

Journal of Contemporary Studies

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
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Editor's Note

The *Journal of Contemporary Studies* is a flagship publication of the Faculty of Contemporary Studies (FCS), National Defence University (NDU), Islamabad. It started with the unequivocal objective of advancing critically oriented, inter-disciplinary academic and intellectual discourse. It is a biannual, double blind peer-reviewed journal that offers its readers in academia, government and the policymaking world in-depth and scholarly analyses, diverse policy perspectives on important contemporary issues, and ongoing debates in the areas of national and international security, public policy and the wider field of world politics.

This issue of the journal comprises of seven articles, three book reviews and four documents providing valuable primary information on significant international developments. The first article, titled *Transition in World Order: An Eclectic Inquiry* by Zafar Nawaz Jaspal & Samra Naz. The article posits that current changes towards a multipolar world order are multifaceted, loose, and in need of holistic theoretical investigation, which can be done by using Analytic 'Eclecticism'. Analytic eclecticism employs different theories of international relations to explain a complex phenomenon.

The second article, *China's Sea Power Strategy In The 21st Century*, by YOU Dongxiao looks into Mahan's theory of Sea Power and analyses China's naval strategy. The contrast between the western philosophy of the sea and China's strategic culture and strategy is brought to the forefront. Dongxiao argues that China's interest in developing naval capabilities is primarily economic and it has no ambitions of hegemony or expansionism and believes in freedom of navigation. It concludes that China has built Navy to secure its legitimate maritime rights and interests. For resolving maritime disputes, Beijing believes in diplomatic and legal means by applying United Nations Convention of Law of Sea (UNCLOS) and other international maritime law. China will not protect its Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) by acquiring naval bases but by establishing close cooperation with its strategic partners in different regions.

The third article, *Growing Winds of Change in Saudi Arabia Through Vision 2030*, by M. Ihsan Qadir, M. Saifur Rehman & S. M. A. Gardezi traces the relationship between discovery of oil and economic development and welfare system of Saudi Arabia from its conception. This easy money supported state finances for almost eight decades; however at the turn of the century, its financial landscape changed. Oil prices remained under

pressure for over a decade, negatively impacting Saudi economy and social welfare system. Hence national policy planners have turned to industrialisation and revisited the social welfare system. The social change that comes with these developments is examined.

The fourth article, *Terrorism and the Concept of Jihad: A Critical Appraisal of Post-9/11 Militancy in Pakistan* by Tabinda Siddiqui & Arif Mahmud investigates post-9/11 terrorism discourses. In particular, it surveys the dominant discourse which relates terrorism to religion and the concept of Jihad. The study goes on through a deconstructivist lens to evaluate the conception of religious militancy and its interlinkages to faith and religion.

The fifth article, *The Rise of Authoritarianism in 21st Century and the World Order* by Sajjad Hussain & Azhar Ahmad argues that authoritarianism is on the rise, while the liberal world order is on retreat. The article analyses a rise in authoritarian practices in the United States, China, Russia, and India. There is an emergence of assertive foreign policies, increasing nationalist trends which breed intolerance of minorities. This can influence the world order, and have lasting impacts on the international political order. The norms governing the roles and responsibilities of international organizations must be revised to play a role in ensuring mutual co-existence at the international level.

The sixth article, *Iran's Foreign policy towards Middle East: A Case of Smart Power* by Mehreen Bibi & Syed Qandil Abbas analyses how Iran has used a synergy of hard and soft power by reaching out to both, state and non-state actors and successfully creating a pro-Iranian block even after the strong alliances among the regional and extra-regional powers. The authors argue that Iran's hard and soft power tools share the synergy of revolutionary ideology and interest and they feed each other mainly in states, having weak central authority and disrupted state structures in Middle East.

The last article, *Rejuvenating Pak-Turk Ties: An Appraisal* by Anwaar Kharal & Umbreen Javaid examines the dynamics of growing Pak-Turk bilateral ties in the fields of economy, military, infrastructure development and politics. It argues that the bilateral relations are embedded in shared historical, cultural, and religious connectivity and are poised to grow further due to complementarities in their interest and foreign policy directions.

I am grateful to all the contributors who have sent their articles for this issue, and the anonymous peer-reviewers whose valuable comments helped authors to improve their contributions. We hope that the study of this journal will invoke desire among readers to contribute their perspectives in the ongoing academic discourses. Contributions are invited from a broad spectrum of related fields, like political science, security studies, political economy, terrorism, politics and religion, politics of energy, feminism, media and politics, management sciences, leadership

psychology, military strategy, modern history, international law, sociology, education, conflict management and resolution, urban studies, demography, social anthropology, development studies, foreign policy analysis etc.

We are accepting articles for the upcoming issue of the Journal of Contemporary Studies based on original qualitative or quantitative research, an innovative conceptual framework or a substantial literature review that opens new areas of inquiry and investigation. Case studies and comparative analyses are also welcome. The editorial team at the journal promotes submissions from expert analysts from around the world. The Journal seeks to promote a scholarly understanding of contemporary developments and changes related to aforementioned disciplines of social sciences. It intends to stimulate interdisciplinary research and writing.

Editor
Dr. Shaheen Akhtar

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TRANSITION IN WORLD ORDER: AN ECLECTIC INQUIRY

Zafar Nawaz Jaspal* & Samra Naz**

Abstract

The world order continuously evolves; therefore, it is subject to transitions. These progressions are sometimes slow or not clearly perceptible, but occasionally they are apparent in global politics. The study of contemporary world order is imperative to comprehend current trends in global politics. In the anarchical international order, both high and low politics contribute to the transition of patterns that provide the basis for a new world order. Theories of International Relations assist states in revamping and adjusting policies according to recent developments. These transitions in the world order have been more evident and swift during the second decade of the 21st century. The current changes towards a multipolar world order are multifaceted, loose, and in need of holistic theoretical investigation, which can be done using Analytic 'Eclecticism'. Analytic eclecticism employs different theories of international relations to explain a complex phenomenon. This study is an eclectic inquiry of the prevailing transitions in the world order.

Keywords: *Eclecticism, World Order, Trends, Status quo, Revisionist*

Introduction

A comprehensive study of the contemporary world order is imperative to comprehend the current trends in global politics. Understanding the current patterns in the world order requires a detailed study of changes happening in global politics. High and low politics help change the patterns that form the basis of the new world order. A scientific study of these trends is helpful in reforming and reshaping state policy in an ever-changing world. Changes in world order require a multidimensional and comprehensive theoretical examination

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that can be achieved by using analytical 'Eclecticism'. Different theories of International Relations can be used in analytic eclecticism to define various constraints and opportunities that influence states' and non-state actors' interests, behaviour, and capabilities in the world order.¹ The term eclectic means "selecting what appears to be the best in various doctrines, methods, or styles."² According to the proponents of analytic eclecticism, the existing theories of international politics (classical/neo-liberalism, classical/neo-realism, and constructivism) can only provide a particular explanation of the world order. For instance, the main focus of realists is the use of power in international politics for achieving state interests. At the same time, liberalism explains global cooperation by focusing on states and non-state actors in world politics. In contrast, constructivists claim that state behaviour is socially constructed based on identity and interest. In contrast to these particular and therefore limited/narrow lenses, analytic eclecticism helps to draw a comprehensive picture of the emerging world order. This study is an attempt to answer the three interlinked questions: what is analytical eclecticism? How various schools of thought explain the current transition in the world order? What are the patterns of the emerging world order?

Analytic Eclecticism: An Approach

According to Rudra Sil and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Analytic eclecticism is about making intellectually and practically useful connections among clusters of analyses that are substantively related but normally formulated in separate paradigms."³ They also opine that the goal of analytic eclecticism is not to synthesize or replace paradigms but to provide a means to lessen the gap between practical knowledge and the research conducted by academic disciplines.⁴ Analytic eclecticism resists a single paradigm-based study because many aspects of reality cannot be observed and described from focusing only on a single paradigm that may ignore many essential facts.⁵ According to Rudra Sil and Peter J. Katzenstein, "It is an intellectual stance that supports efforts to complement, engage, and selectively utilize theoretical constructs embedded in contending research traditions to build complex arguments

¹ Rudra Sil and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics: Reconfiguring Problems and Mechanisms across Research Traditions," *Perspectives on Politics* 8, no. 2 (2010): 23.

² "Eclectic", *Merriam-Webster's Online*. <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/eclectic>

³ Rudra Sil and Peter J. Katzenstein, *Beyond Paradigms: Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics* (Palgrave Macmillan, 31, Aug-2010), 2.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Catherine V. Scott, *Gender and Development: Rethinking Modernization and Dependency Theory* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Kumarian press, 1995), 35.

that bear on substantive problems of interest to both scholars and practitioners.”⁶ In international relations, it seeks to selectively interpret and integrate analysis on different issues given by distinct paradigms with interrelated aspects.⁷ Moreover, Larry Laudan suggests that various research doctrines can coexist, and ‘amalgamation’ of multiple approaches and theoretical paradigms is also possible.⁸ In this way, the neo-liberal perception by Tomoko Okagaki that international cooperation between egoist states is also attainable can be based on Hobbes’s source behind constructing Leviathan.⁹ Moreover, Katzenstein also perceives Joseph Nye’s philosophy as analytically eclectic due to merging of liberalism with some aspects of realism.¹⁰

In the field of International Relations, eclectic research can coalesce liberalism, realism, and constructivism.¹¹ Separately these theories can answer contrastive questions about world order such as what are the transitions in a world order based on power or distributive capabilities? or questions related to liberal world order. Still, these questions may deal with only one feature of the transition in the world order, whereas a propositional question with several contrastive aspects such as what are the changes in world order can be answered through analytical eclecticism by using different theoretical explanations.¹² Analytic eclecticism can provide the opportunity for more applied knowledge by addressing and linking all significant transitions.¹³ In this way, analytic eclecticism can generate a holistic image of emerging world order by integrating the empirical and causal observations proposed by

⁶ Sil and Katzenstein, “Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics,” 411.

⁷ Sil and Katzenstein, *Beyond Paradigms: Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics*, 10.

⁸ Larry Laudan, *Progress and Its Problems: Towards a Theory of Scientific Growth* (University of California Press, 1977), 104.

⁹ Tomoko Okagaki, *The Sovereign State, and its Conformists: Japan’s Entrance Into International Society* (University of California, 2000), 67-81.

¹⁰ P. Schouten, “Theory Talk #15: Peter Katzenstein on anti-Americanism, Analytical Eclecticism and Regional Powers,” *Theory Talks*, August 29, 2008, <http://www.theorytalks.org/2008/08/theory-talk-15.html>.

¹¹ T.V. Paul, “A Plea for Puzzle-Driven International Relations Research, Qualitative & Multi-Method Research,” *Newsletter of the American Political Science Association Organized Section for Qualitative and Multi-Method Research* 8, no. 2 (2010): 17.

¹² Jeremie Cornut, “Analytic Eclecticism in Practice: A Method for Combining International Relations Theories,” *International Studies Perspectives* 16, no. 1, (2015): 50–66.

¹³ Andrew Bennett, “From Analytic Eclecticism to Structured Pluralism, Qualitative & Multi-Method Research,” *Newsletter of the American Political Science Association Organized Section for Qualitative and Multi-Method Research* 8, no. 2 (2010): 8.

distinctive paradigm-bound theories,¹⁴ as they respectively reflect state's and non-state actor's collective measures for mutual gains, interests to gain material capabilities and conceptual aspects related to their changing identities.¹⁵ Katzenstein affirms that in eclectic research, the finest amalgamations can be of realism with constructivism and liberalism with constructivism. The merging of liberalism and realism is irrational since both have opposite normative points, whereas constructivism can fill both theories' gaps to provide a middle ground.¹⁶

Eclectic Explanation of World Order by Incorporating Realism and Constructivism

Realism is one of the prominent theories that explain international relations, and it has some conjoint points with constructivism. Realists' primary focus is on power politics for survival and to achieve other state interests. Hans Morgenthau has propagated that the international system or world order is anarchic in which states are major actors with national interests. Their vital importance is national security and survival, for which they accumulate more power that is also a critical factor in governing the relations among states.¹⁷ The states try to possess more power by improving capabilities. It defines world order based on power distribution among states and also explains their position, identity, and interests in the world order. Waltz sees capabilities as the combined material power of a state constituting of population, economic development, and military force.¹⁸

On the other hand, Constructivists argue that the world order is socially constructed. Alexander Wendt, the leading exponent of constructivism, explained that the international order could impact actor's (states or non-state) behaviour by framing their identities and interests.¹⁹ Constructivists suggest that actors construct the world order through various patterns of interactions with each other.²⁰ Wendt determined three changeable cultures of international anarchy or order, which are Hobbesian, Lockean²¹ and Kantian based on "how actors interpret their

¹⁴ Ibid., 3.

¹⁵ Sil and Katzenstein, *Beyond Paradigms: Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics*, 03.

¹⁶ P. Schouten, "Theory Talk #15."

¹⁷ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5th ed, Revised (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), 4-15.

¹⁸ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (MA: Addison Wesley, 1979)

¹⁹ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 248.

²⁰ Nicholas Onuf, "Constructivism: Auser's Manual," in *International Relations In A Constructed World*, ed. Armonk V. Kubalkova, Nicholas Onuf, & P. Kowert (NY: M. E. Sharpe. 1998), 58-78.

²¹ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 366.

self (identity) in relation to others (enemy, rival or friend)²² or structure.”²³ Wendt discoursed that “only the Hobbesian structure is a true self-help system” due to persistent enmity among states,²⁴ while in the Lockean culture, enmity among states changed into only rivalry with recognition of sovereignty and right of existence of one another.²⁵ Under the Kantian culture of anarchy, states will perceive each other as friends, and there will be harmony in their interests.²⁶ Norms and knowledge are also crucial in defining the states' interests and identities, as conventional constructivists give significance to norms,²⁷ while critical constructivists emphasize on discourses.²⁸ On the other hand, realists stress on structure (distribution of power elucidated by structural realists) and functioning (balancing or domination described by neoclassical realists) of states to explain changing trends in world order within anarchical international relations and for eclectic analytic analysis they will be discussed with the incorporation of constructivism.

Changing Distribution of Power in the World Order from an Eclectic Realist and Constructivist Lens

The theory of Neo-realism or Structural Realism by Waltz helps describe and predict continuity and changes in world order structure. It can be explained by analyzing the distribution of capabilities among states, which affects nations' interaction.²⁹ Waltz proposed that all states in the anarchical situation have similar functions due to the same structural restraints of anarchy, and their capabilities or power differentiate their identity and role in the international system.³⁰ The world order and role of states within it transform with changes in power distribution such as super or major powers, middle powers, and weak or small powers.³¹ Based

²² Samuel M. Makinda, “Reading and Writing International Relations,” *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 54, no. 3 (2000): 389-401.

²³ Maja Zehfuss, “Constructivism and Identity: A Dangerous Liaison,” *European Journal of International Relations* 7, no. 3, (2001): 315-348.

²⁴ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 247.

²⁵ Ibid., 279.

²⁶ Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of it: the Social Construction of Power Politics,” *International organization* 46, no. 2 (1992): 391-425.

²⁷ Karin M. Fierke and Knud Eric Jørgensen, *Constructing international relations: The Next Generation*, ed. Armonk (NY: M. E. Sharpe. 2001), 52; Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” *International Organization*, (1998): 887-917.

²⁸ Thomas A. Schandt, Constructivist, Interpretivist Approaches to Human Inquiry, in *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, ed. N. Denzin & Y. Lincoln (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 1994), 118-138.

²⁹ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*.

³⁰ Ibid., 36.

³¹ Robert Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers*, (New York: Columbus University Press, 1968) : 229.

on such power distribution, world order can be unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar. So polarity defines the number of hubs of power, whereas polarization is the inclination or coalition of states to those hubs making different poles.³² World order with multiple power hubs can have a larger polarization level as states within it can form separate blocs.³³

The post-Cold War world observed unipolar and multipolar movements, and Samuel Huntington in 1991 argued that the world is now passing from a uni-multipolar transition decade and that it will turn into a genuinely multipolar order in the 21st century.³⁴ The current world order has more characteristics of a multipolar world based on the distribution of power. New power poles are rising, which may be lacking one form of power but might hold another kind (s) of power with an active role by states at the regional level, which has reduced the U.S. hegemony on power.³⁵ Though until now the military power of the U.S. has remained unchallenged, the predictable rising states comparative to and sometimes confronting the U.S. are China, Germany, Russia, India, and Japan.³⁶

The Neorealists explain that anarchical structural constraints such as security dilemma make states struggle for more power.³⁷ So major powers generate or reject the regimes and organizations according to their interests, and due to anarchy, other states are unable to stop them.³⁸ In a uni-polar order, the hegemonic state serves its own interests and attempts to sustain the status quo. However, its power can decline with the changes in international power distribution as anarchy lets other states rise and challenge hegemonic states. As Robert Gilpin argues that:

International order at any particular moment in history is the reflection of the underlying distribution of power of states within the system, over time the distribution shifts leading to conflict and ruptures in the system, hegemonic war and the eventual reorganization of order to reflect the new distribution of power capabilities. It is the rising hegemonic state or group of states whose power position has been ratified by the result of warfare

³² R. William, "Polarity Long Cycle and Global Warfare," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 30, no. 4 (December 1986): 587-615.

³³ Charles W. Kegley and Gregory A. Raymond, *A Multipolar Peace? Great Power Politics in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Matins Press, 1994): 86.

³⁴ S. Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower: U.S. Military and Cultural Hegemony Resented by Other Powers," *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 2 (1999): 35-49.

³⁵ Fyodor Lukyanov, "Russian Dilemmas in Multipolar World," 19-32. <http://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/russian-dilemmas-multipolar-world>

³⁶ Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *World Politics :Trend and Transformation* (Thomson Higher Education, 2006): 44, 106.

³⁷ John Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 2, no. 2 (1950): 157-180.

³⁸ Clive Archer, *International Organizations*, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 1992) : 85.

that defines the terms of the post-war settlement and the character of the new order.³⁹

Even in the multipolar world, due to anarchy, there is a constant struggle among major powers to become world hegemon. The anarchic structure explained by neorealists looks like the Hobbesian and Lockean anarchic structures given by constructivists with the similarities of self-help and security-seeker states respectively.⁴⁰ In this respect, constructivists argue that the structure of international politics is more social than material, and even material realities have value because of some normative social beliefs linked to them. So normative assumptions are directly related to world order.⁴¹ Thus based on material and conceptual factors, world order can be considered as multipolar or cooperative.

States can be categorized as a major power, middle power, or weak power as per perception and acceptance of their abilities by other actors, which gives it social plus ideational status. For example, if a state is not perceived as a major power by other states, it may lack social and conceptual factors. This perception can affect other states to have a different policy towards it other than they have for an alleged major power.

Constructivists establish that perceptions of power are inter-subjective and focus on two interrelated roles and procedures of changes in the world order. First is the role of the system that gives identity to states as major, middle and small powers;⁴² the second role of the system is shaping actors' identity and interests.⁴³ Hence, constructivists explain how states shape their identity plus interests and also how states make others perceive their defined identity, while structural realism only focuses on material factors but neoclassical realism has supported this point of constructivists.⁴⁴

³⁹ Quoted in John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and Rebuilding of Orders After Significant Wars* (Princeton University Press 2001)

⁴⁰ Yücel Bozdaglioglu, "Constructivism and Identity Formation: An Interactive Approach," *Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika* (USAK Yearbook of International Politics and Law, 1 2008): 389-412. <http://www.usak.org.tr/dosyalar/dergi/3abv06hKYpVj1fK71jEi4AP2g6ctBc.pdf>.

⁴¹ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (1992): 397.

⁴² Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 248.

⁴³ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 392.

⁴⁴ Dale C. Copeland, "The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism," *International Security* 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000): 187-212, 190.

Making and Breaking of Balance in World Order

The ordering principle of balance is not permanent in the anarchic world order. A contingent order or symmetry can be created through hegemony or balancing, both by internal and external actions of states. If a state cannot become a hegemon, it attempts to balance others' power by acquiring more power. Internal balancing is linked with increased military and economic abilities, and external balancing is referred to as alliance making.⁴⁵ Hans J. Morgenthau explicated alignment as "a necessary function of the balance of power, operating within a multiple-state system"⁴⁶ because it increases the relative power of even weak states both through bandwagoning and balancing.⁴⁷ Stephen Walt gave the concept of 'balance of threat' ⁴⁸ by modifying the realist's balance of power notion and opined that states try to balance not rising powers but perceived threats in an anarchic self-help system.⁴⁹ Constructivists also argue that states create their own security dilemmas and enmities⁵⁰ and they make alliances to balance against enemies rather than power.⁵¹

Neoclassical realists like Randall Schweller have established the 'balance of interests' notion as the third wave of realism. His two main works, "Tripolarity and the Second World War",⁵² and *Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest*⁵³ refurbished balance of power and balance of threat concepts. Schweller explained state behaviour at the unit or domestic level and at the system level. The unit-level describes the state's efforts to balance other states based on the perceptions gathered and interpreted within the framework of one's own values, norms, and judgments about its interests, identity, and the international system.⁵⁴ On domestic perception basis, Schweller categorized two types of states. First are those states which have a primary interest of security-maximizing and are considered as status-quo powers that manage the ongoing international system, like superpowers who created the existing order and can achieve more benefits from the status quo. Thus, these states try to maintain their relative advantageous positions in the system and collaborate to balance self-preservation

⁴⁵ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 69-72.

⁴⁶ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 193.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 193.

⁴⁸ Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliance* (Cornell University Press, 1990).

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*.

⁵¹ Stephen M. Walt, *The Origin Of Alliances*.

⁵² Randall L. Schweller, "Tripolarity and the Second World War," *International Studies Quarterly*, 37, no. 1 (1993): 73- 103.

⁵³ Randall L. Schweller, *Deadly imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).

⁵⁴ Alexander Siedschlag, *Realistische Perspektiv en Internationaler Politik*, ed. Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 2001): 51.

interests and to extend their views by influencing other actors.⁵⁵ If these powers observe that the order is changing and challenging their positions and interests, particularly in terms of influence, then they can make war against revisionist states, which are the second type.⁵⁶ Schweller described revisionist states as dissatisfied powers, which are opportunistic rising powers or middle powers.

The revisionist states need more power or influence for which they can use military means, alliances, or bandwagoning, and in this way, they can change the status quo or world order.⁵⁷ Schweller opined that a just distribution of capabilities could not achieve stability in international politics. Still, their use is also vital due to actions related to the balance of interests. The use of these capabilities determines whether the system will be dominated by the status quo state or will be changed by the revisionist state. Hence, the perceptions of states made at the domestic level are essential in defining interests in the world order as states can act as revisionist states according to their claims and insights in international politics.⁵⁸ On the other hand, the system rests stably when status quo powers remain more powerful than revisionist states. It can alter when revisionist states become more forceful than the status quo states with undecided gains for anyone.⁵⁹ So when there are several rising powers, the symmetry of the order depends on the balance generated by revisionist powers, and the position never remains everlasting for both revisionist and status quo states due to anarchy, which leads to changes in perceptions, interests, and capabilities of the state. In the balance of interests approach, interest determines how states pick their allies, as friends are helpful in perceptual legitimization and recognition of the state as a major power (similar to the notion of constructivists on the normative character of material realities) and supportive of the major power to maintain status quo.

The perceptions about state power can play a significant role in defining world order.⁶⁰ Schweller suggests bandwagoning as an option for

⁵⁵ Jan Triska, *Dominant Powers and Subordinate States/Dominant Powers and Subordinate States* ed. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1986) spheres of interest and informal empires often achieve Great-power cooperation in managing the system.

⁵⁶ A. Organski and Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1980): 23.

⁵⁷ Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back," *International Security* 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994): 105.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 99.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 72, 107.

⁶⁰ Barbara Kunz, "Power, Vision and Order in World Politics: A Neoclassical Realist," Paper presented at the NISA-conference, Odense, University of Southern Denmark, May 23 – 25, 2007.

states⁶¹ to balance their payoffs with other states based on security purposes. It is also to increase their ability to exert influence for achieving other objectives such as prestige, alliances, raw materials, even security. So, neoclassical realists consider influence as a feature of power and a main factor in the current world order.⁶² They also suggest that states attempt to overcome the suspicions created due to anarchy by trying to shape their outer world and enhancing their external influence through their foreign policies.⁶³ So the state's role, power, and identity in the world order can also be observed by its capacity to exert influence on other states.⁶⁴ In this way, neoclassical realists suggest that states' foreign policies made at the domestic level based on perceived information and power can affect the international system.⁶⁵ Thus for neoclassical realists, domestic politics and state capabilities are an intervening variable in foreign policy behaviour. In this way, the assumed unit-level responses could be linked with the international system's power structure as systemic-level is taken to be an independent variable.⁶⁶

The constructivists also assert similar assumptions made by the neoclassical realists that states' foreign policies are a result of national perceptions based on identity and values derived through discourses, social structures,⁶⁷ and circumstances.⁶⁸ The constructivists also propose that identity defines state interests,⁶⁹ and commands the relations among states because "an actor cannot know what it wants until it knows who it

⁶¹ Ibid., 88.

⁶² Kalevi J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*, 7th ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1995) : 118.

⁶³ Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," *World Politics* 51 no. 1 (1988) : 152.

⁶⁴ Alexander Siedschlag, *Realistische Perspektiven Internationaler Politik*, 51, 147.

⁶⁵ William C. Wohlforth, *The Elusive Power Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993)

⁶⁶ Stephen M. Walt, "The Enduring Relevance of the Realist Tradition," *Political Science, State of the Discipline* ed. Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner (New York/London: W.W. Norton & Co., 2002): 211.

⁶⁷ Ron Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," in *The Culture of National Security*, ed. Peter Katzenstein, (New York: Colombia University Press, 1996): 59.

⁶⁸ Alexander Wendt, *Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics*, 396.

⁶⁹ Mlada Bukovansky, "American Identity and Neutral Rights from Independence to the War of 1812," *International Organization* 51, no. 2 (1997): 209-243.

is.”⁷⁰ Constructivists claim that states’ identities continuously change in constitutive processes⁷¹ and define other states as friends or foes based on their interests.⁷² In this regard, holistic constructivism has bridged the international and domestic system influencing state’s identities and interests⁷³ as it “focuses on how domestic and international social phenomena interact to shape the states’ behaviour in international relations”.⁷⁴ Moreover, Wendt opined that foreign policy is an outcome of a bond of corporate identity (made at domestic level and defining itself and others) and social identities (created at the international system with others such as status quo or revisionist state) of states.⁷⁵

For balance in the world order, Robert Gilpin suggested that the multipolar system offers the most stable system because it is best to achieve a balance of power. The order changes with the new reallocation of power if the dominant states can't overcome instability and the costs of maintaining the status quo increases for the major powers. The causes of the decline of dominant powers can be internal and external. The internal reasons can be the state's weak economic conditions, which lessen its profits from the system by reducing its sphere of influence. In contrast, externally, it can face revisionist states or those challenging states for which the cost of changing the system is smaller than the benefits it can get from the transformation.⁷⁶ The principle of symmetry in hegemonic or unipolar order is domination and preservation, whereas in a bipolar or multipolar order the organizing principle is balancing. On the other hand, transformation can occur by two interrelated changes: first, shift in the international distribution of power and second, modification in domestic preferences and national interests due to change in domestic perceptions of states. Therefore, in the modern-day global system, the dominant

⁷⁰ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 231.

⁷¹ Carol Atkinson, “Constructivist Implications of Material Power: Military Engagement and the Socialization of States, 1972-200,” *International Studies Quarterly* 50, no. 3 (2006): 534.

⁷² Alexander Wendt, *Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics*, 397.

⁷³ Christian Reus-Smit, “Constructivism,” in *Theories of International Relations*, ed. Scott Burchill (New York: 2001): 220.

⁷⁴ Richard Price and Christian Reus- Smit, “Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and Constructivism,” *European Journal of International Relations* 4, no.3 (1998): 265.

⁷⁵ Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” *American Political Science Review* 88, no. 2 (1994): 385.

⁷⁶ Robert Gilpin, *War, and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 30-Oct-1981) 185-187.

powers have similar neo-mercantilist economic expansionist objectives and similarly influence other states.⁷⁷

Eclectic Explanation of World Order by Incorporating Liberalism and Constructivism

Liberalism explains cooperative proceedings within world order, focusing on state and non-state actors' role in international politics. At the beginning of the 20th century, liberalism in international politics was promoted by Woodrow Wilson with his designs of collective security, cooperation, and right of self-determination. The liberal principles about world order include a strong proclivity for a collectively law-oriented society of states, cooperation through international organizations, the spread of democracy, the quest for free trade, and striving for universal peace to improve human life.⁷⁸ Liberalism postulates that international actors cooperate to reduce security dilemmas and pursue shared interests by following international rules and norms. Neoliberalism began in the 1970s. Its leading proponents, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, gave a functionalist approach which argues that cooperation in one affair can 'spillover' and lead to cooperation in other matters, thus decreasing issues related to military security. In such ways, neoliberals have propagated ideas about global integration by collaboration among states. Neoliberalism clarifies the varying dimensions of cooperation and peace through liberal internationalism and liberal institutionalism. Liberal institutionalists admit that the international system is anarchic with constraints that cause difficulties for states to cooperate. Still, they also argue that states can overcome these constraints to attain cooperative mutual benefits by creating international organizations. Liberal institutionalism focuses on the importance of non-state actors such as international organizations, regimes, and institutions, which help to increase interdependence and cooperation among states and participate in lessening their conflicts in the world order.⁷⁹ According to Karl Deutsch, over time, improvement in such multinational relations and connections can lead to the establishment of "security communities" through promoting peace.⁸⁰ Moreover, Robert Keohane, in his work *After Hegemony* ⁸¹ opined that the hegemonic structure can permit the

⁷⁷ Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in International Politics*, Ch 1-5.

⁷⁸ Jennifer Sterling-Folker, *Making Sense of International Relations Theory*, ed (London: Lynne Rienner, 2006): 50-65.

⁷⁹ Stephen D. Krasner, *International Regimes* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983): 173-194.

⁸⁰ Karl W. Deutsch, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957): 45-85.

⁸¹ Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton University Press, 1984)

formation of institutions and lead to cooperation, which can keep working after the decline of hegemonic power based on functional principles.⁸² Keohane explained that in the international system, the most egoist and rational states could have reasons to be part of international institutions and regimes to achieve some ideal interests that cannot be accomplished in other ways. Therefore, international institutions help to lessen the snags like distrust and doubts among states due to international anarchy by providing forums for state cooperation.⁸³ Liberal institutionalism presents its version of a world order by proposing global governance through international organizations based on common interests and endorsing complex interdependence via several channels.⁸⁴ The concept of complex interdependence offers commercial or economic liberalism by activating a global free market through economic cooperation and integration. Complex interdependence creates a world order where economic and social issues have become important enough to lessen the differences among states with the establishment of international networks and institutions.⁸⁵ These transnational links give importance to the non-state actors in the world order, and attribute to them some power to moderate states' issues through cooperative bonds.⁸⁶ States try to construct, improve and institutionalize the liberal and cooperative identity to achieve long-term interests,⁸⁷ as "states seek to enact their identities in interstate normative structures, including regimes and security communities".⁸⁸ Identity formation at both international and domestic levels is based on domestic perceptions, which can be influenced by international institutions having fixed sets of rules to guide behavioural roles.⁸⁹ The bases of formal international institutions can be found in agreements, conventions, and treaties signed and ratified by more than one state to

⁸² Ibid.; Robert Keohane, *Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond Neorealism and its Critics* (Columbia University Press, 1986)

⁸³ Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*.

⁸⁴ Inis Claude, *Swords Into Plow Shares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization* (Random House, New York, 1971)

⁸⁵ Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, "Power and Interdependence In The Information Age," *Foreign Affairs* (1998, September/October): 81, 94.

⁸⁶ Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Transnational Relations and World Politics*, eds. (Harvard University Press, 1971).

⁸⁷ Glenn Chafetz, "The Struggle for a National Identity in Post-Soviet Russia," *Political Science Quarterly* 111, no. 4 (1996-97): 665.

⁸⁸ Ron Jepperson, Alexander Wendt and Peter Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* 33 (1996): 34-62.

⁸⁹ R. O. Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches," *International Studies Quarterly* 32 (1988): 379-396.

monitor states' behaviours and decision-making on specific issues.⁹⁰ By focusing on international institutions, liberal institutionalists emphasize soft power and cooperation under international law.⁹¹ On the other hand, non-governmental organizations provide a bridge for world society and culture⁹² as middle agents who connect all levels of society to resolve issues by assisting international and local actors and become "sticky".⁹³ They also function as mediators, activists, implementers, negotiators, promoters of progress and social changes by influencing state's policies and enhancing global governance.⁹⁴

Liberal internationalism focuses on international society's role in the world order to solve global problems by forming a rule-based system through common institutions and eliminating illiberal differences.⁹⁵ It also considers peace and cooperation as interdependent and endorses republican liberalism or democratic peace theory. John Ikenberry proposed that democratic alliances can permit and support collaboration among states to resolve world's common issues.⁹⁶ Moreover Anne-Marie Slaughter focused on intergovernmental networks formed by links of responsible governmental agencies of different states to deal with common issues on a global scale⁹⁷ helping towards social globalism by exchange of ideas and scientific knowledge.⁹⁸

Liberalism meets constructivism based on changes in identities, which are always subject to be reform and can modify world order.⁹⁹ The liberals' idea about a peaceful world through cooperation is similar to

⁹⁰ S. D. Krasner, *International Regimes* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).

⁹¹ John Donahue and Joseph Nye, *Governance in a Globalizing World*, ed. (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 150-200.

⁹² John Boli, "Contemporary developments in World Culture," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 46 (2005): 383, 404.

⁹³ R. O. Keohane, and L. L. Martin, "Institutional theory as a Research Program," in *Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field* ed. C. Elman and M. F. Elman (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003): 71, 108.

⁹⁴ K. Sikkink, "Human Rights, Principled Issue Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America," *International Organization* (1993): 411-431.

⁹⁵ S. Bulmer, "The Governance of the European Union: A New Institutional Approach," *Journal of Public Policy* 13, no. 4 (1993): 351-380 ; G. John Ikenberry, "Liberal Internationalism: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order," 72, <http://acme.highpoint.edu/~msetzler/IR/IRreadings2add/LiberalInternationalismIken.PerOnPol09.17.pdf>

⁹⁶ G. John Ikenberry, "Liberal Internationalism," 72.

⁹⁷ Anne-Marie Slaughter, *A New World Order* (Princeton University Press, 2004).

⁹⁸ D. Laouisset, *Managerial Technology Transfer* (New York: Nova, 2009).

⁹⁹ Carol Atkinson, "Constructivist Implications of Material Power: Military Engagement and the Socialization of States, 1972-2000," *International Studies Quarterly* 50, no.3 (2006): 534.

Kantian system of constructivism. Therefore, constructivism and liberalism both talk about the role of non-state actors and social interactions, which can create cooperative identities to have a cooperative structure.¹⁰⁰ Constructivists see norms given by international organizations as non-material factors of the world order impacting states' perceptions and identities by changing interests from relative to absolute gain by which peace can be attained via cooperation.¹⁰¹ Internationally, changing cooperative identities create interstate normative structures by making international organizations.¹⁰² Hence, liberals focus on the role of norms in the world order. At the same time, constructivists explain the development of these norms by postulating a norm cycle, starting from norm emergence until its internationalization or norm cascade,¹⁰³ when several states start following it and giving it constitutive effects through liberal arrangements such as human rights forums.

Patterns of Emerging World Order

According to eclectic analysis, both realist and liberalist features can be seen in patterns of emerging multipolar world with increasing international institutions, and states can collaborate on some matters. They can be against each other at the same time. For instance, since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has acted as a status quo state to maintain its hegemony, but now several revisionist states are struggling to change the world order by challenging the United States. Currently, the U.S. is facing economic, ideological, and military challenges such as the economic rise of China with single party democracy and the rise of new nuclear powers to have an operative approach for persistence against it.

U.S. hegemonic interests and its sphere of influence are also countered by the rising phenomenon of regional hegemons which are making possible a heterogeneous multipolar world order with several hierarchical regional subsystems. For example, regions founded on the basis of geographic, market, and security interests have their hegemons behaving as revisionist states. Their interactions will probably shape world politics in the future with no single world hegemon or status quo power like the U.S. All these states are trying to balance each other regarding power and interests. So the status quo efforts by the U.S. are not

¹⁰⁰ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (1992): 392.

¹⁰¹ Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security," *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* 1, no. 5 (1996): 22.

¹⁰² Ron Jepperson, Alexander Wendt and Peter Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," 62.

¹⁰³ Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* 52, (Autumn:1998): 898.

averting the change towards multipolarity in both economic and geopolitical domains even as the U.S. intervened in Asia to encircle its utmost competitor China.¹⁰⁴ This produced a direct threat to China and Russia and led them to sign a 'Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International Order'. According to the balance of power notion given by Kissinger, countries dislike and fear hegemons and in reaction try to balance its power¹⁰⁵ as done by Russia, China, and France to counter-balance the U.S. actions against Iraq.¹⁰⁶

The social identities of China and Russia, according to neoclassical and constructivist explanations, are changing to revisionist states due to changes in perceptions of states about power distribution and influence. This partnership presents the prime indication of a multipolar world. Consequently, a multipolar world order can arise with power distribution among China, Japan, Russia, India, Germany, Australia, Iran, and Brazil, which are also regional powers and new power centers of the 21st century.¹⁰⁷

The changing world order under liberal explanation can be more cooperative while restricting some state actions under the umbrella of international organizations and confirms the constructivists' view that there is no permanent hierarchy of power politics in a world order that can be changed from Lockean to Kantian order. Liberal theorists believe that multipolarity can boost international cooperation, institutionalism, and pro-democratic ideas based on economic coordination.¹⁰⁸ The multipolar world order can be liberal when numerous subsystems based on power are interconnected and become interdependent to deal with common issues. The international organizations and multinational companies influence changing international politics in several ways, such as they provide a forum for cooperation, act as mediator or arbitrator, impose sanctions on states, and help states in development. The prime international organizations are the United Nations and its agencies, the European Union, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, World Bank, Group of 8, and the International Monetary Fund. In contrast, multinational corporations include software, food, and machine producers. Increasing globalization and emerging

¹⁰⁴ Pao Yu Ching, "U.S. Dominance over Asia," *Asia Pacific Research Network*, 2006, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=4999>.

¹⁰⁵ H. Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995)

¹⁰⁶ K. Booth and T. Dunne, *Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order*, (ed.) (Houndmills, 2002).

¹⁰⁷ Sofa Jawaro, "Uni-Polarity or Multipolarity: Is There a Shift in the Global Balance of Power? (Part II)": *The Sword Of Truth*, April 7, 2009, <http://sofawarrior.blog.com/2009/04/07/uni-polarity-or-multi-polarity-is-there-a-shift-in-global-balance-of-power-part-iv/>.

¹⁰⁸ Z. Brzezinski, *The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership* (New York: Basic Books, 2004).

security challenges also make states cooperate and create world order similar to Wendt's Lockean international system with some elements of the Kantian international system under a cooperative security system. The other non-state actors, like terrorist organizations, have posed new security concerns to states, which can lead to a complex security interdependence among states. The complexity is also higher because sometimes these organizations are used by different states to achieve their interests, especially in the multipolar world order.

Moreover, critical constructivists propose that literature and discourses constitute discursive power of the state, which impacts changing social realities by influencing the perceptions related to identities.¹⁰⁹ These discourses can reflect realist and liberal perspectives with a nexus between power and knowledge, and actors try to dominate through them. The recent literature in international politics is also supporting the emergence of a multipolar world order with a significant role of non-state actors and making states develop their policies according to the imminent multipolar world. For instance, in 2009, the first speech of former President Obama in the United Nations General Assembly presented the policy of multilateralism.¹¹⁰ In the *New York Times*, historians like Paul Kennedy observed that "we're going to have a multipolar world in military terms 20 or 30 years down the line."¹¹¹

The rising multipolar world order with new alliances among status quo states and revisionist states also reflects bipolarity between blocks of revisionist powers and status quo powers. Thus, peace in the emerging world order can depend on the balance of power, threat, and interest plus tolerance and cooperation. This can be seen in the form of fluctuating coalitions of states to counter unequal distribution of power and influence in their respective regions.¹¹² Emerging world order can be both restrictive/preventive and permissive at the same time. It can be restrictive as the use of military power can be limited or not be favored due to agreements or institutions. In contrast, it can be permissive as

¹⁰⁹ Dale C. Copeland, "The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism," *Constructivism and International Relations: Alexander Wendt and his Critics* (2006): 1-20.

¹¹⁰ Ivaneishvili, "Obama Foreign Policy Doctrine, Preparing America to Succeed in Multipolar World," *Journal of Social Sciences* 1, no. 1 (2012): 27-33.

¹¹¹ Dennis Hevesi, "Connecticut Q&A: Paul Kennedy; 'The Phone Rings All the Time,'" *New York Time*, April 3, 1988.
<https://www.nytimes.com/1988/04/03/nyregion/connecticut-q-a-paul-kennedy-the-phone-rings-all-the-time.html>

¹¹² K. R. Cox and T. J. Sinclair, *Approaches to World Order* (Cambridge U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1996), ch 2-3.

states struggle for power and may use force and breach treaties to attain national interests.¹¹³

Conclusion

In the transforming world order balance of power and cooperation can act as the preservers of the order. The major powers can harmonize their strategies by agreeing to some institutions to address common problems with flexible foreign policies. The U.S. foreign policy seems to have changed from unilateralism to multilateralism, while Russia is struggling to regain its pre-eminence. China's rising economic and military capabilities are providing it more leverage in international politics. Besides, it is devoted to multilateralism and regionalism within the framework of the BRICS. The international community is also experiencing institutional revisionism due to the emergence of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which has critical, revisionist states like China and Russia as its leading members. Globalization has also improved cooperation among nations by making them more interdependent for security and economic concerns.

¹¹³ Charles W. Kegley and Jr. Gregory A. Raymond, "Preventive War and Permissive Normative Order," *International Studies Perspectives* 4, no. 4 (November 1, 2003): 385–394.

CHINA'S SEA POWER STRATEGY IN THE 21st CENTURY

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Abstract

China's Sea Power projection fundamentally contrasts with traditional Western thinking. The paper first looks into Mahan's theory of Sea Power and then analyses China's naval strategy and argues that China's interest in developing naval capabilities is primarily economic and China has no ambitions of hegemony or expansionism and believes in freedom of navigation. It concludes that first, China has built its PLA Navy to secure the legitimate maritime rights and interests of China. Second, for resolving maritime disputes, China believes in diplomatic means of negotiation and legal means by applying United Nations Convention of Law of Sea and other international maritime law. Third, China will not protect SLOCs and its overseas interests by acquiring naval bases and overseas possessions all over the world, but by establishing close cooperation with its strategic partners in different regions.

Keywords: *Sea Power, PLAN, UNCLOS, SLOCs, China, Maritime Strategy*

Introduction

The sea covers over seventy one percent of the earth's surface.¹ The ability to "traverse, explore, and share this vast expanse is crucial to the security and prosperity of every nation around the world. The maritime domain is essential to global mobility and trade, and is an abundant source of vital resources, from food to energy."² Sixty-five per

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¹ National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, "Ocean" (Washington, DC: Department of Commerce, n.d.), www.noaa.gov/ocean.html.

² Gordan E. Van Hook, "Maritime Security Consortiums," in *Conflict and Cooperation in the Global Commons: A Comprehensive Approach for International Security*, ed. Jasper Scott (Georgetown University Press, 2012), www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt2tt578.17.

cent of the world's population lives less than 180 miles from the coast, and eighty-seven per cent live within three hundred miles.³ This concentration is due in part to the generally temperate climate near the sea, the effectiveness and efficiency of maritime trade, and the strong capacity of world sea ports for growth and communications with inland areas. More than ninety per cent of the world's trade is conducted through water, and the world's waterways are and will remain the most efficient means for transporting goods. Especially with the exhaustion of natural resources on land, the human beings pay more attention to the sea, giving it an increasingly important role in economic development and national and international security.

The 21st century is also called "the Century of Sea", and 'blue economy' is one of the emerging popular concepts in the world, which is based on harnessing oceanic resources for economic growth. Owing to the great significance of seas for national economies, states need to take necessary means to protect and safeguard their maritime resources for continuous, unhindered and sustainable economic development. Traditionally, the function of providing safety and security of maritime resources fell into the hands of state security-providing agencies. States increased their naval capabilities to protect their maritime resources, and to safeguard themselves from traditional and non-traditional security threats emanating from sea. Therefore, the sum total of a state's naval power and maritime power together becomes the 'Sea Power' of a state.

China has been traditionally regarded as a land power. However, China is also a large littoral state with 18000 km long coastline, and claims three million sq. km Exclusive Economic Zone according to the United Nations Convention of Law of Sea (UNCLOS). Hence, the seas are becoming exceedingly important for China's economic development and national security. Considering this, China has over the years embarked upon a programme to match its naval capabilities with the increasing demand of securing its maritime interests. This paper first looks into Mahan's theory of Sea Power and then analyses China's naval strategy; it argues that China's interest in developing naval capabilities is primarily economic and China has no ambitions of hegemony or expansionism, and believes in freedom of navigation in the high seas.

Western Concept of Sea Power

Sir Walter Raleigh pointed out in *A Discourse of the Invention of Ships*: "For whosoever commands the sea commands the trade; whosoever commands the trade of the world commands the riches of the world, and

³ Guy Labou  rie, "The Oceans and Geopolitics: A World United," *Naval War College Review* 46, no. 4 (Autumn 1993), 96.

consequently the world itself.”⁴ Historically, great powers struggling for supremacy have invariably focused their attention on the ocean and spared no efforts in pursuing their maritime supremacy. The struggle for maritime supremacy among early Egyptian, Cretan, Phoenicians, Carthaginian, Greek and Roman empires in the Mediterranean Sea started in ancient times. At the end of the eighteenth century, Napoleon attempted to cut England off from its foreign markets and natural resources by way of the Persian Gulf and advanced into the Mediterranean on the southern flank. It maintained its alliance with Russia and controlled the command of Mediterranean Sea. Russia, in order to gain maritime access seized the control of the northern flank, and expanded its outreach to the Black Sea and the Persian Gulf region. A new great game began between Russia and England for maximizing influence and power. “Russia’s strategic goal was to rise beyond the Baltic littoral and the Black Sea to break through England’s blockade line. England’s goal was to contain Russia’s westward and southward advance, while at the same time preserving maritime hegemony in the Mediterranean Sea and also the Indian Ocean.”⁵ The British Royal Navy held command of the sea for most of the period between the 18th to the early 20th centuries, allowing Britain and its allies to trade and to move troops and supplies easily during wars, while its enemies could not.

After studying the history of naval dominance, especially the history of British Empire’s global hegemony, Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914), an American historian and president of the U.S. Naval War College, believed that “national greatness was inextricably associated with the sea, with its commercial use in peace and its control in war, ... in peacetime, states should increase production and shipping capacities and acquire overseas possessions”.⁶ Sea Power is vital to a nation’s development, prosperity and security. A world power must have a well-equipped and trained navy with operational bases abroad, which enjoy freedom of manoeuvres on the sea. He stressed that the command of the sea, especially the control of important straits, peninsulas, islands and international sea-routes with strategic significance is the key to world hegemony.

Mahan advocates securing overseas territories for their purposefulness as he observed, “in peace [naval strategy].....may gain its most decisive victories by occupying in a country, either by purchase or

⁴ Quoted in Van Hook, “Maritime Security Consortiums,” 173.

⁵ Xu Qi, Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein, “Maritime Geostrategy and the Development of the Chinese Navy in the Early Twenty-First Century,” *Naval War College Review* 59, no. 4 (Autumn 2006), 46-67.

⁶ A.T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783* (US: Boston Little, Brown and Company, 1890).

treaty, excellent positions which would perhaps hardly be got by war.”⁷ As per Cropsey and Milikh, “Peace for Mahan is a breather, a time when architects of foreign policy look to the direct and indirect effects of far-flung sea power in a future when gun ports are once again opened”.⁸ In Mahan’s opinion, the primary role of a country’s navy was to gain the command of sea, that is to ensure the access of sea for one’s own ships and deny them to one’s enemy. Control of the sea could be achieved not by destruction of commerce but only by destroying or neutralizing the enemy fleet. Mahan divided his analysis of naval strategy into four areas: (1) concentration of force; (2) the necessity of central positions or lines; (3) the necessity of movement relative to central positions; and (4) the bearing of communication upon a force’s ability to maintain itself and to operate.⁹ After considering all the elements which comprised naval strategy, Mahan concluded that “the proper main objective of the navy is the enemy’s navy.”¹⁰ This theorem is the foundation of his strategy. He felt that in order to assure oneself of free communications (i.e., the use of the sea), the destruction of the enemy’s fleet must be attained. He wrote: “A crushing defeat of the fleet, or its decisive inferiority, when the enemy appears, means a dislocation at once of the whole system of colonial or other dependencies, quite irrespective of the position where the defeat occurs.”¹¹ To administer such a crushing defeat upon an enemy necessitates, of course, a fleet superior to any force it has to face.

Mahan held that American greatness depends on sea power by pointing out the close connection between domestic prosperity and maritime pre-eminence. He thought the United States enjoyed favourable geographic position: located in the geographical centre of the world, facing two oceans and far from Eurasia. As the United States had the geographic features for becoming a sea power, he suggested that, if the United States wanted to become a world power instead of a regional power, it must vigorously develop its navy to control the Isthmus of Central America. It should also develop the Panama Canal to link the two oceans, which can become the strategic pivot to control the two oceans. The United States should also control Hawaii, the Caribbean Sea, the Philippines, all-important strategic passages, and expand towards Eurasia.

⁷ Ibid., 27.

⁸ Seth Cropsey and Arthur Milikh, “Mahan’s Naval Strategy: China Learned It, Will America Forget It?” *World Affairs* 174, no. 6 (March/April 2012): 85-92.

⁹ Alfred T. Mahan, *Naval Strategy* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1975), 25; quoted in Thomas R. Pollock, “The Historical Elements of Mahanian Doctrine,” *Naval War College Review* 35, no. 4 (July-August 1982) : 44.

¹⁰ Ibid., 48.

¹¹ Ibid.

Mahan's theory drew a lot of attention from American political and military leadership. Theodore Roosevelt, the 26th President of the United States, was a faithful disciple of Mahan; he expanded the U.S. naval force greatly during his tenure of office. Consequently, the U.S. navy leaped to the 2nd place in the world. In accordance with Mahan's recommendations, the U.S. occupied Hawaii, Guam and established military bases in Porto Rico, the Philippines, the Virgin Islands in 1898, controlled Panama in 1903, and dug Panama Canal to link the Pacific and the Atlantic in 1914. The other world powers followed suit in expanding their naval armament leading to a global naval arms race. One American historian said: "Mahan had greater influence on the policies of world governments than anyone else of his time."¹²

China's Sea Power Strategy

The aforementioned analysis shows that the crux of Sea Power Theory in the west is to seek command of the sea and maritime supremacy through a powerful naval force. China's Sea Power theory on the contrary is focused on protecting China's legitimate maritime rights and interests rather than seeking command of the sea and maritime supremacy. It is China's economic interest which necessitates China to develop its naval fleet to protect its offshore interests.

At the turn of the 21st century, the sea is becoming exceedingly important for China's economic development and national security. As the world's economic and strategic centre continues to shift towards the Asia-Pacific, the region has become a focus of major powers competition, bringing uncertainties for regional security. The United States is strengthening its Asia-Pacific military alliances and reinforcing military deployment and intervention, thus adding complexity to the regional security structure. In an attempt to circumvent the post-WWII framework, Japan has adjusted its military and security policies, becoming more outward-looking in its military endeavours. Regional hotspots and disputes are yet to be resolved.

The Korean Peninsula still faces uncertainty despite some sporadic positive progress. Disputes over territorial and maritime rights and interests as well as ethnic and religious discord still exist among regional countries. Hence security hotspots arise from time to time in the region. USA is reinforcing her partnerships in the Pacific: the 'Quad' is the name given to this association of USA, Japan, India and Australia. India and USA conduct major Naval Exercise MALABAR in the Bay of Bengal. Japan has joined in as a permanent member since 2015. Australia continues to

¹² Michael T. Corgan, "Mahan and Theodore Roosevelt: The Assessment of Influence," *Naval War College Review* 33, no. 6 (November-December 1980), 96.

strengthen its military alliance with the USA and its military engagement in the Asia-Pacific, seeking a bigger role in security affairs. It can be concluded that China faces diverse and complex security threats and challenges from the sea.

Given the context, it is imperative for China to develop its sea power strategy to circumvent the emerging challenges and threats to its rise. However, Chinese Sea Power Strategy is different from the traditional western concept of sea power which seeks the command of seas or maritime supremacy by a powerful naval force. China's Sea Power Strategy is based on its distinct civilizational past, geographical characteristics, and its legitimate maritime rights and interests. The key objectives of China's Sea Power Strategy are to safeguard China's national security, advance legitimate maritime rights and interests and protect the safety of SLOCs and overseas interests. The main strategic means for China to achieve these objectives are developing a strong naval force and promoting international security cooperation.

So the main purpose of developing a strong naval force for China is not to gain the command of sea by force, but to address various security threats and challenges to China's national security from the sea. This naval force to be used as a last resort to safeguard her territorial integrity and legitimate maritime rights and interests when all political and diplomatic means fail.

To fully comprehend China's Sea Power Strategy, it is important to review China's distinct strategic culture vis-à-vis the sea, which provides the foundation for China's naval strategy in the Twenty-first century.

China's Strategic Culture

China is traditionally regarded as a land power not only because of its vast territory of 9.6 million square kilometres; the fourth largest in the world, but also because it has been an agricultural society since ancient times. The land area of ancient China was vast; its power and level of cultural development invariably surpassed many other civilisations. The primary threat to the imperial court in the central plains was from the northern nomad invaders. Successive dynasties built up the Great Wall in order to resist this continental threat. This kind of land-oriented survival compulsions restricted China to its own territory and borders. Moreover, China was self-sufficient and with its vast territory, it had no interest in expansionism or formation of overseas colonial empires. Therefore, with no immediate threat from sea and presence of rivals on land, Chinese geostrategic thought emphasized land power at the expense of sea power. The exception, however, was Admiral ZHENG He of Ming Dynasty, who had embarked upon seven voyages into the Western Ocean opening a maritime silk route. In these brief but glorious times, China emerged as a maritime power. This preceded the Western great age of discovery by almost a century. In modern history, China has faced various threats and

challenges from the sea; the abandonment of naval power led the other powers to invade China. This can be analysed from the fact that "China's shores were invaded by external powers more than 470 times since the Opium War (1840) till the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949."¹³

China's approach towards sea power and also its strategic culture is shaped by the Chinese philosophy of 'Confucianism' which considers peace and harmony as fundamentals. The historical lessons of the failure of some countries seeking hegemony show that though a country may become strong, bellicosity will lead to its ruin. The bitter suffering of Chinese people due to foreign aggressions in modern history not only teaches them the value of peace and the pressing need for development, but also reminds them that one should not impose on others what he himself does not desire. Therefore, China does not intend to inflict such sufferings on any other country. In the 71 years since the founding of the People's Republic, China has successfully grown from a weak country to be the world's second largest economy through hard work and efforts for peace.

Chinese traditional philosophical thinking and past experiences of China and other countries fully demonstrate that peaceful development, not the competition with other major powers for hegemony, is in the fundamental interest of the Chinese nation. That's why China has reiterated commitment to the path of peaceful development and declined the pursuit of hegemony. China's sea power strategy in the 21st century aims to protect China's legitimate maritime rights and interests mainly by applying international laws and promoting international cooperation while building a strong maritime force. Therefore, the aim of China's sea power strategy is not to seek the command of the sea or maritime supremacy in order to dominate the whole world, but to safeguard China's national security, maritime rights, and overseas interests.

Role of People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)

The navy is the armed force with which a nation can resist threats from the sea: "Defending national sovereignty and upholding national maritime rights and interests are sacred duties with which the navy has been entrusted."¹⁴ Naval strategy is the overall strategy for employing naval force, including the movement and disposition of naval forces and the planning and conduct of military operations at sea. Naval strategy is an important component of and is determined by the Sea Power Strategy. For instance, the Sea Power Theory in the West is to seek command of the sea

¹³ Bradley Hahn, "Third Ranking Maritime Power—And Growing," *Pacific Defence Reporter* XV, no. 4 (October 1998): 46–49.

¹⁴ Xu Qi, Erickson and Goldstein, "Maritime Geostrategy," 60.

and maritime supremacy, so the naval strategies of the Western powers are offensive in nature with an aim to achieve victory at sea by destroying the enemy's fleet, controlling a certain portion of the sea and occupying the coastal areas. Since China's Sea Power Strategy is to safeguard China's national security, maritime rights and overseas interests, so its naval strategy is defensive in nature with an aim of offshore waters defence and far seas protection.

The diverse and complex security threats and challenges to China from the sea highlight the necessity for China to develop a modern maritime military force/ structure commensurate with its national security and development interests. This is imperative in order to safeguard its national sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, protect the security of strategic SLOCs and overseas interests, and participate in international maritime cooperation, so as to provide strategic support for building itself into a maritime power.

The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has an important standing in China's national security and development framework: "It comprises submarine, surface ships, aviation, marine, and coastal defence forces. The PLAN consists of Northern Theatre Command (NTC) Navy (Beihai Fleet), Eastern Theatre Command (ETC) Navy (Donghai Fleet), Southern Theatre Command (STC) Navy (Nanhai Fleet) and the PLAN Marine Corps. Under the Theatre Commands (TC) there are naval bases, submarine flotillas, surface ship flotillas and aviation brigades."¹⁵ The PLAN is speeding up transition of its tasks from defence in the offshore waters to protection missions on the far seas. It is also improving its capabilities for strategic deterrence and counterattack, maritime manoeuvre operations, maritime joint operations, comprehensive defence and integrated support, so as to build a strong and modernized naval force.¹⁶

The key mission of China's navy is to protect China's three-fold legitimate maritime rights and interests which include: i) safeguarding China's Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity; ii) protecting China's legitimate maritime rights and interests in its Exclusive Economic Zone; iii) protecting the security of SLOCs and overseas national interests. These three-fold maritime rights and interests also shape Chinese naval strategy and reflect China's concept of sea power.

Safeguarding China's Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity

National sovereignty and territorial integrity are fiercely safeguarded by China. China is a huge littoral state with a coastline of over 18000 km; it has more than 6500 islands, each over 500 meters².

¹⁵ The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, *China's National Defence in the New Era*, (Beijing: China, July 2019).

¹⁶ Ibid.

Protection of its huge coastline and territorial waters is one of the core interests of China. This includes important maritime zones, islands, and reefs in the East and South China Sea and Yellow Sea.

China has a maritime interest in unification with Taiwan, the largest offshore island of China. The unification of the Island with the mainland is one of the core interests of China; it is of paramount importance to the country. China adheres to the principles of peaceful reunification' and 'one country, two systems', and also promotes peaceful development of cross-Straits relations. However, unification will remain a challenge for China as "the Taiwan authorities, led by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), stubbornly stick to 'Taiwan independence' -- the policy of separating Taiwan formally and permanently from China mainland--and refuse to recognize the 1992 Consensus, which embodies the one-China principle."¹⁷ Moreover, China considers Taiwanese independence movement a threat to its territorial integrity: "The 'Taiwan independence' separatist forces and their actions remain the gravest immediate threat to China's territorial integrity and sovereignty. Yet if there is either external forces interference or the separatist activities w.r.t. 'Taiwan independence', China makes no promise to renounce the use of force, or the option of taking all necessary measures."¹⁸

Although China has settled border issues with 12 of its 14 land neighbours except India and Bhutan through consultations and negotiations, and also signed treaties with 8 countries on its periphery, China still has maritime disputes over the sovereignty of islands and reefs, and maritime delimitation issues with some maritime neighbours. China enjoys sovereignty over Diaoyu Islands in East China Sea and its affiliated islands which Japan calls Senkaku and also claims sovereignty over. China also has sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands and over the internal waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf based on the South China Sea Islands. China has historic rights within the nine dash-line in the South China Sea.¹⁹ Some coastal states in the South China Sea also have overlapping claims over those islands and maritime areas.

¹⁷ "White Paper: The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue: The Taiwan Affairs Office and the Information Office of the State Council, February 21, 2000," *China Report* 36, no. 2 (May 2000): 277-92.

¹⁸ The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, *China's National Defence in the New Era*.

¹⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, *Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China on China's Territorial Sovereignty and Maritime Rights and Interests in the South China Sea* (Beijing: China, December 2016), https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/eng/snhwtlcwj_1/t1379493.htm

China refuses to accept or recognize the award rendered on 12th July 2016 by the Arbitral Tribunal on the South China Sea arbitration undertaken at the unilateral request of the Philippines. The reason is that as early as in 2006, pursuant to Article 298 of the UNCLOS, China excluded from the compulsory dispute settlement procedures of UNCLOS disputes concerning, among others, maritime delimitation, historic bays or titles, and military and law enforcement activities. The subject-matter of the arbitration in essence constitutes part of the territorial and maritime delimitation dispute between China and the Philippines, over which the Tribunal has no jurisdiction. Therefore, the Chinese assert that "The Tribunal's awards are groundless both in fact and in law, thus null and void, and have no binding force."²⁰

China is opposed to the invasion and illegal occupation by certain states of some islands and reefs of China's South China Sea Islands, and also activities which infringe upon China's rights and interests in relevant maritime areas under China's jurisdiction. The Chinese official stance is that "China fully acquires situation awareness of adjacent waters, conducts joint rights protection and law enforcement operations, handles maritime and air situations, and responds to security threats, infringements and provocations on the sea. China has maintained maritime peace, stability and order as of 2012 by deploying over 4,600 maritime security patrols, 72,000 rights protection and law enforcement operations."²¹ In these waters, China exercises its "national sovereignty to build infrastructure and deploy necessary defensive capabilities on the islands and reefs in the South China Sea, and to conduct patrols in the waters of Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea."²²

Major power competition in the region and the United States' policies towards China has increased Beijing's sensitivities towards its territorial waters. In 2018, US warship USS Mustin entered into territorial waters of South China Sea evoking forceful response by China. Chinese media reported: "China always respects and safeguards the freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea all countries are entitled to under international law, but firmly opposes any country or person

²⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, *Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China on the Award of 12 July 2016 of the Arbitral Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration Established at the Request of the Republic of the Philippines* (Beijing: China, July 12, 2016), https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/eng/snhwtlcwj_1/t1379492.htm

²¹ Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China, *Defence Policy: China's Defensive National Defense Policy in the New Era*, <http://eng.mod.gov.cn/defense-policy/index.htm>.

²² Ibid.

undermining the sovereignty and security of littoral countries under the pretext of 'freedom of navigation and over flight.'"²³

Moreover, India along with the United States and Japan conducted MALABAR exercises near the disputed Diaoyu Islands. Though China was not named, the exercise was entirely in the framework of helping Japan against an assumed Chinese naval offensive. India and the USA have arranged defence oriented strategic treaties. They can use each other's land, air and naval bases for rest, repair and supplies. It will be naïve to assume that these treaties are not China-specific. India's dream of *Akhand Baharat*,²⁴ a state stretching from Afghanistan well into South East Asia, and also including large parts of Chinese territories makes it quite evident.

Protecting China's Legitimate Maritime Rights and Interests

China - the most populous nation of the world - needs enormous resources to sustain its rapid development. With rapid growth of the Chinese economy and the exhaustion of natural resources on land, the sea provides an alternative source of resources and their transportation for sustainable economic development. China can claim three million km² sea area of Exclusive Economic Zone under her jurisdiction according to the United Nations Convention of Law of Sea (UNCLOS). As per Chinese scholars, "Along with the accelerating process of economic globalization, China's maritime economy is moving toward the great oceans. By the end of 2020, China's maritime commerce will exceed \$1 trillion US dollars."²⁵ Moreover, as per Minghui Gao, "The maritime industry has employed more than 34 million workers, and reported a total production value of 5 trillion yuan in 2012, which contributed almost 10 percent of the country's GDP and is thus seen as 'a new engine for growth.'"²⁶ China's economic dexterity can be assessed from the fact that "China has developed more than twenty clusters of industrial groupings, while maintaining the relatively rapid pace of overall development".²⁷ In 2018, China's maritime output reached 8.35 trillion yuan, accounting for 9.3 per cent of the total GDP whereas it engaged more than 36.84 million people in economic

²³ "China Hits Out at US Provocation in South China Sea," *CGTN*, March 24, 2018, https://news.cgtn.com/news/306b6a4d306b7a6333566d54/share_p.html

²⁴ Shayam Yadav, "RSS and the Idea of Akhand Bharat," *Indian Express*, January 4, 2016, <http://indianexpress.com/article/explained/rss-akhand-bharat/>.

²⁵ Wai Ming To and Peter lee, "China's Maritime Economic Development: A Review, the Future Trend, and Sustainability Implications," *Sustainability* 10 (December 2018), DOI: 10.3390/su10124844.

²⁶ Minghui Gao, "Maritime clusters in China," Electronic Publications of Pan-European Institute, March 2014. https://www.utu.fi/sites/default/files/media/drupal/PEI%20Pub%20Minghui%20Gao%203_2014.pdf.

²⁷ Xu Qi, Erickson and Goldstein, "Maritime Geostrategy," 62.

activities.²⁸ Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) have thus become a lifeline for national existence and development.

Protecting the Security of SLOCs and Overseas National Interests

China's national defence aims to safeguard China's overseas interests and ensure free access to high seas. China's sustainable economic development also depends upon the security of SLOCs and its overseas interests. Being the largest trading nation, Chinese economy is heavily dependent upon imports and exports. China imports almost three quarters of its oil from overseas. The SLOCs have become the nation's main artery of foreign trade and their security is crucial for China's sustainable economic development. The country's prosperity, nation's existence and great resurgence all increasingly rely on the sea. To provide necessary protection for strategic SLOCs and maritime national interests, it is necessary for China to build a blue-water naval force, develop logistical facilities, and enhanced capabilities for accomplishing diversified military tasks.

Instead of following in the footsteps of Western powers, China seeks guidelines from its strategic culture and believes in promoting international security and military cooperation rather than seeking dominance or imperial expansionism. China has no intention or ambition to acquire worldwide naval bases and overseas possessions unlike the previous colonial powers or superpowers, but seeks to establish close security and military cooperation with its strategic partners in different regions. China's naval forces are tasked to ensure freedom of navigation and to protect the rights and interests of Chinese people, organisations and institutions by conducting vessel protection patrols, anti-piracy operations and counter-terrorism missions.

China has been dispatching naval ships to carry out regular vessel protection operations in the Gulf of Aden and the waters off the coast of Somalia since December 2008. Till August 2019 in the vessel protection operations, over 106 vessels and 28,000 officers and sailors have been regularly deployed in 33 convoys, each consisting of three to four ships. They have provided security protection for over 6,700 Chinese and foreign ships, and rescued, protected or assisted over 70 ships in distress."²⁹

²⁸ The State Oceanic Administration, *China Marine Economic Statistics Bulletin 2018*, accessed May 3, 2020, http://gi.mnr.gov.cn/201904/t20190411_2404774.html.

²⁹ Ministry of National Defence, the People's Republic of China, *China sends New Naval Fleet for Escort Mission*, (Beijing : China, August 29, 2019), http://eng.mod.gov.cn/news/2019-08/29/content_4849309.html.

Peaceful Resolution of Maritime Disputes

Building a strong navy does not mean China wants to resolve the unsettled maritime disputes with neighbouring countries by force. As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and a responsible stakeholder in the international community, China upholds international law and norms governing international relations based on the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and is committed to resolving related disputes through negotiations.

China respects the legitimate maritime rights of other nations as per maritime international law. China firmly believes that maritime disputes should be resolved through peaceful means according to the relevant international law and UNCLOS. China is committed to building an amicable relationship and partnership with other states and believes in peaceful resolution of disputes over territory and maritime delimitation through negotiation and consultation.

To maintain the stability of its neighbourhood, China considers it a priority to manage differences and enhance mutual trust. It endeavours to deepen military partnership with its neighbours in order to promote strategic mutual trust. China has initiated defence and security consultations as well as meeting mechanisms with 17 neighbouring countries to keep exchange and communication channels open. Moreover, as per the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "China and the ASEAN countries have executed the Declaration of Conduct (DOC) and advanced the consultations on the Code of Conduct (COC). They are committed to enhancing practical maritime security cooperation, extending regional security mechanisms and transforming the South China Sea into a sea of peace, friendship and cooperation."³⁰ China has been in dialogue with Philippines since 2016 to address South China Sea issue through friendly consultation. It also signed a memorandum of understanding with Japan in 2018 on maritime and air liaison.

China will spare no effort to resolve the relevant disputes peacefully through negotiation and consultation with the states directly concerned, on the basis of historical facts and in accordance with international law. Pending final settlement, China is ready to make every effort with the relevant states to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature, including joint maritime development maritime areas, in order to achieve win-win results and jointly maintain peace and stability in both the East and the South China Seas.

³⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People Republic of China, *China's Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation* (Beijing: China, January 2017), https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1429771.shtml.

China's International Maritime Security Engagements

Based on the principle of 'shared neighbourhood' and 'common destiny', China has been actively engaging South East Asia through different maritime initiatives. China's Belt and Road Initiative has also revived the Maritime Silk Route (MSR) which integrates South East Asia with South Asia, West Asia, Africa and Europe. The MSR is based on strategic, commercial, and naval posts so to build a network of bases to facilitate smooth and secure trade. In addition to strengthening bilateral security cooperation with the MSR countries, China has also tried to strengthen such cooperation, pragmatic exchanges and military-to-military relations with other countries, especially its strategic partners in different regions such as Pakistan and Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean, in line with the principles of mutual trust, mutual benefit and win-win cooperation.

Moreover, China has also been conducting joint military exercises and training on "counterterrorism, peacekeeping, search and rescue, and tactical skills with its neighbouring countries. China has also carried out extensive exchanges and practical cooperation on border and coastal defence, academic institutions, think tanks, education, training, medical science, medical service, and equipment and technology."³¹ It has also increased its interaction with ASEAN states. The China-ASEAN Defence Ministers' Informal Meeting and the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) plays a positive role in enhancing trust among regional countries through military exchanges and cooperation. China has proposed a China-ASEAN defence ministers hotline. China actively participates in multilateral dialogues and cooperation mechanisms including the ADMM-Plus, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Shangri-La Dialogue, Jakarta International Defence Dialogue and Western Pacific Naval Symposium. It regularly holds China-ASEAN defence ministers informal meetings, and proposes and constructively promotes initiatives to strengthen regional defence cooperation. The first ASEAN Maritime Exercise between Chinese and ASEAN militaries was held in October 2018 and demonstrated the determination for maintaining regional peace and stability.³²

Chinese officials assert that "China will fulfil its international responsibilities and obligations, and provide more public security goods to the international community to the best of their capacity consolidating the

³¹ Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Negara Brunei Darussalam, *Joint Efforts to Safeguard Regional Peace and Prosperity* (August 3, 2020), <http://bn.china-embassy.org/eng/sgxws/t1803406.htm>

³² Ibid.

win-win principle".³³ China's armed forces regularly participate in Humanitarian and Disaster Relief Operations (HADR) and UN peacekeeping operations (UNPKOs). China is the "major contributor to the UN peacekeeping budget and makes the largest troop contribution amongst the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. China has participated in 24 UN peacekeeping missions and has contributed more than 39,000 peacekeepers by December 2018.³⁴ PLAN takes an active part in the international efforts for HADR, and has "participated in the search for the missing Malaysian Airliner MH 370, and in the relief operations for Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines and the water scarcity in Maldives. Since it entered, service a decade ago, the PLAN's hospital ship – 'Ark Peace' has fulfilled 7 voyages coded as 'Mission Harmony' and visited 43 countries. During these visits, it provided medical services to the local communities, organized medical exchanges, and helped over 230,000 people."³⁵

Conclusion

From the above discussion, it can be concluded that there is a stark difference in Western and Chinese concepts of sea power. Firstly, the fundamental objective of China's Sea Power is not to seek the command of seas or maritime supremacy, but to safeguard China's national security, advance legitimate maritime rights and interests and ensure the safety of SLOCs. Secondly, China will protect its legitimate maritime rights and interests by diplomatic means of negotiation and legal means as per UNCLOS and other international law; and thirdly, China will not protect SLOCs and its maritime interests by acquiring naval bases and overseas possessions all over the world, but by establishing close cooperation with its strategic partners in different regions.

The contemporary security threats and challenges emanating from the maritime realm compel China to not rely on the good will of others to safeguard its own national security and territorial integrity, making it imperative for China to develop powerful armed forces, including a modern maritime military force commensurate with its national security and development interests. This is the need of the hour to safeguard its national sovereignty and maritime rights, protect strategic SLOCs and maritime security through participating in international maritime cooperation, so as to provide strategic support for building itself into a 'maritime power'.

³³ The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, *China's National Defence in the New Era*.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

GROWING WINDS OF CHANGE IN SAUDI ARABIA THROUGH VISION 2030

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Abstract

Discovery of oil in the Arab peninsula in late 1930s had a pronounced effect on social life in all Gulf States. Saudi Arabia, being the largest country of the Peninsula, started its national journey on 23rd September, 1932 with very limited resources. At the end of 19th century as state coffers kept overflowing with Petro dollars. This easy money supported state finances for almost eight decades; however, at the turn of the century, its financial landscape changed. Oil prices remained under pressure for over a decade, negatively affecting Saudi economy and social welfare system. As the cash flows, slowly desiccated, national policy planners were compelled to diversify economy through industrialization and restructuring of Saudi 'cradle to grave' welfare system for resource generation and its better management. It analyses the possibility of success of the strategy stipulating social change due to economic downturn. The conceived change will be implemented through Royal Vision during the next decade.

Keywords: Social Reforms, Vision 2030, Economic Diversification, Oil Rents, Saudi Arabia.

Introduction

During the last few decades, rising global demand for oil made the Gulf states enormously rich as the Arab peninsula houses world's largest oil reserves. Since discovery of oil in 1938 in the Middle East, the regional monarchies spent huge sums of money in providing comforts of life to their subjects. Subsidies afforded to the indigenous Saudi population cannot be found anywhere in the world

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including Scandinavia which stands out for having the best social welfare system. The extraordinary welfare subventions transformed the Middle Eastern states to welfare states for local population. According to McKinsey Global Report of December 2015 on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, "The oil price boom from 2003 to 2013 fuelled rising prosperity in Saudi Arabia, which became the world's 19th largest economy, GDP doubled, household income rose by 75 per cent and 1.7 million new jobs were created, including many for Saudi women. The government invested heavily in education, health and infrastructure and built up reserves amounting almost 100 per cent of GDP in 2014."¹ Economies of almost all Middle Eastern states were burgeoning alike till 2014.

By the end of 2014, the Saudi population was enjoying various luxuries of life as the state had enormous resources to support welfare programmes for their population through huge subsidies. However, the economic landscape of the country started facing a downturn as oil prices in the international market plummeted. The drop in oil prices hit Saudi Arabia very hard as it had total dependence on oil revenues. The 'hydrocarbon culture' created citizen's over-dependence on the state which resulted in massive and bloated unproductive pool of public employees² whose competence and efficiency is questionable even today. State's financial managers realized the upcoming danger and drew up a plan to diversify the oil dependent economy by industrialization and developing quality human capital which had too long enjoyed national prosperity without contribution resulting in a 'sense of entitlement' and dependency on the state. The plan in the shape of 'Vision 2030' has been designed to transform the Kingdom from an oil-revenue dependent country into a modern, liberalized and thriving entrepreneurial society whose prosperity is underpinned by flourishing industrial, financial, economic and commercial sectors.³ This article analyses if the objectives of the Royal Vision 2030 are achievable in terms of perceived social change in Saudi society.

Saudi Arabia at a Glance

The Arabian Peninsula is one of the world's largest landmasses, situated at the crossroads of Asia, Africa and Europe, and having an area of 2,240,000 sq. km with an inhospitable climate. Saudi Arabia, the 'land of

¹ McKinsey Global Institute Report 2015, "Saudi Arabia beyond Oil: The Investment and Productivity Transformation," [https://www.mckinsey.com/search?q=saudi per cent202030](https://www.mckinsey.com/search?q=saudi+per+cent+2020+30), accessed on 19 January 2020.

² M. Aman, "Editor's Viewpoint: beyond Oil: A New Middle East Vision," *Digest of Middle East Studies* 25, no. 2 (2016): 180-185. DOI: 10.1111/dome.12096.

³ Neville Teller, "Saudi Vision 2030: A Progress Report – Analysis," October 13, 2018, <https://www.eurasiareview.com/13102018-saudi-vision-2030-a-progress-report-analysis/>

hot sand,' occupies about 80 percent of the Arab peninsula and has an area of 2,149,640 sq. Km. Seven sovereign states border the Saudi Kingdom: Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, Yemen, Oman, United Arab Emirates and Qatar. The island nation of Bahrain lies off Saudi Arabia's eastern coast.⁴

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) was formally founded by the *Al-Saud* family in 1932 after a 30 years' campaign to unify the Arabian Peninsula. The family united the four regions into a single state through a series of conquests beginning in 1902. It is the Islamic heartland, being the birth place of Islam, and houses the two Holiest shrines for Muslims. It has a population of 28.5 million and expats make up about 37 per cent of the total population. The Kingdom has a high unemployment rate of 24.2 per cent.⁵ It has the largest oil reserves in the region which were discovered in 1938 by the American Oil Company in Dhahran area of the country. According to the Oil & Gas Journal (OGJ), Saudi Arabia had approximately 266 billion barrels of proven oil reserves as of January 1, 2017, amounting to 16 per cent of the world's total oil reserves.⁶ These reserves are expected to last for about 90 years at the current rate of production. Saudi Arabia has an oil-based economy and is the largest petroleum exporter. The per capita oil export revenue was US\$ 7098 in 2018.⁷ The petroleum sector accounts for roughly 87 per cent of revenue generation, 42 per cent of GDP, and around 90 per cent of export earnings.⁸ During the last few years, budget deficit has seen a continuous rise and reached 8.3 per cent of GDP during 2017. This deficit was made up by bond sales and utilizing foreign reserves. Though the Kingdom can absorb this increasing deficit for a few more years, yet it has recently decided to cut capital spending and reduce subsidies on electricity, water and petroleum products and has introduced Value Added Tax (VAT) of 15 per cent for increasing much needed capital collection. Following is a brief look at the Saudi economy from 2003 onwards during which it kept growing.

Saudi Economy – Prosperity to Paucity

Saudi economy in pre-corona settings was ranked the 18th largest economy in the world. It almost doubled in size during the 2003-2013 decade due to the boom in oil prices. It jumped from 27th position in 2003

⁴ James Wynbrandt, *Brief History of Saudi Arabia* (2nd Edition) (New York: InfoBase Publishing, 2010).

⁵ "CIA World Fact Book Information on Saudi Arabia," *CIA*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sa.html>.

⁶ "EIA 2017 Country Analysis Report: Saudi Arabia," *EIA*, https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/countries_long/Saudi_Arabia/saudi_arabia.pdf.

⁷ "EIA OPEC Revenue Fact Sheet 2019," *EIA*, https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/special-topics/OPEC_Revenues_Fact_Sheet.

⁸ CIA World Fact Book information on Saudi Arabia.

to 19th largest economy in 2014. Its nominal GDP of US\$ 790 billion is larger than Switzerland and Sweden. On per capita basis, its nominal GDP is US\$ 22794 which is behind France and Canada only. The most unique feature of Saudi economy is its over dependence on oil and sizable population (30 per cent) of migrant workers.

Saudi Arabia is the one of the world's largest oil exporters and 90 per cent of the government revenues come from oil sales. The sharp increase in oil prices started in 2003 from US\$ 30 per barrel to US\$ 110 in 2013, doubling the GDP. The highest price of US\$ 110 per barrel stayed for about two years which gave a major boost to the economy and foreign exchange reserves. That's why the decade of 2003-2013 is labelled as 'decade of rising prosperity' for Saudis by international economists.

For an ordinary Saudi household during this decade, income rose by about 75 per cent. This upswing was driven by the public sector which created over one million new jobs. Out of these, Saudi nationals alone availed two-third of these job opportunities. In the overall economic perspective, 4.4 million new jobs were created by the rising economy during 2003-2013 and Saudi nationals had the lion's share of 1.7 million jobs. However, subsequent down-slide of the economy in 2015 could not maintain this new job creation tempo and unemployment started rising thereafter. The decade also witnessed an increase in the number of foreign workers because of the availability of new job opportunities. The influx of expat workers mainly from Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and a few other South Asian countries increased overall population of the Kingdom by 36 per cent from 22 million to 30 million.

Saudi government used these exorbitant oil revenues (US\$ 450 billion) for investment in health, education, transportation, infrastructure development and social welfare sectors. This increased public spending fourfold and these ventures gave a big boost to living standards and quality of life in the Kingdom. The major projects included establishment of new universities, new metro transit lines, and 80 new hospitals. The number of doctors in the Kingdom doubled as compared to 1990. Infant mortality rate improved by two-third and life expectancy rose to 76 years.⁹ More than a quarter of government spending went to education alone and about 60 per cent of each age cohort accessed tertiary education, a proportion similar to that of France and Germany.¹⁰ Despite such heavy investment in public sectors, standard of education still remains low, evident from Saudi children's poor scores on the international level and much higher (50 per cent) university dropout rates. Establishment of so many modern hospitals have also not played an

⁹ Mckinsey Global Institute, "Saudi Arabia Beyond Oil: The Investment and Productivity Transformation," 2015, <https://www.mckinsey.com>.

¹⁰ "Gross Enrolment Rates of Tertiary Education," *UNESCO Institute of Statistics*, 2013, <http://data.uis.unesco.org/?queryid=142>.

effective role, as obesity and diabetes ratios in KSA are highest in the world.¹¹

The prosperous decade saw a massive increase in male and female work force participation in overall development of the state. Female work force touched 1.2 million in 2014 or 18 per cent which doubled compared to the previous decade (1993-2003). However, restrictions over mixed gender work environment and female driving remained a unique challenge for women. Expatriate workers make half of the work force in KSA. There is a great disparity in their wages as foreign workers are paid far less than local workers. Local workers are paid three times more in government sector and six times more in private sector despite being less skilled. This has resulted in lower labour productivity. The reluctance of local population to undertake new jobs was due to generous unemployment benefits and plentiful family support. The unemployment benefit was two-third of the minimum public sector wage, thus providing least incentive to work.

Post second Gulf war and the decade of prosperity, Saudi economy started down sliding and started facing few critical challenges. Firstly, volatility of oil prices posed a challenge, as it is lifeline blood of the Kingdom. Second most important challenge faced by the Saudi economy since 2015 is massive youth unemployment. Both these challenges will be dealt with in detail in ensuing paragraphs.

Situational Analysis

Population Growth & Unemployment

A few factors have contributed in putting extreme strain on the Saudi economy, in addition to fluctuation in oil revenues. Rapid increase in population was one of the major factors which entailed a broad spectrum of issues such as large and young population, higher fertility rate of Saudi women (6 children per family), high population growth, and large expats' population. Since the last two decades, Saudi population has shown a steady increase at the rate of 2.5 per cent¹² which is very high as compared to developed countries. The consistent high population growth rate has direct linkage with the country's unemployment rate. As per World Bank data (1991-2019) for Saudi Arabia, the average unemployment rate of available work force of all age groups has been floating around 5.69 per cent.¹³ However, youth unemployment (age 15-24) has been a cause of


¹¹ World Health Organization (WHO) Global Report on Diabetes 2019, <https://www.who.int/>.

¹² "Saudi Population Estimates," General Authority of Statistics, <https://www.stats.gov.sa/en/43>.

¹³ "Saudi Arabia: Unemployment Rate Forecast," *The Global Economy*, https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Saudi-Arabia/unemployment_outlook/.

serious concern for the Kingdom being 26 per cent, which is extremely high as per international standards.¹⁴ Although unemployment rate has been declining since 2006 when it was highest (34 per cent), yet overall number with increased population has swelled.

Fig 1: Youth Unemployment Rate in Saudi Arabia



Source: *World Bank Data - Youth (15-24) Unemployment Rate for Saudi Arabia*

For creating job opportunities for the unemployed Saudi youth, Saudi government recently introduced new taxation regime and withdrew fuel and electricity subsidies. Introduction of 15 per cent Value Added Tax (VAT), increase in electricity tariff with revised calculation formula and increase in fuel prices affected both locals and expats alike. Introduction of Family Dependent Tax in 2017 (100 Riyals per family member with 100 Riyals annual increase till 2020) on foreigners' families was the major cause of discontent amongst foreign workers. The direct taxation had adverse impact on foreign workers forcing them to leave. The departure of over a million working class men coming from South Asia and Philippines since 2016 created low level job opportunities. The expat's exodus brought down the real estate price index by almost 15 per cent since 2016, which hit the Saudi property owners badly. The workers' outward flight from the Kingdom introduced deflation in the economy and consumer prices witnessed continuous fall averaging 2.2 per cent since 2018¹⁵.

Saudization Program

Saudization policy to reduce reliance on expat workers has been adopted since long. The campaign was initiated in 1985 where Saudi companies were asked to recruit Saudi nationals on quota basis. In the last 5 years, Ministry of Labour has allocated 72 professions exclusively to

¹⁴ World Bank, "Youth Unemployment Rate for Saudi Arabia," (FRED) Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SLUEM1524ZSSAU>.

¹⁵ Michael Amon & Nicholas Parasie, "Saudi Arabia's Economic Overhaul is Backfiring," *Wall Street Journal*, March 23, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-arabias-economic-overhaul-is-backfiring-11553338819#comments_sector.

Saudi nationals; however these jobs are of very low level. The list does not contain Human Resources related jobs, labour affairs related jobs, sales and finance roles. There is a major shortage of skills in Saudi nationals in terms of doctors, teachers, engineers, architects, IT specialists and healthcare professionals. The major setback to Saudization program since its inception is non-availability of highly skilled Saudi nationals as low level jobs are considered below the self-esteem of Saudi nationals. Despite all efforts by the Kingdom, much could not be done to change this mind-set to contribute towards reduction of unemployment amongst Saudi nationals.

Oil Dependence and Emerging Challenges


Saudi economy has been oil dependent since discovery of this liquid gold. Historically, a major chunk of the Kingdom's revenues have been generated through global oil sales. The figure below shows that during the last 5 years, 64.37 per cent of the revenue came from oil and the rest, 35.63 per cent, was contributed by non-oil sectors. This shows overwhelming dependence of the economy on oil which has been the primary growth driver of Saudi Arabia's economy. Fluctuating oil prices have been affecting social life and development in the Kingdom. Major dependence for state revenues on oil has been a cause of concern to economists, as Saudi Arabia has no other alternatives at the moment for its revenue diversification. All oil-based economies felt seriously threatened when production of modern electric cars/vehicles was started in 2008. The major reason for electric car renaissance was a breakthrough in battery manufacturing technologies. The obvious advantages of electric cars made them a preferred option for buyers, which at the same time rang alarm bells for economic planners of oil producing countries as they would face a major dent in global oil sales thus reducing government revenues.

The major oil importers of recent times are China, India, Japan and many advanced European countries. The entry of electric vehicles has started showing its impact as oil demands of the advanced countries have already started dwindling. China's oil consumption will peak in 2025, five to eight years earlier than market consensus as electric vehicles and rails takes over, according to Morgan Stanley analyst Andy Meng¹⁶. India is also offering many incentives like tax holidays, cheap electricity and labour to attract electric vehicle manufacturers. Many European countries have started working on deletion plan of fossil fuel driven vehicles. Europe's

¹⁶ Dan Murtaugh, "China Oil Use Seen Peaking in 2015 as EV and Rail Takeover," *Bloomberg*, March 6, 2019, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-06/china-oil-demand-seen-peaking-in-2025-as-evs-and-rail-take-over>.

car-makers are gearing up to make 2020 the year of the electric cars¹⁷. Germany set the target in 2010 of having one million Electric Vehicles (EVs) on road by 2020. France already has 150000 EVs plying on its roads since 2017. Scandinavian countries have already taken lead in this field. Moreover, USA has also declared 'non reliance on Middle Eastern oil' as their home produced oil is sufficient to meet local demands, as asserted by Donald Trump in his state televised address to the nation on 8 January 2020.¹⁸

Fig 2: Oil Revenue and Non-oil Revenue: 2016-2020



Source: Report on Saudi Arabia, Beyond oil: The investment and Productivity Transformation, Mckinsey Global Institute, USA.

Continuous Fiscal Deficit

Scrutiny of Saudi Arabian budget of last six years reveals that economy is facing heavy fiscal deficits since 2014. Budget deficit touched a peak of 388 billion Riyals in 2015, though it has been reducing thereafter but this has direct linkage with oil prices. The lower oil price constricted the cash flows and more investment internationally in diverse sources of energy like renewable energy, and shale gas made the oil market more competitive. All this translated into global decrease in oil demand and glut in oil prices which receded to US\$ 30 per barrel after staying at US\$ 130 in 2014-2016. Resultantly, Kingdom's budget swung from surplus of 6.5 per cent in 2013 to a deficit of 2.3 per cent in 2014¹⁹. IMF even projected budget deficit forecast of 22 per cent of GDP for 2015²⁰ with a prediction of further increase if the oil prices did not recover from their lowest ebb of

¹⁷ Jasper Jolly, "2020 Set to Be Year of the Electric Car," *The Guardian*, December 25, 2019, <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/dec/25/2020-set-to-be-year-of-the-electric-car-say-industry-analysts>.


¹⁸ "State of the Union address by President Donald Trump in US Congress," *New York Times*, January 8, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/08/us/politics/trump-address.html>.

¹⁹ "Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency Annual Statistics," 2015, [http://www.sama.gov.sa/en-US/EconomicReports/AnnualReport/Fifty per cent20Second per cent20Annual per cent20Report.pdf](http://www.sama.gov.sa/en-US/EconomicReports/AnnualReport/Fifty%20per%20cent20Second%20per%20cent20Annual%20per%20cent20Report.pdf).

²⁰ "World Economic Outlook," *IMF*, 2015, <https://www.imf.org/en/publications/weo?page=2>.

US\$ 30 per barrel. Slight recovery in oil prices (US\$30 to US\$60) improved budget deficit but it is staying in deficit since then. Another noticeable factor related to the budget deficit was massive expansion in size of all three armed forces, and purchase of expensive military hardware from western suppliers at inflated prices.

Fig 3: Budget Deficit in Saudi Arabia: 2012-2021



Source: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency Annual Statistics, 2015.

Depleting Foreign Exchange Reserves

Saudi Arabia has huge foreign exchange reserves. These reserves were mainly built up because of higher oil prices since 2004. The foreign exchange (FE) reserves touched their peak of US\$ 746.66 billion (2800000 Billion Saudi Riyals) in 2015 and started decreasing thereafter. The FE reserves stood at US\$ 506.6 billion by the end of 2019 depleting US\$ 48 Billion per year on an average. Since 2015, budgetary shortfall is being met by using Foreign Exchange Reserves. The following graph shows direct linkage of global oil prices with FE reserves: higher the price, higher the reserves.

Fig 4: Global Oil Prices- Foreign Exchange Linkage



Source: Tradingeconomics.com referred by Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency

The above analysis brings out reasons necessitating a long term road map for economic stability and fiscal balance of the Kingdom. The policymakers of the country have concluded since long that oil dependence coupled with low oil prices is a dangerous reality for the economy in the long run. Therefore diversification of the economy is the only viable solution for sustainability. High unemployment rate amongst the young people was another cause of concern as monarchies can't afford to confront this kind of existential threat. Though economic diversification plans have been devised since long but lower oil prices and rapidly growing population were the main drivers for announcing 'Vision 2030' in 2016.

Major Features of Vision 2030

Prince Mohammad Bin Salman, after his nomination as crown prince, had great realization about the seriousness of the economic situation of the Kingdom. He announced National Transformation Plan (NTP) on 25th April, 2016 which included Vision 2030 as its centre piece and is described as a "neo-liberal blueprint" for progress and prosperity of the nation. The Vision is built on three pillars drawing on the Kingdom's inherent strengths: being Arab and Islamic heartland, an investment powerhouse, and geographically connecting three continents. At level 1, these three overarching tenets have two sub-parts, each resulting in six primary objectives. At level 2, these six objectives translate into 27 'branch objectives' and level 3 has 96 strategic objectives²¹. Brief explanation of the three overarching tenets of the vision 2030 is as under:

1. A vibrant society
2. A thriving economy
3. An ambitious nation, responsibly enabled

Vibrant society tenet encompasses strengthening of Islamic and national identity, and offering a fulfilling and healthy life to its citizens. The goal set for this segment of the vision are; serve 30 Million Umra visitors, increase household spending on culture and entertainment to 6 per cent, and finally to increase the average life expectancy from 74 years to 80 years.

Thriving economy tenet includes expanding and diversifying the economy and increasing employment. Goals set forth for this part of the vision are decreasing the unemployment rate from 11.6 per cent to 7 per cent, increasing public investment fund's assets to 7 trillion Saudi Riyal

²¹ "KSA Vision 2030 Objectives and Vision Realization Programs," Vision 2030, <https://vision2030.gov.sa/sites/default/files/vision/Visionpercent20Realizationpercent20Programspercent20Overview.pdf>.

(SAR), increasing private sector's contribution to 65 per cent of GDP and finally increasing share of non-oil GDP to 50 per cent.

Ambitious nation tenet involves effective governance and responsibility enabled society. Goals set forth to achieve this segment are raising the ranking on the e-government survey index from current position of 36 to be among the top five nations. KSA plans to prepare one million volunteers per year to achieve the objective of responsibility enabling in Saudi society.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia executed the National Transformation Program (NTP) with full fervour and started endeavours to achieve 96 strategic objectives progressively. It was expected that 'resistance to change' phenomenon will affect the program's execution. Austerity policies like cuts in subsidies (fuel price), salaries (20 per cent reduction in minister's salaries) and other government benefits (cars and housing for senior officials) were bound to produce discontent amongst Saudi nationals. Secondly, the vision aspires to achieve more than economic transformation. It is an effort to reshape one of the world's most socially and religiously conservative states into a liberal and tolerant society.²² Presently, the government is the main employer of the population which needs to be shifted to private sector; however, appropriate skills for any private job are a mandatory requirement in the private sector. Despite all the social resistance and bad press to some extent, "the path to reform remains steep, but the king and his son appear determined to stay on it", observes Farida Ghitis, a renowned Gulf expert.²³

Key Targets of Vision 2030²⁴

- Move from being the 19th largest economy in the world to the top 15.
- Increase the private sector's contribution from 40 per cent to 65 per cent of GDP.
- Increase foreign direct investment from 3.8 per cent to the international level of 5.7 per cent of GDP.
- Increase non-oil government revenue from SAR 163 billion to SAR 1 trillion.

²² Frida Ghitis, "Is Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 Reform Plan Faltering or Succeeding," *World Politics Review*, April 27, 2017, <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/21969/is-saudi-arabia-s-vision-2030-reform-plan-faltering-or-succeeding>.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Jane Kinninmont, "Vision 2030 and Saudi Arabia's Social Contract: Austerity and Transformation," *Chatham House*, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2017-07-20-vision-2030-saudi-kinninmont.pdf>.

- Increase the number of pilgrimage visitors from 8 million to 30 million annually.
- Localize over 50 per cent of military equipment spending by 2030.
- Increase Saudization in the oil and gas sectors from 40 per cent to 75 per cent.
- Increase the Public Investment Fund's assets from SAR 600 billion to more than SAR 7 trillion.

Vision 2030 as a Driver of Social Change

Centerpiece of Saudi domestic agenda of King Salman and his clique lies in vision 2030 which is a harbinger of radical reformation of Saudi society. The Vision 2030 blueprint seeks transformation of Saudi economy by diversification in both government revenue generation and collection. The document envisages reduction in longstanding oil dependence by promoting investment and private sector growth. Consumer and industrial subsidies are being phased out and Value Added Tax (VAT) and additional fees for every government provided service have been levied. Special focus has been placed on promoting Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) and tourism. Creation of a futuristic smart city "Neom" close to Jordan and Egypt's borders as a logistic hub will have a deep seated impact on the society as transition from Camel to Camry has still not been fully absorbed by all tribes. Increasing number of Hajj and Umra pilgrims travelling to Mecca and Medina will stretch the existing facilities to the limit, which would thus need major up-gradation.

Historically, Saudi social contract has been based on the distribution of oil rents to the general populace in exchange for their loyalty to the king. However, this may slightly change after implementation of the Vision 2030. Royals need to be very cautious in the Vision's implementation and keep political and social consequences of these reforms under full focus. Used to the 'cradle to grave' patronization policy, the populace and society of KSA will take a lot of time to readjust to the new realities of life. The IMF has predicted that if these plans fail to deliver desired results, unemployment will further increase. This will intensify social pressures on the government and any reduction in existing pay-outs to the public will increase general dissatisfaction which monarchies cannot afford. Implementation of more strict austerity measures will exert more stress on the social contract between the Kingdom's rulers and their subjects. Though it is unlikely that democracy will be established in Saudi Arabia soon, yet involvement of the general public in overall decision making with increased transparency are need of the hour.

Occasional demonstrations by the general Saudi population which were unthinkable in the past have started taking place. They are being dealt with sternly at the moment but have the potential of ending up in a

mass rebellion in the future. For ensuring success of the Vision 2030, involvement of civil society is mandatory. On the macro level, the existing Saudi education system has failed to provide skilled Saudi manpower to replace foreign workers. Motivation and 'willingness to work' is another weak area as Saudi population has never worked previously and have been handling foreign workers as managers rather than working themselves. Another issue is the demand for higher wages in private sector by the Saudi workers which is almost six times higher than a foreign worker, therefore private companies avoid hiring locals and prefer cheap foreign labour.

Vision 2030 includes the ambitious plan of building a modern desert megacity at the cost of US\$ 500 billion (1000 square miles area, 33 times bigger than New York in size) which will be a hub for manufacturing, renewable energy, biotechnology, media, and entertainment, and will be filled with skyscrapers, five-star hotels, and robots to free humans from repetitive labor.²⁵ The project needs careful handling and must not meet the same fate as of six economic cities announced in 2005 which never attracted expected response from the general public.

The economic fruits of the vision after three years of implementation have started becoming evident. The IMF in 2018 appreciated the progress being made in achieving objectives as stipulated in the vision document. The commitment of the government in implementation of wide-ranging economic and social reforms is above board. IMF mission chief for Saudi Arabia Tim Callen said in a statement. "Growth is expected to pick-up in 2020 and over the medium-term as reforms take hold."²⁶ He further acknowledged that GDP is expected to rise to 1.7 per cent from 0.7 per cent as in 2017 and economy will accelerate further in 2020.²⁷

Confining of over 200 royals and wealthy businessmen in a five star hotel in Riyadh on 26th November, 2017 in an anti-corruption sweep has sent a clear message to all that corruption is intolerable in the Kingdom. This activity generated over US\$ 107 billion²⁸ alone and shows the level of corruption prevalent in Saudi society.

²⁵ Mimi Kirk, "Saudi Arabia's \$500 Billion Fantasy of a Utopian Megacity," *CityLab*, January 10, 2018, <https://www.citylab.com/design/2017/11/saudi-arabias-latest-planned-city-costs-500-billion-and-is-insanely-huge/544748/>

²⁶ Tim Callen, "IMF Mission Chief in Saudi Arabia," *IMF*, May 22, 2018, <https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2018/05/22/pr18190-imf-staff-completes-2018-article-iv-mission-to-saudi-arabia>.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Bethan McKernan, "Saudi Arabians are Ready to Embrace Social Change - but Fear it May Come at a Cost," *Independent*, February 6, 2018, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/>.

The Royal Vision was well on its way to achieve its long term objectives but the sudden eruption of Corona Virus pandemic in the world has an extremely negative impact on its implementation and execution. The pandemic has sent most of the world's economies into a nose-dive wiping out billions of dollars in a very short span of time. The imposed lockdowns and restrictions on free movement of people worldwide reduced production and affected delivery chains. Saudi economy suffered extensively when Hajj 2020 was cancelled depriving her of billions of dollars. A few other political challenges like the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, rapprochement with Israel, and the role of Saudi controlled Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) over Kashmir have indirect linkages with the success of Vision 2030.

Conclusion

Saudi Arabia has embarked on one of the most ambitious diversification programmes through Vision 2030. Efforts to diversify the economy have been made through the last nine five-yearly development plans as well; however, most of these plans could not achieve the desired results. The Kingdom has to be wary of factors such as magnitude of the mega projects/ schemes, and focus on political development of institutions rather than the economy alone. The country needs heavy investment in vocational education for preparation of skilled local workforce for the jobs which Saudis reject and consider below them. The Kingdom does not anymore enjoy the luxury of ignoring the relationship between economic and political development as tribal based social system is bound to undergo a sea change after complete implementation of Vision 2030. Saudi society is well knit, status oriented, structured along tribal lines, and has the culture of total freedom with least law abiding trend. The society needs to be radically reformed for universal values essential for the operation of a modern economy and polity.

As new realities will dawn on the general Saudi public with the passage of time, society must readjust with the emerging change. The positive impact created by the Royal Vision has to be carried through forcefully by the government as falling back is not an option. The diversification of economy towards industrialization, along with necessary social change, is the only possibility left with the Saudi monarchy if their rule is to continue.

TERRORISM AND THE CONCEPT OF *JIHAD*: A CRITICAL REAPPRAISAL OF POST-9/11 MILITANCY IN PAKISTAN

Tabinda Siddiqui* & Arif Mahmud**

Abstract

Post-9/11 terrorism in Pakistan proved to be a complex and multifaceted challenge. A distinguished feature of this violent campaign is its religious orientation. While tracing the causes, the role of Islam as a faith and practice is generally debated. Hence, dominant discourse about this terror campaign revolves around the religious concept of jihad through which militants justify their violence. Since the challenge is multifaceted, the causes of this violence are also diverse but as the militancy intensified over the years, the discourse of religious militancy over-shadowed other factors and constructed a violent image of Islam and jihad as a source of indiscriminate violence. This study draws upon the insights provided by the field of critical terrorism studies and employs the deconstructivism approach to examine this dominant discourse of 'religious' militancy in Pakistan, the concept of jihad. This critical analysis would help to understand and deconstruct the dominant discourse of post-9/11 militancy in Pakistan in the light of both primary and secondary sources of information.

Keywords: *Post-9/11, Pakistan, Terrorism, Jihad, Islamic Rulings, Militancy*

Introduction

Terrorism is not a modern phenomenon.¹ It is generally identified as a ubiquitous phenomenon that has remained recurrent throughout human history. The tragic events of 9/11, 2001, introduced

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¹ C. Cindy Combs, *Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century*, (New York: Routledge, 2018), 55.

terrorism as an emerging threat to the worldwide stage and a new form of warfare was introduced and initiated at the global scale against terrorism, involving world's sole superpower, United States and non-state actors, mainly al-Qaeda at the time led by Osama bin Laden (OBL), hiding in Afghanistan. Initially, Afghanistan became the central stage for the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) due to al-Qaeda's presence and Afghan Taliban's refusal to surrender OBL to the United States as the prime suspect of 9/11 attacks. Since that time, due to Pakistan's geographic compulsions and past links with Afghan Taliban, it was foreseen that it would be inevitable for Pakistan to avoid the repercussions of another war in Afghanistan with whom it not just shares its porous border; but cultural, ethnic and religious ties as well. Over the years, WOT gradually shifted inside Pakistani border areas followed by a vicious cycle of indiscriminate terrorism across the country.

This campaign of militancy and terrorism in Pakistan was generally perceived and projected as religiously mandated *jihad* throughout the years in an effort by the militants to impose their version of Islamic *Sharia* in the country. Self-proclamations of militants under the umbrella organization of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), formed in December 2007, also constructed this image of 'Islamic' militancy. Their public statements, interviews to the national and international media outlets, atrocious actions against public in the areas under their control, and increased terrorist activities across the country, also constructed the image of violence motivated by religious reasons.

This image of 'Islamic' militancy in Pakistan was also predominantly constructed through political and scholarly discourse at the international level. As the WOT started shifting inside Pakistan, the country started to be perceived in Western perceptions as a "potential base for Islamic radicalism".² It was stated by the former American Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, that Islamist militancy in Pakistan has become a key international security concern.³ Writing in 2009, a noted Pakistani analyst, Shuja Nawaz, claimed that FATA sanctuaries for the Taliban and al-Qaeda guerrillas caused the generation of Islamic militancy in Pakistan.⁴ Talking to Al-Jazeera network in 2016, former US Director of Intelligence, Lt General (Retd) Michael Flynn stated that in the last decade

² Stephen Philip Cohen, "The Jihadist Threat to Pakistan," *The Washington Quarterly* 26, no. 3 (Summer 2003): 7-25.

³ Hillary R. Clinton, U.S. Secretary of State, testimony before the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee, "New Beginnings: Foreign Policy Priorities in the Obama Administration," 111th Cong., 1st sess., April 22, 2009, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2009a/04/122048.html>.

⁴ Shujah Nawaz, "FATA: A Most Dangerous Place," (Washington DC: Center on Strategic and International Studies, 2009), 13, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/081218_nawaz_fata_web.pdf.

or so, there has been doubling of the numbers of radical Islamist groups in Pakistan alone.⁵ In addition, Pakistan was identified as a country where home-grown 'Islamic' extremists target civilians and security forces on a regular basis.⁶

This discourse of 'religious' militancy in Pakistan has greatly impacted the country, its people, security, and interests in all possible ways. Pakistan was perceived as the most dangerous country⁷ and an epicenter of *jihad*.⁸ In addition, how this selected discourse even hampered Pakistani diaspora in the United States, is captured by an American scholar, Craig Considine who observed that "the lives of Pakistanis of all backgrounds were dramatically changed by the 'War on Terror' narrative which associated Pakistanis with Islam, and in turn, Islam with violence and suddenly, Pakistanis were lumped into the same category as 'Muslim terrorists' – brown, bearded, Islamic, backward, violent, anti-Western, and so on."⁹

While keeping in view the above debates, rationale for this study is to deconstruct the dominant discourse of post-9/11 militancy in Pakistan in the light of primary religious sources, intellectual history of *jihadi* thought in South Asia, and personal profiles of militants captured by the distinguished Pakistani scholar Tariq Rahman.¹⁰ Though the subject has been widely discussed and the notion of 'Islamic' militancy has been challenged by various academic studies in general, but this concept in the context of Pakistan is quite under-researched. This paper would contribute to the existing scholarship in the context of Pakistan. With the help of deconstructivist approach, the conduct of militants claimed as *jihad* would be problematized and it would be identified that discourse of 'Islamic' militancy in Pakistan is a constructed one and falls under the

⁵ "Pak-US Relationship: A Double Game? - Upfront," *Al Jazeera English* video, 10:37, May 28, 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k4e-w9iHmdI&vI=en>.

⁶ Shamil Shams, "What is Pakistan's Militancy Issue All About?" *DW*, January 12, 2017, <https://www.dw.com/en/what-is-pakistans-militancy-issue-all-about/a-36212654>.

⁷ "Pakistan Obsessed with India, Sees as 'Existential Threat,' Ex-US Spy Chief," *Deccan Chronicles*, May 3, 2019, <https://www.deccanchronicle.com/world/america/030519/pak-obsessed-with-indiasees-as-existential-threat-ex-us-spy-c.html>: Throughout the WOT years, numerous accounts referred to Pakistan as the most dangerous place, including former US President Barak Obama.

⁸ Rajeev Sharma, *Global Jihad: Current Patterns and Future Trends* (India: Kaveri Books, 2008).

⁹ Craig Considine, *Islam, Race, and Pluralism in the Pakistani Diaspora* (London: Routledge, 2018), 4.

¹⁰ Tariq Rahman, *Interpretations of Jihad in South Asia: An Intellectual History* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018).

category of terrorism than *jihad* in the light of primary and secondary religious sources. In the light of intellectual history of South Asian *jihadi* thought, this paper would further argue that post-9/11 militancy in Pakistan lacks any theoretical and intellectual support to its foundation as claimed by the West.

With reference to methodology, this qualitative research employs both primary and secondary data collection methods. Primary data has been collected in the form of militants' self-proclamations and claims of responsibility of indiscriminate terrorist attacks in the name of *jihad*. Primary sources also comprise of references from original religious texts. Secondary data has been collected through literature review spanning the subjects of *jihad* and post-9/11 terrorism signified as the form of 'Islamic' militancy in Pakistan. Findings of this research are discussed in the following pages in an orderly manner to contextualize and situate the issue at hand.

Post-9/11 Terrorist Spate in Pakistan

The most striking feature of post-9/11 terror campaign in Pakistan was its association with Islam and militants' justifications and self-proclamation in the context of *jihad*. This '*Jihadi*' terrorism also introduced the phenomenon of suicide bombings in the country. Plethora of non-state actors emerged in the form of diverse groups who used religion as source of their indiscriminate violence. Another defining feature was the sheer magnitude of violence which left no aspect of Pakistani state and society unharmed. It also involved active military operations and displacement of millions of people from their native regions. The term Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) was heard for the first time in Pakistan in post-9/11 era. Likewise, unprecedented national and international media coverage of Pakistani militants, justifying their violent campaign in the name of *jihad* is another defining feature of the post-9/11 terror episode.

Since concept of *jihad* remained at the center of terrorism debates not just in Pakistan but internationally as well, therefore, it is pertinent to study the phenomenon in detail to know how far concept of *jihad* as a religious ideology provides justification for post-9/11 terrorism inside Pakistan as widely claimed by the militants and perceived, attributed and projected by the West and Western media. Therefore, this descriptive study explores the concepts of terrorism, *jihad* and Islamic rulings on warfare to deconstruct, understand and determine the nature of post-9/11 militancy inside Pakistan, attributed to religion.

Understanding Terrorism

The beginning of the twenty-first century is marked with global terrorism.¹¹ One of the various defining features of this form of terrorism is the emergence of non-state actors such as al-Qaeda with the capacity to conduct worldwide operations, challenge the superpower of the time and hence, the world order.¹² These attacks caused initiation of GWOT impacting many countries and lives of millions of people across the globe. But, despite the gravity of this phenomenon that is driving the foreign policies of many states including the world's only superpower, the term terrorism remained one of the contested ones and the world community remained divided on a unanimously agreed upon explanation. Thus, there are diverse definitions explaining the phenomenon and the exercise has been undertaken by diverse actors including the states themselves, different state institutions, international organizations, academics and scholars worldwide. The distinguishing features of United Nations Security Council's broad definition of terrorism include: an act with intention to cause death or serious injury to civilians or non-combatants, or to threaten a population or force a government or an international organization to do or desist from an act.¹³

In line with various earlier definitions, Cindy identifies terrorism as an illegal form of violence against civilian non-combatant victims, involving an audience to create a mood of fear for political objectives.¹⁴ Alex P. Schmid, an internationally recognized scholar on terrorism studies, views the phenomenon as, "a certain combination of violence and communication whereby the immediate victims are often civilians and the main addressee of the 'language of blood' is often a government or its citizens – or, in the case of state terrorism, a section of the public."¹⁵ Writing in 2006, Bruce Hoffman identified terrorism in the context of political aims and objectives which incorporate violence or threats of violence by a sub-national or non-state organization, to create psychological impacts beyond direct victims.¹⁶

¹¹ Gus Martin, *Essentials of Terrorism: Concepts and Controversies* (Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, 2008), 2.

¹² Hassan Askari Rizvi, "Theoretical Foundations of Terrorism," (paper presented at International Seminar on Global Terrorism: It's Genesis, Implications, Remedial and Counter Measures, Islamabad, August, 2005)

¹³ "United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 1566," adopted by the Security Council at its 5053rd meeting, on October 8, 2004, <https://undocs.org/S/RES/1566>.

¹⁴ Cindy, *Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century*, 7.

¹⁵ Alex P. Schmid, ed. *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research* (London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2013), 2.

¹⁶ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 43.

Consulting different definitions, some basic components of a consolidated definition of terrorism can be identified as an act of violence, committed by non-state actors, against civilians, to create fear, in order to communicate with an audience, for political purposes. Thus, civilians are the ultimate victim to communicate a message for political objectives. It is pertinent at this moment to delve into the most debated concept of *jihad* followed by the Islamic rulings on warfare to determine how far this concept can be stretched to justify the violence perpetrated by the diverse groups of terrorists in Pakistan against the predominantly civilian targets.

Concept of Jihad

Islamic concept of *jihad* with reference to terrorism is at the center of terrorism debates across the globe. Pakistani religious scholar, Javed Ahmad Ghamidi highlights that it is one of the most debated concepts in the modern era like polygamy, veiling, and slavery.¹⁷ As the GWOT gradually shifted inside Pakistan, a drastic peak in terrorist campaigns was also witnessed and endured by Pakistan as a state and society that was claimed to be and attributed to be done in the name of Islam by the perpetrators of appalling violence. Since this campaign of terrorism is predominantly identified with the religious concept of *jihad*, therefore, while keeping in view the aforementioned definitions and distinguishable features of terrorism, the much debated concept of *jihad* also needs to be analyzed to determine how far this religious ideology provides a rationale for terrorism.

General meaning of *jihad*, identified and explained by diverse scholars is that it means to 'struggle' or to 'strive' for a cause. Generally it is perceived in the West as a concept of 'holy war' while this is not the accurate translation of the word. Khalid Fadl, being an international scholar and authority on Islamic Law, argues that the concept of 'holy war' does not exist in Islam as this very expression is neither used in the Quran nor employed by Muslim theologians.¹⁸ He explains that the term 'holy war' in Arabic language translates into *al-harb al-muqaddasa* which is not the definition of *jihad*, while in Islamic theology, "war is never *holy*; it is either justified or not."¹⁹

Similarly, he differentiates between the two terms of *jihad* and *qital* and argues that the Quran does not use the word *jihad* to refer to warfare instead it refers to *qital* for fighting.²⁰ Additionally, he explains

¹⁷ Javed Ahmad Ghamidi, Al Mawrid Official, "Islamic Sharia of Jihad: An Introduction (1/17)," *Youtube* video, 26:35, February 6, 2017, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jmjjMLS8tKg>.

¹⁸ Khalid Abou El Fadl, *The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists* (New York: Harper Collins, 2005), 222.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 223.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 223.

that the Quran's call to *jihad* is unconditional and unrestricted in terms of seeking justice and truth, whereas this is not the case for *qital*. In the Quran *qital* is constrained and bounded by specific and strict conditions.²¹

British scholar of comparative religion, Karen Armstrong elaborates that the word *jihad* occurs only 41 times in the Quran and only 10 of those instances referred unambiguously to warfare, while all other times it means an effort, to struggle.²² Ghamidi explains that "the meaning of *jihad* is to exhaust all available energy for a task",²³ while another noted Pakistani religious scholar Israr Ahmad further adds to this by identifying that Arabic word '*jihad*' originates from the root word '*jehed*' that means to strive for, or to struggle while the word '*Jihad*' in the context of Arabic grammar means to 'struggle against' that involves two opposing forces or parties that are in mutual struggle or in *jihad* against each other for a cause.²⁴

A hadith (saying of the Prophet) is also widely quoted by scholars that the best *jihad* is against the selfish desires of one's own self. Michael Boivin also explained that "until about the 11th century, Muslim mystics considered there were two types of *jihad*: *jihad al-saghir* or small *jihad*, namely to fight the infidel, and the *jihad al-kabir*, the great *jihad*, or fight against the self."²⁵ In the same context, John Esposito also argues that the concept of *jihad* can be categorized into two broad meanings: violent and nonviolent and he traces this categorization to a well-known prophetic tradition in which Prophet Muhammad is quoted to have said to his companions upon return from a battle that, "We return from the lesser *jihad* to the greater *jihad*."²⁶ The greater *jihad* is identified as the more challenging and more important struggle that is against one's own selfish desires.²⁷ Similarly, once, upon an inquiry about what is the best *jihad*, the Prophet stated that "a word of truth spoken before an unjust ruler"²⁸ is the best *jihad*. These multiple explanations of the terminology, traced directly to the prophetic traditions, well explain the fact that warfare or violence is

²¹ Ibid., 223.

²² B-Reality Media "History, Islam, War, Terrorism," *Youtube* video, 12:37, January 3, 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ilSGb1CrhZM&t=22s>.

²³ Ghamidi, "Islamic Sharia of Jihad."

²⁴ Israr Ahmed, *Jihad Bil Quran and Its Five Stages*, Urdu (Lahore: Maktaba Khudam Al Quran, 2012).

²⁵ Michel Boivin, "Jihad, National Process and Identity Assertion in Pakistan: The Dialectic of Metaphor and Reality," in *New Perspectives on Pakistan: Visions for the Future*, ed. Saeed Shafqat (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 105.

²⁶ John Esposito, *Unholy Wars: Terror in the name of Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 28.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Imam Hafiz Abdur Rahman, Ahmad bin Shu'aib bin 'Ali, An-Nasa'i, *Sunan An Nasai 5*, (Maktaba Dar-us-Salam, 2007), 140, <https://www.kalamullah.com/Books/Hadith/>.

neither prescribed nor glorified in terms of *jihad*. On the contrary, even when it is mentioned in terms of *jihad al-saghir* or *lesser jihad*, which is associated with warfare, it is simultaneously explained in terms of and related to the concept of 'greater *jihad*' against one's own self-centered desires.

This concept of greater *jihad* is further elaborated by Fadl in terms of "strong spiritual and material work ethic" of individuals that translates into two broad categories that are interlinked. Firstly, these attributes lead to personal improvement of individuals in terms of piety, knowledge, health, beauty, seeking truth and standing for justice. Secondly, these attributes lead to a just order in which less privileged segments of society are looked after, and truth and justice is sought even at the cost of personal risks. To Fadl, these are all forms of greater *jihad* without which personal and social standards cannot be achieved.²⁹

These diverse reflections explain that there is diversity in the meanings of *jihad*. As identified by Armstrong that ten out of forty one times the concept of *jihad* in the Quran does refer to warfare, this means that it is a matter of interpretation by scholars and theologians in the light of religious and historic accounts. But the question follows that in an Islamic state, who is authorized to wage *jihad*? Is it a prerogative of state or private militias?

To dispel any possibility of *jihad* by individuals or groups, Ghamidi categorically declares that *jihad* or armed struggle is the prerogative of state and not of the individuals or groups.³⁰ He strictly opposes the call of *jihad* by non-state actors on the basis that it is a recipe for disaster.³¹ His opinion is based on this historical observation that during the Prophet Muhammad's Meccan life period, despite oppression and persecution, believers were never commanded to retaliate. He explains that the concept of *jihad* as a form of warfare developed in the Prophet Muhammad's Medinan time period, when a small city state was formed and a political order was established.³²

Another prominent religious scholar of the twentieth century and founder of Jamat-e- Islami (JI), Abul A'la Maududi also held the same opinion in the light of religious doctrine and declared *Jihad* as the right of the state with explicit use of force and declared policy and not through covert means.³³ He opposed the call of *jihad* by non-state actors in the first

²⁹ Fadl, *The Great Theft*, 221.

³⁰ Javed Ahmad Ghamidi, *Al-Mizan*, Urdu (Lahore: Topical Printing Press, 2014), 579.

³¹ Javed Ahmed Ghamidi with Saleem Safi, "Islam, Jihad and Taliban(1/4)," *Youtube* video, 40:26, February 13, 2017, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oh1c9arB2L4>.

³² Ghamidi, "Islam, Jihad and Taliban."

³³ Tariq Rahman, *Interpretations of Jihad in South Asia: An Intellectual History* (Berlin: DE GRUYTER, 2018), 178-179.

war of Kashmir in 1947 on the basis of the same argument.³⁴ Similarly, Dr. Israr Ahmed was also of the same view and regarded *Jihad* as the state's responsibility, with overt means and with multiple conditions attached in the light of Islamic teachings.³⁵ These observations and declarations by the renowned religious authorities support the fact that it is the state and not private militias that have the authority to declare *jihad*.

Islamic Rulings on Warfare

Though the concept of *jihad* is being debated that it can be used in both defensive and offensive senses in terms of warfare; however, what is never talked about in the dominant discourse of 'Islamic' militancy is the Islamic rulings on warfare. Being an unambiguous set of rules, these rulings regulate the conduct of war on and off the battlefield and are quite clear and explicit based on the Quran and *Hadith* (sayings of the Prophet), which are two primary sources of Islamic law. Practices and teachings of early Muslims are also generally identified as authentic references for guidance on the conduct of warfare in Islamic religious thought.

As a general principle, the Quran commands that, "whoever kills a soul unless for a soul or for corruption done in the land - it is as if he had slain entire mankind and whoever saves one - it is as if he had saved the entire mankind."³⁶ In the same chapter, the Quran also commands to the believers, "do not let your hatred of a people incite you to aggression"; and "do not let ill-will towards any folk incite you so that you swerve from dealing justly, be just that is nearest to heedfulness".³⁷ In case of war, the Quran clearly commands to "fight in God's cause against those who wage war against you, but do not transgress, for God loves not the transgressors".³⁸

From the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad's (Peace be Upon Him) life, it is narrated that once a woman was found killed in one of the battles fought by the Prophet. Upon seeing her dead body, the Prophet expressed his grief and disapproved the killing of women and children.³⁹ It is further documented that this incident prompted the code of conduct for Muslim combatants and they were prohibited from the killing of non-combatants including women, children, elderly, and innocents. Furthermore, they were advised to observe the sanctity of hermits, monks,

³⁴ Jessica Stern, "Pakistan's Jihad Culture," *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 6 (Nov- Dec., 2000): 117.

³⁵ Dr. Israr Ahmed, "Pak-India War Situation on Kashmir Front," *Quran Academy* video, 1:02, June 04, 1999, <http://quranacademy.com/SnapshotView/MediaID/7224/Title/075-Kashmeer-Pr-Pak-Baharat-Jang-Ki-Surt-E-Haal->.

³⁶ Dr. Israr Ahmed, "Pak-India War Situation on Kashmir Front," *Al-Quran*, 5:32.

³⁷ *Ibid*, 5:2; 5:8.

³⁸ *Ibid*, 2:190.

³⁹ *Muslim*, Book 19, Hadith No. 4319.

or other religious figures believed to be non-combatants. Similarly, willful killing of cattle and animals, burning or destruction of trees and orchards, and destruction of wells was strictly prohibited.⁴⁰

A detailed set of rules formulated by the first Caliph, Abu Bakr, reflect the Islamic restrictions on the conduct of war. The Caliph is said to have commanded his soldiers not to commit treachery or deviate from the right path, nor to mutilate dead bodies, neither kill a child, nor a woman, nor an aged man, nor bring harm to trees, slay not any of the enemy's flock except for food, and leave the people alone who have devoted their lives to solitary service.⁴¹

In the light of these commandments, Fadl categorically argued that those among Muslims who justify terrorism at any level should be assured that "this belief is at odds with Islamic law" and Islamic traditions do not support such unprincipled and opportunistic logic.⁴² Islamic code of conduct on warfare is explicit in theory and practice and post-9/11 terrorism in Pakistan, claiming almost 80,000 civilian lives in the name of *jihad*, can be compared and analyzed in the light of these commandments from various sources of Islamic law.

Tracing Intellectual History of Jihad in South Asia

Narrowing the debate on *jihad* from general to specific in the South Asian context, Rahman identifies that historically, Muslim rulers of India (whether Turks, Pathans, or Mughals), used "the Islamic vocabulary to legitimize their rule in the eyes of their Muslim chiefs and *Ulama*."⁴³ The earliest examples Rahman quoted are of a commander and relative of Sulṭān Maḥmūd of Ghaznī (971–1030) who was known as *ghazi*, and of Amīr Khusrau (1253–1325) who had written the words *ojihad*, '*ghazi*, and the 'victory of Islam' about Ghasiuddīn Balban's (1266–1287) victory in one of the battles.⁴⁴

Rahman highlights that Sunni Muslims in India considered six canonical works of hadith – *Bukhari*, *Muslim*, *Ibn Majah*, *Abu Dawud*, *Tirmidi* and *Nisa'i*, as entirely authentic while Imam Malik bin Anas's (711–795) *Muwattā* is also praised by Shah Waliullah (1703–1762) as the most authentic book on hadith.⁴⁵ Similarly *Mishkat* was also studied and remained popular in Indian Madrassas. He finds five broad themes related

⁴⁰ Youssef H. Aboul-Enein and Sherifa Zuhur, *Islamic Rulings on Warfare*, (US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, October 2004), 21–22, <https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/1693.pdf>.

⁴¹ Youssef H. Aboul-Enein and Sherifa Zuhur, *Islamic Rulings on Warfare*, 22.

⁴² Fadl, "Terrorism Is at Odds with Islamic Tradition," *Los Angeles Times*, August 22, 2001, <https://www.latimes.com/archives/>.

⁴³ Rahman, *Interpretations of Jihad in South Asia*, 75.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 75.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 81.

to *jihad* in the collections of all these hadith books used in South Asia. These themes include: praise of *jihad*, desirability of martyrdom, excellence of martyrs and their rewards, continuation of *jihad*, and non-violence against non-combatants, including women, children, elderly, hermits, and those who cannot fight.⁴⁶

Rahman classified the South Asian theologians and scholars discussing and debating the concept of *jihad* in two broad categories: traditionalists and modernists. Traditionalists like Shah Waliullah (considered as the most influential theologian of his era), his sons and followers like Ubaidullah Sindhi, perceived *jihad* as both defensive and offensive and adhered to the view that disbelief must be fought but with sufficient means to do it,⁴⁷ not against the Muslims (even if non-observant of religious law), not by non-state actors without state authority, and it was to be declared by the political leadership. To Rahman, these observations are important in the context of theoretical justification for unequal warfare (including suicide attacks) and rebellion against rulers by contemporary radical Islamists.⁴⁸

Modernist scholars of the colonial period are identified as Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Mawlavi Chiragh Ali, Syed Amir Ali, Shibli Naumani, and Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835-1908) among others. This corps was later joined by Abul Kalam Azad and Ghulam Ahmad Parwez among many others. Muhammad Iqbal, Ahmad Raza Khan of Bareilly, and Maududi were also their contemporaries. Being products of their times and circumstances, and exposed to Western education, they interpreted the idea of *jihad* as defensive.⁴⁹ All these personalities were well-versed in the field of education, had knowledge of Arabic language and were able to infer directly from Quran and hadith employing their linguistic skills to explain and debate their deduced interpretations of religious sources pertaining to *jihad* and other associated issues.

Rahman revealed that there had been reference of *jihad* in the anti-colonial resistance movements during the era of 1831 to 1930. Four such movements are identified including the revolt of 1857, while at least three movements either involved or had some influence of Wahabi thought and two were connected to the present day Pak-Afghan border areas where the idiom of *jihad* is used by the Taliban militants against the central

⁴⁶ Ibid., 86.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 102.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 99, 107.

⁴⁹ "... their observation was influenced by the events of failed mutiny of 1857 against British authority (or war of independence called by South Asians) and an earlier move of offensive jihad by Sayyed Ahmad Bareilwi that had ended in 1831. Both these events proved to Indians that armed conflict was useless...", Tariq Rahman, *Interpretations of Jihad in South Asia: An Intellectual History* (2019), 123.

authority. Rahman stated that Wahabis and the Frontier tribesmen considered *jihad* against the British justified. To him the movements launched by this minority have several similarities with the militant movements affecting Pakistan and parts of India today. He identifies both kinds of movements as surreptitious; without a central, recognised legitimate authority (*imam*); and acting upon decentralised and anarchic legitimisations of *jihad* without state-controlled body of *Ulema* authorising the same. Similarly, the role of *Darul Ulum* at Deband, established in 1867, is also identified as influential in resistance movements, as is the case with today's movements in Pakistan. Despite their activism, these movements also never prescribed to the atrocities and transgressions against non-combatants, but set the trend for asymmetrical warfare against the powerful state.⁵⁰

Various other scholars also illuminated the field of religious thought even after partition of India, including Amin Ahsan Islahi from Pakistan and Wahiduddin Khan from India, who projected the tolerant picture of Islam and the concept of defensive *jihad* along with commenting on other persistent issues of the time. Thus, according to Rahman's tracing of South Asian intellectual scholarship regarding the concept of *jihad*, both traditionalist and modernist scholars upheld the rules and regulations in the conduct of defensive and offensive *jihad* and never prescribed to the transgressions let alone violence against civilians; though, they differed in the matter of certain theological interpretations involving defensive and offensive nature of *jihad*.

Middle Eastern (ME) influence on South Asian *jihadi* thought is identified with Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood which was born under the specific circumstances of regional politics comprising of anti-colonial resistance, local westernized elites in power, and Israeli-Palestinian conflict. An important dimension in the radical concept of *jihad* as a universal and continuous struggle was introduced by this organization of Muslim Brotherhood headed by Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) and later by Sayyid Qutb (1906-66). According to Rahman, both are considered the most influential theorists of political Islam outside South Asia and have greatly influenced the South Asian religious movements including Jamat-e-Islami of Maududi, but their *jihadi* ideology also spared the non-combatants during a violent struggle.⁵¹

Through historical accounts, Rahman identifies Abd al-Salam Faraj (1954-1982) as the revolutionary Arab figure who transformed the idea of *jihad* to total warfare. He was influenced by the thinking of Ibn Taymiyyah (1263-1328) and especially of Ibn Kathir (1301-1373) who had argued that Muslims should fight the rulers who do not rule according to Islamic law. Faraj interpreted *jihad* as aggressive warfare and obligatory upon

⁵⁰ Ibid., 141,160.

⁵¹ Ibid., 198.

every individual. He prescribed that *jihad* can be waged without the consent of parents and of state. He was the one who identified two types of enemies, those who are near and those who are far away. To him, the rulers of Muslim countries should be eliminated first as the near ones than the ones who are far away like USA and Israel. According to a researcher, Aaron Zelin, Faraj constituted a “paradigm shift in the intellectual history of *Jihadi* thought” and “he really made *jihad* an anarchistic device for total warfare and rebellion against all established authority.”⁵² But this drastic shift in his *jihadi* ideology i.e., approving killings of civilians and non-combatants in warfare, has not been referred to him in Rahman’s work.

Another important Arab thinker identified is Yūsuf al-Qaraḍawi, whose philosophy was Israel specific. In his book *Jurisprudence of Jihad*, he even authorized suicide bombing on the pretext that Palestinians are under Israeli persecution and much weaker party in the conflict.⁵³ However, he authorized such missions only against Israel but his reasoning influenced the other theatres of war as well, as witnessed in Pakistan and Afghanistan.⁵⁴

These ideas also disseminated in South Asia through various historic encounters and present day militants of Pakistan and Afghanistan represent this ideology of total warfare. People like Osama bin Laden and Ayman Al Zawahiri came to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets and stayed back due to their governments’ refusal to accept them back at the end of war while Afghan civil war provided them space and reason to propagate their version of *jihad*. Subsequent developments in the wake of 9/11 attacks further helped their ideology to disperse at national and international levels with the help of international media coverage.

While keeping in view this aforementioned discussion, it is pertinent at this juncture to highlight the profile of Pakistani militants to have an idea about their claims and conducts and to what ideologies and beliefs they subscribe.

Profile of Pakistani Militants

With respect to Pakistani militant organizations which popped up in post-9/ 11 era, it is important to recognize them as shadowy and clandestine groups confined to mountainous tribal areas, and emerging during a crucial time of history in a border region of Pakistan and Afghanistan. These groups also predominantly inclined towards Deobandi religious-political thought of resistance to the foreign influences and occupation. In this respect they are similar to the earlier movements that

⁵² Aaron Y. Zelin, “*Al-Farida al Ggha’iba and al-Sadat’s Assassination: A 30 Year Retrospective*,” *International Journal for Arab Studies* 3, no. 2 (July 2012): 31, quoted in Rahman, *Interpretations of Jihad in South Asia*, 205.

⁵³ Rahman, *Interpretations of Jihad in South Asian : An Intellectual History*, 207.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 205-207.

had emerged during the colonial period in British India with almost the same credentials.

As to their conduct and claims (in terms of continuous call of *jihad* and establishment of Islamic rule in Pakistan or worldwide), the influence of Middle Eastern militant groups and individual scholars is also recognizable, especially Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's political and *jihadi* thought, Faraj's philosophy of *jihad* and Qaradawi's reasoning in favour of suicide bombings in certain specific situations. But in their other aspects, these post-9/11 militant outfits, grouped under the umbrella of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), did not correspond to the above mentioned movements.

In contrast to the individual scholars deliberated upon by Rahman from South Asian history and from the Middle East, and selectively discussed in this paper, it is identifiable that TTP's leadership had no intellectual or theological background at all. They lacked any religious or modern form of knowledge, while intellectuals discussed by Rahman were well-versed in both modern and theological academic training and sound reasoning. They produced great scholarly works, interpreting Quran and hadith and deliberating upon the pressing issues of their times while reaching out to the people and other scholars on the basis of their research and reasoning. On the other hand, TTP's leadership did not produce any intellectual scholarship over the issues of *jihad*, warfare, *sharia* or any other contemporary subject they deemed important to them, but only resorted to violence against the state and innocent civilians.

Why was this, the case? One reason was that they belonged to the downtrodden class of the society without any familiarity with any educational institution. Profiles of some noted militant leaders reveal that Baitullah Mehsud was a bus conductor, Hakimullah Mehsud was a village madrassa drop out, Maulvi Omar sold perfumes on a vending cart, Mangal Bagh was a truck driver and small-time criminal involved in car-jacking, and Mullah Fazalullah operated ski-lifts in Swat.⁵⁵ With this socio-economic background and surroundings, it is not even appropriate to compare the present day militants with the distinguished intellectuals of the past whether from South Asia or from any other region. It also doesn't seem likely that they had ever had consulted these rich intellectual debates over the issue of *jihad* and all the strings attached to it.

Thus, with lack of quality leadership, TTP proved to be more of a reactionary violent force without any political roots or theological knowledge and relied only upon indiscriminate violence, predominantly against civilians. On the other hand, Muslim Brotherhood is still a dominant political force in today's Egypt. This contrast reflects that the

⁵⁵ Shahzad Qazi, "Rebels of the Frontier: Origins, Organization, and Recruitment of the Pakistani Taliban," *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 22, no. 4, (September 2011): 578.

latter has a socio-political foundation for conduct of their politics while the former only based their existence on extreme use of force. Thus, TTP lacks any credibility to be contrasted with any organized political party.

Terrorism and its Implications for Pakistan

TTP led militancy was perceived and projected by the local and international analysts as an “Islamic militancy” and “a key international security concern”.⁵⁶ The diversity of serious security threats associated with the TTP and the Western threat perception can be gauged by one of the studies conducted by Jacob Shapiro and Christine Fair on the subject. Writing in 2009, the authors highlighted TTP’s capabilities in the light of their capacity to establish a parallel administrative structure along the Pakistan-Afghan border areas, increased number of suicide attacks against the Pakistani state, and with their capacity to seize the Red Mosque in the capital of Pakistan in June 2007.⁵⁷ For them, considering these capabilities of an extremist organization, concerns about Pakistan’s stability intensified due to “its nuclear status, dysfunctional civil-military relationship, a demonstrated propensity for risk-seeking behaviour, and ever-expanding connections between local groups and transnational Islamist terrorist organizations.”⁵⁸ Thus, Taliban’s growing activities, being a ‘religious’ force with links to international organizations, had a direct bearing on Pakistan’s security environment in a highly volatile and contested situation in the context of post-9/11 developments in Pakistan and in the surrounding region.

Thus, how an organized terrorist group like TTP can pose grave security challenges to nations and states is evident from the above mentioned projection of threat perception constructed by Shapiro and Fair in terms of national and international security concerns and threat to nuclear weapons of Pakistan from ‘Islamic’ militancy. This aspect should also be analysed in the light of above quoted scholarly opinions that declaration of *jihad* by private militias is a recipe for disaster and that is what the TTP and other organizations actually did to Pakistan.

Conclusion

The research analysed the post-9/11 terror campaign in Pakistan, generally perceived and projected as an ‘Islamic’ militancy (as overwhelmingly claimed by TTP and projected in national and international media), considering original religious texts, diverse and expert scholarly opinions, and in the light of leadership profile of known

⁵⁶ Jacob N. Shapiro and Christine Fair, “Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan,” *International Security* 34, no. 3 (Winter 2009/10) : 79.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

militants to deconstruct and understand the nature of vicious episode of violence in Pakistan's history.

Tracing the history of intellectual thought on *jihad* demonstrated that *jihad*, whether being defensive or offensive, does not prescribe any form of violence against non-combatants under any circumstances. It proved that any scholarly figure, who had done genuine research, never advocated use of force against civilians. Only lack of genuine knowledge and scholarly background on the part of TTP leadership explains their campaign of brutal violence, which finds no precedent in the history of religious jihadi thought in South Asia. The campaign that has claimed more than 80,000 civilian lives in Pakistan cannot be termed as 'Islamic' militancy fighting to impose *Sharia* in Pakistan. The religious orientation, self-proclamations of terrorists, and immense media coverage constructed an image of 'Islamic' militancy emanating from Pakistani border areas with Afghanistan, which is not just jeopardizing Pakistan's internal security situation but also threatening regional and international security environment. This religious orientation of sheer violence committed by terrorists inspired a critical reassessment of the post-9/11 terrorism in Pakistan to determine how far this can be regarded as religious one.

Based on documented information on terrorism, *jihad*, Islamic rulings on warfare, South Asian intellectual history over the subject of *jihad*, and terrorists' profiles, this study concludes that considering post-9/11 terrorism in Pakistan as a 'religious' rebellion demands a serious re-evaluation as this phenomenon neither corresponds to the religious teachings of Quran nor to the practices and commandments of the Prophet Muhammad. Thus, in theory and practice post-9/11 terrorism in Pakistan falls under the pure ambit of terrorism than *jihad*.

Foregoing discussion to understand the concept of *jihad* reflects that theoretically, it is a subject of intense investigation and interpretation due to diverse meanings attached to it. In the light of Islamic scholarship over the subject, it by no means pertains to terrorism. It has also been established that *Jihad* by all means is a prerogative of Islamic states and not of individuals or private groups. On the other hand, terrorists' reliance on religion was for their own personal and group benefits in terms of gaining legitimacy and public sympathy, and personal projection at a particular time of history. Therefore, with reference to diverse Islamic scholarship, militants' claims and practices of terror labeled as 'Islamic' is a misleading notion and should be analysed with a critical lens since concept of *jihad* is in absolute contrast to what is projected and committed by the terrorists.

THE RISE OF AUTHORITARIANISM IN THE 21st CENTURY AND THE WORLD ORDER

Sajjad Hussain* & Azhar Ahmad**

Abstract

Globally authoritarianism is on the rise, while it seems growth of the liberal world order has halted and may be reversed. Some of the major countries like the United States, China, Russia and India show a rise in authoritarian practices in the form of assertive foreign policies, increasing nationalist trends interlinked with intolerance for immigrants and minorities, intolerance for freedom of speech and free press, and hostility towards liberal world order and international organizations. The contemporary rise in authoritarianism is influencing the world order, and it can have lasting impacts on the international political order; therefore, it is imperative that the major powers in the world take initiatives that can guarantee mutual coexistence. The norms governing the roles, and responsibilities of international organizations must be revised to play a role in ensuring justice at the international level and do not become mere tools in the hands of stronger states.

Keywords: Authoritarianism, World Order, Liberal Democracy, Fukuyama, Foreign Policy, Cold War

Introduction

Authoritarianism has existed in one way or the other in the world since antiquity. However, the rise of authoritarian states in world politics was evident during the interwar years (between the two World Wars). The rise of Kamal Atatürk in Turkey, Francisco Franco in Spain, António de Oliveira Salazar in Portugal, Benito Mussolini in Italy, Chiang Kai-shek in China, Adolf Hitler in Germany, and Joseph Stalin in the USSR was a clear manifestation of the rise of authoritarian regimes at the global level. Though some of these states later became totalitarian, they definitely showed authoritarian tendencies in the early years of their rise. Even the liberal democracies like the Great Britain, the United States, and France

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had a certain liking for authoritarian models. Winston Churchill, while congratulating Mussolini on his ascendancy to power, had said: "If I had been an Italian, I am sure I should have been wholeheartedly with you from the start to the finish in your triumphant struggle."¹ While a US diplomat in Eastern Europe, George Kennan, after observing the rise of authoritarian regimes in Europe had said, "Benevolent despotism had greater possibilities for good than liberal democracy. US should walk down the road which leads through constitutional change to the authoritarian state."² This rise in authoritarianism, however, could not sustain a peaceful world order, and therefore, World War II erupted that resulted in the death of around 50 to 60 million people.

The period after the World War II relatively favoured the rise of liberal democracies. However, there were countries that maintained their authoritarian setup. The most dominant was the USSR, but there were also countries like Chile and Iran that were not in the Soviet bloc but kept their authoritarian setups.

The second major wave of authoritarianism was observed in the 1960s. It was much lower in intensity as compared to the wave during the interwar years, and it was marked with military coups. The countries that became part of this wave included: Greece, Nigeria, Indonesia, South Korea, and the countries in Latin America. However, this wave could not survive long, as in the 1970s an anti-authoritarian wave overshadowed the world politics. More than 30 authoritarian states in the 1970s and 1980s collapsed, and it was perceived as the triumph of liberal democracy. It was the same time when intellectuals like Huntington talked about 'Democracy's Third Wave' referring to the third wave in the rise of liberal democracy.³

This wave was then followed by the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991, which further supported the notion that liberal democracy had triumphed. The disintegration of USSR not only marked the end of the Cold War, it also left a vacuum as far as diversity in political thought is concerned since the international political order was highly overshadowed by the Cold War. Political leaders and analysts strived to fill this vacuum through their own perception of events and realities. For many intellectuals, it was the triumph of liberal democracy and for some, like Fukuyama, it was the *End of History*.⁴ For some time, this proclamation held true as certain states, like the Central

¹ David Motadel, "Waves of Authoritarianism," *History Today*, November 9, 2016, <https://www.historytoday.com/waves-authoritarianism>.

² Ibid.

³ Samuel P. Huntington, "Democracy's Third Wave," *Journal of Democracy* 2, no. 2, (Spring 1991): 12-34.

⁴ Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *The National Interest*, no. 16, (Summer 1989): 3-18.

Asian and East European states, after separation from the USSR, started their journey towards a democratic setup, with the support of the US. Nevertheless, not all of these countries were able to form truly democratic setups.

At the international level, though proclaimed otherwise by Fukuyama, the liberal values and the liberal world order started facing serious hindrances. Particularly, after the beginning of the 21st century, the journey towards liberal democracy and a liberal world order slowed down; now some major powers in the world are even back-tracking, showing their inclination towards authoritarian regimes. As Robert Kagan puts it, "Today there are signs all around us that the jungle is growing back. Where once many hoped that all the nations and peoples of the world would converge on a common path of liberal democratic capitalist development, we now see authoritarianism surviving if not thriving."⁵

Even countries like the US and UK that have always stood for liberal values, have stopped support for internationalization of the liberal world order. Salvatore Babones argues that liberalism is in retreat in its traditional bastions - US and UK - more than anywhere else.⁶ The US after the election of President Donald Trump and the UK after Brexit clearly manifested that they do not support liberal democracy in the strict sense of the term, and these countries are currently even favoring policies that can easily be termed as authoritarian.

On the other hand there is China, which has always been authoritarian as far as its political system is concerned. Francis Fukuyama had proclaimed that after the downfall of USSR, free-market economy had married liberal democracy, and the marriage would prevail in international politics.⁷ Nevertheless, the case of China showed the exact opposite. It has adopted free market economy as its economic system and the 'marriage' seems to be working for China, rising as the second largest economy of the world. Russia, India and Turkey are also showing their rise as important players in the international world order. These are the countries that have strong influence in Asia and the Middle East. However, it is vital to note that they also seem inclined towards authoritarianism. Russia under Putin, India under Modi and Turkey under Erdogan have clearly shown the rise of authoritarian traits.

Thus, globally authoritarianism is on the rise, and 'Democracy's Third Wave' has halted and may be reversed. Now that some of the major countries in the world are moving towards authoritarianism, it is bound to have an impact on overall international politics and international

⁵ Robert Kagan, *The Jungle Grows Back: America and Our Imperiled World* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2018), 13.

⁶ Salvatore Babones, *The New Authoritarianism: Trump, Populism, and the Tyranny of Experts* (Cambridge: Policy Press, 2018), 11.

⁷ Ibid.

relations. The international world order is likely to be influenced, and the role of world powers, international organizations, and international systems may as well change. Some instances are already evident – the recent trade war between China and US, the rising tensions in South Asia because of Indian policies towards Muslims, the changing dynamics in the Middle East because of the role of Russia and Turkey, the changing nature of European politics after Brexit and the nature of Russia's relations with the US and Europe. Therefore, it is important to see how the rise of authoritarianism is going to influence the world order and what roles states like US, China, Russia, India, and Turkey are going to play in it.

Meanwhile, the number of states manifesting the retreat of liberal democracy seems to be on the rise. The report 'Freedom in the World 2019' by *Freedom House* revealed that there has been a decline in political rights and civil liberties in states around the world for the last 13 years. In 2018, "a total of 68 countries suffered net declines in political rights and civil liberties, with only 50 registering gains."⁸ At the same time, Democracy Index 2019 shows that 54 countries, with 35.6 per cent of the total world population, have authoritarian regimes; while only 22 countries, with 5.7 per cent of the total world population, have full democracies.⁹ The Index also shows that in 2019, the overall conditions of democracy deteriorated as compared to 2018 and an overall decline in liberal democracy for four consecutive years. Thus, there are clear indications that globally authoritarianism is on the rise.

The current rise in authoritarianism is marked with certain attributes, like the centrality of an authoritarian personality as compared to democratic institutions, the discouragement of pluralism, hatred for immigrants and minorities, intolerance for freedom of speech, isolationist economic policies, indifference towards liberal world order or the growth and responsibilities of international organizations. These attributes are bound to influence the international world order and the international relations. It is, therefore, imperative to understand the nature of global rise in authoritarianism and to see how it may impact the world order. Previously, the rise of authoritarianism during the interwar years resulted in aggressive foreign policies by different states, which ultimately culminated in World War II. Therefore, it is vital to study whether the modern wave of authoritarianism can lead to possible clashes and conflicts at the international level.

This study does not refer to authoritarianism with a negative connotation, but rather tries to understand it as per the practices that are

⁸ Freedom House, "Democracy in Retreat: Freedom in the World 2019," December 12, 2019, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2019>.

⁹ The Economic Intelligence Unit, "Democracy Index 2019," January 21, 2020, <https://www.eiu.com/topic/demo>.

carried out by political actors in a particular setting, in order to have a better understanding of it. Moreover, it also does not see authoritarianism as absence of elections or lack of transparency in the electoral process, rather it discusses the rise of authoritarianism in established democracies like the United States or India, although both these states have regular elections, and there are not many doubts as far as quality of elections in these countries are concerned. However, this study goes beyond the framework mentioned above, as it tries to see how the rise in authoritarianism is bound to influence international relations and the world order and the role of different states therein. On the other hand, it also remains in the same framework as far as understanding authoritarianism 'below or beyond the state' is concerned, particularly in understanding the practices related to international organizations.

This study sees in what ways there has been a rise in authoritarian practices at the international level and how this rise is going to influence the international order. For this purpose, it identifies authoritarian states on the basis of the following attributes: assertive foreign policies, increasing nationalist practices and intolerance for immigrants and minorities, intolerance for freedom of speech and free press, and hostility towards liberal world order and international organizations. The four attributes are defined in this study as below:

1. Assertive foreign policies include policies that are aggressive in nature and strive to assert dominance on other political actors through military or other means.
2. Nationalist practices are the practices that tend to favour a particular national identity so that it can acquire power and dominance over other nations/identities. Intolerance for immigrants and minorities refers to practices that tend to violate the basic human rights (as per the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and as per the national constitutions) of the minorities or immigrants.
3. Intolerance for freedom of speech and free press implies practices that are aimed at restricting the right of political actors to raise their voice freely, and that strive to influence the media, either through favour or force, to benefit a particular political actor.
4. Hostility towards the liberal world order and international organizations includes practices that do not emphasize on the promulgation of liberal democracy along with free-market economy throughout the world, rather these are the practices that favour economic isolationism and may even promote governmental control over economic affairs. Moreover, such practices also undermine the role and the rules of the international organizations, and international treaties or agreements.

Keeping the above definitions in consideration, the study carries out a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) of four cases: United States, Russia, China, and India.

The Rise in Authoritarian Practices

An enumeration and identification of authoritarian practices within the four countries in this study are given below. For each state, the observed authoritarian practices that fall under the four attributes determined in our methodology are given, and for each country a summary is also given at the end. The section, therefore, provides an objective discussion of the findings of this study.

United States Assertive Foreign Policies

United States, as the sole super power in the international political order after the Cold War, has pursued an assertive foreign policy. Especially, after the dawn of the 21st century, these policies have become very evident and can be clearly identified. For the last five years, the US military spending has been increasing. In 2019, US military spending was around \$904.3 billion, while in 2020, it is estimated to be \$935.8 billion.¹⁰ These spending are the largest in the world. Moreover, the US has a busy military engagement around the world: it has around 800 military bases in different parts of the world; while, only in Middle East it has stationed around 60,000 to 70,000 troops.¹¹ These numbers show the assertive nature of US foreign policy.

Since the dawn of the 21st century, the US has been involved in two major wars. First, on October 7, 2001, as a repercussion of 9/11 attacks, the US officially launched Operation Enduring Freedom against Afghanistan, as the ruling Taliban in Afghanistan had sheltered Osama Bin Laden, the Al-Qaeda leader that was involved in 9/11 attacks.

Second, the US launched Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003, without the consent of United Nations, on the pretext that Iraq possessed Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). According to statistics given by the Watson Institute, over 801,000 people including 335,000 civilians, have died as a result of direct war-related violence and 21 million people have become refugees or been displaced as a result of the War against

¹⁰ Kimberly Amadeo, "US Military Budget, Its Components, Challenges and Growth," *The Balance*, March 3, 2020, <https://www.thebalance.com/u-s-military-budget-components-challenges-growth-3306320>.

¹¹ Rashaan Ayesha, "Where U.S. Troops and Military Assets are Deployed in Middle East," *Axios*, January 8, 2020, <https://www.axios.com/where-us-troops-deployed-middle-east-5e96fdb2-c7ba-4f26-90b4-7bf452f83847.html>.

Terrorism that has cost US \$6.4 trillion.¹² The numbers clearly show how the basic human rights like the rights to life and security of millions of people have been violated by a war that has been inflicted on the people against the norms of the liberal world order.

At the same time, the US approach towards the Middle East (ME) has been assertive as well. The US has been pursuing its security strategy in the ME primarily through its military bases in different countries. The US has adopted an aggressive policy towards Iran as well. In May 2018, it opted out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that was signed between Iran and the P5+1 in July 2015. The result of this move has been escalation in assertiveness by both Iran and the US. In one of such instances, a US air strike targeted Qassem Soleimani, Iran's Quds Force chief, and the deputy commander of Iraq's Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), Mahdi al-Muhandis.¹³

Meanwhile, the US stationed around 500 troops in Syria to fight the Islamic State (ISIS). Though Trump claimed in September 2019 that the US would withdraw troops from Syria, the commander of US Central Command, Gen. Kenneth McKenzie stated in November 2019 that he did not receive any orders of reduction in troops.¹⁴

At the same time, the US has been stepping up military activity in South China Sea. In March and April 2018, the US sent the aircraft carriers USS Carl Vinson and USS Theodore Roosevelt to Vietnam, and South China Sea respectively.¹⁵ From May 2017, the US has been conducting freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) every two months in South China Sea region.¹⁶ All these initiatives show that the US has been assertive in its foreign policy.

¹² "Estimate of US War on Terror Spending," *Watson Institute*, November 13, 2019, <https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/figures/2019/budgetary-costs-post-911-wars-through-fy2020-64-trillion>.

¹³ "Iraqi TV: Iranian Military Commander General Soleimani Killed in Baghdad Strike," *CNBC*, January 2, 2020, <https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/03/iranian-military-commander-qassim-soleimani-killed-in-baghdad-strike-iraqi-tv.html>.

¹⁴ Lara Seligman, "No 'End Date' for U.S. Troops in Syria," *Foreign Policy*, November 25, 2019, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/25/no-end-date-for-u-s-troops-in-syria/>.

¹⁵ "U.S. Says Completes Second Aircraft Carrier Visit to Vietnam," *Reuters*, March 11, 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-vietnam-usa/u-s-says-completes-second-aircraft-carrier-visit-to-vietnam-idUSKBN20Y0F3>.

¹⁶ Ankit Panda, "China Condemns US FONOP near Mischief Reef in the South China Sea," *The Diplomat*, March 25, 2020, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/china-condemns-us-fonop-near-mischief-reef-in-the-south-china-sea/>.

Increasing Nationalist Practices and Intolerance for Minorities and Immigrants

Nationalist practices and intolerance for minorities and immigrants is on the rise in the US, particularly after the election of Donald Trump as president. Trump administration, soon after being sworn in, started efforts to get a travel ban approved, especially for the Muslims. A third version of this travel ban was formally imposed on September 2017, which was against Libyan, Iranian, Somalian, Syrian, and Yemeni nationals.

Since 2017, the Trump administration has been pursuing a denaturalization campaign, which may lead to a policy initiative to search for inconsistencies in the applications of naturalized citizens, strip them of their citizenship and even deport them. In June 2018, the US attorney general, Jeff Sessions announced that the migrants in US who were victims of 'private' crimes in their home countries, could not qualify as refugees anymore, which is against the international asylum law, and even liberal values.¹⁷ Jeff Sessions also announced in spring 2018 that the US had a "zero tolerance" policy, threatening that anyone illegally crossing the southern border would be prosecuted.¹⁸

For several countries like Sudan, Honduras, Haiti, and El Salvador, the Trump administration has sought to abolish the Temporary Protected Status (TPS); however, it is being opposed by a court so far and therefore, could not be implemented.¹⁹ If implemented, it would be another US immigration policy against the international law.

Moreover, intolerance for minorities has also come to the forefront through discrimination and violence against African Americans, particularly by certain law enforcement personnel. For example, the killing of George Floyd after a white police officer knelt on his neck drew attention of the people towards persistent targeting of African Americans in the country, and increased their support for Black Lives Matter movement.²⁰ The movement was founded online in 2013 by Alicia Garza, Patrisse Khan-Cullors, and Opal Tometi to protest the death of an unarmed black teenager, Trayvon Martin, by George Zimmerman in February 2012.²¹

¹⁷ Ted Hesson and Josh Gerstein, "Sessions Moves to Block Asylum for Most Victims of Domestic, Gang Violence," *Politico*, June 11, 2019, <https://www.politico.com/story/2018/06/11/jeff-sessions-asylum-standards-domestic-violence-614158>.

¹⁸ Priyanka Bogani, "A Guide to Some Major Trump Administration Immigration Policies," *Frontline*, October 22, 2019, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/a-guide-to-some-major-trump-administration-immigration-policies/>.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Britannica, "Black Lives Matter," September 3, 2020, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Black-Lives-Matter>.

²¹ Ibid.

Intolerance for Freedom of Speech and Manipulation of Information

There have been policies by the US government that indicate the intolerance for freedom of speech and manipulation of information. During early days of his administration in 2017, President Trump, during a press conference, stopped a CNN reporter from asking a question and called the media outlet 'fake news'.²²

In February 2017, President Trump posted several anti-media tweets such as: "The fake news media is going crazy with their conspiracy theories and blind hatred. @MSNBC & @CNN are unwatchable. @foxandfriends is great!" and "The FAKE NEWS media (failing @nytimes, @NBCNews, @ABC, @CBS, @CNN) is not my enemy, it is the enemy of the American People!"²³

On May 9, 2018, President Trump, in a tweet, threatened to "take away credentials" of the reporters who wrote news that depicted him negatively.²⁴ Meanwhile, in a tweet on March 26, 2020, in addition to calling news outlets fake news, he termed the journalists "corrupt" because of their criticism on Trump's response to COVID-19 cases in the United States.²⁵

Hostility towards Liberal World Order and International Organizations

The US has been showing signs of hostility towards the liberal world order and international organizations. As mentioned above, US discredited a United Nations' resolution and attacked Iraq. The United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan, said that the US-led war on Iraq was not supported by the UN and, therefore it was illegal as per the UN charter.²⁶ This US move made it clear to the international community that the super power could disregard the United Nations as and when suitable and pursue its own decisions without the consent of the international body. Later, the claim by US intelligence that Saddam Hussein had reconstituted his nuclear weapons programme, he had biological weapons and mobile biological weapon production facilities, that he had stockpiled and was producing chemical weapons etc., proved incorrect.

²² Emily Bell, "At White House Press Conferences, No Questions Allowed," *The Atlantic*, January 13, 2019, <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/01/donald-trump-continues-to-call-the-media-fake-news/579670/>.

²³ *Trump Twitter Archive*, March 23, 2020, <http://www.trumptwitterarchive.com/archive>.

²⁴ *Trump Twitter Archive*.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ "Iraq War Illegal, Says Anan," *BBC*, September 8, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3661134.stm.

In 2019, the US began a formal process to withdraw from the Paris climate agreement, an international agreement that ensured that all countries would take initiatives to control climate change.²⁷ US' withdrawal from the agreement weakened the agreement and negatively influenced the international commitment to control climate change. This move by the US showed further hostility towards the liberal world order, which regarded climate change as a real issue.

In June 2018, the US announced its withdrawal from the UN Human Rights Council after it accused the body of bias against US ally Israel, and failure to hold human rights abusers accountable.²⁸ In the same way, the US's withdrawal from JCPOA, mentioned above, also disregarded an important multilateral agreement and the liberal commitment to resolve conflicts through peaceful means. It also disregarded the international organizations like United Nations and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as the agreement was endorsed by them.

Trump reiterated his familiar theme in the UN General Assembly 2019 as, "The future does not belong to the globalists. The future belongs to the patriots."²⁹ The recent decision by the Trump administration to withhold funds from WHO in the midst of corona crisis is another example of the country's total disrespect for international organizations and the existing world order.

The rise of authoritarian practices in the US is unprecedented. Its foreign policy seems to be getting aggressive, as its military expenditure shows a rising trend. Its military presence throughout the world in the form of military bases also seems consistent. Moreover, the nature of its presence in the Middle East and South China Sea is aggressive and militaristic. As far as the discrimination against minorities and the rise of nationalist sentiments are concerned, a considerable rise has been observed in such practices, especially after the election of President Trump. There have been legislations and policy initiatives that have discouraged minorities, particularly Muslims, to enter the US or have citizenship rights. The environment for the minorities has further deteriorated particularly after the violence and unjust killing of African Americans by the police in the country. Surprisingly, freedom of speech in the US is under threat as the US President Trump himself has launched a

²⁷ Michael D. Shear, "Trump Will Withdraw U.S. From Paris Climate Agreement," *The New York Times*, June 1, 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/trump-paris-climate-agreement.html>.

²⁸ Laura Koran, "US leaving UN Human Rights Council -- 'A Cesspool of Political Bias,'" *CNN*, June 20, 2018, <https://edition.cnn.com/2018/06/19/politics/haley-pompeo-human-rights-bias/index.html>.

²⁹ The White House, "Remarks by President Trump to the 74th Session of the United Nations General Assembly," Accessed April 22, 2020, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-74th-session-united-nations-general-assembly/>.

campaign of calling reportage by certain media outlets as fake news and trying to control them by alleging that they are against the people and the country. Meanwhile, the liberal world order that the US used to lead is being orphaned as the US is withdrawing from international obligations and agreements.

Russia's Growing Assertiveness

Russia is considered as one of the top countries among authoritarian regimes. Freedom House categorizes it as 'Not Free' with an overall score of 20³⁰, while Democracy Index 2019 ranks it as 134th country with an overall score of only 3.11.³¹ Its foreign policy initiatives are mostly considered assertive, and under President Vladimir Putin, these policies seem to have intensified in assertiveness. In 2018, Russia's defense spending was around 4 percent of its GDP.³²

In August 2007, Russia sent out an expedition in the Arctic, which was to expand territorial claims in the North Pole.³³ In January 2008, Russia carried out once more Soviet-era Atlantic navy exercises in neutral waters of the Biscay Bay, displaying resurgent military might.³⁴ While in August of the same year, there was an escalation between Georgia and Russia as Russia supported separatist forces in South Ossetia; Georgian forces were driven back from the region by Russia.³⁵

Russia started interference in the Middle East in September 2015, and carried out the first air strike in Syria against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in the same month. Today, Russia is an ally of Iran in the ME and has been pursuing an aggressive foreign policy in the region.

Russian involvement in Central Asia has been security dominated as well. It has military bases in the region and strives to pursue cooperation and dominance through agreements that are militaristic in nature, like the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). In 2019, in its military base in Tajikistan, Russia deployed anti-aircraft missile system

³⁰ Freedom House, "Countries and Territories," Accessed February 4, 2020, <https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores>.

³¹ The Economic Intelligence Unit, "Democracy Index 2019."

³² The World Bank, "Military Expenditure (% of GDP)," *Data*, Accessed February 1, 2020. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?most_recent_year_desc=false.

³³ Tom Parfitt, "Russia Plants Flag on North Pole Seabed," *The Guardian*, August 2, 2007, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/aug/02/russia.arctic>.

³⁴ Guy Faulconbridge, "Russia Bombers to Test-fire Missiles in Atlantic," *Reuters*, January 22, 2008, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-spain-flights/russia-bombers-to-test-fire-missiles-in-atlantic-idUSL2235954320080122>.

³⁵ Michael Schwartz, Anne Barnard, and C.J. Chivers, "Russia and Georgia Clash Over Separatist Region," *The New York Times*, August 8, 2008, <https://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/09/world/europe/09georgia.html>.

(S-300), and in Kyrgyzstan it deployed unmanned aerial vehicles.³⁶ The moves clearly show Russian assertive foreign policy towards Afghanistan where US forces are stationed and towards China that borders Tajikistan.

Increasing Nationalist Practices and Intolerance for Minorities and Immigrants

Russian intolerance towards the Chechens has always been evident. In March 2005, Aslan Maskhadov, the leader of the Chechen separatist movement, was killed in a Russian attack.³⁷ Meanwhile, since his second term in office, President Vladimir Putin has been propagating a new nationalist narrative, wherein he calls Russia a “state civilization” with “distinct cultural identity, not only a sovereign power”, which shares a common religion and ethnicity.³⁸

From February to May 2014, Russian forces, with the support of pro-Moscow president Viktor Yanukovich, took over Crimea, which later, through a referendum, decided to join Russia. Putin, after the annexation of Crimea, justified it as an act to strengthen Russian state; it was also significant to note that he referred to Russian people as an ethnic entity – “*rusскиinarod*”.³⁹

Intolerance for Freedom of Speech and Manipulation of Information

Russia under Putin has been intolerant to freedom of speech and has taken strict steps to manipulate information. Gazprom, the Russian state-owned gas company, in 2000, took control of NTV, which was the key asset of Gusinsky who had failed to repay a Gazprom loan, because he had been asked to repay it before its due time.⁴⁰ Later in the same year, another investor Boris Berezovsky was forced to give up the control of Russian Public Television (ORT).⁴¹ Before the 2008 election, REN TV practiced independent editorial policy; however, it was taken over by

³⁶ Warsaw Institute, “Russia Strengthens Its Military Bases in Central Asia,” February 14, 2020, <https://warsawinstitute.org/russia-strengthens-military-bases-central-asia/>.

³⁷ Nick Paton Walsh, “Chechen Rebel Leader Killed in Russian Assault,” *The Guardian*, March 9, 2005, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/mar/09/chechnya.russia1>.

³⁸ Aron Friedberg, *The Authoritarian Challenge: China, Russia and the Threat to the Liberal International Order*, (The Sasakawa Peace Foundation, 2017), 28.

³⁹ Pål Kolstø and Helge Blakkisrud, *The New Russian Nationalism: Imperialism, Ethnicity and Authoritarianism 2000–15* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press Ltd, 2016), 18.

⁴⁰ Sophie Lambroschini, “Russia: Journalists Defend Joining Berezovsky’s ORT Trust,” *Radio Free Europe*, September 9, 2000, <https://www.rferl.org/a/1094745.html>.

⁴¹ Sophie Lambroschini, “Russia: Prosecutors Charge Media-MOST Magnate Gusinsky.”

National Media Group (NMG), a pro-Putin company, which resulted in a change of policy favourable to Putin and his party.⁴²

Russian Television (RT) is believed to be largely sponsored by the government and is used to promulgate Russian 'propaganda' internationally. RT's statistics show that it reaches more than 600 million viewers, and it is among YouTube's most popular news channels, with a budget of more than US\$ 300 million.⁴³

Hostility towards Liberal World Order and International Organizations

Russia has not been partial to the liberal world order and has sought to cause division among European nations. It has been exerting influence in the Baltic states of Estonia and Latvia by leveraging the Russian-speaking minorities in these countries; it also seems ready to use military force in these states following the episode in Ukraine.⁴⁴ Moreover, Russia has been striving to counter the EU and NATO initiatives in Southeastern Europe, particularly in Romania and Moldova.⁴⁵ Such initiatives clearly show Russian hostility towards the EU and NATO.

In November 2009, President Putin suspended Russia's participation in Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty which limited the deployment of heavy military equipment in Europe.⁴⁶ In August 2016, Russia banned international organizations like Media Development Investment Fund (MDIF) and International Republican Institute (IRI) from functioning in Russia.⁴⁷

Russia is an authoritarian state, with an assertive foreign policy. It spends a considerable part of its budget on military expenditures. It strives to regain the military might it used to have during the Soviet era. Particularly, under Putin, Russia has kept on asserting itself in Central Asian countries, Eastern Europe and the Middle East. In Central Asia, it has

⁴² Jill Dougherty, "How the Media Became One of Putin's Most Powerful Weapons," *The Atlantic*, April 21, 2015, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive>.

⁴³ Larry Diamond, March F. Plattner and Christopher Walker, *Authoritarianism Goes Global: The Challenge to Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016), 179.

⁴⁴ Raphael S. Cohen and Andrew Radin, *Russia's Hostile Measures in Europe: Understanding the Threat* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019) https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1793.html.

⁴⁵ Raphael S. Cohen and Andrew Radin, *Russia's Hostile Measures in Europe: Understanding the Threat*.

⁴⁶ "Putin Signs Law Suspending CFE Treaty," *Radio Free Europe*, November 30, 2007. <https://www.rferl.org/a/1079211.html>.

⁴⁷ Anastasia Ovsyannikova, "Russia Bans More International Organizations," *Human Rights Watch*, August 22, 2016, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/08/22/russia-bans-more-international-organizations>.

established military bases and seems ready to thwart any sort of dominance from the US and China. While in the Middle East it has sent troops as well to support the fight against the forces supported by the US.

China's Assertive Foreign Policy

Since the dawn of the 21st century, China's assertive policies have become evident. Chinese president Hu Jintao, in 2003, brought under discussion the "Malacca Dilemma" suggesting that it was imperative for China to acquire blue-water capabilities. In 2009, Chinese Communist Party's Politburo Standing Committee approved working on Varyag, a former Soviet aircraft carrier, for operationalization and induction in the PLA Navy.⁴⁸

In June 2001, China undertook a simulation exercise of an invasion of Taiwan as a response to Taiwanese forces' test of capability to defend the island against a Chinese missile attack.⁴⁹ Moreover, in 2007, China cautioned US energy companies to abolish joint cooperation with Vietnam, particularly the ones in South China Sea (SCS).⁵⁰ In May 2009, China submitted its 'nine-dash line' map to the United Nations Commission, regarding the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS); ultimately, China increased Chinese paramilitary personnel' numbers and patrols in the SCS.⁵¹ It also increased the number of Chinese military exercises in the sea.

In May 2014, tensions between China and Vietnam escalated after the collision of their ships in South China Sea.⁵² Additionally, in October 2015, China confronted the US after its naval ship sailed near the artificial reefs that were being built by China in disputed Spratly Islands in the SCS.⁵³

⁴⁸ Rush Doshi, "Hu's to Blame for China's Foreign Assertiveness?" *Brookings*, January 22, 2019, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/hu-to-blame-for-chinas-foreign-assertiveness/>.

⁴⁹ David Shambaugh, *Modernizing Chinese Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002), 102-103.

⁵⁰ Kalus Heinrich Raditio, *Understanding China's Behaviour in the South China Sea: A Defensive Realist Perspective* (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 4.

⁵¹ Kalus Heinrich Raditio, *Understanding China's Behaviour in the South China Sea: a Defensive Realist Perspective*.

⁵² Li Zoe, "China, Vietnam, Philippines Collide Amid Escalating South China Sea Tensions," *CNN*, May 9, 2014, <https://edition.cnn.com/2014/05/08/world/asia/south-china-sea-drilling/index.html>.

⁵³ Gordon Lubold, Adam Entous, and Jeremy Page, "U.S. Navy Tests China over Sea Claims," *The Wall Street Journal*, October 27, 2015, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-says-it-warned-u-s-warship-in-south-china-sea-1445928223>.

Increasing Nationalist Practices and Intolerance for Minorities and Immigrants

In mid-2003, a controversial anti-subversion bill was passed in Hong Kong, which was opposed by approximately 500,000 people who marched on the streets of Hong Kong⁵⁴ – the protests made the Chinese government shelve the bill. Meanwhile, in March 2005, a new law was passed on Taiwan that called for non-peaceful means against any Taipei intention to declare independence from mainland China.⁵⁵

Western media has also accused China of addressing the Uighur issue with force. According to BBC, in 2011, seven Uighurs were killed by Chinese police after they were suspected of being behind the Horan and Kashgar attacks.⁵⁶ While on September 23, 2014, IlhamTohti, the Uighur rights activist, was jailed for life in Xinjiang region.⁵⁷ He had criticized the Chinese government for not providing complete autonomous status to Uighurs.

On October 18, 2017, during the 19th CPC's National Congress, Chinese president Xi Jinping said in his speech, "The Chinese nation has stood up, grown rich, and is becoming strong... with the historic mission to realize the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation."⁵⁸ The speech highlighted Xi's intention of revitalizing Chinese nationalism and providing the narrative for its future ambitions.

Intolerance for Freedom of Speech and Manipulation of Information

There have been practices supported by Chinese authorities that depict intolerance for freedom of speech and show manipulation of information. Google, in March 2010, as a response to the alleged cyber-attacks on the email accounts of Chinese human rights activists, ended its compliance with Chinese internet censorship and redirected searches through Hong Kong.⁵⁹ The Chinese government passed a new cyber security law in 2017 that gave it more control over the data processed by

⁵⁴ "Huge Protests Fill HK Streets," *CNN*, July 2, 2003, <https://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/east/07/01/hk.protest/>

⁵⁵ "What Behind the China-Taiwan Divide?" *BBC*, January 2, 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world->

⁵⁶ "China Profile – Timeline," *BBC*, July 29, 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13017882>.

⁵⁷ "Why is There Tension Between China and the Uighurs?" *BBC*, September 26, 2014, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-26414014>.

⁵⁸ "Full text of Xi Jinping's report at 19th CPC National Congress," *China Daily*, November 4, 2017, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcongress/2017-11/04/content_34115212.htm.

⁵⁹ "China Condemns Decision by Google to Lift Censorship," *BBC*, March 23, 2010, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8582233.stm>.

foreign and domestic firms.⁶⁰ Moreover, in December 2015, it passed a counter-terrorism law, which required the firms dealing in technology to provide assistance in the decryption of information.⁶¹ In a February 19, 2016 speech, Xi directed state media outlets to “speak for the Party’s will and its propositions and protect the Party’s authority and unity.”⁶²

Hostility towards Liberal World Order and International Organizations

It may be a surprise for some but China is actually the one championing the cause that used to be espoused by the liberal world order. China seems to be filling the space that is being left by the United States. It has increased aid to other countries; it has made commitment to safeguard the status and authority of the UN, and to firmly follow climate change initiatives; and it also pursues the intention of global development and financial stability through its Belt and Road Initiative.⁶³ Moreover, the key multilateral institutions that China supports include Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), New Development Bank (NDB), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation Agreement (CMIM), and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).⁶⁴

The findings about China show that it has been increasing its assertiveness in foreign policy with its rise in the economic sphere. Particularly, it has been trying to exert itself within the South China Sea, particularly to counter the rising threats posed by the US. As far as increasing nationalist practices are concerned, China seems motivated to promote Chinese traditions and culture; however, it has shown certain intolerance towards minorities, especially towards Uighurs. In the domain of freedom of expression, China seems reluctant to follow the liberal tradition. It has strong control over its media, and the freedom of expression as promulgated by the liberal world order does not exist in China. China, however, seems to be following the liberal tradition of

⁶⁰ Jack Wagner, “China’s Cybersecurity Law: What You Need to Know,” *The Diplomat*, June 1, 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/chinas-cybersecurity-law-what-you-need-to-know/>.

⁶¹ Ben Blanchard, “China Passes Controversial Counter-terrorism Law,” *Reuters*, December 28, 2015, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-security/china-passes>.

⁶² Edward Wong, “Xi Jinping’s News Alert: Chinese Media Must Serve the Party,” *The New York Times*, February 23, 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/23/world/asia/china-media-policy-xi-jinping.html>.

⁶³ Matthew D. Stephen and David Skidmore, “The AIIB in the Liberal International Order,” *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 12, no. 1 (Spring 2019): 61–91. <https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/poy021>.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

bringing the world together, albeit in its own ways - by creating and supporting multilateral and international initiatives in its own capacity.

India's Assertiveness in Foreign Policy

Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India seems to be following a more assertive foreign policy. Since 2010, Indian defence spending is on the rise. India's defence expenditure rose from US\$ 66,578 million in 2018 from US\$ 64,559 million in 2017.⁶⁵ On February 1st 2020, Indian finance minister presented a defence budget of US\$ 66.9 billion for the year 2020-21 showing a growth of 9.4 per cent.⁶⁶ This is at a time when India's economy is showing a downward trend. India (at par with Saudi Arabia) currently ranks third after the US and China with respect to Defence spending.

India's assertive foreign policy has mostly been targeted at Pakistan. In February 2019, India claimed to have carried out a 'surgical strike' in Pakistan against alleged militant hideouts in Pakistan. The claim was denied by Pakistan and also not substantiated by independent security analysts. India has also repeatedly violated the Line of Control (LoC) between the two countries killing innocent civilians across the border. Such moves by India are largely termed by the international community as highly aggressive, which could lead to a full-fledged war. However, India has continued its assertive foreign policy towards Pakistan.

Increasing Nationalist Practices and Intolerance for Minorities and Immigrants

The nationalistic practices and intolerance for minorities is on the rise in India. Since the rise of Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a variety of nationalistic practices have become prevalent in India that seem to be inspired by Hindutva, which is a Hindu nationalist political ideology propagating that India belongs to Hindus only. BJP's parent organization – the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sang (RSS) – has been known as the staunchest supporter of this ideology and has even turned to violence to pursue it.

Indian Prime Minister Modi was an RSS activist in his youth. Currently, as the leader of India and the BJP, he has started taking initiatives to further promote Hindutva ideology. As a result of backing of Hindutva ideology by BJP, particularly during its last two terms in government, intolerance and violence against the minorities seem to have

⁶⁵ Trading Economics, "India Military Expenditure," March 2020, <https://tradingeconomics.com/india/military-expenditure>.

⁶⁶ Laxman Kumar Bahera, "India's Defence Budget 2020-21," *Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses*, February 4, 2020, <https://idsa.in/issuebrief/india-def-budget-2020-21-lkbehera-040220>.

multiplied. Lynching of Muslims has seen considerable rise. Human Rights Watch (HRW) revealed that between May 2015 to December 2018, 280 people were injured in attacks that were meant to protect cows, while 44 people, including 36 Muslims, were killed.⁶⁷ Most of these lynchings have been carried out in public, and some have been filmed as well, but there has hardly been any action by the BJP government. *Freedom in the World 2020* report recently highlighted: "The Indian government has taken its Hindu nationalist agenda to a new level with a succession of policies that abrogate the rights of different segments of its Muslim population, threatening the democratic future of a country long seen as a potential bulwark of freedom in Asia and the world."⁶⁸

On August 5, 2019, BJP revoked Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, which ended the autonomous status of Jammu and Kashmir without the involvement of the region's political leadership. Thus, the decision was not welcomed in Jammu and Kashmir, certain other parts of the country, and neighbouring Pakistan. In India, the move led to widespread protests. However, the Indian government responded by sending thousands of additional troops to the region, shut down telecommunication and internet services, arrested political leaders and human rights activists, banned journalists from visiting the area, and overall, imposed a crippling curfew.

In December 2019, Indian parliament passed The Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) that allowed Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Christian, Jain and Parsi emigrants from Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh to apply for citizenship in India only after having to live or work in India for six years. However, Muslims were excluded from the Act which has given rise to country-wide and international protests. The protestors consider it a discrimination against Muslims and an attack on the secular nature of the Indian state. In February 2020, riots erupted in New Delhi after the protests on CAA intensified. The riots targeted Muslims and around 52 people were killed.⁶⁹ Recently, the spread of COVID-19 has also been used as an excuse to further persecute the Muslims.

⁶⁷ Human Rights Watch, "Violent Cow Protection in India," February 18, 2019, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/02/18/violent-cow-protection-india/vigilante-groups-attack-minorities>.

⁶⁸ Sarah Repucci, "A Leaderless Struggle for Democracy," *Freedom House*, Accessed February 23, 2020, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2020/leaderless-struggle-democracy>.

⁶⁹ Human Rights Watch, "Shoot the Traitors: Discrimination against Muslims Under India's New Citizenship Policy," February 20, 2020, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/04/09/shoot-traitors/discrimination-against-muslims-under-indias-new-citizenship-policy>.

Intolerance for Freedom of Speech and Manipulation of Information

In order to control growing discontent among the people because of Modi government's exclusionary policies towards minorities, particularly Muslims, there have been efforts to control freedom of speech and a need to manipulate information by the Indian authorities. The recent global press freedom index showed India declining further by two places to be ranked 142th out of 180 countries.⁷⁰ The index also highlighted that at least six journalists were killed in India in 2018 because of their professional duties. It also alleged that the attacks against journalists increased by the BJP's supporters before and during the general elections of 2019.

Moreover, there has been a systematic and coordinated hate campaign on social media against the journalists or activists, such as Arundhati Roy, who oppose Hindutva ideology. The *Reporters Without Borders* report said: "The campaigns are particularly virulent when the targets are women. The emergence of a #MeToo movement in the media in 2018 has lifted the veil on many cases of harassment and sexual assault to which women reporters have been subjected."⁷¹

After ending the autonomous status of Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian authorities started clamping down on freedom of speech, and strove to control the flow of information. At least three journalists were arrested by the Indian authorities in the valley, including Qazi Shibli - a website editor.⁷² Moreover, there were many cases wherein the journalists were beaten by the police, while the distribution of newspapers could not be made possible because of strict curfew in the region. Thus, there seems to be a coordinated and systematic effort underway in India to undermine freedom of speech and manipulate information for the benefit of the ruling elite.

Hostility towards the Liberal World Order and International Organizations

India embraced the liberal world order lead by the United States; however, it has been reluctant to follow the ethical responsibilities towards certain international organizations. For example, it has not been following the Universal Declaration of the Human Rights as far as its policies in Jammu and Kashmir and towards the Muslims are concerned. These policies have already been discussed above.

⁷⁰ Reporters Without Borders, "India," Accessed February 23, 2020, <https://rsf.org/en/india>.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Freedom House, "Indian Kashmir," Accessed September 4, 2020, <https://freedomhouse.org/country/indian-kashmir/freedom-world/2020>.

Another Indian hostility has been evident towards the regional association: South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). In April 2018, New Delhi announced that it was difficult to proceed with the SAARC initiative under the circumstances prevalent at the time.⁷³ SAARC has practically been ineffective due to the intransigent attitude of India. India has experienced considerable rise in authoritarian practices, especially under Modi governments. Its foreign policy has turned assertive as it has kept on increasing its spending on military capabilities. Its foreign policy towards Pakistan, in particular, has raised concerns about the stability in the region. At the same time, the Indian state has been pursuing strong Hindu nationalistic ideology – Hindutva – which promotes discrimination against the rights of minorities, especially of the Muslim population. The same ideology seems dominant in India's changed stance on Kashmir that has initiated violence against Kashmiris and suppression of their rights. Modi government has also contracted the space for freedom of speech and basic human rights, with strict measures against journalists and flow of information. As far as the liberal world order and international organizations are concerned, India seems to be undermining the rules of responsible conduct.

Conclusion & Way Forward

The data mentioned above clearly shows that there has been a rise in authoritarian tendencies in international politics. The liberal world order seems to be changing from pursuing democratic norms in combination with free market economy to authoritarian political order with free market economy. All the determinants of the authoritarian practices – assertive foreign policies, increasing nationalistic practices and intolerance for minorities and immigrants, intolerance for freedom of speech and manipulation of information, and hostility towards liberal world order and international organizations – seem to be gaining strength in all the four cases.

However, the study does not imply that all the four cases discussed above show rise in authoritarian practices relevant to all the four determinants, but rather they show such rise in varying degrees in each determinant.

The overall picture, however, shows that there is a rise in authoritarian practices by different political actors at the national and international levels since the dawn of the 21st century and that seems to be influencing the liberal world order.

⁷³ “Not Possible to Go Ahead with SAARC Under Present Circumstance: India,” *Economic Times*, April 7, 2018, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/not-possible-to-go-ahead-with-saarc-under-present-circumstances-india/articleshow/63659156.cms?from=mdr>.

Where Can Authoritarianism Lead and What Can the World Do?

The rise of authoritarian practices at the national and international level point to a changing world order since the beginning of the 21st century; however, it is also vital to see how the changing world order may shape international politics. With the rise of assertive foreign policies and nationalistic tendencies, there can be a rise in the status of nation-states once again in the international political arena. Moreover, such a rise, with the diminishing authorities and roles of international organizations, may point towards increasing conflicts among nations that are being controlled by their subjective perceptions and interests instead of being controlled and regulated by standardized international norms. The world in such a scenario may move towards multi-polarity, and certain differences may turn into armed conflicts.

American and Russian assertive policies in the Middle East have resulted in a complex situation. Recent escalation between the US and Iran can easily turn into another war that can entangle many nations. Moreover, the situation in South China Sea can also give rise to clashes between China and the United States. Indian assertive policies towards Pakistan could easily turn into a full-fledged war, even a nuclear war. This current rise in authoritarianism can lead to multiple clashes at multiple fronts with each one having the potential to turn into a full-fledged war.

For the United States that has been leading the liberal democratic world order, it is a testing time. It must not let the world believe that the liberal democratic values that it has been promulgating over decades were only empty slogans. For that to happen, it must support the international organizations and international agreements instead of parting ways with them. Though it may be facing the challenge of a multi-polar world order, with the rise of states like China, Russia, Brazil, Turkey and India, it must not fall in the trap of negative competition and deny them their due share of dominance. Striving to counter others through assertive foreign policies and nationalistic fervour can only lead to war and disorder, not a smooth transition to a better world order. Thus, the US has the option to keep on playing a dominant role within the new world order or undermine it altogether and play the role of a solitary power.

China, on the other hand, seems determined to excel with its authoritarian political system and capitalist economic structure. Its rise has made it believe that it can substitute the US in the new world order determined by its own terms and conditions. However, it is essential that China must not fall in the quagmire of overconfidence that every rising power has to face through its evolution. It needs to make sure to keep on cooperating with others in the economic sphere to the best of its ability, and must not fall in the reckless competition of military adventurism that can only bring violence and conflict to the world. Though it has to face

competition with the countries like the US and Russia that have strong military power, it does not have to follow the same route as history showed that military competition between the US and Soviet Union ultimately resulted in disintegration of one of them.

In the changing world order, though Russia has been doing well in cooperation with China, it must never get overambitious regarding its role and position. Cooperation with China may work for it, but if it decides to get into competition with China, it may face myriad problems. Moreover, it must also keep its objective conditions under consideration in its balance of power struggle with the US. Strict authoritarian practices without economic achievements cannot ensure a strong position in the international political scenario, neither can it guarantee internal stability.

For India, it is too early to practice authoritarianism. Instead of indulging in a balance of power struggle with China through assertive foreign policies, backed by a mere assurance of support by the US, it must strive to pursue cooperation and ensure its own economic stability. Authoritarian practices at home against the Muslims in particular cannot help India in achieving a strong position among the states of the world, rather it would fan the divide among people at home and the neighbouring Muslim countries may take advantage of the same to further invigorate instability.

Thus, for the countries studied here in particular and for the world in general, it is vital to scrutinize their policies regarding international undertakings. The rise in authoritarian practices may benefit the states for their internal matters, but they may generate clashes and disputes at the international level; therefore, it is imperative that the states gauge their practices in the light of the international political order as well, and take initiatives that can ensure mutual coexistence and cooperation.

So, the states of the world need to keep such practices in check and take initiatives to safeguard and even amend the norms governing the roles, responsibilities and authorities of international organizations, so that they are able to play an independent and significant role in ensuring justice at the international level. It is vital that they have the authority to implement their decisions and make states and international actors pursue them. On the other hand, it is also essential that international organizations do not become tools in the hands of the more powerful states.

IRAN'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS MIDDLE EAST: A CASE OF SMART POWER

Mehreen Bibi* & Syed Qandil Abbas**

Abstract

Since Iranian Revolution of 1979, Iran has been perceived as rogue and revisionist state that has desired to maximise its security and has redefined regional balance of power that once favoured US and its regional allies. Last four decades sketch a history of economic sanctions and political pressures on Iran by US and its regional allies to halt Iran's quest to shift regional balance of power in its favour. Despite of counter strategies by a strong alliance of regional and extra-regional powers, Iran has successfully managed to create a pro-Iranian block that is composed of both state and non-state actors (mainly proxies). Iranian success in creating a pro-Iran block is widely perceived as the result of penetration of Iranian proxies in the region but this study argues, Iran's hard and soft power tools (smart power) shares the synergy of revolutionary ideology and interest and they assist each other mainly in states, having weak central authority and disrupted state structures in Middle East.

Keywords: *Iran, Revolutionary Ideology, Smart Power, US, Non-State Actors, Middle East*

Introduction

American invasions on Afghanistan and Iraq, Arab spring and rise of ISIS have provided Iran with an environment based on opportunities to be exploited and threats to be eliminated. Iran has successfully deterred

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the threats and consolidated its power in the Middle East by exploiting opportunities and created a pro-Iran alliance or block in the region.¹ This study aims to explore: how Iran could manage to evolve the regional balance of power into its favour through creating an alliance with state and non-state actors? The study argues, Iran has employed both hard and soft power tools to deter threats in the region against its security and exploited opportunities to maximise its regional influence by reaching both state and non-state actors. Both hard and soft power tools aren't only supplementary to each other but also shares the synergy of interest. The lens of Smart Power, as defined by Joseph Nye will be employed to prove the constructed argument. The study will employ the interviews of scholars like Arshin Moghaddam², Bahador Aminian³ and Mohammad Reza Takhsheed⁴ to support the above hypothesis.

Scholars including Natalia Punic, narrow down the Iranian aspirations to Shia' Muslims. By opting an active policy guided by smart power, Iran has exploited soft power tools based on ideals of Iranian Revolution of 1979, its self-perception as leader of Shi'a Islam by cultivating a web of socio-cultural and political links assisted by its hard power tools, mainly demonstrated by the arming and financing of Shi'a militias throughout the region.⁵ But this study has explored Iranian role in Syria, Palestine and Yemen, where Iran support militant groups like Houthis and Hamas and also tries to create goodwill with sunni (Hamas) and non-twelve Shia' Arab street (Syria, Yemen). The study builds its argument on hypothesis, "Iran's soft power tools assist Iran's hard power tools and strategic goals in Middle East and its hard power tools assist its soft power tools. Smart exploration through smart power tools and tactics lead significant choices resulted in consolidation of power across from Yemen to Palestine."

¹ Amin Saikal, "Iran and the Changing Regional Environment," In Shahram Akbarzadeh, Dara Conduit, ed. *Rouhani's First Two Years in Office*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 19-20.

² Arshin Adib Moghaddam, interview via email by Mehreen Bibi, June 12, 2019, Centre for Iranian Studies at the London Middle East Institute.

³ Bahador Aminian Jazi, interview via email by Mehreen Bibi, February 23, 2019, Institute of Training of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tehran.

⁴ Mohammad Reza Takhsheed, interview via email by Mehreen Bibi, February 23, 2019, Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Tehran.

⁵ Natalia Paunic, "The Rising Shia Crescent: Iranian Smart Power and Implications for Middle East, Central Asia and Persian Gulf," *Carleton Review of International Affairs* no.3 (2016): 71.

Theoretical Framework: What is Smart Power?

This study will adopt Joseph Nye's definition of power to look at Iranian successful ventures in the Middle East through its proxies mostly driven by its ideology and Iran's soft power expeditions to create a lasting block in its neighbourhood. Nye splits power into hard and soft forms and defines Power, "as an ability to affect others to achieve the outcomes one wants". Nye calls this, the traditional definition of power that according to him is losing its significance due to the factors like economic growth, education and technology as societies have transformed from agrarian to Industrial.⁶ Nye believes, states demonstrate this ability of affecting others behaviour in desired manner through, coercion, attraction and payments and categorises coercion and payment under Hard power while, attraction with Soft power. By combining both Soft and Hard power, states can produce effective foreign policy. The combination of both faces of power is called Smart Power, the term Nye coined in 2003.⁷ Nye differentiates both faces of power, "one country gets other countries to want what it wants-might be called co-optive or soft power in contrast with the hard or command power of ordering others to do what it wants".⁸ Nye defines Soft power as the ability of states to achieve the desired ends through attraction, "the sources of soft power are the attractiveness of country's culture, political ideals and policies". While hard power on the other hand is commonly defined as, "to shape the behaviours of a political entity by other political entity, by using military and economic means like cohesive political power, military aggression or economic power". According to Nye, by coining the term, smart power, he aims to develop the argument that soft power alone can't become sufficient enough to produce successful choices by states to pursue national interest. Nye believes, state needs the combination of both hard and soft power to successfully pursue national interest.⁹ Smart power's, hard and soft components create a complex and interactive relationship with each other but this neither makes them perfect substitutes nor perfect complements for each other. A state's hard defences can be strengthened by a strong soft positive image while hard force in the wars of liberation, intervention on humanitarian ground can acquire a positive image for the intervening state.¹⁰ Like Hillary Clinton, while speaking to Senate Foreign Relations Committee profess the need of

⁶ Joseph S. Nye, "Soft Power," *Foreign Policy* no. 80 (1990): 154.

⁷ Joseph S. Nye, "Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power," *Foreign Affairs* 88, no.4 (2009): 160.

⁸ Nye, "Soft Power," 166.

⁹ Nye, "Get Smart," 160-163.

¹⁰ Robert Gilpin, "The Rise of American Hegemony," In *Two Hegemonies: Britain 1846-1914 and the United States 1941-2001*, ed. Patrick Karl O'Brien and Armand Clesse (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2002), 165-182.

using smart power, "We must use what has been called 'smart power,' the full range of tools...diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural." Hence, Smart power is the ability of an actor, to effectively merge the elements of both hard and soft power in a way that makes both faces of power mutually complementary and leads to attain the ends in desired manner.¹¹ This trend can be seen in Iranian case as Iranian self-perception (revolutionary ideals) and its regional aspiration are integrated that compels Iran to combine hard and soft tools of power to maximise its security and regional influence.

Iran's Foreign Policy Aspirations: The Need for Smart Power

Arshin Moghaddam writes, Islamic Republic institutionalised "utopian-romantic" ideals, used as attractive slogans during 1979's Revolution in its foreign policy discourses. Such romanticism hasn't been discarded by Tehran but integrated with its grand strategic preferences. Iran and Iranians hold a nostalgic self-perception about Iran's status and role in international affairs.¹² To attain such fantasised amalgamation of power and ideology, Iran needs to pursue a foreign policy that is comprehensive and embraces all aspects of power. The study argues that Iranian foreign policy choices are smart and combination of hard and soft power tools, for some to understand this smart approach; one must understand Iran's aspirations in the region. Iran today may be a shadow of glorious Persian empires but Iran never forgets to uphold its pride in its splendid political and intellectual history. Iranians like nationalist Russians who strongly believe in natural right of maintaining paramount influence in near abroad, also believe that it should develop its sphere of influence within its former imperial boundaries. Even Islamic Republic can't eliminate this thirst based on Iranzamin (Iranian's Land) and is stapled in Supreme Leader, Khamenie's approach.¹³ According to Bahadur Aminiyan, "Without understanding, Nizam ul Mulk Toosi, the Mideval Persian Philosopher, Iran's foreign policy can't be understood. (He wrote, Seyasatnama, the book of guide for rulers. He smartly created balance between political approaches and religion by evaluating the realities of politics and offer an insight about the role of soldiers, finance officers and

¹¹ Mandip Singh, "From Smart Power to Sharp Power: How China Promotes her National Interests," *Journal of Defence Studies* 12, no.3 (2018): 7. <https://idsa.in/system/files/jds/jds-12-3-2018-from-smart-power-to-sharp-power-msingh.pdf>.

¹² Arshin Adib Moghaddam, "Islamic Utopian Romanticism and the Foreign Policy Culture of Iran," *Critical Middle Eastern Studies* 14, no. 3 (2005): 267.

¹³ Michael Rubin, "Strategies Underlying Iran's Soft Power," *American Enterprise Institute*. 7 March 2017, <http://www.aei.org/publication/strategies-underlying-iranian-soft-power/>.

other members in the power structure. Moreover, Aminian is of the view that Iran in Middle East has tried to contact people (as Iran is part of region and knows the region well) by appealing them unlike United States, that solely relied on hard power".¹⁴ This is what Nye has explained as it's explained above. So Iranian strategies in Middle East can't be looked through realist lens or ideological lens separately but should be looked through the combination of both lenses as they supplemented each other.

Iran and Soft Power or Qodrat e Narm

Before exploring Iranian strategies guided by soft power, the study will define, how Iran defines Qodrat e Narm? Arshin Moghaddam says, "for Iran, Qodrat-e-narm or Soft Power is a derivative of the doctrines of "dawat"(to invite) and "tabligh"(to preach) which were central to Ayatollah Khomeini's efforts to export the revolution, without the "barrel of a gun". Whereas the discourse of Khomeini was radical, Qodrat-e narm translates into multilateral engagement and cultural diplomacy, for instance the network of Iranian bonyads, cultural centres and universities with branches all over the world".¹⁵ Although Iranian Revolution of 1979 is widely speculated as a threat by Iran's neighbourhood and West due to Iranian rhetoric of "aspiration for exporting" revolutionary ideals that's its soft power and Iranian support to militant groups in the region is perceived as acts of instability.¹⁶ But the soft power tools employed by Islamic Republic aren't benign and integrated with its expansionist agenda. From cultural diplomacy to charity, Iran exploits all ventures to create goodwill for its revolutionary ideals and its proxies in the region, mainly in states with weak central authority. Soft power tools employed in Middle East are as under.

Tools of Soft Power Employed by Iran

Islamic Republic of Iran's growing regional influence is an indispensable factor to calculate regional power dynamics. More emphasis has been laid on Iran's hard power venture in the Middle East while its endeavours to increase its influence through soft power aren't well documented. Qodrat e narm/ soft power has taken central stage in Iranian politicians, academics and policy makers rhetorical lexicon.¹⁷ We can see,

¹⁴ Ira M. Lapidus, *History of Islamic Societies* (London: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 151.

¹⁵ Arshin Moghaddam, interview via email (June 12, 2019).

¹⁶ Shirin T. Hunter, "Iran and the Spread of Revolutionary Islam," *Third World Quarterly* 10, no. 2 (1988): 730.

¹⁷ William Bullock Jickens, " Bonyads as Agents and Vehicles of Islamic Republic's Soft Power," In *Rouhani's First Two Years in Office* ed. Shahram Akbarzadeh, Dara Conduit (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 155.

consensus among all factions of Iranian political stage. Even conservative Ayatullah Misbah Yazdi has laid emphasis on use of religious soft Power¹⁸ and moderate President Rouhani, in his 2013 presidential campaign stated, "Iran needs soft power."¹⁹ Iran has exploited a wide range of areas to spread its soft power both through state and non-state actors. Islamic Cultural and Relations Organisation, bonyads (non-state welfare organisations), state media, economic influence through state and no state actors, educational institutes, utilisation of shared religious bond and political influence through pro-Iranian elements.

Direct Community Engagement

In order to reach people Iran has developed mechanisms, the most important one is ICRO. ICRO (Islamic Cultural and Relations Organisation) or *Saazman e Ferhang o Irtebatat e Islami* runs a state-run chain of cultural centres(along with Iranian embassies) propagating the ideals of Iranian Revolution, Persian language and civilization and improving relations between Muslim counties. ICRO works directly under Vilayat e Faqih(the supreme leader), hence exporting Iran's regional foreign policy goals, successfully working in Middle Eastern states including Pakistan, Indonesia and Malaysia.²⁰ This policy of direct engagement with local communities has created loyalty between Shiites and Iranian Government. Promotion of religious tourism in Iran and Iraq falls under this strategy.²¹ According to Jeffery Haynes, Iran's cultural soft power can be characterised in three ways, Persian language, Twelver Shiism and Iranian traditions. Very few Iraqis speak Persian and one can't rightly predict how much Iranian traditions are popular in Arab Iraq but Iran's satellite channel Al Alam has won a great deal of audience as majority Iraqis are followers of Twelver Shiism. Hawza of Najaf is under Ayatullah Ali Sistani, and contrary to Qom and Mashad its quietest Shia' tradition but it is the oldest Shia' hawza and has regained its past glory after the fall of Saddam.

In reaching to people, or Arab street policy, Iran targeted both Shiites and Sunnis. Even Iran successfully attracted the Zaidis of Yemen who aren't follower of Iranian official Tweller Shia strand. Many of them are part of Houthi movement. Such as Abdul Malik Houthi, the leader of Houthis, whose admiration for Khomeini and Hezbollah's Hassan Nasrullah as symbol of resistance to colonialism and zoinism is borrowed from the rhetoric of Iranian Revolutionary mentality, slogans like Death to

¹⁸ Jeffrey Haynes, *Religious Transnational Actors and Soft Power* (Routledge, 2016).

¹⁹ Akbarzadeh, and Conduit ed. *Iran in the World*, 155.

²⁰ "Culture and Relations Organization," Islamic Culture and Relations Organisation, <http://icro.ir/>, Accessed on April 20, 2019.

²¹ Christopher Forrest, "Coercive Engagement: A Security Analysis of Iranian Support to Iraqi Shia Militias," *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 3, no. 2 (2009): 114.

America and Death to Israel can be quoted as example in this regard.²² Supreme Leader Ayatullah Ali Khamenei has ordered to renovate the shrine Nasser Haqq, who was Zaidi Imam of 3rd century in order to strengthen ties with Zaidis.²³

Iran certainly is the strongest candidate in post-Saddam Iraq, an Iraq with weak central authority. Iraq's 60-65 percent population is Shiite and fall of Saddam provided opportunity for Iran under Ahmadinijjad to exploit its religious soft power in Iraq. Iran actively supported American stance of making Iraq a democratic country in hope of having a Shiite dominated government in Baghdad with which Iran could develop understanding based on religious affiliation. Such policies of using soft power in Iraq are contrary to Iranian policies opted right after revolution when government largely relied on funding Shiite resistance groups to export revolution. Iran's soft power ventures in Iraq also countered Saudi influence. Iran has better military capability in Iraq and Saudi Arabia is trying to exploit the dissatisfaction of Sunni Iraqis. Iran is struggling to win the heart of common Iraqis. According to Geoffrey Kemp, Iran's capability and will to influence events in Iraq are high both in terms of soft and hard power.²⁴

Iran's community outreach isn't limited to Shiites only, it has also maintains links with Sunni and Kurdish parties. Former Iraqi president Jalal Talabani has longstanding ties with Iran because of Islamic Republic's support for Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan party during 1990s.²⁵ This helped Iran to influence political process in Iraq. Muqtada al Sadr, despite of his strong nationalistic orientation couldn't resist to act as pro-Iranian militia leader. He placed his followers in ministries like Health ministry where he could enhance his influence at grass root level. Khodair al Khozei, an important pro-Iranian member of Da'wa party placed members of the party in schools across Iraq. Controlling Health and Education ministries, means transferring Iranian influence to the micro level where like-minded doctors and teachers are hired regardless of their qualifications.²⁶ So the community outreach serves dual purpose for Iran not only creates favourable environment for Iran in public but also assist Iran in creating and increasing influence in political spheres of the hosting states.

²² Dayrl F. Urbina, "IRGC and Iranian Soft and Hard Power Influence in Middle East," PhD diss., (University of Central Florida, 2018), vi.

²³ Urbina, "IRGC and Soft and Hard Power of Iran," viii.

²⁴ Haynes, *Religious Transnational Actors and Soft Power*.

²⁵ Quil Lawrence, *Invisible Nation: How the Kurds' Quest for Statehood Is Shaping Iraq and the Middle East* (New York: Walker & Company, 2008), 78-79.

²⁶ Rubin, *Underlying Iranian Strategies*.

Bonyads: Non-State Charities and Assistance for IRGC

Bonyads, the parastatal organisations, emblemize and propagate mainly the Islamic Republic's revolutionary religious discourses and to a lesser extent, Persian identity through business, religious and secular philanthropy and media both at home and abroad. Bonyads ability to influence and effectively instrumentalize Iranian foreign policy agendas, is guaranteed by their links/connection with policy makers.²⁷ Today, the most important bonyads are Foundation for the Oppressed and Disabled or Bonyad-e-Mosta'zafin va Janbazan, Martyr's and Veterans' Foundation or Bonyad-e-Shahid va Isargaran, Imam Khomeini Relief Committee or Komiteh ye Emdad-e-Emam Khomeini, Islamic Propagation Organization or Sazeman-e-Tablighat-e-Eslami, 15 Khordad Foundation or Bonyad-e-Panzdah-e-Khordad and Aastan-e-Qods-e-Razavi.²⁸ Being trans-national charitable foundations, bonyads provide targeted social welfare, philanthropic, cultural and commercial activities in Iran and abroad. For example, Sa'adi foundation propagates for Persian language and literature, 15 Khordad Foundation commemorates revolutionary struggles, Bonyad e Farabi promotes Iranian cinema and bonyads like Global Society for Reconciliation between Islamic Schools offer religious services. Islamic Propagation Organisation or Sazeman-e-Tablighat-e-Islami and Resalat Foundation or Bonyad-e-Resalat are influential vehicles for disseminating Islamic ideology. They are energetic partisans for Revolutionary government to fulfil the revolutionary mandate to promote a just society for the oppressed that gives Iran a mandate to appeal through soft power.²⁹ Bonyads account for between 30 and 40 percent of the Iranian economy and formerly receive 58 percent of state budgets. Bonyads do businesses outside Iran in free and unchecked manner providing them with leverage to appeal and attract in more systematic manner and assist Iran's hard power tools like IRGC, Hezbollah, Hamas and other groups through soft war to counteract Western influence. These groups, having bonyads help and support enjoy great popularity for regional communities, often across the sectarian lines.³⁰ The bonyads on the other hand provide enduring support to Hezbollah of Lebanon directly and indirectly through the IRGC. The establishment of a seminary by Hezbollah's first leader for Lebanese clerics was supported by Bonyad e

²⁷ Suzanne Maloney, "Agents or Obstacles? Parastatal Foundations and Challenges for Iranian Development," in Parvin Alizadeh, *The Economy of Iran: Dilemmas of an Islamic State*, ed. (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2000), 150.

²⁸ Akbarzadeh and Conduit, *Iran in the world*, 157.

²⁹ Suzanne Maloney, "Islamism and Iran's Postrevolutionary Economy: The Case of the Bonyads," in *Gods, Guns, and Globalization: Religious Radicalism and International Political Economy*, ed. Mary Ann Tetrault and Robert A. Denemark, (Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner, 2004), 198.

³⁰ Akbarzadeh and Conduit ed. *Iran in the World*, 158.

Shaeed that provided impetus for establishment of Hezbollah.³¹ The bonyads also support Iranian hard power initiatives with soft power value. Thus the contribution to Iranian soft power counter intuitively revolves around the fact that soft power can be propagated by “command power equally.”³²

Iran’s Media Diplomacy: Aiming to Shape Minds

According to article 75 of constitution “freedom of expression and publication of ideas by the Radio and Television must be in line with Islamic laws and national interests.”³³ Since its inception, Islamic Republic has smartly employed electronic media as a strategic tool to disseminate its ideology. *Sazman-e-Seda va Sima-ye Jomhuri-ye Eslami-ye Iran* or Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), founded after revolution, is the key state agency that is in charge of the propagation of the audiovisual policy of Tehran. According to Peirri Pahalvi, *Sazman-e-Seda va Sima-ye Jomhuri-ye Eslami-ye Iran’s* world service functions under supervision of the Valiy-e-Faqih (the Supreme Leader) and serves to facilitate the achievement of Iran’s strategic objectives, by promoting the reputation of the Islamic Republic in positive manner. Through IRIB’s Arabic satellite television channels like Sahar, Jamejam, Al-Alam, and Press TV (English and Spanish Television), Iran has targeted millions to promote Islamic Republic’s image as “Moderate Islamic democracy.”³⁴

Iran’s Al-Alam is a news channel with 24 hours news service in Arabic.³⁵ Al-Alam’s professional and slick coverage effectively shaped perceptions of viewers against U.S, prepared the groundwork for the new regional dynamics in which Iran emerged as a crucial power broker in Iraq.³⁶ Al-Alam didn’t achieve significant success only in instable states like Iraq and Lebanon but also in rich Arab states like Bahrain where Saudi and Bahraini authorities blame Al Alam for inciting population to engage in violence and sabotage, to mislead their Arab population to flame sectarian

³¹ Misbah Mahjub, Hezbollah Va Rahbari-Ye Seyyed Hassan Nasrullah [Hezbollah and the Leadership of Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah], trans. Mohammadreza Mirzajan (Tehran: Mu’asase-ye Farhangi-honari-ye Qadr-e Velayat [CulturalArtistic Institute of the Guardianship’s Esteem], (2012), 32–33.

³² Akbarzadeh and Conduit, *Iran in the World*, 167.

³³ “Iran: Constitution 1979,” Ace Project: The Electoral Knowledge Network, <http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/asia/IR/Iran%20Constitution%201979.pdf/view> Accessed April 23, 2019.

³⁴ Pierre Pahlavi, “Understanding Iran’s Media Diplomacy,” *Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs* 6, no. 2 (2012): 22–24.

³⁵ Al Alam TV, <https://www.alalamtv.net/aboutus>, Accessed March 16, 2019.

³⁶ “Iran TV Channels Targets Iraq,” *BBC News*, April 3, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2913593.stm.

strife in their states. This shows the level of Iranian influence in the region through media as soft power tool.³⁷

Press TV (started in 2007) not only endeavours to convey Iranian perspective on its nuclear program, U.S presence in the region but also tries to shape perceptions in the favour of “resistance movements” like Hezbollah and Hamas.³⁸ Press TV has conducted and conducts live broadcasts for Hassan Nasrullah’s speeches and gives coverage to Sadar movement in Iraq. Both face censorships and lack of access to international regional audiences. Press TV by providing opportunity to these symbols of Iranian resistance has played pivotal role in increasing their popularity as carious polls have described Hassan Nasrullah as one of the most popular figures in Middle East.³⁹

Education: A Tool to Spread Khomienism and Jihadism

Education is an important tool for Iran. In religious and theocratic sphere, it’s the Al- Mustufa International University with headquarters in Qom (Iran’s religious capital), that serves Iranian interest through a wide network of institutions working in the Middle East. It provides missionaries for the Arab and rest of the world to spread Iran’s ideological goals.⁴⁰ Al-Mustafa network not only produces subjects loyal to the ideology of Vilayat-e-Faqih but also provides a recruiting pool for IRGC’s Quds Force. Such ideological underpinnings definitely motivate the graduates to fight in conflict zones and spread Khomenist ideology in their home countries.⁴¹ Since its establishment, Al Mustafa International, 30,000 future clerics and religious scholars has been graduate from Al Mustafa International, which serves in different countries spreading Khomenist ideology.⁴² Iran has also offered scholarships to Yemeni students belong to the Houthis and the Zaidis belong to the tribes of Sheikhs. Zaidis don’t follow Twellver Shia strand. By offering scholarships to such people in

³⁷ Firouz Sedarat, “Sattelite TV News Channels Widen Iranian Arab Gulf,” *The Reuters*, December 14, 2011, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-arabs-iran-television-idUSTRE7BD11Q20111214>.

³⁸ Ramin Mostaghim and Borouzu Daraghi, “Iran Starts its Own English News Channels,” *Los Angeles Times*, July 13, 2007, <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2007-jul-13-fg-presstv13-story.html>.

³⁹ Jordan Stekler, “Iran’s Ideological Expansion,” *United against Nulcear Iran*, June 18, 2018, https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/sites/default/files/expansion/iran%27s_ideological_expansion_report.pdf.

⁴⁰ Hasan Dai, “Al Mustufa International: Iran’s Network of Global Schools,” *Iranian American Forum*, April 12, 2016, <http://iranian-americans.com/irans-export-of-islamic-fundamentalism-al-mustafa-global-training-centers-2/>.

⁴¹ Jordan Stekler, “Iran’s Ideological Expansion,” 7-8.

⁴² Dai, “Al Mustufa International: Iran’s Network of Global Schools.”

Qom Iran tries to increase its through conversion of people.⁴³ Scholarships aren't limited to religious studies, but also cover Persian language and literature. Iran has opened Departments for Persian language and literature in different universities in its allies like Damascus University (opened in 2005).⁴⁴

Trade, Aid, and Financial Dependence

Since 2003, Iraq has become an important economic partner making Iran its second largest trading partner. Iran's soft economic power in Iraq isn't limited to Iranian exports to Iraqi markets but heavy investment in religious tourism, electricity, hydrocarbon, and construction and banking sectors. Here too, Iran remained conscious of Iraq's Shia centres as much of its investment is directed towards Holy cities of Kerbala, Najjaf and southern Iraq. Iraq is Iran's second largest non-oil market in 2007.⁴⁵ Iraq imports mostly non-oil commodities such as cement, gas and electricity. Despite of international sanctions, trade between two states increased in 2019 as Iran exported close to US \$9 billion goods.⁴⁶ Iranian soft power investment in Iraq doesn't aim only creating a favourable environment for Iran through construction of holy shrines and promotion of religious tourism but Iran is also concerned about the centrality of Najjaf in Shiite world that offers a parallel quietist Shiite tradition contrary to Vilayat e Faqih of Iran. Positioning for clerical succession of Najjaf after Grand Ayatullah Ali Sistani (who is facing health issues) is a concern of great importance for Iran. In absence of clear succession alternative, Iran tries hard to expand influence of Vilayat e Faqih in Najjaf. Muqtada al Sadr, who has lived in Qom and studied under Ayatullah Kazem al Haeri who is an Iraqi cleric but upholds Khomeni's version of clerical rule of Vilayat e Faqih. Appointment of Ayatullah Abdullah Mahmood Sharoudi as the Guardian of the Jurists for in Iraq in 2011 by Ayatullah Khamenei was an attempt to expand Iranian influence but strongly opposed by Ayatullah Ali Sistani. Hence one can conclude that

⁴³ Daryl Urbina, "IRGC and Iranian Soft and Hard Power Influence in Middle East," (B.S Thesis, University of Central Florida, 2018).

⁴⁴ Nadia von Maltzahn, "The Case Of Iranian Cultural Diplomacy In Syria," *Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication* no. 2 (2009): 43-45.

⁴⁵ Frederick W. Kagan, Ahmad Majidyar, K Pletka, Danielle Sullivan, and Marisa Cochrane, "Iranian Influence in the Levant, Egypt, Iraq, and Afghanistan," *American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War* (2012): 71-72.

⁴⁶ "Iraq to Establish Special Mechanism for Trade with Iran," *Radio Farda*, July 2, 2019, <https://en.radiofarda.com/a/iraq-to-establish-special-financial-mechanism-for-trade-with-iran-w/30033685.html>.

Iran's investment in Najaf and Kerbala can't come at the expense of Qom, the Iranian theological centre.⁴⁷

Syrian Government has granted lucrative contracts to IRGC companies after the seizure of Aleppo. On the visit of Syrian Prime Minister Imad Khamis, Tehran and Damascus have signed several agreements ranging from telecommunication to construction; awarding contracts to IRGC affiliated Iranian companies. IRGC has successfully progressing in its mission to consolidate long term influence in Lebanon and Syria through its economic soft power assisting its hard power.⁴⁸

Iran also signed a number of joint economic agreements with Houthis in oil, electricity, aviation and sea transit after the deposition of President Ali Abdullah Saleh. The agreements pledged construction of electricity plants in Ade, Hodeida and Taiz, expansion of port of Hodeid, reconstruction of Yemeni infrastructure and creation of Sky Bridge to increase bilateral trade. These agreements blatantly declared that Iran and Houthis were bonafide allies. Operation Decisive Strom by Saudi led coalition started in March 2015 and bonafide allies couldn't materialise their joint economic agreements.⁴⁹ After 2006, Lebanese Israel war, Iran provided Hizbullah with \$150 million, including \$10,000 of donations for the victims of Israeli aggression. Most interesting thing in this financial aid was the catch phrase: "The Zionist enemy destroys; the Islamic Republic of Iran builds."⁵⁰

Iran's Hard Power: State and Non-state Actors

Supporting armed non-state actors has been a pillar of Iran's strategy towards Middle East since 1979. Iran pursues a range of objectives through these armed groups. The most important is to seek access to geographic areas to project its influence to decrease influence of US presence and to confront Iran's regional rivals, Saudi Arabia and Israel. Over the course of four decades, Iran has developed significant deterrent

⁴⁷ Kagan, Majidyar, Pletka, and Sullivan, "Iranian Influence in the Levant, Iraq, and Afghanistan," 73-74.

⁴⁸ Ahmad Majidyar, "IRGC's Khatam-al-anbia Eyes Leading Role in Syria's Reconstruction," *Middle East Institute*, December 13, 2017, <https://www.mei.edu/publications/irgcs-khatam-al-anbia-eyes-leading-role-syrias-reconstruction>.

⁴⁹ Hassan Al-Qadhi, "The Iranian Role in Yemen and Its Implications on the Regional Security," *Arabian Gulf Centre for Iranian Studies*, 2017, <https://rasanah-iiis.org/english/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2017/12/>.

⁵⁰ A. Shadid, "With Iran Ascendant, U.S. Is Seen at Fault: Arab Allies in Region Feeling Pressure," *Washington Post Foreign Service*, January 30, 2007. www.washingtonpost.com/dyn/content/article/2007/01/29/AR2007012902090_pf.html/.

capacity by forging ties with non-state actors to protect its interest in case of confrontation with its rivals. Hezbollah in Lebanon, militant groups in Iraq, Islamic Jihad and Hamas in Palestine severely constrain Iran's rivals' margin of manoeuvres against the Islamic Republic. By supporting these armed groups, Islamic republic gains position for itself as indispensable player to influence decision-making process in home lands of its non-state allies or proxies.⁵¹

Iran's support for non-state armed actors is motivated by three considerations

1. Support to Hezbollah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad (the anti-Israeli organisations), provides Iran with opportunity to garner popularity in the Sunni Arab world.
2. Support is driven by self-image of Iran, being de-facto leader of oppressed Shi'a communities in the region.
3. Finally the support is driven by Iranian quest to deter its enemies while having conventional military weakness.⁵²

Iran hedges its bets by developing ties with multiples actors by providing them political military and financial support keeping in view the cost and benefit analysis according to the possible future utility of these actors. Iran quickly creates new partners when an old one becomes a difficult partner. Muqtada al Sadr tried to distance itself from Iranian interest in Iraq; Iran started investing in breakaway factions (Asa'ib Ahl ul Huqq and Kata'ib Hezbollah) of Sadr's movement. Both are small, more manageable and dependent on Iran but important actors on Iraqi scene.⁵³

Hezbollah: A Proxy that has Emerged as State

Hezbollah, a socio-political and military organisation of Lebanon was founded in June 1982. It shares ideological synergy with Iranian Revolution and enjoys close relationship with Islamic Revolution Guard Corps.⁵⁴

Hezbollah pledged its allegiance to Khomeini and then Ayatullah Khamenie, A devout in its adherence to the philosophy of vilayat e faqih. According to Hassan Nasrullah, Khomeini told the delegation that visited Tehran in 1982, to "rely on God and predict about the victories that we now see." The meeting led to the arrival of 1,000 IRGC soldiers in Lebanon

⁵¹ Thomas Juneau, "Iran's Policy towards the Houthis in Yemen: A Limited Return on a Modest Investment," *International Affairs* 93, no. 3 (2016): 649.

⁵² Marc R. Dvornak, "Exploring the Hezbollah Iran Relationship: A Case Study of How State Sponsorship Affects Terrorist Group Decision Making?" *Perspectives on Terrorism* 6, no. 4-5 (October 2012): 90.

⁵³ Juneau, "Iran's Policy towards the Houthis in Yemen," 649.

⁵⁴ M. Mahtab Alam Rizvi, "Evaluating the Political and Economic Role of the IRGC," *Strategic Analysis* 36, no. 4 (2012): 587.

to provide military training to the Hezbollah fighters. So Hezbollah formally emerged in Feb 1985.⁵⁵

Financial and military support from Tehran to Hezbollah is passed through Al Qods, the elite branch of IRGC making it a medium between Islamic Republic and Hezbollah. In 2010, According to the U.S. Department of Defence, Hezbollah received roughly \$100 million to \$200 million annually.⁵⁶ Hasan Nasrullah openly admitted in a publicly broadcasted speech in June 2016, that Hezbollah solely relies on Tehran and denies having any business ventures. "We are open about the fact that Hezbollah's budget, its income, its expenses, everything it eats and drinks, its weapons and rockets, come from the Islamic Republic of Iran,"⁵⁷ Anoushiravan Ehteshami believes, Hezbollah serves as bridge between Arab world and Iran.⁵⁸ Sanctions imposed by Trump in 2018 have greatly affected Iranian financial assistance to Hezbollah forcing the organisation to cut its 2019 budget. Thus affecting both hard and soft ventures of Hezbollah as its fighters have reassigned or furloughed on one hand and Al-Manar media group that serves Hezbollah in Lebanon, also have to laid off staff along with cancelling its programming on the other.⁵⁹

Hezbollah isn't only an Iranian proxy driven by the ideology of Resistance but it's a political party that has penetrated its roots in Lebanese society and polity through charities, education and TV channels. Through Hezbollah, Iran aims to create a state within a Lebanese state by delegitimizing the official status of state until it is co-opted with Hezbollah or over thrown.⁶⁰ Hezbollah began its political journey in 1992 by winning eight of the 128 Parliamentary seats. Hezbollah won 23 seats and in the 2009 election by defeating "March 14" alliance supported by US. Hezbollah and its allies won 70 seats in 2018.⁶¹

⁵⁵ Counter Extremism Project, Hezbollah, 3, https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/threat_pdf/Hezbollah-07252019.pdf.

⁵⁶ Greg Bruno, "State Sponsors: Iran," *Council on Foreign Relations*, October 13, 2011, <http://www.cfr.org/iran/state-sponsors-iran/p9362>.

⁵⁷ Agence France-Presse, "Hezbollah Brushes off US Sanctions, Says Money Comes Via Iran," *Times of Israel*, June 25, 2016, <http://www.timesofisrael.com/hezbollah-brushes>.

⁵⁸ Anoushiravan Ehteshami, *The Foreign Policy of Iran*, The Foreign Policies of Middle East States (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 298.

⁵⁹ Liz Sly and Suzan Haidamous, "Trump's Sanctions on Iran are Hitting Hezbollah, and it Hurts," *Washington Post*, May 18, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/trumps-sanctions-on-iran-are-hitting-hezbollah-hard/2019/05.

⁶⁰ Rubin, "Strategies Underlying Iran's Soft Power."

⁶¹ "Hezbollah's Nasrallah says Lebanon Results Are 'Victory' for the Resistance," *Reuters*, May 7, 2018, [https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-election-hezbollah/hezbollahs-](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-election-hezbollah/hezbollah/hezbollahs-)

Hezbollah has fought Iranian war in Syria alongside Syrian National Army to protect Iranian ally, the Assad regime. So, Hezbollah's role and influence isn't limited to Lebanon, but serves the Iranian interest beyond Lebanese borders. It has fought against Daesh, a Wahabi threat to Iran and Hezbollah both. Hassan Nasrullah in an interview in 2014 rejected the view that, Hezbollah has fought against ISIS to protect Iranian and Syrian interest as to him, Daesh, "is an extential threat to Lebanon too". Iranian enemies are Hezbollah enemies. Hassan Nasrullah is very vocal to express his anger on Saudi involvement in Yemen as he regards Saudi Arabia's Wahabi ideology as "more evil than Israel."⁶²

Hezbollah al Hejaz: Incongruence Dilemma between Iran and Kingdom

Hezbollah al Hejaz, The Party of God in Hejaz (KSA), allegedly is a successful attempt of Islamic Republic to export Hezbollah's model to Gulf to threaten Gulf monarchies. Those who believe in Iran's strong role in formation of Hezbollah al Hejaz, argues that Iran ventures to capitalise the grievances of Shiites of Gulf, chafing under Sunni regimes through groups like Hezbollah al Hejaz.⁶³ The group was established after the clashes between Shiites pilgrims and Saudi security forces in 1987. The group met with violent resistance by Saudi security apparatus and dismantled. But in 2015, the name surfaced again with the arrest of Ahmed al Mughassil, the leader of military wing. He was hiding in Lebanon and was accused of Khobar bombings of 1996. Saudi authorities claim, he wasn't famous among Saudi Shiites, but claims couldn't be verified due to the closeness of Saudi state and society.⁶⁴

Iran: Hard Power, Non-state Actors and State of Iraq

Iraq is of vital importance for Iran as its gateway to Levant. Countering American presence in Iraq and shaping the Iraqi state, are two driving factors for Iran to deepen its influence. Iran opted for tactical strategic approach on both fronts in Iraq. Significant number of militia members has now been integrated in Iraq's political structure. The rivalries among different militia groups and political factions help Iran to strengthen its control as it keeps the state weak with contesting factional rivalries. Iran doesn't pose to have relationship of command and control on Iraqi militias but of mentorship. Iran's security concerns in Iraq have evolved through different stages, from the American presence to counter

⁶² "Counter Extremism Project," 4-6.

⁶³ Stekler, "Iran's Ideological Expansion," 42.

⁶⁴ Hassan Al Mustafa, "Hezbollah al Hejaz: A Story not Yet Written," *Al Arabiya*, October 1, 2015, <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2015/10/01/Hezbollah->.

the leviathan of ISIS. IRGC and Al Qods under Qasem Soleimani, are the primary actors, involved in designing and training the Shia' militias in Iraq. Hashad ul Shaabi or PMU (Popular Mobilisation Front), since 2014 is the primary conduit for expanding Iranian influence in Iraq, created through Ayatullah Ali Sistani's fatwa to fight against Daesh, Hashad ul Shaabi is an alliance of diverse militia groups mostly Shia' groups. Not all Shia' groups are under Iranian flag, as some of them are loyal to Ali Sistani and some follow Muqtada al Sadr but their presence is evident in all Iraqi governorates except Kurdish region. However, Iran exercises substantial influence over PMU as Jamal Jaafar Mohammad al-Ibrahimi (widely known as Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis), an Iraqi militant who spent most of his life in Iran is considered as the face of Iranian interest in PMU and Iraq. Despite of being deputy, he is the single most strongest actor in PMU, (till his death in American drone strike in Baghdad on January 3, 2020. Important point to note here is, most of the Iranian backed groups in PMU share ideological synergy with Iran as they adhere to Vilayat-e-Faqih.⁶⁵ IRGC oversees, funding training and coordination of PMU, which gained popular support of Iraqi Shiite population as it was perceived as a Shiite resistance to protect Shiites from Daesh and earned popularity of majority of Iraqi population. PMU's leadership is often criticized by Ali Sistani for its authoritarian conduct specially those who are pro-Iran like Muhandis.⁶⁶ Iraqi parliament passed a law, to institutionalise PMU as an official permanent military corps. The law was supported by majority of Kurdhish, Shiite and Sunni members of the Parliament. The dominant Shi'a identity of Iraq provided IRGC a basis to increase and prolong its presence on Iraqi soil. PMU 's role isn't limited to battle field as it provides Iran with better ability to achieve its hegemonic goals in society, economy and politics of the region.⁶⁷ Recently Iraqi parliament passed a resolution to end US led coalition's presence in Iraq. The vote was boycotted by Sunni and Kurd members who believe, American presence is necessary for Iraq's security. Mainly Iran backed Shia' factions in parliament moved the resolution. Interestingly not all Iraqi Shia's favour evacuation of foreign forces as demonstrators in Shia' dominated Southern Iraq and Baghdad demanded

⁶⁵ "Iran's Network of Influence in Middle East, A Strategic Dossier," *IJSS*, November 2019, 121-158, <https://www.ijss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/iran-dossier>.

⁶⁶ Mansour and Jabbar, "Popular Mobilisation Forces and Future of Iraq," *Carnegie Middle East Center*, 2017, https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/Carnegie_MidEast-CMEC_63_Mansour_PMF_Final_Web.pdf.

⁶⁷ Sardar Aziz, "The Dangers of the Institutionalization of Iraq's Popular Mobilization Units," *The Washington Institute*, 2017, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/the-dangers-of-the-institutionalization-of-iraqspopular-mobilization-units>.

genuine reforms and reduction of Iranian influence in Iraq during street protests.⁶⁸

Iran's Hard Power in Syria, Palestine and Houthis

Iran praised the level of destabilization in the aftermath of Arab Spring, and defined Islamic Awakening as the extension of its own revolution. But in Syria, this Islamic Awakening couldn't win Iran's moral support. Instead, Iran claimed that Arab uprising in Syria was by product of Western conspiracy and interference to weaken Assad's regime. Assad regime is the valuable ally of Iran and its being functioning authority in Damascus guarantees smooth flow of supply by IRGC to Hezbollah. Syria is part of Iran's Axis of Resistance, formed to resist American and Israeli influence.⁶⁹

Iran protected Assad Regime and helped the liberation of Syrian territories from occupation of Daesh. Iran utilised Shiite Militia to maintain Assad in power. Iran created Shabiah militia or National Defense force that worked on the pattern of Iranian Basij militia. General Qasem Soleimani of Al Qods force played central role in formation of NDF. 7,000 Iranian and Iraqi fighters fought under the guidance of Qods Force and IRGC in Syrian Civil War. 5,000 Iraqi Shiite fighters, 5,000 Hezbollah fighters and 18,000 Afghan and Pakistani Shiite fighters were deployed by Qods Force to aid Assad Regime.⁷⁰ General Mohammad Ali Jafri the former head of IRGC, admitted, Iran is assisting Houthis of Yemen. This statement is a move that has negated Iran's claims of negation of providing assistance to Houthis. General Jafri, openly expressed the keenness of IRGC to assist the resistance front in Yemen if the people and government in Yemen seek IRGC's help against Saudi aggression.⁷¹

In 2006 when Hamas came to power, U.S and EU cut of funding to Palestine, Iran quickly pledged \$50 million aid to Hamas. Karim Sadjapour is of the opinion that Iran on one hand claims that Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah are indigenous forces and enjoy merely a moral support from Tehran. But Iran at the same time claims that road to peace to Middle East must go through Tehran as Iran enjoys great leverage over these armed actors. He believes, Iran provided huge material support to Hamas because Iran desires to be the regional power and the vanguard of Muslim

⁶⁸ Jaboori Rafid, "Call for US troops Withdrawl from Iraq Continue as Al Amiri Emerges as Leader of PMU," *Terrorism Monitor*, January 14, 2020, <https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/TM-Jan.-14-2020-Issue.pdf?x17103>.

⁶⁹ Mohsen Milani, "Why Tehran Won't Abandon Assad(ism)," *The Washington Quarterly* 36, no. 4 (2013): 84-85.

⁷⁰ Urbina, "IRGC and Iranian Soft and Hard Power Influence in Middle East," xli-xlii.

⁷¹ Ibid., li.

world. By supporting Hamas, Iran endeavours to diminish the Shiite-Sunni divide and keeps the Israel at bay. As Gaza provides a more fertile land for potential conflict with Israel and saves Lebanese-Israeli border guarded by Hezbollah.⁷² No accurate figures are available for Iranian economic and military support to Hamas. Only speculative estimates of Israeli authorities circulate as Israeli Chief of Staff, General Gadi Eizenkot, claims, Iran provides Hamas and other Palestinian factions with \$100 million a year. This prompted, PM Netanyahu to speculate that half of Palestinians are under Iranian influence. Hamas also don't hesitate to hide its disappointment towards Arab states and leaders. On the other hand, Hamas is being perceived as Iranian proxy by rich Gulf capitals. Anwar Grgash, Foreign Affairs Minister of the United Arab Emirates, accused Hamas in November 2018 being a tool for Iran to expand its regional influence. Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister, Adel Jubeir took severe position by explicitly stating that Hamas' relationship with the Arab capitals largely depend on Hamas attitude of distancing itself from Iran. Hamas, did not pay much attention to these overtures as these rich Arab capitals don't offer alternative financial and military support for the movement.⁷³

The scene on Yemen's front isn't different. According to a confidential UN report, Tehran has been shipping weapons to Houthis of Yemen since 2009. The report, presented to the Security Council's Iran's sanctions committee stated that Tehran's support dates back to the early days of Shiite militia insurgency in Yemen. The panel reported on an investigation conducted on the seizure of the Iranian ship, Jehan that was carrying weapons for Houthis in 2013. The weapons included anti-tank and anti-helicopter rockets.⁷⁴ So Tehran supports Houthis with both hard and soft power tools.

Conclusion

From the above analysis, the study concludes, Iran's *modus operandi* in supporting non-state actors (which in most cases have evolved into state actors, like Hezbollah, PMU, Badr Corps, Sadrist militia, Hamas and Houthis) are characterised by presence of two common

⁷² Karim Sadjadpour, "Iran Supports Hamas but Hamas isn't Iranian Puppet," *Council on Foreign Relations*, January 7, 2007, <https://www.cfr.org/interview/iran-supports-hamas-hamas-no-iranian-puppet>.

⁷³ Dr Adnan Abu Amir, "Hamas Iran Alliance Remains and Expands," *Middle East Monitor* January 14, 2019, <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20190114-the-hamas-iran-alliance-remains-and-expands/>.

⁷⁴ Carole Landry, "Iran Arming Yemen's Houthi Rebels: UN Report," *Middle East Eye* May 1, 2015, <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iran-arming-yemens-houthi-rebels-2009-un-report>.

features, (a) instability, (b) dissatisfaction towards state structure. Islamic Republic penetrates through hard and soft power tools in state and societies where central authority proves to be weak in provision of physical and economic security. Islamic Republic invests in like-minded actors or creates the like-minded actors based on its ideology like Shi'a militias, which are driven by the narrative of resistance as propagated by Iran and also loyal to Velayat-e-Faqih as explained above. Moreover, the success of Iran in states in Middle East is also dependent on exploiting the fault lines that create distance between state and society. Iran employs both soft and hard power tools. Its hard power assists its soft power and its soft power assists its hard power. By reaching people of the region through media, education institutions, welfare organisations Iran built a long lasting connection between people in its ally states.

As Aminiyan rightly said, Iran knew the region and it developed connection with the people of the region, unlike U.S who didn't know the region and mostly rely on hard power.⁷⁵ Same goes for the Arab states, who failed to lead Palestinian cause and this failure provided space for Iran that defying all sectarian boundaries, assisted Palestinian groups and people. Hence the Shiite Crescent, described by King Abdullah of Jordan has become full moon⁷⁶ in four decades through the strategies of smart power employed by intellectual inherits of Nizam ul Mulk Toosi. But one can't ignore the fact that this full moon is not shining alone in the Middle Eastern sky as the rising challenges in Iraq and Lebanon are trying to shake the favourable status-quo of Iran that is rightly depicted by Takhsheed when he says, "creating influence even through soft power isn't easy and it does not seem Iran is in position to maintain its desirable status quo because no state can act freely not even global powers and Iran may be a Umm ul Qorra e Jehani Islami (The mother of the Muslim world) for majority Shia's of the world but not for Saudi or Emirates' Sunni Muslims and not even for all Shia's."⁷⁷

⁷⁵ `Aminiyan, Interview ; Lapidus, Ira, *History of Islamic Societies* (London: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 151.

⁷⁶ "Fear of Full Shia Moon," *The Guardian*, January 26, 2007, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jan/26/worlddispatch.ianblack>.

⁷⁷ Dr. Mohammad Reza Takhsheed, interview by Mehreen Bibi, February 23, 2019, Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Tehran.

REJUVENATING PAK-TURK TIES: AN APPRAISAL

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ABSTRACT

Every nation state strives to protect its interests through its external relations with other states. Pakistan and Turkey have traditionally enjoyed cordial relations embedded in shared history, religion, cultural linkages as well as political interests. Both have taken up common causes and stood by each other in their trying times. Over recent years, both are forging closer ties to strengthen economic, diplomatic and defence cooperation. They have expressed deep concerns over rising Islamophobia and boosted counter-terrorism collaboration. They have also strongly supported the struggling people of Kashmir and Palestine and made efforts to resolve Afghan and Syrian crises. The article examines the dynamics of growing Pak-Turk bilateral ties in the realms of economy, military, infrastructure development and cooperation in the international political arena. It argues that changing global context and shared political, security and economic challenges are bringing them closer. The bilateral ties are poised to grow further as political leadership on both sides find it mutually beneficial.

Keywords: Islamophobia, Counter-terrorism, Military Cooperation, Trade, Kashmir, Afghanistan

Introduction

Pakistan and Turkey have a long shared history. Both are Muslim countries and support unity among Muslim Ummah. Even before the independence of Pakistan both countries had been cooperating on different fronts. The Muslims of the sub-continent extended moral and financial support to Turkey in the nineteenth century Crimean War.¹ They

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¹ "Turkey-Pakistan Friendship: From Past to Present," *Daily Sabah*, February 20, 2020, <https://www.dailysabah.com/op-ed/2020/02/13/turkey-pakistan-friendship-from-past-to-present>.

also extended support to Turkey in its war of independence following World War I. They launched the Khilafat Movement to support Turkey. Hence, the foundation of present-day relations and the growing strength of goodwill and brotherhood between their peoples can be traced back to the nineteenth century. Even today, there are roads across Pakistan's major cities named after the founding father of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Reciprocally, in Ankara there is a major road named after Pakistan's founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah. In 1947, Turkey and Pakistan established diplomatic ties as Turkey quickly recognized creation of Pakistan and supported its membership of the United Nations.

After independence when Pakistan issued its own currency in 1948, it was Turkey that printed Pakistani money in the early months.² Turkey and Pakistan have many things in common like both were close allies of the US during the Cold War era and signatory to Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), Regional Cooperation for Development Organization (RCD), and shared many other international platforms.³ During the dismemberment of Bangladesh, Turkey extended full political, diplomatic and even military support to Pakistan. Pakistan has always supported Turkey on Kurdish and Cyprus issues. The two states share the membership of important international organisations like Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) and the D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation. Although during 1990s, both diverged on Afghanistan as Pakistan backed Afghanistan-based Taliban and Turkey supported the Northern Alliance. This caused a rare misunderstanding between the countries but after 9/11 their perspectives converged in the context of Afghanistan. In addition, both states hold unique geostrategic position in their respective geostrategic milieu. Significantly, Pakistan is the only Muslim-majority country to possess nuclear weapons while Turkey has NATO membership. The relationship has become stronger in the recent years as there has been greater convergence of interests between the two countries spanning over economic, military and political arena. This paper examines the dynamics of growing ties between the two countries and argues that they are likely to become stronger in the coming decades.

² Thomas Clayton, "Afghanistan: Background and US Policy in Brief," Congressional Research Service 1 April, 2018, <https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc1157192/>

³ Abdul Aziz Ahmet Yasar, "Now Is the Time to Strengthen Turkish-Pakistani Relations," *TRT WORLD*, January 4, 2019, <https://www.trtworld.com/turkey/now-is-the-time-to-strengthen-turkish-pakistani-relations-23075>.

Forging Ahead: Growing Convergences and Partnership

In the recent years, the area of shared interest has grown between the two countries. There have been high-level official exchanges between the two countries, including top political leadership. Recep Tayyip Erdogan has visited Pakistan several times officially, since he became Turkish prime minister in 2002. Similarly, Pakistan's Presidents and premiers have paid official visits to Turkey. The high levels official visits and meetings have created deeper understanding of each other's concerns and interests, which has promoted greater cooperation between the two countries, particularly on international issues. As a corollary, today both the states are witnessing an ever high level of cooperation and collaboration on multiple issues and fora. This cooperation has burgeoned in the area of counter-terrorism, fighting against Islamophobia, economic and defence cooperation and most importantly on Kashmir issue.

Counter Terrorism Cooperation

In the post-2001 world, global terrorism brought Pakistan and Turkey together in terms of mutual interests and shared responsibilities. Both countries have been facing the threat of terrorism to their internal security. The then Prime Minister of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in his maiden visit to Pakistan in the summer of 2003 laid the foundation of renewed cooperation between both states. In return, the president of Pakistan Pervaiz Musharraf visited Turkey the following year that expanded bilateral cooperation of issues including terrorism and organised crime. Responding to international terrorism, Turkey and Pakistan, in January 2004, signed a treaty of 'Fight against International Terrorism and Organized Crime' (FAITOR).⁴ The agreement highlighted counter-terrorism and organised crime as major areas of concern for both countries. The two sides also agreed to have closer cooperative arrangements to counter organised crime and international terrorism.⁵

In December 2013, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and visiting President Erdogan agreed to increase cooperation in the field of counter-terrorism and security. In this context, a protocol signed by the two countries provided for the framework for security and counter-terrorism

⁴ "Compendium of Bilateral and Regional Instruments for South Asia: International Cooperation in Criminal Matters," *UNODC Regional Office* 2015, https://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Publications/SAARC%20compendium/SA_Compendium_Volume-1.pdf.

⁵ "Anti-Terrorism Accord Signed, Pakistan-Turkey Talks Focus on Defence Cooperation, Trade," *Dawn*, January 21, 2004, <http://www.dawn.com/news/403813>.

cooperation.⁶ In August 2015, President Erdogan and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in a meeting in Islamabad agreed to expand cooperation in countering terrorism by including possible threat from militant group Islamic State and other such organisations.⁷ Subsequently, in June 2019, Turkish and Pakistani officials met in Ankara and reviewed threats posed by international terrorism at regional and global level. They “reiterated their resolve to jointly combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations.”⁸

In a statement, it was avowed that the fight against terrorism and extremism requires a comprehensive approach at global and regional levels whereas eradicating the root causes was deemed essential for combating extremism. They also agreed “to explore further avenues of cooperation between the two countries including the exchange of best practices in areas such as law enforcement/security, criminal justice and rule of law, countering financing of terrorism and prevention of radicalization.”⁹ Turkey and Pakistan also discussed the threat posed by terror group such as Daesh in the Middle East and other parts of the World. In addition, both the states put forward strong condemnation of “the vicious acts of terrorism” in Sri Lanka and New Zealand. It was also accentuated that terrorism cannot and should not be portrayed as an ascribed trait of a single nation, religion, civilisation or an ethnic group.

Another episode of significant cooperation and friendly ties between both the states was reflected at Financial Action Task Force (FATF) forum when Turkey, among two other states resisted the move by the US and the UK to put Pakistan on the Black List alleging its failure to curb terror financing from its soil. However, in an unprecedented second discussion on Pakistan, FATF placed Pakistan on its ‘grey list’ in June 2018, where Turkey was the only state that withstood with Pakistan and opposed the move. Turkey along with China and Malaysia has continued their support to Pakistan on FATF issue. In his speech in the Pakistan Parliament in June 2020, President Erdogan reiterated that Turkey would stand by Pakistan against any political pressure by the intergovernmental FATF. He appreciated “Pakistan’s efforts to combat terrorism.” He underscored: “Pakistan is a country that has suffered from instability, terrorism and conflicts in its region. As a country that has been fighting

⁶ “Pakistan, Turkey to Bolster Counter Terrorism Cooperation,” *Dawn*, December 25, 2013, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1076292/pakistan-turkey-to-bolster-counter-terrorism-cooperation>

⁷ Mateen Haider, “Pakistan, Turkey Agree to Enhance Counter-Terrorism Cooperation,” *Dawn*, August 1, 2020. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1197821>

⁸ Ali Murat Alhas, “Turkey, Pakistan Discuss Counter Terrorism Efforts,” *Anadolu Agency*, June 2, 2019, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/turkey-pakistan-discuss-counter-terrorism-efforts/1495200>

⁹ Ibid.

separatist terrorist organizations including Daesh (ISIS), the PKK and Fetullah Terrorist Organization(FETO) for 35 years, we understand the challenges Pakistan faces and we will continue to support Pakistan in its efforts against terrorism.”¹⁰ He appreciated Pakistan for supporting Turkey in times of crisis, as a true friend. Pakistani government handed-over the administrative control of FETÖ-sponsored schools to Turkish Government¹¹ and backed Turkey’s anti-terror operations in northern Syria to secure its borders.¹² Pakistanis also launched a support Turkish Lira campaign by buying the Turkish currency when the US slapped sanctions on two Turkish ministers over the issue of an American pastor being detained in Turkey on terror charges.

Convergence on Afghanistan

Since 9/11, Pakistan and Turkey are on the same page in Afghanistan. The cooperation started in September 2006 with the Ankara Declaration, where Afghan and Pakistani leaders agreed to build their relationship in the future on the basis laid down in their joint statement. Terrorism was considered a "common threat" and they vowed to "deny sanctuary, training, and financing to terrorists and to elements involved in subversive and anti-state activities." Commitments were also made to enhance confidence building measures by forming a "Joint Working Group". This was further consolidated by Turkey-Afghanistan-Pakistan Trilateral Summit Process (2007) and Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process (2011). Turkey also took many initiatives towards Afghanistan’s economic development and stability. Turkey’s development assistance program for Afghanistan was launched in 2004, which was worth 1.1 billion dollars.¹³ Besides, a pledge of 60 million dollars for sustaining Afghan security forces was made at Warsaw NATO Summit in 2016.¹⁴ These initiatives further strengthened Pak-Turk ties.

¹⁰ Sibel Morrow and Faruk Zorlu, "Kashmir is as Important to Turkey as it is to Pakistan," *Anadolu Agency*, February 14, 2020, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/-kashmir-as-important-to-turkey-as-it-is-to-pakistan-/1733770>.

¹¹ "Turkey takes over FETO-linked Schools in Pakistan," *Anadolu*, January 03, 2019, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/todays-headlines/turkey-takes-over-feto-linked-schools-in-pakistan/1354576>.

¹² "Turkey to Stand with Pakistan on Kashmir Issue, Erdoğan Says," *Daily Sabah*, February 14, 2020, <https://www.dailysabah.com/diplomacy/2020/02/14/turkey-to-stand-with-pakistan-on-kashmir-issue-erdogan-says>.

¹³ "Turkey-Afghanistan Bilateral Political Relations," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_afghanistan-bilateral-political-relations.en.mfa, last accessed January 16, 2020.

¹⁴ Ibid.

Shared Concern on Islamophobia

Pakistan and Turkey have raised their shared concerns regarding rising Islamophobia in the western world. After the attack on two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand at an emergency meeting of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Turkish President Erdogan said: "Just as humanity fought against anti-Semitism after the Holocaust disaster, it should fight against rising Islamophobia in the same determined fashion."¹⁵ Similarly, Prime minister Imran Khan while addressing the reporters at a news conference at the United Nations General Assembly in 2019, talked of taking effective steps against incidents based on religious discrimination, especially faced by Muslims in the Western countries.

Muslims living in the western societies are being subjected to Islamophobia. This is because on the international stage terrorism and Islam have been forcefully associated. Yet truthfully, no religion has anything to do with terrorism, but all religions have fanatics.¹⁶ In the same vein, President Emmanuel Macron's outlook on Islam and France's strict policies for Muslims have time and again forced President Erdogan to respond in harsh terms and stand up against Islamophobia. In addition, in September 2019, Pakistan, Turkey and Malaysia agreed to jointly launch an English language television channel dedicated to counter Islamophobia. This offered Muslims a dedicated media presence for raising awareness on Islam and fighting the phenomenon of Islamophobia internationally.

Support on Kashmir

Both Turkey and Pakistan have advocated Muslim causes. Islamabad has always supported Ankara's position on Cyprus, while the latter has supported Islamabad's stance on Jammu and Kashmir.¹⁷ Turkey has traditionally stood by Pakistan's position on Kashmir, which calls for a free plebiscite in Kashmir under the supervision of the United Nations as envisaged in UN Security Council Resolutions on Kashmir. Ankara was quite critical of abrogation of the Article 370 by India in August 2019, according limited special status to Kashmir under Indian control. Turkey

¹⁵ "Erdogan Calls For Fight Against Islamophobia Like Anti-Semitism," *Aljazeera*, March 22, 2019, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/3/22/erdogan-calls-for-fight-against-islamophobia-like-anti-semitism>

¹⁶ Ayaz Gul, "Pakistan, Turkey, Malaysia to Jointly Launch Anti-Islamophobia TV," *Voice Of America*, September 26, 2019. <https://www.voanews.com/south-central-asia/pakistan-turkey-malaysia-jointly-launch-anti-islamophobia-tv>

¹⁷ EurAsian Times Desk, "Khan-Erdoğan Further Deepen Historic Turkey-Pakistan Relations," *EurAsian Times*, February 14, 2020, <https://eurasianimes.com/khan-erdogan-further-deepen-historic-turkey-pakistan-relations/>.

not only supported Pakistan's stance but also strongly criticised India for taking steps that have only complicated the problem and emphasised that any solution that can only be reached through dialogue in line with UN resolutions and - the will of people of Kashmir.¹⁸ Erdogan also underscored that Kashmir is the key to the stability and peace of South Asia.

At the 74th General Assembly, Erdogan said that "in order for the Kashmiri people to look at a safe future together with their Pakistani and Indian neighbours, it is imperative to solve the problem through dialogue and on the basis of justice and equity, not through clashes." He said residents of Jammu & Kashmir are "virtually under blockade with 8 million people, unfortunately, unable to step outside of Kashmir."¹⁹ In February 2020, while addressing a joint session of Pakistan's parliament, President Erdogan stated that the issue of Kashmir is as important to Turkey as it is to Pakistan. "It was Canakkale [Gallipoli] yesterday and it is Kashmir today, [there is] no difference."²⁰ He was referring to a critical battle in the Turkish War of Independence. He observed that the suffering of the Kashmiris had worsened in recent years due to India's taking of "unilateral steps" and "this approach, which aggravates the current situation and revokes the freedom and vested rights of the Kashmiri people, benefits no one". He observed that "the Kashmir problem can be solved not by conflict or oppression, but on the basis of justice and equity."²¹

Economic Collaboration

In the past 72 years, Pakistan and Turkey have joined hands in various economic and defence treaties. Turkey, Pakistan and Iran formed Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) in July 1964 to enhance socio-economic cooperation between the three countries. In 1985, the RCD was converted into Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). The ECO was also expanded, and Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan were included in its fold.

Pakistan and Turkey have enhanced their cooperation in the economic, health, energy and defense sectors, ever since Justice and

¹⁸ "No Difference Between Gallipoli and Occupied Kashmir: Erdogan Stands by Pakistan in Parliament Speech," *Dawn*, February 14, 2020, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1581209>

¹⁹ Zehra Nur Düz, "Turkish Leader's Remarks on Kashmir Win Wide Acclaim," *Anadolu Agency*, September 25, 2019, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/74th-un-general-assembly-2019/turkish-leaders-remarks-on-kashmir-win-wide-acclaim/1594264>

²⁰ Sibel Morrow and Faruk Zorlu, "Kashmir as Important to Turkey as It Is to Pakistan."

²¹ Ibid.

Development (AK) Party headed by Erdogan came into power in Turkey. Turkish company, Zorlu Enerji Holdings set up a 100 MW solar project at Quaid-i-Azam Solar Park in the Bahawalpur district of Punjab in 2019. Turkey's Coca Cola company has also shown interest to invest \$200 million in Pakistan in next two to three years. The Recep Tayyip Erdogan Hospital Trust has been running four major hospitals and two blood transfusion centres in Punjab. Besides, the trust is running a hospital in Muzaffargarh district of Punjab since 2014. Turkey also provided substantive assistance to Pakistan in its rehabilitation efforts for the victims of 2005 massive earthquake in Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) that killed over 80,000 persons, and during devastating floods of 2010 and 2011. Turkish government provided housing facilities to over 2000 flood victims in Thatta district in Sindh province. According to Turkish Ambassador to Pakistan Mustafa Yurdakul, Turkish companies are interested in investing in Special Economic Zones (SEZ) to be set up under CPEC in Pakistan. He suggested visit of a delegation of Turkish businessmen to Pakistan to explore business opportunities in SEZs.²²

Turkey is a developing business economy, and as indicated by CIA World Factbook, it is a recently industrialized nation with the thirteenth biggest GDP by purchasing power parity.²³ If we trace the beginnings, post 1999, there is a dynamic augmentation of trade relations between the two states. In this context, the activity of High-Level Cooperation Council (HLCC) has been indisputable, a couple of social events have been held since 2010. Currently there are seventeen Turkish firms working in Pakistan. Turkish investment is mainly coming in infrastructure, energy projects, and financial sector. Construction is emerging as a major sector for Turkish investors in Pakistan.²⁴ The bilateral trade has slowly grown over the past decade or so. The volume of trade, which was 133 million in 1990 increased marginally to 136 million in next ten years.²⁵

The existing bilateral trade between Turkey and Pakistan is around \$800 million which is far less, keeping in view, the potential of

²² Amir Latif, "Overview of Unconditional Turkey-Pakistan Relations," *Anadolu Ajansı*, January 3, 2019, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/overview-of-unconditional-turkey-pakistan-relations-/1354618>.

²³ "The World Factbook: Turkey," *Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)*, February 1, 2018, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html>.

²⁴ "Turkey-Pakistan Economic and Trade Relations," *Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, accessed June 25, 2020, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-commercial-and-economic-relations-with-pakistan.en.mfa.

²⁵ "From Rep. of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs," *Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, accessed May 15, 2020, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_pakistan-high-level-cooperation-council-meeting-was-held-in-islamabad.en.mfa.

common market of both countries which is billions of dollars. Exports from Turkey to Pakistan over the past 11 years have risen from \$155 in 2008 to \$352 million in 2017. Similarly, Turkey's imports from Pakistan in the same period declined from \$586 million to \$323 million.²⁶ In fact, both countries need a long term Free Trade Agreement (FTA) to ensure sustainable growth in their trade turnover. The bilateral trade is likely to increase with the signing of a Strategic Economic Framework in February 2020, which will boost the bilateral trade from a current volume of 800 million USD to eventually 5 billion USD. Many Protocols and Memorandums of Understandings (MoUs) were signed in the fields of trade, energy, tourism, defence, and infrastructure development. 450 Business-2-Business (B2B) meetings were conducted between the business communities of engineering, energy, tourism, construction, automotive, chemicals, defence, and information technology.²⁷

Table: 1
Turkey's Trade with Pakistan: 2014-2019 (In million US\$)

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Export	259	289.1	347	352.3	462	550.1
Import	436	310.5	262	323.1	330	306.3
Volume	695	599.6	610	675.4	792	865.4
Balance	-177	-21.4	+84	+29.2	+132	+243.8

Source: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-commercial-and-economic-relations-with-pakistan.en.mfa

Major export items of Turkey are communication instruments, cameras, machines, etc., while major import items to Turkey include textile fiber, plastic, cotton, polyester and natural synthetic substances.²⁸ The five identified potential items include semi or entirely processed rice, medicinal instruments, fresh and dry dates, men's pants, and stick or beet sugar, that are further exportable to Turkish market. In such manner, an exhaustive investigation of these items needs to be done with regard to Pakistan's rivals in Turkish market based on ECI positioning, to send out offer, Average unit value, trade advancement methodologies, levy and non - tax boundaries. Islamabad Chamber of Commerce & Industry, President, Muhammad Ahmed Waheed has urged that Pakistan and Turkey should

²⁶ Turkish Statistical Institute (Turk Stat) data.

²⁷ Syed Baqir Sajjad, "Pakistan, Turkey to Transform Ties into Economic Partnership," *Dawn*, February 16, 2020, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1534568>.

²⁸ Filiz Sekerden, "Status of Textile and Clothing Imports and Exports in Turkey," *Fibres & Textiles in Eastern Europe* 3, no. 86 (2011): 7-9.

sign FTA as early as possible that would increase bilateral trade to US\$ 2 billion in a couple of years.²⁹

China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)

Economic power is moving towards East and Pakistan is a gateway for Asia. Pakistan through CPEC is striving towards infrastructure and connectivity. The economic potential for Pakistan will be realized only when trade is prioritized. In case of Turkey, currently companies have invested around \$1.5 billion in Pakistan. The investment opportunities in CPEC and other sectors in Pakistan are lucrative especially keeping the access to the Central Asian and other markets. Turkey itself offers to the equation as it can connect China with Europe, where Pakistan connects China's western landlocked province of Xinjiang to the Middle East, Africa and beyond. This makes Pakistan-Turkey economic and commercial relationship of utmost significance. Turkey has shown great interest in the 9 Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in CPEC in Pakistan. With its recent economic growth, it has expertise and technology to offer Pakistan which would accelerate industrialization, exports and economic growth. It generates \$35-36 billion revenue annually from tourism alone which is also an up and coming industry of Pakistan.³⁰ The demand for joint partnerships, ventures and business to business relations in the industrial, agricultural, tourism, construction, education, human resource development and healthcare sectors as well as CPEC in Pakistan make for a profitable relationship for Turkey.

Defence and Military Cooperation

Pak-Turk military ties became even more significant when Pakistan confronted hurdles on the upkeep of F-16s it was given by the U.S. In 2015, Turkey and Pakistan agreed to arrange crucial unmanned airborne vehicles. Turkey would equip Pakistan with 34 T-37 contender cum-preparing flying machine and its extra parts on a complimentary reason. Pakistan and Turkey expressed long-term interest by cooperating in the defense sector under framework of strategic partnership act signed in 2016. In 2016, Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) consented to modernize the Pakistan Air Force's team of F-16s at the cost of \$75 million.³¹ Turkish firm STM also signed contract with the Pakistani Navy

²⁹ "Turkey is Willing to Explore SEZs under CPEC," *CPEC INFO*, March 13, 2020, <http://cpecinfo.com/turkey-is-willing-to-explore-sezs-under-cpec/>

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Omer Aslan, *The United States and Military Coups in Turkey and Pakistan*, (Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018)

for the upgradation of Pakistan's submarines in 2016.³² The modernization will include "entire sonar suite of the submarine ship, periscope systems, and command and control system, as well as the radar and electronic support systems, and command and control system, as well as the radar and electronic support systems" which will be replaced by Turkish military software developed by HAVELSAN.³³

In 2017, Turkey obtained 52 MFI-17 Super Mushshak training planes from Pakistan and it remains the second most conspicuous member (after China) in Pakistan's International Defence Exhibition and Seminar.³⁴ In 2018, Turkey agreed to sell 30 Turkish-made Advanced Attack and Tactical Reconnaissance (ATAK) helicopters worth \$1.5 billion to Pakistan, thus strengthening the military relations between the two.³⁵ ATAK helicopters are indigenously produced by the TAI under permit from the Italian-British Agusta-Westland and are great resources for the Turkish Army. Ankara also agreed to sell four MILGEM Ada Corvettes to the Pakistan Navy.³⁶

Another area of collaboration could be based on Pakistan's interest in understanding the operational dynamics of the Russian S400 missile defence system, which Turkey purchased. It is extremely significant for Pakistan to understand its operational framework and map out a strategy. Yet there are issues in the way that would have to be resolved such as Pakistan's relations with certain Arab states that see Turkey as a major threat. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia are getting uneasy about Pakistan's close relationship with Turkey.

³² Capt HPS Sodhi, "Pakistan Navy's Emerging Underwater Threat," *Center for Air Power Studies*, July 8, 2016, http://capsindia.org/files/documents/CAPS_Infocus_HPS_12.1.pdf

³³ "Despite French Sanctions, Turkey Making Progress in Pak's Agosta 90B Sub Upgrade," February 26, 2020, https://www.defenseworld.net/news/26416/Despite_French_Sanctions_Turkey_Making_Progress_in_Pak_s_Agosta_90B_Sub_Upgrade#.YCunsWgzayI

³⁴ Franz-Stefan Gady, "Pakistan to Sell 52 Military Aircraft to Turkey," *The Diplomat*, May 12, 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/pakistan-to-sell-52-military-aircraft-to-turkey/>

³⁵ Saim Kurubas, "Turkey-Pakistan Military Relations Reach New High," *TRT World*, June 7, 2018, <https://www.trtworld.com/turkey/turkey-pakistan-military-relations-reach-new-high-17910>.

³⁶ Bilal Khan, "Pakistan Inks Contract for 4 MILGEM Ada Corvettes from Turkey," *Quwa Defence News & Analysis Group*, July 7, 2018, <https://quwa.org/2018/07/07/pakistan-inks-contract-for-4-milgem-ada-corvettes-from-turkey/>.

Shared Vision on Climate Change

Turkey and Pakistan have also prioritized climate change since both are highly vulnerable. Natural disasters such as frequent earthquakes and floods, have caused increased water stress and land degradation. Both countries are experiencing economic losses from flooding and landslides. On both sides remedial efforts have centered on cleaner production, waste management, green initiatives and efficient and sustainable use of water and other natural resources. The National Rural Development strategy initiated in Turkey 2006 centers on natural resources based rural development as a key to overcoming rural and urban disparities. Turkey's Ninth Development Plan (2007-2013) emphasizes its commitment to climate change. Pakistan has also achieved the UN Sustainable Development Goal 13 for protecting the environment well before the 2030 deadline. Key initiatives like "Billion Tree Tsunami" and clean-green Pakistan programs have helped achieve this target, which proves the seriousness of efforts to tackle climate change. Pakistan's National Climate Change Policy adopted in 2012 and a framework for implementing this policy in 2013 as well as Pakistan Vision 2025³⁷ all prioritize climate change for action, identifying it as a compounding challenge for providing food, energy and water security for a large population. Currently, there are funded adaptation programs focused on water resource management, agriculture, and disaster risk management.

Challenges and Future Prospects

In recent years, geopolitics has forced both countries to re-align themselves according to emerging situation in their respective regions; and globally; as both nations have become victim of terrorism, intolerance and insecurity. The contemporary leadership in both countries has thus resolved to coordinate and take the partnership to new a diplomatic height which has also sent a message of solidarity to the international fraternity, paving a way for integration of Muslim Ummah.

Pakistan and Turkey are trying to play a leadership role for the Muslim countries in the world and within this context the speeches made in the United Nations General Assembly in September 2019 are very significant. The emerging partnership can play a pivotal role in reviving the unity of the Muslim Ummah. However, Turkey has longstanding issues with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan has to maintain a balanced relationship with both Muslim countries. This dynamic was reflected during Malaysia's Kuala Lumpur Islamic Summit in 2019 where Pakistan withdrew its participation after accepting the invitation. The controversy further

³⁷ "Pakistan 2025: One Nation - One Vision," Ministry of Planning, Development and Reform, <https://www.pc.gov.pk/uploads/vision2025/Pakistan-Vision-2025.pdf>.

escalated as President Erdogan alleged that Pakistan backed out under Saudi pressure. Pakistan has been a long-term ally of Saudi Arabia which viewed the summit as a challenge to its leadership role in the OIC and the Muslim world.

Besides, forging politico-strategic ties, both countries have started the negotiations for Free Trade Agreement (FTA) to actualize the dreams of optimizing bilateral trade volumes for mutual benefits. The two countries have signed about dozen MoUs while the Strategic Economic Framework aims at enhancing the trade from \$700 million to \$6 billion by 2022-23. The agreements include standardization, conformity assessment, development and training, development and facilitation of tourism, custom cooperation matters, railway infrastructure and much more.

Expanding economic and trade relations would remain a big challenge, as concrete steps are still somewhat lacking between the two countries. There are several contributing factors such as the safeguard duties that Turkey has laid on Pakistan's textile products since 2011, contributing to decline in exports.³⁸ The additional duties were also imposed on carpets and rugs, compounding the adverse effect on exports. While for the longest time Pakistan was excluded from the GSP-Plus facility, but its inclusion since January 2014 has encouraged progress in enacting new laws and developing new institutions for implantation of 27 core conventions of GSP-Plus, especially the National Action Plan (NAP) for human rights.³⁹ In comparison to Turkey's trade with India, Pakistan has not been able to reap the benefits of Turkey's economic boom.

Another underutilized area of cooperation is a softer angle, but extremely important to rejuvenate relations, i.e., is the people to people contact. It is necessary to build on the warm feelings the citizens have for each other. As seen in the case of Turkish drama 'Ertugul' and how it created a bridge of communication in spite of language barrier between the people of both countries, media will play an important part in this goal. The lack of knowledge and information about each other, absence of cultural centers and dearth of academic exchanges need to be remedied.

Some important areas of future prospects are given below:

1. In the education sector the opportunities are vast: educational and professional training opportunities, educational scholarships etc. Turkey can open campuses of their universities in Pakistan, whereas Pakistan can fill Turkey's gap of providing education in English language. Moreover, an exchange program for area studies,

³⁸ Shahbaz Rana, "Pakistan Wants Cut In Custom Duty on 35% of Tariff Lines," *The Express Tribune*, August 6, 2016, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1156527/fta-talks-turkey-pakistan-wants-cut-customs-duty-35-tariff-lines>.

³⁹ Mubarak Zeb Khan, "Pakistan Wins GSP-Plus Extension," *Dawn*, March 7, 2020, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1538967>.

better understanding of each other through research, learning of Turkish language in Pakistan and Urdu in Turkey are also some possibilities worth exploring.

2. The public on either side receives news on each other through third parties, this gap can be filled by media outlets either syndicating their news channels or setting up journalists reciprocally in Pakistan and Turkey.
3. As Turkey focuses on industrial economy and is a member of G-20, it can consider relocating its industries to Pakistan especially home appliances. Pakistan can import Turkish dairy products and refrigerators, washing machines, electronic goods, automobiles etc., which are said to be qualitatively better and cheaper than the Western and Japanese products. Turkey can import dry fruits handicrafts from Pakistan. Similarly, Turkish agro-based industries could help Pakistan in milk processing and meet our needs of imported cheese from the EU.

Conclusion

Pakistan- Turkey relationship that is rooted in their history has grown phenomenally in recent years. Convergence of interests is reflected in cooperation in the fields of counter-terrorism and Islamophobia, joining hands in stabilising Afghanistan, growing military and economic collaboration, and extending support to just struggles of the Muslims. Further, CPEC offers vast possibility to expand Turkish investment in Special Economic Zones in Pakistan. An early conclusion of FTA can also boost bilateral trade between the two countries. There are also shared perceptions on taking effective measures to tackle climatic threats faced by the two countries. Cultural and educational exchanges can further promote friendly ties between the two counties. Politically, however, Pakistan will have to maintain a balance in its relationship with its traditional Arab allies and Turkey.

Book Reviews

Title: **The Battle for Pakistan
The Bitter US Friendship and a Tough
Neighbourhood**
Author: **Shuja Nawaz**
Publisher: Liberty Publishing, Karachi, 2020, 374

Shuja Nawaz has the unique advantage of having access to both the Pentagon and the General Headquarters at Rawalpindi. The book thus gives an insiders' account of events since 2007 from diverse perspectives. It adds to the interest of the readers that the book covers recent history with most of the characters still alive and in clear memory. In the introduction the author has shown an apprehension of being termed as traitor for revealing hitherto shrouded facts and clarifies that he is an American and a Pakistani. For sure, he can't be termed a traitor, however while going through the book it can be ascertained with equal surety that he is first an American and then a Pakistani. In a way he has lent legitimacy to Shashi Tharoor's allegation echoing late 19th century Prussia — not a state with an army but an army with a state.

The book feels like a suspense thriller story where in an unending cycle the military, the Inter Services Intelligence Agency and the civilian political leadership in Pakistan continue to spook each other and simultaneously wraith the USA. And USA reciprocates wholesomely in the same coin influencing every institution of the country. In the words of Arnold Zeitland: *"(Shuja) Nawaz has created, perhaps, inadvertently, another dark, tragic comedy of duplicity, chaos, misunderstanding, miscommunication, backstabbing, and betrayal"*.

"The Battle For Pakistan" begins with the political adjustments underway in 2006 when President Musharraf wanted to accommodate Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif through a National Reconciliation Ordinance. Musharraf was ready to share power, as a dominant partner but the others were not interested in such a deal. During the time, President Musharraf was also engaged in combating the 'Lawyers Movement'. Benazir Bhutto landed in Pakistan in October 2007, to be assassinated at Rawalpindi after having survived an earlier attempt in Karachi. Despite the tragedy, the elections were held giving power at the center to Bhutto's Peoples' Party. Shuja Nawaz was a first-hand witness to Bhutto's deliberations in the US and provides an insight into her parleys.

In the US too, the guard had changed. President Obama was elected on the electoral promise of quitting the unpopular wars. There were confusions, contradictions and problems in decision making, with State Dept, CIA, Military on one side and on the other was Richard Holbrooke. Ultimately, Obama announced the faulty exit timetable from Afghanistan

alongside a surge in number of troops. With George W Bush gone, the post-9/11 Mush-Bush 'bromance' had also faded away. Pakistan had been a Non – NATO Ally and had received US aid and support as a result of that relationship. Time had changed.

Shuja Nawaz has laid special emphasis on 2011, the American raid killing Osama Bin Laden in Abbottabad plunged U.S.-Pakistan relations abysmally low. To add, the Americans attack on a Pakistan border position (Salala) near the Afghan border, killing 24 Pakistani regulars and the shooting of two Pakistanis in a Lahore by Raymond Davis made the conditions even worse. As if these were not enough, the memogate scandal further helped in creating mistrust. Author's narrative adds to the understanding of how these happened and give different points of view refreshing the wounds that were inflicted on Pakistan during this chaotic period.

Shuja Nawaz highlights that Pakistan remains an aid dependent country living from handout to handout rather than reshaping its landscape and rightly using her resources. He has dedicated a chapter to the Financial Aid which Pakistan received from the United States, involving failures on both sides. Allegedly there were misappropriations, inflated claims and undue beneficiaries. The author also discusses the questionable Kerry-Luger bill supposedly prioritizing the civilian aid to Pakistan and criticized by the Army. Doubts have been raised about the aid's disposal and never endingly allege Pakistan Army to have been running with the hares and hunting with the hounds.

The author keeps the Pakistan's civilian leadership in an apparent disrepute not just for their empty rhetoric and poor governance skills but also their actions swerving into autocracy and kleptocracy. He portrays General Kayani's persona as a bigger than life and has given him a large share of space in the book. The other person he keeps in high esteem is General Mattis, he led 100 US Marines in a stealth landing along Makran Coast and established "Camp Rhino" in Afghanistan, this happened to be the first Forward Operating Base. He also admires him for his plan to nab Osama Bin Laden in Tora Bora by encircling him. He was asked not to, an opportunity wasted; it took a decade to get to Bin Laden.

Shujah Nawaz's suggestions for establishing lasting peace in South Asia and a developed Pakistan with improved relations with USA are too wishful. His ideas of US opening its discussions with Iranians rather than taking a confrontational path, ending the condition of no war no peace to improve Pakistan's economic conditions, federation of Pakistan working in harmony with provincial parties and crafting trans-frontier economic links and the emergence of a Pakistani confederation are almost impossible to be materialized in prevailing global milieu.

At times the author drifts into to trivial details, and in doing so wastes time of the readers. Why shall the reader be interested in the font and spacing of letters handed over to certain authorities? While

mentioning the incumbent Director General of Inter Services Intelligence Agency, He refers to an incorrect previous assignment in the General Headquarters, one it wasn't necessary, two it shows either lack of information or callously handled issue: in both cases it dilutes the authority of the writer. Something interesting also emerges like a universal constant during reading. Richard Nixon in his famous "Seize the Moment (2001)" ridiculed the Muslim Leadership by advising Americans to look the other way when the circumstances forced their friends to denounce the Americans in public but cheer them in private. Alas! the same echoes in Shuja Nawaz's book in 2020.

The book is recommended for people interested in Pakistan's internal tug of war commonly termed as civil – military relations (*divide*) and how the US considers its relationship with Pakistan.

Reviewed by Mian Zahoor Ul Haq, PhD Scholar, Department of IR at NDU.

Title: **Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War**
Author: **Paul Scharre**
Publisher: W.W. Norton Company, April 24, 2018, 448

Paul Scharre is a retired army officer who is currently heading technology and national security program at the Center for New American Security. He took part in four tours with US army in Afghanistan and Iraq. Having ground fighting experience and as an expert of technology and warfare, he often writes on the subjects of warfare, technology, philosophy and psychology. In his recent book under the title of "Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War" published by Norton and Company he argues the notion of autonomy in weaponry because of technological advancement and its future implications. The book is comprised of six (6) parts and twenty one (21) chapters.

The subject matter of the book revolves around three questions. The primary or central question is about the episteme of autonomous weapons systems and changing the nature of warfare. The derivative or secondary questions include impacts autonomous weapons systems on national (US) and global security, potential AI arms race, legal and ethical debate regarding autonomous weaponry. The third question is about the future outlook of warfare in context autonomous weapons. Contextually, subject of autonomous weapons raises epistemological and ontological questions regarding the notions of autonomy, legality, lethality, speed, reach, mobility and cognition of autonomous weapons systems and further argues the intelligence of machines (weapons) and investigates the faculties of intelligence such perception, detection, selection and execution of tasks or operations using the chief faculty of cognition.

Arguably, it holds the argument that quantitative era of weapons is being transformed into another era of qualitative weapons and resultantly it weapons are becoming more and more lethal with ever increasing rate of autonomy. This scenario is undermining the human role of decision making or supervision in machines and if it will have unintended consequences on political, economic, moral/ethical, legal and security fronts. Autonomous weapons means machines that have the capacity to perform military operations/tasks without human input in terms decision making. Weapons include Aegis Combat System (a complex array of radars, missiles, and computers). It can launch its missiles automatically through a special feature of auto-special. Humans can abort a strike but autonomous weapons systems cannot do this because of absence of moral impulse and fear destruction.

Another significant argument rose in the book that advance militaries are keen to increase the role of autonomous weapon systems in the area of securitization. They are of the opinion that autonomy in

weapon systems is likely to give them strategic leverage over others. That is why flock of unmanned vehicles is becoming new armies of advance militaries. That is to say unmanned vehicles are becoming more-smaller, more-lighter, more-faster with enhanced mobility having cheap costs. Scharre further argues that it is logical to infer that self-driving cars are forerunner of self-driving tanks and jets. With the help of other features like auto-image identification and facial recognition these weapon systems are becoming existential for modern militaries. These enhancing potentialities are generating conditions for advance militaries like Russia and China to enter into the era of AI arms race.

For author, there are three crucial events that provide sufficient rationales that AI arms race is undergoing slowly but it is likely to escalate in the near future. In the first place, US replaced principle threat from terrorism to Russia and China which means future AI arms race is inevitable as it happened between US and USSR in the form of space arms race during the Cold War. In the second place, aforementioned countries announced a massive budget for more research and development in the area of Artificial Intelligence. In the third place, now countries have launched National AI Strategies and national security has become part of their National AI Strategies converse to the previous ones in which the focus of national security was on other elements. This manifests an enhancing trend of AI arms race among the major great players of global politics. Scharre vividly explains that incorporation of cognitive features into weaponry will revolutionize the conduct of warfare. Therefore, for good reasons the fully autonomous weapons systems are going to be subject of legal and ethical debates. Legal debate refers to use of autonomous weapons systems in context of international law and ethical debate raises concerns that investing on machines (autonomous weaponry) that could take human lives without human input. Paul tries to explain moral debate through his own experience when he was posted in Afghanistan and Iraq some years back. He writes, he and his fellow soldiers were on the mission at the top of a mountain near Pak-Afghan border. A five/six year old girl was herding goats nearby their position. In the stillness of the mountain air, they were hearing her talk on radio with Taliban hiding nearby.

He argues, according to the rules of warfare she would have been shot as she was doing espionage for the combatant enemy. But they did not shot her because of their moral impulse as girl was noncombatant and was too young. Here, he argues if they were machines they would have shot dead the girl as machines don't have moral impulse or ethical consideration. The same conundrum can be applied to legal question. According to Geneva Protocols of 1949, it is codifies as violation of international law if any soldier or army kills noncombatant enemy but aforesaid event suggests that autonomous weaponry or machines neither take into account moral dimension nor legal dimension. Therefore, he

infers that this kind of misjudgment can occur and can annihilate notion of stability in crisis like situation.

Author's argument also raises concerns over the use of lethal autonomous weapons systems. He opines that conventional battlefield are likely to be filled by autonomous jets, tanks, missiles and other carriers which have various flaws in making judgments and calculations as they are solely driven by algorithms which can generate an auto-chain of more algorithms in order to perceive threats, detect enemy, select target, multiple engagements and execution. In the presence of lethal weapons like nuclear nuke or other lethal weapons; there is a likelihood of triggering first strike by the autonomous weapons as fully autonomous weapons systems cannot make reverse the actions as humans can. He argues, "Unlike humans autonomous weapons would have no ability to understand the consequences of their actions and no ability to step back from the brink of the war." Another issue is advanced drone technology coupled with AI driven image identification to destroy enemies place like ground-based mobile missile launchers as most of the nuclear states to rely on mobile missile systems for retaliation in the wake of first strike. In real times, it is almost impossible to maintain deterrence because of auto-chain algorithms from an adversary. Therefore, stability is compromised which means any catastrophic event can occur due to non-uniform autonomous weapons systems.

The book ends with exploration of international ban on fully autonomous weapons. Scharre argues that complete ban on absolute autonomous weapons is almost impossible but various features of autonomous weapons could be supervised and even banned. He also opines that international law should be amended and should have the elements of modern warfare so that legal binding should be reconciled with the times we live in.

Though, author pronounced a thought provoking discussion which seems logical but at the same time he did not took into account the other major issues like big data, non-uniform autonomous systems, alternative internet and approach of other powers like China and Russia regarding the autonomous or cognitive weaponry. It is like an expert is examining and investigating the art of warfare but avoids the approach of Sun Tzu's towards warfare. Furthermore, faculties of cognitive or autonomous weaponry are missing in his argument as AI is being modeled on humane intelligence and ignoring basic faculties of intelligence is irrational. Above all, Scharre often takes autonomy of weapon systems as absolute as human autonomy is, but scholars like Nick Bostrom and Horowitz are doubtful of absolute autonomy of weapon systems. Apart from these questions, the book received meaningful attention of policy makers and scholars because of its unique and relevant subject which is great contribution in the existing literature suggesting new avenues of insights

in terms of evolutionary human conditions and its relationship with technological advancement.

Reviewed by Khaqan Ahmad, PhD Scholar, Department of IR at NDU.

Title: China And The Middle East: Venturing Into the Maelstrom

Author: James M. Dorsey

Publisher: Spring International Publishing AG, 2019, 278.

The book, *Global Political Transitions: China and the Middle East: Venturing Into the Maelstrom*, is published by the Springer International Publishing in January, 2019. The author of the book, James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Singapore's Nanyang Technological University.

He is a seasoned author, columnist and award-winning foreign correspondent with an extensive expertise on ethnic and religious matters, politico-economic and social affairs of Middle East, North Africa, Southeast Asia and Central Asia. He has written many famous books including *Comparative Political Transitions Between Southeast Asia and the Middle East* and *North Africa: Lost in Transition*, *The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer* and *Shifting Sands: Essays On Sports And Politics In The Middle East And North Africa*.

This book has presented a detailed account of China's growing influence, its economic as well as security motives in the turbulent Middle East region and the implications of China's involvement on the regional dynamics. In the current competitive and conflictual world, where states pursue their own national interests at the cost of other's interests, it is very important to have a comprehensive analysis of China's long term geo-strategic ambitions especially in the already fragile Middle East region.

China's rise so far is attributed as "peaceful" and complies with the notion of "non-interference". It has time and again emphasized that it has no military ambitions rather it aims to advance mutual economic development in the region and beyond. However, the instability and turbulent political transitions in the Middle East region could pose a threat to China's security, particularly in the Xinjiang region.

The writer therefore maintains that with its strong emphasis and projection of the principle of non-interference in the internal matters of other states throughout its rise, China will now find it challenging to comply with this policy. This is mainly due to the reason that the increasing instability in Middle East, in recent years, has compelled China to redefine its security as well as economic interests in the impulsive region.

China's rise, undeniably, has become a much-discussed subject of debate of the century among the international scholars. There are very a few authors who have analyzed the great power politics from a regional lens, particularly focusing on widely neglected regions such as the Middle East. In this regard, this book is an excellent piece of work by James M. Dorsey, as he has very well delineated China's regional and extra-regional engagements, focusing specifically on Middle East and South Asia. He has

dissected the increasingly complex and interdependent relationship between the two i.e., China and the Middle East.

The central argument of the book revolves around the fading concept of China's firm insistence on its foreign policy principles of non-interference and refusal of establishing foreign military presence, thus solely guided by mutually beneficial economic relations. This is true to great extent as we observe the transforming regional dynamics particularly in Middle East and the diminishing role of United States in the region which is creating a power vacuum. This calls for China to reconsider its foreign policy approach as it falls short of what China requires to safeguard its security, strategic and economic interests.

The author has very well pointed out the foreseeable possibility that China will ultimately have to merge as a key regional power, in what he calls the 'competitive cooperation', with the existing dominant player; the United States. Here the notion of competitive cooperation is very interesting owing to the reason that China's increased regional and extra-regional engagement after its Belt and Road Initiative is happening at a time when it is managing to adjust with the United States in the current world order dominated by the latter.

The Belt and Road Initiative of President Xi Jinping holds immense significance for China and is part of the country's grand strategy. Many scholars argue that this mega project serves as a foundation for China to expand its economic influence across Asia, stretching to the Greater Middle East and beyond. China has time and again emphasized that BRI is an economic venture directed towards mutual development and prosperity, and that the Chinese investments do not imply obtrusive conditions. Nevertheless, China at the same time also wishes that its partners support China in various conditions for example in limiting relations with Taiwan, in Uyghur extremist issue, its stance on Tibet, its stance in United Nations Security Council, and last but not the least in giving Chinese companies priority in economic projects.

On the other hand, China has attributed its rise as peaceful, focused on "mutual economic progression", particularly the Belt and Road Initiative and its related components. For example, according to the Chinese perspective, the Silk Road Fund and the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank are regarded as providers, which shuns China's perception of free-rider of international public goods.

Furthermore, the complex and conflict ridden Middle East region has made China's adherence to its official foreign policy principles of non-interference, resistance to extend military influence, and its focus on mutually beneficial "win-win" economic relations, unclear. The author maintains that this approach would no longer guarantee China's long-term interests in Greater Middle East. Interestingly, China has tried not to repeat the mistakes that US made in the region but as argued by Mr. James

M Dorsey also, China has gradually began to realize that it eventually will be sucked into the vortex of regional conflicts and politics.

The current century is witnessing rapid developments, new power centers emerging and evolving regional dynamics. The heartland of world, Eurasia, as defined by Mackinder has become the new attraction of great powers as well as the rising ones. Against this backdrop, the author argues that in the contemporary international system, the Western and Asian giants are not the key powers alone. In fact, states like Saudi Arabia, Iran etc. have also become significant players as they have considerable influence on Eurasia's energy landscape and control over oil market, cultural and religious outlook, and the infrastructure networks of the region.

Thus the anti-China alliance in the making by United States has brought together India, Japan and Russia to balance China so that it does not emerge as the sole dominant power in Eurasia. These efforts are supplemented by nations playing the role of potential spoilers in the Middle East, thereby giving rise to anti-China sentiments and reservations against the Belt and Road Initiative. James Dorsey has highlighted various reasons for the rise of anti-Chinese sentiments in the Middle East, which include China's increasing military presence in the region, its trading policies and practices in the BRI. The outcome of great powers struggle for dominance in Eurasia however remains unpredictable, but China will no doubt be a key player, as author writes.

China for the first time exclusively presented its Middle East policy in the Arab Policy Paper published in year 2016. The paper, however, failed to give an account of policies regarding China's approach to region's conflicts and the comprehensive framework for countering extremism and political violence. It focused on the same old principles of non-interference and win-win mode of cooperation. Therefore China would have to realign its regional policies by assuming a greater role as key player. China faces a very difficult challenge to avoid entangling in the complex wars, conflicts and rivalries pertaining the region.

The author has called for Chinese policy community to realign China's foreign policy taking the region's intricacies and complexities into account. China should reconsider its non-interference policy particularly in the Middle East as it threatens its security and economic interests in the longer run. Moreover, he informs China of being extremely cautious in its policies while dealing regional players, regional rivalry, ethnic groups, and the regime threatening elements engulfing the Middle East region.

This book is very interesting and informative, as it gives in-depth analysis of China's aims and involvement in the greater Middle East while taking into account the internal dynamics of the region. This is a great book for those who have interest in areas like foreign policy of rising powers and Middle East politics. I support the argument of James M Dorsey that while observing realities on ground, it can be concluded that

increased political turmoil and tensions in Middle East has compelled the emerging Asian giant to diverge from its traditional policy of non-interference. Much attention until now has been placed on great powers dealing with China's rise and vice versa, and very less attention has been devoted to how the third world countries view the rise of this economic giant and what aims China hold in the region. This book, thus, presents in-depth study of impact of China's rise with respect to the third world countries.

Reviewed by Minahil Afridi, MPhil Student at the Dept. of IR NDU

Documents

Document: 1

Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Which is not Recognized by the United States as a State and is Known as the Taliban and the United States of America, February 29th, 2020.

A comprehensive peace agreement is made of four parts:

1. Guarantees and enforcement mechanisms that will prevent the use of the soil of Afghanistan by any group or individual against the security of the United States and its allies.
2. Guarantees, enforcement mechanisms, and announcement of a timeline for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Afghanistan.
3. After the announcement of guarantees for a complete withdrawal of foreign forces and timeline in the presence of international witnesses, and guarantees and the announcement in the presence of international witnesses that Afghan soil will not be used against the security of the United States and its allies, Taliban will start intra-Afghan negotiations with Afghan sides on March 10, 2020.
4. A permanent and comprehensive ceasefire will be an item on the agenda of the intra-Afghan dialogue and negotiations. The participants of intra-Afghan negotiations will discuss the date and modalities of a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire, including joint implementation mechanisms, which will be announced along with the completion and agreement over the future political roadmap of Afghanistan.

The four parts above are interrelated and each will be implemented in accordance with its own agreed timeline and agreed terms. Agreement on the first two parts paves the way for the last two parts.

Following is the text of the agreement for the implementation of parts one and two of the above. Both sides agree that these two parts are interconnected. The obligations of the Taliban in this agreement apply in areas under their control until the formation of the new post-settlement Afghan Islamic government as determined by the intra-Afghan dialogue and negotiations.

PART ONE

The United States is committed to withdraw from Afghanistan all military forces of the United States, its allies, and Coalition partners, including all non-diplomatic civilian personnel, private security

contractors, trainers, advisors, and supporting services personnel within fourteen (14) months following announcement of this agreement, and will take the following measures in this regard:

- A. The United States, its allies, and the Coalition will take the following measures in the first one hundred thirty-five (135) days:
 - 1) They will reduce the number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan to eight thousand six hundred (8,600) and proportionally bring reduction in the number of its allies and Coalition forces.
 - 2) The United States, its allies, and the Coalition will withdraw all their forces from five (5) military bases.
- B. With the commitment and action on the obligations the Taliban in Part Two of this agreement, the United States, its allies, and the Coalition will execute the following:
 - 1) The United States, its allies, and the Coalition will complete withdrawal of all remaining forces from Afghanistan within the remaining nine and a half (9.5) months.
 - 2) The United States, its allies, and the Coalition will withdraw all their forces from remaining bases.
- C. The United States is committed to start immediately to work with all relevant sides on a plan to expeditiously release combat and political prisoners as a confidence building measure with the coordination and approval of all relevant sides. Up to five thousand (5,000) prisoners of the Taliban and up to one thousand (1,000) prisoners of the other side will be released by March 10, 2020, the first day of intra-Afghan negotiations. The relevant sides have the goal of releasing all the remaining prisoners over the course of the subsequent three months. The United States commits to completing this goal. The Taliban commits that its released prisoners will be committed to the responsibilities mentioned in this agreement so that they will not pose a threat to the security of the United States and its allies.
- D. With the start of intra-Afghan negotiations, the United States will initiate an administrative review of current U.S. sanctions and the rewards list against members of the Taliban with the goal of removing these sanctions by August 27, 2020.
- E. With the start of intra-Afghan negotiations, the United States will start diplomatic engagement with other members of the United Nations Security Council and Afghanistan to remove members of the Taliban from the sanctions list with the aim of achieving this objective by May 29, 2020.

- F. The United States and its allies will refrain from the threat or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Afghanistan or intervening in its domestic affairs.

PART TWO

In conjunction with the announcement of this agreement, the Taliban will take the following steps to prevent any group or individual, including al-Qa'ida, from using the soil of Afghanistan to threaten the security of the United States and its allies:

1. The Taliban will not allow any of its members, other individuals or groups, including al-Qa'ida, to use the soil of Afghanistan to threaten the security of the United States and its allies.
2. The Taliban will send a clear message that those who pose a threat to the security of the United States and its allies have no place in Afghanistan, and will instruct members of the Taliban not to cooperate with groups or individuals threatening the security of the United States and its allies.
3. The Taliban will prevent any group or individual in Afghanistan from threatening the security of the United States and its allies, and will prevent them from recruiting, training, and fundraising and will not host them in accordance with the commitments in this agreement.
4. The Taliban is committed to deal with those seeking asylum or residence in Afghanistan according to international migration law and the commitments of this agreement, so that such persons do not pose a threat to the security of the United States and its allies.
5. The Taliban will not provide visas, passports, travel permits, or other legal documents to those who pose a threat to the security of the United States and its allies to enter Afghanistan.

PART THREE

1. The United States will request the recognition and endorsement of the United Nations Security Council for this agreement.
2. The United States and the Taliban seek positive relations with each other and expect that the relations between the United States and the new post-settlement Afghan Islamic government as determined by the intra-Afghan dialogue and negotiations will be positive.
3. The United States will seek economic cooperation for reconstruction with the new post settlement Afghan Islamic government as determined by the intra-Afghan dialogue and negotiations, and will not intervene in its internal affairs.

Signed in Doha, Qatar on February 29, 2020, in duplicate, in Pashto, Dari, and English languages, each text being equally authentic.

Source:<https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf>.

Document: 2**Xi Jinping's Speech at Extraordinary China-Africa Summit on Solidarity against COVID-19, CGTN, June 17th, 2020.**

Chinese President Xi Jinping on Wednesday delivered a speech titled "Defeating COVID-19 with Solidarity and Cooperation" at the Extraordinary China-Africa Summit on Solidarity against COVID-19 via video conference from Beijing, calling for more efforts to mobilize necessary resources, stick together in collaboration, and do whatever it takes to protect people's lives and health and minimize the fallout of COVID-19.

Your Excellency President Cyril Ramaphosa,

Your Excellency President Macky Sall,

Your Excellencies Heads of State and Government,

Your Excellency Moussa Faki Mahamat, Chairperson of the African Union Commission,

Your Excellency António Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations,

Your Excellency Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Director-General of the World Health Organization,

At such a critical moment in the global fight against COVID-19, we are gathered together in this Extraordinary China-Africa Summit. Friends old and new are connected via video link to discuss our joint response to COVID-19 and to renew the fraternity between China and Africa. I thank President Ramaphosa and President Sall for joining me in initiating the Summit, and I appreciate the participation of all colleagues present. I also want to send my regards to other African leaders who are not able to be with us today.

The sudden onslaught of COVID-19 has taken a heavy toll on countries around the world, with the loss of several hundred thousand precious lives. Here, I suggest that we observe a moment of silence for those who have tragically passed away due to COVID-19 and express our condolences to their families.

— In the face of COVID-19, China and Africa have withstood the test of a severe challenge. The Chinese people have put up a fierce fight and made enormous sacrifice to bring the situation in China under control. Still, we remain mindful of the risk of a resurgence. In the same spirit, governments and peoples in Africa have put up a united front and, under the effective coordination by the African Union, have taken strong measures to effectively slow the spread of the virus. These are indeed hard-won results.

— In the face of COVID-19, China and Africa have offered mutual support and fought shoulder to shoulder with each other. China shall always remember the invaluable support Africa gave us at the height of our battle with the coronavirus. In return, when Africa was struck by the

virus, China was the first to rush in with assistance and has since stood firm with the African people.

— In the face of COVID-19, China and Africa have enhanced solidarity and strengthened friendship and mutual trust. Let me reaffirm China's commitment to its longstanding friendship with Africa. No matter how the international landscape may evolve, China shall never waver in its determination to pursue greater solidarity and cooperation with Africa.

Colleagues,

COVID-19 is still affecting many parts of the world. Both China and Africa face the formidable task of combating the virus while stabilizing the economy and protecting people's livelihoods. We must always put our people and their lives front and center. We must mobilize necessary resources, stick together in collaboration, and do whatever it takes to protect people's lives and health and minimize the fallout of COVID-19.

First, we must stay committed to fighting COVID-19 together. China will continue to do whatever it can to support Africa's response to COVID-19. China will lose no time in following through on the measures I announced at the opening of the World Health Assembly, and continue to help African countries by providing supplies, sending expert teams, and facilitating Africa's procurement of medical supplies in China. China will start ahead of schedule the construction of the Africa CDC headquarters this year. China will work with Africa to fully deliver the health care initiative adopted at the FOCAC Beijing Summit, and speed up the construction of China-Africa Friendship Hospitals and the cooperation between paired-up Chinese and African hospitals. Together, we will build a China-Africa community of health for all. We pledge that once the development and deployment of COVID-19 vaccine is completed in China, African countries will be among the first to benefit.

Second, we must stay committed to enhancing China-Africa cooperation. To cushion the impact of COVID-19, it is important to strengthen Belt and Road cooperation and accelerate the follow-ups to the FOCAC Beijing Summit. Greater priority needs to be given to cooperation on public health, economic reopening, and people's livelihood.

Within the FOCAC framework, China will cancel the debt of relevant African countries in the form of interest-free government loans that are due to mature by the end of 2020. For those African countries that are hardest hit by the coronavirus and are under heavy financial stress, China will work with the global community to give them greater support, by such means as further extending the period of debt suspension, to help them tide over the current difficulty. We encourage Chinese financial institutions to respond to the G20's Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) and to hold friendly consultations with African countries according to market principles to work out arrangements for commercial loans with sovereign guarantees. China will work with other members of the G20 to

implement the DSSI and, on that basis, urge the G20 to extend debt service suspension still further for countries concerned, including those in Africa.

China hopes that the international community, especially developed countries and multilateral financial institutions, will act more forcefully on debt relief and suspension for Africa. China will work with the UN, WHO and other partners to assist Africa's response to COVID-19, and do it in a way that respects the will of Africa.

To help Africa achieve sustainable development is what matters in the long run. China supports Africa in its effort to develop the African Continental Free Trade Area and to enhance connectivity and strengthen industrial and supply chains. China will explore broader cooperation with Africa in such new business forms as digital economy, smart city, clean energy, and 5G to boost Africa's development and revitalization.

Third, we must stay committed to upholding multilateralism. In the face of COVID-19, solidarity and cooperation is our most powerful weapon. China will work with Africa to uphold the UN-centered global governance system and support WHO in making greater contribution to the global COVID-19 response. We oppose politicization and stigmatization of COVID-19, and we oppose racial discrimination and ideological bias. We stand firm for equity and justice in the world.

Fourth, we must stay committed to taking China-Africa friendship forward. The world is undergoing profound changes unseen in a century. Given the new opportunities and challenges we face, closer cooperation between China and Africa is needed, more than ever. On my part, I will stay in close touch with all of you, my colleagues, to consolidate our friendship and mutual trust, support each other on issues involving our respective core interests, and advance the fundamental interests of China and Africa and, for that matter, of all developing countries. This way, we will be able to take the China-Africa comprehensive strategic and cooperative partnership to a greater height.

Colleagues,

At the FOCAC Beijing Summit, we agreed to work together to build an even stronger China-Africa community with a shared future. Today's Extraordinary China-Africa Summit on Solidarity against COVID-19 is our concrete step to deliver the commitment we made at the Beijing Summit and to do our part in the international cooperation against COVID-19. I am convinced that humanity will ultimately defeat the virus, and that the Chinese and African people are poised to embrace better days ahead.

Thank you.

Source: <https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-06-17/Full-text-Xi-s-speech-at-China-Africa-summit-on-COVID-19-fights-Rp7hgf5tu0/index.html>

Document: 3**Communiqué of the Organization of Islamic Council (OIC) Contact Group on Jammu and Kashmir Virtual Emergency Meeting Held at the Ministerial Level, June 22nd, 2020.**

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the OIC Contact Group on Jammu and Kashmir participated in the Emergency Virtual meeting of the Contact Group on Jammu and Kashmir held on 22 June 2020. The OIC Secretary General chaired the meeting. Having heard a detailed briefing from the Foreign Minister of Pakistan over the recent developments in Indian Occupied Jammu & Kashmir (IOJ&K),

The Ministerial meeting:

Took note of the recent developments and expressed deep concern over the worsening human rights and humanitarian situation in IOJ&K since India's illegal and unilateral actions of 5 August 2019.

Welcomed the statement issued by the UN Secretary General of 8 August 2019 affirming that the position of the United Nations on Jammu & Kashmir region is governed by the UN Charter and applicable UN Security Council Resolutions, and the statement issued by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) on 29 October 2019 expressing extreme concern over the worsening human rights situation in IOJ&K.

Welcomed the UN Security Council meetings of 16 August 2019 and 15 January 2020 considering the situation arising from India's actions.

Also welcomed the Open Discussion of the OIC-IPHRC under its "Standing Mechanism to Monitor Human Rights Situation in Indian Occupied Kashmir" during its 16th Regular Session on 25 November 2019 that, inter alia, strongly condemned the continued human rights violations in IOJ&K.

Appreciated the OIC Secretary General's Special Envoy for Jammu and Kashmir's visit to Pakistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) from 2-6 March 2020.

Affirmed that any so-called political process held under foreign occupation cannot substitute the exercise of the right to self-determination by the people of Jammu & Kashmir as provided for in relevant UNSC Resolutions.

Rejected the newly-notified "Jammu & Kashmir Reorganization Order 2020" and "Jammu & Kashmir Grant of Domicile Certificate Rules 2020" aimed at changing the demographic structure of IOJ&K.

Affirmed that Indian actions of 5 August 2019 and new domicile rules are in complete violation of the UNSC Resolutions, international law including the 4th Geneva Conventions, and India's own solemn commitments to implement UNSC resolutions.

Welcomed the two reports issued by the UN OHCHR in June 2018 and July 2019 comprehensively documenting the gross and systematic violations of human rights in IOJ&K.

Further welcomed the role played by world leaders, parliamentarians, human rights organizations and international media, in raising their voice against Indian occupation and atrocities in IOJ&K.

Deplored the extended, months long, lockdown of the Kashmiri people and communications blackout since 5 August 2019, and suppression of Kashmiris through arbitrary detentions, fake “encounters,” so-called “cordon-and-search” operations designed to inflict collective punishment on entire neighbourhoods, and indiscriminate use of force, including use of pellet guns, against unarmed Kashmiri protestors.

Expressed concern over India’s intensified ceasefire violations on the Line of Control (LoC), resulting in deaths and injuries to civilian population particularly women and children.

Deplored that India has callously exploited the current Covid-19 crisis to intensify its military crackdown and further advance its unlawful occupation in Jammu and Kashmir, which may have an impact on the spread of pandemic.

Regretted that India has not allowed the OIC, IPHRC and UN Fact Finding Missions to visit IOJ&K.

Reaffirmed the unanimously adopted Communiqué on Jammu & Kashmir by the OIC Contact Group Ministerial meeting on the sidelines of the 74th UNGA session in September 2019.

Having considered the aforementioned grave developments, The Ministerial Meeting:

Reaffirmed the OIC position and resolutions on the Jammu & Kashmir dispute.

Further reaffirmed its support for the legitimate struggle of the Kashmiri people for realization of their inalienable right to self-determination and freedom from Indian occupation.

Demanded that India:

- rescind its unilateral and illegal actions, and allow the Kashmiri people to freely exercise their right to self-determination through a UN-supervised plebiscite;
- halt its human rights violations, stop indiscriminate use of force including the use of pellet guns, lift the unabated military siege and inhuman lockdown, repeal its draconian emergency laws, allow exercise of fundamental freedoms, and release all illegal detainees;
- stop any moves towards changing the demographic structure of IOJ&K, as they are illegal and in violation of international law, particularly the 4th Geneva Convention.
- provide unhindered access to the OIC, IPHRC and UN Fact Finding Missions, OIC Secretary General’s Special Envoy for Jammu and Kashmir, and international media to investigate into human rights violations in IOJ&K;

- agree to the call made in the OHCHR's report to establish a Commission of Inquiry to conduct comprehensive independent international investigations on human rights violations in Kashmir.

Requested the Office of UN OHCHR to continue to monitor the situation of human rights in IOJ&K with a view to continuing reporting on the matter.

Requested the OIC Secretary-General to direct the Humanitarian Department at the General Secretariat to examine and analyze the egregious violations of international human rights and humanitarian standards in the deepening crisis in IOJ&K – with particular reference to the COVID-19 Pandemic – with a view to evolving ways and means to address its gravity and adverse impact on the lives and livelihoods of Kashmiri people in IOJ&K.

Emphasized that the question of Kashmir is of utmost importance for Muslim Ummah and requested the General Secretariat and OIC affiliated and specialized institutions and subsidiary organs, to take necessary measures to ensure implementation of OIC resolutions on Jammu & Kashmir.

Welcomed the efforts made by some OIC Member States to calm the situation between India and Pakistan.

Called upon the OIC Member States to raise the Jammu and Kashmir dispute in their bilateral engagements with India with a view to safeguarding the fundamental human rights of the Kashmiri people in the occupied territory, and ensuring expeditious implementation of the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions.

Requested the OIC Secretary General to highlight the worsening situation in IOJ&K at various international fora including the United Nations and call for immediate steps for amelioration of the human rights and humanitarian situation and peaceful resolution of the Jammu & Kashmir dispute.

Source: <http://mofa.gov.pk/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/communique-22-June-2020-1.pdf>

Document: 4**Joint Press Release of the 2nd Round of China-Pakistan Foreign Ministers' Strategic Dialogue, Islamabad, August 21st, 2020.**

On 21 August 2020, State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi of the People's Republic of China and Foreign Minister Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan held the 2nd Round of China-Pakistan Foreign Ministers' Strategic Dialogue in Hainan Province, China. The two sides exchanged views on COVID-19 pandemic, bilateral relations, and international and regional issues of mutual interest, and reached consensus to collectively take measures to safeguard their common interests and promote peace, prosperity, and development in the region.

Both sides agreed that Pakistan and China have stood in solidarity and worked together since the COVID-19 outbreak by timely sharing of experiences relating to the prevention and control of the virus, mutual support in providing medical materials, and have set an example for international community to jointly fight the pandemic. Both sides agreed to further strengthen cooperation in developing a vaccine to defeat the COVID-19 pandemic, and strive to promote establishment of China-Pakistan Community of Shared Future and Community of Common Health. Both sides emphasized that unity and cooperation are the most powerful weapon for the international community against the disease. Both sides opposed politicizing the pandemic, labeling viruses; supported WHO to play a leading role in global public health governance, and called for the international community to increase the sense of a community of shared future and carry out effective joint prevention and control measures in order to mitigate the negative effects of COVID-19.

Both sides reiterated that the enduring China-Pakistan All-weather Strategic Cooperative Partnership is beneficial to international and regional peace and stability, and serves the mutual security and development interests of both countries as well as of international community and regional countries. Both sides were committed to firmly implementing the consensus reached between the two leaders, enhancing mutual strategic trust, strengthening all-round cooperation, maintaining momentum of high-level exchanges, further advancing construction of Belt and Road Initiative, promoting bilateral relationship to a higher level, and delivering greater benefits to both countries and the two peoples.

Both sides agreed on continuing their firm support on issues concerning each other's core national interests. The Chinese side reiterated that Pakistan and China are iron brothers and Pakistan remains China's staunchest partner in the region and that China firmly supports Pakistan in safeguarding its territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, independently choosing a development path based on its national conditions, striving for a better external security environment

and playing a more constructive role on international and regional affairs. The Pakistani side appreciated China for standing together with Pakistan in safeguarding its national security and sovereignty, and reaffirmed its firm support to China on affairs concerning China's core interests and issues of major concern, such as those related to Taiwan, Xinjiang, Tibet and Hong Kong.

Both sides underscored that China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has entered the new phase of high-quality development, and has played and will continue to play an important role in supporting Pakistan to overcome the impact of COVID-19 and achieve greater development. The two sides will continue to firmly advance the construction of CPEC, ensure in-time completion of those projects under construction, focus on economic and social development, job creation and improvement of people's livelihood, and further strengthen cooperation in Specialized Economic Zones, industrial relocation, science and technology, medical and health, human resources training, poverty alleviation, and agriculture etc., with the aim to continuously unleash the great potential of CPEC to make it a hub of regional connectivity. Both sides expressed satisfaction on agreements reached on recent mega energy projects and look forward to convening the 10th JCC meeting at the earliest possible date to promote CPEC to make positive contributions to the high-quality construction of BRI.

Both sides reaffirmed the principle of wide consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits in building CPEC, and welcomed the international community to join in the CPEC construction on the basis of consensus to achieve shared development.

Both sides expressed satisfaction over cooperation on regional and international issues at multilateral fora such as the UN, Shanghai Cooperation Organization and ASEAN Regional Forum, and agreed to deepen coordination and cooperation to safeguard mutual interests and uphold principles of fairness and justice. Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and support for multilateralism, free trade and win-win cooperation, and opposition to unilateralism, protectionism and coercive practices.

Both sides underlined that a peaceful, stable, cooperative and prosperous South Asia was in common interest of all parties. Parties need to settle disputes and issues in the region through dialogue on the basis of equality and mutual respect. The Pakistani side briefed the Chinese side on the situation in Jammu & Kashmir, including its concerns, position and current urgent issues. The Chinese side reiterated that the Kashmir issue is a dispute left over from history between India and Pakistan, which is an objective fact, and that the dispute should be resolved peacefully and properly through the UN Charter, relevant Security Council resolutions and bilateral agreements. China opposes any unilateral actions that complicate the situation.

Both sides agreed to strengthen cooperation on the Afghan issue and appreciated the efforts made by Afghan government and the Taliban to initiate the Intra-Afghan Negotiations. They emphasized the importance of an inclusive, broad-based and comprehensive negotiated agreement for future political settlement in Afghanistan. While reaffirming their commitment to an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned Peace Process, both sides encouraged relevant parties in Afghanistan to seize this historic opportunity and commence the Intra-Afghan Negotiations at the earliest leading to durable peace and stability in Afghanistan. China appreciated Pakistan's positive contribution to the Afghan peace process and efforts for promoting peace and stability in region and beyond.

Both China and Pakistan reaffirmed the vitality of the time-tested and All-Weather Strategic Cooperative Partnership between the two countries which remains unaffected by the vicissitudes of the regional and international developments and continues to move from strength to strength.

Source: <http://mofa.gov.pk/joint-press-release-of-the-2nd-round-of-china-pakistan-foreign-ministers-strategic-dialogue/>

Guidelines for Contributors

Journal of Contemporary Studies is published bi-annually in Winter and Summer by the Faculty of Contemporary Studies, NDU. Research Scholars who wish to contribute their original, unpublished articles and book reviews to the Journal may submit these by the end of March for the Summer edition and by the end of September for the Winter edition. Manuscript submitted for JCS should be original and not submitted anywhere else. Once accepted for publishing after peer review, the author cannot withdraw the article. Papers/articles should not be longer than 7000 words or less than 5500 words, with an abstract of about 150-200 words. Reviews of recent books by scholars of standing in their field may comprise 1100-1500 words. Authors are required to submit both soft and hard copies, along with their brief introduction, in MS Word format to the editor at the following address:

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Reference to a Book:

S.M. Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1988), 118.

Reference to a Journal:

Ali A. Mazrui, "Has a Clash of Civilization Begun? From the Cold War of Ideology to a Hot War of Religion," *NDU Journal* VI, no.2 (Summer 2006): 17-27.

Reference to a Newspaper Article:

Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "London Moot & the Kashmir Dispute," *Pakistan Observer* (Islamabad), December 4, 2007.

Reference to a Newspaper:

Dawn (Islamabad), July 30, 2007.

Reference to an Internet Source:

Hamid Hussain, "The Tale of a Love Affair that Never Was: United States-Pakistan Defence Relations," *Pakistan Horizon* June, 2002, www.pakistanhorizon.com/2002/june/loveaffair.html. (accessed September 2, 2009)

For reference already cited in full, use Ibid. For reference cited already elsewhere, use short title form (i.e., Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, 118.) instead of op.cit or loc.cit. Give page number or date, if different from the one already cited. Avoid citing too many references. Cite only the most authentic reference.

Writing Style:

1. British spellings should be used.
2. Date should be written as December 7, 2007.
3. Abbreviations should be written in brackets after writing within bracket after spelling the acronym in full at first use, e.g., the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Subsequently only SAARC should be used without bracket.
4. Word "per cent" should be used instead of sign "%".

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