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Editor's Note

The *Journal of Contemporary Studies* is a flagship publication of the Faculty of Contemporary Studies (FCS), National Defence University (NDU), Islamabad. The journal offers its readers in academia, government and the policymaking world in-depth and scholarly analyses, diverse policy perspectives on important contemporary issues, and ongoing debates in national and international security, public policy and the broader field of world politics.

This journal issue comprises nine articles, two book reviews and four documents providing valuable primary information on significant international developments. The first article, *Economic Diplomacy in Africa: Options and Opportunities for Pakistan* by Sadia Sulaiman examines Pakistan's 'Look Africa Policy' that denotes a policy shift prioritising geo-economic goals in the African region. It argues that Pakistan requires active diplomatic engagement at public and private levels both to boost trade and economic relationships with the African region

The second article, *National Interest: Perspectives and Practices* by Ehsan Mehmood revisits the concept and context of national interest and dissects various facets of national interest through the lens of IR, and security studies. The author identifies and discusses interplay of factors that are under debate. These include the interplay of power and morality, the permanency of national interests, the interaction between national and public interests, the process of interest adjudication, the Islamic perspective and the growing power of the non-state actors.

The third article, *Threats from Climate Change to the Military Security of Pakistan* by Faraz Haider and Adil Sultan, examines the nexus between climate change and military security, which is essentially missing in Pakistan's security discourse. It argues that climate change, especially extreme events threatens Pakistan's overall military readiness. Threats are more potent in strategically significant locations (Siachen, Sindh, and Punjab) which house important forward military bases. It provides actionable recommendations to address the emerging climatic threat to military security.

The fourth article, *Addressing Cyber Vulnerabilities through Deterrence* by Nida Shahid and Ahmad Khan analyses the possible responses to cyber-attacks through cyberspace deterrence. It argues that in the absence of a punishment model, as found in the nuclear domain, the efficacy of cyber deterrence is limited. The authors suggest response options based on a model of punishment similar to the traditional model of nuclear deterrence. A model of punishment based on attribution in

response to cyber-attacks is a necessary consideration for assured destruction.

The fifth article *Climate Change and Migration: New Challenges to Global South* by *Erum Muzaffar* explores the causes of climate-induced migration and its impact on developing countries. It argues that climate change disasters are a major cause of population displacement. It suggests that Global South requires a new framework for managing potential displacement. They also need to collaborate and work on mitigation, adaptation, and risk reduction strategies at national and regional levels.

The sixth article, *Quad: A Recipe for Confrontation or Stability?* by *Muhammad Sheharyar Khan* and *Dost Muhammad Barrech*, traces the foundations of the Quad and the perceived threat from China's fast-growing influence. The authors examine the Quad's designs and actions and quote the likely two outcomes: stability or confrontation. They foresee this group's existence and actions leading to a confrontation rather than stability in the region.

The seventh article, *Socio-Economic Disparities and National Security of Pakistan* by *Tariq Niaz*, examines emerging socio-economic disparities as a looming threat to Pakistan which, the National Security Policy (NSP) 2022-2026 also rightly brings forth. It concludes that only a comprehensive approach towards national security can prepare Pakistan for the challenges ahead.

The eighth article, *Gender and Leadership Response in Covid-19* by *Aroobah Lak* and *Tasawar Hussain* discusses the intersection of politics and leadership in response to the covid-19 pandemic. The authors enlist 'essential gender identities', power hierarchies and social identities that come into play which hinder a gender neutral leadership responses in a high stake bio-security crisis at a global level. They argue the emerging narrative attached to the female leadership success in the first wave of Covid-19.

The last article, *State of Indian Democracy and U.S.-India Strategic Cooperation: An Uneasy Convergence?* by *Humayun Javed* and *Ameer Abdullah Khan* contextualizes US strategic convergences in a bid to balance China. The authors cite the authoritarian Modi's India as a weak link in the Joe Biden administration's promotion of liberal democratic values as its agenda. It also hinders US designs to bring similar minded democracies together to contest China on Human Rights violations. They question the nature of US-India strategic convergence.

I am grateful to all the contributors who have sent their articles for this issue and the anonymous peer-reviewers whose valuable comments helped authors to improve their contributions. We are accepting articles for the upcoming Journal of Contemporary Studies issue based on original qualitative or quantitative research, an innovative conceptual framework or a substantial literature review that opens new areas of inquiry and investigation. The editorial team at the Journal promotes submissions

from expert analysts from around the world. The Journal seeks to promote a scholarly understanding of contemporary issues about traditional and non-traditional security, peace studies, public policy and human resource development. It intends to stimulate interdisciplinary research and writing.

Editor
Dr. Shaheen Akhtar

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ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY IN AFRICA: OPTIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR PAKISTAN

Sadia Sulaiman*

Abstract

Pakistan's paradigm shift in foreign policy to geo-economics, necessitates that Islamabad look for opportunities within and outside the region to utilise its geographic and economic potential. This new policy shift makes the African region a key area of significance for Pakistan, owing to the huge trade and market potential of the region. The adoption of 'Look Africa Policy' by Pakistan is a key step. This paper aims to explore the options and opportunities for Pakistan in the African region. It analyses these opportunities and associated challenges in the light of economic diplomacy framework. The paper argues that Pakistan requires active diplomatic engagement at public and private levels both, to boost trade and economic relationship with African region for the mutual economic benefit.

Keywords: *Africa, Economy, Trade, Pakistan, Look Africa Policy, Diplomacy*

Introduction

Africa is a region of huge potential with around 54 countries and inhabited by more than one billion people. Among them 50 percent young population will be under 25 years of age by 2050.¹ The continent as a whole has huge potential being a vibrant and diverse market due to its young population and resource rich geography. Especially the region's natural resource richness further increases its importance in global arena. Despite its huge potential, challenges such as persistent conflict, economic uncertainty, increasing poverty, unemployment, migrations and chronic instability in the region overall have all left the region underdeveloped and marginalized. Amid all these challenges, certain countries' (Kenya, South Africa and Nigeria) impressive rise from conflict and taking a route to development has compelled the

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¹ "World Bank in Africa," World Bank's Regional Overview, January 15, 2022, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/afr/overview>.

world community to explore the immense economic potential of the region. In 2020, the economic activity in the region was badly affected due to Covid-19 pandemic; however, its GDP was projected to grow by 3.4 percent in year 2021.²

With the economy of \$2.4 trillion, the region holds tremendous economic opportunities for Pakistan. However, the region has remained neglected in the foreign and economic policy domains of Pakistan. The total global trade volume of Africa stood at USD 1.075 trillion in 2018 while Pakistan and Africa trade remained stagnant at USD 3 billion.³ In the past few years the policy stakeholders in Pakistan have realized the economic potential of Africa. Especially the recent thrust of Pakistan's security and foreign policy towards "geo-economics" makes it important to further explore the options and opportunities in a promising region like Africa. Recently Pakistan initiated its Look Africa Policy, to harness economic and diplomatic ties between Pakistan and the potential African countries through exploring common economic, trade and security interests. Under this policy, Pakistan looks at multi-dimensional interactions with the region to share its experiences in public sector reforms, technical cooperation, infrastructure development and private investment with the African countries.⁴

In the pursuance of this policy, the government of Pakistan will increase diplomatic presence across Africa which is currently confined to 15 countries only. Pakistan seeks to establish diplomatic missions in six African countries that include Djibouti, Angola, Uganda, Ghana, Rwanda and Ivory Coast. Pakistan also wants to open commercial sections in Kenya, Senegal, Algeria, Nigeria, Ethiopia and Kenya.⁵

It is worth mentioning here that the African countries are equally keen to expand diplomatic and economic ties with Pakistan. In January 2020, the adviser to Prime Minister on Commerce, Industries and Production, Textile and Investment, Abdul Razzak Dawood, exclaimed that African countries were keen to explore the options of use of China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and Gawadar Port to export their items to Central Asia and China.⁶ He also informed that the Central Bank of

² "African Economic Outlook 2021," A Report by African Development Bank Group, January 15, 2022, <https://www.afdb.org/en/knowledge/publications/african-economic-outlook>

³ "Africa Likely to Use Gawadar Port, CPEC to have Access to CARS, China," *The News*, February 3, 2020.

⁴ "Pakistan Envisages 'Engage Africa Policy' for Economic Policy," *The Nation*, December 29, 2020.

⁵ Areeba Arif Khan, "Expanding Diplomatic Footprint: Pakistan and East Africa," Center for Strategic and Contemporary Research, December 2020, <https://cscr.pk/explore/themes/trade-economics/expanding-diplomatic-footprint-pakistan-and-east-africa/>.

⁶ "Africa Likely to Use Gawadar Port."

Kenya allowed the Pakistani Banks to open branches in Africa in order to facilitate the trade between interested countries from Africa to enhance trade relationship with Pakistan.

The mutual desires both on the part of African countries and Pakistan and the recent shift to geo-economics in Pakistan's foreign policy sets the momentum for exploring and exploiting avenues of mutual economic and trade interests. The study aims at exploring and documenting the opportunities for Pakistan in the robust African continent using the analytical framework of economic diplomacy. The study also analyses prevailing challenges that both Pakistan and African countries may face while extending economic cooperation in various spheres. The study primarily relies upon key informant interviews with stakeholders involved in economic diplomacy in the African region and the secondary data, which is scarcely available on the topic under discussion.

Economic Diplomacy: Conceptual Framework

The concept of economic diplomacy is a relatively recent phenomenon that attracted the attention of intellectuals and academics in the 1980s. Much of the focus in the debates on economic diplomacy revolves around the extent to which economic diplomacy is linked with the state and public interests or whether it pertains to a broader range of social actors and interests.⁷ Traditionally, the concept is associated with the key role of state in promotion of its economic interests through various official interactions at the global level. However, in its contemporary connotations, diplomacy is not confined to inter-state relations in an international system, but also involves the social, economic, cultural and political relations among various political, diplomatic, social and economic actors both within domestic and international settings. The role of private and non-state actors such as businessmen, private entrepreneurs, industrialists and diplomats have enhanced in the economic diplomacy of any country. All these actors can equally generate goodwill within the international market to promote a state's economic interests.⁸

The traditional role of diplomats and their diplomacy in the promotion of the state's interests, owing to factors such as familiarity with cultures, language and situation, cannot be denied. But with the changing nature of global interaction in this era of globalization and information revolution the diplomats also need to engage the private sector, civil

⁷ Donna Lee and Brian Hocking, "Economic Diplomacy," in Robert A. Denemark (ed.) *The International Studies Encyclopedia*, vol. II, (Wiley Blackwell: 2010): 1216-1227.

⁸ Dubravko Duby Zirovcic, "Theoretical Principles of Economic Diplomacy," *SSRN*, January 4, 2016, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2710671.

society and various socio-economic actors to promote the state's interests in an adequate manner.⁹ Therefore, there is a need to understand the term economic diplomacy in the context of changing global realities where along with traditional role of state, the role of other economic factors such as business groups, industrialists and relevant institutions are equally important in the promotion of economic interests of a country. Similarly, the role of these stakeholders expands beyond the local markets into regional and global theatres both.

The model of economic diplomacy is not without limitations, as it may face problems of implementation due to the tensions between economics and politics, tensions between the domestic and international interactions and the stress of government's interaction with the non-state actors.¹⁰ Despite its limitations, its viability cannot be underestimated because of the increasing connectivity and crucial interplay of various actors, other than state itself, in the promotion and protection of the national economic interests.

Pakistan's former Foreign Minister, Shah Mehmood Qureshi in one of his speeches iterated that Pakistan has shifted its foreign policy focus to geo-economics. He further stated, "This has made economic diplomacy all the more important."¹¹ The Africa-Pakistan relations under the new Look Africa Policy are primarily driven by the non-state economic actors. These relations can best be understood and framed within the context of economic diplomacy framework. The role of private business entrepreneurs and chambers of commerce cannot be denied in this regard. One important feature of Look Africa Policy is the enhancement of Pakistan's diplomatic missions across Africa and vice versa, hence making it important to evaluate the crucial role of diplomats in economic diplomacy.

Geographic Layout of Africa: Geostrategic and Geo-Economics Significance of the Continent

Africa is the second largest continent in the world that spreads over 30 million km.² The total length of coastlines of this region ranges more than 39,000 kilometers. Africa is bounded to the north by the Mediterranean Sea, to the northeast by the Suez Canal and the Red Sea along the Sinai Peninsula, to the southeast by the Indian Ocean, and to the west by the Atlantic Ocean. The region rich in natural and mineral resources is

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Dr. Usman W. Chohan, "Economic Diplomacy: A Review," Working Paper by Center for Aerospace and Security Studies, February 2021, <https://casstt.com/post/economic-diplomacy-a-review/295>

¹¹ "Pakistan has Shifted its Focus from Geopolitics to Geo-economics: FM Qureshi," *Geo News*, December 14, 2021.

strategically located across the major sea-lanes of the world.¹² In terms of population, it is the second most populous continent. An additional leverage comes in the form of natural resources where it has 10 percent of the world's proven oil reserves, and approximately eight percent of proven gas reserves, making it extremely promising for the world economy overall. In terms of mineral resources, it possesses "60 percent of world's diamonds, 40 percent of phosphate, and 30 percent of cobalt."¹³

The region is further classified into five sub-regions: North Africa, East Africa, Central Africa, West Africa and Southern Africa. All these sub-regions have attracted significant attention by major European powers in the 19th century. Almost the entire African continent remained as a colony of various European states. During the Cold War era the region remained important due to de-colonization movements. In most contemporary contexts, the Chinese and American growing presence and interest in various African states make the region a focal point in global power jockeying.¹⁴ For example, the Chinese demands for minerals, and Chinese and American oil investment led Africa to 5.2 percent economic growth in 2005. Similarly, the US also increased its engagement with Africa. It enhanced its trade with Africa by 37 percent in 2004. In fact, Chinese and American trade and investment initiatives have driven Africa to the center of the global energy and security politics.¹⁵

African population is another source of its strength as its population provides a vast pool of potential consumers and clients. Most importantly, the middle class in Africa is increasing which was 355 million people in 2010. The middle class population is expected to reach approximately 1.1 billion by 2060.¹⁶ Its increasing middle class is reflective of the region's

¹² "The Geostrategic Importance of Africa's Maritime Domain: Opportunities and Challenges," Africa Maritime Safety and Security towards Economic Prosperity Conference Stuttgart, Germany, October 13-14, 2010.

¹³ Jennifer Giroux, "Africa's Growing Strategic Relevance," *Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich* 3, no. 38 (2008).

¹⁴ Earl Conteh-Morgan, "Strategies of Sino-American Rivalry in Africa: From 2000 to COVID-19," *Vestnik RUDN, International Relations* 21, no. 2 (2021): 265-278.

¹⁵ Padraig R. Carmody, Francis Y. Owusu, "Competing Hegemons? Chinese versus American Geo-Economic Strategies in Africa," *Political Geography* 26 (2007) 504-524, doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2007.03.005

¹⁶ Rama Yade, "Africa is America's Greatest Geopolitical Opportunity: Does the US Know it?" The Atlantic Council, May 2021, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/africa-is-americas-greatest-geopolitical-opportunity-does-the-us-know-it/>.

adherence to positive tendencies like economic stability, culture of salaried jobs and economic growth.¹⁷

Africa, along with some of the world's fastest growing economies and populations sits at the intersection of international commerce and is adjacent to critical sea lines of communication¹⁸. Almost 38 African countries are either coastal states or islands and the remaining are landlocked.¹⁹ This makes the region further important. For instance, since 1869 opening of the Suez Canal, the Horn of Africa region provides linkages through sea routes to Mediterranean, Middle East and Indian Ocean regions. Similarly, around 10 to 20 percent of global trade, including over 6 million barrels of oil per day, "reportedly transits along the Horn's shores. This makes the region a key geostrategic hub for countries all across the world."²⁰

For Pakistan the region is both geo-strategically and geo-economically important. For instance, the CPEC project in general and the Gwadar Sea port, in particular, offers major opportunities to the African region for expanding its trade through Pakistan into the neighbouring region of Central Asia. The distance from Gwadar Sea port to Somalia's Mogadishu sea port is around 1900 nautical miles, which makes Somalia a gateway for Pakistan in its trade with Africa, along with offering Africa opportunities to expand their trade with China and Central Asia.²¹ Similarly, Kenya and China both are interested in further integration of the Port of Mombasa with China's Belt and Road Initiative specifically linking the port to the Gwadar Port in Pakistan.²² Overall Pakistan's Gwadar Port not only provides a golden opportunity to China-Pakistan to enhance their bilateral trade; but also the port's strategic location offers huge opportunities for Africa as well.

¹⁷ "Africa's Middle Class Triples to more than 310m over Past 30 Years due to Economic Growth and Rising Job Culture," African Development Bank Group, May 10, 2011, <https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/>

¹⁸ Randle Steinbeck, "US Forces in Africa," Harvard Model Congress, 2021, <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/>

¹⁹ "The Geo-Strategic Importance of Africa's Maritime Domain."

²⁰ Guido Lanfranchi, "Geopolitics Meets Local Politics in the Horn of Africa," Analysis – Conflict and Fragility, Clingendael Spectator, December 2021, <https://spectator.clingendael.org/en/publication/geopolitics-meets-local-politics-horn-africa>.

²¹ "Somali Port Cities can Act as Gateway to Africa for Potential Trade via Gwadar: PM," *Associated Press of Pakistan*, December 1, 2017.

²² Eric Olander, "Chinese Ambassador to Kenya Wants to Integrate the Port of Mombasa Into Overland Trade Routes in Asia," *The Chinaafrica Project*, November 1, 2021, <https://chinaafricaproject.com/2021/11/01/chinese-ambassador-to-kenya-wants-to-integrate-the-port-of-mombasa-into-overland-trade-routes-in-asia/>.

Similarly, the African region can be a potential market for the sports goods, medicines and dry fruits from Pakistan. The region's growing population and elevating socio-economic status provides an appropriate momentum for Pakistan to enter into the African market and explore the opportunities of trade and economic engagement with various countries of the region.

Historical Overview of Pakistan-Africa Relationship

Pakistan's relations with the African continent can be traced back to the time of independence when the whole world was going through the phase of decolonization. Post-1947, Pakistan always supported various countries in their struggle for independence such as Algeria, Kenya, Sudan, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Tanzania, Namibia, Morocco, Libya, Egypt, and Nigeria.²³ That resulted in a general goodwill for Pakistan among the African countries and paved the way for long-lasting political relationship. The political ties between various African countries and Pakistan have been based on cardinality, warmth, mutual trust and understanding.²⁴ Pakistan extended principle support for the struggle of self-determination and the independence of the people of Africa and steadfastly stood with them in their freedom struggles and movements against colonialism and apartheid in the 1950s and 1960s. The African countries, especially those which received support from Pakistan in their freedom struggle, are very close to Pakistan and consider Pakistan as a promising land.

Pakistan has also helped the African countries through its participation in the United Nations' (UN) peacekeeping missions, which has created a positive image of the country and its people among its African counter parts. Pakistan started its peacekeeping mission in Congo in 1960.²⁵ Even today, Pakistan's peacekeepers are deployed in Congo, Central African Republic, South Sudan, Darfur, Somalia, Western Sahara, Mali, Abyei and Cyprus.²⁶ Several Pakistani soldiers have lost their lives while serving in the African continent. In June 1993, Pakistani soldiers performed the daunting task of rescuing and evacuating American soldiers who were trapped by Somali rebels, subsequently killing 24 Pakistani peacekeepers.

In terms of economic ties, Pakistan could not take advantage of the economic potential of the African region as a whole despite the general

²³ Rukhsana A. Siddiqui, "Pakistan-Africa Relations: Appraisal and Future Prospects," *Pakistan Politico*, February 7, 2019.

²⁴ Ambassador Tajammul Altaf, interviewed by the author, Islamabad, January 24, 2022.

²⁵ Anwar Iqbal, "Pakistan Maintains its Contributions to UN Peacekeeping," *Dawn*, February 11, 2021.

²⁶ Zeeshan Ahmad, "Green, White and Blue: Pakistan on the Frontlines of UN Peacekeeping," *The Express Tribune*, February 16, 2020

goodwill that it enjoyed among the African people and governments alike. There were sporadic efforts in the past to cultivate better economic and trade relationships. For instance, several trade delegations and diplomatic missions paid a visit to Pakistan to enhance trade and economic cooperation. A five members Kenyan trade mission led by L. M. Kabetu, Director of Trade and Supplies in the Ministry of Commerce, visited Pakistan in 1973 to promote trade and economic collaboration between Pakistan and Kenya. In the same year, delegations from Somalia and Mauritius visited Pakistan to maximize economic engagement. In 1973 the President of Congo, Mr. Ngouabi, and Dr. Okoi Arikpo, Nigeria's Commissioner for External Affairs, also came to Pakistan intending to cooperation in the economic field.²⁷ In the past two decades, 47 African countries have sent around 1500 students to study in Pakistan which further highlights the positive image of Pakistan and hence can be utilized to improve the relations in the economic sphere.

Pakistan needs to further build on that positive image and pursue mutually beneficial economic policies that would not only add to the economic potential of Pakistan but help stabilize the situation on African continent as a whole. In this regard, Pakistan's recent initiative referred to as Look Africa Policy needs special attention and is explained in the following section.

Pakistan's Focus on Geo-economics and Look Africa Policy

The 2022 National Security Policy of Pakistan gives a geo-economic dimension to the foreign policy of Pakistan. This new focus on geo-economics means that Pakistan maximizes its economic engagement across the world through maximum utilization of the unique geographic advantage that the country has bordering South, Central and West Asia at the same time. Within this new focus on geo-economics, the African region offers multiple opportunities for Pakistan. The government of Pakistan is equally keen to enhance cooperation with African nations through its Look Africa Policy initiative. The policy also known as 'Engage Africa Initiative' was launched by Ministry of Commerce in August 2017.²⁸

According to the Ministry of Commerce, the policy is aimed at increasing trade and economic activities through enhanced diplomatic presence, participation in trade fairs and emphasis upon bilateral and multilateral negotiations to increase trade ties in particular and economic

²⁷ Mehrunnisa H. Iqbal, "Pakistan's Relations with Africa and Latin America," *Pakistan Horizon* 27, no. 2 (Second Quarter, 1974): 57-61.

²⁸ "Look Africa Policy Initiative," Ministry of Commerce, Government of Pakistan, January 30, 2022, <https://www.commerce.gov.pk/look-africa-policy/>

ties in general between African continent and Pakistan.²⁹ The policy further put emphasis on organization of Look Africa Trade Forums in major cities in Pakistan to create awareness among the private sector about diverse economic and trade opportunities across the African continent.³⁰ Under the stated goal of the policy, it has been further decided to draw back two percent additional duty on selected items exports to Africa.³¹

This policy initiative focuses on the top ten economies of Africa which comprise 78 percent of the total GDP of Africa as per 2017-18 figures. These countries for trade promotion include: Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa, Morocco, Senegal, Algeria, Egypt, Sudan, Tanzania, and Ethiopia.³² Pakistan, is also negotiating preferential trade agreements (PTA) with some African trading blocs. According to the Ministry of Commerce, these blocs include the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), which includes countries of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland. Pakistan further wants to have a preferential trade agreement with Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda which are part of the East African Community (EAC). Similarly, Pakistan will have a similar arrangement with Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) countries including Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togolese.³³

There has been considerable progress in the pursuit of the goals of the Look Africa Policy since its inception in 2017. According to the Ministry of Commerce, Pakistan-Africa trade which remained stagnant at US\$ 3 billion for the last few years has crossed the mark of US \$4 billion in the year 2019-20.³⁴ This increase is the result of the adopted policy and relevant conferences like 'Pakistan-Africa Trade Development Conference' held in Nairobi in January 2020 to enhance trade and cooperation.

Similarly, six trade wings have been opened in Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan and Tanzania recently, where local people have been appointed as trade development officers with no resident missions. They work under the supervision of an accredited ambassador and are responsible for the trade and development activities.³⁵ In this regard, Pakistan Ministry of Commerce hosted some significant events in the African continent. It hosted Pak-Africa Trade Development Conference in

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid. "Pakistan's Trade with Africa Reaches \$4.18bn in 2020: Razak Dawood," *The Nation*, December 27, 2020.

³⁵ Mian Nasser Hayatt Maggo, Interviewed by author in Islamabad, December 5, 2021.

Nairobi, Kenya with the objective of multiplying the trade opportunities between the African continent and Pakistan. Around 500 delegates participated in the conference including executives of over 100 leading Pakistani companies, Pakistan's trade and foreign ministers, government officials as well as business people and investors from African states.³⁶

Since the inception of the Look Africa Policy there has been a significant increase in trade ties with various African countries. For example, adviser to former Prime Minister on Commerce and Investment Abdul Razak Dawood stated in a press conference that exports to Kenya increased to US\$ 289.3 million in 2019-20, which has been nine percent high ratio despite challenges associated with the Covid-19 pandemic. He also claimed an increase in trade with Tanzania, which according to him reached US \$ 194.58 million in 2019-20, as compared to US \$ 136.52 million in 2018-19.³⁷

Within that context, Pakistan participated in International Trade Fair in Khartoum in January 2021. This participation has opened up new avenues for trade and economic cooperation between Pakistan and Sudan. The event generated business of around \$2 million. Deals worth \$3m are under process between the Pakistani exporters and Sudanese buyers.³⁸ Similarly second PATDC was organized in Lagos, Nigeria to improve Pakistan trade ties with ECOWAS. Abdul Razak Dawood led a delegation of 232 members comprising businessmen and government officials. From the Nigerian side the Governor Lagos State, Federal Minister for Industry, Trade & Investment Minister of Information and Culture Minister of Special Duties & Intergovernmental Affairs and senior officials from Standards Organization Nigeria, National Agency for Food & Drug Administration, Nigerian Investment Commission and other officials attended the conference.³⁹ However, the policy is not without challenges as highlighted in the following section.

Challenges of Cooperation between Africa and Pakistan

Lack of Policy Orientation

The main reason behind low trade between Pakistan and Africa is the lack of prioritization in Pakistan's policies, which is now addressed through Look Africa Policy. In this regard, Pakistan and African

³⁶ Andrew Wasike, "Pakistan-Africa Trade Conference Kicks off in Nairobi," *Anadolu Agency*, January 30, 2020, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/pakistan-africa-trade-conference-kicks-off-in-nairobi/1719269>.

³⁷ "Pakistan's Trade with Africa Reaches \$4.18bn in 2020: Razak Dawood."

³⁸ "Look Africa Policy Yields \$5m Order from Sudan," *Dawn*, January 31, 2021.

³⁹ "2 Pakistan-Africa Trade Moot Begins at Lagos," *The Business Recorder*, November 24, 2021, <https://www.brecorder.com/news/40135452/2nd-pakistan-africa-trade-moot-begins-at-lagos>.

counterparts are keen to take certain steps. For example, Pakistan views its diplomatic presence crucial in the pursuit of its economic and trade interests in the region and hence is taking steps to increase the diplomatic presence of Pakistan in the African continent by establishing diplomatic in six African countries including Djibouti, Angola, Rwanda, Uganda, Ghana and Ivory Coast. Commercial sections in Algeria, Ethiopia, Senegal, Nigeria and Kenya will be opening soon.⁴⁰ These steps will help in enhancing the engagement with Africa; however, the plan needs to be materialized on priority basis.

This problem of lack of policy orientation towards Africa was evident in the history, where the major focus of attention had been the ties with the major powers. It is equally true that the biggest challenge in enhancing cooperation with Africa is Pakistan's little diplomatic presence on the continent. Pakistan has only 15 resident missions in Africa while relations with rest of the African countries are maintained through accredited missions. Indeed, the challenges Pakistan faces in entering the African market are more internal than external. The government and private sector does not seem to show much interest in Africa, hence the lack of trade and economic ties.⁴¹

Pakistan's Economic Problems at Domestic Front

Secondly, Pakistan faces several crucial challenges on the economic front which is another reason limiting its outreach towards African countries. Pakistan needs to broaden its export base drastically to capture significant position in the African markets. However, the domestic economic situation, especially the energy crisis, lack of technology and resources and little presence in the international markets are some of the challenges which may hamper Pakistan-Africa trade. The diversification of trade would require Pakistan to not only have a robust economic diplomacy in Africa but to address the above mentioned issues on priority basis. For example, Pakistan's energy crisis issue is a major obstacle in increasing exports. The long hours of energy outage have resulted in the slow pace of production or closure of industries. The Chairman of All Pakistan Textile Mills Association, Abdul Rahim Nasir, while explaining the effect of electricity outages on textile industries stated that the industries were unable to meet the deadlines of order delivery, which was hampering their position in the international market.⁴² The government of Pakistan

⁴⁰ Areeba Arif Khan, "Expanding Diplomatic Footprint: Pakistan and East Africa," *Center for Strategic and Contemporary Research*, December 23, 2020, <https://cscr.pk/explore/themes/trade-economics/expanding-diplomatic-footprint-pakistan-and-east-africa/>; "Pakistan's Trade with Africa Reaches \$4.18bn in 2020: Razak Dawood."

⁴¹ Farzana Yaqoob, Interviewed by author in Islamabad, November 24, 2021.

⁴² "Electricity, Gas Crisis Batter Textile Outputs," *The Express Tribune*, December 17, 2021.

wants to enhance ties with the region, however, it does not have enough means to help and assist poor African countries that need financial aid and assistance and loans.⁴³ Pakistan's economic crisis due to debt burden may be a reason for a sluggish approach towards African market.

Geographic Constraints

Transportation and connectivity are two core components of the international trade. To maximize trade profit it is important to use efficient means of transportation and communication that minimizes the distance. In the international trade, shipping industry has a significant share as more than 80 percent of world trade takes place via sea lanes. Pakistan under its blue economy policy is working on improving its shipping and marine industry. The construction of Gwadar port as part of CPEC is yet another milestone in the direction of improving trade relations with the world overall. However, the long geographic distance from African region will require a proactive policy on the part of Pakistan to engage in trade and economic diplomacy through improving its shipping industry. The Chairman of The Federation of Pakistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry (FPCCI) in his interview explained that the power cost of production as well as cost of transportation to Africa is significantly higher than other countries because of shipping freight cost, which makes it a significant challenge in exploring economic avenues in the African region.⁴⁴

In Pakistan, Ministry of Ports and Shipping, established in 2004, act as the central administrative authority to facilitate the ports and shipping industry. It works through policy guideline for port and shipping development, in addition to ensure safety standards as per International Maritime Organization (IMO) for Pakistani seafarers.⁴⁵ Pakistan's Blue economy policy focuses on improving its economic growth through maritime trade and exploiting the resources in coastline of Pakistan. In this regard, the shipping industry of Pakistan acquires great importance.⁴⁶ As part of promoting Blue Economy the government has taken several steps to encourage the private sector to invest in the shipping industry including "reduction in gross tonnage tax, first berthing right to flag carriers, acceptance of freight charges in Pakistani rupees along with US

⁴³ Aminah Khan, Interviewed by Sadia Sulaiman, Islamabad, November 10, 2021.

⁴⁴ Mian Nasser Hayatt Maggo, Interviewed by the author.

⁴⁵ Tuba Azeem, "Pakistan's Maritime Sector: Contemporary Challenges with Special Reference to Legal Implications," CSCR Report, January 2017, <https://cscr.pk/explore/themes/trade-economics/>

⁴⁶ Ayesha Zafar, "Untapped Blue Economy of Pakistan," Paradigm Shift, February 14, 2022, <https://www.paradigmshift.com.pk/blue-economy-of-pakistan/>.

dollars, Long Term Finance Facility, and other fiscal incentives.”⁴⁷ However, it may take some time for the private sector and government to improve the conditions of shipping industry in order to extend its outreach in African market.

Market Competition in African Continent

Present day rising Africa will benefit immensely from the African Continental Free Trade Area (AFCFTA) signed in 2020. This agreement has the potential to create a borderless single trade unit in African continent and generate better indigenous manufacturing opportunities. In 2015, Africa had just six cities with more than 5 million citizens and this number will swell to 17 in 2030. The process is already under way with 24 million Africans moving to the cities each year.⁴⁸ This potential of African market has given rise to an international competition there, where countries like US, India and China are competing with each other. For Pakistan, it will be a challenge to make inroads in the African markets especially in the presence of significant US, Chinese and Indian presence in the region. During 2006-2016, China became the largest partner of Africa where China’s imports increased by 233 percent while its exports increased by 53 percent.⁴⁹

There are certain plus points of Chinese approach towards Africa, such as consistency in policy, generous economic aid and assistance, its huge technological capacity and abundant resources. In comparison, Indian strategic advantage in Africa emanates from their historical ties, shared colonial experiences, historical legacy of leaders like Mahatma Gandhi and Nehru in Africa, common cultural orientation inspired by Indian soft power, presence of Indian diaspora in Africa, and Indian presence in the market of Africa especially in IT industry and pharmaceutical industries.⁵⁰

Africa’s Economic and Political Fragility

The African Continental Free Trade Area brings together 1.3

⁴⁷ Afrasiyab Gul and Vice Admiral (R) Khawar Ali Shah, “Policy Insights to Maritime Economy in Pakistan,” PIDE Policy Viewpoint, 2021, <https://pide.org.pk/research/policy-insights-to-maritime-economy-in-pakistan/>.

⁴⁸ “Is China Squeezing out India from Resurgent African Market,” The Pioneer, December 12, 2021, <https://www.dailypioneer.com/2021/sunday-edition/is-china-squeezing-out-india-from-resurgent-african-market.html>.

⁴⁹ Landry Signe, “US Trade and Investment in Africa,” Testimony by Brookings, July, 2021, <https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/us-trade-and-investment-in-africa/>

⁵⁰ Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “China Looks to Dominate Africa unlike India’s Partnership based on Equality: New Book,” *The Economic Times*, January 15, 2022, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/>

billion people in a US \$3.4 trillion economic bloc that will be the largest free trade area since the establishment of the World Trade Organization. Historic challenges including Africa's poor road and rail links, political unrest, excessive border bureaucracy and petty corruption will not disappear overnight.⁵¹

Besides several business entrepreneurs face challenges such as fraud in the African markets, inefficient shipping and delivery, and conversion of foreign exchange rates. There are also certain logistical challenges present in many African countries, "including difficulties in customs, fragmented retail markets, low urbanization rates, and long dwell times in ports."⁵² For instance, Ethiopia is the largest landlocked country in African continent and its lack of logistical facilities has hugely affected its economy. Ethiopia could not get access to the sea after the independence of Eritrea. The lack of infrastructural facilities was a prime reason due to which it was challenging to deliver goods to the markets for public consumption. Hardly 15 percent of the Ethiopian population could benefit of the goods reaching in markets thus affecting its overall trade opportunities.⁵³ This problem is widespread across Africa, where the lack of infrastructural and logistical facilities connecting various African states is not only meagre but poor as well. Moreover, the problem exists inside the African states where rural areas have connectivity issues with trade and urban centers.⁵⁴

Future Way Out

Proactive Economic Diplomacy

To increase the trade volume Pakistan has to engage the countries of the continent. There is a dire need to organise government to government and business to business meetings to establish understanding among the people of the two sides. Pakistan must exploit all the opportunities offered by the resource rich countries of Africa and its emerging markets. Pakistan must diversify its exports to the continent besides traditional exports like pharmaceutical, surgery equipment, foods, sports goods, rice etc. Until and unless we do not know about the African

⁵¹ Joe Bavier, "African Free Trade Bloc Opens for Business, but Challenges Remain," World Economic Forum Report, January 5, 2021, <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2021/01/african-free-trade-bloc-business-challenges>.

⁵² "Boosting Trade and Development by Tackling Africa's Supply Chain Challenges," Wilson Center Event Report, November 2017, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/boosting-trade-and-development-tackling-africas-supply-chain-challenges>.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ambassador Tajammul Altaf, Interviewed by the author in Islamabad, January 24, 2022.

culture, their fashion, and most importantly the increasing demands for specific products we cannot boost economic relations with them. Therefore, Area Studies departments of renowned universities of Pakistan must increase its research about Africa to explore more about the continent.

Diversification of Trade in Africa

Pakistan is endowed with mineral resources and agrarian land, which adds to its trade potential for exporting fruits, rice, gems, cotton and garments to the international community including African region. There is a need to broaden and diversify the exports to Africa. The key requirement in this regard is to conduct need assessment studies and surveys about various African countries about their market demands. Pakistan should involve the African diplomatic missions to get maximum knowledge about their market conditions and demands. In this regard, the Chambers of Commerce and Industries in various cities can play crucial role through engaging with the diplomatic missions in Pakistan and also by personally visiting the region for assessing market demands.

Pakistan's pharmaceutical companies also have opportunities to work with African counterparts. The Pharmaceutical Export Promotion Committee of Pakistan has already started working on production and export of medicines and medical products to African countries like Kenya, Rwanda, Ivory Coast and Djibouti.⁵⁵ In the post-Covid-19 scenario, it is an additional field where both the Pakistan and African countries can work together. Most importantly, Pakistan needs to conduct some country-wise assessment surveys to identify countries with trade potential.⁵⁶

Showcasing CPEC and Gwadar Port

The Gwadar port is usually referred to as the Jewel of the CPEC crown. Its strategic location has already attracted a lot of worldwide attention. As stated earlier, the African countries are equally keen to exploit the potential of Gwadar port for their connectivity with Chinese and Central Asian markets. Keeping in view the geo-economic focus in Pakistan's foreign policy, it needs to improve the facilities in strategically located Gwadar port in order to improve trade with Africa. China under BRI project is working on several link roads within East Africa and sea line connections to revive the ancient Silk Road. From Pakistan's perspective a corridor that connects Walvis Bay to Chinese port clusters in Mozambique, Tanzania, and Kenya, and linking them with Gwadar becomes important.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ Areeba Arif Khan, "Pakistan's Engage Africa Policy and the Future of Pak-Afro Ties."

⁵⁶ Dr. Ishfaq Tola, Interviewed by Sadia Sulaiman, Islamabad, December 6, 2021.

⁵⁷ Paul Nantulya, "Implications for Africa from China's One Belt One Road Strategy," Spotlight, Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, March 22, 2019,

This corridor will link up the African traders in Pakistan, hence making it mandatory for Pakistan to make CPEC a key feature of its Look Africa Policy. Moreover, the cheapest mean of trade between Pakistan and African continent is sea route, therefore making CPEC's Gwadar Port an integral part of its economic diplomacy towards Africa.

Making Space in African Market through People-to-People Contacts

One key challenge that Pakistan is currently facing in African market is to find space there. In order to create that space Pakistan needs to work on enhancing people-to-people and business-to-business contacts. In this regard, Pakistani diaspora in Africa can be an asset for Pakistan's economic diplomacy in African continent. Pakistani diaspora living in Kenya and Somalia, primarily from Memon community is serving as bridge between Pakistan and Kenya and Pakistan and Somalia. Even in the Kenyan Parliament, there are people of Pakistani descent.⁵⁸

Along with diaspora, the business community in Pakistan is also playing its part in improving business-to-business ties with the African continent. The government should encourage the interaction among these stakeholders and facilitate them in their endeavours. Similarly, youth on both sides comprises the majority of population and they can also play crucial role in bringing each other closer. The government of Pakistan should encourage youth exchange programs between public and private universities of Pakistan and African continent as a whole.

Conclusion

Pakistan's Look Africa Policy is a good initiative, keeping in view the huge economic and trade potential of African region. However, the policy is not without challenges especially keeping in view the economic crisis that Pakistan is facing currently and economic and political fragility in the African continent. The geographic distance between Pakistan and the African continent further adds to these constraints. Without addressing these issues, Pakistan cannot succeed in attaining its objectives of the Look Africa Policy. Therefore, Pakistan requires a diverse, robust and an all-encompassing economic diplomacy in Africa. Pakistan has already started working on establishing diplomatic and commercial missions across Africa. Along with this official engagement the diplomats, business community, private entrepreneurs and youth also needs to be engaged in economic diplomacy in Africa as they can equally play their role in further enhancing ties between Pakistan and African region for their mutual economic and trade benefit.

<https://africacenter.org/spotlight/implications-for-africa-china-one-belt-one-road-strategy/>

⁵⁸ Aminah Khan, Interviewed by the author in Islamabad.

NATIONAL INTEREST: PERSPECTIVES AND PRACTICES

Ehsan Mehmood Khan*

“The objectives of foreign policy must be defined in terms of the national interest and must be supported with adequate power.”

– Hans J. Morgenthau¹

Abstract

Even though, national interest is one of the most developed concepts of IR scholarship, yet it remains under the debate in academic and policy circles. Various scholars and institutions contextualize and categorize national interests varyingly. There are five main issues under deliberation: first, the interplay of power and morality in formulation and pursuit of national interests; second, longevity, durability and permanency of national interests; third, the interaction between national and public interests, and the process of interest adjudication, which is the function of the political system; fourth, Islamic perspective on national interest; and fifth, the future of national interest in the wake of growing power of the non-state actors, which have started challenging the notion of national interest. This paper revisits the concept and context of national interest with strategic arguments on different debates on national interest. Important attributes of the power potential affecting national interests are considered and conceptualized by the author. The research is descriptive, explanatory, analytical and perspective in nature.

Keywords: National Security, Comprehensive National Security, National Interest, National Power, Elements of National Power

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¹ Hans Joachim Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 3rd rev. ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963), 561-657.

Introduction

Interest forms to be the nucleus of human relationship from individual to communities, and nations to alliances. The term 'interest' is used in multiple ways and with a host of prefixes and suffixes. A few examples are personal interest, individual interest, group interest, community interest, ethnic interest, parochial interest, party interest, commercial interest, economic interest, security interest, national interest, etc. While all these phrases are important at the domestic level (and some even at the international level), national interest reigns supreme at national and international levels. National interest is an expression of national purpose, aspirations, and objectives. It is stepping stone to the attainment of national purpose. It explains the state behaviour as to why it is as it is. Over time, it has evolved into one of the most important terminologies in the strategic lexicon of IR and security studies. In most cases, "statesmen think and act in terms of interest."² Thus, one may term it as the currency of international statecraft. According to Hans J. Morgenthau, "It is not only a political necessity, but also a moral duty for a nation to always follow in its dealings with other nations but one guiding star, one standard for thought, one rule for action: The National Interest."³

In the past, national interest was understood as the interest of a sovereign, a monarch, or a dynasty. The Peace of Westphalia (1648) paved the way for new concepts including the phrases signifying national interest. The term was first used during the 16th and 17th centuries in Italy, France, Germany, and Britain in different ways. American political scientists also used this phrase to explain constitutional matters and the deliberations on political philosophy. Today, the 21st Century statesmen, scholars, policymakers, strategists, bureaucrats, diplomats, business leaders, civil society activists, media professionals, and commoners discuss national interest from various angles. What should and what should not be national interest comes under debate in addition to the interplay of national and public interest.

This paper aims at giving a conceptual perspective on national interest. The identification of interests of a particular country goes beyond the purview of the paper. It revisits the concept and context of national interest with strategic arguments on different debates on national interest.

National Interest and the School of Political Realism

Conceptual value and analytical usefulness of national interest have remained under discussion in different schools of thought. Realism is the leading exponent of national interest. The proponents of Realism argue

² Hans J. Morgenthau quoted in Jack Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), 45.

³ Hans J. Morgenthau, *In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), 241-242.

that states seek to maximize power and promote national interests.⁴ The realist thinking focuses on 'nature' of the three levels to include international system, state, and individual. In Realism, national interest serves as the nucleus. However, it does not go uncontested. Critics argue that the concept faces serious intellectual and normative challenges. Stanley Hoffman rejects it as being "oversimplified and wrong-headedly dogmatic."⁵ To the proponents of national interest, the most important national interest is the survival of state, including its people, political system, and territorial integrity.

Defining National Interest

There is no single definition of national interest. It is an abstraction. Anything that is 'good' for the nation may be deemed in its interest to attain as long as it serves to attain and maintain the national purpose. With this in view, various forums and individuals have defined national interest varyingly. A few such definitions are following: National interests are the fundamental building blocks in any discussion of foreign policy.⁶ (*The Commission on America's National Interests*)

- National interest is "the general and continuing ends for which a nation acts."⁷(*Brookings Institution, USA*)
- *Dictionary of Diplomacy*. National interest "is deemed by a particular state to be a "vital or desirable goal in its international relations."⁸ (*Dictionary of Diplomacy*)
- National interests are the most important wants and needs of a nation. At the highest level of abstraction, national interests are the "wellspring" from which national objectives, policy and strategy flow.⁹ (*National Defence University (NDU), Islamabad, Pakistan*)

⁴ "National Interest," *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, <http://www.britannica.com/> (accessed May 25, 2014).

⁵ Stanley Hoffmann, *Primacy or World Order: American Foreign Policy since the Cold War* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978), 131.

⁶ The Commission on America's National Interests, *America's National Interests* (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, July 1996), 13.

⁷ Quoted in Harold J. Clem, *The Environment of National Security* (Washington DC: National Defense University, 1983), 26.

⁸ G. R. Berridge and Alan James, *A Dictionary of Diplomacy* (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2001), 164.

⁹ *Statecraft and Strategy, vol II* (Islamabad: National Defence University, 2010-11), 147.

- National interests may be defined as “desired end states based on values and strategic analysis. Expressed as policies.”¹⁰ (*The US Army War College*)
- “What is good for the nation as a whole in international affairs” is national interest and “what is good for the nation as a whole in domestic affairs is the public interest.”¹¹ (*Michael G. Roskin.*)
- *Charles Lerche and Abul Said.* National interest is “the general long-term and continuing purpose which the state, the nation, and government all see themselves as serving.”¹² (*Charles Lerche and Abul*)
- National interest is an interest which the states seek to protect or achieve in relation to each other.¹³ (*Vernon Van Dyke*)

Categorizing National Interest

Various scholars and institutions have categorised and classified national interest varyingly. Categorization and classification is aimed at informing the policymakers on the extent of significance of a given issue. It is also meant to underscore the intensity as to how much should a state care for an interest, what should be the extent of means used to attain an interest, and the decision on the ways. In other words, categorization provides a gauge for cost-benefit analysis as well as an operational framework for dealing with this subject.

Some of the phases and terminologies used while categorising interests include: core, vital, very important, extremely important, important, less important, primary, secondary, permanent, specific, general, and peripheral. A few sets are discussed below.

Thomas W. Robinson's Classification: Thomas W. Robinson has broadly classified national interests into six categories:¹⁴

- *Primary Interests.* These include the preservation of physical, political, and cultural identity of the state against encroachments from outside powers.

¹⁰ J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. ed., *US Army Guide to National Security Issues, Vol I: Theory and Strategy of War* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012), 48.

¹¹ Michael G. Roskin, “National Interest: From Abstraction to Strategy,” *Strategic Studies Institute*, US Army War College, (May 20, 1994): 1.

¹² Charles Lerche and Abul Said quoted in Rumki Basu, ed., *International Politics: Concepts, Theories and Issues* (New Delhi: SAGE Publication, 2012), 54.

¹³ Vernon Van Dyke cited in Urmila Sharma and S.K. Sharma, ed., *Principles and Theory In Political Science, vol 1* (New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers, 2007), 126.

¹⁴ Thomas W. Robinson, quoted in Urmila Sharma and S.K. Sharma, “Western Political Thought,” (Washington: Atlantic Publishers, 2006) 127-128.

- *Secondary Interests*. These are less important than the primary interests though quite vital to the existence of the state.
- *Permanent Interests*. These refer to the relatively constant and long-term interests of the state. The change in the permanent interests is rather slow.
- *Variable Interests*. These refer to the interests of a nation, which are considered vital for national good in a given set of circumstances.
- *General Interests*. These refer to those positive conditions which apply to a large number of nations or in a several specified fields such as economics, trade, diplomatic, intercourse etc.
- *Specific Interests*. Through the logical outgrowth of the general interest, specific interests are defined in terms of time or space, and are ended with change in environment.

In addition to the above, Robinson mentions three other interests which he calls “international interests.” These include identical interests, complementary interests, and conflicting interests.¹⁵

Joseph Frankel’s Classification: Joseph Frankel proposed a classification of the uses of the term ‘national interest’ into ‘aspirational’, ‘operational’, ‘explanatory’ and ‘polemical’.¹⁶

Categorization by the Commission on America’s National Interests. The Commission on America’s National Interests, in its July 2000 report on America’s National Interests identified a hierarchy interests as follows: vital interests, extremely important interests, important interests, and less important or secondary interests.¹⁷

The Commission on America’s National Interests summarizes interest under these four categories but identifies five world regions of interest as follows: (1) China, Japan, and East Asia, (2) Russia, (3) Europe and NATO, (4) the Middle East, and (5) the Western Hemisphere.

US Army War College’s Categorization: The US Army War College, in its official academic guide on national security issues, categorizes national interests considering the intensity of important and application as survival, vital, important and peripheral interests.¹⁸

National Defence University (NDU) of Pakistan’s Categorization: The NDU Pakistan’s academic guide for the students of

¹⁵ A perspective on conflicting interests of the US and Russia in the Ukraine crisis in 2014 in Robinson quoted in Urmila Sharma and S.K. Sharma, quoted in Robinson(128).

¹⁶ Peu Ghosh, *International Relations* (New Delhi: PHI Learning, 2013), 65.

¹⁷ The Commission on America’s National Interests (July 2000), 2.

¹⁸ J. Boone Bartholomees, 18-19.

national security and war course categorizes national interests as vital, most important, important, and peripheral.¹⁹

Power-Focused vis-à-vis Morality-Based Interests

A great debate goes on as to whether it is legitimate to pursue national interest *sans* morality. For instance, if a nation's survival is threatened from within or outside, it needs to take actions which may be detrimental to the values of humanity, morality, and national ethos—thereby putting human security in jeopardy at the cost of state security. Realism is one such school of thought that virtually approves of the attainment of national interest at all costs. On the other hand, liberals consider advancement of national interest through the values of cooperation, collaboration, and mutuality.

It is a contest between power and morality. Power is the focal point in national interest. It is the essence of national interest. It creates a clash of interest between states *sans* morality. However, in practice, power and morality go hand in hand. States endeavour to maximize power through advancement of national interest but cooperation in the spheres of human security and human rights, economic collaboration, and spread of values like democracy and freedom go on concurrently. Thus, power *sans* morality would crumble, and morality *sans* power is an impracticable proposition.

Interstate relations in today's world are no more as compartmented to have total enmity or complete friendship between different countries. Due to the nature of national interest and the complexity of interstate relations, states make a choice for complex interdependence in a rapidly evolving world wherein contest, competition, and confrontation between them take place in concert with conformity, cooperation, and collaboration. All are aimed at attaining the national interest in the most desired and effective manner.

National interest is the interplay of all these facets that lead to the attainment of national ends i.e., interests. For instance, trade cooperation between India and China continues alongside strategic rivalry between them in the Indian Ocean region and elsewhere. They have many longstanding territorial and non-territorial conflicts: a few to cite are India-China Aksai Chin Conflict, India-China Sikkim Conflict, and India-China Arunachal Pradesh/South Tibet Conflict. Both fought a major war in 1962 and their standing armed forces are deployed since along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). They have had military clashes during the recent years. However, while maintaining the state of contest and conflict over the aspects they disagree, they are cooperating and collaborating in the area of mutual benefit.

¹⁹ *Statecraft and Strategy, Vol II*, 147.

The same is true in the case of the US and Russia. They continue to cooperate on several issues while contending with each other on others. At any rate, the power-focused interests, being linked with the survival and security of the state itself, are of primary importance and the morality-based interests, often being linked with cooperation to and from other states, are secondary in importance. Power maximization is blamed only when it is pursued at the cost of human blood. On the contrary, morality cannot be exercised at the cost of national security. In the words of Henry Kissinger, "We cannot abandon national security in pursuit of virtue."²⁰ In the final analysis, both lead to the single end: attainment of national interest.

Interests of states are also crisscrossed by the interests of many supra-state, sub-state, and non-state actors and entities. A few to mention are as follows: international organizations, regional organizations, multinational corporations, state institutions including military forces, political parties, militant organizations, interest groups, pressure groups, religious entities, super-empowered individuals, media conglomerates, amongst others. All these entities have their interests. In some cases, these actors are more powerful than many of the states and thus have both constraining and enabling effect on their national interests.

Are National Interests Permanent?

Existence and survival falls into the category of permanent interests. However, there are other interests that change with time. Likewise, there are interests that advance the security interest of a state and help it maximize its power; there are others that are based on its values, national purpose, ideological leaning, and public aspirations. There are three different views on this issue. First, national interests are permanent. Those holding this view often quote such maxims as from Lord Palmerston: "We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal, and those interests it is our duty to follow."²¹ However, Palmerston did not refer to permanent nature of a given national interest. He only referred to the significance of interests while using the words "eternal" and "perpetual." *Second*, most scholars and statesmen believe that national interests do adjust to the varying situations. Evens and Newnham believe in changing nature of national interest during different times, under different circumstances and with different policymakers leading a nation state.²² Morgenthau also believes

²⁰ Henry Kissinger, *Years of Renewal* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999), 1072.

²¹ Adolphus William Ward and George Peabody Gooch, eds., *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 1783-1919* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 160.

²² A detailed view can be found in Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham (1998).

in adjustable nature of interests. He argues that the interest cannot have “meaning that is fixed once and for all.”²³

Let us take an example from the Cold War. It was in the national interest of the former Soviet Union to spread communism across the world. The Cold War is over. The Soviet Union does not exist anymore. Its main successor, the Russian Federation, struggling with the disintegration after-shocks, has changed the system at home and the pursuits abroad. Although the spread of communism is not its core national interest, it is striving to attain and retain the status of a major power in Eurasia and the world at large. Similarly, the US interest to contain communism does not exist anymore. Pakistan’s interest that the people of Kashmir should get the right of self-determination in the form of plebiscite in keeping with the UN Security Council Resolutions on the subject would cease to exist as soon as it so happens. However, Pakistan’s interest for national integration and security against internal and external threats cannot subside under any circumstances.

Third, yet others argue that some interests are permanent. These interests enjoy timeless value, universal applicability, and non-negotiable status such as survival, security, and sovereignty of the state. National values and wellbeing of the populace also fall in the same category but they may have to be overlooked under special circumstances e.g., in times of war when the survival of state is threatened and is to be safeguarded.

Attributes of the Power Potential Affecting National Interests

Ten key attributes of a nation state’s power potential that influence the makeup, definition, and determination of its national interest are: geography, history, demography, political system, military strength, economic capacity, technological base, interest adjudication at domestic level, international environment, and national morale including public opinion.

Interest and National Values

National interest has a strong relationship with core national values. Each nation looks forward to protect its values at home and abroad. National interest thus personifies national values in expressive and normative terms. The blend of American values and national interest provides an apt example of this. Marybeth Ulrich notes:

American interests since colonial times flow from American values. The roots of these values and their preservation as the primary national interest. This unique heritage may at times

²³ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 4th Ed, 8.

make it difficult to separate American values and interests, thus leading to the simultaneous pursuit of seemingly conflicting interests. This phenomenon continues to manifest itself in modern-day foreign policy dilemmas, such as when the United States is torn between promoting democracy and facilitating a stable international order.²⁴

This denotes that both liberty and security are in the interest of a people or state. None can be relegated or neglected. The acme of leadership dexterity lies in balancing the both. This would also work toward striking a balance between national and public interests. Security in some cases and at some point in the history of nations becomes synonymous to liberty, freedom, independence, and survival of states and societies. To this end, Barry Buzan notes:

Security is taken to be about the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change, which they see as hostile. The bottom line of security is survival, but it also reasonably includes a substantial range of concerns about the conditions of existence.²⁵

Justification of the Means and Ends (National Interests)

The concept and practice of national interest does not recede even within the boundaries of nation-state. With other notions like sovereignty, integrity, legitimacy, and authority shaping fast due to the emerging realities and the effects of globalization, the conceptions of nation and interest *per se* are also transforming. What is national interest and what it is not remains a matter of debate. The idea of protecting national interest vis-à-vis other nations at “all costs” cannot be applied in the same fashion at home. The ends cannot justify the means in inland processes. The means also have to be justified. The instruments of statecraft, especially the hard power such as military forces, cannot be applied without the qualms of conscience. Indiscriminate use of force in the name of national interest to kill, torture, and imprison all those who are against the misuse of political power and privileges of the ruling classes is a dangerous proposition.²⁶ The concept of minimum use of force must be applied to deal with a domestic challenge including pacification of an internal threat posed by

²⁴ Marybeth P. Ulrich, “American Values, Interests, and Purpose: Perspectives on the Roots of American Political and Strategic Culture,” in *US Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Volume II: National Security Policy and Strategy*, 9.

²⁵ Barry Buzan, “New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-first Century,” *International Affairs*, 67.3 (1991): 432-433.

²⁶ For a sound perspective on the issue, Raja Saim-ul-Haq Satti, “Understanding the ‘National Interest’?” *Islamic Research Foundation International, Inc.*, <http://www.irfi.org/articles2/> (accessed March 8 2014).

the rebels or insurgents. Even to repel an external threat, proportionate rather than maximum use of force or fire—proportional to the challenge—is to be employed. Indiscriminate scale or enormity of means to meet or maintain a national interest or objective can be questioned both from home and abroad. Thus, the reality needs to subsist within the folds of morality, legality and legitimacy.

The means apart, the ends too need to pass the test of reason and rationality. National interests of a state are often at odds with those of the other states. This points to hurting the interest of a counterpart in an attempt to attain its zero-sum outcome. Is that rational? Certainly not, but Realism-based interstate relationship is claimed to have founded on realities rather than rationalities. Yet, 'might' cannot be 'right' in all cases and under all circumstances. State security cannot take precedence over human security whether it is the case of a state's own populace or the residents of another state. The value of national interest cannot hyperbolically outweigh the worth of public interest. If it does, it has a cost. After all, nations are made up of people. The interests of people are analogous, although they may belong to different states. The interest of humanity cannot be put into jeopardy for the sake of state interests. The answer may be found in calibrating the national interests with the public requirements.

Formulation of National Interests

Considering the function of postmodern international state system, it is important for a nation-state to determine its national interest. Certainly, there are interests such as sovereignty and survival, which cannot be negotiated or compromised. There are others which need to be reviewed and reappraised regularly. On this, Robert J. Art observes.

The most fundamental task in devising a grand strategy is to determine a nation's national interests. Once they are identified, they drive a nation's foreign policy and military strategy; they determine the basic direction that it takes, the types and amounts of resources that it needs, and the manner in which the state must employ them to succeed. Because of the critical role that national interests play, they must be carefully justified, not merely assumed.²⁷

Henry Kissinger, too, is convinced that the identification of national interests is crucial for the development of policy and strategy.

Hypothetically, national interests are rooted in the history, values and aspirations of a nation and are indirectly identified by the entire nation through an informal process which may involve an extended debate. However, practically, the government being the vanguard of a

²⁷ Robert J. Art, *A Grand Strategy for America*, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2003), 45.

nation, determines its interests. Alan Stolberg notes, "For the US, the executive branch of the federal government has primary responsibility for determining the national interests that address perceived needs and aspirations external to the geographic borders of the nation."²⁸ However, "the determination of internal or domestic interest", he notes "is more complex with executive and legislative bodies at federal, state, and local levels interacting in the political process to reach decisions."²⁹ But public interest is aggregated and articulated through a lengthy process and is a function of the political system of the country.

Interest and the Units of Analysis of IR

Interest can be studied at supra-national and intra-national plane in the light of the units of analysis given by Buzan, Waeuver, and Wilde. This way, 'Interest' is relevant to the *international subsystems* (groups or units such as EU, SAARC, ASEAN, and SCO etc.), *individual units* (actors such as communities, ethnicities, intrastate political entities, and multinational corporations), *subunits* (e.g., institutions and groups within the units such as lobbies, bureaucracy, corporate sectors organizations, trade unions, and other meso level establishments).³⁰

Interests of the Constituent Units

In some cases, interest of the constituent units of a nation e.g., states or provinces gains precedence over the national interest. It becomes difficult for a nation when these constituents start pursuing their interest even by dealing with foreign countries directly. The First American Republic from 1776 to 1789 was a case in point. To this end, Marybeth P. Ulrich notes:

The US constitution was adopted from 1781 to 1789. The first Constitution of the United States as embodied in the Articles reflected something of an idealized view of American political philosophy. Under the Articles, the United States were a loose confederation of independent states ... The powers to impose taxes or to raise troops were reserved to the individual states ... It was clear that the weak central government established under the Articles was unable to prevent war, mount and sustain military operations should war occur, or even prevent internal rebellion. ... Their aversion to sending taxes to Congress is also well known. States were even conducting their own foreign

²⁸ Alan G. Stolberg, "Crafting National Interests in the 21st Century," in *US Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Volume II: National Security Policy and Strategy*, 14.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ A detailed perspective may be found in Barry Buzan, Ole Waeuver and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1998).

policy with external countries, despite the fact that the Articles strictly forbade such actions.³¹

Adjudication of Public Interest

Adjudication of intrastate public interest is a function of political system steering the affairs of a given state. Interest forms to be the central section in the string of a political process. Almond and Coleman listed seven functions of all political systems: political socialization, interest articulation, interest aggregation, political communication, rulemaking, rule application and rule adjudication.³² It is evident that 'interest' is the core of the entire system. The process of political socialization integrates people into the political structure and culture of a state. This sets in motion a process of interest articulation and aggregation, which passes through the stage of political communication and eventually turns into rules. It leads to interplay of rule application and adjudication. This denotes that the public interests are adjudicated even during the course of application. Let us glance over the focal part: interest articulation and interest aggregation.

Interest Articulation: Gabriel Almond *et al.* define interest aggregation as, "the process by which individuals and groups make demands upon the political decision makers that we call interest articulation."³³ In characterizing the interest articulation function in a political system and in comparing it with other political systems, we need to identify four main types of structures involved in the process: institutional interest groups, non-associational interest groups, anomic interest groups, and associational interest groups.³⁴

Interest Aggregation: Gabriel Almond *et al.* define interest aggregation as "the activity in which the political demands of groups and individuals are combined into policy programs."³⁵ For example farmers' demand from higher crop prices, public preferences for lower taxes, environmentalists' demand for natural resource quality, and the interests of the businessmen often have to be balanced while determining an economic program. Interest aggregation also includes the tools and

³¹ Marybeth P. Ulrich, "American Values, Interests, and Purpose," 6-7.

³² Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman, ed., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960) and John R. Fisher, "System Theory and Structural Functionalism," in John T. Ishiyama and Marijke Breunin, ed., *21st Century Political Science: A Reference Handbook* (Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, 2011), 76.

³³ Gabriel Almond et al, *Comparative Politics Today: A World View* (London: Longman, 2010, 9th ed), 79.

³⁴ Howard J. Wiarda, *Comparative Politics: Critical Concepts in Political Science, Vol 1* (London: Routledge, 2005), 184.

³⁵ Gabriel Almond, *Comparative Politics Today*.

techniques used by the individuals on the way of personal interest aggregation, and by the groups or communities to meet shared interests.

Choices with the Smaller Nation-States

Theoretically, to pursue national interest in accordance with aspiration and national purpose is the right of each nation-state. International law and ethos endorse equality between states. Practically, however, the case of smaller and weaker nation-states is different from powerful states. Smaller nations often accept infringement of their sovereignty by the stronger states to remain viable territorially as well as politically. For instance, whereas dominant states can use coercive diplomacy as a tool to advance their interests, smaller nations cannot go beyond cooperation, collaboration, and persuasion to save their national interests from being hurt. At times, they even have to submit to the demands of stronger states. Thus, national interests of smaller, and weaker states are indirectly linked with the interests of powerful states.

Islamic Perspective on National Interest

Islamic perspective on national interest is linked with the Islamic concepts of nation, state, and sovereignty. As for sovereignty, the Holy Quran notes: "Sovereignty belongs to none but Allah."³⁶ However, the man has been delegated to exercise the authority based on the commands of Allah (SWT), Who is Lord of the universe. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan puts it into perspective as: "Sovereignty over the entire Universe belongs to Almighty Allah [SWT] alone, and the authority to be exercised by the people of Pakistan within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust."³⁷

Islam considers Muslims as an *Ummah* i.e., nation as a whole *sans* politico-territorial boundaries. Thus, the security and prosperity of the entire Muslim community, otherwise part of any state, is in the *Ummah's* interest. However, today's international system is made up of about 193 nation-states and a number of self-governing, autonomous and semi-autonomous states and regions. Muslims are living virtually in all states of the world. The largest Muslim organization, Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), has 57 member states. Viewed from this angle, the pursuance of national interest in accordance with the popular concept of international relations in vogue is not un-Islamic, if it does not otherwise contradict the Islamic commands and injunctions in any way and does not put the security of the Muslim people into jeopardy.

³⁶ Al-Quran, 12:40, Translation by Justice Mufti Taqi Usmani.

³⁷ Preamble to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

The Constitution of Pakistan and 'Interest'

The constitution is the quintessence of national interest of a country. According to Morgenthau, the idea of national interest in general resembles the constitution of the US and "its content can run the whole gamut of meanings which are logically compatible with it [i.e., national interest]." ³⁸ Pakistan is no exception. In the Constitution of Pakistan, the word "interest" appears 65 times signifying in 16 different characters even though the prefix "national" has not been used with "interest".³⁹ It has been mentioned in such terms as public interest, interests of minorities, interest of sovereignty, interest of services, interest of the glory of Islam and general interest of people.

The State shall endeavour to preserve and strengthen fraternal relations among Muslim

The Future of National Interest

The future of national interest is essentially linked with the future of nation-state system. A few notions hitherto monopolized by the nation-state have been challenged by various sub-state elements such as civil society, academia, intelligentsia, media, corporate sector, societal elite, and even the educated commoners. *Inter alia*, national interest, too, is under debate. There are sections of international civil society that advocate preferring public interest over national interest, and human security over state security. This also denotes that in certain cases national interest and public interest cannot be moderated or aggregated and thus cannot move onto a converging axis. Thus public interest is gaining against national interest outpacing national interest both ontologically and phenomenological.

State is no more the sole constituent or building block of the international system. There are a number of other actors that have taken over several roles earlier possessed and performed by the state. Such actors exist in all continents, regions, and states of the world. Likewise, these elements are playing their role across all spheres of human life ranging from super empowered individuals to interest and pressure groups, and governmental and nongovernmental organizations of various kinds to multinational corporations with worldwide presence.

³⁸ Hans J. Morgenthau, "Another 'Great Debate': The National Interest of the United States," *The American Political Science Review*, XLVI (December, 1952), 972, cited in Ken Kiyono, "A Study of Concept of the National Interest of Hans J. Morgenthau: As the Standard of American Foreign Policy," *Nagasaki University's Academic Output Site*, Japan, http://naosite.lb.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/10069/27783/1/keieikeizai49_03_04.pdf (accessed March 11, 2014).

³⁹ All reference to the Constitution given from relevant articles as indicated.

The theories of international relations (IR) and security studies, particularly the different variants of Realism and the related ideals refer to a challenger in the system. A rising power, often a state discontented with its share in existing distribution of power in the system, poses a challenge to the superpower(s) or major power(s) to attain a rightful share and status. The challenge evolves manifold. The non-state challenge posed by sub-state, supra-state, and sans-state actors has a synergetic effect toward the decay of the state power. The monopoly, legitimacy, authority, supremacy, and sovereignty of state have been challenged both in moral and functional realms. There are people, groups, and organizations which have taken over the jobs earlier understood as inexorable functions of the states, not in rhetoric but in essence. Let us take example of a vital national interest. Arguably, the most important national interest of any state is its security against existential internal and external threat. Defence and security policies and military strategies are formulated to ensure security and sovereignty. These policies and strategies are backed by adequate means – military and non-military – which call for allocation of compatible budgetary allocations.

In the post state of nature times, the human society has experienced various kinds of rules and governance. Whereas better part of the 21st century mankind is under democratic governance of various shades and grades, some of the states are still under dictatorial or monarchical regimes. While national interest has the same meanings in case of such regimes too as are for democratic states, the application of the idea is different in that its primary function is the survival of the regime and not the security of the state or wellbeing of its people. State security is linked with the safety of the ruling elite. The wellbeing of the people is not among the top priorities. This practice cannot continue indefinitely in future.

The civil societies have started questioning the defence spending on moral grounds considering the poverty and deprivation among masses and other human insecurities. Parsimonious allocations to human security – the sphere of public interest – and extravagant allotment of resources, as viewed by the liberal civil societies, for states security needs, the domain of national interest, is being constantly criticized especially in the states wherein human security situation is unstable. Analytical comparisons are often drawn between defense and development budgets, and questions raised regarding the necessity of the former when people of the state need more. This is but one example. Other national interests, vital or otherwise, are also facing questions. The entire decision-making process and the determinants of national interest remain under the scrutiny of the non-state actors that often influence the decisions and limit the choices of the states. Similarly, both the structural and functional aspects of the states are also coming under debate. However, the chief proponents of national interest, Realist scholars and statesmen, study the concept with little

reference to moralistic reasoning, due to the key role played by human nature as the classic Realist believe and international structure as the Neorealist uphold, in an environment of international anarchy. A priori hypotheses on national interest rooted in theoretical conceptions are being overruled by the determinants of public interest founded on empirical deductions.

Non-state actors are gaining status equilibrium with the states in some spheres and are influencing the state behaviour in other areas. A few non-state actors have more global outreach as compared to states. They have stronger economic backbone, added credibility, more influence, and a better bargaining power in the international system than most of the states. To be true, the powerful states and state actors are keeping the case of states alive and dynamic. Otherwise, the heavyweight non-state actors would fast erode the role, repute and status of power of the states. Yet again, the states are dependent on so many non-state actors in so many aspects that they often feel helpless before them and their national interests remain hostage to these dependencies. This vulnerability of the states is increasing with each tick-of-the-clock due to the reason that the non-state entities have fewer liabilities towards the masses compared with the states that owe a whole heap of responsibilities and thus accountabilities. Thus, with the passage of time, national interests of weaker states in the system are steadily reducing to a point where it remains no more than a footnote to the interests of major powers and the powerful non-state actors. Besides, the intensity of national interest notwithstanding, which may be analogous in case of all states, sanctity or inviolability of the bounds of national interest are different in case of different states depending on the power of a given state.

Realist theorists such as Morgenthau view national interest in a bond with power and explain why states behave as they do. If it is taken as true, it is reasonable to believe that the declining sway of national interest owes much to the declining power of the state in face of the non-state challengers. Does this mean that the state would need to attain and maintain balance of power against the non-state contenders too, at least in non-traditional and non-military spheres? It is a new catch-22 particularly for the otherwise weaker states. In this case too, the concept of national interest comes under threat.

Another tight spot for the national security is its relative subjectivity compared with the public interest, which can be interpreted better and can be translated into a normative-functional paradigm for implementation. It may be noted that no state or its inhabitants may be bothered about the national interest of another state. However, public interest and human security issues of people of any state can sensitize the entire international community irrespective of caste, creed, region, religion, or color of skin. Thus, national interest does not always pass the test of morality when pitched against public interest. The answer may be

found in keeping it aligned with the interest of populace and not tangent to it.

The notion of internationality embedded in the concept of national interest keeps it aloof from domestic concerns. It looks at the internal construct and dynamics as means and instruments of power to realize national interests rather than the resources that can be employed for collective good of the nation. This too raises the eyebrow of morality.

On the other hand, the constructive side of the national interest draws on a sense of nationhood, national identity and national purpose. Identity is one of the strongest linkages of an individual or group. Nationhood brings people from all socioeconomic classes onto the platform of a same single identity. Thus, it also works towards a common national interest. Eventually, if well aggregated and adroitly moderated by the national leadership keeping the civil society and interest groups on board, national and public interests may epitomize both the will of nation and its populace. Due to this, national interest would and should retain its function at all three levels of international relations.

Conclusion

Even though composed of human beings, the character of states is unlike human souls. Human beings keep forth their interest only to the extent that they serve them and their kith and kin well. If they have to choose between their friends and the interests, they might decide on the former. The case of states is different. More often than not, they pick out the latter. The assertion of Lord Palmerston, a renowned statesman of 19th century, before the House of Commons in 1848, bears testimony to the fact: "It is a narrow policy to suppose that this country or that country is to be marked out as the eternal ally or the perpetual enemy of England. We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal, and those interests it is our duty to follow."⁴⁰

National interest is likely to continue to play an important role not only in the interstate relations but also in the intrastate relations in the future international system. Thus, understanding the process and interplay of national interests is of prime importance for scholars, policymakers, peace and security analysts, military strategists, and students of IR and other related disciplines.

⁴⁰ Ward and Gooch, 160.

THREATS FROM CLIMATE CHANGE TO THE MILITARY SECURITY OF PAKISTAN

Faraz Haider* & Adil Sultan**

Abstract

The nexus between climate change and military security is essentially non-existent in Pakistan's security discourse. The paper argues for the connection between these two sectors - from the Copenhagen School framework of security - and presents how threats from climate change threaten Pakistan's military security. Most notable threats, in severity and frequency, are sea level rise, cyclone risks, drastic floods, warming patterns, and glacial melting. Sea level rise and cyclone risks impact naval assets and infrastructure while warming patterns and glacial melting affect troop movement, deployments, and logistics. Resultantly, military training, force capacity, and operational readiness is affected. Threats are more potent in strategically significant locations (Siachen, Sindh, and Punjab) which house important forward military bases. The paper provides actionable recommendations that create foundations for future steps as well.

Keywords: *Climate Change, Pakistan's Military Security, Extreme Events, Operational Readiness, Force Capacity*

Introduction

Anything that operates does so in a certain environment and military always has to consider the surroundings in which it functions. This has even been a part of its strategy and the larger discipline of strategic studies. Naturally, changes to the environment will have an impact on anything operating in that area. Climate change constitutes a change in the environment in which a military operates, and reasoning would suggest these shifts necessitate a focus towards those changes. However, that has not been the case in a substantive way on a global level, particularly in Pakistan. The security focus in Pakistan has been traditional and military specific but has failed to incorporate emerging threats that

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hold substantial threat potential. This neglect is dangerous since it refuses to consider climate change reality, that poses threat to Pakistan's military security.

The nexus between climate change and military security is an underexplored area and one that is almost non-existent in the security discourse of Pakistan. Climate change has been acknowledged and termed officially as a national security threat at the Islamabad Security Dialogue (ISD) 2021, a forum for identifying and reaching a consensus on threats to national security.¹ The following ISD 2022 reiterated and linked climate change with national security.² Subsequently, the National Security Policy of Pakistan 2022-2026 released by the government clearly highlighted its impact in areas of development, economic security, food security, and water security.³ However, these national level security documents and forums have yet to identify the link between a non-traditional threat like climate change and traditional security sectors like military. The discourse outside of government documents has also discussed climate change as a threat to national security, creating insecurities in economic, food, energy, water, and other domains.⁴ While these are important contributions to the discourse around how climate change is an existential and multi-sectoral threat, they leave out how it can also threaten the military; an important sector of national security. The literature even highlights how climate change can damage peace and stability, and play its role as a threat multiplier by exacerbating existing tensions and insecurities⁵. Yet, it fails to investigate direct threat linkages or a connection between climate change and military security. As a result, there is a gap that requires exploration to create a body of knowledge for academic research and for

¹ National Security Division, "Islamabad Security Dialogue Event Report," Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May, 2021, <https://mofa.gov.pk/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Islamabad-Security-Dialogue-Event-Report.pdf>.

² The News International (Islamabad), April 2, 2022, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/946761-coas-gen-bajwa-addresses-islamabad-security-dialogue-2022>.

³ National Security Division, "National Security Policy of Pakistan 2022-2026," Government of Pakistan, January, 2022, <https://static.theprint.in/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/NSP.pdf>.

⁴ Mahnoor Hayat Malik, "The Non-Traditional Security Threat of Climate Change in South Asia," The Roads Initiative, February 27, 2022, <https://theroadsinitiative.org/the-non-traditional-security-threat-of-climate-change-in-south-asia/>; Hamid Mir, "Climate Change is a Bigger Threat to Pakistan than Terrorism," *The Washington Post*, July 4, 2022, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/07/14/climate-change-pakistan-india-worse-threat-terrorism/>.

⁵ Jumaina Siddiqui, "Pakistan's Climate Change Challenges Pose a National Security Emergency," United States Institute of Peace, July 7, 2022, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/07/pakistans-climate-challenges-pose-national-security-emergency>.

policy creation as well as action. Thus, the paper studies this linkage with its primary question that climate change manifestations in Pakistan have the potential to threaten its military security directly and indirectly. It uses qualitative data, both primary (press releases, government policy documents and government reports) and secondary (books, research articles, newspaper articles, reports, and web articles) to study its operating research question. The paper discusses the link between climate change and military security and specific climate change manifestations that may threaten military security of Pakistan. It also explores how those threats will form and what aspect of the military will be impacted.

Copenhagen School Framework and Definitional Understandings

This paper's operating research question prompts a broader understanding of security because of which theoretical frameworks such as realism are insufficient, since it perceives mostly external threats as being threatening to the state⁶. Multitudes of new threats have emerged and been identified as threatening to the state after the cold-war era. These have been adequately categorised in the Copenhagen School's framework of comprehensive security which includes five sectors: political, social, economic, military, and environment.⁷ As the paper studies threats from climate change to the military security of Pakistan, it relies on this framework while using its environment and military sector as focus areas. According to the comprehensive security framework, forces may arise from any of these sectors and be existential enough to be deemed as threats to national security, which then allows them to be made into national security issues so that action can be taken to address them.

The comprehensive security framework points out that the state is not the only referent object for the military and that threats other than external threats may become so existential to the survival of the armed forces that the military sector itself is raised to the referent object status.⁸ In such a case, adequate action is required to address that threat and that requires it to be securitised. Securitising is a speech act that brings a threat to an existential level, which allows for a state of exceptionality that makes any action to deal with it acceptable.⁹ Normally, the securitising agent is the government or a government body. However, the paper explores how

⁶ Emily Tripp, "Realism: The Domination of Security Studies," E-International Relations, June 14, 2013, <https://www.e-ir.info/2013/06/14/realism-the-domination-of-security-studies/>.

⁷ Bary Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 21-23.

⁸ Bary Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 22.

⁹ Ibid., 26-27.

the military security could be threatened so the military sector institutions are treated as the securitising agent. Without an emphasis that climate change can threaten military security as well, it may go unaddressed since protection against a threat is only possible once it is identified as such by the organisation or state institution that is being threatened. Therefore, after exploring the linkage, the paper presents suggestions to securitize climate change as a significant threat to the military security for it to be accepted by the military sector itself and to create a space for substantive action in the future.

Climate change and military security have specific meanings and they must be clearly defined. For the purpose of this paper, an understanding of climate change is needed that is both scientific in its formation and shows acceptability within the larger military sector. The Global Military Advisory Council states that climate change is understood as a significant and permanent change in the climate of a given region or area that is observed over extended periods.¹⁰ This change is also anthropogenic, which means that it is caused by human activity and results in intense weather events. There can be variations in what is thought of as military security, especially since what is a security issue depends on theoretical frameworks and also requires a level of general acceptability. The definition presented by the United States (US) Department of Defense's 'DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms' document is useful since it explores climate change threats to military in multiple policy and defence review publications. It states that military security consists of all those threats that can hinder or impair the military's effectiveness.¹¹ Additionally, and as per the comprehensive security framework in the Copenhagen school, military security is tied to the security of the state and its survival from internal and external military threats as well as non-military threats.¹²

Pakistan's Climate Change Risk Profile and Threats to Military Security

Climate change threats have been proven existential and disproportionate for some countries in comparison to others. Pakistan falls in the category of states most at risk from climate change threats as compared to its contributions towards Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions

¹⁰ Wendell King, "Climate Change: Implications for Defense," Global Military Advisory Council, June 5, 2014, https://static.s123-cdn-static-d.com/uploads/4109963/normal_5f68bf0d6ca46.pdf.

¹¹ "DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, June, 2018, 206, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=813130>.

¹² Bary Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 50.

and climate change. Global Climate Risk Index ranks Pakistan among the top ten countries at the risk of climate change.¹³ The report also categorises Pakistan as a country that has been and will be prone to extreme events in the future. These risks have risen from climate change globally and in Pakistan potentially threatens military security.

The military sector is often overlooked in discourse surrounding climate change threats at a global level and especially in Pakistan. Some progress has been made in developed countries such as the USA in terms of viewing the military sector as being threatened from climate change, which is highlighted below. However, focus is needed in Pakistan keeping in mind the existential and disproportionate nature of climate change threats. For this purpose, those threats must be highlighted which hold the highest potential of impacting military security and discussing the form and shape of those threats. States that have given credence to the nexus between climate change and military security provide insight through comparative applicability, which means their operational environments and military systems are similar to Pakistan. These states primarily include the US with its military presence at various bases in Pakistan's regional environment and India due to a shared geography.

Threats from climate change to military security or the military sector at large have been documented and reported in the 21st century. This has been led by the US military sector, which has outlined and elaborated on how its security can and has been affected through threats that arise from climate change. This paper focuses on a select few that possess comparative applicability for the military security of Pakistan. Military security can even come into question through a burdened and diluted force capacity due to frequent occurrence of climate induced conflicts and disasters because of which the military is called in for relief efforts, as has been evaluated by *The National Security, Military, and Intelligence Panel on Climate Change* (USA).¹⁴ Such forecasts can be applicable to Pakistan's military security; however, there are more direct links between climate change manifestation and threats. Nevertheless, the link between climate change and military security is evident, both directly and indirectly.

Direct Threats to Military Security from Climate Change

A direct relation between military security and climate change has been established over the last 15 years. The US Department of Defense

¹³ David Eckstein, Vera Künzel, and Laura Schäfer, "Global Climate Risk Index 2021," Germanwatch, January 2021, 13.

¹⁴ National Security, Military, and Intelligence Panel on Climate Change (NSMIP), "A Security Threat Assessment of Global Climate Change," The Centre for Climate and Security, February, 2020, 23.

(DoD), in its 2006 Quadrennial Defence Review, outlined how severe climate change induced events can threaten military infrastructure and assets.¹⁵ Subsequently, the DoD in a congressionally mandated report outlined the directly impactful threats it faces from climate change. The US Air Force Base Tyndall Florida was struck with a devastating Hurricane that affected the base and its 325th Fighter Wing of F22-Raptors became inoperable for a month.¹⁶ This threat was not restricted to a single base but a majority of the US Air Force bases were damaged due to recurrent and severe flooding.

In South Asia specifically, the link between climate change and military security is identified by the Global Military Advisory Council on Climate Change.¹⁷ Direct threats from climate change normally occur as impacts on military infrastructure and assets, mostly naval through sea level rise and oceanic climate change induced events.¹⁸ However, as the paper argues, these direct threats Pakistan may also experience these direct climate change threats in the form of hindrance in the military movement ability in strategic areas (Siachen), training ability, and operational readiness through glacial melting, increase in average warming, rise in maximum average temperatures, and extreme heat. In order to highlight these elements, the paper first discusses climate change manifestations along with their nature and severity in Pakistan.

Precipitation Changes and Severe Flooding Risk

Climate change and its threats in Pakistan have been observed and reported by numerous credible sources of literature, making them an established reality that can significantly damage economic, social, and military sectors. Since 1960, climate change data shows that the arid plains and coastal belt of Pakistan experienced a mean decrease of 10-15 per cent in rainfall.¹⁹ As a country in a temperate zone, decrease in mean

¹⁵ Joshua Busby, "Climate Change and National Security," Council on Foreign Relations, November, 2007, 6.

¹⁶ Benjamin Silliman, "Climate Change Is a Threat to Military Security" Council on Foreign Relations, January 23, 2019, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/climate-change-threat-military-security>.

¹⁷ Tariq Ghazi, A. Muniruzzaman, and A. Singh, "Climate Change & Security in South Asia," Global Military Advisory Council on Climate Change, 2016.

¹⁸ Centre for Climate and Security, "Climate Security 101," Centre for Climate and Security, February, 2015, 2 <https://climateandsecurity.org/>; Shirley Scott and Shahedul Khan, "The Implications of Climate Change for the Military and for Conflict Prevention, Including through Peace Missions," *Air & Space Power Journal - Africa and Francophonie* 7, no. 3 (2016), 83, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ_French/journals_E/Volume-07_Issue-3/scottkhan_e.pdf.

¹⁹ World Bank Group, "Climate Risk and Adaptation Country Profile: Pakistan," World Bank Group, April 2011, 3.

rainfall can be devastating for agricultural yields and have spill-over effects on the economic output. The decrease in mean rainfall in arid plains is coupled with rainfall increase in northern areas, contributing to flood risks.²⁰ Projections from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) clearly indicate a higher likelihood of climate induced disaster events resulting from heavy precipitation within the warming estimates of Pakistan.²¹ A higher occurrence rate of said events would result in the onset of disastrous outcomes.

Extreme floods in the past have shown their capacity to devastate the country. In the 2010 floods, Pakistan experienced the devastation of hectares of land, the uprooting of entire communities, and costs upwards of billions of USD to the economy.²² An increased likelihood by 2.7 times, as projected by IPCC, will mean sheer destruction with the added frequency of such flooding events.²³ Exacerbated risk of severe floods also indicates an increase in disaster relief operations that hold the potential for threatening military security. Along with floods, sea level rise also holds the potential to create damaging impacts.

Sea Level Rise

As a coastal state of the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, Pakistan has not been immune to sea level rise and its related threats. This sea level rise is attributed to both warming of the oceans and glacial melting resulting in its volume loss.²⁴ Karachi, in particular, is more vulnerable to threats from sea level rise because of its tidal flat topography. Relatedly, sea level rise in Pakistan will also cause shrinking of the Indus Delta and is expected to lead to more general coastal belt erosion.²⁵ Pakistan specific and regional forecasts state that sea level rise is projected to increase even further in future due to an intersection of warming of ocean temperatures and glacial melting.²⁶ As a result, threats from sea level rise in Pakistan are

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, "Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis," Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2021, 18; World Bank Group, "Pakistan," Climate Change Knowledge Portal, 2021, <https://climateknowledgeportal.worldbank.org/country/pakistan/climate-data-projections>.

²² World Bank Group, "Climate Risk and Country Profile: Pakistan," World Bank Group, 2021, 20.

²³ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, "Climate 2021: Physical Science," 18.

²⁴ Asian Development Bank, "Climate Change Profile of Pakistan," Asian Development Bank, 2017, 17.

²⁵ Ibid., 33-34.

²⁶ World Bank Group, "Climate Risk and Adaptation Country Profile: Pakistan," 6; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, "Regional Fact Sheet – Asia," IPCC: Sixth Assessment Report, 2021, <https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/>

significant and potentially devastating for military security as well due to naval installations in the region.

Warming Patterns

Climate change is affecting precipitation patterns. Temperature extremes such as days and nights with maximum and minimum recorded temperatures have shown changes. Cold nights went down by approximately 10 days and hot days increased by 20 days as well as hot nights by 23 days, showing an overall warming trend from 1960 onwards in Pakistan.²⁷ Projections of temperature increase leading to different warming trends, show a gravely dangerous future as well. Increase in the global average temperature is projected at 3.7°C in case of high emissions by the IPCC but Pakistan may experience warming, disproportionate to the global average of 4.9°C by the end of the 21st century.²⁸ Threat scenarios of such warming can have catastrophic and overarching impacts.

Warming patterns and trends in Pakistan are undeniable and severe as a potential threat but are differentiated on a regional basis. While the country exhibits increased warming since 1961, the rate of warming has been higher in Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan along with an increase in the average for the daily maximum temperature.²⁹ Sindh and Balochistan are crucial coastal zones for Pakistan's Navy. Furthermore, Punjab and Sindh also house important Airforce bases and Army Corps deployments in relation to the eastern border with India.³⁰ Temperature trends and warming patterns, which have all been predicted to increase much more over time, provide a wide range of dangers when paired with the increased frequency of heat waves.³¹ Such cases can directly and indirectly threaten military security.

Glacial Melting

Global warming and temperature increase has resulted in significant glacial melting that creates intersecting threats. Similar to other

²⁷ World Bank Group, "Climate Risk and Adaptation Country Profile: Pakistan," 3; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, "Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis," 18.

²⁸ World Bank Group, "Pakistan."

²⁹ World Bank Group, "Climate Risk and Country Profile: Pakistan," 6.

³⁰ Lt. Gen. Prakash Katoch, "Nuclear Pakistan – Incessant Tail Wagging," *Indian Defense Review*, October 23, 2015, <http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/nuclear-pakistan-incessant-tail-wagging/> (accessed November, 2021); Global Security, "Pakistan Air Force Bases," 2021, <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pakistan/airbase.htm>. (accessed November, 2021)

³¹ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, "Regional Fact Sheet – Asia."; World Bank Group, "Pakistan."

areas, glacial melting is taking place at a higher rate in Pakistan than the global average and naturally it adds to sea level rise in the country's coastal zones.³² From 1990 to 2000 alone, three major glaciers of Pakistan experienced significant volume loss, the highest of which was a 11.09 per cent volume loss observed in Siachen.³³ Reports indicate that Himalayan glaciers have been receding ever since with substantial losses to their volume, especially since Pakistan's northern areas have experienced higher warming.³⁴ When combined with increased and intensified precipitation in the north, glacial melting worsens flood risks and threats mentioned earlier. Resultantly, it also creates other threats applicable to the military sector.

Cyclone Risks

Different components of climate change can also combine to form various manifestations that hold damaging impacts. Cyclones, stem from the intersection of different climate change manifestations and present an increasing likelihood of threatening the coast in different shapes and forms. Cyclone Yemyin resulted in major damages and Sindh's coastal belt is more susceptible to being affected by such events because of a low slope and due to its flat topography.³⁵ Furthermore, as part of the Arabian Sea coastal belt, Pakistan has a higher propensity to experience storms, especially during the summer season, which coincides with the periods of extreme heat and high daily average temperature.³⁶ The likelihood of increased cyclonic activity landing on Pakistan's coast is a result of rising ocean temperatures and a warming Arabian Sea, and these cyclones have the ability to cause serious damages. Given the all-encompassing nature and pervasive characteristics of both climate change and its threats, all security sectors are impacted. This includes military security; however, neglect of this threat nexus can give rise to vulnerabilities.

³² Planning Commission, "Task Force on Climate Change Final Report," Government of Pakistan, February 2010, 17.

³³ Naseem Abbas Gilani, "Degradation of Siachen Glacier in the Context of Volumetric Decrease in Siachen, Baltoro and Biafo Glaciers of Pakistan," *International Journal of Innovation and Applied Studies* 6, no. 4 (2014), 891.

³⁴ Asian Development Bank, "Climate Change Profile of Pakistan," 18; Dr. Moonis Ahmer, "Environment: Meltdown at Siachen," *Dawn*, October 22, 2017.

³⁵ M. M. Rabbani et al., "The Impact of Sea Level Rise on Pakistan's Coastal Zones in a Climate Change Scenario," National Institute of Oceanography, March 2008, 6; World Bank Group, "Climate Risk and Adaptation Country Profile: Pakistan."

³⁶ M. M. Rabbani et al., "The Impact of Sea Level," 6; World Bank Group, "Climate Risk," 3-6.

Direct Threats to Military Security

Sea Level Rise and Cyclones

Threats to naval assets and infrastructure in Pakistan occur simultaneously though sea level rise and an increased frequency and severity of climate change induced oceanic events such as cyclones. The US Central Command (CENTCOM), which includes Pakistan in its classification, has stated a high vulnerability to the naval infrastructure from sea level rise and severe events due to climate change.³⁷ Naval bases also directly face potential impact from sea level rise and given Sindh's topography as mentioned before, Pakistan's naval assets face direct threats.³⁸ Especially, the increased likelihood and projections of cyclonic activity that would land on Pakistan's coast, can create similar threats and damages. Damage to bases or related infrastructure could dampen or reduce their operational capacity, creating vulnerabilities and threats to military security.

Warming Patterns

Warming trends and increase in mean and daily average temperatures for Pakistan have resulted in a set of threats to military security. It must be noted that the likelihood of heat based extreme events that would occur each decade are projected to increase by 5.6 times globally even in modest warming scenarios.³⁹ Moreover, both Pakistan and India are positioned against each other on the highest militarised zone, so Pakistan's military faces the same threats as the Indian military. The first threat is glacial melting that puts the lives of troops and deployed forces at an increased risk. An ice avalanche caused the death of 10 Indian troops in 2018.⁴⁰ This event on the Siachen Glacier can be directly and unequivocally attributed to climate change. A similar but more drastic event happened in Pakistan. In 2012 when an ice avalanche hit a Pakistani base in Gayari sector in the northern glacial region that led to the death of 140 people out of which 120 were armed forced personnel.⁴¹ Although, the

³⁷ National Security, Military, and Intelligence Panel on Climate Change (NSMIP), "A Security Threat Assessment of Global Climate Change," 39.

³⁸ Global Military Advisory Council, "Climate Change: Implications for Defense," 8.

³⁹ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, "Climate 2021: Physical Science," 18.

⁴⁰ The Economic Times, "Global Warming Making Siachen Riskier for Soldiers," *The Economic Times*, July, 2018, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/-global-warming-making-siachen-riskier-for-soldiers/articleshow/53696876.cms>; Dr. Moonis Ahmer, "Environment: Meltdown at Siachen."

⁴¹ Inter Services Public Relations, "Press Release," Inter Services Public Relations, April, 2013, [https://ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail](https://ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail;); Richard

incident cannot be directly attributed to climate change as no scientific research established the link but the role played by glacial melting and increased warming in the northern areas of Pakistan cannot be discounted. The Gayari avalanche also points to the kind of dangers and threats that can arise as per projections.

Glacial warming has also changed the operating environment for troops deployed on Siachen. Those changes include an increase in greenery on high altitudes, formation of crevices, and instances of rainfall which had not been experienced before by troops stationed on the Indian side.⁴² Particularly, crevices create deadly situations for troop movement. They also effect other operational issues like the deterioration of helipads and logistical dropping zones.⁴³ Moreover, mountain warfare as a whole can be affected due to difficulties in troop movement stemming from the unusual snow melt. These observations must be seen and analysed in tandem with the previously mentioned warming projections, specific to Pakistan's northern region. Thus, the above stated threats may only become worse for military security.

There have been other cascading impacts from the warming patterns and trends. Increase in extreme weather events and hot days threaten operational readiness and force capacity through their effects on military equipment and training abilities.⁴⁴ As a result both the Army and Air Force of Pakistan face threats. Fighter jet performance of even some of the most advanced air forces is hindered and periods of extreme heat reduce military training abilities.⁴⁵ Specifically, aircrafts are affected due to a reduced ability to carry payloads or travel the same distances with the same amount of fuel, necessitating more refuelling or shorter flying

Leiby, "Himalayan Avalanche Buried Scores of Pakistani Troops, Army Says," *The Washington Post*, July 4, 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/

⁴² The Economic Times "Global Warming Making Siachen Riskier for Soldiers."; Dr. Moonis Ahmer, "Environment: Meltdown At Siachen."

⁴³ P.K. Gautam, "Changing Geographical Factors in Planning and Conduct of Indian Military Operations," *Strategic Analysis* 32, no. 2 (2008), 248, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09700160801994878>.

⁴⁴ Louise Schaik et al., "Ready for Take-off? Military Responses to Climate Change," Netherlands Institute of International Relations, The Hague, Clingendael, March, 2020.

⁴⁵ Louise Schaik et al., "Ready for Take-off? Military Responses to Climate Change," 7; P.K. Gautam, "Changing Geographical Factors in Planning and Conduct of Indian Military Operations," 249; Bruce Stanley, "US Military Destabilised by Climate Change in the Middle East," *Orient XXI*, June, 2021, <https://orientxxi.info/magazine/us-military-destabilised-by-climate-change-in-the-middle-east,4885>.

distances.⁴⁶ This could result in mission cancellation, strain crisis response, and dampen air force training potential.

Extreme heat days, heat waves, and an overall increase in higher mean and increasing daily maximum temperatures can make training activities and military machine movement for the army impractical and dangerous for their respective health and sustainability.⁴⁷ This has been highlighted in literature addressing climate change and geographical issues for the Indian military which means it has comparative applicability for Pakistan's military as well. Resultantly, mechanised operations can be impacted due to reduced functionality and added maintenance costs of mechanised weapon systems. As a consequence, military security is threatened through reduced crisis response abilities, operational readiness, and border patrolling capacity as some of the domains that are negatively affected.

It is important to note that Punjab and Sindh, as stated before, experience higher than average warming and extreme heat-based events.⁴⁸ Both of these provinces also house strategically important operational and forward military bases.⁴⁹ Due to the aforementioned impacts of warming and extreme heat, their training abilities and operational readiness will be threatened as well as Pakistan's overall military security; thus creating vulnerabilities that could be exploited by adversaries. While direct threats from climate change to military security are the most existential and potent, Pakistan also faces indirect threats in the light of its disproportionate risk to climate change induced disasters.

Indirect Threats to Military Security Severe and Frequent Flooding

Indirect threats from climate change to Pakistan's military security are also likely to impact operational readiness by reducing force capacity. Flooding risk and its impact creates these threats and the severity as well as increased frequency of disasters stems from intersecting climate change manifestations.⁵⁰ In any such disaster, the military of a country is often called for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) efforts due

⁴⁶ "Climate Change Implications for U.S. Military Aircraft," Center for Climate and Security, 2019, 1-3.

⁴⁷ P.K. Gautam, "Changing Geographical Factors in Planning and Conduct of Indian Military Operations," 249.

⁴⁸ World Bank Group, "Climate Risk and Country Profile: Pakistan," 6.

⁴⁹ Lt. Gen. Prakash Katoch, "Nuclear Pakistan.," Global Security, "Pakistan Air Force Bases."

⁵⁰ World Bank Group, "Climate Risk Pakistan," 3; World Bank Group, "Climate Profile Pakistan," World Bank Group, 2021, 20.

to its institutional capabilities and quick response capacity.⁵¹ However, the increased frequency and intensity of climate change induced severe floods would even limit the military's capacity for HADR after a certain threshold.⁵²

Pakistan has experienced many floods since 2000 but the 2010 floods, due to their severity, provide an example for the reliance on the military for HADR efforts. The Armed Forces were crucial in initiating immediate rescue efforts and the resources used of the military included a significant number of helicopters, hovercrafts, boats, and numerous personnel in rescue relief teams as well as 10 air bases.⁵³ Therefore, the rate of involvement and resource use of the military will also increase resulting in stresses and reduction of force capacity and its dilution. These would combine to impact operational readiness and military security subsequently.

Addressing Climate Change Threats to Military Security in Pakistan

The identified climate change threats to military security must be addressed through substantive actions. This study, suggests a few of those actions and directional steps to the military sector as the primary stakeholder. The suggestions stem from the discussed understanding of the military sector where its primary responsibility is to protect the state from external and internal military threats in addition to non-military threats. The military is increasingly realising climate change as a threat to the existence of the state. It has signalled towards the importance of the environment in its operations through forestation efforts.⁵⁴ Such signs of its realisation indicate military's readiness to adopt measures to deal with the climatic threats to military security.

Recognition and Formalisation as a Military Security Threat: A primary issue in acting on climate change threats, regardless of the sector they threaten, is its acceptance and declaration as an existential security concern by the referent object which in this case is Pakistan's military sector. Its sector specific securitisation must be the first point of action for Pakistan's military. There is some work done in this regard which can be witnessed through different Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) press

⁵¹ Shirley Scott and Shahedul Khan, "Implications Climate Change Military," 86; Louise Schaik et al., "Ready for Take-off? Military Responses to Climate Change," 25.

⁵² Centre for Climate and Security, "Climate Security 101," 4.

⁵³ National Disaster Management Authority, "Annual Report 2010," National Disaster Management Authority Pakistan, 2011, 17.

⁵⁴ Sarfraz Ali, "'Go Green Week': Pakistan Army to Plant 60,000 Trees in Cantonments," *Daily Pakistan*, March 16, 2016.

releases where Pakistan's navy has taken the lead in the matter.⁵⁵ However, similar actions must be taken from all the services of the military as none is immune. Currently, there is no formal institutional cell or department dedicated for this purpose in the military structure. The recognition of climate change as a threat to military security must be formalised through the creation of a climate security cell in the Joint Services Headquarter (JSHQ) of Pakistan military's institutional infrastructure. Formalisation under the JSHQ would allow for a wide-ranging acceptance of climate change as a threat to military security and subsequent substantive climate action.

Discourse Creation for Climate Security Action: There is an alarming discourse surrounding the nexus between climate change and military security in Pakistan despite the disproportionate risk it faces from climate change threats.⁵⁶ For this purpose, establishment of a think tank/research institute called Joint Services Climate Security Centre (JSCSC), under the JSHQ, with the scope of studying, understanding, and analysing climate change threats to the military sector of Pakistan and its security. The output should cover the entire range starting from reports, research papers, and books to round table discussions, webinars and international conferences. Due to the requirement of sector specific knowledge, JSCSC would require both military and climate change experts from both the public and private sector. Military experts should be inclusive of serving military personnel or recently retired ones, as operational experience is crucial for tangible climate security action in the context of military security.

Knowledge Sharing on Climate Security and Confidence Building: A regional climate security military summit or conference should be initiated, under the auspices of JSCSC, where military contingents or representatives along with climate change experts speak on how climate change can threaten military security and comprehensive security as a whole. Military to military contact on an academic level in regards to deal with the common adversary i.e. climate change, can start the process of bridging gaps and fostering confidence to ease tensions that have persisted between India and Pakistan in South Asia.

Climate Security Education for Military Officers: Military officers are required to complete both academic and military education throughout their career. Officers should complete their Staff Course and then a War Course at higher ranks, for which only a few are selected, but still

⁵⁵ Inter Services Public Relations, "Cns Message On The Occasion Of World Oceans Day – 2021," Inter Services Public Relations, June, 2021, <https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail.php?id=6182>.

⁵⁶ David Eckstein, Vera Künzel, and Laura Schäfer, "Global Climate Risk Index 2021," 13.

constitute a significant percentage. The officers at the helm of affairs must be imparted knowledge about climatic threats to Pakistan's military security. This can be done through introduction of climate security courses as a part of their Staff Course and War Course education.

Data Monitoring and Technology Improvements for Climate Change Threats: Knowing the threats is necessary for protecting military security against them and requires enhanced climate change data monitoring capacity. Capacity building and technological improvements for Pakistan Meteorological Department's (PMD) early warning systems and data monitors that collect and analyse information related to the direct threats is required. Additionally, PMD's Glacier Monitoring unit should conduct regular and accurate studies to analyse volume loss, density loss, and crevice formation through advanced equipment and increased human resources with relevant expertise. This information can provide critical data for Pakistan Army's troop deployment in glacial regions and an information sharing mechanism or a collaborative framework should be established between PMD and JSCSC.

Conclusion

It is highly unlikely for one security sector to remain immune from another. In the case of the military sector and the environmental sector, their link is more impactful than usual. This link in Pakistan is manifested in climate change projections. These do not exist in isolation. Even within countries, there are variations on a geographical basis. Therefore, a country-specific view is useful and for Pakistan, it highlights certain trends, observations, and threats that will impact the military security. The most notable of these are drastic flooding risks, sea level rise, cyclone risks, and warming patterns of both frequency and severity in tandem with glacial melting. In Pakistan, flooding risks pose indirect threats, through force dilution from HADR stresses, while other climate change manifestations present direct threats.

Threats from climate change can directly impact naval assets and infrastructure through sea level rise and cyclone risks. Furthermore, threats from warming patterns that cause glacial melting impact troop movement, deployment, and logistics in Siachen. They also threaten military training and force capacity because of extreme heat related events. Warming patterns even reduce the operational readiness of the Pakistan Air Force by impacting aircraft and fighter jet performance. The most noteworthy part of these threats to military security in Pakistan is that they can be more intense in areas of strategic significance. This includes Siachen as the highest conflict zone, Sindh, and Punjab with important, operational, and forward military bases. In either case, direct or indirect threats, vulnerabilities are formed which could be exploited by adversaries. Collectively, there is a demonstrably observable link between

the underscored threats from climate change and Pakistan's military security. Climate change indeed endangers military assets and infrastructure, dilution of force capability, troop transportation and logistics, and operational preparedness.

There are some directional measures that can lead to further implementable steps address and reduce the threat impact from climate change to military security. The primary measure is the recognition of climate change as a strong impact factor to threaten military security directly and indirectly. This allows for subsequent action that aims to address that impact. To that effect, the paper suggests the creation of a climate security cell under JSHQ. In addition, there is a requirement of discourse creation for tangible and substantive climate security action that is well grounded in climate change realities and military security domains. For this purpose, the JSCSC is recommended to establish a think tank which involves both climate change experts and military officials (serving, retired, and civil/academic). Relatedly, better data monitoring through technology improvements is required in the PMD to identify climate change threats along with an information sharing mechanism with the JSCSC. The JSCSC is suggested to be used for Confidence Building Measures between India and Pakistan through regional climate security military conferences. Also, the paper suggests the inclusion of climate security courses in Staff Course and War Course curricula of the military academies so that officers receive training for additional preparedness in the changed environment in which their operations and duties will be conducted.

ADDRESSING CYBER VULNERABILITIES THROUGH DETERRENCE

Nida Shahid* & Ahmad Khan**

Abstract

The study analyses the possible responses to cyber-attacks through cyberspace deterrence. The inundated cyber-attacks have prompted major powers to establish cyber deterrence. However, in the absence of a model of punishment, as it is empirically found in the nuclear domain, the efficacy of cyber deterrence is limited. The model of punishment against cyber-attacks is based on the traditional nuclear deterrence model, which is either deterrence by denial or deterrence by punishment. Cyber deterrence may not be a replica of traditional deterrence and give similar response measures in a cyber-attack. The assured retaliation in cyber requires an explanation of response measures that do not cause collateral damage. The paper concludes that cyber aggressors escaped retaliation due to the lack of attribution and not being punished due to limited retaliatory measures.

Keywords: *Cyberspace, Deterrence, Networks, Doctrine, Communication, Credibility*

Introduction

The cyber domain has gained importance since the advent of computerized networks as the foundation for military and economic power.¹ As States' reliance on digital platforms increases, their

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¹ There is voluminous literature on the importance of cyber domain in military and economic power of the state. e.g., John Naughton, "The Evolution of the Internet: from Military Experiment to General Purpose Technology," *Journal of Cyber Policy* 1, no.1 (2016): 5-28; Joseph Bussing, "The Degrees of Force Exercised in the Cyber Battle Space," *Connections* 12, no. 4 (2013): 1-14; Jeffrey L. Caton, "The Army Role In Achieving Deterrence In Cyberspace," *Strategic Studies Institute*, US Army War College, 2019, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep20084>; also see Beth E. Lachman, et al, "Information Technology Trends," In *Key Trends That Will Shape Army*

national, military and economic securities remain at risk from cyber threats.² The States' and peoples' reliance on computer networks has grown more since the Covid-19 outbreak because of the worldwide lockdown.³ The advent of the digital domain, the need and means to protect assets in the cyber world has gained traction.

One of the major issues within the cyber space is the lack of physical boundaries.⁴ Clear physical and geographic boundaries, which demarcate the extent of land, sea and air domains, do not exist in cyberspace. Thus, the scope of securing the cyber space becomes a more daunting task.⁵ In cyberspace, it is not enough to merely secure the computer networks. No matter how holistic, security is, it can be breached by a single well-planned cyber-attack exploiting an overlooked area.⁶ There have been many examples in the past of such incidents where nefarious actors have successfully circumvented a state's cyber security to launch a successful attack. One such attack that targeted American intelligence agencies was the SolarWinds cyber-attack in December 2020.⁷ With technological breakthroughs in cyberspace weaponry happening at lightning speed, states have started engaging in warfare by cyber means.⁸

Installations of Tomorrow (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013), 171–206.

- ² Julian Jang-Jaccard and Surya Nepal, "A Survey of Emerging Threats in Cyber Security," *Journal of Computer and System Sciences* 80, no. 5 (August 2014): 973-993.
- ³ Rahul De', Neena Pandey and Abhipsa Pal, "Impact of Digital Surge during Covid-19 Pandemic: A Viewpoint on Research and Practice," *International Journal of Information Management* 55, no.1 (December 2020), and also see Pew Research Centre's quantitative assessment of digital reliance during the pandemic, Colleen McClain, "The Internet and the Pandemic," *Pew Research Center*, September 1, 2021, <https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2021/09/01/the-internet-and-the-pandemic/>.
- ⁴ Kenneth J. Miller, "Understanding the Unique Challenges of the Cyber Domain," (Dissertation. Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, March 2010).
- ⁵ There is general understanding that cyberspace is created by man whereas land, sea and air are by nature. This concludes that cyberspace is easier to change and border less. Dorothy E. Denning, "Rethinking the Cyber Domain and Deterrence," *Joint Force Quarterly* 77, no. 2 (2015): 8-15.
- ⁶ Dan Lohrmann, "Planning for a Nation-State Cyber Attack — Are You Ready?" *Government Technology* (blog), February 13, 2022, <https://www.govtech.com/blogs/lohmann-on-cybersecurity/planning-for-a-nation-state-cyber-attack-are-you-ready>.
- ⁷ Marcus Willett, "Lessons of the Solar Winds Hack," *Survival* 63, no. 2 (2021): 7-26.
- ⁸ Yuchong Li and Qinghui Liu, "A Comprehensive Review Study of Cyber-Attacks And Cyber Security; Emerging Trends and Recent Developments," *Energy Reports* 7, no.1 (November 2021): 8176-8186; and also RA Atrews,

Stuxnet and the Russian-Georgian cyber conflict and tactical cyber operations by the US against Islamic State (IS) in Afghanistan are examples of such cyber operations.⁹ Thus, cyber warfare is being employed for desired effects at the strategic and tactical levels.¹⁰

Thus, states consider responses through deterrence strategy to protect the cyber space, which may deter nefarious actors from instigating such attacks.¹¹ The question, however, remains whether cyber deterrence is even possible.¹² As is the case in traditional deterrence models, the threat of punishment must be evident and credible so that there is no ambiguity regarding retaliation.¹³ It must be etched in words as well as actions. Any possible deterrence theory for cyberspace will constitute the

"Cyberwarfare: Threats, Security, Attacks, and Impact," *Journal of Information Warfare* 19, no. 4 (2020): 17–28.

⁹ For details on reported cyber incidents (2006–March 2021), "Significant Cyber Incidents Since 2006," *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, accessed May 15, 2022, <https://www.csis.org/programs/strategic-technologies-program/significant-cyber-incidents>; and also Sico van der Meer, "State-level Responses to Massive Cyber-Attacks: a Policy Toolbox," *Clingendael Institute*, December 2018.

¹⁰ Answers to some key questions like the utility of military cyber capabilities in conflict situation are explored by Matthias Schulze, "Cyber in War: Assessing the Strategic, Tactical, and Operational Utility of Military Cyber Operations," in *12th International Conference on Cyber Conflict. 20/20 Vision: The Next Decade. Proceedings 2020*, G. Visky et al (eds.) (Tallinn 10132, Estonia: The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 2020), 183–197.

¹¹ For U.S cyber deterrence, *Cybersecurity: Deterrence Policy* (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, January 18, 2022). Russian cyber deterrence is analysed by Erica Lonergan and Keren Yarhi-Milo, "Cyber Signaling And Nuclear Deterrence: Implications For The Ukraine Crisis," *War on the Rocks (blog)*, April 21, 2022, <https://warontherocks.com/2022/04/cyber-signaling-and-nuclear-deterrence-implications-for-the-ukraine-crisis/>; and Chinese cyber deterrence policy is explained by Ariel E. Levite et al., *China-U.S. Cyber-Nuclear C3 Stability* (Washington DC: CEIP, April 2021).

¹² American understanding is that a limited US cyber deterrence strategy is possible with limited success with the help of effective cooperation with partner states. See Timothy M. McKenzie, *Is Cyber Deterrence Possible?* (Maxwell, AL: Air Force Research Institute, 2017). As far as SolarWinds attack is concerned, the U.S. did not retaliate despite knowing the origin of the attack. This reflects that deterrence in cyber space is limited to an extent that its communication part exists but employment or punishment is completely missing.

¹³ Robert Jervis, "Review of Deterrence Theory Revisited," by Alexander George and Richard Smoke, *World Politics* 31, no. 2 (1979): 289–324; Glenn H. Snyder, "Deterrence and Power," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 4, no. 2 (1960): 163–78; and also Todor Tagarev, "Theory and Current Practice of Deterrence in International Security," *Connections* 18, no. 1/2 (2019): 5–10.

same critical facets as the theories which came in the past.¹⁴ The study aims to understand present theories and concepts related to deterrence strategies and subsequent actions in cyberspace. Conceptualizing and preparing actions and subsequent responses to a cyberattack are daunting since the basic foundations of cyber deterrence are unclear despite a dearth of traditional and nuclear deterrence theories. Finding a mix of passive and active deterrent actions is the key to building a retaliatory cyberspace strategy.

Finding an answer to the question of how cyber deterrence works is the study's primary objective. It focuses on the nature of cyber warfare and security, the emerging cyber threats, impacts of cyber-attacks as well as the challenges in cyberspace. Keeping these attributes in mind as well as looking at empirical evidence from recent cyber-attacks, the study attempts to ascertain the possibility and means of understanding cyber deterrence theory. The paper is divided into four sections: In the beginning, most recent cyber-attacks are exemplified to understand, how modernized cyber warfare is and what are its impacts? The second section explains cyber-space vulnerabilities and challenges. The third section addresses these vulnerabilities through cyber deterrence concerning the effectiveness of the model of punishment. The last section focuses on the ingredients required to establish cyber deterrence.

Understanding Cyber Attacks

The world has witnessed more cyber-attacks since the twenty-first century. As the states' and individual reliance and access to network systems increases, so does their ability as well as vulnerability in cyberspace. At least three international skirmishes have escalated to conflict levels initiated by cyber-attacks. These include the Israeli-Palestinian conflict of 2000,¹⁵ the Russo-Estonian conflict of 2007,¹⁶ and the Russo-Georgian conflict of 2008.¹⁷ The Ukraine war is also witnessing

¹⁴ Cyber deterrence is different from nuclear deterrence however the punishment model may resemble the nuclear deterrence model. States' digital reliance and economic activities are dependent on the cyber domain therefore their survival may be ensured through establishing deterrence strategies in the cyber domain while having a punishment model to persuade the enemy not to commit any future course of aggression. Christopher Haley, "A Theory of Cyber Deterrence," *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, (February 06, 2013).

¹⁵ Patrick Allen and Chris Demchak, "The Palestinian-Israeli Cyberwar," *Military Review*, (March–April 2003).

¹⁶ Stephen Herzog, "Revisiting the Estonian Cyber Attacks: Digital Threats and Multinational Responses," *Journal of Strategic Security* 4, no. 2 (2011): 49–60.

¹⁷ Ronald J. Deibert, Rafal Rohozinski and Masashi Crete-Nishihata, "Cyclones in Cyberspace: Information Shaping and Denial in the 2008 Russia–Georgia War," *Security Dialogue* 43, no. 1 (2012): 3–24.

cyber-attacks by Russia and the US intelligence agencies have warned that Russia may launch cyber-attacks on the US and its western allies due to severing of diplomatic relations over the war.¹⁸ The abovementioned incidents are not isolated events since cyber-attacks for political purposes, with or without governmental support, are becoming frequent.¹⁹

Not all cyber operations with malicious intent can be grouped as cyber-attack.²⁰ Merriam-Webster dictionary defines an attack as a violent act against something or someone. Translating that to the cyber space means that the state infrastructure, such as economic or military, is 'something' against which a cyber-act of violence has occurred. The Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare describes a cyber operation, "whether offensive or defensive, as one which is expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage or destruction to objects."²¹ Traditionally, experts have categorized a cyber-attack as (permanent) one which causes physical damage to property or injury to persons.²² However, cyber operations categorized as disruptive, aggressive or causing temporary damage could also potentially rise to the level of a cyber-attack depending on their impact on intangible state infrastructures such as the economy.²³ The US SolarWinds attack of December 2020 is one of the most recent examples of a systemic cyberattack that exploited vulnerabilities in the network system of U.S' national agencies.²⁴

¹⁸ David E. Sanger, "Russia Was Behind Cyberattack in Run-Up to Ukraine War, Investigation Finds," *The New York Times*, May 10, 2022, <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/10/us/politics/russia-cyberattack-ukraine-war.html>

¹⁹ Ashley Lukehart, "2022 Cyber Attack Statistics, Data, and Trends," *Parachute*, January 4, 2022, <https://parachute.cloud/2022-cyber-attack-statistics-data-and-trends/>.

²⁰ There is no single definition of cyber-attack. For that purpose see definitions prepared by IBM, Kaspersky, CISCO, and Microsoft etc.

²¹ "It identifies international law principles applicable to cyber warfare and enumerates ninety-five black-letter rules governing such conflicts. Topics addressed include sovereignty, state responsibility, the *jus ad bellum*, international humanitarian law, and the law of neutrality," Michael N Schmitt, *Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare* (Tallinn 10132, Estonia: The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 2013).

²² Yuchong Li and Qinghui Liu, "A Comprehensive Review Study of Cyber-Attacks and Cyber Security; Emerging Trends and Recent Developments," *Energy Reports* 7, no. (2021): 8176-8186.


²³ McKenzie, "Is Cyber Deterrence Possible?" 4.

²⁴ On SolarWinds finds President and Vice Chair of the Microsoft blog, Brad Smith, "A Moment of Reckoning: the Need for a Strong and Global Cyber Security Response," *Microsoft* (blog), December 17, 2020; Microsoft identifies vulnerabilities in the networks in US intelligence agencies setup that led to the Solar Winds attack, "A Deep-Dive into the Solar Winds Serv-U SSH

US Solar Winds Attack

Solar Winds cyber hacking attack is one of the biggest cyber attacks that targeted US government agencies, including intelligence and nuclear administration agencies, labs and private companies.²⁵ The attack targeted ten major US agencies, including the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), US Treasury, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Commerce and parts of the Pentagon.²⁶ The exact scale of the attack still remains unknown; however, more than eighteen thousand computers attached with over two hundred and forty networks being run by SolarWinds were attacked.²⁷ The SolarWinds breach highlights US cyber security vulnerabilities. The attack was carried out using "Trojanized" updates to SolarWinds' Orion IT monitoring and management software posted on the company's website. The Trojanized update run code created three backdoors (Sunburst, Sunspot and Teardrop) into the compromised networks that hackers exploited for credential theft. Cyber security companies, including Fire Eye, Microsoft and Crowd Strike, carried out an assessment of the Trojanized code and identified three different strains.²⁸

Fig1: Trojanized Backdoor Codes



Vulnerability," *Microsoft*, September 2, 2021, <https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/09/02/a-deep-dive-into-the-SolarWinds-serv-u-ssh-vulnerability/>

²⁵ David E. Sanger, Nicole Perlroth and Eric Schmitt, "Scope of Russian Hacking Becomes Clear: Multiple U.S. Agencies were Hit," *New York Times*, September 9, 2021, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/14/us/politics/russia-hack-nsa-homeland-security-pentagon.html>


²⁶ "Explained: A Massive Cyberattack in the US, using a Novel Set of Tools," *Indian Express*, December 29, 2020, <https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/us-solarwinds-hack-cybersecurity-fireeye-russia-7110550/>

²⁷ Dina Temple-Raston, "A 'Worst Nightmare' Cyberattack: The Untold Story of The Solar Winds Hack," *NPR*, April 16, 2021.

²⁸ Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages Solar Winds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor, *Fire Eye*, December 13, 2020, <https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/>

It was assessed that the cyber-attack remained dormant for weeks before being detected. A timeline of events mapped by SolarWinds shows that the attack began in September 2019.

Fig: 2 Attack Timeline- Overview



All Events, Dates and Times Approx. and Subject to Change, Pending Completed Investigation.

The Solar Winds attack highlighted the US cyber-security vulnerabilities as well as problems associated with attribution in the cyber space. If a developed country like the US remains vulnerable to such cyber-attacks despite its advanced Cyber Security Directive, there is reason to assume that countries with nascent cyber-security programs remain even more vulnerable. The Trump administration blamed Russian involvement in the attack.²⁹ American officials have blamed the Russian military hacking group "Cozy Bear" for the breach. FireEye, Microsoft and CrowdStrike have assessed that Sunburst and Sunspot source codes resemble Kazuar. It is a malware strain linked to the Turla group, which is alleged to be Russia's most sophisticated State-sponsored cyber espionage outfit. Researchers at Kaspersky and Symantec have identified similarities between Sunburst and Kazuar source codes. However, Russian intelligence agencies denied the involvement.³⁰ The attack left more diplomatic bitterness in US-Russia relations.

The Solar Winds cyber-attack suggests limited US cyber deterrence responses. The US was preparing to retaliate against Russia. However, no

²⁹ US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has blamed Russia for what is being described as the worst-ever cyber espionage attack on the US government. See, "US Cyber-Attack: Russia 'Clearly' behind Solar Winds Operation, says Pompeo," *BBC News*, December 19, 2020.

³⁰ Guy Faulconbridge, "Flattered Russian Spy Chief Denies Solarwinds Attack - BBC," *Reuters*, May 18, 2021.

specific details were shared. The White House press secretary Jen Psaki stated that the government will carry out "a mix of actions seen and unseen."³¹ President Biden announced more sanctions on Russia after the Solar-Winds attack. However, it is debatable whether economic sanctions would establish cyber deterrence's effectiveness.

Iran Nuclear Facility Attack

In April 2021, while the world powers and Iran were attempting to re-negotiate the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Natanz nuclear facility in Iran suffered an electrical blackout resulting in damage from the centrifuges housed at that facility.³² The blackout came a day after Iran disclosed that new advanced centrifuges had been set up at the facility.³³ The Iranian leadership termed the attack at Natanz as an act of nuclear terrorism through the cyber space.³⁴ It is argued that an explosive device was planted, likely by Israel, near a gas line. However, experts believed that a cyber-attack was used to trigger the incident.³⁵ Later, an unnamed Middle Eastern intelligence official revealed to the New York Times that Israel had caused the blast at Natanz. Previously, Israel's foreign minister Gabi Ashkenazi had responded obliquely when asked if Israel was behind the incident, saying, "It is better not to mention our actions in Iran."³⁶

While most cyberattacks are not considered physical attacks³⁷—as they mostly pertain to the theft of virtual information or sabotage of virtual infrastructure— the Iranian nuclear program has been repeatedly targeted with cyber- attack which caused physical damage. 'Stuxnet' attack at the same Natanz facility a decade earlier remains one of the first demonstrations of cyber-attacks with physical manifestations. Computer

³¹ K. Holt, "US Plans 'a Mix of Actions' against Russia over Solar Winds Cyberattack," *Engadget*, March 8, 2021.

³² Siobhán O'Grad, "What we Know about the Natanz Nuclear Site Attack," *The Washington Post*, April 14, 2021.

³³ Ronen Bergman, Rick Gladstone and Farnaz Fassihi, "Blackout Hits Iran Nuclear Site in what Appears to be Israeli Sabotage," *New York Times*, April 13, 2021.

³⁴ "The Usual Culprits," *Tehran Times*, April 21, 2021.

³⁵ David E. Sanger, Eric Schmitt and Ronen Bergman, "Long-Planned and Bigger than Thought: Strike on Iran's Nuclear Program," *New York Times*, July 10, 2020.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Russell Buchan, "Cyber Attacks: Unlawful uses of Force or Prohibited Interventions?" *Journal of Conflict and Security Law* 17, no. 2 (2012): 211–27. He considers that as per Article 2(4) UN Charter if cyber- attacks cause physical damage then it violate the said Article. However, many of the cyber-attacks do not cause physical damage, therefore are thus not captured by Article 2(4). However, it does not mean that cyber-attacks are lawful rather coercive and nevertheless violate the non-intervention principle.

codes caused real-world physical damage by interfering with the centrifuges controllers, spinning them at breakneck speeds, resulting in slow-motion explosions, which were not detected until it was too late.³⁸ It is one of the most sophisticated and targeted operations jointly run by the US and Israel.³⁹ The Stuxnet attack provided a new understanding of cyber-attacks to the world that cyber-attacks could also cause physical damage.

Vulnerabilities and Challenges in the Cyber Space

Advancements in the cyber space have been occurring at lightning speed in recent years, with more actors realizing that the vulnerabilities inherent in the cyber space can be exploited. In order to develop deterrence against cyber-attacks, one must first understand the vulnerabilities and challenges inherent in the cyber space.⁴⁰ Some of the main challenges and vulnerabilities of the cyber space, which States would need to contend with while formulating any potential cyber deterrence policies are elaborated below.

Regulation and Attribution

One of the most significant challenges and vulnerabilities in the cyber space remains that of regulation and attribution.⁴¹ Vulnerabilities associated with deterrence in the physical domain are amplified in the cyber space due to attribution difficulties. For States' cyber deterrence to be seen and presumed as credible and capable, they have to demonstrate their ability to not only pre-emptively detect the attack but also attribute it to the right actors. "Assumptions about identity, intent, nature or rationality of a typical cyber adversary can be called into question when

³⁸ To understand the physical damages caused by the Stuxnet, Jon R. Lindsay, "Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare," *Security Studies* 22, no.3 (2013): 365-404.

³⁹ Gordon Corera, "Iran Nuclear Attack: Mystery Surrounds Nuclear Sabotage at Natanz," *BBC News*, April 12, 2021.

⁴⁰ There is a dearth of literature of vulnerabilities and challenges to cyber security. Some of the research papers are analyzed for literature review. J Chen, "On Levels of Deterrence in the Cyber Domain," *Journal of Information Warfare* 17, no. 2 (2018): 32-41; Robert Ghanea-Hercock, "Why Cyber Security Is Hard," *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, (2012): 81-89; McKenzie, "Is Cyber Deterrence Possible?"; and also see Sitara Noor, "Cyber (In) Security: A Challenge to Reckon with," *Strategic Studies* 34, no. 2/3 (2014): 1-19.

⁴¹ Annegret Bendiek and Matthias Schulze, "Attribution: A Major Challenge for EU Cyber Sanctions," *German Institute for International and Security Affairs*, SWP Research Paper 11, December 2021; and also see Amanda G. Hill, *The Ultimate Challenge: Attribution for Cyber Operations* (Maxwell, AL: Air Command and Staff College, n.d).

forming the basis for retaliation."⁴² Attribution is a time-consuming and expensive endeavour. It has been proved by the SolarWinds attack as well as solving the mystery of Iran's allegation of an Israel-led cyber-attack on Natanz.

For cross-border cyber-attack investigations, the jurisdictional limitations can further hinder the efforts to establish the attack's origin and the attacker.⁴³ Going through official lines of communication to request access to data and evidence is onerous and can hamper the investigation when the information needs to be collected as quickly as possible. One of the most pertinent examples, which signify the difficulties related to attribution, is that of the Mariposa botnet, which was involved in denial-of-service attacks and cyber-scamming.⁴⁴ The botnet consisted of thirteen million computers being used for malicious activities. Attribution for the botnet was a momentous exercise involving hundreds of human hours and research to track the source IP and the cyber actor.⁴⁵

Emerging Technologies

Today's world is overrun by many emerging technologies, all of which have direct or indirect implications in the cyber space. Artificial Intelligence (AI), Machine Learning (ML), Blockchain Networks, Big Data, Internet of Things (IoT), mega constellations,⁴⁶ cloud and quantum computing are few of the many transformative technologies which will have a substantive impact on physical and cyber spaces. As likely as these emerging technologies are radically changing how humans work, communicate and even fight in the future, they are simultaneously capable of disrupting vital services and posing a massive threat to strategically vital networks.⁴⁷

⁴² Steve Winterfeld and Jason Andress, *The Basics of Cyber Warfare Understanding the Fundamentals of Cyber Warfare in Theory and Practice* (Waltham, MA: Syngress, 2012), 123.

⁴³ Alexandra Perloff-Gilest, "Transnational Cyber Offenses: Overcoming Jurisdictional Challenges," *The Yale Journal Of International Law* 43, no.1 (2018) 191-227.

⁴⁴ Ali Zerdin, "Cyber Mastermind Arrested, Questioned in Slovenia," *The Washington Times*, July 28, 2010.

⁴⁵ Steve Winterfeld and Jason Andress. *The Basics of Cyber Warfare Understanding the Fundamentals of Cyber Warfare in Theory and Practice* (Waltham, MA: Syngress, 2012), 123.

⁴⁶ Russia disrupted Satcom services provided by a Viasat satellite. But SpaceX's broadband constellation Starlink provided internet services in Ukraine. This shows the power of mega constellations providing commercial satellite internet. Mega constellations of internet services are also considered as part of emerging technologies.

⁴⁷ Robert A. Manning, "Emerging Technologies: New Challenges to Global Stability," *Atlantic Council*, issue brief, 2020, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep26000>. He argues that Disruptive

With the advent of 5G technology, the attack surfaces and the number of entry points for hackers increase drastically as more devices with minimal security features are connected to the same grids. Not only do these interconnected devices increase vulnerabilities in the cyber space, but their ability to communicate with each other also remains one of the weakest links in 5G security.⁴⁸ AI and ML are other facets of emerging technologies, which will have consequences for the cyber space. These technologies have become critical linchpins in information security as they exponentially increase the speed with which data is identified and analysed. Owing to their ease of use and increasing ease of access, cybercriminals can use AI technologies to go through defences while avoiding detection and subsequent attribution. Therein lies the 'AI/cybersecurity conundrum.'⁴⁹ While AI and ML can guard against cyber-attacks, sophisticated cyber criminals can also bypass the security algorithms through data manipulation using the same technologies. This manipulation can remain dormant and undetected until the right time, which will have integrated into the victim's cyberspace.⁵⁰

Cloud Computing Risks

Cloud computing is the availability, on demand, of online servers for data storage without the physical and active involvement of the user. Cloud computing has revolutionized cyberspace, enabling users to keep large-scale data freeing up their servers at remote locations. It has accelerated the speed of work for businesses and organizations. Given its popularity, cloud computing is expected to reach 947.3 billion by 2026.⁵¹ However, as with most beneficial technologies, there is also a downside – cloud vulnerabilities- in this case. Cloud data centers experience the same threats as traditional data centers. However, given the virtual nature, the vulnerabilities increase. Businesses are shifting their operations to the cloud, making cloud providers a profound target for hackers. In this

technologies, also known as emerging technologies pose new risks and challenges to strategic stability across increasingly contested global commons—air, sea, cyber, and space.

⁴⁸ Fotios Kanellos, "Implications of 5G to Air Power – A Cybersecurity Perspective," in *Joint Air & Space Power Conference 2020 Read Ahead*, Bruce Hargrave (ed) (n.d), <https://www.japcc.org/read-aheads/joint-air-space-power-conference-2020-read-ahead/>.

⁴⁹ "Using Artificial Intelligence in Cybersecurity," *Balbix*, accessed May 15, 2022, <https://www.balbix.com/insights/artificial-intelligence-in-cybersecurity/>

⁵⁰ Maria Bada and Jason R.C. Nurse, "Profiling the Cybercriminal: A Systematic Review of Research," (paper, 2021 International Conference on Cyber Situational Awareness, Data Analytics and Assessment (CyberSA), 2021), 1-8.

⁵¹ "The Top 5 Cloud Vulnerabilities to Watch Out for in 2022," *Alert Logic Staff*, January 20, 2021, <https://www.alertlogic.com/blog/top-cloud-vulnerabilities/>

connection, Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks are frequent. A business-oriented website in a DDoS attack remains at the attacker's mercy for days or even weeks, which may result in loss of revenue, brand authority and customer trust.

On the other hand, there is a greater possibility of adversaries gaining access to exploit vulnerabilities in cloud computing. One of the most common and exploitable vulnerabilities is account hijacking, where malicious actors can steal users' account credentials through phishing, key logging, buffer overflow attacks, XSS attacks and brute force attacks.⁵² Likewise, cloud data breaches are increasing, especially since securing sensitive data is becoming daunting.

In cloud computing, Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) are convenient and efficient means of sharing information with two or more applications. However, insecure APIs can be another source of cloud vulnerabilities. API's greatest benefit is accessing data from any part of the world and from any device. Hackers are leaving no stone to unearthing to gain access to vulnerabilities and exploit authentication via APIs provided ample time. Hackers can exploit insecure APIs to access data and launch potential DDoS attacks.⁵³ With more and more private and public sector organizations increasing their dependence on APIs, the data becomes more vulnerable.⁵⁴ Additionally, exploitation of cloud system vulnerabilities, deliberate or accidental, by potential malicious insiders, including current and former employees, contractors and partners, cannot be ruled out.⁵⁵

Proportionality of Punishment

Warfare in the cyber space also raises unique complications about applying the International Humanitarian Law (IHL), especially regarding the use of force against civilians and proportionality of punishment.⁵⁶ Many experts believe that the Tallinn Manual only describes how the IHL might be applicable in the cyber space.⁵⁷ However, even under Tallinn

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Danko Kovacic, "API Security: The Complete Guide," *Bright*, April 4, 2022, <https://brightsec.com/blog/api-security/>; and also see "What is a DDoS Attack?" *Cloudflare*, accessed May 15, 2022, <https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/what-is-a-ddos-attack/>

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Atulay Mahajan, Sangeeta Sharma, "The Malicious Insiders Threat in the Cloud," *International Journal of Engineering Research and General Science* 3, no. 2 (March-April 2015): 245-256.

⁵⁶ *International Humanitarian Law and Cyber Operations during Armed Conflicts* (Geneva: ICRC Position Paper, November 2019).

⁵⁷ Peter Pascucci, "Distinction and Proportionality in Cyberwar: Virtual Problems with a Real Solution," *Minnesota Journal of International Law* 26, no. 2 (2017): 419-460.

Manual, the issues of distinction and proportionality for the protection of civilians are not addressed adequately. For example, the scope of what constitutes a civilian versus a military object remains unclear in the cyber space,⁵⁸ especially regarding data and functioning of cyber systems. Additionally, the definition of attack, as per IHL and Tallinn Manual, does not fully account for non-kinetic effects, which are likely to be greater in the cyber space.⁵⁹ Likewise, the assessment for damages as well as the calculation of damages remains vague in cyberspace. Encompassing all these factors is the lack of guidance for assessing the value of a cyber-attack for the response or punishment to be proportional.⁶⁰

Addressing Vulnerabilities through Cyber Deterrence

Deterrence as a concept has developed and endured since the advent of the first weapons. It became a more concrete concept following the advent of the nuclear age when States developed nuclear weapons to deter the adversary from initiating aggressive action.⁶¹ Whereas the deterrence theory has a historical lineage, dating back centuries, cyber deterrence is still in its nascent stages.⁶² Most of the academic literature on the subject has only been produced in the past fifteen or so years. One school of thought believes that cyber deterrence practices outpace the development of the theory. "Tactics, strategy, doctrine, and policy are developed and used even before corresponding theories are properly understood."⁶³ For any deterrence to be effective, actors need to understand their adversary's values and willingness to take risks when faced with a potential threat. However, deterrence in the cyber space lacks a model of punishment, unlike nuclear deterrence.

Communication and credibility of one's threat are also important factors for effective deterrence. Traditional deterrence models, especially

⁵⁸ Susan W. Brenner and Leo L. Clarke, "Civilians in Cyber Warfare: Conscripts," *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law* 4, no. 4 (October 2010): 1011–1076.

⁵⁹ Pascucci, "Distinction and Proportionality in Cyberwar."

⁶⁰ McKenzie, *Is Cyber Deterrence Possible?* and also Oona A. Hathaway et al., "The Law of Cyber-Attack," *California Law Review* 100, no. 4 (2012): 817–85.

⁶¹ Ahmad Khan and Ali Ahsan, "Deterrence in Indo-Pak Context: A Critical Appraisal," *Policy Perspectives* 13, no. 1 (2016): 53–76.

⁶² McKenzie, *Is Cyber Deterrence Possible?*; Mark Montgomery and Erica Borghard, "Cyber Threats and Vulnerabilities to Conventional and Strategic Deterrence," *Joint Force Quarterly* 102, (July 1, 2021); Stefan Soesanto and Max Smeets, *Cyber Deterrence: The Past, Present, and Future* (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2020); Max Smeets, "Cyber Deterrence Is Dead. Long Live Cyber Deterrence!" *Council on Foreign Relations*, February 18, 2020, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/cyber-deterrence-dead-long-live-cyber-deterrence>

⁶³ Alex S. Wilner, "US Cyber Deterrence: Practice Guiding Theory," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 43, no. 2 (2019): 245–280.

nuclear deterrence, presume a stable bi-polar relationship between adversaries with roughly equal capabilities, power and the expectation and will to avoid nuclear warfare at all costs. In the traditional concept of deterrence, referent States are needed. The referent States are considered rival or adversary States. In conventional concept, a referent State is easy to recognize, unlike in cyber deterrence, where attributing an attack is a primary challenge. One fine example is the SolarWinds hack, where major nuclear labs and administrations, including intelligence agencies' computer networks, were hacked. Unfortunately, a response did not come up because of the attribution challenge. President Biden and President Putin discussed the SolarWinds attack during Biden-Putin Summit in Geneva on 16 June 2021. However, awkward conversations over the subject did not let the issue be included in the joint statement issued by the White House.

The cyber space does not contain any elements that make traditional deterrence work, especially the issue of including a State as a referent object.⁶⁴ In the traditional model, two States are considered referent objects. The model does not include a non-State actor as a referent object in a deterrence model. In the cyber space, prominent challenges in the non-State actor led to attacks on a state's critical infrastructure.

Unlike traditional deterrence models, the cyber space is rife with an infinite number of asymmetric, constantly in flux, multilateral and bilateral relations between states and non-State actors, which make the development of a clear hierarchy of action and reaction a much more difficult task.⁶⁵ The availability of cyberspace to a wider group of actors complicates and undermines the stability, communication and clarity of threat for deterrence.⁶⁶ However, deterrence in the cyber space is still being termed as one of the few plausible means of preventing or defending cyber-attacks. The establishment of effective cyber deterrence requires the development of newer theories and their implementation mechanisms. Like traditional deterrence, cyber deterrence would only be successful if the adversary is dissuaded from taking aggressive action in the cyber

⁶⁴ David J. Betz, *Cyberspace and the State: Towards a Strategy for Cyber-Power* (London and New York: Routledge, 2017); Joseph S Nye, Jr., "Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace," *International Security* 41, no. 3: 44-71; Will Goodman, "Cyber Deterrence: Tougher in Theory than in Practice?" *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 4, no. 3 (2010): 102-135.

⁶⁵ Betz, *Cyberspace and the State*; also see Goodman, "Cyber Deterrence."

⁶⁶ Jon Lindsay and Erik Gartzke, "Coercion through Cyberspace: The Stability-Instability Paradox Revisited," In *Coercion The Power to Hurt in International Politics*, Kelly M. Greenhill and Peter J. P. Krause, eds., (London: Oxford University Press, n.d); Meer, "State-level Responses to Massive Cyber-Attacks," and also see, Edward Geist, "Deterrence Stability in the Cyber Age," *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 9, no.4 (Winter 2015): 44-62.

space. Also, like traditional deterrence, the adversary can be dissuaded from action through deterrence by denial and punishment.

Deterrence by Denial

Traditionally, deterrence by denial seeks to stop the adversary from taking any action by convincing them that their actions will not yield the desired results. For this type of deterrence to succeed, there needs to be no doubt in the adversary's mind regarding the futility of their action.⁶⁷ For deterrence by denial to work in the cyber space, one's defences must be made so strong that the possibility of a successful cyber-attack becomes low. Although, establishing it in cyberspace is extremely low. Still, as with all deterrence, the communication of strong defences needs to reach the adversary for deterrence to be effective.⁶⁸ Typically, deterrence by denial is achieved by having multiple layered defences, also known as the defence-in-depth concept. For deterrence by denial in the cyber space, the defences could include intruder detection systems, firewalls, encryption, and training and awareness of the practitioners. The possibility of breaching these defences cannot be ruled out unless assured cyber deterrence is established and communicated. Resilience against cyber threats as well as the flexibility of defences, are two of the key factors of deterrence by denial by the cyber space. Additionally, management and minimization of a cyber-attack's potential consequences are likely to augment the deterrence by denial by making the adversary weigh the costs and benefits of an attack.

Deterrence by Punishment

Deterrence by punishment is the alternative to the deterrence by denial concept. Deterrence by punishment works by letting the adversary know that the punishment in retaliation for action will be dire. In this case, the threat of retaliation and punishment must be perceived by the adversary as more costly than any potential gains. Therefore, for the threat of retaliation to work, attribution of the action must be established.⁶⁹ In the case of the SolarWinds attacks, the attribution challenge reduced the chances of punishment. Although the Biden Administration announced sanctioning Russia after the SolarWinds attack, the key question here is whether economic sanctions establish assured cyber deterrence.

⁶⁷ Michael C. Williams, "Rethinking the 'Logic' of Deterrence," *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 17, no. 1 (1992): 67–93; and also see Michael J. Mazarr, "Understanding Deterrence," *RAND Corporation*, 2018.

⁶⁸ Robert Morgus, "Deterrence by Denial: The Missing Element of U.S. Cyber Strategy," *Lawfare* (blog), March 11, 2020, <https://www.lawfareblog.com/deterrence-denial-missing-element-us-cyber-strategy>.

⁶⁹ Anthony Ellis, "A Deterrence Theory of Punishment," *The Philosophical Quarterly* (1950-) 53, no. 212 (2003): 337–51.

Answering this question is a tough job as such measures so far cannot persuade State and non-State actors not to commit any future course of aggression in cyberspace. However, it may be noticed that if the US being an economic power, decides to put economic sanctions on a country; then it might contribute toward a cyber compellence. Still, such measures may not work against those States whose economic systems are invariably different from the world economy influenced by the US economic power.

Deterrence by punishment in the cyber space works on the same principles. However, the issue becomes complicated owing to the difficulty of attribution in cyberspace.⁷⁰ In the cyber space, deterrence by punishment can be exerted through retaliatory strikes against the perpetrators and potential pre-emptive strikes should the adversary's intentions become clear. It is risky to assert deterrence by punishment, but other means, including putting under economic sanctions, have also failed to achieve the desired outcome. While these are non-kinetic means of punishment, kinetic means, such as the attack against tangible targets, economic strangulation, and diplomatic brokering, may also be employed as deterrence by punishment.⁷¹ The complications with such actions remain the attribution factor and proportionality of the response options. For an effective cyber deterrence strategy, both denials of objectives as well as fear of proportional retaliation needs to factor into the adversary's calculation of whether the cost of the cyber-attack is worth the perceived benefits. Once again, the Solar Winds and Stuxnet and other Iran's cyber-attack allegations on Israel can be exemplified where the issue of attribution restricts the power to retaliate similarly. In Iran's case, Israelis were not persuaded by the veiled threats of being militarily attacked by the former.⁷² However, one proposed model could be to wait and see and launch a non-kinetic retaliatory cyber-attack to at least cause physical damage with tremendous economic loss.

Factors for Effective Cyber-Deterrence

Cyber deterrence remains difficult to execute, while an integral and necessary element of cyber-security, owing to several factors. Several facets must align in order for the deterrence strategy to be effective. These include communication, signalling, attribution and proportionality of

⁷⁰ Liam Nevill and Zoe Hawkins, "Deterrence by Punishment in Cyberspace," in *Deterrence in Cyberspace: Different Domain, Different Rules* (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2016).

⁷¹ Western literature argues that there are kinetic means to be employed in the cyber-domain. But once again the issue of attribution may lead to dissolution of such an approach.

⁷² Arie Egozi and Brad D. Williams, "Iran Threatens Israel after Cyber Strike on Nuke Facility," *Breaking Defence*, April 12, 2021.

retaliation.⁷³ Without these factors, the adversary may not receive and process the intended purpose, thus inflating the risks of misunderstanding and misinterpretation, leading to potential escalation and physical altercation.⁷⁴

Communication

Communication remains one of the essential elements of any deterrence strategy, be it traditional, nuclear or cyber. There is a need to effectively communicate to the adversary what is acceptable and where the redlines are, crossing which would result in a reaction. In the cyber-space, communication holds a vital function since the space is rife with ambiguity. Addressing malicious activities in the cyber space, where actors are unknown to each other, broken communication pathways can further complicate the ability to send clear indicators for potential de-escalation. However, effective communication in the cyber-space would require the establishment of norms and a common lexicon, both of which are difficult to achieve, given today's global environment.⁷⁵

Signalling

Signalling is another important aspect of deterrence and is closely linked to communication. Signalling has been used to dissuade and compel certain actions by adversaries in many areas, including the decision to go to or avoid war, crisis management, economic negotiations and diplomatic relations. Signalling remains a vital element of any deterrence strategy to showcase intent to the adversary. Without signalling, the possibility of deterrence by punishment would run the risk of escalating tensions because of being misconstrued and misinterpreted. Signalling in the cyber-space can be achieved overtly through diplomatic and established channels of communication or covertly through media and other cyber means.⁷⁶

Attribution

As already established, attribution remains one of the cyber space's most vital and difficult aspects. With the advent of newer stealth

⁷³ Eric Sterner, "Retaliatory Deterrence in Cyberspace," *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 5, no.1 (Spring 2011):62-80.

⁷⁴ Will, "Cyber Deterrence." and also see, Sandeep Baliga, John L and Helen Kellogg, Deterrence with Imperfect Attribution, *Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University*, accessed May 15, 2022, <https://economics.mit.edu/files/14938>.

⁷⁵ Brian Harding, "Cyber Deterrence," (Dissertation., Air War College, Air University, 2016).

⁷⁶ *Cybersecurity: Deterrence Policy* (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, January 18, 2022).

technologies in the cyber-space, savvy nefarious actors employ multiple techniques to hinder the correct identification of the attacker and the attack's correct point of origin. Despite the difficulties, attribution remains vital for any deterrence strategy to work as the main premise of deterrence, especially deterrence by punishment, is the fear of greater retaliation.⁷⁷

Several problems are associated with quick and accurate attribution, including the possibility of misattribution, availability of data, analysis of the attack patterns, time, identification of motives etc. Nevertheless, attribution remains one of the most important factors for deterrence by punishment to be successful in the cyber-space.⁷⁸ On the other hand, attribution may not always be necessary to engage the deterrence by denial strategy. Non-destructive pre-emptive actions, including defence-in-depth and augmentation of their security systems, are measures that states take for cyber-security. Even without attributing the action to a particular adversary, these measures allow actors to augment their deterrence. Successful cyber-deterrence strategies should blend the technical, cognitive and behavioural investigation of the adversary to identify and take appropriate actions correctly.⁷⁹

Conclusion

The traditional concept of deterrence rests on its three manifestations; capabilities, communication and credibility. The traditional deterrence concept resides on clearly defined referent states, which is not the case in cyberspace, leaving little space to orchestrate an assured cyber deterrence model. However, this does not conclude that maintaining cyber deterrence is difficult. Primarily, a punishment model in the traditional concept of deterrence is based on deterrence by denial or deterrence by punishment. This tells varied response options- kinetic and non-kinetic. In the contemporary world, challenges and vulnerabilities faced by the States germinate a need to establish deterrence in the cyber world to ensure State's survival. The study concludes that cyber deterrence is unlike nuclear deterrence and works only at a limited level primarily due to attribution and increasing cost-benefit ratio. Cyber deterrence manifests a limited punishment model, works at a limited level,

⁷⁷ Michael Farrel, "Attribution and its Role in Deterrence," *Institute for Information Security & Privacy*, accessed May 15, 2022, <https://www.ntsc.org/resources/ntsc-blog/>

⁷⁸ Jan Dymant, "The Cyber Attribution Dilemma: 3 Barriers to Cyber Deterrence," *Security Intelligence* (Blog), December 28, 2018, <https://securityintelligence.com/the-cyber-attribution-dilemma-3-barriers-to-cyber-deterrence/>.

⁷⁹ Sandeep Baliga, "Deterrence with Imperfect Attribution," *American Political Science Review* 114, no. 4, (November 2020): 1155-1178.

and requires tremendous input to outweigh any possible outcome. The study concludes that the examples of SolarWinds and Iran's allegations of Israel's cyber-attack on its nuclear installation indicate that capabilities are not yet able to create enough credibility for cyber forces. States have launched cyber-attacks on other states but escaped retaliation due to lack of attribution. However, credible cyber forces are not yet prepared to launch a preventive or defence counter cyberspace attacks. The adversaries have yet not denied benefits or persuaded of any course of aggression as the States establishes only limited cyber deterrence.

CLIMATE CHANGE AND MIGRATION: NEW CHALLENGES TO GLOBAL SOUTH

Erum Muzaffar*

Abstract

In 21st century, climate change has emerged as one of the major threats to mankind. Although climate change is a global phenomenon, but it's not affecting the world equally. The International Federation of Red Cross claims that in recent years—more than war and persecution—climate change disasters are a bigger cause of population displacement. This poses new challenges to the Global South. In the developing countries, it is not only climate change but other push factors which have compelled people to migrate internally or internationally. The study explores the causes of climate-induced migration and its impact on developing countries. The paper is based on qualitative research. To deal with climate-induced migration, the Global South requires a new framework for managing potential movements. It also need to collaborate and work on mitigation, adaptation, and risk reduction strategies at national and regional levels.

Keywords: *Climate-induced Displacement, Climate Refugee, Global South, Risk Reduction Strategies*

Introduction

Climate change has become one of the major drivers of human displacement in recent decades. The movement of people as a result of changes in environment is not a new phenomenon. For centuries, people have been moving seasonally, in response to climate change, as an adaptive strategy.¹ In 1985, United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) report described the environmentally conditioned migration.

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¹ Frank Laczko and Christine Aghazarm (ed.), *Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Assessing the Evidence* (Geneva: IOM, 2009).

Professor Essan El-Hinnawi –author of the report – first used the term environmental refugee as “those people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of marked environmental disposition (natural and/ or triggered by people) that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously affected their life”.² Furthermore, International Organization for Migration (IOM) define ‘environmental migrants’ as “persons or groups of persons who, for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive change in the environment that adversely affect their lives or living condition, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or chose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad.”³ In 1990, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) warned about the risks of climate related disaster. It states that sudden and slow changes in climate can cause human displacement at regional and global level.⁴ Later, in 1992, UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali argued at Security Council that ‘drought and disease can decimate no less mercilessly than the weapons of war’.⁵

Traditionally, war and other human disasters are considered the push factors while better socio-economic opportunities act as pull factor. Migration, as a result of environmental degradation and rapid events related with climate change, has increased in the past few decades. Climate related migration has become a new frontier for research. The International Strategy Disaster Reduction report of 2009, clearly indicates increased events of natural calamities three fold in the past three decades. Furthermore, it also links migration with slow and rapid events of climate change.⁶

In 21 century, climate changes – rapid and slow together– have altered the physical environment. Across the globe there has been marked increase in natural disasters and gradual land degradation. Though climate change is a global phenomenon but its impact is not equal in every part of the world. Developing countries have to face more challenges than the

² Bogumil Terminski, *Development-Induced Displacement and Resettlement: Theoretical Framework and Current Challenges* (Geneva: 2013) <https://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/8833>.

³ Susan Martin, “Climate Change, Migration and Governance,” *Global Governance* 16, no. 3 (2010): 397-414.

⁴ Laczko & Aghazarm (ed.), *Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Assessing the Evidence*.

⁵ Karen Elizabeth McNamara, “Conceptualizing Discourses on Environmental Refugees at the United Nations,” *Population and Environment* 29, no.1 (2007): 12-24.

⁶ United Nations, *International Strategy for Disaster Reduction* (New York: United Nations 2009).

developed one. Hallegatte et.al⁷ discussed five aspects of the poor people hit by natural disasters. Overexposure, higher vulnerability, less ability to cope and recover, permanent impacts on education and health, and, effects of risks on saving and investment behaviours are common factors for the developing countries – facing the challenges of natural disasters. Their ability to deal with catastrophic event is limited to capacity building. It is pertinent to mention that climate change is not the sole driver of migration. In the developing countries there are other push factors – for instance, poverty, fragile government, inequality, lesser economic opportunities, loss of arable land, ethnic conflicts, and depletion of natural resources etc., which compel people to migrate internally or internationally. Betts argues that environmental displacement is complex interaction of environment with other factors such as livelihoods and state fragility.⁸ Climate-induced migration can be temporary, as most of the migrants return home when conditions are favourable; or it can be permanent if migrants get better opportunities and refuse to return; thus exerting pressure in the areas of relocation. This situation can lead to conflict. The level of preparedness and capacity of resilience, of affected communities, determine their choices and actions of staying or moving to safe areas. The level of mobility can be reduced with climate change resilience projects.

Numerically and geographically, developing countries are more vulnerable to large -scale forced migration. Oxfam report of 2017, reveals that between 2008 and 2016, people in poor countries were around five times more than people of high income countries to be displaced by natural disasters.⁹ The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) also states that eight countries, out of ten, are at highest risk of internal migration as a result of climate related events.¹⁰

In past few decades, impact of climate change on society has become significant because of increased natural calamities. Mostly, researches focus on a particular area affected by the disaster. The aim of the research is to explore the challenges faced by the global South vis-a-viz climate induced displacement. The vulnerabilities of affected population are more or less similar in low- and middle-income countries. This paper attempts to address following research questions:

1. What are the causes of climate-induced migration?

⁷ Stephane Hallegatte, et.al, *Unbreakable: Building Resilience of the Poor in the Face of Natural Disasters* (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2017). <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/>.

⁸ Alexander Betts, "Survival Migration: A New Protection Framework," *Global Governance*, 16, no. 3 (2010): 361-82.

⁹ Oxfam, "Uprooted by Climate Change: Responding to the Growing Risk of Displacement," 2017, <https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/>

¹⁰ Norwegian Refugee Council, "Disaster will Displace 14 million People Every Year," 2017, <https://www.nrc.no/news/2017/october/>.

2. What are the implications of climate-induced migration on developing countries?
3. How can Global South encounter the challenges of climate related migration?

The conceptual framework of this study is mainly migration and secondly climate change and its impacts on societies. The uprooting of population from their land due to slow and abrupt climate changes, stages and type of migration, relocation and plight of refugees are discussed in paper.

Methodology

The study is qualitative where primary and secondary sources are explored. The sources include research papers published in scientific journals, books, periodicals, policy papers, thematic reports, NGOs reports, newspapers etc. Furthermore, institutional websites such as Oxfam, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) World Bank and Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) have been reviewed for the latest updates. The collected data has been analysed to identify the common themes and issues of the developing countries pertaining to climate change and displacement. The literature review provided the insight information on challenges face by the developing countries in context of climate change and displacement.

Causes of Climate-Induced Migration

Climate-related migration is the result of slow-onset and sudden-onset changes in environment. The slow-onset changes in environment and climate include sea-level rise, land degradation, loss of arable land, drought, desertification etc. While, the sudden-onset changes are natural disasters such as floods, cyclones, intense heat wave etc. According to Susan Martin, environmental changes compel people to migrate internally or internationally because of:

- (a) the intensification of natural disaster
- (b) drought limiting the food production and access to clean water
- (c) increase in number of sinking islands due to rising sea level
- (d) competition over natural resource leading to conflict and in turn displacement.¹¹

After Copenhagen Conference in 2009, much attention was given to the gradual changes affecting the environment. In this context, the Cancun Agreement 2010 identified warming of earth due to rise in temperature, acidification of oceans, melting of glaciers and associated impact,

¹¹ Susan Martin, "Climate Change, Migration and Governance," 397-414.

degradation of land, deforestation, loss of biodiversity, desertification, and salinization as slow-onset events.¹² The Sub-Sahara African countries, South Asia, Middle East and parts of Latin America have experienced ill-effects of slow-onset changes in environment. Since last two decades they have been affected by the drought, desertification and water shortage resulting in decline of arable land, lesser food productivity and stress on remaining natural resources. UNHCR also affirms that human displacement is also related with decrease in natural resources, for instance, fresh water, food production, loss of arable land, fishing resources etc.¹³

In 2007, IPCC presented the projections for the twenty-first century, expecting increase in global warming, with estimates indicating a temperature increase of 3° C by 2100. The report predicted intensification of the hydrological cycle. Rainfall patterns are likely to change. Heavy and erratic rainfall in wet areas would turn them wetter, and lesser rainfall in arid and semi-arid zones will increase the dryness and aridity.¹⁴ Across the globe, developing countries are likely to be affected by the slow-onset climate changes. Crop productivity is projected to decrease at lower latitudes –Africa to be affected utmost – particularly in semi-arid and arid regions. Furthermore, salinization and desertification of agricultural land is expected in Latin America. With the loss of livelihood of agricultural communities, human movement from one degraded eco-zone to other zone is expected to increase in future.¹⁵ Along with slow-onset changes, rapid events – floods, erratic & heavy rainfall, cyclones, typhoons etc. – have emerged as the greater risks to the low-income countries.

The negative impacts of climate change on the eco-system have already caused severe damage to the land and people. In 1996, UNHCR's environmental guideline identifies six categories of environmental impact: natural resource degradation; irreversible impact on natural resources; impact on health; impact on social condition; social impacts on local population and economic impact.¹⁶ Local communities in the developing world stand testament to these impacts. In extreme cases, the degradation of livelihood of communities depending on natural resources compels people to migrate to the other areas.

¹² Denise Margaret Matias, "Slow-Onset Climate Change Impacts: Global Trends and the Role of Science Policy Partnerships," *Discussion Paper* (Bonn: German Development Institute, 2017)<https://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/>

¹³ UNHCR, "Climate, Natural Disasters and Human Displacement," *A UNHCR Perspective*, 2008, <http://www.unhcr.org/4901e81a4.pdf>.

¹⁴ United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change, "Slow Onset Events," Technical Paper, 2012, <http://unfccc.int/resource/>

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Adrian Martian, "Environmental Conflict between Refugee and Host Communities," *Journal of Peace Research* 42, no.3 (2005): 329-46.

Movement, as result of negative impacts of climate change on environment, is either internal or cross border. Migrants cautiously calculate levels of threats of staying in the hazardous zones with benefits of moving to safe places where they can find new opportunities before leaving a land.¹⁷ Migrants chose either to stay within their country or to cross the border, depending on their economic status and level of vulnerability. Climate-related displacement can be as follows in nature; internal / cross border migration, permanent/temporary, seasonal or circular. The pattern of internal migration can be rural-urban, rural-rural or urban- urban. Various studies suggest that climate related migration, in most of the cases, is internal. Further, McMichael et al argues that in developing countries, most of the rural-urban migration is circular. Displaced people have emotional and cultural attachment with their native land. They maintain their bond with their homeland and support their communities financially, too. For instance — research in Cote d'Ivoire indicates that people from Burkina Faso took great interest in development of basic facilities and agricultural modification of their villages by sending remittances to their hometown.¹⁸ Gioli et al endorsed the argument observing that in context of climate change it is often labour migration to benefit the areas via social and financial remittances.¹⁹ It is apparent from different climate- induced migration researches that in case of climate-induced migration people prefer to move internally. They avoid international migration because of its cost as moving from country of origin to country of destination is costly and people affected by disaster cannot afford it. Thereby, they want to stay close to their previous environment.²⁰

Circular migration is common in South Asia, too. Zaman's research (1989) explains the case of agricultural community of Bangladesh.²¹ After floods land was eroded and houses were destroyed, compelling families to migrate. People chose to stay within the two miles of their settlement.²² McAdam also agrees that most climate related movement will be internal rather than cross-border, particularly in the case of natural disasters. In

¹⁷ Celia McMichael, et.al, "Climate Change, Migration and Health," *Environmental Health Perspectives* 120, no. 5 (2012): 646-654.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Giovanna Gioli, Talimand Khan, Suman Bisht and Jurgen Scheffran, "Migration as an Adaptation Strategy and its Gendered Implications: A Case Study from the Upper Indus Basin," *Mountain Research and Development* 34, no.3 (2014): 255-65.

²⁰ Anthony Messina and Gallya Lahan (ed.), *The Migration: Exploring Politics and Policies* (New Delhi: Viva Books, 2006).

²¹ Mohammad Q. Zaman, "Vulnerability, Disaster, and Survival in Bangladesh: Three Case Studies 1," In *The Angry Earth* (Routledge, 2019) 162-177.

²² Laczko & Aghazarm (ed.), *Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Assessing the Evidence*.

Kiribati and Tuvalu, people living on the outer islands will initially move internally to the main Atoll not directly overseas.²³

Internal Displacement Migration Centre (2016) reveals that from the years 2008 and 2015, 21.5 million people, per year, were uprooted by rapid onset events—floods and storms. The majority of displaced people prefer to stay within their country.²⁴ The severity of issue can be confirmed as Norwegian Refugee Council also ratified that storms, floods and droughts displaced over twenty-four million people within their respective countries in 2016 alone.²⁵

The case of Somalia's communities is an example of cross border climate- induced migration. Slow-onset of changes causing drought has displaced many a poor communities in Somalia. In 2011, Somalia experienced severe drought. Pastoralists were compelled to migrate because of lack of rainfall and political turmoil. The drought worsened the turmoil leading to violence. It affected the livelihood of pastoralists. This resulted in internal and cross border migration. Many pastoralists' tribes migrated to Kenya and Ethiopia. In Somalia drought was not the single push factor; political turmoil and violence together with drought acted as push force for pastoralists to migrate internationally.²⁶

Implications and Challenges to Global South

Climate change is not affecting the world equally. Low-income²⁷ and middle-income²⁸ countries are more vulnerable to the negative impacts of climate change. It is recognized that the single most dominant factor, which determines vulnerability to climate change is poverty. World Bank report (2017) discloses that natural disasters increase global poverty. "Poverty is thus a factor in the vulnerability of disasters; similarly, disasters are a driver of poverty."²⁹

²³ Jane McAdam, "Conceptualizing Climate Change-Related Movement," Proceedings of the Annual Meeting, *American Society of International Law* 106, (2012): 433-36.

²⁴ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), "Seizing the Momentum: Displacement on the Global Climate Change Agenda," 2016, Briefing Paper, <http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/publications/2016/20161102-climate-change.pdf>.

²⁵ Norwegian Refugee Council, "Disaster will Displace 14 million People every Year."

²⁶ Shweta Jayawardhan, "Vulnerability and Climate Change Induce Human Displacement," *Consilience*, no.17 (2017): 103-42.

²⁷ According to World Bank, Low-income Economies are Those with a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of \$1,045 or less in 2014.

²⁸ Lower middle income and upper middle-income economies are those with GNI per capita between \$1,046 to \$4,125 and \$4,126 to \$12,735 respectively.

²⁹ Stephane Hallegatte, et.al, *Unbreakable: Building Resilience of the Poor in the Face of Natural Disasters*.

Climate change impacts are felt differently (i.e. more strongly) to the vulnerable communities and nations. Not only communities and countries that are in areas where climate is altering rapidly and having negative impacts, but this is amplified for societies that are highly vulnerable to these impacts due to risk factors such as high poverty rate and inequalities. That is, climate change impact is exacerbated in societies that have fragile socio-economic situations.³⁰

IPCC had already warned about the repercussion of climate change on poor nations. It said 'it is low- income women and men within developing countries who are most at risk from climate change'.³¹

In developing countries, many urban communities are located in the areas where disaster risks are high. When people migrate to urban-poor settlements they will face ongoing threats associated with climate change, including shortage of water, flooding, sea-level rise, and extreme weather events.³² People migrating to Bangkok, Mumbai, Vietnam are not very safe from the risks of extreme events. In low and middle -income countries, the impact of climate change on ecosystem poses risks to the livelihood of the communities. Their well-being is threatened as they are dependent on natural resources. Alteration in ecosystem can compromise their livelihood. This can cause people to migrate as an adaptive strategy.³³ The 2017 report of Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) reveals the number of people displaced by natural disaster in 2016; the countries with largest number of displaced people include China, India, Philippine Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Indonesia and Cuba.³⁴ The weaknesses of developing countries are evident from this report. Furthermore, South Asia appears to be more susceptible than any other part of the world.

Bardsley & Hugo's studies finds the susceptibility of highland region by emphasizing that extreme monsoon, floods and resultant landslides have acted as push factors for rural people in Nepal. Furthermore, poverty, food insecurity and lack of local development

³⁰ MDG Achievement Fund, "Environment and Climate Change: Review of MDG-F Joint Programmes Key Findings and Achievements," http://mdgfund.org/sites/default/files/Environment_Thematic%20Study_0.pdf.

³¹ Oxfam, "Bolivia: Climate Change, Poverty and Adaptation," 2009, <https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/>.

³² Celia McMichael, et.al, "Climate Change, Migration and Health."

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ IDMC & NRC, "Global Report on Internal Displacement," 2017, <https://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/publications/>.

opportunities compel rural population to give up cultivation on their land and move to urban centers.³⁵

Another example of South Asia's vulnerability to climate change is case of Bangladesh. Cyclone Aila, 25th May 2009, hit six districts of Bangladesh. There was loss of 190 lives and three million of population was affected.³⁶ The cyclone destroyed the agriculture and shrimp farming. The livelihood of rural people was jeopardized. The male members of family had no option left but to migrate. They moved to urban areas to earn money for their families. Their migration was in order to make their lives better as there was no feasible alternative left in their place of origin.³⁷

As per MIT Lincoln Laboratory research, Bangladesh, contributes less than one percent of carbon emissions but is a victim of climate change more than any other country. Rice cultivation has been badly compromised because of sea level rising in the coastal area of Southern Bangladesh. Ninety millions population is directly suffering from the rapid and slow events of climate change.³⁸

Across the world, some of the thickly populated regions are overexposed to negative impacts of climate change. For instance, Java in Indonesia, Mekong delta, Cho Phraya valley (Thailand), coastal areas of China, river valleys of Pakistan, India and Bangladesh are countries, where some communities are vulnerable due to lesser levels of preparedness and resilience. The Institute for Climate and Sustainable Cities' findings further recognized the negative impact of climate change on South Asia and South East Asia. The report states that agricultural productivity would be reduced to 50 percent in the next three decades and 'agriculture serving as the backbone of most economies in the region, such plunging yield would shake countries to the core'.³⁹ This will accelerate the process of migration internally and internationally. The migrants in Asia have to leave their origin place and settle in other risk prone areas. Bangkok has been identified as one of most vulnerable city to coastal inundation. Parda argues that 20 million people are annually migrating from Bangladesh to

³⁵ Douglas K. Bardsley & Graeme J. Hugo, "Migration and Climate Change: Examining Thresholds of Change to Guide Effective Adaptations Decision-making," *Population and Environment* 32, no.2/3 (2010): 238-62.

³⁶ International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), Operation updated, October 8, 2009.

³⁷ Shweta Jayawardhan, "Vulnerability and Climate Change Induce Human Displacement."

³⁸ Kylie Foy, "Empowering People to Adapt on the Frontlines of Climate Change," *MIT News*, April 19, 2021, <https://news.mit.edu/2022/>

³⁹ Institute for Climate and Sustainable Cities, "Slow-Onset Climate Changes Impacts: What it is, Why should We Care, and What We can Do About It," 2014, http://icsc.ngo/sites/default/files/resources/Slow-Onset-Impacts-of-Climate-Change_iCSC.pdf.

India. He refers to Myers (2002) fear that climate refugee from Bangladesh alone might outnumber all current refugee worldwide.⁴⁰ Another study on migration regime highlights the Middle East's worsening situation. Koser⁴¹ explained that environmental degradation will reduce the fertile arable land in Middle East and North Africa. This will result in unemployment – youth would look for economic opportunities—forcing people to migrate.⁴² Many countries in Asia are dealing with post disaster plans. For instance, government of Philippine is working to permanently relocate a million people displaced by the Typhon Haiyan in 2013. They are utilizing their national resources along with international aid.⁴³

The African nations, too, have been experiencing slow-onset changes in environment since many decades. Drought, lack of rainfall, desertification have affected millions of Africans. With the increase in climate-related migration, the conflicts over natural resource have also intensified. Furthermore, the ruthless exploitation of natural resources by non-natives has accelerated the tension over the control of the resources. Sub-Saharan states are badly affected by poverty, political turmoil along with environmental degradation. The region comprises of 800 million people in 49 countries; its population for 2050 is projected to approach 1.5 billion people.⁴⁴ Another research by UN Environment Programme predicted that 'by 2060 there could be 50 million environment refugees in Africa alone'.⁴⁵ The vulnerability of Africa would further accelerate as there will be decrease in fresh water availability by 2020 in Africa eventually affecting between 75 and 250 million people.⁴⁶

Rachel Furlow traces the Darfur civil war with desertification and food insecurity. Population in Darfur relied on agriculture. Dry spell and high temperature resulted in drought, which negatively impacted the livelihood of those directly related with primary sector activities. Different groups migrated towards South Darfur increasing the social tension in the

⁴⁰ Architesh Parda, "Climate Refugee: Implications for India," *Economic and Political Weekly* 45, no.20 (2010): 76-79.

⁴¹ Khalid Koser, "Introduction: Internal Migration and Global Governance," *Global Governance* 16, no.3 (2010): 301-15.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Elizabeth Ferris, "Disaster, Displacement and Climate Change: New Evidence and Common Challenges Facing the North and South," 2015, Brookings Institution, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/planetpolicy/2015/07/27/>

⁴⁴ The World Bank, "4 Turn Down the Heat: Climate Extremes, Regional Impacts, and the Case of Resilience," 2013, <http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/>

⁴⁵ Petra Durkov, et al., "Climate Refugee in the 21st Century," 2012, Regional Academy on the United Nations, <https://fusiondotnet.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/climate-refugees-1.pdf>.

⁴⁶ Shweta Jayawardhan, "Vulnerability and Climate Change Induce Human Displacement."

area. The burden on natural resources multiplied with increased food insecurity, creating a low-intensity local conflict among the migrants and the host population. Khartoum's failure to address the challenge of climate-migration-conflict link, resulted in the civil war.⁴⁷

The highest cross border movement around the globe was witnessed in Eastern Horn of Africa. In 2020, the region hosted 6.5 million internally displaced persons due to climate related events. The uneven weather patterns were recorded earlier in 2018, with increase in hot and dry conditions, in Somalia, Eritrea and Djibouti. The risk of prolong drought created fear in the communities directly linked with agriculture. The food insecurity impacted 12 million people of this region. Nonetheless, in coming years this region is more vulnerable to climate related events resulting in internal and circular migration.⁴⁸

African states are also working to eradicate different environmental crisis. The case of Mozambique is worth mentioning. In rural areas, authorities had focused on a resettlement process by providing basic infrastructure and locals were encouraged to produce solid houses. However, resettlement is causing additional problems as well. The affected population is still dependent on government and international aid and remain very vulnerable to future flooding.⁴⁹

In Latin America, floods, cyclones, heavy rainfall has created havoc in the last few years. Although desertification of the Amazon rainforest was globally discussed, but negative impacts of other slow-onset changes in agriculture countries were not highlighted in international media. Many Latin American countries are going through environmental and climate changes which is affecting the livelihood of poor pastoralist and agricultural communities. Oxfam highlighted the dilemma of this region. Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador are vulnerable to climate change. They are least responsible for global warming but are paying the prices of massive industrialization in the developed world.⁵⁰ In this region migration trend is internal. People move within their country to avoid hardships of cross border migration. The Oxfam exclusive report on Bolivia exposed its vulnerability. Flooding, landslides, epidemic and drought affected thousands of Bolivians. Since the beginning of twenty-first century, the frequency of natural disaster has increased markedly.

⁴⁷ Rachel Furlow, "Addressing the Politics of the Climate-Migration-Conflict link," *Forced Migration Review*, Oxford Issue 69 (Mar 2022): 14-16.

⁴⁸ Eric Nelson and Saira Khan, "Climate and Migration in East and the Horn of Africa: Spatial Analysis of Migranys flow Data," IOM UN Migration and Havard Humanitarian Institute, August 16, 2022, <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/climate-and-migration-east-and-horn-africa-spatial-analysis-migrants%E2%80%99flows-data>

⁴⁹ Laczko & Aghazarm (ed.), *Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Assessing the Evidence*.

⁵⁰ Oxfam, "Bolivia: Climate Change, Poverty and Adaptation."

The period of 2001 to 2004, saw the highest number of declaration of emergency in the last seventy years'.⁵¹

It is likely that climate related migration would increase in food insecure areas where hunger is prevailing and large number of population is malnourished.⁵² It aggravates the insecurity of poor individuals or communities if they have been forced to leave their country of origin. Furthermore, the huge population settled in destination area would exert pressure on natural resources. It is likely that host community and refugees will compete for resources and end up in conflict. Nordqvist and Krampe highlighted the risks of conflict in host communities and migrants in case of interstate and intra-state migration.⁵³

Usually, the conflict between the locals (host communities) and outsiders (migrants) occurs over the resources of the area. The xenophobic attitude of the locals is unfavourable in places where socio-political stability is at a lower level. The influx of migrants is perceived as a burden on the local resources of the land and liability to the region. Regions experiencing environmental migration –with population stress – are expected to be in a worse scenario in future. Sinking small island states like Tuvalu and Maldives, flooding in deltaic plains – for instance, Mekong Delta, Inner Niger and Ganges Delta – drought affected and desertized regions like Sahel are prone to adverse climate change in coming years.⁵⁴ Presently, much attention has been giving to issues related with climate change and its impact on humans. Many developing states are trying to cope up with the negative impacts of changes caused by climate with various strategies. UNDP Project (2003) intended developing countries to take account of their own future. They suggested that countries of South cooperate and collaborate each other thus, enhancing the South-South cooperation.⁵⁵

Recommendations

The Global South can counter climate-related challenges, including displacement as following:

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Celia McMichael, et.al, "Climate Change, Migration and Health."

⁵³ Pernilla Nordqvist and Florian Krampe, Climate Change and Violent Conflict: Sparse Evidence from South Asia and South East Asia," SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security No. 2018/4: September 2018.

⁵⁴ Laczko & Aghazarm (ed.), *Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Assessing the Evidence*.

⁵⁵ Arif Dirlik, "Global South: Predicament and Promise," *The Global South* 1, no.1 (Winter 2007): 12-23.

At Local Level

- Environmental consciousness must be inculcated in local people. Environmentally aware population can conserve and protect their natural resources passionately.
- Indigenous communities and their knowledge should be integrated in conservation and preservation strategies as these communities – particularly in Asia and Africa – has been the custodian of land and its resources.
- Introduction of policies securing the livelihood of communities depending on natural resources.
- Participatory approach should be encouraged. Bangladesh government had launched cyclone preparedness programme in which locals participated actively.
- To deal with the slow-onset changes, adaptation of sustainable agricultural practices, management of pastoral lands, construction of dykes, embankments and coastal barriers should be planned to reduce the pressure on fragile eco-system.

At National Level

- It is necessary to strengthen the institutions by adopting proactive policy to deal with the climate related issues.
- Integration of local and national strategies for effective capacity building.
- Formulation of environmental/climate change policy, clearly defining the hazards and risk zones in the country
- Early warning system should be highly vigilant in order to avoid extensive damages.
- Preparedness policy must cover both pre-disaster and post-disaster action plan.
- Well planned relocation policy for migrants. For instance, Vanuatu, in the Pacific Islands, has developed protective measures and operational procedures for resettlement.⁵⁶
- To address the land degradation issue, sustainable land management practices need to be introduced in country.
- Climate resilient, migrants friendly towns have been set up by Bangladesh. Such towns would not exert demographic pressure on the densely populated urban centers.

⁵⁶ International Organization for Migration (IOM) 2018, Vanuatu: National Policy on Climate Change and Disaster-Induced Displacement, https://www.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd1486/files/press_release/

At Regional Level

- Collaboration with neighbouring countries, experiencing the similar threats, is recommended.
- Formulation of a regional environmental policy emphasizing on collaboration and common threat of climate change issues, sharing scientific and technical knowledge that can prepare the developing country to combat the aftermath of climate change.
- The role of regional organizations (SAARC, ECO, AU, ASEAN) needs to be enhanced to deal with environmental issues in twenty-first century.
- Relief-web and Oxfam are quite actively working for displaced people. Another notable organization, Relief International operates in sixteen states of Asia and Africa. Refugee International helps migrants, in Americas, Asia and Africa.
- It is necessary to check that host communities do not turn hostile towards migrants. Maintenance of peace in areas of disaster is necessary for implementation of policies
- Carrabin Movement Agreement on climate migration, is a good example of free movement between member states. In 2017 hurricane, governments soften border restrictions and allowed affected populations to move towards safe places on other islands.⁵⁷

At Global Level

- Global South needs to work with the developed countries in order to eradicate poverty, inequality which in turn enhances the vulnerabilities of poor nations to respond to climate change impacts. On the other hand, it is the responsibility of developed states to finance the adaptive strategies in the Global South which have become victim of Green House Gasses (GHG) emissions produced by the developed nation.
- Mitigation is a significant response to deal with the threat of global warming. Developed countries should reduce their GHG emissions to 2°C temperature in future
- The scope of refugee regime should be extended. The status of environmental/ climate refugees should be recognized by the International law.
- It is necessary to deal with the challenges of climate-related migration – by providing climate-migrants protection and humanitarian aid – especially in time of an increasing resentment towards migrants around the world.

⁵⁷ Ama Francis, *Free Movement Agreements & Climate-Induced Migration: A Caribbean Case Study* (New York: Columbia Law School, 2019)<https://disasterdisplacement.org/portfolio-item/fma-caribbean>

- Increase in Climate Change Research Fund is highly recommended. To reduce risks, strategies for preparedness and mitigation planning is suggested.

Conclusion

Global South constitutes of many developing states. Though there is diversity across the South – in terms of geography, culture, languages, developments etc., many factors are similar too. The comparable factors include poverty, dense population, unemployment, lack of education and health facilities, inequality, poor governance and in some cases colonial history, civil and human rights violations, abuse, war, hunger, disease etc. Now a days, climate change has emerged as one such threat. IPCC had warned the climate related disasters in 1990 and feared that such natural disasters can uproot the population which is vulnerable and exposed to natural disasters.

The impacts of climate change have been quite negative on the poor countries of the world. Climate induced migration is one of the negative effects of change in environment. With slow and rapid changes in environment, most of the poor communities in developing countries have lost their livelihood. Frequent natural disasters, drought, scarcity of water, increased vulnerability of islanders with exposure to rising sea level are major push factors of population displacement. Slow and sudden on-set changes in the middle and lower latitudes, have increased the climate related migration in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Slow onset changes, particularly, drought, scarcity of food and water have exerted undesirable pressure on livelihood of Sub-Sahara African, South Asian and South American countries. Communities, especially, dependent on agriculture, have no other option left but to migrate. Furthermore, sudden and rapid events for instance— flood, heavy rainfall, typhoon also pose greater threat to exposed population of developing countries having with zero or lesser resilience. From 2008 to 2015, floods and storms caused twenty-one and half million people, per year, to displace. At the initial and intermediate stages of slow onset climate change, the migration is often voluntarily opted by the affected population with meagre resources to move from one place to other. It is more of an adaptation strategy. The ongoing deterioration of eco-systems across the world is increasing the hardships of the poor communities dependent on natural resources, causing temporary and circular migration.

It is important to encounter the challenge of climate and relate it to issues including migration, collectively. First it is necessary to comprehend and recognize the seriousness of climate- related disaster on poor countries. Secondly, developing countries should put forth pressure on the developed states to cut down carbon emissions causing disasters in the developing countries that are not responsible for global warming. Developing countries contribute the least of global carbon emissions but

are at greater risk of rapid and slow events of climate change. According to Global Climate Risk Index 2021, the most affected countries from 2000 to 2019 are Puerto Rico, Myanmar, Haiti, Philippines, Mozambique, the Bahamas, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Thailand and Nepal. A developed and developing countries collaboration can benefit the global environment. Thirdly, developing countries themselves avoid environmental-hazards development projects. All projects whether in developed or in developing countries should be in line with an environmental protection policy.

A more holistic approach is needed to deal with all the issues pertaining to environmental changes. At national and regional level, it is necessary to prioritize policy for land and natural resources management. Slow-onset changes in environment should be managed with viable strategies, thus, securing the livelihood of communities dependent on natural resources. This will in turn, reduce the migration too. If migration is inevitable, then national policy should be integrated with regional policies to protect the climate refugee in the region.

QUAD: A RECIPE FOR CONFRONTATION OR STABILITY?

Sheharyar Khan * & Dost Mohammad**

Abstract

Quad or Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, a group of four democracies, the US, India, Japan, and Australia, was first proposed in 2007 by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in his 'confluence of two seas' speech that subsequently embarked on the path to the foundation of the group. Quad perceives China's economic growth, which enables her to transform the world order as a threat and aims at containing the growing Chinese assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region. The Malabar naval exercises in the Indian Ocean by the Quad members were one such exercise. This paper, aims to analyze the formation of Quad and will contemplate whether the group is causing confrontation or stability in the Asia-Pacific and Indo-Pacific regions. The paper will also assess that the Quad is designed to counter China's growing influence in the Asia-Pacific and Indo-Pacific regions. Containing China is likely to create a confrontation in the region.

Keywords: Quad, Malabar Naval Exercise, Containment, Indo-Pacific, US Indo-Pacific Strategy

Introduction

The Quad, also known as the quadrilateral Security Dialogue, comprises four democracies, the US, India, Japan, and Australia. Interestingly, the idea of Quad was first presented in 2007 by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in his 'confluence of two seas' speech that later heralded the path to the foundation of the group.¹ China is emerging as a formidable threat to the Quad in the Indo-Pacific region and the creation of a quadrilateral coalition in 2017, by and large, is attributed

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¹ Vaibhav Kullashri, "Quad Grouping and India's Role in It," *The Kootneeti*, July 8, 2020, <https://thekootneeti.in/2020/07/08/quad-grouping-and-indias-role-in-it>.

to thwarting Chinese increasing influence in the region.² The primary objective of the Quad is to have a free and open Indo-Pacific region. The democratic norms consolidate ties of the Quad members and view China as a nationalistic and authoritarian government, crushing pro-democracy protesters in Hong Kong, and incarcerating Muslims in concentration camps in its Western region of Xinjiang. They suspected that Beijing has been stepping up threats of military force to occupy Taiwan.³ In the pretext of democracy, China's negation of democratic norms in Hong Kong and its growing foothold in the Asia-Pacific and Indo-Pacific regions bring the members of the Quad closer to countering China. Malabar Naval Exercises by Quad members in the Indian Ocean are designed to encircle China and to slow down its economic growth that by and large would have monolithic implications for the region as well as for the world. Such aggressive moves clarify that the group instead of a recipe for stability in the future is likely to open the way for a confrontation.

This paper looks into the changing geo-political and geo-strategic dimensions in the Indo-Pacific region with the lens of neo-realism. This theory tells us that the changing power equation in the region has affected the behaviour of the regional countries and powers. Since China has seen growth in power, it has affected the power equation. The rise of China has caused fear in the US, which is the reigning power. The structural change has caused a response from the US and its allies. The US feels challenged in the region and has resorted to external balancing by making a coalition of like-minded countries---the Quad. This alliance may not been possible if China was not rising and asserting itself. Based on this theory, this paper argues that the formation of the Quad is intended for containing the rising China. The containment would also entail confrontation. Instead of creating stability in the region, there is likelihood that it will lead to hostility. There is a convergence of interests among the Quad countries to contain China in the region. This will provide a balancing act in the region. But, this alliance does not seem to be defensive. The US is known for its offensive realist policies. It is thus further argued that the US and its allies, Quad, will pursue offensive realist policies and strategies against China. It is upto China, that how it perceives and responds to this alliance. This study uses qualitative analysis of the situation and takes stock of the historical development in the region.

Convergence among Quad Members

China's remarkable economic growth has enabled her to modernize its military, and enhance its economic, political, and diplomatic

² Ibid.

³ Z. Rasheed, "What is the Quad and can it Counter China's Rise?" *Al Jazeera*, November 25, 2020, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/25/what-is-the-quad-can-us-india-japan-and-australia-deter-china>.

clouds in the Asia-Pacific and Indo-Pacific regions, resulting in the creation of predicaments for the Quad countries. The US under the umbrella of the Quad leaves no stone unturned to thwart the Chinese presence and metaphorically uses the Quad as a shared interest in cementing a rule-based order in the Indo-Pacific region.⁴ The US officials under Trump's administration maintained that the US and India were the two largest democracies of the world and their democratic values had been intertwined by reinforcement of democracy. It further reiterated that the Quad, by all means, was an inclusive group, all four countries of the group were keen on welcoming other democratic countries into the group for cooperation.⁵ The US under Quad has accentuated a slogan of the "free and open" Indo-Pacific region. Washington's relations have further exacerbated with Beijing due to the prevailing trade war, South China Sea conundrum, the coronavirus fallout, human rights issue in Xinjiang, the crackdown in Hong Kong, the Taiwan crisis, intellectual property theft, press freedoms, and Artificial Intelligence (AI) race.⁶

In order to contain China, Japan has already started sharing intelligence with India, and Australia. Tokyo has regularly been sharing intelligence with Washington. Most considerably, Japan within its Ministry of Defence has established a new division to accelerate coordination with India and Australia on ASEAN and Pacific Island issues.⁷ Tokyo in its annual defense White Paper unveiled in July 2020 asserted that "China has relentlessly continued unilateral attempts to change the status quo by coercion in the sea area around the Senkaku Islands, leading to a grave matter of concern."⁸ Japan single-handedly unable to counter Beijing's unstoppable influence in the region views the Quad as a formidable platform to prevent China.⁹

New Delhi like Tokyo via the Quad intends to reduce China's ascendancy in the Indo-Pacific region and is thoroughly obsessed with reducing the latter's political and economic power in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as well as in the East and the African coastlines in the West. The Quad appears to be an application platform for New Delhi to oppose China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).¹⁰ It also

⁴ "Quad Countries Interested in Strengthening Rules-Based Order in Indo-Pacific," *Mint*, October 24, 2020, <https://www.livemint.com/news/world/>.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Derek Grossman, "The Quad is Poised to become Openly Anti-China Soon," *RAND*, July 28, 2020 <https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/07/the-quad-is-poised-to-become-openly-anti-china-soon.html>.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ "Why India must Exercise the Quad Option," *The Times of India*, October 15, 2020, <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/why-india-must-exercise-the-quadoption/articleshow/78676596.cms>.

remains the top priority of India to have uninterrupted access to ports across the Indo-Pacific region. However, Beijing's naval base at Djibouti in Africa clearly poses a grave threat to Indian interest in the region.¹¹ Consequently, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has forged agreements with Assumption Island (Seychelles), and Duqm (Oman) to protect Indian naval routes. India intends to leverage QUAD to protect its national interest in the Indo-Pacific region and exploit the Quad partnership as a bulwark against China.¹² S. Jaishankar, the Indian Foreign Minister in the Quad forum, articulated that "rebalance of global geopolitics is already underway; India is stepping out as never before. But India seeks to do a lot more, for instance, get into the driving seat of the Quad because this could be the core of new security architecture."¹³

Meanwhile, Australia is dissatisfied with China over the mishandling of human rights violations in Xinjiang and the demonstrations in Hong Kong. Canberra is deeply suspicious of Beijing's increasing influence on its domestic issues, ranging from politics to real estate and educational institutions. Both states are at daggers drawn on ideological issues too. Canberra is committed to reduce its excessive dependence on China, trying to bolster its ties with ideological partners of the Quad. Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison argues that it is in the national interest of the country to be aligned with "like-minded democracies" to stop China's expansion and aggression.¹⁴ Marise Payne, Australian Foreign Minister, in this regard, asserts that there is a need for an inclusive Indo-Pacific region that ought to be governed by rules and not by domination.¹⁵

The US administration under the presidency of Joe Biden looks forward to underpin the Quad to impede China's rapid assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region. Biden, in Quad virtual summit held on March 12, 2020, emphasized "free and open Indo-Pacific" and also indicated that the Quad would remain a key component in the US Indo-Pacific strategy. He further reiterated that the members of the Quad were going to play a crucial role in cooperation in the Indo-Pacific strategy.¹⁶ His predecessor Trump sought to punish China by following unilateral tools for instance imposing

¹¹ Derek Grossman, "India Is the Weakest Link in the Quad," *Foreign Policy*, July 23, 2018, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/23/india-is-the-weakest-link-in-the-quad/>.

¹² Derek Grossman, "India Is the Weakest Link in the Quad."

¹³ Indrani Bagchi, ET Bureau, "Chinese Belligerence: Whither Goes India, Will Go the Quad and the IndoPacific," *The Economic Times*, October 17, 2020, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/chineser>.

¹⁴ A Sadana, "Explained: Why Australia-China Ties have gone Down Under," *The Indian Express*, October 9, 2020, <https://indianexpress.com/article/>.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Abhijnan Rej, "In 'Historic' Summit Quad Commits to Meeting Key Indo-Pacific Challenges," *The Diplomat* March 13, 2021, <https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/>.

tariffs and sanctions. Biden, unlike, Trump has been trying to enhance the US strength by winning the confidence of his allies to work closely in the region.¹⁷ At the same time, Wang Yi, Chinese Foreign Minister had termed the Quad as an “Indo-Pacific NATO” through which the US had been striving to contain Beijing. Yi further said that the genesis of the Quad was based on the Cold War mentality, stirring up confrontation, aimed at stoking geopolitical competition to perpetuate the US hegemonic system in the world.¹⁸

The US Indo-Pacific Strategy

US is regarded as the leader of the Indo-Pacific region. The bona fide objectives of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy are to prevent China and to securitize its core interest in the region.¹⁹ India continues to play a vital role in the US Indo-Pacific Strategy. Japan, a pivotal partner of the US is unconformable with China’s growing economic and military powers, perceives, Beijing as a serious challenge, and believes the US as a reliable partner in the US Indo-Pacific Strategy. Australia warmly welcomes the US Indo-Pacific Strategy. Australian support for Indo-Pacific Strategy is aimed at enhancing its presence and interest in Southeast Asia.²⁰ Singapore and Indonesia have also welcomed the US Indo-Pacific Strategy that greatly expands the significance of their strategic locations.²¹

The Trump administration declassified the 2018 US Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific (SFIP) on January 5, 2021. The document revealed continuation of the US dominance in the region, bolstering economic ties with Southeast Asia by espousing trade agreements and investment standards set by the United States, and reducing the region’s economic reliance on China.²² SFIP underscores that US-China’s strategic competition will intensify by virtue of the US divergent goals and nature of economic and political systems of China as the latter tries its utmost to circumvent international rules for its advantage. The US blames Beijing’s intention to weaken the former’s alliances and its partnerships in the region. In the containment of China, India would play as a catalyst to counterbalance China. Beijing’s economic, military and diplomatic

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ananth Krishnan, “China’s Foreign Minister Says U.S. Using Quad to Build ‘Indo-Pacific NATO,’” *The Hindu*, October 13, 2020, <https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/>

¹⁹ “The Indo-Pacific Strategy: A Background Analysis,” *ISPI*, June 4, 2018, <https://www.ispionline.it/it/>

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Sebastian Strangio, “What Does the US Indo-Pacific Framework Say About Southeast Asia?” *The Diplomat*, January 13, 2021, <https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/what-does-the-us-indo-pacific-framework-say-about-southeast-asia/>.

influence would expand, challenging the US and preventing her from not gaining its national interest in the Indo-Pacific region.²³

SFIP documents appear to be China-centric cautioning the US allies that China is making inroads into cutting-edge technologies, including biogenetics artificial intelligence that will largely pave the way for consolidation of authoritarianism in the region. Chinese headways in these technologies certainly would pose a grave challenge to their societies.²⁴ Chinese progress in surveillance and information control thwarts the US efforts in the expansion of its national interest and values in the Indo-Pacific region.²⁵

China believes that the Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) of the US is based on the construction of an exclusive regional group to oppose Beijing. China fears that the implementation of the US strategy will pose a serious threat from three broader perspectives, i.e., in the domain of regional economic cooperation, strategic extension, and protection of regional vital interests. Through IPS the US will create troubles for China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and counter Beijing in the South China Sea (SCS). It is worth mentioning that the US under the Trump administration has approximately carried out 14 Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) against China in South China Sea (SCS).²⁶ SCS is another important combat zone for the US to restrain China economically, politically, and militarily.²⁷ Assumingly, IPS, instead of stability, is opening the path to confrontation. The US views China as a belligerent and an existential threat to the Western interests, and global and regional order. Such aggressive acts of the US may provoke China in the near future. The US antagonistic posture toward China will cause a confrontation in the region, risking a pointless Cold War with China.²⁸

Meanwhile, the Biden administration in the Indo-Pacific Strategy, unlike Trump, is unlikely to be espousing the policy of complete confrontation. US will remain tough on China. However, it is likely to cooperate with Beijing on climate change and is expected to follow the path of Obama by giving a great deal of importance to the liberal economic order and strengthening diplomatic ties with partners. The new

²³ American Institute in Taiwan, 13, 2021, https://www.ait.org.tw/wp-content/uploads/sites/269/IPS-Final-Declass_OCR.pdf.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ "Indo-Pacific Strategy and China's Response," The Institute for China-America Studies (ICAS), October, 2019, <https://chinaus-icas.org/staging/6779/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Indo-Pacific-Strategy-and-Chinas-Response.pdf>.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Michael D. Swaine, "Creating an Unstable Asia: the U.S. "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" Strategy," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, March 2, 2018, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/03/02/creating-unstable-asia-u.s.-free-and-open-indo-pacific-strategy-pub-75720>.

administration is committed to countering Beijing's territorial aggression, diplomatic assertiveness, and economic coercion. Such coercive steps against Beijing in the Indo-Pacific region will certainly incite a confrontation.²⁹

China's Presence in the Region Threat to Quad Countries?

The Indo-Pacific region has become an epicentre of the world's attention, connecting an extensive swath of the globe, resulting in becoming a major threat among global and regional players. The "Indo-Pacific" term indicates New Delhi's importance in the region, as it connects India with its western boundaries and recognizes it as a key player in the geopolitics of the twenty-first century in the region. Any threat and event can have a huge impact on India's economy and its strategic interests. Major players recognize the pivotal role of New Delhi in maintaining a balance against China. The countries comprising Quad have demonstrated their intentions of countering China in the Indo-Pacific.³⁰ They perceive China as an expansionist power, claiming maritime territory in South China and East China seas. The US diplomatic ties with Taiwan further provoke Beijing, consequently making the latter more belligerent in the region.³¹

The US National Defense Strategy in its January 2018, says that China is engaged in a military modernization program, and desires to have hegemony in the Indo-Pacific region achieve global dominance instead of US.³² While China is suspicious of the US's freedom of navigation operations (FONO) in the South China Sea, believes that such a move will violate Chinese sovereignty. The US along with India, Japan, and the Philippines carried out FONO exercises in the SCS. Biden administration has been toughening its posture on Beijing's claims in SCS. The US in its latest Freedom of Navigation Operation (FONOP) in SCS deployed the guided-missile destroyer, USS Russell, into the 12 nautical mile zone around the Chinese-claimed islands in the Spratly.³³

²⁹ "Biden's Indo-Pacific Strategy: Expectations and Challenges," *Institute of South Asian Studies*, April 15, 2021, <https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Bidens-Indo-Pacific-Final.pdf>.

³⁰ Saloni Salil, "Beijing's Great Game in the Indo-Pacific: Future Dynamics," *Future Directions International*, October 28, 2020, <https://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/beijings-great-game-in-the-indo-pacific-future-dynamics/>

³¹ Ibid.

³² Xiang Bo, "China Urges US to Abandon Cold War Mentality," *Xinhuanet*, December 19, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-12/19/c_136838057.htm

³³ Richard Javad Heydarian, "Pressure Mounts on Beijing in the South China Sea," *Asia Times*, February 26, 2021,

The Biden administration castigates China's recently-passed Coast Guard Law, terming it as a source of deep "concern." It is a part of the Asian superpower's broader effort to coercively "assert its unlawful maritime claims in the South China Sea."³⁴ China's new maritime law has infuriated the US and its allies. Biden is believed to have been following a trajectory of his predecessor, showcasing belligerent pushback against China's maritime assertiveness in Asia. Meanwhile, China has alleged the Biden administration of violating China's security and sovereignty and disturbing regional peace and stability. The US is intentionally engaged in the South China Sea to disrupt its conducive environment of peace.³⁵ Japan, on the other hand, is concerned about China's latest move by entering its Coast Guard vessels in the East China Sea. Tokyo considers it contested water that is likely to trigger a war between both states. China's new "open fire" law may further exacerbate the already fragile ties between the Quad members and China.³⁶

The issue of Taiwan is a bone of contention between Quad members and China. Beijing terms any arms sale to Taiwan as violation of the "One China Policy". Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, Zhao Lijian has asserted that there is just 'One China' and Taiwan is an inseparable part of its territory.³⁷ The promised military talks between US and Taiwan have also irked China. Beijing has urged Washington to "immediately stop any form of official exchanges and military links with Taiwan, to avoid further damaging stability in the Taiwan Strait and Sino-US relations".³⁸ In order to exploit the Quad forum, the US may also embroil India in the Taiwan issue, and create hardships for Beijing in its peripheries.³⁹

The economic and political influence of China in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states has increased manifold. Even Vietnam, regards the US an unreliable partner and is looking for other options to resolve its dispute with China over the South China Sea. Trump in his presidency was unwilling to participate in the annual summit of the ASEAN creating a vacuum to be filled by China. Beijing, meanwhile has signed a trade pact with 14 other Asian states. A Washington's Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 2020 survey claims that ASEAN countries regard China as a formidable political power as compared to the

<https://asiatimes.com/2021/02/pressure-mounts-on-beijing-in-the-south-china-sea/>

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian's Regular Press Conference, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, October 20, 2020.

³⁸ Staff, "China says it will Respond to Planned Taiwan, U.S. Defense Talks U.S.," Reuters, January 6, 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/article/>

³⁹ Ibid.

US in Southeast Asia. Even the ASEAN countries have outstripped the European Union (EU), becoming China's major trading partner.⁴⁰

The withdrawal from Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) both are reckoned as the world's largest economic blocs, heralding way for China's increasing influence in the Indo-Pacific region, consequently, damaging the US geo-economic and geo-strategic interests. The US's aggressive moves against China, by and large, may create the likelihood of a confrontation in the region.⁴¹

Malabar Naval Exercise by Quad Countries

The US and India began Malabar-I Naval Exercise in 1992. The exercises were a part of joint training between both countries in basic sea-based operations. The exercises were discontinued due to Indian nuclear tests in 1998 only to be resumed in 2002. Since 2002, the exercise remained an annual feature between the US and India. Japan and Australia, following in the footsteps of the US and India, joined the exercise in 2015 and 2007 respectively.⁴² The Malabar exercise involve different naval operations including simulated war games and combat maneuvers.⁴³ It is pertinent to mention here, that all four states of Malabar exercises, interestingly, are also members of the Quad.

The formation of the quadrilateral coalition in 2017 and Malabar exercises by Quad members were designed to prevent China's growing assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region.⁴⁴ China was perceived as a grave threat to freedom of navigation, respect for territorial integrity, rule of law, sovereignty, peaceful dispute resolution and free trade markets.⁴⁵ The first phase of the Malabar exercise started on November 3-6, 2020 in the Bay of Bengal in the Indian Ocean, where sophisticated and complex maneuvers were carried out, including submarines, anti-air warfare drills, and surface weapon firing exercises. The participation of Australia in the

⁴⁰ Dost Muhammad Barrech, "Biden's Dilemma in the Indo-Pacific," *Pakistan Today*, January 29, 2021.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Krishn Kaushik, "Explained: The Purpose, Participants of the Malabar Navy Exercise," *The Indian Express*, November 3, 2020, <https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/malabar-naval-exercise-india-6915447>.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ "Why India must Exercise the Quad Option," *The Times of India*, October 15, 2020, <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/why-india-must-exercise-the-quadoption/articleshow/78676596.cms>.

Malabar Naval Exercise in 2007 was also aimed at preventing China's maneuvering, opening a path to a confrontation in the region.⁴⁶

Within Quad, the US and India had an excessive preoccupation with the containment of China via Malabar exercises. The exercises reassure in mounting pressure on China. India remained engaged in a military stand-off with China; confronted humiliation in June 2020 and is now is committed to retaliating against China. In this regard, the *Hindustan Times* by alluding to Malabar Naval Exercise writes, "The road to peace in the mountains may lie through the sea."⁴⁷ In the meantime, an Indian defense analyst Captain D. K. Sharma argues that Malabar Exercise will certainly prove helpful for New Delhi as "It will be the best of the best."⁴⁸

An aggressive mind set of India had clearly been reflected by retired Vice Admiral Pradeep Chauhan who says that Malabar manoeuvres have bolstered the naval power of Quad countries in the Indian Ocean. India has given a lucid message to Beijing that New Delhi is not alone in the region.⁴⁹ A strategic expert, Alok Bansal, opines that existing maneuvers are prerequisite to build cohesion among the navies of Quad countries, particularly in the event of war with China. The contemplations of Indian policymakers and experts are obvious; they are preoccupied with the Quad and Malabar exercises but are oblivious to the fact that their unprofessional demeanours will cause a confrontation in the region. It is crystal clear, that India cannot compete with China economically, politically, and militarily and will cajole its partners to prevent a Chinese foothold in the region. Indeed, the containment policy of Quad to bring peace in the region remains elusive; it is more likely to embark on a path to a confrontation with China in near future.⁵⁰

The Implications of the Malabar Naval Exercise for the Region

China is being perceived as a threat by Quad members due to its hostility with the US, a border dispute with India, maritime brawl with Japan, and exacerbating diplomatic and economic tussle with Australia. The prevailing differences with China have brought Quad members

⁴⁶ "Navies of India, US, Japan, Australia Conclude Phase 1 of Malabar 2020 Naval Exercise," *The Economic Times*, November 7, 2020, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/>

⁴⁷ "What is the Malabar Exercise, and Why is it Significant," *Deccan Herald*, October 20, 2020, <https://www.deccanherald.com/national/what-is-the-malabar-exercise-and-why-is-it-significant904598.html>.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ravi Dubey, "Malabar Naval Exercise 2020: What is so Special about it that Worries China?" *DNA India*, November 19, 2020, <https://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/>

⁵⁰ Ibid.

together to put China under tremendous pressure to eschew its mounting assertiveness in the region. Malabar Naval Exercise, thus, is an appropriate platform to thwart China's aspirations of becoming a dominant world power. Cmdr. Ryan T. Easterday, commanding officer asserts that "Malabar provides an opportunity for like-minded navies, sharing a common vision of a more stable, open, and prosperous Indo-Pacific, to operate and train alongside one another."⁵¹

However, Malabar Naval Exercises have many implications for the region. China remains quite wary of the annual exercises. According to *Global Times* a Chinese newspaper, the primary objective of the Malabar's Naval Exercises is to target China's submarines activities in South China and East China seas. The editorial claims that US and Indian navies have been operating variations of the P-8 Poseidon.⁵² Beijing also has reservations over the deployment of the Japan's largest post-World War II warship, Izumo in the South China Sea that has spent time there before heading towards India. It was carrying up nine helicopters and conducting flight operations in the South China Sea will offend China. In this regard, Hua Chunying, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson says:

If this is only about normal visits and normal transit through the South China Sea, we hold no objection and hope that such normal exchanges between relevant countries can help promote peace and stability in the region. But if it is going to the South China Sea for other motives, it would be a different story.⁵³

Beijing is alienated by Tokyo's inclusion in the Malabar Exercise alleging, that it may provoke hostility in the region. Hong Lei, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman says, China hoped that the inclusion of Japan in the Malabar Exercise will not provoke a confrontation in the region. Lie further reiterated: "China respects freedom of navigation enjoyed by all countries in the SCS according to the international law."⁵⁴ It should be noted that the members of Quad and China are accelerating their military defense exponentially. The Quad has collectively spent nearly US\$ 876.6

⁵¹ Jesse Johnson, "Malabar Military Exercises with 'Quad' Nations Begin in Message to China," *The Japan Times*, November 4, 2020, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/11/04/asia-pacific/malabar-military-exercises-china-quad/>.

⁵² "China Wary as US, India and Japan Prep for Malabar Naval Drills," *Stars and Stripes*, April 14, 2021, <https://www.stripes.com/news/china-wary-as-us-india-and-japan-prep-for-malabar-naval-drills-1.476863>.

⁵³ "China Wary as US, India and Japan Prep for Malabar Naval Drills."

⁵⁴ "China Reacts Sharply to Japan's Inclusion in Malabar Exercises," *The Economic Times*, December 14, 2015, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/>

billion on their military defense in 2020, while China in the same year alone has spent US 261 billion dollars.⁵⁵

The Indo-Pacific region, arguably, has become a new battlefield, where the world's advanced and sophisticated technologies are used in the naval exercises certainly do not augur well for regional stability. History is a tangible testimony; many wars around the world have been triggered by miscalculations. In the case of Quad's confrontation with China, any miscalculation could also cause a devastating war. One can assume that the forging of Quad followed by Malabar Exercises will create instability in the region. In short, alliances are superficially formed to contain or defeat the rival state. The word 'containment' is an antithesis of 'stability'.⁵⁶

Summation

The military build-up in the form of military exercises and strategic cooperation among Quad countries indicate that the Neo-realist world has taken shape given the changing power equilibrium. China's rise has prompted regional powers like India, Australia, and Japan to team up with the Superpower, US, to contain China's rise. This change of behaviour is caused by a change in the security structure in the Indo-Pacific region. The very nature of alliance and containment is indicative of confrontation rather than providing stability in the region. We can expect further escalation in terms of military build-up and Cold War-like politics in the region. This will ultimately lead to some sort of confrontation. Quad countries see the region in terms of a zero-sum game where the gains of China are considered as a loss for these powers. This article claims that the making of the Quad and subsequent policy actions in the Indo-Pacific region do not bring stability, but rather to contain the rise of China, which has created fear among the Quad countries. They see their security being compromised by the power of China. The article argues that this will not augur well for the region since checking the Chinese power will prompt reactions from Beijing as well. Such a heated environment becomes prone to confrontation. The formation of Quad and its military exercises can be easily taken as a threat by China.

According to the theory of Neo-realism, China will try to balance this multilateral alliance. China's rise has changed the balance power in the region, but the Quad alliance can tilt the balance in its own favour. Subsequently, China will have to balance again. This will create a security dilemma in the region. The region will descend into competition, which may give rise to increasing incidents of confrontation. The stability of the region, previously maintained through the status quo power equation, is at stake.

⁵⁵ "What is Malabar Military Drill and Why It Concerns China," *Times of India*, October 20, 2020, <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/>

⁵⁶ Ibid.

Way Forward

- The 21st century, unlike the 20th century, is a century of globalization, which indicates that diplomatic solutions are sought for disputes and tensions on win-win basis. The Quad members can avoid the Cold War mentality of forging alliances and may cooperate with China to cement the canon of globalization.
- The United States, a liberal state, is going against its own Bretton Woods System (1944) imposing trade sanctions on China. The US being a lawmaker should not be a lawbreaker and should promote the doctrine of a win-win situation. The US leadership in the world is in question, given its lack of will and ability to resolve the issues with the rising Chinese power.
- Quad members as well as China ought to avoid seeing their foreign policies merely through the prism of realism theory. Instead, they are required to implement the context of the theory of complex interdependence that believe in an anarchic environment better economic ties among states will create the possibility of enhancement of economic interdependence; resulting in mutually dependent vulnerability to each other actions. Although such interdependence may also entail asymmetry of power, where some powers especially China, may wield more benefits from this interdependence.
- Forging alliances by Quad members alluding to countering China will have a long-lasting implication for the world's economy. Cooperation instead of alliances is the need of the hour to cement the world's economic growth that has already been halted by Covid-19. The world needs to recover from the recession caused by Covid-19. This means that there is now a greater need for cooperation among all the powers. The pandemic has proved that global challenges need a global response. No country alone can deal with such pandemics. It is unfortunate to witness the information warfare between the US and China when the pandemic broke out in China. Instead of cooperation, both the countries saw it as an opportunity for political point scoring and information warfare against each other.
- At the current juncture, the world is economically more dependent on China than the US. The containment of China and slowing down its economic growth will also slow down the world's economic growth that will affect the Quad members too. The US has more trade with China than it has with India or other Quad members. The same goes for other countries. Any disturbance in the dependence or interdependence with China will affect the global economy and will push the world into an economic crisis. Interestingly, Quad countries are economically more dependent on

China than vice versa. Containment of China, thus, does not serve the national interest of Quad members.

- Threat perception is a socially constructed phenomenon; China being perceived as a threat by Quad countries can be deconstructed as a vital ally and partner in international politics.

Conclusion

The revival of the Quad in 2017 is changing the geo-political and geo-economic complexions of the Indo-Pacific region. Quad members believe in the consolidation of democracy and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) concept. It is an open secret now that the US through Quad desires to contain China and persuade its allies to be united under the umbrella of Quad and slow down China's economic growth. As far as Quad is concerned, China has been posing an existential threat to their so-called democracies. The Quad members are unhappy with China on account of its authoritarian regime, debt trap policy under BRI, human rights violations in China, and its labour exploitation in African states, perceiving its governing system as antithetical to their democratic values. However, China has termed the Quad as Asian NATO in the Indo-Pacific region. Malabar Naval Exercises are China-centric and disrupts its submarine activities in South China and East China seas. It is more worrisome that, the US under the Trump administration has launched nearly 14 Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) against China in the South China Sea.

The US is in a deep quandary assuming that it may be replaced by an emerging power China. The US cannot wage a direct war against China alone to weaken the latter; the former would ally to obtain its primary objectives. It can easily be forecasted that the foundation of Quad and its activities of carrying out Malabar Naval Exercises, will incite a confrontation in the region. China's String of Pearls strategy is regarded by Quad members as an existential threat to their national interests in the oceans across the world. It is worrisome to note that international politics first-time witnesses a block of democracies having the sole objective of targeting a specific country.

In the prevailing circumstances, the world order is obviously divided into two blocks, underpinned by the US and China. The US alone is unable to contain China on the pretext of promotion of democracy; with the support of Quad, the US will put Beijing in hot waters. US strained relations with China due to the prevailing trade war, South China Sea conundrum, coronavirus fallout, human rights issue in Xinjiang, the crackdown in Hong Kong, Taiwan crisis, intellectual property theft, press freedoms, and Artificial Intelligence (AI) race will further intensify their hostility. In the final analysis, the formation of Quad carrying out Malabar exercises by showcasing aggressive postures will create instability and a likelihood of a destructive war.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC DISPARITIES AND NATIONAL SECURITY OF PAKISTAN

Muhammad Tariq Niaz*

Abstract

Socio-economic disparities can pose threat to the security of a nation-state. They may even threaten a state's survival. Thereby States have to adopt a comprehensive security approach to address socio-economic disparities. Pakistan is also challenged by socio-economic disparities caused by several internal and external factors. National Security Policy (NSP) 2022-2026 has duly recognised these factors and proposed a comprehensive security paradigm for the country. This study deploys a Comprehensive security approach as propounded by Copenhagen School to understand the linkage between socio-economic disparities and the national security of Pakistan. It attempts to explain how socio-economic disparities affect Pakistan's national security and what can be done to address them.

Keywords: *Socio-economic Disparities, Comprehensive National Security, National Security Policy*

Introduction

With the end of the Cold war, the broad understanding of national security underwent a remarkable change. The post-cold war era debates over national security were dominated by the Copenhagen School of thought. This school surfaced in the realm of security, which was dominated by the traditional approaches to security in terms of defining and understanding the concept.¹ Copenhagen School, for the first time, emphasized the non-traditional aspects of security, purporting a shift away from traditional security studies.² Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde's work "*Security: A New Framework for Analysis*" added other security sectors – political, economic, societal, environmental – to the list that made the idea of security a comprehensive

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¹ Rebecca Glasencnik, "International Security Studies: Critical Security, Human Security and Copenhagen School Approaches," *Wordpress*, November 28, 2012, <https://bekahbblade.wordpress.com/2012/11/28/>.

² Alan Collins, "*Contemporary Security Studies, 4th Ed.*" (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2016).

concept.³ There was a delicate shift of referent object of security, from state to individual, with a claim that “the security of individuals is inseparably entwined to that of the state”.⁴

When viewed through the prism of Copenhagen School, Pakistan is vulnerable to several threats related to other sectors of security going beyond.⁵ Pakistan’s security mosaic presents a grim picture. The pillars of Pakistan’s national power potential intend to safeguard its core national interest(s) and objective(s) in the traditional security domain. Concerns around socio-economic disparities have not been given adequate priority. This warrants a holistic understanding of the national security of Pakistan which should guide formulation as well as implementation strategies.

Aristotle once said that “*Well begun is half done*”.⁶ To attain comprehensive, security objectives, it is important to identify the key threats and factors which may emerge as a security threat in the future i.e., socio-economic disparity. The instability that socio-economic disparities can create in the country can hit almost every sector of national security highlighted by the Copenhagen School. This paper attempts to examine the threats that socio-economic disparities can pose to Pakistan’s national security. For this, it looks into the concept of nation-state, threats, and national security. Later, it looks at the relevant sections of the NSP, focusing on socio-economic disparities and analyses the challenges they pose to national security and the way forward.

Nation-State and National Security

Consequent to the “Peace of Westphalia (1648),⁷ the idea of nation-state found linkage with the modern system of states based on the “Westphalian System”.

- **Nation-State:** In *Strategy and Statecraft*, nation-state is defined as “a polity controlling fixed territory with defined borders.”⁸ The

³ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, “Security: A New Framework for Analysis,” (United States: Lynne Rienner Publishers, September 1998).

⁴ Martin Shaw, “*There is No Such Thing as Society: Beyond Individualism and Statism in International Security Studies*,” *Global Society and International Relations* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994).

⁵ Brig (Retd) Muhammad Khurshid Khan, “A Stable Pakistan: Proposed Model of National Security,” *Margalla Paper*, vol 17 no. 1. (2011):71. <https://margallapapers.ndu.edu.pk/site/issue/view/6/57>.

⁶ The International Association of Forensic Toxicologists (TIAFT), “Well Begun is Half Done – Aristotle,” <http://www.tiaft.org/well-begun-is-half-done.html/> (accessed on August 25).

⁷ Lumen Learning, “Boundless World History,” Accessed on Feb 14, 2022. <https://courses.lumenlearning.com/boundless-worldhistory/chapter/nation-states-and-sovereignty/> (accessed on Feb 14, 2022).

privileges given to a nation-state in the Westphalian system were; "each state has sovereignty over its territory and domestic affairs, to the exclusion of all external powers, on the principle of non-interference in another country's domestic affairs, and that each state (no matter how large or small) is equal in international law".⁹

- **National Security:** National security as a collective term is used for defence and foreign relations, and the protection of a country's interests. Whenever contemporary scholars discuss "national security" they term it as "the ability of a nation to protect its internal values from external threats".¹⁰ In addition to military aspects (traditional security), the concept of national security encompasses elements of political independence, territorial integrity, internal stability, and national unity (non-traditional security). Furthermore, John C. Gannon argues that "besides many other factors, demographics, health; natural resources, and environment; science and technology; the global economy; national and international governance; and future conflicts are the drivers which impact the national security".¹¹ Another approach to defining national security postulates that the non-traditional security themes can be encapsulated into the term 'human security'; the idea that assumptions of national security should revolve around the security of the individual, which moves away from the state-centric view.¹² A combination of traditional and non-traditional security is what is known as *comprehensive security*.¹³

The comprehensive approach integrated in the National Security Policy covers all those sectors and elements that either contribute to stability or may incite conflict. Existential threats that have the potential to impair the unity, cohesion, and integrity of a

⁸ Basic book of Strategy and Statecraft of National Defence University, Islamabad.

⁹ Lumen, "Boundless World History."

¹⁰ International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, "National Security," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*. 1968. (accessed on March 2, 2022) <http://www.encyclopedia.com/>.

¹¹ John C. Gannon, "Defining US National Security for the Next Generation," Conference on the Role of Foreign Assistance in Conflict Prevention US Agency for International Development, January 8, 2001, National Intelligence Council: www.dni.gov/nic/

¹² Peter H. Liotta and Taylor Owen, "Why Human Security?" *The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations* vol. 7, no. 1 (2006): 37- 5, <https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/shjdir/v7n1/>.

¹³ NSD, "Islamabad Security Dialogue," *National Security Division and the Advisory Board of the National Security Committee of Pakistan*, March 17-18, 2021, <https://mofa.gov.pk/wp-content/uploads/>.

state must be mainstreamed. The threats induced by the socio-economic disparities within a state can be existential threats to national security. There is a great need for securitization¹⁴ of the socio-economic disparities as underscored by Ole Wæver of the Copenhagen School. To gauge the intensity of positive as well as negative consequences of socio-economic equality and inequality respectively, it is important to identify the key facets of socio-economic disparities, which are as follows.

Socio-economic Factors and Disparities

The world is divided into several socio-economic statuses (SEs). It can be defined as “an economic and sociological combined total measure of a person's work experience and an individual's or family's economic access to resources and social position as compared to others”.¹⁵ SES is commonly used to depict an economic difference in society.¹⁶ It is generally broken into three levels: high, middle, and low to describe three places an individual or group may fall into. Socio economic factors help us determine an individual's or a group's SES. SES is also used as an instrument to measure the socio-economic disparity by quantitatively assessing the socio-economic factors (education, health, income, and occupation). These factors are crucial for the comprehensive national security of Pakistan.

- **Socio-economic Factors:** There are certain factors by which the SES is assessed. Broadly speaking, SES encompasses income, education, health, and occupation as well as family structure related changes.¹⁷
- **Socio-economic Disparities:** An analysis of SES shows inequalities in individuals' access to resources (in addition to the issues related to privilege, power, and control).¹⁸ Therefore, socio-

¹⁴ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, “*Security: A New Framework for Analysis*,” (United States: Lynne Rienner Publishers, September 1998)

¹⁵ J Michael Oakes, Peter H Rossi, “The Measurement of SES in Health Research: Current Practice and Steps toward a New Approach,” *Social Science & Medicine* 56 (2003): 769–784.

¹⁶ Institute of Education Sciences, “National Center for Educational Statistics,” *Institute of Education Sciences*, March 31, 2008, <http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/glossary/s.asp>.

¹⁷ Allison Milne and Lee A Plourde, “Factors of a Low-SES Household: What Aids Academic Achievement?” *Journal of Instructional Psychology*, vol. 33, no. 3 (September 2006): 183-193, <https://eric.ed.gov/?id=EJ764667>.

¹⁸ American Psychological Association, “Socio-economic Status,” *American Psychological Association*, Accessed on February 14, 2022. <https://www.apa.org/topics/socio-economic-status> (accessed on February 14, 2022)

economic disparity arises when some people or groups are systematically excluded from an upstanding economic cycle.¹⁹ In simple terms, this inequality prevails when some people in a society are less privileged in terms of income, education, health, and occupation than others.

Poverty is Inequality?

Generally, it is believed that where there is poverty, there is inequality. However, this is a wrong assumption as both are two distinct concepts. There can be a wealthy country with little poverty and a huge amount of inequality. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is one such example. A similar one is Cuba; there is more poverty in Cuba than in KSA, but it is less inequitable and more equal. Poverty and inequality do not change at the same pace and they may even change in opposite directions. A decrease in poverty is not always accompanied by a decrease in inequality; it may be accompanied by an increase in it.²⁰

Linkage between Socio-Economic Disparity and National Security

There is a strong linkage between socio-economic disparities and the national security of a country. The socio-economic harmony brings dividends, which can be seen in the socio-economic models of the United Kingdom (UK) and South Korea.

- **United Kingdom (UK):** The UK with its policies of the welfare state,²¹ as noted by Sir William Beveridge,²² has a system of 'National Insurance' which has three basic elements: family allowances, a National Health Service, and full employment to its citizens. All three elements are basic factors which determine the SES of an individual.
- **South Korea:** Republic of Korea (ROK) has also kept the socio-economic has prioritized concerns and ensured provision of

¹⁹ APEC Economic Committee, "Socio-Economic Disparity in the APEC Region," *APEC Economic Committee*. (2006):04.

²⁰ Andre Beteille, "Poverty and Inequality," *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 38, no. 42 (2003): 44-56.

²¹ Virginia Noble, "*Inside the Welfare State: Foundations of Policy and Practice in Post-War Britain*," 1st Ed. (UK: Routledge, 2009).

²² Sir William Beveridge, "Beveridge Report: Social Insurance and Allied Services," *Socialist Health Association*, November 1942: <https://www.sochealth.co.uk/national-health-service/>.

education to almost 97 percent of its population²³ and health insurance to almost every citizen.²⁴

While looking at the negative consequences of socio-economic disparity on the national security of a nation-state or a region, one can see examples of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and countries engulfed in the Arab Spring.

- **Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC):** Despite being the second-largest African country with nearly 200 million acres of cultivable land and large reserves of diamonds, gold, copper, cobalt, zinc, and coltan (which is used in mobile phones and other electronics), DRC is one of the poorest countries ridden by socio-economic disparities. It ranks 175th out of 189 as per the UN Human Development Index 2021 and 73 percent of its population lives in extreme poverty. The roots of this menace lie in years of exploitation and violent plundering by colonizers, leaders, private interests, neighbouring countries, and internal warring factions.²⁵ DRC is experiencing instability and anarchy. The immense potential of the natural resources cannot benefit the people of Congo. DRC has an inherent socio-economic disparity due to a lack of legitimate political infrastructure and the absence of coherent systems.
- **The Arab Spring:** The series of protests against governments, uprisings, and armed rebellions that spread across much of the Arab world in the early 2010s was the result of factors of corruption and economic stagnation.²⁶ The Arab Spring was ignited by the discontentment of the locals, especially of youth and unions, with the rule of local authoritarian governments. However, many have also concluded that the huge disparity in the income levels and pressures of the Great Recession (2008) also cause such chaotic movement.²⁷ The damage done by the socio-economic

²³ Korean Education Center UK, "Education in Korea," *Korean Education Center UK*, 2020, <http://www.koreaneducentreinuk.org/en/education-in-korea/>.

²⁴ Young Joo Song, "The South Korean Health Care System," *International Medical Community: JMAJ* 52(3) (200): 206–209.

²⁵ Concern Worldwide US, "The DRC Crisis, Explained," *Concern Worldwide US*, October 28, 2021, <https://www.concernusa.org/story/drc-crisis-explained/>.

²⁶ Lin Noueihed, "Peddler's Martyrdom Launched Tunisia's Revolution," *Reuters World News*, January 19, 2011, <https://www.reuters.com/article/>.

²⁷ The Arab Spring—One Year Later: The CenSEI Report analyzes how 2011's clamor for democratic reform met 2012's need to sustain its momentum; "The Arab Spring – One Year Later," *The Center For Strategy, Enterprise & Intelligence (cenSEI) Report vol 2, no. 6* (2012): <https://censei.wordpress.com/our-products-and-services/the-censei-report/>.

disparity was such that even today, numerous ongoing conflicts are considered an outcome of the Arab Spring. Civil wars in Syria,²⁸ Yemen,²⁹ and Libya (concluded in 2020)³⁰ and the bank crisis in Lebanon are some of the by-product of the Arab Spring sparked by socio-economic disparity among other factors in the region.

The Current Socio-Economic Landscape of Pakistan

The socio-economic disparity is persistent in the social spheres of Pakistan. In general, socio-economic disparities in Pakistan can be divided into two categories: general disparities among the citizens of Pakistan and the disparities that prevail among different regions of Pakistan.

According to Pakistan's National Human Development Report (NHDR) 2020, there exists an immense inequality among Pakistan's provinces and regions, across the urban-rural divide, and within neglected and less privileged segments of the population, such as youth, labourers, women, and children. Pakistan's NHDR 2020³¹ presents the idea of "two different Pakistans", "one for the affluent and the other for the poorest". One with a myriad of opportunities such as quality education guaranteed health care and generational wealth while the other is without even the minimum life necessities and livelihood. Intrinsically, the 1 percent poorest of the population holds only 0.15 percent of national income, while the 1 percent of the richest holds 9 percent of national income back in 2018–2019. According to the report, the widening wealth inequality, access to services, and income generation may have a long-term negative impact on human development. To mitigate income inequality, it is the per capita income of the poorest 40 percent of Pakistanis that must grow at a rate that supersedes the income growth rate of the total population. While discussing the general socio-economic disparity the report suggests two pertinent findings related to Pakistan:

- Pakistan has a Gini coefficient (that is a usual tool to measure income disparities) of 30 percent, signalling low inequality overall.
- Pakistan has a level of income inequality that is low to moderate but changes considerably. For example, during 1987-88 to 2013-

²⁸ BBC, "Why has the Syrian War Lasted 11 Years?" *BBC*, March 15, 2022, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35806229>.

²⁹ Kali Robinson, "Yemen's Tragedy: War, Stalemate, and Suffering," *Council on Foreign Relations*, January 25, 2022, <https://www.cfr.org/background/yemen-crisis>.

³⁰ Center for Preventive Action, "Yemen War: Background," *Council on Foreign Relations* | *Global Conflict Tracker*, March 25, 2022, <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen>.

³¹ UNDP, "Pakistan National Human Development Report," *UNDP*, 2020, <https://www.pk.undp.org/content/pakistan/en/home/library/>.

14 income inequalities increased by 6 percent and 8.7 percent respectively for different regions of Pakistan.³²

The other type of disparity is regional disparity in Pakistan. According to Pakistan's NHDR 2016,³³ the most unequal income distribution was in urban Punjab where the Gini coefficient remained highest during 1987-88, and with an increase of 5 percent it remained at the top even during 2013-14. In rural Punjab, income inequality also increased by 29 percent from 1987-88 to 2013-14. During the same time, the income distribution in rural Sindh worsened by almost 36 percent while overall inequality in Sindh also increased. And in the urban areas of both Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), income inequality worsened by 28 percent and 26 percent respectively. This whole mosaic suggests an overall increase in income inequality across all provinces of Pakistan. Furthermore, some evidence also shows that income disparities among various provinces have considerably increased over the last 15 years. According to NHDR 2020, the provinces experienced a wide increase in income inequality from 2006 to 2016, which further decreased the difference between the richest and poorest quintiles. In terms of GDP, the gap between the rich and poor increased slightly between 2006 and 2019. KP has witnessed substantial human development in recent years but it did not go that far. And finally, Baluchistan shares a profile of being the province that has the lowest share of the country's population and the weakest performance on indicators of human development. Irrespective of their income progress, all these provinces have consistent inequalities in education, living standards, and health facilities.³⁴

Persistent socioeconomic disparities will certainly affect human development in Pakistan, thereby acting as a drag for the overall development of the country. Less development means fewer resources for the people which translates into human insecurity; which is a key component of comprehensive national security. Lack of access to basic health, clean water, quality education, food, employment, social security, and social justice will certainly undermine the national security of Pakistan. The socioeconomic disparities coupled with the deprivation of the marginalized segments of society have the potential to worsen the security calculus of Pakistan. The marginalized, less privileged, and socially deprived people of the society can become targets of the forces inimical who aim at destabilizing Pakistan. Hence, much neglected

³² Haroon Jamal, "Does Inequality Matter for Poverty Reduction? Evidence from Pakistan's Poverty Trends," *The Pakistan Development Review* vol. 45, no. 3(2006): 439-459.

³³ UNDP, "Pakistan National Human Development Report," UNDP, 2016, <https://www.pk.undp.org/content/pakistan/en/home/library/annual-reports/>.

³⁴ UNDP, "Pakistan National Human Development Report," 2020, <https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/migration/pk/>.

phenomenon of socio-economic disparities has the potential to endanger the comprehensive national security of Pakistan.

Therefore, a proactive approach is required to address the persistent socio-economic disparities so that the comprehensive national security of Pakistan may be ensured. A clear manifestation of this approach is visible in the NSP of Pakistan. The document is the first of its type and articulates a citizen-centric approach to draw a 'Comprehensive National Security' framework for the country. It places economic security at the core with an emphasis on geo-economic vision and enhanced focus on geo-strategy so that with sustainable and inclusive economic growth, the national resource pie can expand, which will usher in greater availability of resources to bolster both human security and traditional security. A keen analysis of this policy document would also illustrate the need and ways to overcome the socio-economic disparities in Pakistan. The challenges to national security of Pakistan are discussed as follows:

Challenges to the National Security of Pakistan

Currently, there are several internal as well as external challenges undermining the national security of Pakistan. The external challenges need to be guarded against but the internal threats require a proportionate response. These challenges are as follows:

Challenges of Disharmony: Federation and Inter-Provinces³⁵

Ever since the independence, Pakistan has faced multiple challenges. These challenges have created mistrust between the federation and provinces. It is a by-product of the sense of deprivation felt by the people of these provinces due to socioeconomic disparity. These challenges when coupled with the lack of people's trust in the state, which is also a by-product of socio-economic disparity, have complicated the process of national cohesion in Pakistan.³⁶

State is the chief enabler of socio-economic wellbeing of its people. After the 18th amendment in the Constitution of Pakistan, this falls under the domain of the provinces. The complex nature of discontent and lack of harmony between the federation and provinces in Pakistan is widely

³⁵ Ehsan Mehmood Khan, "SAN Analysis: Internal Security Strategy for Pakistan," Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies-Knowledge for Peace, January, 2011, <https://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/> "Pakistan: Worsening Conflict in Baluchistan," *International Crisis Group, Asia Report No: 119*, September 14, 2006, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/pakistan/>.

³⁶ Nawaz M. Khan, "National Integration: Challenges and Options for Pakistan," *Journal of Security and Strategic Analyses*, vol. VII, no.1: July, 2021, <https://thesvi.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/dr-nawazkhan.pdf>.

recognized.³⁷ Although there exist several causes for such a predicament, this disharmony is hindering the efficient response to the issues of national security and human security. It constrains the state organs to put up a coherent response to combat socio-economic disparity. Political harmony needs political stability while socio-economic disparity can cause political instability i.e., violent demonstrations by the people, to show their distress, and increased political activism by the local leaders. All these elements when combined can reduce the prospects of political harmony among federation and provinces.

Governance Challenges:³⁸ The absence of good governance is a persistent factor in Pakistani society. To overcome the socio-economic disparity, governance is the most important element which needs to be focused upon. However, one of the key impediments in the implementation of governing principles is socio-economic disparity itself. For example, some of the main attributes of good governance include lack of corruption, accountability and provision of social justice, in addition to the rule of law. However, due to socio-economic disparity in society, the state organs have separate standards of delivering governance to two different segments of society i.e. rich and the poor. As mentioned by Dr Hafiz Pasha the concept of “two different Pakistans,” aptly applies here as the rich have money to pay/bribe to get away with their corruption and avoid accountability, whereas the poor class continues to suffer unabated. This way the socio-economic disparity doesn’t only hamper the process of good governance but, also contributes to the lack of good governance.

Economic Challenges:³⁹ A healthy economy enables socio-economic development of a state whereas socio-economic disparities hinder the economic progress. Pakistan is currently facing a significant economic challenge with total debt and liabilities reaching up to Rs. 53.5 trillion⁴⁰ and a record inflation rate of up to 24.9 percent in July 2022, the highest since October 2008.⁴¹ According to International Energy Agency (IEA), approximately, 40 million people in Pakistan have no access to electricity. Those who have access, are facing the worst kind of load-shedding due to

³⁷ Dawn, “Reducing Disharmony through New NFC Award,” February 17, 2003, <https://www.dawn.com/news/82412/reducing-disharmony-through-new-nfc-award>.

³⁸ Lt. Colonel Muhammad Aslam, “National Integration: Current Status and Future Strategy,” *National Defence College*, 1999-2000.

³⁹ Muhammad Tariq Niaz, “National Security Policy of Pakistan under Current Socio-economic Disparities,” unpublished MPhil Thesis, National Defence University, Year 2014.

⁴⁰ Shahbaz Rana, “Pakistan’s Debt Mounts to Rs53.5 Trillion,” *Express Tribune*, May 21, 2022.

⁴¹ Trading Economics, “Pakistan Inflation Rate,” *Trading Economics*, July 22, 2022, <https://tradingeconomics.com/pakistan/inflation-cpi/>.

energy shortfall of 25 percent of the total produced capacity.⁴² This needs immediate attention of the policymakers to pursue economic policies that ensure sustainable and all-inclusive development, reduction of poverty and inflation, and management of foreign debt services and mitigation of the growing energy crisis.

Health and Education Challenges: Health and Education are two basic indicators of progress in society. The provision of high standards of health and education to all people in Pakistan is a huge challenge that is also aggravating socio-economic disparities. According to *Lancet Study*, Pakistan ranks 154th among 195 countries in terms of quality, accessibility, and affordability of healthcare.⁴³ There is a shortage of community hospitals as compared to the huge population that is currently 235,824,862. And there are only 1201 government hospitals. The literacy rate of Pakistan also presents some worrisome statistics. The current literacy rate of Pakistan is 62.3 percent which means that an estimated population of 60 million is illiterate in the country.⁴⁴ It should be noted that many of these hospitals and literate people are in developed regions of Pakistan whereas the less developed regions i.e., rural Sindh, Southern Punjab, Gilgit Baltistan and Baluchistan have only a limited number of government hospitals.⁴⁵ Moreover, the increased socio-economic disparity in rural Sindh and Southern Punjab, highlighted in the UNDP Report 2020, has the potential to further aggravate the security problems for Pakistan.

Social Challenges: Pakistan's society is in constant flux, though still dominated by traditional norms. Ironically, the period of late 1970s and 1980s witnessed mushrooming of militant religious outfits in Pakistan. The visible decline in the cultural norms and radicalization of society along with adoption of state sponsored religious indoctrination sowed the seed of grave social challenges. This resulted in an upsurge in extremism, terrorism, and sectarianism, in addition to the weaponization of the society, which worsened the societal mosaic. It can be ascertained through observations that socio-economic disparity when combined with radicalization instigates the locals towards or extremism or terrorism. Therefore, addressing these social issues in addition to the provision of education, health security, employment and speedy justice are essential to avert the alarming ramifications of socio-economic disparity in the

⁴² IEA, "Pakistan: Key Statistics 2019," <https://www.iea.org/countries/pakistan>, (accessed on August 24, 2022)

⁴³ The Frontier Post, "Pakistan Ranks 154 among 195 Countries in Healthcare," *The Frontier Post*, <https://thefrontierpost.com/pakistan-ranks-154-among-195-countries-in-healthcare/> (accessed on August 26, 2022)

⁴⁴ MOFEPT, "Adult Literacy," (accessed on August 26, 2022) <http://mofept.gov.pk/ProjectDetail/> (accessed on August 26, 2022)

⁴⁵ Dawn, "DHQ Hospital at Gilgit," *Dawn*, October 15, 2008, <https://www.dawn.com/news/877100>.

country. Another social challenge is the demographic imbalance across major cities of Pakistan like Karachi, Lahore, and Faisalabad among others. People from marginalized segments of Pakistan come to these cities for better opportunities for employment, education, and health. This results in overpopulated cities which in turn affect other segments of society i.e., increased crime rates, inflation, noise pollution, air pollution and ill-management of resources.

The Way Forward

Socio-economic disparity is a widespread phenomenon witnessed across time and almost across every part of the world. The difference is related to its intensity. It can be understood with a simple example of a person. Whoever leaves his home is liable to confront multiple risks i.e., road accidents, expected robbery, or even murder. However, the intensity of risk is increased when there is a situation of inevitable risk to life or money. This risk will then define one's course of action as either he will stay home or call the police for safety and security. Similarly, socio-economic disparities were present in Pakistan for long but the current situation is alarming as they are now threatening Pakistan's national security. Thereby, there is an urgent need to take concrete steps that can mitigate the socio-economic disparity in Pakistan. These include as:

Enhanced National Cohesion and Political Harmony: National cohesion plays a critical role in making a state strong. There is a need to pursue policies that promote 'unity in diversity' and patriotism by valuing our ethnic, religious, cultural, and linguistic diversity. For example, policies that ensure wholesome participation from all segments of Pakistan and strict laws adherence to prohibit violation of basic rights of minority groups by the majority ethnic, religious or lingual groups. Furthermore, there should be endeavours to strengthen Pakistan's federal nature by observing democratic principles and ensuring harmony among federating units and territories. Given the provincial system of Pakistan, harmony among all provinces is indispensable for prosperity. Therefore, the only way to eradicate socio-economic disparity is through provincial harmony that will ensure the just disbursement of resources among the masses and enduring solutions to the issues i.e., water discords, Baluchistan crisis, etc.

Good Governance: The quality of governance is a key determinant of good economic performance, not foreign assistance.⁴⁶ The provision of basic needs, equal rights, rule of law and swift social justice to the people

⁴⁶ Dr. Ishrat Husain, "Governing the Ungovernable: Institutional Reforms for Democratic Governance," (Oxford University Press: July-September, 2018).

must be considered the sole responsibility of the state.⁴⁷ There is a need to effectively implement the already established policies which promote transparency, and efficient and equitable delivery of public services to strengthen the social contract between the state and the citizens.

Educational Reforms: There are several reforms needed in the education sector as it is the key to overcoming the effects of socio-economic disparity. Education helps to diminish the sense of deprivation among the less-privileged masses. In addition, it reduces the chances of exploitation of people by external actors. The initiative of "Single National Curriculum"⁴⁸ by the former PM Imran Khan's government has envisioned equal education opportunities for every segment of Pakistan. If implemented properly, it will serve the purpose. Moreover, there is a need to draw a proper facilitation plan for the primary, elementary and secondary school teachers who are the main enablers of an educated society. Affordable and accessible provision of education to all citizens will further arrest the socio-economic disparities in society.

Economic Opportunities for Youth: The level of employment ratio among the people of indicates the state of economy of a country. Unemployment, when coupled with poverty and high inflation, is one of the key factors that accentuate the socio-economic disparities in Pakistan. According to the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, over 31 percent of Pakistan's youth are currently unemployed, out of this, 51 percent are females, 16 percent are males, with many of them holding professional degrees.⁴⁹ If the youth is provided with essential tools and an environment for employment opportunities, it will immensely help in addressing economic challenges. To manage the current employment situation there are some long-term and some short-term policy measures:

- The long-term policy measures include better reforms to attract FDI that will in turn not only provide a financial advantage to the state but also employment opportunities to its people and diversify exports that will provide employment opportunities to the people of Pakistan.⁵⁰ An important factor that must be incorporated in this regard is the provision of entrepreneurship skills to the locals so

⁴⁷ Brigadier (Retired) Shaukat Qadir, "Can Good Governance be Simplified for Pakistan," *Strategic Thought* 2, no.1 (July, 2020)

⁴⁸ Dawn, "Punjab likely to Roll Back Single National Curriculum for Middle Classes," *May 3, 2022*, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1687977>.

⁴⁹ "31% of Pak Youth Currently Unemployed, Many with Professional Degrees: Rpt," *Business Standard*, <https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/>

⁵⁰ Sakina Lavingia, "Attracting Foreign Direct Investment in Pakistan: The Role of Governance, National Security and Global Investment Trends," (Oberlin: Oberlin College, April 11, 2016): <https://etd.ohiolink.edu/>

that they can benefit from these endeavours i.e., entrepreneurship skills to the people, specifically near Gwadar so that they can have their constructive share from the dividends of CPEC.

- The short-term policy measure can be providing the people with skills that can equip them to generate income even if they do not have any government or private job. In the age of e-commerce, the government must take practical steps to provide expert training to the people so that they can have better employment opportunities. According to a report published, in 2020 Saudi Arabia exported crude oil worth \$113.7 billion while India exported software services worth \$133.7 billion.⁵¹ Moreover, Pakistan has an e-commerce potential of \$15 billion by 2025. Pakistan was the 37th largest market of e-commerce with total revenue of \$5.9 billion in 2021 and is expected to reach \$7.66 billion by the end of 2022.⁵² This shows the potential of the IT sector for uplifting the state's economy. The service sector has the most export potential but it is yet to attract the government's attention as 'the next big thing'. These steps, if managed properly, can help alleviate the socio-economic disparities in society.

Improvement of Healthcare Facilities: There must be better health facilities for the people of Pakistan. It is suggested to not only improve the standards of health facilities but also provide equal access to the health facilities. The initiative of 'Sehat Card' by the previous government is a worthy initiative that is likely to raise health standards by providing health insurance to deserving citizens. In addition to the 'Sehat Card' program,⁵³ the number of community hospitals must be increased. It is because in remote areas of Pakistan, the sole reliance is on community hospitals and there is a negligible number of private hospitals there.⁵⁴ There are several rural areas of Sindh, Baluchistan, KP, and Punjab where community hospitals hardly exist. Although initiatives like 'Sehat Card' are fruitful as they will ensure health security and curb socio-economic disparity, there is a need to improve the health sector both qualitatively and quantitatively. This will further strengthen the citizen-centric approach of the state.

⁵¹ Gitconnected, "Software is the New Oil," *Gitconnected*, February 6, 2022, <https://levelup.gitconnected.com/software-is-the-new-oil-4a698409f296>.

⁵² Itrat Bashir, "E-commerce Market Projected to Generate & 7.7bn Revenue in 2022," *Business Recorder*, April 30, 2022, <https://www.brecorder.com/>

⁵³ Sehat Sahulat Program, "Sehat Card," *Sehat Sahulat Program*, <https://www.pmhealthprogram.gov.pk/> (accessed on August 26, 2022).

⁵⁴ Mahmood, Mohammed & Moss, J & Karmaliani, Rozina, "Community Context of Health System Development: Implications for Health Sector Reform in Pakistan," *Eastern Mediterranean Health Journal*: 464-71.

Strengthening Social Sector: Challenges in the social sector are manifold, however, those which widen socio-economic disparities can threaten Pakistan's security by contributing to radicalization and weaponization of society, and rising extremism. Education along with comprehensive awareness campaigns will promote tolerance and abidance of legal norms. The awareness program by Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) Pakistan can assuage the curse of increased drug usage.

GENDER AND LEADERSHIP RESPONSE IN COVID-19

Aroobah Lak* & Tasawar Hussain**

Abstract

The study attempts to uncover the gendered construction and understanding of subjects of politics and leadership. It argues that mainstream construction of Covid-19 leadership response as, 'success of femininity' and 'failure of masculinity' encapsulates naturalisation of 'essentialist gendered understanding' of subjects of politics and leadership. By applying theoretical and methodological framework of post-positivist feminist traditions and identity theory, the paper tends to contextualise the origin, source and objectives of gendered lens that juxtaposes femininity with politics and leadership. In essence, the article underscores that a political agents' leadership response to Covid-19 is a manifestation of his or her social and discursive identities, agent's understanding of their placement within power hierarchies and internationalisation of 'essentialist gendered identities' and argues in favour of reworking political assumptions and identity solutions to construct gender-neutral discourses in politics and leadership.

Keywords: Covid-19, Gender, Politics, Leadership, Essentialist Gendered Norms

Introduction

The article highlights the overlapping of gender, power, and identity in leaders' responses to Covid-19 and argues in favour of reworking political assumptions and identity solutions to form gender-neutral discourses of politics and leadership. It focuses on the 'leadership responses' to Covid-19 to uncover gendered construction of leader identities¹ that manifested in their crisis leadership. This article answers the following two questions: 1) How leaders' threat perceptions, political rhetoric and leadership response is rooted in their social and discursive

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¹ Karen Celis et al., *The Oxford Handbook of Gender and Politics* (Oxford University Press, 2013) 1-27.

construction of identities? 2) In what ways leaders' responses (policies and rhetoric) to covid-19 confirm their gender stereotypes.

The first wave of Covid-19 pandemic presents an excellent context to study leadership in high-stake bio-security crisis at a global scale. However, the ubiquitous nature of threat faced by national leader failed to elicit a uniform response across the globe. Epidemiologists and bio-security experts contend that human cost of Covid-19 pandemic could have been reduced if leaders across the globe had reacted sooner.² Eventually, it all came down to the promptness or delay in imposition of social distancing measures such as, lockdowns, and pandemic related restriction. The timely execution of Covid-19 restrictions has a direct correlation with flattening the curve that indicates the containment of the Covid-19 spread.³ Based on this understanding the dominant narrative on Covid-19 asserts that female heads of the states performed relatively better during first wave of Covid-19 pandemic and achieved better results on two counts: relatively low Covid-19 positivity rates⁴ and 6 times less Covid-19 related deaths.⁵

Moreover a 'perceived gender influence' is accredited for better performance of female leaders. Reliance on this discourse constructs success of female leaders as a, 'success of femininity' and 'blames masculinity' for bad performance of male heads of states. The article takes issue with this juxtaposition dichotomies in representation, discourses and analysis of male and female leaders that drive from the vantage point of 'private vs. personal' rooted in the discourses of politics and international relations.

Literature Review

Covid-19 as a bio-security threat transcended socio-political and geographical boundaries creating unique set of problems applicable across globe. However, the leadership responses, across the globe have been diverse and varied. From leaders reacting with 'swift and decisive' socio-political and economic policy responses to 'downplaying the threat' of the virus engaging in tactics of 'shifting responsibility and blame game' to engaging in 'militarist wartime political rhetoric' and 'politicizing the virus

² Ahmed M. Al Saidi et al., "Decisive Leadership is Necessity in the COVID-19 Response," *The Lancet* 396, no.10247 (2020): 395, doi:10.1016/ s0140-6736(20)31493-8.

³ Satyaki Roy and Preetam Ghosh, "Factors Affecting COVID-19 Infected and Death Rates Inform Lockdown-Related Policymaking," *PLoS ONE* 15, no. 10 (2020), doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0241165.

⁴ Leah C. Windsor et al., "Gender in Time of COVID-19: Evaluating National Leadership and COVID-19 Fatalities," *PLoS ONE* 15, no.12 (December 2020)

⁵ Luca Coscieme et al., "Women in Power: Female Leadership and Public Health Outcomes during the Covid-19 Pandemic," 2020, 1-10, doi:10.1101/2020.07.13.20152397.

for geopolitical goals'. Some even 'misconstrued it as a hoax', consequently, resulting into a quantifiable difference in the human cost of the pandemic across nations.⁶ Feminists have historically been protesting the invisibility of women from discourse on international politics, with the onset of Covid-19 - a bio-security threat, the discussion on female leadership has renewed in the global political commentaries.⁷

First wave of Covid-19 witnessed an uncharacteristic success of female leaders in taking charge of the situation with swift and decisive actions.⁸ An overview of the media representation and mainstream coverage of pandemic depicts female leaders as "secret weapons against corona virus", applauding them as the "voice of reason" and source of stability during the unforeseen times of uncertainties.⁹ Female leaders, from Merkel to Arden, Sanna Marin of Finland to Tai Ing-wen of Taiwan have been praised for being "proactive and decisive" conducting a 'coordinated policy' with 'effective messaging' in their Covid-19 responses.¹⁰ Female leaders with 'strategic decisiveness' implemented covid-19 social distancing rules and locked down their nations almost immediately as compared to their male counterparts in countries with somewhat similar socio-economic context and pandemic situation resulting in a lower Covid-19 positivity rates and less Covid-related deaths.¹¹

A critical overview of mainstream media portrays an unnecessary emphasis on female leaders' gendered identities as women. First, their framing in headlines such as, "women are the stronger sex in this crisis"¹² and arguing that traits of female leadership categorised as 'empathy traits'- adaptability, flexibility, interpersonal style of leadership are geared

⁶ Peter Hartcher, "Xi and Trump: Insecure 'Strongmen' Who had Nothing to Offer in a Crisis but Vanity," *The Sydney Morning Herald*, April 20, 2020, <https://www.smh.com.au/national/>.

⁷ Avivah W. Cox, "What Do Countries with the Best Coronavirus Response have in Common? Women Leaders," *Forbes*, April 13, 2020, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/avivahwittenbergcox/2020/04/13/>.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Arwa Mahdawi, "The Secret Weapon in the Fight against Coronavirus: Women," *The Guardian*, July 1, 2020, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/apr/11/>.

¹⁰ Jon Henley, "Female-led Countries Handled Coronavirus Better, Study Suggests," *The Guardian*, August 18, 2020, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/18/>.

¹¹ Jon Henley and Eleanor Roy, "Are Female Leaders more Successful at Managing the Coronavirus Crisis?" *The Guardian*, January 11, 2021, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/25/>.

¹² Trevor Phillips, "Women are the Stronger Sex in this Crisis," *The Times*, May 17, 2020, <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/>.

for handling a health crisis.¹³ This emphasis on 'gender of female leaders' uncovers the gendered nature of discourses of leadership and politics. Similar to their counterparts, the reporting on male leadership is driven from the vantage point of male leaders as 'great men', naturally destined to lead during crisis situation.

Male leaders have been judged in their handling of Covid-19 during the initial phase of the pandemic against the standards of 'hegemonic leadership qualities' that views leadership as a natural domain of 'strong men'.¹⁴ Apparently strong men thrive as leaders during crisis situations; they stand as a 'pillar of stability' for their nations.¹⁵ Western media barraged the "weak and self-interested"¹⁶ leadership response of male heads of states by declaring it a display of "lethal incompetence", "complacency" with adoption of "bombastic approaches" and personification of "reckless insouciance".¹⁷ The Sun claimed that male leaders are "big babies" running biggest nations on the face of earth.¹⁸

In hindsight, the overview of media coverage depicts naturalization of gendered discourse of leadership that considers agentic leadership as a natural domain of masculinity. The associations of reversing the gendered binaries of strong with 'women' and 'weak' with male leaders in their reporting, reflect its hegemonic nature that has somewhat acquired the status of common sense. Association of stereotypically feminine traits treated as 'weakness' such as maternal instincts, emotionalism, empathy, and kindness that has historically disadvantaged women¹⁹ in their struggle for leadership positions is being

¹³ Shaheena J. Jivaraj, "Why the Traits of Female Leadership are Better Geared for the Global Pandemic," *Forbes*, October 11, 2020, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/shaheenajanjuhajivrajeurope/2020/10/11/>

¹⁴ Ann M. Koeing, Alice H. Eagly, and Abigail A. Mitchell, "Are Leader Stereotypes Masculine? A Meta-Analysis of Three Research Paradigms," *American Psychological Association PsychExtra Dataset*, 2010, 12, doi:10.1037/e617292010-001.

¹⁵ Helen Lewis, "The Pandemic has Revealed the Weakness of Strongmen," *The Atlantic*, May 6, 2020, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/05/>.

¹⁶ Simon Tisdall, "Trump, Putin and Bolsonaro have been Complacent. Now the Pandemic has Made them All Vulnerable," *The Guardian*, July 1, 2020, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/may/17/>

¹⁷ Peter Hartcher, "Xi and Trump: Insecure 'Strongmen' Who had Nothing to Offer in a Crisis but Vanity," *The Sydney Morning Herald*, April 20, 2020, <https://www.smh.com.au/national/>.

¹⁸ Jimmy Leach, "While Strongmen Let Us Down, Women Show Us the Virtue of Competence," *The Sun*, May 22, 2020, <https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/11688949/>.

¹⁹ Johnson and Williams, "Gender and Political Leadership," 943-947.

viewed in an entirely different light.²⁰ The maternal side of femininity associated with female leader's sex is credited for their better leadership during the pandemic as the mother takes care of the sick in her family; hence female leaders are taking care of their sick national families.²¹ Chancellor Merkel is reported to have returned to "her role of nation's Mutti". Mutti in the German language means, mother. Chazan claims that Merkel is not a "touchy-feely" mum; but a strict "disciplinarian" mother²², although chancellor Merkel in her real life is not a 'mother'.

Media coverage surrounding Prime Minister Ardern's Covid-19 leadership focuses on her role as a new mother who is the "only second world leader to give birth in office after Benazir Bhutto." The western media praises her for managing the challenges of her recent venture into motherhood and spearheading a national pandemic response. She is commended as a "doting mother and a world leader", that she held "Kiwis' hands through the lockdown"²³ and how after "putting her toddler to bed, she empathizes with citizen's anxieties". She is considered a "perfect mix of epidemiology with empathy, law leavened with mom jokes" due to her warm and kind-hearted public persona.²⁴

Moreover, the mainstream media coverage of female leaders inadvertently falls back to 'subtle sexism' rooted in gendered discourse on 'female leaders.' It tends to focus on their 'physical features' with overt descriptions, dressing, personal styles, private lives, and sexuality; a scrutiny evaded by their male counterparts.²⁵ For example, the article that praises Ardern for her leadership approach of constructing a sense of national cohesion through her innovative social media public engagements doesn't forget to mention how tired she looked and what she was wearing while she repeatedly insisted on Kiwis being the "team of five million".²⁶

²⁰ J. Jivaraj, "Why The Traits of Female Leadership are Better Geared for the Global Pandemic," *Forbes*, October 11, 2020, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/shaheenajanjuhajivrajeurope/>.

²¹ Carol Johnson and Blair Williams, "Gender and Political Leadership in a Time of COVID," *Politics & Gender* 16, no.4 (2020):943-950, <https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/>.

²² Guy Chazan, "Angela Merkel: Germany's Crisis Manager is Back," *Financial Times*, March 27, 2020, <https://www.ft.com/content/>.

²³ Jon Henley and Eleanor Roy, "Are Female Leaders more Successful at Managing the Coronavirus Crisis?" *The Guardian*, January 11, 2021, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/25/>.

²⁴ Avivah W. Cox, "What Do Countries with the Best Coronavirus Response have in Common? Women Leaders."

²⁵ Blair E. Williams, "A Tale of Two Women: A Comparative Gendered Media Analysis of UK Prime Ministers Margaret Thatcher and Theresa May," *Parliamentary Affairs* 74, no. 2 (2020):398-420, doi:10.1093/pa/gsaa008.

²⁶ "Coronavirus: How New Zealand Relied on Science and Empathy," *BBC News*, April 20, 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-52344299>.

A perceived gender influence is also visible in scholarly research on Covid-19. Johnson and Williams argue that women leaders' femininity has provided them with leverage in health crisis, in a sense that pandemic blurred the boundaries of 'public and private' in politics. Female leaders' maternal tendencies have given them an edge over their male counterparts. They have conformed to their social and discursive duties inscribed to them through the traditional divisions of 'public vs private', assigning, the role of caregiving [empathy traits] to the women and leadership to men [agency], which tilted media coverage in their favour.²⁷

Garikipati and Kambhampati argue that feminine leadership traits such as, "big thinking, empathy and good communication skills," assisted female leaders and affected their threat perception of Covid-19 as a "life and death matter" that eventually guided their Covid-19 leadership. However, they take issue with the mainstream rationale that women being 'risk averse' reacted quickly and therefore performed better than their male counterparts. They contest the connotations of the said 'risk' itself and argue that female leaders displayed an aversion to the risk posed to 'human security', 'public health' and 'lives of their citizens', whereas they took greater risk in terms of 'economic and financial security' when they enacted prompt lockdowns in their countries. Therefore, it is not their "risk aversion" rather a 'low threshold for ambiguity' that dictated female leaders' covid-19 response.²⁸

Abras argue that the states with better social indicators tend to choose leaders irrespective of gender. Female-led states generally perform better in terms of social welfare services. Therefore, the better covid-19 indicators in female-led countries have a direct correlation with social and healthcare services in place.²⁹ Doyle highlights the tendencies of mainstream and scholarly analysis to harken back to gendered understanding of subjects of leadership and politics in analysis and research, especially pertaining to Covid-19 response. She argues that such emphasis on 'maternal aspect of femininity' of female leaders in their covid-19 response is intrinsically flawed and detrimental to their progress as leaders.³⁰

²⁷ Johnson and Williams, "Gender and Political Leadership," 943-950.

²⁸ Supriya Garikipati and Uma Kambhampati, "Leading the Fight Against the Pandemic: Does Gender 'Really' Matter?" *SSRN Electronic Journal*, 2020, 20. doi:10.2139/ssrn.3617953.

²⁹ Ana Abras, Ana C. Fava, and Monica Y. Kuwahara, "Women Heads of State and Covid-19 Policy Responses," *Feminist Economics* 27, no.1-2(2010):380-400, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9132784/>.

³⁰ Nancy Doyle, "Do Women Make Better Leaders in a Pandemic? Don't Trust the Data," *Forbes*, August 20, 2020, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/drnancydoyle/2020/08/20/>.

Critical Analysis of Literature Review

Based on the understanding that, 'language is not neutral'³¹ the brief overview of literature depicts a reproduction and reinforcement of gender norms termed as 'essentialist' by feminist. The accreditation of 'maternal form of protective femininity' on female leaders' performance uncovers gendered treatment of female leadership. This discursive construction of Covid-19 discourse that directs the spotlight on female leaders' 'sex', and focuses on gender binaries of male and female leaders; their respective leadership attributes need to be contextualised considering Shepherd's assertion that gender lens only becomes relevant when a woman is concerned. Similarly, it is quite evident that female politicians and heads of states face a gendered treatment with a more critical, invasive, and personalised scrutiny³² evaded by male heads of states. Mainstream media coverage of the pandemic conspicuously missed any mentions of male leaders as fathers but highlighted female leaders' identities as mothers depicting the internalization of the gendered construction of leadership discourses.³³

Theoretical and Methodological Framework

Michel Foucault presented a field of inquiry that explores and asserts that social reality of subjects is a product of discursive construction through reiterative application of key words, phrases, and statements in a constitutive manner. He proposes the understanding and application of 'discursive practices' to comprehend the dialectical and intertwined natures of "knowledge and power" within a historical context that shape the prevalent power relation. By doing so, it poses questions whether there are any 'essential human subjects'; agents that are subtracted from and independent of social-cultural and historical constructivism. For Foucault, discourse is not merely rhetorical; in fact, it is "responsible and responsive" to social and discursive construction, continuation and reproduction of pre-existing and new power hierarchies and hegemonies.³⁴ This is further elaborated by Richard Ashley's argument that, "knowledge is always constituted in reflection to interests"; this

³¹ Rukh Wodak, *Language, Power and Ideology: Studies in Political Discourse* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing, 1989) 10.

³² Blair Williams, "It's a Man's World at the Top: Gendered Media Representations of Julia Gillard and Helen Clark," *Feminist Media Studies*, 2020, 1-20. doi:10.1080/14680777.2020.1842482.

³³ Linda Trimble, Jane Arscott, and Manon Tremblay, *Stalled: The Representation of Women in Canadian Governments* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013) 643.

³⁴ Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), 22.

understanding about 'political nature of knowledge' falls within the broader scope of critical theory.³⁵

This understanding of social and discursive construction of reality, the impact of political nature of knowledge is imperative in understanding the origin, source, and objectives of intrinsic dichotomies of gender binaries in subject of politics.

Identity Theory

Identity theory explains how political discourse constructs identities by creating 'linkages of series of signs differentiated from one another'. The discursive construction of these identities is accomplished by the application of tools of symbolism and association through the strategies of representations and the process of othering.³⁶ Moreover, discursive means of 'silencing, denial and marginalization' of 'other identities' are applied to construct and establish dominance of particular social and discursive identities.³⁷

Thereby, subjects act based on their social and discursively constructed identities.³⁸ It is nevertheless pertinent to note that identity of subjects is not monolithic or static; in fact, it is a complex amalgamation of various subject positions that emanate in socio-political, cultural, racial, and physiological variables. Hence, a single aspect of identity cannot be isolated as fundamental. Moreover, the discursive construction of subjects is a continuous evolutionary process; identity of subjects is always in flux. Identities manifest themselves in speech, talk, actions, and perceptions of individuals; subjects as, identities are woven into a 'narrative' by processes of generalizations, simplifications and abstractions; a process that is intrinsically political and subjective.³⁹ In simpler terms, discourse give meanings to subjects' social identities making the latter product of their social and discursive construction.⁴⁰

³⁵ Richard K. Ashley, "Political Realism and Human Interests," *International Studies Quarterly* 25, no.2 (1981):289. doi:10.2307/2600353.

³⁶ Christina Rowley and Jutta Weldes, "Identities and US Foreign Policy," in *US Foreign Policy*, ed. Michael Cox and Doug Stokes (Oxford University Press, 2012), 184.

³⁷ Cynthia H. Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches & Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics* (Pandora, 1989), 25.

³⁸ Ruth R. Pierson, "Beautiful Soul or Just Warrior: Gender and War," *Gender & History* 1, no. 1 (1989): 77-86, doi:10.1111/j.1468-0424.1989.tb00237

³⁹ Rowley and Weldes, "Identities and US Foreign Policy," 185.

⁴⁰ Mary McIntosh and Judith Butler, "Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity," *Feminist Review*, no. 38 (1991):131. doi:10.2307/1395391.

Post-Positivist Feminist Positions

When feminist talk about 'gender', they reject essentialised categories of male and female binaries established based on the bodies or sex they are born with. On the other hand, they emphasise how preconceived notions about male and female bodies and their connection to masculine and feminine traits influence and in turn are shaped by the actual circumstances and experiences of the people and institutions they construct and interact with.⁴¹ Similarly, post-structural feminists refuse that gender can be fixed in a single category. They assert that biological sex is in fact performed through discourse: gender identities are socially construed.⁴²

The aforementioned popular commentaries on pandemic leadership emphasise the complicated relationship between state and gender, as well as how they are ever-changing "subjects in process."⁴³ This brings Butler's argument on "performative nature of gender" that becoming a man or women is equivalent to becoming a social and discursive construction with no specific end or beginning, rather it is a continuous process that is open to intervention and resignification. For Butler, 'performaty' is not a specific 'act' it is a "reiterative and citational practice by which discourse produces the effect that it names" through stylized and sanctioned repetition of behaviours that associate meanings to an action.⁴⁴ In essence, subjects have no existence if subtracted from the political practices. A political being, be it state, or agents of state is constituted by political practices, preferences, and narrative.⁴⁵

On the same lines, feminists argue that state is a gendered construct, and its identity is constructed by the expressions said to be its results [meaning a mutually constitutive relation exists between state and discourses of state]. States as social and gendered constructs are manifestations of social and discursive processes and reflection of value identified with it through the dominant political discourse.⁴⁶

Gender, Politics and Leadership

Politics is viewed as a study of power, and feminists contend that the difference in how studying politics affects different strata of society is

⁴¹ Sandra Whitworth, "Feminist Theories and International Relations," *Feminism and International Relations*, 1994, 11-38. doi:10.1007/978-1-349-23572-82.

⁴² Judith Butler, *Bodies That Matter: On The Discursive Limit of "Sex"* (London: Routledge, 2014), 35.

⁴³ Butler, *Bodies That Matter*, 25.

⁴⁴ Judith Butler, *Undoing Gender* (London: Psychology Press, 2004), 12.

⁴⁵ Ashley, "Political Realism and Human Interest."

⁴⁶ Weber, "Performative State," 80.

its most peculiar feature.⁴⁷ Feminists historically have been criticising the theory and practice of politics and statecraft for the invisibility of women's perspective, arguing that women's role in politics is either invisible or that of passive agents.⁴⁸ Feminists argue that politics is a patriarchal and masculine domain as it is rooted in Anglo-American traditions that could be traced back to the work of John Locke with its heavy reliance on analytical separation of public and private.⁴⁹ Gendered in its essence, theory and practice of politics establishes gendered binaries of rights and responsibilities by creating water tight divisions of public and private in its theory and practices; dedicating decision-making powers including leadership, combat, politics, economy and statecraft to male and reproductive duties to women.⁵⁰

In addition, subsumes women to private sphere through discursive and social construction of impermeable binaries and gender power hierarchies of 'agency' and 'empathy' within the political discourse. These gender binaries lay the groundwork for excluding women from 'agentic' political discourse of politics.⁵¹ Hence, the tendency to associate female leader's political response to health crisis to their inherent nature, that women are 'instinctively better' at handling human security problems. In this context, Pateman and Herschmann's explain this tendency in a sense that, performance of female leadership and political agency are 'viewed' and 'treated' in an entirely different perspective as their male counterparts from a vantage point of their "natural destiny as mothers."⁵²

Feminists argue that women contending for leadership positions in politics have to compete against the naturalisations of social identities of leaders within the political culture of the states⁵³. In the West, especially in the U.S. the most dominant social identities associated with the image of a leader are "white and male" that consequently results in biasness against

⁴⁷ Karen Celis et al., *The Oxford Handbook of Gender and Politics* (Oxford University Press, 2013), 1-27.

⁴⁸ Hilary Charlesworth, "Feminist Methods in International Law," *American Journal of International Law*, 93, no. 2 (1999): 379-394.

⁴⁹ Cynthia Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases*, 10. ; Rebecca Grant and Kathleen Newland, *Gender and International Relations* (Didcot: Taylor & Francis Group, 1991), 20-30.

⁵⁰ Ibid. ; Rebecca Grant and Kathleen Newland, *Gender and International Relations*, 20-30.

⁵¹ Judith Butler, *Bodies That Matter*.

⁵² Caron E. Gentry and Laura Sjoberg, *Beyond Mothers, Monsters, Whores: Thinking about Women's Violence in Global Politics* (London: Zed Books, 2015), 35-42.

⁵³ Martin M. Chemers, "Leadership Effectiveness: An Integrative Review," *Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology: Group Processes*, 2008, 110-112, doi:10.1002/9780470998458.ch16.

and unacceptability of individuals that do not fit the description of 'white and male.'⁵⁴

Shepherd argues that this exclusive emphasis on 'sex' or 'physicality' of political agents emanate from naturalisation of traditional essentialist understanding of gender that asserts a 'direct relationship between body and behaviour'. In a sense that, if a body is 'braded male' it should possess the traditional 'masculine traits' of strength, power, assertiveness that falls within the broader category of 'agentic traits', whereas a female body should display traditional 'feminine traits' connoting 'empathy traits': kindness, irrationality, emotionality, empathy and, maternal qualities of care and nurture.⁵⁵

Such social and discursive construction of identities prevalent and dominant in discourses of politics and leadership has resulted in naturalisation of women's 'lack of fit' for leadership position.⁵⁶ This naturally points towards the fact that, women leaders have historically made a significantly smaller segment among world leadership of their times. Currently, there are only 21 female heads of the states in 194 countries, a fraction of only 20 percent among total world leaders. Feminists criticise this minority in representation as "single sex conjecture".⁵⁷ in the same line of thinking as representation of history as biographies of "Great Men".⁵⁸ This highlights a gap in study of leadership and politics due to the dearth of literature on correlation between genders of leader in a state of nation crisis.

Gendered division of 'agency' and 'empathy' establishes the foundation of social and political institutions. Based on which social and political institutions provide rationale for assigning of 'privilege or exclusion', 'punishment or justification' for a wide range of behaviours, attitudes, conducts and practices of political actors. Divergence in treatment of political and social actors somewhat appears organic and, embedded in nature; hence, widely accepted as such.⁵⁹ Consequently, the dominant discourses on politics and leadership tend to associate

⁵⁴ Alice H. Eagly and Linda L. Carli, "Women and the Labyrinth of Leadership," *Contemporary Issues in Leadership*, 2018, 146-167, doi:10.4324/9780429494000-17.

⁵⁵ Laura J. Shepherd, *Gender Matters in global Politics: A Feminist Introduction to International Relations* (London: Routeledge, 2010), 35-65.

⁵⁶ Eagly and Carli, "Women and the Labyrinth of Leadership," 150-155.

⁵⁷ Virginia Sapiro, "When are Interests Interesting? The Problem of Political Representation of Women," *American Political Science Review* 75, no.3 (1981):

⁵⁸ Bert A. Spector, "Carlyle, Freud, and the Great Man Theory," *Leadership* 12, no.2 (2015): 250, doi:10.1002/9780470998458.ch16

⁵⁹ Fred Halliday, "Hidden from International Relations: Women and the International Arena," *Rethinking International Relations*, 1994, 147-169, doi:10.1007/978-1-349-23658-9_7.

connotations of 'masculinity' with that of 'leadership'⁶⁰. Evidently Joseph Roast's definition of leadership that synthesises 221 definitions of leadership from last century defines leadership as, "rational, management oriented, male, dominant, technocratic, quantitative, cost-driven, hierarchical, short-term, pragmatic and materialist."⁶¹ In a broader perspective, there is a superimposition of connotations of masculinity on ideals of state, politics, and leadership.

According to the feminist standpoint the association of feminine attributes such as, dependent, irrational, emotional, and peace loving being diametrical to the key values of state-rationality, autonomy, self-reliance, and aggressiveness, women are deprived of their political agency and leadership positions.⁶² The outcome of this construction is a plethora of scholarship on gender and leadership. It focused on the 'nature and impact of gender' and invested in exploratory studies on 'behavioural conduct' of female leaders.⁶³ The basis of such inquires and propensities is internalisation of gendered norms of leadership as a masculine domain that give birth to discourses that there is a difference between male and female leader's behaviour and leadership style.⁶⁴

Feminists say that the behavioural requirements for women leaders necessitate a look at the concept of 'political gender double bind,' which forces female leaders and politicians to face scrutiny that their male counterparts evade. Political gender double bind suggests that female leaders should possess and display both, stereotypical masculine as in 'act like a leader' and 'stereotypical feminine: act like a woman' characteristics to reach leadership position or break the invisible 'glass ceiling' in masculine domain of leadership and politics.⁶⁵ Johnson and William argue that pandemic presented an excellent opportunity to assess the validity of 'political gender double bind on female leaders.' The duality of expectations caused by the pandemic required leaders to take quick and

⁶⁰ Alice H. Eagly and Steven J. Karau, "Role Congruity Theory of Prejudice towards Female Leadership," *Psychological Review* 109, no.3 (2002): 573-598, doi:10.1037/0033-295x.109.3.573.

⁶¹ Joseph C. Roast, *Leadership for the Twenty-first Century* (Santa Barbara: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1991)

⁶² Jill Steans, *Gender and International Relations: An Introduction* (Chicago: Rutgers University Press, 1998), 20-33.

⁶³ Jean L. Chin and Joseph E. Trimble, *Diversity and Leadership* (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2014), doi:10.2307/448946.

⁶⁴ Debroh Alexander and Kristi Andersen, "Gender as a Factor in the Attribution of Leadership Traits," *Political Research Quarterly* 46, no.3 (1993): 521.

⁶⁵ Courtney Burns and Amanada Murdie, "Female Chief Executives and State Human Rights Practices: Self-Fulfilling the Political Double Bind," *Journal of Human Rights* 17, no.4 (2018): 470-484. doi:10.1080/14754835.2018.1460582.

decisive actions classified as a 'masculine trait,' and focus on the health and wellbeing of their nations: a duty, which falls under 'feminine trait.'⁶⁶

Furthermore, questions concerning the behavioural conduct of female leaders are of great value to the feminist scholars. They criticize the gendered nature of dominant discourses in gender and politics to be predominantly masculine, setting behavioural standards for female leaders to adopt to be accepted as leaders.⁶⁷ They argue that female leaders are 'expected' to 'adapt' and 'lean in', and to emulate masculine behaviour to be taken seriously within the political and institutional settings.⁶⁸

Gender stereotyping in leadership discourse stems from the understanding that female leaders possess the same qualities as 'women'. Therefore, the social and discursive construction of gender identities of women permeates in the association of 'female leadership traits' as well.⁶⁹ Female leadership traits are classified as 'empathy traits' that are deemed 'communal'; placed on the opposite side of 'agential traits: traditional leadership traits' on leadership spectrum. The traits of 'absolute understanding of leadership' require leaders to command/possess strength and power, display dominance, rationality, and assertiveness.⁷⁰ Thereby, the gendered structural and discursive impositions in leadership discourse such as, "women take care and men take charge" require female leaders to possess and display the 'absolute traits of leadership' that have been canonised as such.⁷¹

Individuals' political and leadership decisions amid a crisis have a strong connection to and influence over their identities. Individuals' (subjects'/leaders') identities are moulded by exposure to social and discursive constructions together with the inherent predispositions of

⁶⁶ Johnson and Williams, "Gender and Political Leadership in a Time of COVID," 945.

⁶⁷ Tomas C. Premuzic, "As Long As We Associate Leadership with Masculinity, Women Will Be Overlooked," *Harvard Business Review*, March 8, 2019, <https://hbr.org/2019/03/as-long-as-we-associate-leadership-with-masculinity-women-will-be-overlooked>

⁶⁸ Tomas C. Premuzic, "Why do so Many Incompetent Men become Leaders?" *Harvard Business Review*, August 22, 2013, <https://hbr.org/2013/08/why-do-so-many-incompetent-men>.

⁶⁹ Monica C. Schneider and Angela L. Bos, "Measuring Stereotypes of Female Politicians," *Political Psychology* 35, no.2 (2013): 246, doi:10.1111/pops.12040.

⁷⁰ Eagly and Karau, "Role Congruity Theory," 574.

⁷¹ Jeanine L. Prime, Nancy M. Carter, and Theresa M. Welbourne, "Women "Take Care," Men "Take Charge": Manager's Stereotypic Perceptions of Women and Man Leaders," *The Psychologist-Manager Journal* 12, no.1 (2009): 25-49, doi:10.1080/10887150802371799.

political discourse, which feminists believe is gendered in nature.⁷² Individuals' placement in gender hierarchies affects the formation and naturalisation of their social and political identities that emanates in their everyday interactions, perceptions and socialisations.⁷³ The overview of Covid-19 leadership response in the West explains how leaders' identities and positioning within gender hierarchies influenced their leadership responses to the Covid-19 bio-security threat. The socio-political environment that determines how leaders' identities are socially and discursively constructed, as well as how they are positioned within gender hierarchies and ideological frameworks, is reinforced and repeated in speeches and policies by leaders.

Leaders' Political Rhetoric and Crisis Communication

Leadership is a performative act accomplished with the help of language and rhetoric.⁷⁴ Due to the nature of the biosecurity threat posed by Covid-19, leaders applied a diverse range of emotional appeals in their political rhetoric to construct a sense of seriousness and urgency among their citizens. National leaders employed negative and positive emotional appeals to synthesize cohesive national responses to contain the spread of the virus: flattening of Covid-19 curve.⁷⁵

In this context, the inscriptions of social and discursive gender identities of leaders are transparent in latter's choices of rhetorical tools. National leaders have skilfully applied positive emotional rhetoric of pro-social appeals (personalization of loss, grief, hope, and empathy) in addition to negative emotional appeals (fear, loss, and guilt) and threat-based emotional appeals (militarism, wartime political rhetoric, and war semantic) in their crisis communication to achieve a targeted emotional response from the public.⁷⁶ There is a significant difference between leaders' choices of rhetorical tools and emotional appeals based on their genders. A study of female leaders' political rhetoric highlights their

⁷² Celis, *The Oxford Handbook of Gender and Politics*, 10.

⁷³ R.W. Connell and James W. Messerschmidt, "Hegemonic Masculinity," *Gender & Society* 19, no.6 (2005):829-859. doi:10.1177/0891243205278639.

⁷⁴ Manpreet Kaur, Rajesh Verma, and Frank N. Otoo, "Emotions in Leader's Crisis Communication: Twitter Sentiment Analysis During Covid-19 Outbreak," *Journal of Human Behaviour in the Social Environment* 31, no. 1-4(2021): 362-372.

⁷⁵ Naimah A. Al-Ghamdi, "Ideological Representation of Fear and Hope in Online Newspaper Reports on Covid-19 in Saudi Arabia," *Heliyon* 7, no.4 (2021): e06864. doi: 10.1016/j.heliyon.2021.e06864.

⁷⁶ Connor M. Chapman and DeMond S. Miller, "From Metaphor to Militarized Responses: The Social Implications of "We Are at War with COVID-19-Crisis, Disasters, and Pandemics Yet to Come," *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy* 40, no. 9/10 (2020): 1107-1126, doi:10.1108/ijsssp-05-2020-0163.

reliance on personalized emotional appeals. The political rhetoric adopted by male heads of the state displays a masculinised militarist political rhetoric heavily infused with wartime, battlefield imagery, and out-right declarations of war against virus.⁷⁷

Dada et al. conducted a computerised study of speeches of world leaders from February 26th to April 6th, 2020, to study the political rhetoric of the leaders. The study declares that female leaders constructed their political rhetoric around the ideas of empathy and personalised emotional appeals, whereas male leaders' political rhetoric is heavily masculinised and militarised. While both male and female leaders refer to war metaphors, "the frequency and volume" is relatively higher for male leaders. Within the said timeframe of study: female leaders' used war metaphors at an average rate of 6.1 in 19 speeches as compared to male leaders who averaged 25.4 percent in 40 speeches. President Trump alone applied war metaphors 136 times in his 23 speeches.⁷⁸

Arguably, female leaders' reliance on a "wide-range" of emphatic and emotional rhetorical tools uncovers internalisation or performance of social and discursive identities of 'femininity' with emotionality, empathy, sensitivity, and kindness by the female leaders. Exposure to a wide range of emotional and linguistic expressions due to the associations of femininity with 'empathy traits' plays a mutually constitutive role. It develops a subliminal proclivity among women to express themselves with help of emotive expressions.⁷⁹

On the contrary, male leaders have displayed an excessive proclivity and tendency to engage in militarised wartime political rhetoric in their covid-19 speeches.⁸⁰ This uncovers the gendered identities of 'men' constructed in association with masculine identities of 'agent of political violence' and 'warrior' who needs to display the masculine traits of violence, strength, and power.⁸¹ Their gendered identities as 'agents of politics and political violence' manifest in a subliminal proclivity and propensity to engage in a militarist political rhetoric, the moment they face a crisis. The movement Feminists criticise wartime political language as

⁷⁷ Nathan A. Sears, "The Securitization of COVID-19: Three Political Dilemmas," *Global Policy Journal*, March 25, 2020, <https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/25/03/2020/securitization-covid-19-three-political-dilemmas>.

⁷⁸ Sara Dada et al., "Words Matter: Political and Gender Analysis of Speeches Made by Heads of the Government during the COVID-19 Pandemic," 2020, doi:10.1101/2020.09.10.20187427.

⁷⁹ Butler, *Bodies That Matter*, 81.

⁸⁰ Anuradha Chenoy, "Why Populist Leaders Use Rhetoric for All things Related to the Covid-19 Pandemic," *The Wire*, August 19, 2020, <https://thewire.in/politics/covid-19-war-militarism-public-health-populist-leaders>.

⁸¹ Elshtain, *Public Man, Private Women*, 35-50.

“inherently masculine, power based, paternalistic and violent”⁸² that is constitutive of and constitutes social and discursive gendered hierarchies within discourses and theory of politics.

The inscriptions of leaders’ gender identities on their speech acts could be better understood by taking Debra Cameron’s argument in ‘Feminist Critique of language: A Reader’ into account that there is a general social expectation from both sexes to engage in particular linguistic practices. For instance, there is a certain dislike for women’s use of profanities which teaches them to “circumlocution”.⁸³ In a similar way, it could be said that male gender’s exposure to excessively militarised language internalises their gendered identities of a specific way of male speech reflective of their violent agency.

Threat Perception of Leaders

Threat perceptions of leaders played a significant role in how the responses to the outbreak of Covid-19 pandemic unfolded. Arguably, a leader’s socio-political and gender identity manifested in his/her threat perceptions. Feminists’ argue that masculinised construction of states, theory, and practice of politics requires their ‘natural agent: men’ to present an identity of a ‘Strong Man’ when faced with a looming threat.⁸⁴

Moreover, this masculinised identity of strong men compels a refusal to acknowledge the ‘threat’ to display a facade of ‘fearless warrior’ as witnessed in the case of the pandemic. Initial refusal by male leaders to acknowledge the ‘threat of the virus’, resulted in a lacklustre response by many of the male leaders.⁸⁵

British Prime Minister Johnson’s ‘fearless warrior attitude demonstrated on the 3rd of March, 2020 when he boasted about shaking hands with Covid-19 positive patients eventually landed him into intensive care on 7th of April.⁸⁶ Trump’s depicting of “strong man” identity could easily be encapsulated by his claims of ‘powering through covid-19’ and ‘feminization of mask wearing’.⁸⁷ Their reiterative insistence on

⁸² Laura J. Shepherd, *Gender Matters in global Politics: A Feminist Introduction to International Relations* (London: Routledge, 2010), 35-65.

⁸³ Deborah Cameron, *The Feminist Critique of Language: A Reader* (London: Psychology Press, 1998), 10.

⁸⁴ Helen Lewis, “The Pandemic Has Revealed the Weakness of Strongmen,” *The Atlantic*, May 6, 2020, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/05/>

⁸⁵ Ruth R. Pierson, “Beautiful Soul or Just Warrior: Gender and War,” *Gender & History* 1, no. 1 (1989): 77-86, doi:10.1111/j.1468-0424.1989.tb00237.

⁸⁶ Simon Tisdall, “Trump, Putin and Bolsonaro have been Complacent,” *The Guardian*.

⁸⁷ Jimmy Leach, “While Strongmen Let Us Down, Women Show Us the Virtue of Competence,” *The Sun*, May 22, 2020, <https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/11688949/>.

downplaying the threat of Covid-19 created an illusion of control over circumstances in addition to their over-estimation of healthcare systems in their countries, resulting in worsening of the situation; rise of Covid-19 positivity ratios, and high Covid-19 related death tolls.

Female leaders anticipated the threat at the earlier stages, reiteratively asserted the severity of the threat posed by the virus and articulated uniform and consistent policy responses whereas, male heads of the states initially downplayed the covid-19 threat. Feminists in this context argue that threat perception of women and 'persons of colour' is strikingly heightened compared to white male because of their real-life experiences of 'lack of power'⁸⁸. Female leaders' anticipation of the threat resulted in prompt enactment of covid-19 social distancing measures and lockdowns of their countries. They understood and accepted the severity of covid-19 early on and articulated their crisis leadership and political rhetoric around the themes of seriousness that created a sense of urgency among their citizens and resulted in better compliance with social distancing measures.

Early acceptance of bio-security threats resulted in the formulation and enactment of quick, decisive, and task-oriented crisis leadership in female-led states. Crisis leadership in most male-led countries suffered due to ambiguities and inconsistencies in political messaging, delays in lockdowns, and social distancing measures affecting covid-19 curves. This reasserts the significance of understanding the underlying processes of construction of identities in individuals' behaviours, their speech acts and meaning making processes.

Conclusion

Covid-19 pandemic represents an excellent opportunity to deconstruct the discourses of politics and gender, to see how gender ideologies, gender binaries and gender power hierarchies are constructed, reconstructed, perpetuated, and naturalised in theory and application of politics. Arguably, the gendered nature of subject of politics produces gendered subjects who act on basis of their placement on tiers of gender hierarchies. Contextually, the hegemonic nature of such gender ideologies is rooted in assumptions that they somehow appear organic, common-sense and consensual within the broader domains of politics. The social acceptance of such gender hierarchies is accomplished through discursive process, whereby the agents of such discourses and political processes fail to recognise their own gendered behaviours, masculine privileges, and

⁸⁸ Melissa L. Finucane et al., "Gender, Race and Perceived Risk: The 'White Male' Effect," *Health, Risk & Society* 2, no.2 (2000): 159-172. doi:10.1080/713670162.; Jeanette Norris, Paula S. Nurius, and Linda A. Dimeff, "Through Her Eyes," *Psychology of Women Quarterly* 20, no1 (1996): 123-145. doi:10.1111/j.1471-6402.1996.tb00668.

sexism. Apparent inadvertent sexism is visible in representation and reporting of the Western leaders.

In retrospect, the meanings of 'masculinised and feminised' signifiers are rooted in and mediated by the discourse that underline the meaning-making processes of social and political identities of agents or subjects of politics employing social and discursive constructions political actors are exposed to through language and discourses. Individuals' social and political identities are produced and naturalised on basis of their gendered identities. Both male and female leaders act based on their identities which implicitly and explicitly comes forward in their political rhetoric, threat perception, and policy responses.

Gendered identities are most dominant as political identities of male leaders as 'strong men' and their rhetorical choices of militarised semantics and wartime metaphors. This displays a dominance of a particular way of doing male gender and association of masculinity [authority and aggressiveness] with an absolute understanding of leadership. Male leaders' failure to anticipate Covid-19 threat to a larger part is driven by their masculine identities as strong men. Strong men stand tall in face of calamity creating a facade of 'fearless warrior', they act by delegitimizing their enemies through association of binaries of 'us vs them'. Delays in acceptance of Covid-19 threat resulted in a late response and worsened the pandemic in their countries. Their political rhetoric is infused with wartime imagery, militarist, and nationalist language that uncover social and discursive inter-subjectivities of discourses of violence [war] with masculinity and politics.

Female leaders depict their gender rationality by acting according to their gender identities. Interestingly their leadership in Covid-19 confirms and contradicts gendered understanding of leadership discourses. While their leadership response comprises of 'personalised and emphatic political rhetoric' conforming to empathy traits, their decisive, task-oriented approaches seem to resist the ideal of female leadership and infringe upon the domains of agentic (masculine) leadership. And contest the credibility of gendered construction of water-tight compartments of femininity and masculinity within discourses of leadership and politics.

The construction of mainstream views on Covid-19 leadership as "success of femininity" and "failure of masculinity" uncovers the dominance and naturalisation of an essentialist understanding politics and leadership subjects which proves restrictive and insufficient. It calls into questions the naturalisation of gendered discourse of politics that reconstitute cycles of hegemonies within the theory and practices of politics.

This inherent disposition in theories and practices of politics to revert to the physicality/physiology of leaders by focusing on their leadership through a gendered lens restricts the understanding of subjects

of politics and leadership. The social and discursive association of female leadership with empathy traits and femininity further strengthens the binaries of empathy and agency within leadership discourses and may prove detrimental to the progress of political agency.

In the context of pandemic leadership, it is essential to highlight that gendering of leadership qualities in a certain context by claiming certain intrinsic qualities as necessary leaves incompetence and complacency unaccounted for and unaddressed. The construction of 'supposedly better female leadership' response to Covid-19 is an inadvertent effect of femininity of female leaders that makes them naturally better at handling a bio-security crisis owing to the very nature of the crisis. Female leaders performed better because they anticipated threat and acted decisively by undertaking great economic risks. To argue that political agents based on their biological 'sex' are predisposed to a way of leading and doing politics is a disservice to the subjects of politics and restricts it.

Crisis leadership is simply leadership under distress. If a crisis or security situation demands a particular leadership trait such as empathy or assertiveness it is only logical that agents of politics notwithstanding their social and discursive gender, learn that leadership trait instead of categorising, branding, and associating leadership qualities to gender identity. This calls for a gender-neutral discourse on leadership and politics.

STATE OF INDIAN DEMOCRACY AND US-INDIA STRATEGIC COOPERATION: AN UNEASY CONVERGENCE?

Humayun Javed* & Ameer Abdullah Khan**

Abstract

US-India strategic convergence is likely to continue as Washington considers New Delhi a counterweight to Beijing. However, rising right-wing authoritarianism in India under BJP, marked by the erosion of democratic standards, has created a policy paradox for Biden Administration- how to balance geopolitical interests with democratic ideals. The paper argues that adhering to the norms of democracy is not just a normative concern but also a strategic concern for the US as democracy is one of the core pillars that sustains US- led liberal world order. However, the Biden administration does not appear to emphasize democratic values and human rights performance to the point where strategic convergence would seem at risk. Thus Biden administration is likely to emphasize democratic values and human rights performance to the point where strategic convergence would not seem at risk.

Keywords: *Democracy, Human Rights, Balancing, US, India, China*

Introduction

US-India relations have been driven by the convergence of their strategic interests and resemblance of democratic values. The emergence of China as a major player in international politics provided a new impetus to this relation. However, with the upsurge of Hindu nationalism in India and drifting away of the state from liberal democratic values under the leadership of Indian Premier Narendra Modi, a rift has appeared in the value system of both the states. Right-wing populism and extreme nationalism carried with ideological motives under state patronage characterize today's India, which the United States

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considers a counterweight to China in the region. Unlike Donald Trump, who provided a free pass to India on issues of democratic freedom and human rights, Biden has vowed to link geopolitical calculations with considerations for human rights and democratic values. This is imperative not only for Biden's domestic constituency but also for the US to retain the world order that has been designed by itself based on the values of liberal democracy and economy. He considers a coordinated foreign policy of democratic partners as an effective way to confront China's abusive behaviour and human rights violations.² Moreover, foreign policy blueprint, Interim National Security Strategy Guidance, showed Biden administration considering nationalism and authoritarianism as urgent threats which required preservation of democracy and coalition of democratic states to uphold American values and ideals.³ This is also worth noting that this emphasis on preservation of democracy is not mere reflection of US normative standing but is also closely linked with its strategic interests. The US is facing the challenge to maintain the liberal world order that is based on multilateralism, democracy and free market. If any of these pillars is undermined greatly, it will give a serious blow to the US efforts to sustain its world order that is being challenged by non-democratic, authoritarian powers. In the shape of Brexit, this order has already suffered a shock. Now dwelling of the world's largest democracy into the hands of right-wing authoritarian government will do further damage.

Joe Biden's first foreign policy speech showed that Washington was committed to support and preserve democracies. However, the US is going to face a difficult situation when questions on India's record of human rights and democratic freedoms are to be raised.⁴ Moreover, the declining state of human rights under the Bharatiya Janata Party's (BJP's) rule in India could be worrisome for American State Department, which has doubled down on its criticism on authoritarian practices and human rights record in China. Consequently, as it appears, the U.S. could increasingly face criticism for double standards if it casts a blind eye on New Delhi's record of human rights while continuing intense rhetoric against Beijing. Thus, this paper hypothesizes that Biden administration's hope to form a coalition of like-minded liberal states against authoritarianism in the context of rise of populist-religious nationalism in

² Joe Biden, "Why American Must Lead Again: Recusing U.S. Foreign Policy after Trump," *Foreign Affairs* 99 (2020): 64, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-01-23/>

³ Joe Biden, "Interim National Security Strategic Guidance," *The White House*, March 3, 2021, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/>

⁴ Joe Biden, "Remarks by President Biden on America's Place in the World," *U.S. Department of State*, February 4, 2021, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/04/>

India could have significant implications for U.S.-India strategic cooperation. The study is based on two research questions. First it explores the implications of the rise of right-wing Hindu nationalism – with consequences for democratic values and human rights record – on U.S.-India strategic convergence against the backdrop of an American administration committed to preserving democracies, countering right-wing populism, and confronting China on its record of human rights and freedoms. The second question explains that how the likely undermining of democracy in India and its toleration by the US can impact the global order that is already facing challenges from China through the rise of its material capabilities and presentation of an alternative to the liberal democracy. The paper justifies the hypothesis through the theory of democratization. The paper starts with discussion on strategic convergence between the US and India followed by an overview of declining state of democracy in India and subsequent challenges for Indo-US strategic partnership. The paper concludes that declining state of democracy in India will bring Indo-US strategic partnership to new tests because ignoring it will undermine Biden regime's commitment to counter China through the narrative of anti-Human rights agenda and also by undermine US led global order that is based on promotion of liberal democracy and freedom.

Theoretical Framework & Methodology

The paper adopts the explanatory methodology to provide an enhanced understanding over the delicate issues of democracy and strategic interests of major powers. However, a plethora of freshly published literature can be found on challenges to democracy in the recent times but its relevance to the strategic relationships between major powers need more pondering. Additionally, this paper uses the theoretical framework of neoliberalism and consults literature on global order to justify the central argument. Out of different foci of neoliberalism, the paper specifically used the concept of democratization to explain the phenomenon under question.

Rooted in 17th and 18th century western political thought, neoliberalism can be understood through five major assumptions⁵. These include firm belief in human reasoning guiding towards cooperative approach of international relations, human progress as linear historic development, state-society linkage, economic interdependence, and role of international institutions. Using these assumptions, neoliberalism sees international relations as an arena of international cooperation where the effects of international anarchy can be reduced through rational acts of

⁵ Knud Jorgenson, *International Relations Theory: An Introduction* (Palgrave: London, 2018) 90.

states like⁶ promotion of democracy, multilateralism and promotion of free trade and democracy. The spread of liberal democracy requires a participatory political culture where all the minorities (ethnic, religious, linguistic) get equal share in political processes at every level. In addition, it is coupled with spread of individual liberties throughout the society and respect for universal human rights and a free and transparent media and judiciary. In addition, a liberal democracy must ensure continued guarantee for minorities protection and their rights. The research incorporates the work of various theorists on democratization to understand the important indicators of democratic transition and consolidation. For the specific case of India, the work uses measures of democratization – concluded from different surveys and freedom measures – to understand how democratization could experience a reversal in a state due to the eroding of democratic institutions and values. The Freedom House annual report *Freedom in the World* (2022) declares India's relegation from the status of 'free state' to 'partially free state'.⁷ Similarly an analysis of previous reports show a gradual decline in the state of Indian democratic values.⁸ The most recent of these reports indicates the deteriorating state of necessary components of a democratic polity including– consent of the governed; accountability of institutions; adherence to the rule of law; respect for human rights; checks and balances through independent judiciary and media; and protection of minorities.⁹ The same report argues that with the relegation of India to this status, a big percentage of the world population now lives out of the free world. The report also states that the fall of India from the upper ranks of free nations could have a particularly damaging impact on global democratic standards. This can mainly be attributed to the fact that India is home to 1 out of every 7 persons on the planet.

At the end of WW-I, the US President Woodrow Wilson tried to bring America out of isolationism under the liberal dream. However, it was after WW-II that the US showed a firm commitment to spread liberal democratic values throughout the world. This was a beneficial to the US in two ways. Firstly, it provided legitimacy to US fight against fascism during the war and policy of containment of USSR immediately after it. Secondly, it helped the US to gather around liberal democratic states and establish a world order where the US had a central role. Following the fall of USSR, Fukuyama led the voices that avowed the championship of liberal

⁶ Robert Jackson, George Sorenson, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches* (Oxford University Press: London, 2013) 102.

⁷ "Freedom in the World," *Freedom House*, May 16, 2022, <https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/>

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

democracy and liberal economies¹⁰. Though the US has not followed a black-and-white policy in terms of democratic values, yet the overall leaning of the US policy has been towards democracies. Special US relations with Israel, EU and India are some of the prominent examples to quote in this regard. Though the US has preferred strategic interest over democratic issues in its relations with Israel, still Washington has been facing troubles in defending Israeli actions. In case of India, the situation would be more complicated due to the size of Indian economy and population as well as its role in countering authoritarian states. The spread of and support for liberal democracy has had more of rational value for the US foreign policy than mere ideological one. This is the reason that US has been maintaining relations with monarchs as well as dictators in Asia, Africa and Latin America. However, recently, the neoliberal policy of the US has come across a new dilemma that is the rise of illiberal democracies and right-wing populism. India presents an ideal case in this regard where BJP led government following Hindutva ideology has come to power. The rise of BJP to power in India has been tantamount to the rise of illiberal democracy due to undermining of basic requisites for the spread of democracy. It is worth noting that the rise of BJP was made possible through the democratic process. So this can be viewed in linkage with the world-wide trends where right-wing populist and extremist leaders are coming to power through democratic processes, thus giving rise to illiberal democracies. This poses the aforementioned dilemma to the US foreign policy. The subsequent part of the paper justifies the central argument basing the neoliberal assumption that spread of liberal democracy and free market economy necessitates the acceptance and spread of liberal values in a society. If this platform is not set, the democracies tend to degenerate into illiberal democracies that negate the very core of liberal agenda that has been the hallmark of the US foreign policy. In case of India, deteriorating state of democracy will have negative consequences for Indi-US strategic convergence.

U.S.-India Strategic Convergence

When, in 2001, President George W. Bush lifted all sanctions on India after its nuclear tests in 1998, relations between the two countries significantly improved and remains warm to this day. From the Bush administration signing a Civil Nuclear Deal with India to Hillary Clinton (Secretary of State under the Obama administration) calling New Delhi "an indispensable partner",¹¹ relations between the United States and India have experienced greater strategic convergence in the last two decades.

¹⁰ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (The Free Press: New York, 1992) 244.

¹¹ Yashwant Raj, "Indo-US Ties Indispensable Partnership," *Hindustan Times*, September 9, 2010, <https://www.hindustantimes.com/world/>

Only to be further intensified under Donald Trump, who considered India an essential strategic partner against China, labelled by his administration as "a revisionist power."¹²

Convergence of strategic interests, accordingly, is evident from several initiatives that both the states undertook, especially in the realms of defense and security in the last few years.¹³ For instance, the U.S. designated India as a 'major defense partner' in 2016; U.S.-India 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue was established in 2018, paving the way for India to have access to advanced communication technology used in the U.S.. Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement was signed in 2018, allowing real-time information sharing between two states' militaries; and an intelligence-sharing agreement called Basic Exchange and Communication Agreement (BECA) was signed between the two states in 2020.¹⁴ All these initiatives of defense partnership and security cooperation were taken in the backdrop of growing Chinese military power – a concern for both Washington and New Delhi, making India a natural partner for the U.S. to balance China.¹⁵ Thus, these efforts have evoked U.S. defense secretary Mark Esper to label these responses as attempts against "increasing aggression and destabilizing activities by China."¹⁶

Defense partnership, therefore, is likely to continue given the growing American concern over China, making the U.S. consider India as its strategic partner to counterbalance Beijing – labelled as the "most serious competitor" by President Joe Biden in his first foreign policy speech after acquiring presidency.¹⁷ The course of strategic convergence is likely to continue, as demonstrated by both Biden and Modi agreeing to continue close cooperation in their first call after Biden was sworn in as

¹² Mahrukh Khan, "Growing India-U.S. Strategic Cooperation," *Strategic Studies* 37, no. 4 (2017): 97-, <http://www.issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/>.

¹³ Cara Abercrombie, "Realizing the Potential: Mature Defense Cooperation and the U.S.-India Strategic Partnership," *Asia Policy* 26, no. 1 (2019): 119, <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/717563/summary>.

¹⁴ "A Timeline of U.S.-India Relations," *Council on Foreign Relations*, May 16, 2022, <https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-india-relations>.

¹⁵ Samit Ganguly and M. Chris Mason, *An Unnatural Partnership? The Future of U.S.-India Strategic Cooperation* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S Army War College Press, 2019), 1, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/>

¹⁶ Anjana Pasricha, "With Eye on China, India and US Sign Landmark Military Agreement," *Voice of America*, October 27, 2020, <https://www.voanews.com/usa/>.

¹⁷ Joe Biden, "Remarks by President Biden on America's Place in the World," The White House, February 5, 2021, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/04/>.

president.¹⁸ Both leaders intended to support freedom of navigation, territorial integrity, and a stronger regional architecture through the Quad, thereby showing a greater vision for a coalition between the U.S. and India. This was followed by the first-ever Quad Summit held to promote “free, open, and rules-based order in Indo-Pacific” (a veiled reference to China).¹⁹

Moreover, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken – who, during his confirmation hearing, called America’s relations with New Delhi “a bipartisan success story” – has reaffirmed the strength of the U.S.-India strategic partnership with his Indian counterpart S. Jaishankar.²⁰ Furthermore, Lloyd Austin, U.S. defense secretary under Biden, assured Congress that he would “operationalize India’s major defense partnership status” – a commitment he emphasized with Indian defense minister Rajnath Singh as well.²¹ On his visit to India, he reiterated American commitment to strengthening bilateral defense ties and strategic partnership amidst China’s growing assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, the recent Sino-Indian border standoff in the Himalayas has accelerated relations between the two countries.²²

Consequently, these commitments and developments have considerable geopolitical implications and are likely to remain and get intensified since American concerns over strategic competition have been exacerbated: this has compelled Antony Blinken to single out China as the “world’s greatest geopolitical test for Washington.” Therefore, it is evident that as concern for Beijing’s rise grows in Washington, the United States and India are likely to head closer.²³

¹⁸ “Readout of President Joseph Biden Call With Prime Minister of India,” *The White House*, February 8, 2021, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/02/08/>.

¹⁹ “Eye on China, Biden Holds First Summit with Japan, India and Australia,” *Dawn*, March 12, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1612105>.

²⁰ “Readout of Secretary Blinken’s Call with India External Affairs Minister Jaishankar,” *U.S. Department of State*, accessed January 29, 2021, <https://www.state.gov/>.

²¹ “Would Further Operationalize India As Major Defense Partner: U.S. Secretary of Defense Nominee Lloyd Austin,” *Swarajya*, accessed January 23, 2021, <https://swarajyamag.com/insta/>.

²² Tanvi Madan, “China Is Losing India: A Clash in the Himalayas Will Push New Delhi toward Washington,” *Foreign Affairs*, June 22, 2020, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2020-06-22/china-losing-india>.

²³ Jeff Smith “Austin Goes to India: An Agenda for India–U.S. Defense Consultations,” *The Heritage Foundation*, March 18, 2021, <https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/austin-goes-india-agenda-india-us-defense-consultations>.

A Declining State of Democracy in India

When the U.S. and India celebrate their close relationship, the word 'democracy' gets a marked focus, depicting the greater significance of two nations converging on ideals of freedom and democracy.²⁴ India – considering itself 'world's largest democracy' – and the U.S. – referring to itself as 'world's oldest democracy' – often observe their strategic relationship with underlying notions of being natural partners, sharing common values. Today, such conceptions are more relevant when both share a convergence against China (which is criticized by both for having an authoritarian political system and an assertive outlook) and Indian democracy, on the other hand, faces an assault from right-wing authoritarianism marked by the centralization of power and curbing of freedoms.

Theories of democracy enable us to identify the key elements of a democratic polity. Leading American political scientist on democracy, Larry Diamond, considers participation, pluralism and representation of all citizens as vital to the system of democracy in a state.²⁵ Proponents of the theory of democratization see a guarantee of fundamental freedoms, provision of basic human rights, protection of minorities, the rule of law that applies equally to all citizens, decentralization of power and media freedoms as some essential components of democracy. The famous book on the meaning and purpose of democratic practices, "Theories of Democracy: A Reader", considers these elements to be vital for a democratic society according to classical, modern and contemporary commentators on the roots of the democratic ideal.²⁶ The work provides a consensus of social scientists on some basic principles of democracy concluded through democratic theorizing and used as indicators or measures of democratic values. Let us examine the condition of these essential credentials of a vibrant democracy in India.

The state of India sliding towards Hindu majoritarianism or extreme Hindu nationalism has seen an intense communal upsurge under the flag of the Hindutva project (a right-wing religious movement based on exclusive Hindu nationalism). For instance, New Delhi's divisive campaign against Kashmiris, demonstrated by the abrogation of Article 370 and 35A, followed by brutal repression and clampdown with the intent to carry demographic changes, has raised serious questions about India's

²⁴ "U.S. Relations with India: Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet," Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, *U.S. Department of State*, January 20, 2021, <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-india/>

²⁵ Larry Diamond, "What Is Democracy?" Stanford University, January 21, 2004, <https://diamond-democracy.stanford.edu/speaking/lectures/what-democracy>.

²⁶ Ronald J. Terchek and Thomas C. Conte, *Theories of Democracy: A Reader* (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001).

democratic image in the United States.²⁷ Moreover, the formulation of discriminatory laws aimed against Muslims – Citizenship Amendment Act (2019), National Register of Citizens in Assam, and “Love Jihad” Law (Prohibition of Unlawful Religious Conversion Ordinance) in 2020 – are a bid to disenfranchise Muslims and discredit minorities, thereby attacking the secular and diverse nature of Indian polity. International community and media have been joining the same course and have condemned the attitude of BJP government towards the issues mentioned above.²⁸

Furthermore, with cow vigilantism on the rise and BJP’s racial and communal ideology seeking state patronage, democracy and freedom (especially for minorities) are in jeopardy. Several studies and official reports depict the declining state of Indian democracy under the premiership of Mr. Modi. A think tank funded by the U.S. government, Freedom House, downgraded India’s status from the ranks of free nations to partly free nations. The report warned, “... [India] is elevating narrow Hindu nationalist interests at the expense of the founding values of inclusion and equal rights for all.”²⁹ The report observed that increased pressure on human rights organizations³⁰, rising intimidation of academics³¹ and journalists,³² and a spate of bigoted attacks, including lynching³³, aimed at Muslims show the deterioration of political rights and

²⁷ Akanksha Singh and Roshan Abbas, “Opinion: In the World’s Largest Democracy, ‘Looking Muslim’ could Cost your Life,” CNN, May 19, 2022 <https://edition.cnn.com/2022/05/19/opinions/indian-muslims-violence-hindu-nationalism-singh-abbas/index.html> and Aproov anand, “India’s ‘Love Jihad’ Laws: Another Attempt to Subjugate Muslims,” Al-Jazeera, January 15, 2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/1/15/indias-love-jihad-laws-another-attempt-to-subjugate-muslims>. and “Citizenship Amendment Bill: India’s New ‘anti-Muslim’ Law Explained,” BBC December 11, 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-50670393>.

²⁸ Akanksha Singh and Roshan Abbas, “Opinion: In the World’s Largest Democracy.

²⁹ “Democracy under Siege,” *Freedom House*, March 4, 2021, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege>.

³⁰ Murali Krishnan, “Why Is India Cracking down on Human Rights Groups?” DW, October 1, 2020, <https://www.dw.com/en/why-is-india-cracking-down-on-human-rights-groups/a-55105954>.

³¹ The Wire Staff, “Scholars at Risk Report Details Bleak State of Academic Freedom in India,” *The Wire*, November 25, 2020, <https://thewire.in/education/scholars-at-risk-report-academic-freedom>.

³² Raju Gopalakrishnan, “Indian Journalists Say They Are Intimidated, Ostracized If They Criticize Modi and the BJP,” Reuters, April 27, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/>

³³ “Haunted India’s Lynch Files: The Quint Records Incidents of Mob Violence across India since 2015,” *The Quint*, September 1, 2021, <https://www.thequint.com/quintlab/lynching-in-india/>.

civil liberties³⁴ in Modi's India. This, according to the report, could have a damaging impact on global democracy standards.

An annual report of the U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights, also regretted religious-based violence in India aimed mainly at Muslims. The report also showed concerns about the "curtailment of freedoms and lack of accountability persisting at all government levels."³⁵ This shows that it will not be possible for the US to remain completely blindfolded towards the developments in India. The US will be forced to accept democratic situation in India as an irritant in their bilateral relations. Similarly, such reports are themselves a reflection of the policy priorities in the US. Furthermore, prominent rights watchdogs have shown serious concerns over India's turn towards authoritarian nationalism with racial and communal underpinnings. Dissent and criticism are facing increasing government repression as the government has intensified its crackdown on protestors and advocates of human rights. Human Rights Watch, for instance, observed, "The Modi government [in 2019] continued its widespread practice of harassing and sometimes prosecuting outspoken human rights defenders and journalists for criticizing government officials and policies."³⁶

Consequently, it seems clear that India's democratic credentials are in a quick decline. The worsening situation of democratic freedoms in India – which has long boasted about being the 'biggest democracy in the world' – could be largely worrisome for the Biden administration, which considers New Delhi a strategic partner and considers the preservation and promotion of democracy important foreign policy goals. Therefore, the deteriorating ideals of democracy in India could complicate the bondage of interests between the two: their attempts to lecture Beijing on human rights and freedoms could appear hypocritical; Biden's urge to preserve and promote democracy globally could be in contradiction with strategic convergence shared with New Delhi; and, America's bid to ally with link-minded democratic states against China in Asia-Pacific could be affected.

³⁴ Prem M. Trivedi, "Is the Modi Government a Threat to Civil Liberties?", *Foreign Policy Magazine*, July 8, 2014, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/07/08/is-the-modi-government-a-threat-to-civil-liberties/>.

³⁵ "2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: India," *U.S. Department of State*, March 30, 2021, <https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/india/>.

³⁶ "World Report 2020: India," *Human Rights Watch*, accessed March 28, 2021, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/india>.

The Commitment of Biden Administration for Democracy and Human Rights

A declining condition of India's democracy could turn out to be a predicament for President Joe Biden, who considers authoritarian nationalism and religious populism as serious challenges to democracy worldwide. Though India still has a functional democratic set-up where different institutions are still resisting the efforts by BJP to sabotage the liberal secular spirit of the constitution. However, it is evident from the development since 2014 that Hindu nationalists are prevailing over these institutions and democratic spirit of the society is weakening. One such example is the state elections in UP and other four states where BJP was not able to win seats but its electoral presence and vote bank increased from the previous elections.³⁷ The United States, in the past, has always felt a need to promote and preserve liberal democracy globally, and the Biden administration is no exception: Joe Biden, during his campaign against Trump, never missed out on accusing Trump of 'admiring autocrats' and 'embracing all the thugs in the world.'³⁸ Moreover, Biden demonstrated a strong ambition to promote and preserve democracy by linking geopolitical objectives to human rights concerns.³⁹

An initial foreign policy blueprint, Interim National Security Strategy Guidance, showed Biden administration considering nationalism and authoritarianism as urgent threats which required the preservation of democracy and a coalition of democratic states to uphold American values and ideals.⁴⁰ In his first foreign policy address, when Joe Biden stated that "America is back," he referred to America's return to diplomacy, multilateralism, and engagement with allies – notions considered by Biden as those rooted in America's most cherished democratic values.⁴¹ Biden was quick to point out authoritarianism as the first and most crucial challenge for the U.S.; his initial part of the speech was marked by cherishing democratic values: defending freedom, upholding universal rights, and respecting the rule of law. Furthermore, Biden also mentioned

³⁷ News Desk "Bypolls: Big Setback for BJP as Party Loses in all Four States," India TV, April 16, 2022, <https://www.indiatvnews.com/elections/news/bypoll-results-2022>.

³⁸ "Biden Criticizes Trump for Embracing all the Thugs in the World," *Independent*, October 16, 2020, <https://www.independent.co.uk/>.

³⁹ Joe Biden, "Remarks by President Biden at the 2021 Virtual Munich Security Conference," The White House, 2021, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/19/>.

⁴⁰ Joe Biden, "Interim National Security Strategic Guidance," The White House, March 3, 2021, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf>.

⁴¹ Joe Biden, "Remarks by President Biden on America's Place in the World," *U.S. Department of State*, February 4, 2021, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/04/>.

his administration's urge to work with partners to support the restoration of democracy and the rule of law while imposing consequences on those responsible.

Biden's Secretary of State Antony Blinken, too, showed a deep commitment to helping other states advance democracy and strengthen human rights. Blinken hosted the Summit for Democracy, declaring 2022 the "Year of Action" to "mobilise countries for making significant commitments to enhance their own democracies," and arguing that pledges for democracy must be followed by concrete action.⁴² Furthermore, Biden's National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan also showed commitment to arrest democratic backsliding, stating that "the U.S. is going to work to reinforce the strength of democracies and make sure that we show that democracy, rather than autocracy, is the form of government best suited for the challenges of our time."⁴³

With the Biden administration hoping to form a coalition of like-minded liberal states against authoritarianism, the rise of populist nationalism in India could have significant implications for U.S.-India strategic cooperation. When concerns about India's record on human rights and democratic freedoms are raised, the US will find itself in a tough situation given that Joe Biden's maiden foreign policy speech demonstrated that Washington appears committed to promoting and sustaining democracies.⁴⁴ Moreover, the declining state of human rights under the Bharatiya Janata Party's (BJP's) rule in India could be worrisome for the American State Department, which has doubled down on its criticism of authoritarian practices and the human rights record in China. It is worth noting that in terms of ideological inclination, BJP is closer to the western capitalism and follow pro-West policies at most of the times. This enables them to gain advantage and get away with their anti-democratic policies at home. However, as the battle between liberalism and authoritarianism will intensify, the dilemma for the west will also become more complicated to resolve, particularly when supporting India could threaten the sustenance of the liberal world order itself.

For instance, State Department's annual human rights report has accused China of "crimes against humanity" while mentioning China's treatment of Uighur Muslims as "genocide."⁴⁵ Earlier this year, Biden,

⁴² "Secretary Antony J. Blinken at Virtual Summit for Democracy Civil Society Roundtable - United States Department of State," *U.S. Department of State*, February 16, 2022, <https://www.state.gov/>

⁴³ Amy Mackinnon, "Defining the Biden Doctrine," *Foreign Policy*, January 18, 2022, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/18/>

⁴⁴ Biden, "Remarks by President on America's Place."

⁴⁵ "2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: China," *U.S. Department of State*, March 30, 2021, <https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/china/>.

while responding to queries at a televised event, stated that the "U.S. will reassert its global role in speaking for human rights, and China will pay the price for its human rights abuses."⁴⁶ Moreover, Secretary of State Antony Blinken, too, constantly points out the geopolitical contest with China while sharing concerns over human rights. For instance, while reminding the world of China being the 'greatest geopolitical test,' he never forgets to press for accountability on human rights abuses, especially in Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong.⁴⁷ Criticism aimed at China has clearly intensified and has taken a sharp turn towards alleging China more on democracy, freedoms, and human rights issues.

The United States, along with Canada, the United Kingdom, and European Union, has sanctioned a number of Chinese officials for Beijing's mistreatment of Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang.⁴⁸ Similarly, the US support for democratic Hong Kong has been increasing in the recent years. This, therefore, increases the burden for Washington to not overlook how democratic principles are being jeopardized in India; if the U.S. casts a blind eye on what happens in Beijing's immediate neighbour India – described as a strategic partner to the U.S. – the intense criticism against Beijing on human rights would lose credibility. In short, the United States would face the age-old dilemma of being accused of lecturing adversaries on democracy meanwhile overlooking authoritarian rulers who are allied for geopolitical necessities.⁴⁹

Hence, a Biden administration considering right-wing authoritarianism and populist nationalism as crucial challenges; intending to establish a collision of like-minded democratic states; affirming the need to promote and preserve democracy globally; and intensifying criticism against Beijing for its policies in Xinjiang, Tibet, Taiwan, and Hong Kong could raise serious questions on Washington's stance. As to how democracy and human rights face serious threats in India. Strategic convergence between the U.S. and India against China could further enhance cooperation between Washington and New Delhi. However, avenues of collaboration on the geopolitical front could have certain repercussions if the Biden administration remains keen on preserving democracy globally and linking power politics with values and ideals. As

⁴⁶ "Biden says China to Pay Price for Human Rights Abuses," *Al Jazeera*, February 17, 2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/17/>

⁴⁷ "China is World's Greatest Geopolitical Test, Blinken Says," *Voice of America News*, accessed March 3, 2021, <https://www.voanews.com/usa/china-worlds-greatest-geopolitical-test-blinken-says>.

⁴⁸ "Uighur: Western Countries Sanction China over Rights Abuses," *BBC*, March 22, 2021, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56487162>.

⁴⁹ Osita G Afoaku, "US Foreign Policy and Authoritarian Regimes: Change and Continuity in International Clientelism," *Journal of Third World Studies* 17, no. 2 (2000): 13-40.

Biden announced at Munich Security Council, "democracy does not happen by accident. We have to defend it, fight for it, strengthen it, and renew it."⁵⁰

Deteriorating Indian Democracy and Concerns for the United States

Donald Trump's transactional version of foreign policy did not demonstrate a linkage of human rights and liberal ideals with geopolitical considerations. As Trump overlooked human rights and minority rights records in India, strategic partnership with India grew. For instance, when Trump visited India in February 2020 while making defense deals and receiving a grand tour event (Namaste Trump), the visit coincided with the Delhi Riots, in which Hindu mobs deliberately attacked Muslims after protests were staged in different parts of the country against controversial citizenship laws. Trump, in response, never uttered a word on the killing of fifty-three people (thirty-six of them being Muslims); instead, he regarded Modi as the "Father of the Nation." In India, human rights predicaments evoked little response from Trump's foreign policy team: a free pass was offered to Modi on changing the character of Indian democracy.⁵¹

Biden, too, is also likely to continue or strengthen the bilateral relationship (as mentioned above), which the U.S. shares with India, since a bipartisan consensus to constrain China is visible in Washington's strategic circles. However, to leave the deteriorating standards of democracy in India unnoticed would be difficult, given the advocacy of liberal principles that Biden has promised throughout his election campaign and in his initial speeches on foreign policy. Some of this could be rhetoric for polls, and some of it could be traditional liberal language in which American foreign policy – even one based on *realpolitik* – is usually encapsulated. Nevertheless, the current U.S. administration's urge to promote coalitions of democratic states while criticizing Beijing's authoritarian practices against human rights could persuade Biden to revisit the stance Washington has on India's domestic politics. Another dimension to this can be the rise of Donald Trump and his authoritarian-styled presidency. His four years tenure followed by the circumstances leading to the mob attack on Capitol Hill brought the US to a situation where the democracy within the US felt threatened. This makes it even more of an imperative for the Biden administration to work for protection of democracy at both home and abroad.

For instance, in his policy paper for Muslim Americans, Biden asked India to restore the rights of Kashmiri citizens while condemning

⁵⁰ Biden, "Remarks by President at Munich Security Council."

⁵¹ Shivshankar Menon, "League of Nationalists: How Trump and Modi Refashioned the US-Indian Relationship," *Foreign Affairs* 99 (2020): 132, <https://heinonline.org/HOL/>.

the formulation of the Citizenship Amendment Act and the National Register of Citizens.⁵² His Vice President Kamala Harris, too, has been vocal on Kashmir: "We have to remind the Kashmiris that they are not alone in the world. We are keeping track of the situation. There is a need to intervene if the situation demands," she said last October.⁵³ In addition, United States Commission for International Religious Freedom issued an annual report (2020) for India in which India was recommended to be designated as a country of particular concern regarding religious freedoms.⁵⁴ It observed that India experienced a drastic turn downward, with religious minorities under increasing assault. The official government commission, whose commissioners are appointed by the president, also recommended targeted sanctions on Indian government agencies and officials responsible.

The findings by U.S. government agencies about human rights violations, along with the Biden administration's public commitments to promote democracy and human rights, could force the United States to exert pressure on India over its deteriorating democratic credentials. Although Biden's Secretary of State Antony Blinken has discredited military interventions to promote democracy, an initial foreign policy blueprint, Interim National Security Strategy Guidance, showed Biden's administration considering nationalism and authoritarianism as urgent threats which required the preservation of democracy and a coalition of democratic states to uphold American values and ideals.⁵⁵

Hence, public statements and policy documents show that the Biden administration is more likely to hold India to account for its human rights record. Moreover, during the first telephonic call between Biden and Modi after American President's inauguration, American President underscored his desire to defend democratic institutions and norms worldwide and noted that a shared commitment to democratic values is the bedrock for the U.S.-India relationship. This mention of democratic values is not without a context. Similarly, U.S Secretary of State Antony Blinken's first visit to India was marked by Blinken's veiled criticism of backsliding India's democracy. He, in a joint news conference with Indian external affairs minister S. Jaishankar, said, "We know that we must constantly do more on these fronts [freedom, equality and opportunity to all our people], and neither of us has achieved the ideals we set for

⁵² "Joe Biden's Agenda for Muslim-American Communities," *Joe Biden Presidential Campaign*, 2020, <https://joebiden.com/muslimamerica/>.

⁵³ Ayesha Ray, "Kashmir still roiled in conflict," *East Asia Forum Quarterly* 12, no. 4, (2020): 23-26, <https://search.informit.org/doi/abs/10.3316/informit.590870170195232>.

⁵⁴ "India Chapter: Annual Report 2020," *United States Commission on International Religious Freedom*, April 10, 2021, <https://www.uscirf.gov/countries/india>.

⁵⁵ Biden, "Interim National Security Guidance."

ourselves.”⁵⁶ Hence, his remarks about deteriorating ideals and values during a visit to expand the Indo-U.S. partnership demonstrate that Washington tends not to overlook the human rights record of New Delhi; democracy and human rights are going to be on the agenda along with other strategic matters.

Implications for Strategic Partnership

How much of this moralist expression and commitment would affect American calculations driven by power politics in a bilateral relationship with New Delhi depends upon the extent to which Biden is willing to compromise the realist logic of power maximization for liberal principles of democracy. According to a public intellectual on American foreign policy, John Mearsheimer, U.S. foreign policy is guided by the dictates of realist logic (based on power politics at the expense of liberal ideals and values) and is couched in the language of liberalism (based on the preference for human rights, democracy, and freedoms).⁵⁷ If this approach is followed by Joe Biden’s foreign policy team, U.S.-India strategic partnership will flourish, but at the expense of having a like-minded partner with healthy democracy and freedoms at home.

Moreover, this would also cost the U.S. moral standing and acceptance to condemn and sanction human rights abuses in China. When the Trump administration unleashed a fierce campaign against China’s human rights record, criticism came from every side on Washington’s policy stance on the deteriorating situation of secularism and inclusivity in India; the U.S. was intensely condemned for double standards.⁵⁸ Hence, the intense rhetoric against China’s crackdown on minorities and surge towards authoritarianism will have little effectiveness if Biden casts a blind eye on Beijing’s immediate neighbour and America’s strategic partner. As Mel Gurtov observes that “for U.S. to be more persuasive in urging Beijing to change its direction on human rights, Biden will have to align with Black Lives Matter, respect rule of law, refuse to endorse dictators, and urge the U.S. senate to ratify all the UN conventions on human rights.”⁵⁹ This means that Washington lacks moral ground to lecture Beijing on human rights while endorsing Narendra Modi next door as human rights violations grow under his watch.

⁵⁶ “Biden in Veiled Criticism of Indian Democracy,” *Dawn*, July 29, 2021.

⁵⁷ John J Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton & Company, 2001), 25.

⁵⁸ Wamika Kapur, “India Showcases America’s Double Standard,” CGTN, July 8, 2020, <https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-07-08/>

⁵⁹ Mel Gurtov, “US-China Relations and Human Rights: The Xinjiang Case,” *Asian Perspective* 45, no. 1 (2021): 83-90, <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/787895/summary>.

However, despite questions on India's record, the Biden administration "is widely expected to exert more pressure on China in terms of human rights and democracy," writes Xiangfeng Yang.⁶⁰ Furthermore, America's attempt to counter authoritarian nationalism in the backdrop of a worldwide democratic recession and to rebuild America's image as the leader of the free world would be tested by Washington's stance on declining democratic standards in India. The significance of the bilateral relationship between the U.S. and India persuades many experts on US-India relations to believe that strategic cooperation is likely to continue without any chances of considerations related to democracy and human rights, having the potential to completely jeopardize the convergence between Washington and New Delhi.

However, many believe that Biden would associate geopolitical interests with respect for democratic values and records of human rights. Ashley J. Tellis, a senior fellow at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, believes that "A Biden administration would be different [from Trump administration] bringing domestic Indian political developments under greater scrutiny and possibly pushback."⁶¹ A research fellow at Hudson Institute, Aparna Pande, who is also a director of Initiative on the Future of India and South Asia, predicts that "Biden [compare to Trump] would be more willing to speak out on India's perceived drift towards illiberalism. ... Indians would have to accept that a strategic partnership cannot be completely friction-free."⁶²

Hence, if BJP continues with its majoritarian and divisive policies, Biden could link cooperation with India's performance on human rights and democratic freedoms. As Anubhav Gupta, associate director of Asia Society Policy Institute, predicts greater scrutiny and public commentary on human rights violations in India but warns that the Biden administration has to walk a tight rope of standing up for democratic ideals while ensuring that it does not alienate important partners like India in the process.⁶³ However, Biden does not appear to emphasize democratic values and human rights performance to the point where

⁶⁰ Xiangfeng Yang, "US-China Crossroads Ahead: Perils and Opportunities for Biden," *The Washington Quarterly* 44, no. 1 (2021): 129-153, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/>

⁶¹ Ashley J. Tellis, "Pivoting to Biden: The Future of U.S.-India Relations," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 9, 2020, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/11/09/pivoting-to-biden-future-of-u.s.-india-relations-pub-83179>.

⁶² Aparna Pande, "Trump or Biden, India-U.S. Strategic Ties Won't Be Friction-Free," *The Print*, October 16, 2020, <https://theprint.in/opinion/trump-or-biden-india-us-strategic-ties-wont-be-friction-free/524133/>.

⁶³ Anubhav Gupta, "Nature And Nurture: How the Biden Administration Can Advance Ties With India," Asia Society Policy Institute, January 2021, <https://asiasociety.org/sites/default/files/>

strategic convergence would seem at risk. The reason: to enhance strategic cooperation with India to contain China is a greater and more urgent geopolitical test than setting others' houses in order. Moreover, as Blinken discredited "costly interventions to promote democracy," factors like America's domestic predicaments requiring urgent attention, limited priorities and muscle to engage in domestic politics of other states, and greater strategic necessity to have India as a counterbalance against China would limit Washington's potential to have greater involvement in India's domestic affairs. As Chivshankar Menon, former National Security Advisor and Foreign Secretary of India, affirms that Biden would not give Modi a free pass on human rights, yet his "priorities would be domestic."⁶⁴

The debate so far shows that the US is facing a policy dilemma. On one hand, India with its economic might and geographical proximity to China, vast territory and likeminded ideology is a great source of attraction for the US. On the other hand, the deteriorating state of democracy, human rights and the rise of right-wing Hindu Extremism in India can act as push factors for the US as a non-democratic India will be counter beneficial to the liberal world order. In addition, the phenomenon of populism has started threatening the democracy at home. This is not the first time that the US has been facing this policy dilemma. Historically, the US policy has been getting support from both the aspects, i.e. its strategic and political power as well as the power of its ideology. "The United States has long tried to marry power and principle -- realism and idealism."⁶⁵ This uniquely American realism has always been the trademark of American foreign policy. At no point, the US has been conveniently able to completely side-line either of these aspects. Therefore, again the same can be expected that the US will have to redefine its terms of engagement with India if democracy continues to deteriorate there.

Conclusion

U.S.-India strategic partnership is of great strategic value for Washington and New Delhi with the addition of the China challenge. Nevertheless, it will be very difficult for Biden to overlook India's fast-declining democratic standards, given the Biden administrations urge to make democracy a top foreign policy agenda. Thus, Modi would not enjoy a free pass on democracy and human rights as he did during Trump's era. Yet, there is not much possibility of U.S.-India strategic convergence being at the risk of a greater rift due to Washington's concerns on human rights and democracy: they share more convergences on trade, defense, and

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Condoleezza Rice, "Rethinking the National Interest: American Realism for a New World," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2008, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/>

China than divergences on values and ideals.⁶⁶ However, pressure on New Delhi to ensure minority rights and democratic freedoms would check Modi's reckless drive for Hindu nationalism with some consequences for strategic cooperation. The consequences could not lead to the overturning of strategic cooperation but would certainly affect Biden's envisioning for democracy. America's intense criticism of China's human rights record, as pressing China on human rights while ignoring violations by allies is not a good sign when a coalition of democracies is envisioned to take on China and project yourself different from a transactional predecessor.

With Joe Biden acquiring office after Donald Trump's exit, the U.S.-India strategic cooperation is likely to persist amid growing strategic competition between Washington and Beijing. However, a new administration committed to linking geopolitical objectives with consideration for human rights and democracy would find it increasingly difficult to counter authoritarian nationalism, promote a coalition of democratic states, and allege China of human rights violations while overlooking the declining standards of democracy in India. Hence, the U.S. under the Biden administration is expected to exert more pressure on India regarding its human rights record and declining credentials of democracy. Yet, divergence on the issues of human rights and democracy could not lead to parting, as balancing Chinese power and strengthening alliances are more urgent foreign policy goals for an administration that has discredited interventions to promote democracy.

⁶⁶ Tridivesh Singh Maini, "The U.S.-India Relationship after Trump: A Return to Convention?" *Future Directions International*, November 12, 2020, <https://www.futuredirections.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/The-US-India-Relationship-after-Trump-A-Return-to-Convention.pdf>.

Book Reviews

Title: **The Four Ages of American Foreign Policy: Weak Power, Great Power, Super Power, Hyper Power**
Author: **Michael Mandelbaum**
Publisher: **Oxford University Press, 2022, 624.**

The book divides the history of American Foreign Policy into Four Ages for comprehensive understanding of readers, each defined by a consistent increase in the country's power in its relations with others. Three unique features of American foreign policy are the ideological goals of foreign policy, the use of economic instruments in pursuing them, and a democratic process for formulating and implementing decisions about it. These are the themes that the author used to examine the distinguishing features of the United States' foreign policy over the twenty-five decades between the Stamp Act of 1765 and the Iran deal of 2015.

Michael Mandelbaum, professor emeritus at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies describes that the history of American foreign policy is characterized by the continuities and changes from the distinctive American features mentioned above. Based on the author's observations, there are three major continuities: American foreign policy has been unusually ideological, unusually economic, and unusually democratic by which he means more than any other nation. In terms of changes, the main one has been the steady growth in America's power in comparison to other countries in the international system. This growth has given the United States four distinct eras in the world: from 1765 to 1865, America was a weak power, from 1865 to 1945, a great power, from 1945 to 1990, a superpower, and from 1990 to 2015, a hyper power.

In the first age, the United States began as a weak power and remained so for the next one hundred years. However, it survived by employing three primary means to maintain their independence against the strong: difficulty of access, active defence, and diverting strong's attention. These proved to be the most important determinants of American foreign policy success in its first fifty years. The United States experienced rapid territorial and economic expansion even as a weak power. In the second half of America's century as a weak power, innovations that established a new foundation for military power began to emerge. The United States fought four wars between 1765 and 1865. The outcome of each war increased the country's strength; its independence from Great Britain was secured during the Revolutionary War, which lasted from 1775 to 1783. America's relations with the United Kingdom

were occasionally strained, but the two never clashed again. The outcome of the Civil War established the territorial dimensions as well as the political and economic character of the United States.

In the second age, the term "great power" came into use to describe the world's geopolitical giants. Following the Civil War, the United States joined this select community as one of several great powers and after the Spanish-American War of 1898, the United States became an imperial power. The United States foreign policy was focused on making certain that no European power could threaten North America. After the end of the World War I, the United States maintained a role in European affairs but to avoid direct military engagement, that role was principally an economic one. In World War II, the United States allied itself with the Soviet Union. The post-World War II period had a major impact on the foreign policy of the United States. It laid the foundations for the nation's role as a great power.

In the third age, the United States emerged from World War II with more power than ever before. Its currency gained official recognition, through the Bretton Woods agreements, as the most important on the planet. The America had formidable military forces and the most destructive weapon ever devised by humans, the atomic bomb. After World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union became rivals but never fought each other directly. The Cold War was the fifth global conflict to include the United States-Soviet rivalry. It featured alliances, deadly weaponry, efforts at subversion on both sides, and proxy battles. The two giants of the international system were often called "superpowers" because their conflict encompassed the whole world, including oceans and, with the launch of Earth-orbiting satellites, outer space as well. The Cold War began with the United States and the Soviet Union becoming enemies in World War II, and ended with the collapse of communism. America had not been a party to the outbreak of the two world wars, but in the Cold War it assumed a central role. Cold War was a conflict of both power and ideology between the West and the Soviet Union.

In the fourth age, the United States emerged from Cold War with no peers. No other country had, or ever had had, comparable power. American led collation triumph in the cold war left the United States as the sole hyper power. America had more military power by far than any other country and effectively had no rivals at all. Russia had emerged from the Soviet Union with its armed forces in ruins. China devoted only a modest part of an economy far smaller than the United States to military purposes. The American experience in the post-Cold War era divides into two parts. The first, encompassing roughly the decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the second, a decade and a half of American international setbacks, began with the 9/11 attacks. America's post-Cold War position did not bring with it a readymade foreign policy agenda. The United States decided, more or less by default, what its foreign policy would not be. It

did not retreat from most of the policies of the Cold War. America's ideological, economic, and democratic traditions had strong impact on its foreign policy after the Cold War. In the post-Cold War era, the United States foreign policy sought to expand the scope of the Western international economic order and promote democratic politics in troubled places around the world. The United States' hyper power came under the influence of its unusually democratic character.

In the first three eras of the country's foreign policy the United States had achieved its major goals and expanded its power. In the post-Cold War period the American hyper power did neither. The march of globalization stalled; some of what it sought lay beyond its power to bring about. The book is a well-researched, comprehensive and elegantly written history which will transform our understanding of how the United States came to be the most powerful country the world has ever known.

Reviewed by Rahat Naseem Ahmed Khan, PhD Scholar at IR Department, National Defence University, Islamabad.

Title: **The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict between the US and Xi Jinping's China**

Author: Kevin Rudd

Publisher: Public Affairs, New York, 2022, 432.

The strategists and policymakers predict that the 2020s will be “the decade of living dangerously” due to the unfolding crisis in the relationship between the United States (US) and China. The former Prime Minister of Australia, Kevin Rudd (2007-2010 and 2013), in his book *“The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict between the US and Xi Jinping's China”* terms it a “decisive decade” in the dynamics of changing balance of power between China and the US. Kevin Rudd is an admirer of Chinese classical civilization, economic achievements of the post-Mao era, and policies for lifting its population out of poverty. His writings simultaneously show deep affection for the American people. While admiring the US's unique culture of innovation, Rudd criticizes its domestic politics over voter suppression, unrestricted campaign financing, and corruption of the electoral redistricting system.

The book consists of seventeen chapters. It begins with an introductory section, *“On the Danger of War,”* which raises the question: Should the US and China find a way to coexist through a managed strategic competition? The modern bilateral relationship between China and the US is based on common economic self-interest. The human rights issue is a point of friction in their relationship. In this context, the author shares his personal experiences and explains how he raised human rights issues during his official visit to China while delivering a public lecture in the Chinese language at Peking University.

This book provides a history of mutual distrust between the two big powers. It explains Thucydides's Trap and its relevance to the US-China relationship, the rise of President Xi Jinping, and his views about the United States. Their political and strategic perceptions fuel the deepening distrust between Beijing and Washington. The US does not believe in China's self-proclaimed “peaceful rise,” while China does not buy Washington's pretensions that it has no interest in containing China's rise. The US occupies a central position in the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) strategic thinking as the only country that is capable of fundamentally disrupting China's national and global ambitions, including President Xi's dream of “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”. The American strategic community believes that armed conflict or confrontation is inevitable between the US and China unless the latter changes its strategic direction.

Rudd claims that with the rapid modernization of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), China's traditional belief that it is too weak to engage militarily against the US is fading away. Contemporary China is testing the limits of the US's defense commitments to its Asian allies,

including Taiwan, the Philippines, and Japan. The influential leader Xi Jinping — who sits at the apex of the Chinese political system — has consigned the old Chinese maxim “*Hide your strength; bide your time; never take the lead*” to oblivion. As a result of changing character of its leadership, China is removing the mask of modesty and restraint.

The author further argues that President Xi Jinping’s worldview is based on the following ten concentric circles of interest: (i) The centrality of Xi and CCP and the politics of staying permanently in power; (ii) Maintaining and securing national unity; (iii) Ensuring China’s economic prosperity; (iv) Environmental sustainability; (v) Modernizing the Chinese military to project power throughout the world; (vi) Managing China’s neighbouring states; (vii) Maximizing China’s strategic depth in the Pacific; (viii) Projecting China’s strategic, economic and diplomatic power westward across the Eurasian continent and the Indian Ocean through Belt and Road Initiative; (ix) Increasing influence across the developing world; and (x) Changing the global US-dominated rules-based order. Beijing will seek an international order more conducive to China’s ideological, political, and economic interests.

Kevin Rudd identifies the following three approaches that China has followed to change the nature of international order: (i) Growing its support across the developing world. (ii) Installing China-friendly candidates in international institutions. And (iii) Creating a network of multilateral institutions outside the United Nations (UN) and Bretton Woods system.

The US military looked at China as a regional strategic adversary in the 1950s-1960s, a strategic collaborator against the Soviet Union in the 1970s-1980s, an emerging strategic competitor in the 2000s, and an adversary in the 2020s. Washington formally assesses PLA as a “peer competitor” in the East Asia region and a “long-term strategic competitor” around the world.

The author has noted the following areas of military competition between the two great powers: (i) Taiwan (ii) The South China Sea (iii) The East China Sea (iv) New security threats (Artificial Intelligence, space, and cyberspace). In the chapter *The Decade of Living Dangerously*, Kevin Rudd outlines ten potential scenarios based on different hypothetical assumptions regarding what is likely to happen in the US-China relationship in the future. One important scenario is presented as “America’s Munich moment,” in which China takes Taiwan by force amid a nominal US military response.

The Avoidable War encourages policymakers in the two countries to devise a joint strategic framework, i.e., “managed strategic competition” between US and China to avoid war. It is difficult but possible. The core prepositions of “managed strategic competition” outlined by the author are: (i) China and the US must develop irreducible strategic redlines to avoid miscalculation; (ii) Both countries should divert the burden of

strategic rivalry into a competition that aims to deter armed conflict; and (iii) Washington and Beijing should continue to engage in strategic cooperation to achieve their national and global interests. Kevin Rudd suggests that both great powers need to consider similar procedures and mechanisms that the Soviet Union and the US established and followed after the Cuban Missile Crisis.

The Avoidable War focuses excessively on President Xi Jinping's strategic thinking and core priorities. The book presents him as a "calculated risk taker" who seeks to fracture US alliances. However, as Rudd has not cited references in the book, the readers may face difficulties verifying his claims about Chinese President Xi Jinping and China's national and global ambitions.

Reviewed by Anwer Ali, Research Officer, Center for International Strategic Studies Sindh (CISSS), Karachi.

Documents

Document: 1

Joint Statement of the Leaders of India, Israel, United Arab Emirates, and the United States (I2U2), 14 July, 2022.

On July 14, 2022, we, the Heads of Government of India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the United States, convened for the first leaders' meeting of the "I2U2" Group. This unique grouping of countries aims to harness the vibrancy of our societies and entrepreneurial spirit to tackle some of the greatest challenges confronting our world, with a particular focus on joint investments and new initiatives in water, energy, transportation, space, health, and food security.

We intend to mobilize private sector capital and expertise to modernize infrastructure, advance low carbon development pathways for our industries, improve public health and access to vaccines, advance physical connectivity between countries in the Middle East region, jointly create new solutions for waste treatment, explore joint financing opportunities, connect our startups to I2U2 investments, and promote the development of critical emerging and green technologies, all while ensuring near- and long-term food and energy security.

We reaffirm our support for the Abraham Accords and other peace and normalization arrangements with Israel. We welcome the economic opportunities that flow from these historic developments, including for the advancement of economic cooperation in the Middle East and South Asia, and in particular for the promotion of sustainable investment amongst the I2U2 partners. We also welcome other new groupings of countries, such as the Negev Forum for regional cooperation, that recognize the unique contributions of each partner country, including Israel's ability to serve as an innovation hub connecting new partners and hemispheres to strategically address challenges that are too great for any one country to manage alone.

Today's inaugural I2U2 leaders meeting focused on the food security crisis and clean energy. The leaders discussed innovative ways to ensure longer-term, more diversified food production and food delivery systems that can better manage global food shocks.

To this end, the I2U2 leaders highlighted the following initiatives:

- **Food Security:** The UAE – home to the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) and host of COP28 in 2023 – will invest \$2 billion USD to develop a series of integrated food parks across India that will incorporate state-of-the-art climate-smart technologies to reduce food waste and spoilage, conserve fresh water, and employ renewable energy sources. India will provide appropriate land for the project and will facilitate farmers' integration into the food parks. U.S. and Israeli private sectors will be invited to lend their expertise and offer innovative solutions that contribute to the overall sustainability

of the project. These investments will help maximize crop yields and, in turn, help tackle food insecurity in South Asia and the Middle East.

- **Clean Energy:** The I2U2 Group will advance a hybrid renewable energy project in India's Gujarat State consisting of 300 megawatts (MW) of wind and solar capacity complemented by a battery energy storage system. The U.S. Trade and Development Agency funded a feasibility study for the \$330 million USD project. UAE-based companies are exploring opportunities to serve as critical knowledge and investment partners. Israel and the United States intend to work with the UAE and India to highlight private sector opportunities. Indian companies are keen to participate in this project and contribute to India's goal of achieving 500 GW of non-fossil fuel capacity by 2030. Such projects have the potential to make India a global hub for alternate supply chains in the renewable energy sector.

The leaders expressed their determination to leverage well-established markets to build more innovative, inclusive, and science-based solutions to enhance food security and sustainable food systems. The leaders also welcomed India's interest in joining the United States, the UAE, and Israel in the Agriculture Innovation Mission for Climate initiative (AIM for Climate). They affirmed that these are only the first steps in a long-term strategic partnership to promote initiatives and investments that improve the movement of people and goods across hemispheres, and increase sustainability and resilience through collaborative science and technology partnerships.

Source: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/07/14/joint-statement-of-the-leaders-of-india-israel-united-arab-emirates-and-the-united-states-i2u2/>

Document: 2

Remarks by H.E. Wang Yi at the Opening Ceremony of the Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation 22 March, 2022, Islamabad, Pakistan.

It is a great pleasure to be invited to attend and speak at the opening ceremony of the Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). This is the first time for China's foreign minister to participate in the OIC-CFM meeting. It fully demonstrates the sincere desire of China and the Islamic world to strengthen exchange and cooperation, and will surely lift our relations to a new level.

Both Chinese and Islamic civilizations are ancient civilizations with significant global influence. The exchanges between us date back centuries. Our exchanges have withstood the test of international vicissitudes, and enjoy a deep historical foundation and solid support from our peoples. Friendship has been the mainstream of our relations,

equality the basis of our interaction, and mutual benefit the goal of our cooperation.

Over the years, we have always respected and trusted each other, and supported each other on issues involving our respective core concerns. China will never forget that when Algeria and other countries jointly tabled a resolution at the United Nations, nearly 30 Islamic countries firmly supported it, carrying China into the Organization. Likewise, on the Palestinian issue which is of top concern to the Islamic world, China's support has never been hesitant or absent.

We have always stood in solidarity and mutual support, and shared a commitment to common development. Since the outbreak of COVID-19, Islamic countries have immediately rendered China valuable support, and China has promptly provided 1.3 billion doses of vaccines and a large quantity of supplies to 50 Islamic countries. Belt and Road cooperation has become a bridge and bond connecting our two sides for development and prosperity. To date, China has signed BRI cooperation documents with 54 Islamic countries and launched nearly 600 large-scale projects worth of US\$400 billion. The cooperation has delivered real benefits to the people of China and Islamic countries.

We have always learned from each other and shared the commitment to safeguarding the diversity of civilizations of the world. Both Chinese and Islamic civilizations have made remarkable contributions to human civilization in history. Both have been treated unjustly in modern times. And today both are moving forward hand in hand on the journey toward development and rejuvenation. We should vigorously advocate equal-footed dialogue, exchange and mutual learning among civilizations, so as to draw wisdom from each other's time-honored civilization, resist "civilization profiling", and reject the notion of clash of civilizations.

China and the Islamic world have found a path of friendship and win-win cooperation among civilizations. This is a fine example of how to practice the new type of international relations. And it also provides useful experience on how different countries and civilizations can interact with each other.

In this volatile and changing world, the theme of this Session — "Building Partnerships for Unity, Justice and Development" — answers the common call of the majority of countries in the world. China will work with Islamic countries to uphold true multilateralism, defend the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and safeguard the UN-centered international system. In the pursuit of national rejuvenation, China and Islamic countries will always stand with each other to overcome challenges and forge ahead together. China is ready to work with Islamic countries to build the following four partnerships.

We need to be partners upholding unity and coordination. Our two sides need to firmly support each other in defending national

sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, firmly support each other in independently exploring the development path befitting our respective national conditions, and firmly support each other in safeguarding legitimate development rights and interests and the common interests of the developing countries at large.

We need to be partners advancing development and rejuvenation. We should stay united to defeat COVID-19. China will continue to provide 300 million doses of vaccine to Islamic countries to help them build a line of defence for health. We will foster greater synergy among our development strategies. We will pursue high quality Belt and Road cooperation and the Global Development Initiative (GDI) as “twin engines” to enhance cooperation in traditional areas and foster new highlights, so as to facilitate the development and rejuvenation of China and Islamic countries, guide South-South cooperation, and give a strong impetus to realizing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

We need to be partners promoting security and stability. China will continue to support the efforts by Islamic countries to use Islamic wisdom to solve current hotspot issues and to hold the key to peace and stability firmly in their own hands.

China will continue to stand firmly with the Palestinian people. China supports an early, more authoritative and representative international peace conference on the basis of the two-state solution so as to promote a comprehensive and just settlement of the Palestinian issue.

China respects the choice of the Afghan people, and supports Afghanistan’s efforts to usher in an inclusive political structure and moderate governance and open a new chapter of peace and reconstruction.

On Kashmir, we have heard again today the calls of many of our Islamic friends. And China shares the same hope.

China supports Russia and Ukraine in continuing their peace talks, and hopes that the talks will lead to ceasefire, end the fighting, and bring about peace. Humanitarian disasters should be avoided, and spillover of the Ukrainian crisis should be prevented so as not to affect and harm the legitimate rights and interests of other regions and countries.

We need to be partners enhancing mutual learning among civilizations. The two sides need to advocate peace, development, equity, justice, democracy and freedom, which are the common values of humanity, and reject the practice of stoking division and confrontation by drawing ideological lines. We need to advocate mutual learning among civilizations, reject notions such as superiority of certain civilizations and clash of civilizations, and oppose attempts to distort or vilify non-Western civilizations. We need to deepen cooperation on preventive counter-terrorism and de-radicalization efforts, resist double standards on fighting terrorism, and oppose associating terrorism with any particular ethnic group or religion.

History has proven, and will continue to prove, that China is a sincere friend and cooperation partner of the Islamic world. We stand ready to work with Islamic countries to promote multipolarity in the world, democracy in international relations and diversity of human civilizations, and make unremitting efforts to build a community with a shared future for mankind.

Source: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/202203/t20220323_10654638.html

Document: 3

United Nations S/2022/155, Security Council Draft Resolution, 25 February, 2022, New York, USA.

Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kiribati, Kuwait, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, North Macedonia, Norway, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Samoa, San Marino, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling the obligation of all States under Article 2 of the United Nations Charter to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, and to settle their international disputes by peaceful means, *Recalling* its primary responsibility under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Recalling the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the 1994 Budapest Memorandum,

Recalling its Resolution 2202 (2015) that calls on parties to fully implement the "Package of measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements", including a comprehensive ceasefire as provided for therein, as well as stressing the importance of the full implementation of the Minsk

Protocol of 5 September 2014 and the Minsk Memorandum of 19 September 2014,

Endorsing the Secretary-General's call for the Russian Federation to stop its offensive against Ukraine,

Condemning the 23 February 2022 declaration by the Russian Federation of a "special military operation" in Ukraine,

Expressing grave concern at reports of civilian casualties,

1. *Reaffirms* its commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders;
2. *Deplores* in the strongest terms the Russian Federation's aggression against Ukraine in violation of Article 2, paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter;
3. *Decides* that the Russian Federation shall immediately cease its use of force against Ukraine and shall refrain from any further unlawful threat or use of force against any UN member state;
4. *Decides* that the Russian Federation shall immediately, completely, and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders;
5. *Deplores* the Russian Federation's 21 February 2022 decision related to the status of certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine as a violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and inconsistent with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations;
6. *Decides* the Russian Federation shall immediately and unconditionally reverse the decision related to the status of certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine;
7. *Calls* on the parties to abide by the Minsk agreements and to work constructively in relevant international frameworks, including in the Normandy Format and Trilateral Contact Group, towards their full implementation;
8. *Calls* upon all parties to allow and facilitate the rapid, safe, and unhindered access of humanitarian assistance to those in need in Ukraine, to protect civilians, including humanitarian personnel and persons in vulnerable situations, including children;
9. *Condemns* all violations of international humanitarian law and violations and abuses of human rights, and calls upon all parties to strictly respect the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law, including the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977, as applicable, and to respect human rights;

10. Welcomes and urges the continued efforts by the Secretary-General, UN Member States, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and other international and regional organizations, to support de-escalation of the current situation, and also the efforts of the United Nations to respond to the humanitarian and refugee crisis that the Russian Federation's aggression has created;
11. Decides to remain actively seized of this matter.

Source: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3958806?ln=en>

Document 4:

China-Pakistan Joint Statement, 71st Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Ties between China and Pakistan, 22 May, 2022, Guangzhou, China.

At the invitation of State Councilor and Foreign Minister H.E. Wang Yi, H.E. Bilawal Bhutto Zardari visited Guangzhou on 21-22 May 2022 for his first official bilateral visit after taking office as Foreign Minister of Pakistan. The visit coincided with the 71st anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between China and Pakistan.

2. During the visit, State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari held in-depth discussions on the entire gamut of bilateral relations as well as regional and international issues of shared interest. The talks were conducted in a warm and friendly atmosphere, in line with the finest tradition of mutual trust and cooperation between the two countries.

3. The two sides agreed that amidst profound regional and international changes, the importance of China-Pakistan strategic relations has assumed even greater significance. As All-Weather Strategic Cooperative Partners, China and Pakistan share ironclad mutual trust and friendship, which is a source of peace, stability, and prosperity for the region and beyond. Both sides reaffirmed their strong support for each other's core interests and major concerns, and commitment to deepening strategic communication including at the highest political level and practical cooperation, and building an even stronger China-Pakistan Community with a Shared Future in the New Era.

4. The two sides noted with satisfaction the steady growth of economic cooperation between China and Pakistan. In this context, they agreed that China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has effectively improved Pakistan's infrastructure and boosted its socio-economic development. Both sides expressed firm resolve to synergizing development strategies, pushing forward all CPEC projects in a safe, smooth, and high-quality manner, promoting cooperation in areas such as economy and trade, investment, industry, agriculture, health, and science and technology,

contributing to the peoples' well-being and delivering greater benefits to local communities.

5. Noting with satisfaction the record bilateral trade achieved last year, the two sides agreed to work together to make optimum use of phase-II of CPFTA and work together to diversify their trade ties with deepening cooperation in export-oriented sectors in Pakistan and integrating value chains of the two countries. Both sides also agreed on stronger collaboration in the services sector and skill development in the areas of tourism, education, financial and information technology sectors.

6. The two sides expressed satisfaction at the growing momentum of bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges. They underlined that China-Pakistan defense cooperation was in fact a factor of peace and stability in the region.

7. The two sides termed terrorism as the common enemy of humanity. They once again strongly condemned the Karachi University Confucius Institute terrorist attack. Pakistan reiterated that efforts will be made to speed up investigation, hunt down the culprits, and bring them to justice. Pakistan briefed the Chinese side on its efforts to ensure the safety of all Chinese nationals, projects, and institutions in the country. China appreciated Pakistan's commitment to the safety and security of Chinese nationals. Pakistan and China will further enhance counter-terrorism and security cooperation. The two sides called on the regional countries and the international community to form synergy and fight terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. The two sides expressed their determination not to allow anyone to damage China-Pakistan iron brotherhood.

8. In the face of multiple traditional and non-traditional global challenges, the two sides agreed on the need for international cooperation and solidarity. They noted that, based on the principles of win-win cooperation and shared benefits, Belt and Road cooperation has become an open and inclusive platform for international cooperation and is widely welcomed as a global public good. The China-proposed Global Development Initiative (GDI) and Global Security Initiative (GSI) are new initiatives to respond to the pressing challenges facing the humanity. Both countries stand ready to work with other countries to focus on the development agenda, tackle security challenges, implement the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and jointly build a community with a shared future for mankind.

9. The two sides discussed the Ukraine situation, noting the necessity of being alert to the negative spillovers of the Ukraine crisis, in particular preventing its impact on developing countries, and called on relevant parties involved in the conflict to resolve differences and disputes through diplomacy and dialogue.

10. The two sides reaffirmed the firm commitment to upholding the UN-centered international system, the international order based on international law, and the basic norms governing international relations

underpinned by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, practicing true multilateralism, and promoting democracy and rule of law in international relations.

11. The two sides underscored that Asia, with its rich history, civilizational heritage and growing economic potential, is playing a leading role for peace, prosperity, and economic development in the region and beyond. The two sides hoped that in the pursuance of these cherished goals, the regional countries would uphold Asian values of mutual respect, equality and win-win cooperation, and build an open and inclusive regional architecture, safeguard peace and stability in the region, and advance common development and prosperity.

12. Both sides reiterated that a peaceful and prosperous South Asia is in the common interest of all parties. Given the challenges faced by the peoples of the region, due to global pandemic, soaring commodity prices, climate change and poverty, it is critical to resolve all outstanding disputes to promote regional cooperation and advance the goals of lasting peace, stability and shared prosperity. Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari briefed the Chinese side about the latest developments in Jammu & Kashmir. The two sides underlined the importance of the peaceful resolution of the dispute based on the UN Charter, relevant Security Council resolutions and bilateral agreements.

13. The two sides discussed the latest developments in Afghanistan. The two sides agreed that peace and stability in Afghanistan was vital for regional development and prosperity. The two sides call upon the Afghan interim government to develop a broad-based and inclusive political structure, adopt moderate and sound internal and external policies, and protect the rights of women and children and ensure that the Afghan soil is not used against any of its neighbors. Both sides call on the international community to help avert humanitarian crisis and earnestly honor the pledges on Afghanistan's economic reconstruction and future development. Both sides support the continued contribution of the mechanism of coordination and cooperation among Afghanistan's neighbouring countries and expressed readiness to work with all parties to implement the Tunxi Initiative of the Neighboring Countries of Afghanistan on Supporting Economic Reconstruction in and Practical Cooperation with Afghanistan and provide all possible support for the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan. The two sides also reiterated their readiness to extend CPEC to Afghanistan in consultation with the Afghan interim government and to the mutual benefit of all parties.

14. Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari thanked State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi for the safe and secure return of Pakistani students in a phased manner to China. The two sides also decided to resume direct flight between the two countries carried out by Pakistan

airlines at the earliest and subsequently increase direct flights based on the evolving pandemic situation.

15. Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari thanked State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi for the hospitality extended to him and his delegation in the finest Chinese tradition of hospitality. H.E. Wang Yi accepted his invitation to visit Pakistan for Pakistan-China Strategic Dialogue.

Source:https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/kjgzbdjyq/202205/t20220522_10690893.html

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1. British spellings should be used.
2. Date should be written as December 7, 2021.
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