noted with satisfaction the continued intensification of contacts at all levels including 6 telephonic conversations between the two leaders since the last Summit; visits of Foreign Minister, Raksha Mantri, Minister of Petroleum and Natural Gas and Minister of Steel from Indian Side; visit of Russian Foreign Minister and Secretary of Security Council to India; holding of Foreign Office Consultations, India-Russia Strategic Economic Dialogue, consultations on UN issues, Arctic, policy planning etc.

6. The Leaders welcomed the holding of back-to-back meetings of the India-Russia Inter-Governmental Commission on Military and Military-Technical Cooperation and the first 2+2 Dialogue of Foreign and Defence Ministers of India and Russia in New Delhi on 6 December 2021. They underscored the importance of regular annual 2+2 meetings for exchanging views on global and regional political-security developments.

7. The Leaders noted the ongoing interaction between the Parliaments of two countries and underlined the importance of regular meetings of Inter-Parliamentary Commission as a valuable component of India- Russia relations.

8. The Leaders reiterated the importance of the security dialogue at the level of NSA and NSCS on bilateral and regional issues and welcomed regular interactions between them. This has served to enhance strategic understanding and coordination between the two countries.

Cooperation in Covid-19 Pandemic

9. The Sides exchanged views on the Covid-19 pandemic situation and highly appreciated the ongoing bilateral cooperation in the fight against Covid-19, especially with respect to "Sputnik-V" vaccine.

10. The Leaders expressed gratitude to each other's countries for timely assistance during the pandemic. India's assistance in supplying critical medicines, including paracetamol, hydroxychloroquine, and certain antibiotics during the first phase in Russia and Russia's assistance in providing ventilators, oxygen concentrators and other critical equipment during India's second phase, was a humanitarian gesture well-received by both Sides.

11. The Sides expressed confidence that early mutual recognition of Covid vaccination certificates will further facilitate movement of persons between the two countries and agreed to fast track the formalities in this regard.

12. The Sides expressed appreciation for the efforts of relevant agencies involved in evacuation efforts as well as transport of life saving equipment and medicines. They noted that the Air-bubble arrangement has served the interim travel needs of citizens of both countries. Both Sides agreed to consider resumption of direct passenger and cargo flights to their pre-pandemic capacity.

Economy

13. The Sides appreciated the resumption of the positive trajectory of bilateral trade, with trade registering an increase of about 38% in the first half of 2021 compared to the same period in 2020 despite the pandemic-related restrictions. They positively assessed the overall increase of bilateral trade in 2019-20 compared to the previous year.

14. The Sides noted that the bilateral trade does not reflect the potential of strength and depth of India-Russia strategic partnership. The leaders stressed on the need for greater efforts to achieve the trade target of USD 30 billion by 2025. In this regard, they placed strong emphasis on new drivers of growth for long-term cooperation.

15. The Sides underscored the need for commencement of negotiations on Trade Agreement between India and The Eurasian Economic Union.

16. The leaders noted the relevance of continued engagement under the India-Russia Inter-Governmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific, Technological and Cultural Cooperation (IRIGC-TEC) for bilateral economic cooperation in various priority areas. They acknowledged the holding of 12 Working Group and Sub-group meetings under the IRIGC-TEC and instructed the concerned officials to expeditiously conclude meetings of pending Working Groups. The Sides also welcomed the setting up of the new Working Groups and Sub Groups on Transport, Urban Development and Railways and looked forward to the early holding of their inaugural meetings.

17. The Sides welcomed the holding of the 3rd edition of the India-Russia Strategic Economic Dialogue (IRSED) on April 15, 2021 in virtual format. They noted the productive discussions under this format in the areas of transport, agriculture, digital transformation, tourism, industry and banking and small and medium enterprises. The Sides considered the need to look at the way forward for the collaboration under this mechanism.

18. The Sides appreciated the outcomes of the visit of Minister of Steel of India to Moscow to attend the Russian Energy Week in October, 2021 and welcomed the progress made in a short span in reviving collaboration in coking coal and steel sectors. A mutually beneficial MoU for reliable long-term supplies of coal to India for steel production was signed. Discussions were held on production of specialty steel under Production Linked Incentive (PLI) Scheme in India, and utilization of technologies from Russian state steel institutes for steel production in India by private and public sector companies. The Indian Side welcomed the interest of Russian Side in learning from India's experience of gainful utilization of coal residues. The Sides also welcomed the meeting of the 1st Working Group on Coking Coal in virtual format in October, 2020.

19. The Leaders welcomed the signing of Agreement of Intent between Indian PSUs and Russian company PhosAgro for supply of fertilizers in the period of 2021/2022 calendar years. They instructed their officials to continue discussions for agreement on long term supply and pricing arrangements.

20. Trade in pharmaceuticals continues to be one of the main items of India's exports to Russia. Both Sides noted with satisfaction the continued strength of this commodity as well as Indian companies' participation in Russia's localization programme under Pharma 2020 and Pharma 2030 schemes. They recognized the growing collaboration in medical devices as a new promising area of economic engagement in the context of the pandemic.

21. The Sides appreciated the rapid recovery of collaboration in diamond sector between the two countries, following the initial downturn witnessed during the pandemic.

22. The Sides welcomed the progress on discussions on elimination of trade barriers in respect of critical commodities under the aegis of the Sub-Group on Elimination of the Trade Barriers of IRIGC-TEC. Both Sides agreed to consider fast-tracking elimination of barriers by way of closing critical gaps in phytosanitary and veterinary requirements of both countries in agricultural and agro-processed products.

23. The Sides recognised the need to further streamline and fast-track the process of Customs clearances of cargoes. In this regard, the Sides agreed to replace the discussions on the 'Green Corridor Project' with an Agreement on Mutual Recognition of Authorized Economic Operators (AEO) and a MoU on Exchange of pre-arrival Customs data. The Sides, also, agreed to commence discussions on this Agreement and MoU at the earliest.

24. The Indian Side encouraged participation of Russian companies in the 13 key sectors of Production Linked Incentive scheme of Government of India under the 'Atmanirbhar' and 'Make in India' programme. The Indian Side also invited the Russian Side to continue consideration of setting up manufacturing facilities in Greenfield industrial cities under Industrial Corridor Programme of Government of India.

25. The Sides recognized that the pandemic slowed down progress on certain investment decisions by companies on both Sides. However, both Sides noted with satisfaction that several investment ideas continue to progress, particularly those in inland waterways, railways, shipbuilding and repair, steel and coking coal, medical devices, petrochemicals, ports, banking and re-insurance services, pharmaceuticals, agriculture and agro processing, healthcare, IT and oil & gas.

26. The Sides urged the corresponding Ministries to finalize negotiations of the Bilateral Investment Treaty in a spirit of mutual understanding in order to protect mutual investments. They welcomed the signing of the MoU on Cooperation in the Field of Intellectual Property between Department of Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade, Ministry of Commerce, India and Federal Service for Intellectual Property, Russian Federation.

27. The Sides reiterated their commitment to strengthen inter-bank and insurance cooperation. Commercial Indo Bank, Moscow, the only Indian Bank operating in Russia, has upgraded its rating significantly over the last year. Indian Side expressed hope that this will allow the Bank to enter into retail segment after obtaining necessary approvals. Similarly, GIC Perestrakhovanie LLC, a 100% subsidiary of General Insurance Corporation of India, commenced its operations in September 2020 and is now offering reinsurance support to all major general insurers in the Russian Federation.

28. The Sides agreed to continue joint work on promoting mutual settlement of payments in national currencies, which will help reduce cost and time as well as risks involved in payments.

29. The Sides also expressed interest in continuing dialogue on accepting RuPay and MIR Cards within national payment infrastructures, as well as on interaction of Unified Payments Interface (UPI) and the Faster Payments System of the Bank of Russia (FPS). The Russian Side invited Indian credit institutions to connect to the financial messaging system of the Bank of Russia to facilitate faultless interbank transactions.

30. The Indian Side invited Russian Side's participation in civilian shipbuilding and inland waterways as promising new areas of collaboration. The two leaders welcomed the preparation of bilateral document in the area of civilian shipbuilding, which will facilitate enhancement of interaction and specialist training, investments in ship building and repair, scientific research, development of intelligent transport and navigation systems, international transport corridors. They welcomed the signing of the Agreement of Intent between Mazagaon Dock Ltd. and Zvezda Shipyard for commercial shipping signed in September this year.

Cooperation in the Russian Far-East

31. President Putin welcomed Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi's commitment to an Act Far-East Policy under which India could be a reliable partner in the development of the Russian Far-East. He supported Prime Minister Modi's concept of Sangam as a development tool for the region. The Russian Side warmly welcomed the successful visit of Prime Minister Modi to Vladivostok to attend the 5th Eastern Economic Forum (EEF) in 2019 and his virtual participation in the 6th EEF this year.

32. The Sides noted the greater intensity of Inter-regional dialogue on economic cooperation between the States of India and the regions of Russia including the virtual meeting between the Chief Minister of Gujarat and Governor of Sakha Republic (Yakutia) in September, 2021. They appreciated holding of several B2B, G2G and B2G meetings recently between Indian companies and Russian regions. They welcomed the signing of 9 twinning agreements between the cities/states of India and the regions of Russia so far for mutual cooperation in diverse areas.

33. The Sides welcomed the interest of Indian companies in cooperating in the Russian Far East. Energy, transport and logistics, maritime connectivity, diamond processing, forestry, pharmaceuticals & healthcare, tourism and humanitarian fields have been identified as areas of further cooperation in the Russian Far-East.

34. The Indian Side reiterated its commitment to enhanced trade and investment in the Russian Far-East. The Sides agreed to continue discussion on the operationalization of the US\$ 1 billion Line of Credit announced by Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi in 2019 for projects for development of the Russian Far East.

Energy

35. The Leaders reaffirmed that bilateral energy cooperation is a key pillar of the bilateral ties and an energy bridge between the two countries. Both Sides reiterated their joint efforts under the Roadmap for Cooperation in Hydrocarbons for 2019-24 to further deepen bilateral cooperation in the energy sector and welcomed the opening of Bharat Energy Center in Moscow, representing five Indian oil and gas public sector companies to enhance engagement with Russian stakeholders in energy sector.

36. The Sides noted with satisfaction, the fruitful, wide-ranging collaboration between the oil and gas companies of the two countries, including between JSC Rosneft Oil Company and Oil and Gas Public Sector Undertakings of India in implementing the Vankorneft, Sakhalin-1 and Taas-Yuryakh Neftegazodobycha projects in Russia, and Nayara Energy Limited's oil refinery in India. They also welcomed prospective two way investment initiatives of both countries, which are currently under discussion.

37. The Sides reaffirmed their commitment for increasing sourcing of Russian crude oil on long term contracts through preferential pricing, strengthening LNG imports to India, and the possible utilization of the Northern Sea Route for energy supplies. The two Sides further agreed for the expansion of cooperation in gas sector and welcomed the creation of Gas Task Force to identify mutually beneficial areas including the development of investment in gas infrastructure and distribution projects, use of natural gas in transport and emerging fuels including hydrogen.

38. Both Sides, appreciating the strength of the Indian petrochemical market, agreed to expand collaboration through Russian participation by way of investment, technological and other ways of collaboration in Indian petrochemical sector. The Sides welcomed the interest of Nayara Energy in production of products like polypropylene in India.

39. Both Sides also agreed to consider prospects for expanding cooperation in hydro and thermal power, energy efficiency and the sector of renewable energy. They also noted the need for cooperation in hydrogen economy, low-emission development, including exchange of best practices. The Indian Side emphasized the need for responsible and reasonable pricing of global energy supplies determined by market forces. Both Sides noted the importance of dialogue between consumers and producers for stabilizing energy prices.

Transport and Connectivity

40. The Indian Side welcomed the growing participation of Russian companies in modernization of the railway sector in India. This includes Russian Side's interest in implementing projects using Russian technology, equipment and capital in India, particularly in signalling and telematic

systems, high-speed rail projects, electrification of railways while abiding by India's Make in India and Atmanirbhar Bharat programmes.

41. The Indian Side appreciated Russia's participation in electronic toll collection technology based on satellite navigation technologies on Indian highways, implemented by the joint Russian-Indian company Bharat Telematic Systems Pvt Ltd.

42. The Sides emphasized on greater and effective usage of the International North-South Transport Corridor for cargo transport at lesser cost and time to enhance connectivity in the Eurasian Space. In this context, they welcomed the signing of agreement between Russian Railways (RZD) and CONCOR last year to jointly develop multi-modal logistics services along INSTC route. The Russian Side expressed support for India's proposal to include Chabahar port within the framework of INSTC. They stressed that connectivity initiatives should be based on the principles of transparency, broad participation, local priorities, financial sustainability and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations.

43. The Indian Side informed that the feasibility study of the Chennai-Vladivostok Eastern Maritime Corridor is in advance stage, and the study so far done indicates an array of opportunities for increased traffic upon the successful implementation of its recommendations. The Sides expressed optimism that the implementation of the recommendations of the study will provide a fillip to the bilateral trade.

Civil Nuclear Energy and Space

44. The Sides noted the significant progress achieved in the construction of the remaining nuclear power plant units at Kudankulam. Both Sides noted the importance of continued further discussion on the second site in India; the Indian Side will strive to finalize formal allotment of the second site in accordance with earlier signed agreements. They welcomed continuation of technical discussions on the VVER 1200 of the Russian design, joint manufacturing of equipment and localization of components.

45. Both Sides noted successful cooperation in the setting up of the Rooppur NPP in Bangladesh and expressed their readiness to explore similar cooperation in third countries as well.

46. The Sides welcomed the enhanced cooperation between the State Space Corporation "Roscosmos" and the Indian Space Research Organization, including in the human spaceflight programs and satellite navigation and agreed to study the prospects of the development of mutually beneficial cooperation in the development of launch vehicles and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, including planetary exploration.

47. The Sides welcomed the active work carried out within the framework of the Memorandum of Understanding between the State Space Corporation "Roscosmos" and the Indian Space Research Organization on

joint activities in human spaceflight program and noted with satisfaction the training of 4 Indian astronaut candidates from the «Yu.A.Gagarin Research & Test Cosmonaut Training Center» FSBO.

48. To facilitate further cooperation in Space, the Sides welcomed the signing of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the Russian Federation on technology protection due to cooperation in field of research and use of outer space for peaceful purposes and building and operation of launch vehicles and ground-based space infrastructure.

49. Both Sides intend to strengthen cooperation within the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UN COPUOS), including the issues of the long-term sustainability of outer space activities.

Military and Military-Technical Cooperation

50. Russian Side appreciated the participation of Indian Defence Minister Shri Rajnath Singh along with a Tri-Service contingent of the Indian armed forces in the Victory Day Parade at Red Square in Moscow to commemorate the 75th Anniversary of Victory of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945.

51. Military and military-technical cooperation has traditionally been the pillar of Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership between India and Russia. Responding to India's quest for self-sufficiency, the partnership is reorienting presently to joint research and development, co-development and joint production of advanced defence technology and systems.

52. The Sides expressed satisfaction with regular military contacts and joint exercises of the Armed Forces of the two countries which reached unprecedented heights this year with three exercises being held within a span of 60 days besides simultaneous participation of large Indian contingents in the International Army Games. The Russian Side deeply appreciated participation of INS Tabar in the 325th Russian Navy Day celebrations. The Sides agreed to continue and expand regular defence dialogue, mutual training and exercises, subject matter expert exchanges and other activities under the aegis of India-Russia Intergovernmental Commission on Military and Military Technical Cooperation.

53. Both Sides noted with satisfaction the successful implementation of the 2011-2020 Long-Term Program for Military and Technical Cooperation and welcomed the signing of a new long-term program for the period 2021-2031.

54. The Sides reiterated their commitment to upgrade the defence cooperation, including facilitating joint development and production of military equipment, components and spare parts, enhancing the after-sales service system, progress towards mutual recognition of quality control and regular joint exercises of the Armed Forces of the two countries. The two leaders agreed that for peace, stability and mutual

economic development, there is a need for the two countries to work closely together in the advanced and emerging fields of defence technology and for the Armed Forces of the two countries to work together in niche domains of military capabilities.

55. Both Sides agreed to take forward ongoing engagements to encourage joint manufacturing in India of spare parts, components, aggregates and other products for maintenance of Russian origin Arms and defence equipment under Make-in-India program through transfer of technology and setting up of joint ventures for meeting the needs of the Indian Armed Forces as well as subsequent export to mutually friendly third countries.

56. The Sides recognized the requirement of an institutional arrangement for reciprocal provision of logistic support and services for the Armed Forces.

Science and Technology

57. Emphasizing the importance of joint research in science, technology and innovation, the two Sides welcome the signing of Roadmap for Science, Technology & Innovation Cooperation and, expressed satisfaction with respect to launching joint calls in priority areas as states in the Roadmap.

58. The Sides expressed satisfaction on launching of India-Russia Technology Assessment and Accelerated Commercialization Program by the Department of Science & Technology, Govt. of India and Russian Foundation for Assistance to Small Industrial Enterprises (FASIE), which provides opportunities to Start-ups and SMES of the two countries to address societal challenges through innovative technologies.

59. The Sides also agreed to facilitate collaboration between government and private sector organizations to find ways of joint development of software products, platforms and services as well as in the area of electronics manufacturing. The Sides confirmed their interest in further developing cooperation in the sphere of digital technologies, including those related to information protection, security of critical infrastructure and law enforcement.

60. The Sides noted the promotion of youth exchanges by bringing together co-innovation programs at School level with the Support of Atal Innovation Mission, NITI Aayog and Talent & Success Fund (SIRIUS Centre, Sochi), Russia. These programs engaged students on both Sides to generate hands-on technological solutions for societal problems such as Distance Literacy in remote areas; Rural Health & Well-being and Digital asset monitoring etc.

61. The Indian Side congratulated the Russian Side for its ongoing successful chairmanship of the Arctic Council from 2021-23 and expressed its readiness to play an active role as an Observer in the Arctic Council. Both Sides recalled the bilateral consultations on the Arctic held last year.

The Indian Side also expressed its interest in collaborating with Russia on the Northern Sea Route.

Education, Culture and Tourism

62. Recognising the traditionally strong cooperation between India and Russia in the sphere of education, the Sides appreciated efforts taken by both countries to ensure well-being of students during the Covid-19 pandemic. They agreed to continue their efforts in promoting educational linkages between universities and educational institutions. The Sides also agreed for organizing exchange programs for their diplomats at the respective training institutes under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

63. The Sides appreciated the successful implementation of bilateral Cultural Exchange Program, which plays a crucial role in enhancing people to people contact and noted the signing of the India Russia Cultural Exchange Programme during the summit for continuance of the bilateral cultural cooperation. It was agreed to continue the mutually beneficial practice of reciprocally holding cultural and film festivals. Need for geographical expansion of cultural exchanges and greater involvement of the youth and folk art groups was highlighted. Both Sides agreed to continue their joint efforts in promoting Russian language in India and Hindi in Russia comprehensively, including by developing contacts between relevant educational institutions. They welcomed the signing of MoU between National Sports University, Imphal, India and the Russian International Olympic University Sochi, Russia.

64. The two Sides appreciated the dynamism in tourist exchanges between Russia and India. To further deepen the cooperation in tourism, the Sides expressed intent to discuss ways of cooperation both at government and private sector level with the aim to enhance tourist exchanges between the two countries.

65. Both Sides welcomed progressive simplification of visa formalities, including introduction of eVisa by both countries. India has opened group tourist visa from October 15, 2021 and normal tourist visa from November 15, 2021, which would further strengthen people-to-people contacts. They agreed to continue the work on further simplification of the visa regime in future.

Cooperation in UN and Multilateral Fora

66. Both Sides noted the high level of political dialogue and cooperation on issues at the UN and agreed to deepen it further. Both Sides stressed the importance of reinvigorating multilateralism, with the central coordinating role played by the United Nations in world affairs. The Sides underlined the primacy of respect for international law and emphasized their commitment to the purposes and the principles stated in the UN Charter including the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of Member States.

67. Russia welcomed India's election as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council with an overwhelming majority for a two-year term. Russian Side appreciated India's UNSC priorities which includes commitment to strengthen and reform of the multilateral system, rule of law, fair and equitable international system and are anchored in the Indian ethos of "Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam", i.e. the world being one family. Both Sides highlighted that India's election to the UNSC has provided additional opportunities to coordinate efforts on most pressing issues at the UN based on mutual understanding and a shared view and approach to the global world order.

68. Both Sides called for comprehensive reform of the UNSC to reflect contemporary global realities and to make it more representative, effective and efficient in dealing with issues of international peace and security. President Putin congratulated India on its successful Presidency of the UN Security Council in the month of August and reiterated Russia's support for India's permanent membership of a reformed and expanded UN Security Council. Prime Minister Narendra Modi thanked President Putin for his participation in the UNSC high-level debate on Maritime Security chaired by Prime Minister Narendra Modi on August 9, 2021 as part of India's Presidency of the UNSC.

69. Both Sides reiterated their commitment to enhanced cooperation within BRICS. President Putin congratulated India on its successful BRICS Chairmanship in 2021, including hosting of the XIII BRICS Summit on 09 September 2021 and adopting the New Delhi Declaration. The Sides also welcomed deliverables of BRICS cooperation in 2021, in particular the signing of the Agreement on BRICS Cooperation on Remote Sensing Satellite Constellation, finalization of the Agreement on BRICS Cooperation and Mutual Administrative Assistance in Customs Matters, adoption of the BRICS Counter-Terrorism Action Plan, Action Plan 2021-2024 for Agricultural Cooperation, Innovation Cooperation Action Plan 2021-2024 and establishment of the BRICS Alliance for Green Tourism. Both Sides reaffirmed their commitment to implement the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership 2025.

70. The Leaders recognised the role of the New Development Bank (NDB) as vital to addressing development challenges, including health and economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and encouraged the NDB to explore the possibility of financing more social infrastructure projects, including those that use digital technologies. They commended the NDB's substantive progress in membership expansion despite challenges emanating from the COVID-19 pandemic. They reiterated that the process of expansion should be gradual and balanced in terms of geographic representation.

71. India and Russia stressed the achievements of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in the last two decades of its operation and noted the great potential for further interaction among the SCO

Member States. Both Sides will continue to strengthen the SCO as one of the key pillars of the emerging, more representative, democratic, just and multipolar world order based on international law, above all the UN Charter.

72. The Sides intend to focus particularly on increasing the effectiveness of countering terrorism, extremism, drug trafficking, cross-border organized crime, and information security threats, in particular by improving the functionality of the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure.

73. The Sides support increased role of SCO in international affairs, comprehensive development of the Organization's contacts with the UN and its specialized agencies, and other multilateral organizations and associations. In this context, they support the establishment of official ties between the SCO and Eurasian Economic Union.

74. Both Sides agreed to intensify cooperation within the RIC framework to promote common approaches to pressing issues on the global and regional agenda. The Russian Side expressed appreciation for India's chairmanship of RIC. Both Sides welcomed the results of the RIC Foreign Ministers meeting on 26 November 2021.

75. The Sides highlighted their cooperation within the G20 format and agreed to intensify the same on issues of global and mutual interest, keeping in view India's presidency of the G20 in 2023.

76. Both Sides strongly condemned terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and urged the international community to intensify cooperation against terrorism including safe havens, terror financing, arms and drugs trafficking, radicalization and malicious use of ICTs to spread extremist, terrorist and other illegal content.

77. Both Sides underscored the importance of implementing the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council resolutions on countering terrorism and extremism as well as the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, while taking into account national experiences and state specificities. Both Sides reaffirmed their shared fight against international terrorism, concerted action against all terrorist groups, including those proscribed by the UN, condemned cross-border movement of terrorists and called for the perpetrators of terror attacks to be brought to justice, without any political or religious Considerations. They denounced any use of terrorist proxies and emphasized the importance of denying any logistical, financial, or military support to terrorist groups to launch or plan terror attacks. Both Sides reaffirmed the need to support and strengthen the FATF and the UN Office of Counter Terrorism in their shared fight against terrorism. They reaffirmed their mutual commitment to strengthening the current international drug control regime based on the three relevant United Nations conventions.

78. The Sides agreed that safeguarding of global commons including our oceans, outer space and information space should be based on the principles of transparency, accessibility and upholding international law.

79. The Sides appreciated close cooperation in the field of security in the use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) through inter-agency cooperation under bilateral mechanisms and at multilateral platforms. They highlighted the leading role of the United Nations in the decision-making process on security in the use of ICTs. The Sides also recognized the need for further work on rules, norms and principles of responsible behavior of State aimed at preventing conflicts and promoting peaceful use of ICTs. The Sides reaffirmed the importance of international cooperation against criminal use of ICTs and in this regard they welcome the establishment of an open-ended Ad hoc intergovernmental committee of experts to elaborate a comprehensive international convention on countering the use of ICTs for criminal purposes as stipulated in the UN GA resolutions 74/247 and 75/282.

80. Both Sides expressed concern over the possibility of an arms race in outer space and outer space turning into an arena for military confrontation. They reaffirmed commitment to take efforts for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and its weaponization. They stressed the paramount importance of strict compliance with existing international legal agreements providing for the peaceful uses of outer space and promoting international peace and stability, promotion of international cooperation and mutual understanding. The Sides supported negotiation of a multilateral legally binding instrument for prevention of an arms race in outer space. In this regard they noted the relevance of draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space, the threat or use of force against space objects, submitted to the Conference of Disarmament for future negotiations. The Sides reaffirmed that the Conference on Disarmament, is the only forum for holding multilateral negotiations on an international agreement (or agreements) on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects.

81. The Sides reaffirmed support to full and effective adherence to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BTWC) by all States Parties. The Sides noted that, the BTWC functions, including in what concerns the UN Security Council, should not be duplicated by other mechanisms. The Sides expressed the support to strengthening of BTWC including by adopting a protocol to the Convention providing for, inter alia, an effective compliance verification mechanism.

82. Both Sides reaffirmed support to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and their determination to uphold efforts and initiatives aimed at preserving the integrity of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). They called upon the States Parties

to the CWC to engage in a constructive dialogue with a view to restoring the spirit of consensus in the OPWC.

83. To address the threat of chemical and biological terrorism, both Sides emphasized the need to launch multilateral negotiations on an international convention for the suppression of acts of chemical and biological terrorism at the Conference on Disarmament.

84. Both Sides reaffirmed their commitment to further strengthening global efforts for non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Russia expressed its strong support for India's membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

The Sides urged all members of the international community to work towards enhancing the level of mutual trust, in order to promote global peace and security.

85. The Sides discussed the evolving situation in Afghanistan, especially the security situation and its implications in the region, the current political situation, issues related to terrorism, radicalisation and drug trafficking etc. They outlined the priorities which include ensuring formation of a truly inclusive and representative government, combating terrorism and drug trafficking, providing immediate humanitarian assistance and preserving the rights of women, children and minorities.

86. The leaders reiterated strong support for a peaceful, secure and stable Afghanistan while emphasizing the respect for sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity and non-interference in its internal affairs. They also discussed the current humanitarian situation and decided to provide immediate humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people.

87. The leaders emphasised that Afghanistan's territory should not be used for sheltering, training, planning or financing any terrorist groups including ISIS, Al Qaeda, LeT etc. They reaffirmed their firm commitment to combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, including its financing, the dismantling of terrorist infrastructure and countering radicalization, to ensure that Afghanistan would never become a safe haven for global terrorism. Both Sides recalled the importance of the relevant UN Resolutions on Afghanistan, as well as the recent outcome documents of Moscow format consultations and other international and regional mechanisms. The leaders emphasized the central role of the United Nations in Afghanistan.

88. The leaders welcomed close coordination between India and Russia on Afghanistan including through the creation of a permanent consultative mechanism on the issue between the Security Councils of both countries. They highly appreciated the finalisation of the Roadmap of interaction between India and Russia on Afghanistan, which symbolized convergence of views and interests of the two Sides.

89. The Russian Side welcomed Delhi Regional Security Dialogue on Afghanistan of National Security Advisors/Secretaries of Security Council

on 10 November 2021 in New Delhi and welcomed the Delhi Declaration on Afghanistan that emerged from that meeting.

90. The Sides reaffirmed their strong commitment to sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Syria. The Sides also reaffirmed their commitment that there is no alternative to advancing a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned, UN- facilitated political process in line with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015) and the necessity to mobilize comprehensive humanitarian assistance to all the Syrians in need without politicization and preconditions as required by UNSCR 2585(2021).

91. The Sides reiterated the importance of the full implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and UNSC Resolution 2231 and expressed their support to the relevant efforts to ensure the earliest reinvigoration of the JCPOA.

92. Both Sides urged all the concerned parties to work towards denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula to promote establishment of lasting peace and stability and stressed on the need to continue dialogue to achieve this goal.

93. The Sides agreed to explore mutually acceptable and beneficial areas of cooperation in third countries especially in the Central Asia, South East Asia and Africa.

94. The Sides reiterated the need to preserve and strengthen the role of the World Trade Organization for upholding a transparent, non-discriminatory, and inclusive multilateral trading system with the fundamental principles at its core. They agreed that the post-pandemic world requires diversified global value chains that are based on trust, resilience and reliability.

95. Both Sides emphasized the importance of deepening regional economic cooperation to ensure sustainable socio-economic development and the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, including the expansion of cooperation within the framework of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific in such key areas as transport, energy and trade.

96. The Sides reaffirmed that the emerging regional security architecture should be free, open, transparent and inclusive, based on universally recognized principles of international law and aimed at maintaining international peace and security, developing friendly relations and mutually beneficial cooperation in the region. They agreed to strengthen joint efforts to build an architecture of equal and indivisible regional security. The Sides agreed to intensify consultations on complementarities between integration and development initiatives in greater Eurasian space and in the regions of Indian and Pacific oceans. They underscored their recognition of the ASEAN centrality in the regional architecture of security and cooperation and reiterated the importance of closer cooperation and consultations in various regional fora and

initiatives such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus), Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), the Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), to jointly contribute to regional peace, security and stability.

97. The Indian Side looked forward to Russia's joining of the International Solar Alliance (ISA) and the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI).

98. The Sides noted with satisfaction the coinciding and similar approaches to their foreign policy priorities and reaffirmed their commitment for further strengthening of the India-Russia Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership, both in the context of the current bilateral relations and in addressing regional and international issues. They expressed their mutual intention to strengthen and expand their bilateral relations for the benefit of the peoples of India and Russia.

99. President Vladimir Putin thanked Prime Minister Narendra Modi for the gracious hospitality extended to him and his delegation in New Delhi and invited him to visit Russia next year for the 22nd India-Russia Annual Summit.

Source:https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/34606/India_Russia_Joint_Statement_following_the_visit_of_the_President_of_the_Russian_Federation

Document 3:**China-U.S. Presidential Meeting: Setting Direction and Providing Impetus for Bilateral Relations, Virtual Meeting, November 16, 2021.****Transcript of Vice Foreign Minister Xie Feng's Interview with the Press**

Q1: This is the first ever virtual meeting between the Chinese and U.S. Presidents, and the two leaders had quite a long discussion. Did the meeting achieve its objective?

A: On the morning of 16 November, Chinese President Xi Jinping had a virtual meeting with U.S. President Joe Biden. This is the first ever virtual meeting between the two heads of state in the history of China-U.S. relations. It has great significance for both China-U.S. bilateral ties and international relations. The meeting lasted for three and a half hours, from 8:45 a.m. to around 12:25 p.m. Beijing time, longer than scheduled. The two sides had an extensive exchange of views on the strategic, overarching and fundamental issues in China-U.S. relations, on their respective development agenda and domestic and foreign policies, and on international and regional issues of mutual interest. It was a candid, in-depth, constructive and fruitful meeting. Under the current circumstances, it is crucial that the two Presidents take the helm for the China-U.S. relationship. The meeting has chartered the course and provided impetus for China-U.S. relations to develop going forward.

Q2: The meeting has covered major strategic issues about the future of China-U.S. relations and important issues of shared interest and concern. Could you tell us more details about what has been discussed? Any consensus reached?

A: The meeting can be recapped by a set of figures-3, 4, 2 and 1. To be specific, President Xi put forward three principles and four priority areas for growing China-U.S. relations; the two Presidents reached two principled common understandings; President Xi Jinping worked on the U.S. side on one important question.

On the **three principles**. At the meeting, President Xi pointed out the right way for China and the United States to get along in the new era: **First, mutual respect**. The two sides need to respect each other's social systems and development paths, respect each other's core interests and major concerns, and respect each other's right to development. They need to treat each other as equals, keep differences under control, and seek common ground while reserving differences. **Second, peaceful coexistence**. No conflict and no confrontation is a line that both sides must hold. **Third, win-win cooperation**. The interests of China and the United States are deeply intertwined. The world is big enough for our two countries to develop individually and collectively. The right thing to do is

to choose mutual benefit over zero-sum game or the I-win-you-lose approach.

On the **four priority areas**. President Xi identified at the meeting four areas where China and the United States should focus their efforts on:

First, shouldering responsibilities of major countries and leading global response to outstanding challenges. China-U.S. cooperation may not solve all problems, but few problems can be solved without it. The global initiatives China has proposed are open to the United States, and we hope the same is true for initiatives from the United States.

Second, acting in the spirit of equality and mutual benefit to move forward exchanges at all levels and in all areas and generate more positive energy for China-U.S. relations. The two Presidents have stayed in close contact through meetings, letters and phone calls, chartering the course for bilateral relations. The two countries, with broad common interests in a wide range of areas including economy, energy, mil-to-mil, law-enforcement, education, science and technology, cyber, environmental protection and sub-national cooperation, may draw on what each other has to offer and make the cake bigger for China-U.S. cooperation. Our two sides could fully harness the channels and mechanisms of dialogue between our diplomatic and security, economy, trade and finance, and climate change teams, in an effort to advance practical cooperation and resolve specific issues.

Third, managing differences and sensitive issues in a constructive way to prevent China-U.S. relations from getting derailed or out of control. It is only natural for our two countries to have differences. What matters is to manage differences in a constructive manner and prevent them from getting magnified or escalated. China stands firm in defending its sovereignty, security and development interests. It is important that the United States handle the relevant issues with prudence.

Fourth, strengthening coordination and cooperation on major international and regional hotspot issues to provide more public goods to the world. In a world that is still not peaceful, China and the United States need to work together with the rest of the international community to defend world peace, promote global development, and safeguard a fair and equitable international order.

On the **two principled common understandings**. Both Presidents underscored the importance of China-U.S. relations. President Xi noted the importance of the China-U.S. relationship to the two countries and, beyond the bilateral scope, to the whole world. We have no alternative but to get it right, and we cannot mess it up. A sound and steady China-U.S. relationship is required for advancing our two countries' respective development and for safeguarding a peaceful and stable international environment. Our two sides need to increase communication and cooperation, each manage our domestic affairs well and, at the same time,

shoulder our share of international responsibilities, take China-U.S. relations forward in a positive direction, and work together to advance the noble cause of world peace and development. Doing so will advance the interests of our two peoples and meet the expectation of the international community.

President Biden said that how U.S.-China relations evolve has a profound impact not only on the two countries, but also on the rest of the world. The two countries have a responsibility to the world as well as to the two peoples. The two sides must not mess up the relationship, and the United States has no objective to change China's system. He noted the need for the two sides to respect each other, have peaceful coexistence, enhance communication, reduce misunderstandings and handle differences in a constructive way.

Both Presidents expressed that their opposition to a "new Cold War" and that China and the United States should not have conflict or confrontation. China rejects a "new Cold War" in whatever forms. And President Biden has also made it clear at the UN General Assembly that the United States would not seek a "new Cold War". All countries, including U.S. allies, are unwilling to return to the old path of Cold War or to choose sides between China and the United States. At the meeting, President Xi said that drawing ideological lines or dividing the world into different camps or rival groups will only make the world suffer. The U.S. side needs to meet its word of not seeking a "new Cold War" with concrete actions, and play a constructive and uniting role in the Asia-Pacific. President Biden noted that the U.S. revitalization of its alliances is not anti-China, and that the United States' objective is not to have a conflict with China. The immediate priority is for the two sides to have candid, extensive and substantive dialogues in this relationship, and make sure that competition between the two countries is healthy and does not veer into conflict.

Q3: Could I assume that the "one important question" you mentioned in the end must be the Taiwan question? Tensions are rising again in the cross-Straits relations. This is a matter of concern for every Chinese. On the Taiwan question, the United States has repeatedly interfered in China's internal affairs and stepped on China's red lines, much to the dislike of the Chinese people.

A: Promoting national reunification and safeguarding territorial integrity is the shared will and firm resolve of all Chinese people. The Taiwan question has always been the most important and sensitive issue in China-U.S. relations, and a fixed topic for every discussion between our Presidents. At this meeting, President Xi Jinping pointed out that the one-China principle and the three China-U.S. Joint Communiqués are the political foundation of China-U.S. relationship. Successive U.S. administrations have made clear commitments on this question. In the UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 and the three joint communiqués, the

true status quo of the Taiwan question and what lies at the heart of one China have been articulated in clear-cut terms, i.e. there is but one China in the world and Taiwan is part of China, and the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government representing China.

Achieving China's complete reunification is an aspiration shared by all sons and daughters of the Chinese nation. We will strive for the prospect of peaceful reunification with the utmost sincerity and efforts. That said, should the separatist forces for Taiwan independence make provocations, force our hands or even cross the red line, we will be compelled to take resolute measures. On this question of China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, there is no room for China to back down.

President Biden reiterated at the meeting that the United States abides by the one-China policy and does not support "Taiwan independence".

On the question of Taiwan, I have a few more words to say. As you said, the Chinese people are very unhappy about the recent wrongful words and actions by the U.S. side, which were attempts to misrepresent and obscure the one-China policy. The Chinese government has made serious representations to the U.S. side for multiple times. The meaning and connotations of one China are clear, legally and politically. They are reflected in the three joint communiqués and the UN General Assembly Resolution 2758, which are official international agreements and documents with legal effect. They should not be altered, distorted or negated. The UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 has made it clear that "the representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of China are the only lawful representatives of China to the UN". The Office of Legal Affairs of the UN Secretariat, in a number of legal opinions following the resolution, has also confirmed that "the United Nations considers 'Taiwan' as a province of China with no separate status", and the "'authorities' in 'Taipei' are not considered to enjoy any form of government status". The three Sino-U.S. Joint Communiqués say in black and white that "The United States of America recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China, and acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China". The United States should adhere to the official bilateral agreements reached with China and resolutions adopted with overwhelming majority at the UN General Assembly, respect the fact that most countries uphold and stand for the one-China principle. The U.S. side is expected to change its course and take steps to win the trust of the Chinese people as well as the international community.

Q4: The rest of the world is very concerned about risk management in China-U.S. relations. The United States has talked about risk management many times, stressing the need for making

the rules of the road or "guardrails" in the bilateral relationship. What is China's view? The United States is frequently talking about competition with China. What is China's response?

A: President Xi Jinping said that China is willing to discuss with the U.S. side effective risk management on the basis of mutual respect. The high levels of the two sides, and the departments of foreign affairs and national defense, among others, need to keep and increase communication. That said, it is important to have the resolve to prevent and avert crises, and remove their root causes. That would bring fundamental solutions.

As for competition, President Xi Jinping pointed out that cooperation should be prioritized. Cooperation may involve areas of competition, such as the economic field, but competition must be fair and healthy, conducive to respective and common development.

Let me draw an analogy: putting out fire is certainly important, but fire prevention is equally important. So, inflammables and explosives shall be removed whenever they are spotted.

Importantly, whether it is making rules for competition or installing guardrails for a relationship, it should be done through consultation on equal footing, agreed and adhered to by both sides, rather than one side imposing conditions or demands on the other.

Q5: Since the start of this year, values have often been made an issue by the U.S. side, and a "Leaders' Summit for Democracy" will be held before the end of this year. Did the two sides talk about this summit during the meeting?

A: President Xi Jinping said at the meeting that democracy is not a one-size-fits-all product that has only one model or configuration for the whole world. Whether a country is democratic or not should be judged by its own people. Dismissing forms of democracy that are different from one's own is in itself undemocratic. We are willing to have dialogues on human rights on the basis of mutual respect, but we oppose using human rights to interfere in other countries' internal affairs. Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Tibet and maritime issues concern China's sovereignty, territorial integrity and core interests, and are close to the hearts of the Chinese people. On these questions, China has no room to back down. The United States should respect China's interests and concerns, and handle the relevant issues in a prudent and proper way.

Let me also say that China advocates peace, development, equity, justice, democracy and freedom, which are common values of humanity. Democracy is not a slogan to be chanted, but requires concrete actions. The key criteria is whether it benefits the people and has people's support.

Q6: We know that both Chinese and U.S. Presidents care a lot about climate change. Was this issue covered at this virtual meeting?

A: Climate change is a common concern of the international community, and an important area of China-U.S. cooperation. At the meeting, President Xi Jinping recalled China-U.S. cooperation that brought about the Paris Agreement on climate change. A few days ago, the two sides issued their second joint declaration about climate change. As both countries are transitioning to green and low carbon economy, climate change can well become a new highlight of cooperation.

Needless to say, cooperation on climate change is inseparable from the broader climate of China-U.S. relations, and thus requires efforts from both sides to foster an enabling atmosphere. Since last year, China has announced its goals of carbon peak and carbon neutrality, and then its decision of not building new coal-fired power projects abroad. This means that China will use the shortest time in history to realize the world's biggest cut in carbon emission intensity, a task that will take extraordinary efforts. China is still the biggest developing country in the world. All countries need to uphold the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, and strike a balance between climate change response and livelihood protection. What the world needs is less finger-pointing or blame game, but more solidarity and cooperation. Promises matter, but actions matter even more. Developed countries need to earnestly fulfill their historical responsibilities and obligations, and maintain consistency in their policies.

Q7: COVID-19 is still ravaging the world and the world economy is struggling to recover. Mankind faces multiple crises. Did the two Presidents talk about possibilities of cooperation to address the crises?

A: Emerging from the shadow of the pandemic, achieving recovery and stability, and overcoming the various risks and challenges are shared aspirations of the international community. President Xi Jinping has stressed on many occasions China's readiness to work with all sides in the spirit of solidarity at trying times.

At the meeting, President Xi pointed out that the pandemic once again proves that humanity lives in a community with a shared future. There is no higher priority than putting people's lives first. Solidarity and cooperation are the most powerful weapons for the international community to defeat COVID-19. Response to epidemics must be based on science. Politicizing health issues does no good but great harm. The pressing priority in the global COVID response is to address the vaccine deficits and close the vaccination gap.

At the early stage of the pandemic, China suggested making COVID vaccines a global public good. Recently we have raised a Global Vaccine Cooperation Action Initiative. China is among the first to offer vaccines to developing countries in need, delivering over 1.7 billion doses of finished and bulk vaccines to the world. In the course of this year, the vaccines we will provide to the international community may exceed two billion doses.

On top of its US\$100 million donation to COVAX, China has announced a donation of another 100 million doses of COVID vaccines to developing countries within this year. And we will consider making additional donations in light of the needs of developing countries, the least developed ones in particular.

To get better prepared in the future, China and the United States should advocate the establishment of a cooperation mechanism for global public health and communicable disease prevention and control, and step up prevention against communicable diseases such as influenza. The two countries may also conduct exchanges and cooperation in areas such as the monitoring of COVID pandemic, research on scientific bottlenecks, disease prevention and treatment, and vaccination.

Q8: Did the two Presidents discuss regional and international hot spot issues at the meeting?

A: The two Presidents exchanged views on the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue, the Iranian nuclear issue and Afghanistan, among other regional and international issues of mutual interest. President Xi pointed out that China and the United States need to uphold the international system with the United Nations at its center, the international order based on international law, and the basic norms governing international relations underpinned by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. A multilateralism without China-U.S. cooperation or the participation of either would be incomplete and unrealistic.

I wish to stress here that China is willing to enhance cooperation on the relevant issues on the basis of mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit. China will continue to play a positive role on the relevant issues and make its own efforts. At the same time, we call upon the U.S. side to play a constructive role, actively respond to, take seriously and address reasonable concerns of parties concerned, and shoulder its due responsibilities and obligations.

Q9: You said that the two Presidents also exchanged views on the domestic development agenda. In China, we have just had the sixth Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Committee, a big event that has drawn a lot of attention. Did the two Presidents talk about this?

A: At the meeting, President Xi shared with President Biden, in the context of the sixth Plenum, the major accomplishments and historical experience of the CPC in the past 100 years. President Xi said that over the past centenary, the CPC has kept to its founding aspiration and mission, namely to strive for the happiness of the Chinese people and rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. We have accomplished a lot in that direction, and we will continue to do more. Our people's aspiration for a better life is what the Party strives for. "Serving the 1.4 billion Chinese people and working with them for a better life is my great honor and a great responsibility, and I shall put aside my own well-being and live up to people's expectations," said President Xi. Our people's aspiration for a

better life is the biggest internal driver for China's development and an inevitable trend of history. Any attempt to stop this historical trend will be rejected by the Chinese people, and will by no means succeed.

President Xi also reiterated China's unwavering determination to open wider at a high standard, to share development opportunities with the rest of the world, and to make economic globalization more open, inclusive, balanced and beneficial for all. China is talking about a new development paradigm for the purpose of expanding domestic market, fostering a combination of domestic and international circulations with greater scope and scale, and building a business environment that is more market-oriented, law-based and up to international standard. All this will provide a bigger market and greater opportunities to the United States and other countries.

Q10: How will this meeting shape the future of China-U.S. relations? Do both sides have any arrangement for the two Presidents to meet in person sometime in future?

A: This meeting, held at a crucial moment, is an occasion for the two Presidents to once again set the direction for this relationship and will have significant and far-reaching impact for China-U.S. relations. President Xi and President Biden agreed to keep in touch by multiple means. We are open to all forms of communication between the two Presidents, including an in-person meeting. We will let things take their natural course. What matters is to move in the same direction and foster a favourable atmosphere for the meeting to generate good outcomes.

If the China-U.S. relationship cannot go back to what it was in the past, then it must move toward the future. China has no illusion. But we have confidence, and will continue to stay the course. We are open to all options that can take this relationship forward. That said, we also have our principles, in short, the three principles put forward by President Xi Jinping today: mutual respect, peaceful coexistence and win-win cooperation.

The China-U.S. relationship stands at a crossroads. We hope that the United States will work with China, follow the spirit of the two Presidents' meeting with concrete actions, maintain dialogue and communication, strengthen exchanges and cooperation and manage differences in a responsible way, so as to promote sound and stable development of China-U.S. relationship.

Source:https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/202111/t20211116_10449035.html

Document: 4**Statement by the Prime Minister of Pakistan H.E. Imran Khan to the Seventy-Sixth Session of the UN General Assembly, New York, September 25, 2021.**

Mr. President,

I congratulate you on assuming the presidency of the 76th session of the General Assembly.

I also wish to express appreciation for the significant achievements of your predecessor, Volkan Bozkir, who guided the Assembly skilfully under the difficult circumstances imposed by the Covid-19 pandemic.

Mr. President,

The world is facing triple challenge of the Covid-19, the accompanying economic crisis, and the threats posed by climate change.

The virus does not discriminate between nations and people. Nor do the catastrophes imposed by uncertain weather patterns.

The common threats faced by us today not only expose the fragility of the international system; they also underscore the oneness of humanity.

By the grace of Almighty Allah, Pakistan has been successful so far in containing the Covid pandemic. Our calibrated strategy of 'smart lockdowns' helped save lives and livelihoods and kept the economy afloat. Over 15 million families survived through our social protection programme of Ehsaas.

Mr. President,

Climate change is one of the primary existential threats that our planet faces today.

Pakistan's contribution to global emissions is negligible. Yet we are among the 10 most vulnerable countries to the effects of climate change in the world.

Being fully aware of our global responsibilities, we have embarked upon game-changing environmental programmes: reforesting Pakistan through our 10 billion tree tsunami; preserving natural habitats; switching to renewable energy; removing pollution from our cities; and adapting to the impacts of climate change.

To address the triple crisis of covid pandemic, economic downturn, and climate emergency, we need a comprehensive strategy that should include:

One, vaccine equity: everyone, everywhere, must be vaccinated against Covid, and as soon as possible;

Two, adequate financing must be made available to developing countries. This can be ensured through comprehensive debt restructuring; expanded ODA (Official Development Assistance); redistribution of

unutilized SDRs (Special Drawing Rights), and allotment of a greater proportion of SDRs to developing countries; and finally, provision of climate finance; and

Three, we must adopt clear investment strategies which help alleviate poverty, promote job creation, build sustainable infrastructure, and of course bridge the digital divide.

I propose that the Secretary-General convene an SDG summit in 2025 to review and accelerate implementation of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Mr. President,

Because of the plunder of the developing world by their corrupt ruling elites, the gap between the rich and the poor countries is increasing at an alarming speed.

Through this platform, I have been drawing the world's attention towards the scourge of illicit financial flows from developing countries.

The Secretary General's High-Level Panel on Financial Accountability, Transparency and Integrity (FACTI) has calculated that a staggering 7 trillion dollars in stolen assets are parked in the financial "haven" destinations.

This organized theft and illegal transfer of assets has profound consequences for the developing nations. It depletes their already meagre resources, accentuates the levels of poverty especially when laundered money puts pressure on the currency and leads to its devaluation. At the current rate, when the FACTI Panel estimates that a trillion dollar every year is taken out of the developing world, there will be mass exodus of economic migrants towards the richer nations.

What the East India Company did to India, the crooked ruling elites are doing to developing world - plundering the wealth and transferring it to western capitals and offshore tax havens.

And Mr. President, retrieving the stolen assets from the developed countries is impossible for poor nations. The rich countries have no incentives, or compulsion, to return this ill-gotten wealth, and this ill-gotten wealth belongs to the masses of the developing world. I foresee, in the not-too-distant future a time will come when the rich countries will be forced to build walls to keep out economic migrants from these poor countries.

I fear a few "wealthy islands" in the sea of poverty will also turn into a global calamity, like climate change.

The General Assembly must take steps meaningfully to address this deeply disturbing, and morally repugnant, situation. Naming and shaming the 'haven' destinations and developing a comprehensive legal framework to halt and reverse the illicit financial flows are most critical actions to stop this grave economic injustice.

And at a minimum, the recommendations of Secretary General's FACTI panel should be fully implemented.

Mr. President,

Islamophobia is another pernicious phenomenon that we all need to collectively combat.

In the aftermath of 9/11 terrorist attacks, terrorism has been associated with Islam by some quarters. This has increased the tendency of right-wing, xenophobic and violent nationalists, extremists and terrorist groups to target Muslims.

The UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy has recognized these emerging threats. We hope the Secretary-General's report will focus on these new threats of terrorism posed by Islamophobes and right-wing extremists.

I call on the Secretary-General to convene a global dialogue on countering the rise of Islamophobia. Our parallel efforts, at the same time, should be to promote interfaith harmony, and they should continue.

Mr. President,

The worst and most pervasive form of Islamophobia now rules India. The hate-filled 'Hindutva' ideology, propagated by the fascist RSS-BJP regime, has unleashed a reign of fear and violence against India's 200 million strong Muslim community. Mob lynching by cow vigilantes; frequent pogroms, such as the one in New Delhi last year; discriminatory citizenship laws to purge India of Muslims; and a campaign to destroy mosques across India and obliterate its Muslim heritage and history, are all part of this criminal enterprise.

New Delhi has also embarked on what it ominously calls the "final solution" for the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. It has undertaken:

- a series of illegal and unilateral measures in Occupied Jammu and Kashmir since 5th August 2019;
- it has unleashed a reign of terror by an occupation force of 900,000;
- it has jailed senior Kashmiri leadership;
- imposed a clampdown on media and internet;
- violently suppressed peaceful protests;
- abducted 13,000 young Kashmiris and tortured hundreds of them;
- it has extra-judicially killed hundreds of innocent Kashmiris in fake "encounters"; and
- imposed collective punishments by destroying entire neighbourhoods and villages.

We have unveiled a detailed dossier on gross and systematic violations of human rights by the Indian Security Forces in Occupied Jammu and Kashmir.

This repression is accompanied by illegal efforts to change the demographic structure of the occupied territory, and transform it from a Muslim majority into a Muslim minority.

Indian actions violate the resolutions of the UN Security Council on Jammu and Kashmir. The resolutions clearly prescribe that the “final disposition” of the disputed territory should be decided by its people, through a free and impartial plebiscite held under the UN auspices.

India’s actions in Occupied Jammu and Kashmir also violate International Human Rights and Humanitarian Laws, including the 4th Geneva Convention, and amount to “war crimes” and “crimes against humanity.”

It is unfortunate, very unfortunate, that the world’s approach to violations of human rights lacks even-handedness, and even is selective. Geopolitical considerations, or corporate interests, commercial interests often compel major powers to overlook the transgressions of their “affiliated” countries.

Such double standards are the most glaring in case of India, where this RSS-BJP regime is being allowed to get away with human rights abuses with complete impunity.

The most recent example of Indian barbarity was the forcible snatching of the mortal remains of the great Kashmiri leader, Syed Ali Shah Geelani, from his family, denying him a proper Islamic funeral and burial, in accordance with his wishes and Muslim traditions.

Devoid of any legal or moral sanction, this action was even against the basic norms of human decency. I call on this General Assembly to demand that Syed Geelani’s mortal remains be allowed to be buried in the “cemetery of martyrs” with the appropriate Islamic rites.

Mr. President,

Pakistan desires peace with India, as with all its neighbours. But sustainable peace in South Asia is contingent upon resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute, in accordance with the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, and the wishes of the Kashmiri people.

Last February, we reaffirmed the 2003 ceasefire understanding along the Line of Control. The hope was that it would lead to a rethink of the strategy in New Delhi. Sadly, the BJP government has intensified repression in Kashmir and continues to vitiate the environment by these barbaric acts.

The onus remains on India to create a conducive environment for meaningful and result-oriented engagement with Pakistan. And for that, it must do:

One, reverse its unilateral and illegal measures instituted since 5th August 2019;

Two, stop its oppression and human rights violations against the people of Kashmir; and

Three, halt and reverse the demographic changes in the occupied territory.

It is also essential to prevent another conflict between Pakistan and India. India's military build-up, development of advanced nuclear weapons, and acquisition of destabilising conventional capabilities, can erode mutual deterrence between the two countries.

And now Mr. President, I want to talk about Afghanistan. For the current situation in Afghanistan, for some reason, Pakistan has been blamed for the turn of events, by politicians in the United States and some politicians in Europe.

From this platform, I want them all to know, the country that suffered the most, apart from Afghanistan, was Pakistan, when we joined the US War on Terror after 9/11.

80,000 Pakistanis died. \$150 billion dollars were lost to our economy. There were 3.5 million internally displaced Pakistanis. And why did this happen? In the 1980s, Pakistan was a front-line state in fighting against the occupation of Afghanistan. Pakistan and the United States trained Mujahideen groups to fight for the liberation of Afghanistan. Amongst those Mujahideen groups was Al-Qaeda, various groups from all over the world. There were Mujahideen, Afghan Mujahideen. These were considered heroes.

President Ronald Regan invited them to the White House in 1983. And according to a news item, he compared them to the founding fathers of the United States. They were heroes.

Come 1989, the Soviets leave, and so do the Americans - abandoning Afghanistan. Pakistan was left with 5 million Afghan refugees. We were left with sectarian militant groups which never existed before. But the worse cut of it was, that a year later Pakistan was sanctioned by the US. We felt used.

Fast forward 9/11, Pakistan is needed again by the US, because now the US-led coalition was invading Afghanistan, and it could not happen without Pakistan providing all the logistical support.

What happened after that?

The same Mujahideen that we had trained, that fighting foreign occupation was a sacred duty, a holy war or jihad, turned against us.

We were called collaborators.

They declared jihad on us. Then all along the tribal belt bordering Afghanistan - Pakistan's semi-autonomous tribal belt - where no Pakistan army had been there since our independence, they had strong sympathies with the Afghan Taliban, not because of their religious ideology but because of Pashtun nationalism, which is very strong. Then there are three million Afghan refugees still in Pakistan all Pashtoos, living in the camps.

500,000 in the biggest camp, 100,000 camps. They all had affinity and sympathy with the Afghan Taliban.

So, what happened? They too turned against Pakistan. For the first time, we had militant Taliban in Pakistan. And they too attacked the Government of Pakistan. When our Army went into the tribal areas first time in our history - whenever an army goes into the civilian areas, there is collateral damage - so, there was collateral damage, which multiplied the militants to seek revenge. But not just that. The world must know that in Pakistan there were 480 drone attacks conducted by the US. And we all know that the drone attacks are not that precise. They cause more collateral damage than the militants they are targeting.

So, people whose relatives had been killed sought revenge against Pakistan. Between 2004 and 2014, there were 50 different militant groups attacking the State of Pakistan.

At one point, people, people like us were worried, that will we survive this? There were bombs going all over Pakistan. Our capital was like a fortress.

Had it not been for one of the most disciplined army in the world and one of the best intelligence agencies in the world, I think Pakistan would have gone down.

So, when we hear this at the end. There is a lot of worry in the US about taking care of the interpreters and everyone who helped the US.

What about us?

The only reason we suffered so much was because we became an ally of the US - of the Coalition - in the war in Afghanistan. There were attacks being conducted from the Afghan soil into Pakistan. At least there should have been a word of appreciation. But rather than appreciation, imagine how we feel when we are blamed for the turn of events in Afghanistan.

After 2006, it became apparent to everyone who understood Afghanistan and its history that there would be no military solution in Afghanistan. I went to the US, I spoke to thinktanks, I met the then Senator Biden, Senator John Kerry, Senator Harry Reid - I tried to explain to them that there would not be any military solution, and political settlement was the way forward. No one understood then.

And unfortunately, in trying to force a military solution is where the US went wrong. And if today, the world needs to know why the Taliban are back in power, all the world has to do is to do a deep analysis of why a 300,000 well-equipped Afghan army - and remember Afghans are one of the bravest nations on earth - gave up without a fight.

The moment a deep analysis of this is done, the world would know why the Taliban came back to power and it is not because of Pakistan.

Mr. President,

Right now the whole international community should think what is the way ahead. There are two paths that we can take. If we neglect Afghanistan right now, according to the UN half the people of Afghanistan are already vulnerable, and by next year almost 90% of the people in Afghanistan will go below the poverty line. There is a huge humanitarian crisis looming ahead. And this will have serious repercussions not just for the neighbours of Afghanistan but everywhere. A destabilized, chaotic Afghanistan will again become a safe haven for international terrorists - the reason why the US came to Afghanistan in the first place.

Therefore, there is only one way to go. We must strengthen and stabilize the current government, for the sake of the people of Afghanistan.

What have the Taliban promised?

They will respect human rights.

They will have an inclusive government.

They will not allow their soil to be used by terrorists.

And they have given amnesty.

If the world community incentivises them, and encourages them to walk this talk, it will be a win-win situation for everyone. Because these are the four conditions that the US-Taliban dialogue in Doha was all about.

If the world can incentivise them to go this direction, then after all this twenty-year presence of the coalition forces in Afghanistan would not be wasted. Because the Afghan soil would not be used by the international terrorists.

I end Mr. President, by urging everyone that this is a critical time for Afghanistan.

You cannot waste time. Help is needed there. Humanitarian assistance has to be given there immediately. The Secretary General of the United Nations has taken bold steps. I urge you to mobilize the international community, and move in this direction.

Thank you.

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