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
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ENERGY SECURITY IN PAKISTAN-THE CASE OF IPI AND TAPI

KHURSHID KHAN*

Abstract

Currently, despite having tremendous potential, Pakistan is confronted with an intense 'energy crisis'. The lack of long term sustainable policies, mismanagement, bad governance and lack of awareness at the grass root level are some of the causes leading to the crisis. Moreover, geopolitical conflicts at the regional level continue to be an impediment in dealing with the problems in hand. The money lending agencies have shown reluctance to extend their cooperation to Pakistan, thus, mega projects like Basha Dam seem blocked due to non-availability of the funds. Given the current geo-strategic environment, the much needed Iran- Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline has become hostage to the US politics. Thus, the IPI appears to have been shelved, though Pakistani establishment continues to make false promises to its masses. Similarly, while the Tajikistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline has the US backing, nevertheless it is highly unlikely that the plan will materialize in the foreseeable future due to the uncertain security atmosphere in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, despite such complexities, this paper suggests that both India and Pakistan are likely to realize the economic importance of IPI and will revive the project even at the cost of annoying the US. Finally, it is also important to mention that Pakistan possesses incredible resources to manage the 'energy crisis', provided it plans on consistent short, medium, and long-term basis. In addition, extreme caution in management and improvement in the governing system is a key to address the ongoing problems of energy security.

Introduction

Since the last many years, Pakistan has suffered long hours of load shedding of both electricity and gas. Moreover, the frequent disruption of fuel supply for transport is another dimension of the energy crises. Indeed, the thirty to forty percent energy shortfall has left the general public “struggling even to meet the fundamental needs like lighting, water, cooking and protection against extreme weather conditions”.¹ While the gentry’ class was able to survive due to alternative arrangements, seventy to eighty percent population of Pakistan especially those living in cities are the real sufferers. The shortage of energy has not only made their lives miserable but also left many laborers jobless because of the closure of factories.

Unfortunately, the current energy crisis is intense, costly, and multilayered having enormous economic, social, political and strategic ramifications for the country. The crisis did not take the country by surprise but has been unfortunately fostered due to the lack of long term sustainable policies on the part of successive regimes over the last three decades. It might come as a surprise to many that even if we succeed in constructing Bhasha Dam, Pakistan would be hardly able to restore the water reservoir capacity that it had in 1978, that means we would still be three decades behind the schedule.² The shortage of water and energy in Pakistan is also directly linked to mismanagement, bad governance and a lack of awareness at the grass root level.³

In future, the shortage of energy resources at the global and regional level might not present a threat as serious as it is perceived but the real challenge would come when the availability of tradable resources are compromised because of the disruption of supplies, threatened by growing terrorism and geopolitical conflicts. Protection of supply lines by employing navies would be a very costly affair. While Pakistan’s geo-strategic position could provide a corridor for regional energy trade but regrettably, Pakistan is viewed in the category of those nations which are most vulnerable to potential threat of terrorist attacks.

As highlighted by the National Command Authority, “Pakistan’s socio-economic development is dependent on its ability to meet rapidly expanding energy requirements”. Single track approach even if it is very elaborate and effective would not suffice to fulfill the long term requirement of energy needs of Pakistan. It is therefore, imperative to realize all reachable options to ‘ensure a reliable energy mix’. In

* Brig Khurshid Khan is Director (IS) at Institute of Strategic Studies and Research Analysis (ISSRA), National Defence University, Islamabad

¹ Muhammad Asif, *Energy Crisis in Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011), xi.

² Khalid Mustafa, “the US likely to announce \$ 200 billion aid for Bhasha Dam,” *The News International* (Islamabad), April 18, 2011.

³ Asif, *Energy Crisis in Pakistan*, 115-135.

addition to the other options like coal, hydel, renewable sources, wind and solar, “civil nuclear power generation is an essential part of the national energy security strategy”.⁴

As indicated earlier, Pakistan needs to diversify the energy resources thus, the long awaited ‘IPI’ gas pipeline project is very vital for reinventing the economic wheel. An Indian scholar notes, “in view of the growing energy demands in India and its neighboring countries, ‘IPI’ gas pipeline assumes special significance”.⁵ Similarly, construction of ‘TAPI’ gas pipeline is equally vital if we want to meet the energy shortage in medium to long term. But unfortunately, in both cases, stable Balochistan and stable Afghanistan are central if the benefits are to be accrued without disruption. Additionally, with regards to IPI gas pipeline, it has already become a victim of regional and global politics. Since the US and Iran are not on one side of the page therefore, the US would continue to create obstacle in realizing this significant project and would not hesitate to put its whole weight to block any progress.

On the contrary, it is believed that while Pakistan government would continue to make rhetoric for the public consumption, but in reality, however, it seems unprepared to implement the plan. It is not ready to annoy the US at any cost. Therefore, the possibility of IPI becoming a reality is a distant dream even if security situation in Balochistan improves.

In this backdrop, this paper intends briefly explain the efficacy and feasibility of ‘IPI’ and ‘TAPI’ Gas Pipelines. The broad contours of the paper include: One, Energy Crisis in Pakistan: Brief History, two, Case Studies, Feasibility of IPI Gas Pipeline, three, Efficacy of TAPI Gas Pipeline and finally the proposed policy guidelines. The opinion expressed in this paper is that of author’s own and does not necessarily represent the institutional views. In addition, the paper focuses only on political and security aspects of the proposed gas pipelines while technical issues are beyond the scope.

Energy Crisis in Pakistan: A Brief History

Pakistan, having the sixth largest population in the world and being a nuclear power state, remains an “energy-starved nation having a prolonged history of ‘planned and unplanned’ outages”.⁶ The energy

⁴ Ibid., 204-245; and Prime Minister Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani Chaired the 17th meeting of the National Command Authority (NCA). It was the second meeting of the NCA with the Prime Minister in Chair. www.defence.pk/.../53270-national-command-authority-nca-17th-meeting.html - (accessed on June 27, 2011).

⁵ Amjad Sajjad, “The Relevance of the proposed Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) Gas Pipeline Project to Conflict between India and Pakistan,” (Research Paper, The Institute of Social Studies, 2007-08), oaithesis.eur.nl/ir/repub/asset/6709/Anjit%20Sajjad%20ECD.pdf (accessed on September 17, 2012).

⁶ Dr Tauseef Aized, “Nuclear Power Generation,” *The Nation* (Islamabad), July 28, 2009, <http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/columns/28-Jul-2009/Nuclear-power-generation> (accessed on June 27, 2011).

related issues in Pakistan are not new. The crises were quite intense during the 1980s and the early 1990s which forced Pakistan to go for a painful costly option for establishing Independent Power Plants (IPPs) which not only met its energy requirement but also generated surplus energy until 2005. But power demand in Pakistan surged up whereas the power output decreased abruptly because of a number of factors including lack of maintenance of the plants, line losses as well as corruption and mismanagement.

With an extraordinary rise in gas demand, if we continue to extract the same volume of gas in the coming years, the demand-supply difference would keep rising, ultimately becoming wide enough to consume the entire economy in near future.

The current gas shortfall is 10 bcm, which is expected rise to 36bcm per year by 2017, if we continue to stick to our current energy producing mechanism. Though, Dr Asim, Federal Minister for Petroleum and Natural resources, has given hopes that the government would enhance the natural gas production to somewhere around the 50 bcm mark, by giving incentives to the international exploration and production companies. Even if we believe in what Dr Asim said, Pakistan would still need an external source to quench its gas thirst – cue IP (Iran-Pakistan) pipeline.⁷

Thus, during the last summer, Pakistan faced an ever-worse electricity crisis with a shortfall varying between 4500 MW to 6000 MW.⁸ Pakistan is heavily dependent on thermal power generation with a share of around 63 percent followed by hydel generation amounting to 32 percent. The third source is nuclear power generation with a meager contribution of just over 2.34 percent. Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) is working to add number of nuclear power plants (NPPs) over the next two decades to meet its target of generating 8800 MWe as a part of its ongoing civil nuclear program.⁹

Nonetheless, nuclear reactor is a complex technology with a lot of security concerns. Nuclear plants require high plant decommissioning and waste storage costs in addition to enormous capital cost required for plant building. An additional concern with NPPs is that if nuclear waste generated by the plants were to be left unprotected, it could be stolen and used as a radiological weapon commonly called a dirty bomb. The unfortunate incident in Japan during March 2011 has shattered the confidence of nuclear power possessor states and forced them to revisit the operational worthiness

⁷ Khuldune Shahid, "Putin's snub", *The News International* (Islamabad), October 5, 2012.

⁸ Editorial: the US Support to Ease Energy Crisis (www.energyupdate.com.pk/archive_inside.html), accessed on September, 20, 2012; and Qaiser Butt, "Knocking on neighbours' doors: Energy-starved Pakistan looks to India for electricity" *The Express Tribune*, April 22nd, 2012.

⁹ *Ibid.*; and Zafar Bhutta, "Pakistan to buy two nuclear power plants from China," *The Express Tribune* (Islamabad), November 11, 2011.

of huge number of NPPs. Chairman PAEC, Dr Ansar Parvez assured the nation that as the Fukushima accident unfolded, PAEC also revisited the safety and emergency preparedness of all its plants and found them satisfactory.¹⁰ However, potentially Pakistan has no problems to look for alternative options as it has huge natural resources. If tapped suitably they could take care of its energy for quite some time as amicably highlighted by former Chairman Dr. Summar Mubarakmund.¹¹

Nonetheless, in order to meet the crisis situation, the US had announced to come up with and invest \$ 1 billion in Pakistan. The US Congress has already released \$ 280 million. This support is expected to add 900 MW to the national grid by 2013. However, no further progress has been noticed since the announcement of the project. In addition, China Three Gorges Corporation (CTGC), the largest Company of China will help Pakistan in controlling power shortage by investing \$15 billion that will generate 10000 MWe over the next 10 years.¹² In addition, Russia has also shown its interest to invest in energy sector.¹³

Case Studies: Feasibility of Iran-Pakistan-India Gas Pipeline

During 1995, both Pakistan and Iran signed a preliminary agreement to construct an onshore natural gas pipeline of about 870 miles, linking the Iranian South Pars natural gas field in the Persian Gulf with Karachi. The construction cost of the proposed project was estimated to be \$3 billion. Later on, Iran also made its offer to extend the pipeline to India as well. Since then the progress on IPI gas pipeline, also known as 'Peace Pipeline', has been sneaking forward, though much ambitious and dynamic rhetoric has been in action after the renewal of dialogue in February 2004. The proposed pipeline is approximately 2,670 km long with a 48 inch diameter that would hold \$3.2 billion of gas. In the form of royalties from transit fee, Pakistan could earn as much as \$500 million per annum in addition to the saving of \$200 million per annum due to low price of the gas.¹⁴

Four main companies namely, 'BHP of Australia, NIGC, Petronas of Malaysia, and French Total' had expressed their interests to

¹⁰ Fatima Rizvi, "Nuclear watchdog praises Pakistan's commitment to safety," *The Express Tribune* (Islamabad), April 24, 2011; and Muhammad Saleh Zaafer, "Pakistan seeks civil N-tech to meet energy needs," *The News International* (Islamabad), March 27, 2012.

¹¹ Dr. Shahid Munir, "Thar coal; the game changer", *The Nation* (Islamabad), September 03, 2012; and "Unleashing the treasures of Thar Coal reserves of Pakistan," July 04, 2012, <http://rupeenews.com/2012/07/unleashing-the-treasures-of-thar-coal-reserves-of-pakistan/> (accessed on September 17, 2012).

¹² "Chinese Firm keen to invest \$ 15billion in Pakistan energy sector", *The News International* (Islamabad), April 18, 2011; and Editorial: "the US Support to Ease Energy Crisis".

¹³ Khuldune Shahid, "Putin's snub".

¹⁴ *The Hindustan Times*, July 7, 2000.

undertake this project. French Total is already involved in the development of an international pipeline through Turkey. Similarly, a consortium consisting of 'Shell, British Gas, Petronas, and an Iranian business group was also interested to reach an agreement to construct the pipeline. Additionally, 'Iran National Gas Company and the Gas Authority of India Limited (GAIL)' were also involved.¹⁵

While IPI a 'practicable and attainable project', it has regrettably been on the back-burner since 1995 due to intense debate on the issue of the likely courses, means of shipment, tariff, further, the project itself has been hostage to regional and geopolitics.¹⁶ The problem was less complex prior to 2004, however since then the renewed tensions between Iran and the US has inhibited further development of IPI project. Thus, the international donors who were required to fund this mega project have shown reluctance to come forward and support Pakistan.

The initial accord on the project between the two states (Pakistan and Iran) was signed in Tehran on May 24, 2009, after causing a considerable delay of over 14 years. The project was termed as the 'Peace Pipeline'. However, while talking to IRNA, the Iranian official news agency, the Iran's Oil Ministry had conveyed that the "negotiations on the 'Peace Pipeline' have yet not been finalized".¹⁷

It is important to note that despite showing its willingness, India has rapidly decided to stay away. Indeed, from the outset, India has been hesitant to enter into any agreement with Pakistan due to the historical legacy of mistrust between the two neighbors. Rather, the Indians seemed to be more open to the idea of a deep-sea pipeline. In the absence of Indian affirmation, Iran and Pakistan are now expected to go ahead with the planned project. Therefore, it would no longer be 'IPI' project and it may be appropriate to call it 'Iran-Pakistan (IP)' gas pipeline project. According to the Ideal, Pakistan is expected to receive the gas from Iran by 2014.¹⁸ Practically, this deadline seems ambitious and unrealistic. While Iran might be able to meet the timeline, Pakistan is nowhere close to fulfill its obligations of even initiating the construction process.

¹⁵ Alexander's Gas and Oil Connections, <http://www.gasandoil.com/>; "Iran Background Information", <http://www.iloveiran.com/All%20about%25Iran/oil.htm>; and Shamila N. Chaudhary, "Iran to India Natural Gas Pipeline: Implications for Conflict Resolution & Regionalism in India, Iran, and Pakistan", TED Case Studies, www1.american.edu/ted/iranpipeline.htm (accessed on September 20, 2012).

¹⁶ "Iran-Pakistan-India Gas Pipeline (IPI)," Inter State Gas Systems, www.isgs.pk/project_detail.php?project_id=6 (accessed July 18, 2011); Chaudhary, "Iran to India Natural Gas Pipeline: Implications for Conflict Resolution & Regionalism in India, Iran, and Pakistan"; and Dr Noor ul Haq, "Iran-Pakistan Peace Pipeline," IPRI Factfile, ipripak.org/factfiles/ff124.pdf (accessed on June 23, 2011).

¹⁷ Haq, "Iran-Pakistan Peace Pipeline,".

¹⁸ "Iran, Pakistan finalize gas pipeline deal," The Hindu, June 14, 2010, www.thehindu.com/news/article455012.ece (accessed on June 23, 2011).

Lately during 2008, Iran also tried to lure in People's Republic of China's to participate in the project.¹⁹ Nevertheless, the possibility of its joining the project is quite low. Despite the urge between Tehran and Asian markets for economic cooperation, commercial and geopolitical issues had prevented the deal's fruition. On the other hand, India's uncertain approach whether or not to join the project is linked with a number of factors including Iran's "repeated attempts to raise the price of gas, the US pressure on India to refrain from participating in the pipeline project, external skepticism about Iranian capability to fill the pipeline as it promises, Indian concerns about the overall stability in Pakistan, and in particular, Balochistan province through which the pipeline would travel, all contributed to India's angst".²⁰

During 2010, Iran warned India that "there is a limit to its patience in waiting for New Delhi to decide. Iran was apparently able to present this ultimatum because Iran thought; it now has the 'China card' in its deck".²¹ During the month of February, 2010, Iranian Foreign Minister Manucher Mottaki reportedly emphasized, "Iran is ready to start the pipeline project at any time—even without India—and urged Pakistan not to heed the US pressure".²²



Iran to India Gas Pipeline Route²³

It is viewed that in recent years, there has been a surge in global energy demand. Requirement of natural gas in Asia alone is "expected

¹⁹ "China Brief," The Jamestown Foundation, www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx...tx... (accessed on July 18, 2011).

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ "Will China Join the Iran-Pakistan-India Pipeline?," The Jamestown Foundation, www.jamestown.org/.../single/?...ttnews%5Btt_news%5D (accessed on September 6, 2012).

²² Ibid.

²³ Chaudhary, "Iran to India Natural Gas Pipeline: Implications for Conflict Resolution & Regionalism in India, Iran, and Pakistan".

to expand from 650 million tons of oil equivalent (mtoe) in 1994 to 1,380 mtoe by 2010.” According to a World Bank study, power generation through natural gas is favorable both from economic and environmental perspectives. In South Asian context, we are well aware that India has the fastest growing economy. It’s highly publicized nuclear deal with the US and the likely cooperation from Nuclear Suppliers Group would cater for only up to 12 percent of its total energy needs that too over a period of next two to three decades. By that time the energy demand would have multiplied. Similarly, Pakistan’s decision to generate 8800 MWe through nuclear sources over the next two decades would only cater for just over 4 percent of its total needs. Therefore, the energy requirement will have to be fulfilled through other means, and IP provides one of the best options to Pakistan.

Brief Analysis of the IPI

IPI natural gas pipeline is technically feasible. Strategically, Pakistan would enjoy an edge because it would serve as an energy corridor. While India had suggested a sea route however, the Iranian oil and gas via land route should have been beneficial for India too. It is possible to suggest that a land route pipeline is comparatively easy as well as economically feasible as compared to the sea route option. Because of its geographic location, Pakistan could have financial and strategic benefits if the plan was implemented.

More importantly, the issue of regional cooperation had the propensity to initiate the greatest reform in this under developed region. The cooperation could potentially help improving the relationships between the regional countries. If the IPI gas pipeline project was promoted and implemented in true spirit, it might have helped resolving the outstanding regional disputes. The project would not have only brought economic benefits for the participating countries but it may also help changing the features of the politics in South Asia thus, transforming social and political discourse between the regional countries.²⁴

Rashid Afridi goes on to say that given the tense multidimensional relationships, an agreement on the pipeline project between India and Pakistan would be an important development.²⁵ A successful conclusion of an agreement and execution of the plan might help in restoring the trust between the two countries leading to the

²⁴ Rashid Afridi, “Natural Gas Pipeline: The Issue,” Rashid’s Blog, March 27, 2008, rashidfaridi.wordpress.com/.../iran-to-india-natural-gas-pipeline-the-issue/ (accessed May 23, 2011); and H.E. Amanullah Khan Jadoon, “Iran-Pakistan-India Gas Pipeline for Regional Prosperity,” International Energy Forum, http://www2.iefs.org.sa/Ministers/Pages/issue8_4.aspx (accessed on May 23, 2011).

²⁵ Ibid.

resolution of the issue like Kashmir, a major source of friction between the two countries".²⁶ The project might create the environment for the two countries to "re-evaluate their political discourse and interdependence, especially in light of their energy crises".²⁷ However, putting the idea into practice is unlikely to materialize in medium term. The initial delay was caused by Iran over the issues like gas tariff rate and related legal formalities. But since early 2004, the ground realities have changed. The US has shifted its strategic focus and decided to isolate Iran politically and mutilate its economy.

Therefore, Iran now seems willing to engage India and Pakistan on slightly soft terms. But other two sides have pulled back because of the respective constraints especially in the context of the US pressure. They are unable to benefit from the opportunities that Iran might offer them now. This economically viable project should not be ignored and left to the mercy of extra regional actors. Moreover, if Iran succeeds in bringing China into the gas pipeline loop, it would also help tying financial and strategic interests of China, India, Iran and Pakistan and hence the project can be a source of stability in the region.

It is suggested that while the extra regional factor might be able to delay the process but the futuristic energy needs might force India and Pakistan and possibly China to reassess their policies. However, it is also important to note that the prolonged delay might cause considerable loss to the regional countries interested in Iranian energy, at a later stage because then Iran may have its own priorities to decide whether or not to go ahead with the project.

Nonetheless, since India is undecided and may even take years to realize the significance of the project, the IP gas pipeline venture, excluding India, must be implemented without any further delay. I do not foresee any well thought out substitute which can take care of Pakistan's existing and future energy demands. The planned IP gas pipeline might take less time as compared to other grand projects which may have been conceived by the government. Success of the IP gas pipeline is likely to trigger Iran-Pakistan-China (IPC) and IPI projects too. In this context, Chinese foreign minister, Yang Jiechi once said, "We are seriously studying Pakistan's proposal to participate in the IPI gas pipeline project".²⁸

Pakistan would love to see China joining the pipeline venture for many reasons: Firstly, Islamabad badly needs the gas that might not

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.; Safdar Sial, "IPI Energy Security and Strategic Conflicts," *Economic Policy*, August 20, 2007, san-pips.com/download.php?f=epi0001.pdf - (accessed June 23, 2011); and C Uday Bhaskar, "Is the Iran-India pipeline feasible?," *India Times*, July 2, 2007, articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/.../27684991_1_ipi-pipeline-iran-india-pipeline-natural-gas-pipeline (accessed on June 23, 2011).

²⁸ *Asia Times* (Online), March 6, 2008; and "Proposed Central Asian Gas Pipelines," Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, <http://www.policyalternatives.ca/taxonomy/term/5?page=84> (accessed on June 23, 2011).

otherwise come without involving third party. Secondly, joining of the third party would definitely generate much revenue from the transit fees. Thirdly, it would further strengthen its relationship with China and finally, involvement of China is likely to reduce the US pressure from both Iran and Pakistan. The efforts were also made in the past to bring in China so as to incite India's decision-making process regarding the project.²⁹ It is believed that there were three factors that impact negatively in implanting the planned project of the IPI. One, the Indian government was unsure about the security guarantees by Pakistan for the smooth flow of natural gas. There were three reasons in developing this perception: Firstly, a lack of trust between the two countries. Secondly, Pakistan's capability to provide physical security to the gas pipeline in real term and thirdly, the uncertain security environment in Balochistan that may disrupt the supply lines which the two countries namely India and possibly China are unprepared to afford.³⁰

Unfortunately, over the last six years, a new wave of unrest created by the militant groups, duly supported by foreign hands has engulfed a part of Balochistan. Unless political settlement of the issue in hand is made, and law and order situation is improved, the gas pipeline is likely to be targeted. The current security situation in Balochistan is uncertain. Despite repeated assurances since 2000 that physical security of the gas pipeline would be ensured, India continues to suspect that Pakistan would not be able to ensure guaranteed fuel supply.³¹ Gurmeet Kanwal while commenting on the subject says, "Though this option through Pakistan is economically the most viable, India must consider whether good economics should be allowed to be jeopardized by bad security".³²

Nonetheless, as a matter of fact, the Pakistani establishment may not be in a position to grant a foolproof security to the pipeline passing through Pakistan in the near future. Physical security through other technical means is quite expensive and guarding every inch of the land for 1500 km is even more expensive and impossible to maintain administratively. But a large segment of Pakistani society is of the view that the security situation in Balochistan is linked with the political stability in Afghanistan.

Secondly, while India and Pakistan would still like to benefit from the proposed project however, it is not that simple because the relationship between the pipeline scheme and globalization is multifaceted which is not exclusively driven by economic factors. But, there is a realization that the three countries namely India-Pakistan and

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Bhaskar, "Is the Iran-India pipeline feasible?"

³¹ The Hindustan Times, July 7, 2000.

³² Gurmeet Kanwal, "IPI pipeline A good option – but a security nightmare," India Strategic, www.indiastrategic.in/topstories162.htm (accessed on June 23, 2011); and Sial, "IPI Energy Security and Strategic Conflicts."

Iran may have better economic collaboration in future.³³ Nonetheless, as a matter of fact, both India and Pakistan are seen unable to distance themselves from that of the US policies vis-a-vis Iran.³⁴ The US factor notwithstanding, the lack of conflict resolution approach between India and Pakistan over Kashmir issue also plays negatively in extending collaboration between the two countries. There is another angle to the ongoing issue. If India continues to oppose Iran's nuclear program at the highest forum, it might not be able to get closer to Iran. Similarly, Pakistani officials seem reluctant in proceeding forward under the US pressure as Pakistan has been asked to postpone the deal.

Additionally, there is yet another perspective to the issue as pointed out by Ahmer Bilal Soofi, a well known international law expert, who says, *"Pakistan will not be able to realize this project. Under the United Nations (UN) sanctions against Iran, the income from any commercial deal with any country cannot be used for the up-gradation of Iran's nuclear program. Since the UN will determine whether the income of the deal is being used for the nuclear program of Iran, this project is a non-starter."*³⁵

However, President's visit to Iran twice during the recent past has energized the two sides to materialize the planned project.³⁶ At the working level meeting held in Iran during July this year, also reinsured that the project will materialize.³⁷ The author is of the view that besides the US factor which is pronounced and visibly a main obstacle, security environment in and around Balochistan as briefly explained earlier on, would not allow Pakistan to achieve this long awaited objective in near future.³⁸

In addition, both India and Pakistan also remained involved in gain-loss theory till as late as 2004 and rejected the pipeline proposal. Pakistan had been skeptical that IPI gas pipeline may have negative impact on Kashmir issue as well the government's position on bilateral trade with India. On Indian side, the concerns pertained to "Pakistani fundamentalists disrupting supplies" and probably the dominating factor had been that the pipeline would place Pakistan at an advantageous position because it would be able to "shut of the tap" at

³³ "Pakistan-Iran-India Gas Pipeline Project", Solar Green TV, solargreen.tv/energy/pakistan-iran-india-gas-pipeline-project.html (July 6, 2012); and Mamoonah Ismail, "Significance of Iranian gas reserves," Pakistan Tribune, July 8, 2005, <http://paktribune.com/articles/Significance-of-Iranian-gas-reserves-111878.html> (accessed on July 6, 2012).

³⁴ Forbes, <http://www.forbes.com/home/feeds/afx/2006/01/05/afx2428>. (accessed on July 13, 2011); and Chaudhary, "The Peace Pipeline."

³⁵ Khalid Mustafa, "Pakistan, Iran to build gas pipeline despite the US sanctions", The News International (Islamabad), July, 19, 2012.

³⁶ "Zardari proposes Islamabad-Tehran Currency Swap Accord," The News International (Islamabad), July 17, 2011.

³⁷ Khalid Mustafa, "Pakistan, Iran to build gas pipeline despite the US sanctions".

³⁸ "Iran-Pak Gas Pipeline to be Completed by 2010, says Petroleum Minister Dr Asim Hussain", The News International (Islamabad), July 25, 2011.

its will especially during crises environment. In fact, such conclusions were drawn on the basis of the past experience like the Russian decision to cut off the supplies to Ukraine when it failed to comply with its terms. It also affected the gas supplies to European countries. Thus, the question arises, is it strategically reliable option?

And finally, Pakistan is also stuck up on the issue of funding for the projects. Even Pakistani banks seem reluctant to come forward and support the project. Nonetheless, it has been learnt that China that had earlier on backtracked has shown its willingness as Pakistani side has agreed to its ninety percent terms. Chinese lead role might help Pakistan in diluting the pressure because of its international clout that China enjoys.³⁹ Additionally, Iran has already offered its support in terms of funds as well as equipment to be used in laying down the line towards Pakistani side but because of the US pressure and the legal issues as highlighted by Bilal Soofi, the possibility of advancing the project is quite low.⁴⁰

It was also learnt in the recent past that Russia was prepared to undertake IP gas pipeline project by providing financial and technical assistance. Russia seems willing to participate in TAPI gas pipeline project too. Besides that Russia has also shown keen interest in Thar-coal development and Diamer-Bhasha Dam. Russian intentions were disclosed by a Russian delegation led by Mr Yury Sentyruin, deputy minister for energy who participated in two day Pak-Russia energy talks in Islamabad. But it is always difficult to convert the formal talks into agreement. The next meeting of the Pak-Russia joint working group will be held in Moscow during 2013.⁴¹

Over the past few months, a lot of water has already passed under the bridge. IP game is becoming difficult because of increasing number of the stakeholders. While the US would continue to bully around, China too has taken backseat and seems unwilling to support perhaps because of the US stick. Turkmenistan and Afghanistan would be pressing more for TAPI. With regards to Russia, Pakistan is not sure whether or not it actually sees IP as a worthwhile project or just wants to throw a spanner in the US works. For instance, it can be argued that the Russian President's decision to cancel his visit to Pakistan was the reaction of Pakistan's unwillingness to grant gas pipeline contract to Russia worth \$1.2 billion without getting into legal bidding process. It is believed that without the involvement of Russia and China, Pakistan is unlikely to move ahead with the project because of the US stick, even if

³⁹ Khalid Mustafa, "Beijing Agrees to Lay IP Gas line in Pakistan Territory", *The News International* (Islamabad), June 9, 2012.

⁴⁰ Khalid Mustafa, "Pakistan, Iran to build gas pipeline despite the US sanctions".

⁴¹ "Russia Agrees to Extend Help in Laying IP Gas Pipeline", *The News International* (Islamabad), June 28, 2012.

the funds are made available from elsewhere. Thus, the IP gas pipeline project is likely to remain in freeze.⁴²

Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) Gas Pipeline Project

Turkmenistan holds the world's 4th largest natural gas reserves. It is quite determined to reach out to Pakistani and Indian markets by building a gas pipeline through Afghanistan. The proposed gas pipeline is about 1,700 kilometers. It has the capacity to transport about 20 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually from Turkmenistan to consumer countries. Based on pre-feasibility study, the estimated cost of the project is worth \$ 7.6 billion which will be financed by "Asian Development Bank (ADB)". The Bank has already prepared its feasibility study and indicated that project was cost-effective and monetarily feasible.⁴³

In case, the scheme goes ahead efficiently, it might emerge as Afghanistan's major development project. As per Afghan Ambassador to Canada, "transit revenue could amount to US \$300 million per year. That would represent about one-third of the domestic revenue (US\$887 million in 2008/09) budgeted for development efforts".⁴⁴ TAPI, once put in practice, will help enhancing economies of all participating countries. During 2008, Pakistan's Prime Minister described the pipeline as a "vital project for the development and progress of the region". Further, Turkmenistan's President said that "pipelines are potentially good for peace. The pipeline between Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India will be a weighty contribution to the positive cooperation on this continent".⁴⁵

The project has received tremendous positive response from multinational and financial institutions including the State Bank of India which would entail about \$ 7.6 billion.⁴⁶ The project has attracted the companies like Exxon Mobil, Chevron, BP, RWE, Petronas, BG Group, etc. It may have long-term prospect in the region.⁴⁷ The US too is keen to tap into Central Asia's energy resources. Richard Boucher, the former US assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asia, said in 2007, "One of our goals is to stabilize Afghanistan, and to link South and

⁴² Khuldune Shahid, "Putin's snub"; and Khalid Mustafa, "Pakistan, Iran to build gas pipeline despite the US sanctions".

⁴³ Asian Development Bank, "Technical Assistance for the Feasibility Studies of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan Natural Gas Pipeline Project," TAR: STU 36488, December 2002, www.adb.org/Documents/TARs/REG/tar_stu_36488.pdf - (accessed on May 12, 2011).

⁴⁴ John Foster, "Afghanistan, Energy Geopolitics and the TAPI Pipeline: Part 1," *Journal of Energy Security* March, 2010.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ "TAPI gas pipeline gets tremendous IFIs response", *The News International* (Islamabad), September 24, 2012.

⁴⁷ Khuldune Shahid, "Putin's snub".

Central Asia so that energy can flow to the south.” In December 2009, George Krol, deputy assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asia said, “Central Asia plays a vital role in our Afghanistan strategy”.⁴⁸

The leader of the three countries namely, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Turkmenistan met in Islamabad on 29–30 May 2002 and announced the formation of a coalition to implement the project. India entered in this project later during 2008 however; it continued to remain engaged in the process since 2004/2005. In 2005, during his visit to Afghanistan, Manmohan Singh, the Indian Prime Minister, said, “Both pipeline projects (IPI and TAPI) needed to be realized in order for New Delhi to achieve the energy security that it seeks”. A broad agreement was signed by representatives of the participating states on April 25, 2008 in Islamabad. The participants agreed in principle that the construction work may commence in 2010 and gas supply may start by 2015.⁴⁹



Proposed Iran-Pakistan-India Pipeline⁵⁰

The agreement was formalized during 2010. For the purpose of security of the pipeline, Afghan government agreed to hire 12,000 military forces.⁵¹ However, the contours as to how the Afghan government would arrange the military forces for this specific purpose are not clear. According to Turkmen state-controlled media, Turkmen

⁴⁸ Sial, “IPI Energy Security and Strategic Conflicts.”

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Foster, “Afghanistan, Energy Geopolitics and the TAPI Pipeline: Part 1.”

⁵¹ Afghanistan, “Afghan forces to provide security for the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline”, June 7, 2011, www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=229032133790015; and “Gas pipeline project Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India approved,” November 21, 2006, http://www.turkmenistan.ru/?page_id=3&lang_id=en&elem_id=8859&type=event&sort=date_desc (accessed on July 11, 2011).

President while speaking at a signing ceremony on December 11, 2010, called the pipeline as “a real and effective stabilizing factor with long term positive impact on the overall situation in Central and Southern Asia and adjacent regions,”.⁵²

Critical Analysis of the Project

Unlike the IPI, the project has the full backing of the US.⁵³ However, in order to materialize the project, it has many other snags and gray areas that need to be addressed. In this project, instead of three, there are four stakeholders. For the time being, political and security environment especially in Afghanistan is fragile and it is impossible to predict as to when the situation may improve. Afghanistan is essentially a country that is being governed by many factions and these factions would continue to wield influence even if there is a political settlement in Afghanistan in the foreseeable future. Therefore, security of the pipeline would continue to be a constant source of concern for the countries which intend making huge investment in this mega project.

Nevertheless, economic incentives to these groups might help in realizing the project. After all, if the US could get supplies into Afghanistan all the way from Karachi during the last one decade in the most tense security environment, the interest groups, war lords and insurgents working in Afghanistan domain can also be taken onboard without much challenge but definitely, environment for exploitation would continue to prevail in Afghanistan. Additionally, the pipeline has to pass through Pakistani side of the Afghanistan border and possibilities of disruption on Pakistani side also need special handling. Therefore, unless a permanent security mechanism is evolved, such groups present along the pipeline would continue to exploit the situation at will, thus causing serious economic constraints for the participating countries.

Secondly, political and security environments in South Asia would not be different with regards to TAPI project. If there is a trust deficit between India and Pakistan with regards to IPI, they would also not be comfortable with TAPI. If Pakistan would gain strategic advantage from the proposed project of IPI, it will also gain the same advantage from TAPI. If unresolved disputes between India and Pakistan can compromise IPI project, the similar reaction can come here as well. If IPI project is seen through prism of gain-loss theory,

⁵² Deirdre Tynan, “The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline looks set to go Ahead,” Oil Price.com, December 16, 2010, <http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/The-Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India-TAPI-Pipeline-Looks-Set-To-Go-Ahead.html>. (accessed on July 11, 2011)

⁵³ “Nura-Kushti’ for Turkmen Gas pipeline in Central Asia; India and Afghanistan con Pakistan out of the transit fees,” Khalistan Affair Center, December 15, 2010, www.khalistan-affairs.com/wp/?p=518 (accessed on July 11, 2011).

similar opinion can be developed in TAPI project as well. There is a trust deficit on both sides. Knowing well the impact of the devastating flood of 2010, even then, India did not allow the European Union to offer two years of trade concessions to Pakistan.⁵⁴ However, ground realities changed after Pakistan has declared India as the most favored nation in the context of trade. There is no denying the fact that the proposed project would be a win-win project for all stakeholders including the splinter groups operating inside Afghanistan, provided they are also taken 'on board'. It would give an economic boost to Afghanistan in the form of transit fee and also generate other social activities. It would also help Pakistan and India to overcome their energy shortages. The scheme would add to regional affluence and will strengthen the institutional structure to expand collaboration with each other.

Since April 2008, when the agreement was signed, Afghan government clearly informed the steering committee that, "within two years, the pipeline route would be cleared of landmines and Taliban influence. Whatever may have been anticipated then, the planned route remains insecure even today." Investment is unlikely to come within the war zone. The possibility of laying the pipeline under armed guard and then protecting it for decades is dreadful task, in terms of both manpower and cost. Gran Hewad, a political researcher with the Afghan Analysts Network, said, "the security challenge would be significant", but added, "Kabul might have the political will and a powerful economic incentive to keep the Taliban away from TAPI".⁵⁵

There is a possibility that some NATO countries might be prepared to safeguard the pipeline if Afghanistan government is unable to organize a force of 12000 armed men or if the armed guard fails to protect the pipeline due to the influence of warlords and other relevant actors. The creation of security mechanism for protection of the project would also require the early approval of the stakeholders especially the US and Japan.⁵⁶ "Conventional thinking around the pipeline may include long-term the US bases in Afghanistan, and assistance in training the Afghan National Army to defend the pipeline route".⁵⁷

There are other important queries linked with the pipeline security which include: One, whether or not the Afghan people would be willing to have foreign troops in their country for an infinite period? Two, is the Afghan National Army a viable option for the protection of the project which is ethnically imbalanced and may be seen by the

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Tynan, "The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline."

⁵⁶ "TAPI and Security Concerns," Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, <http://www.policyalternatives.ca/taxonomy/term/5?page=84.%20%28accessed%20%20June%2023,%202011> (accessed on June 23, 2011).

⁵⁷ "SCFI - Condition CPs," scufi.wikispaces.com/file/xml/SCFI+-+Condition+CPs.docx?v=rss (accessed on June 23, 2011).

Pashtuns as a 'foreign' army? Therefore, development cannot take place at the end of a gun. A prolonged stay of the occupant forces is a recipe for ongoing bloodshed and disruption in a country that has long been hostile to occupiers.

As pointed out by the Pakistani PM during a press conference at Kabul, "success of the proposed project could be a beginning, leading to other economically viable mega projects, including the building of electricity transmission lines; enhancing physical connectivity by building or upgrading requisite infrastructure, including road and rail transportation and communication links as well as expediting the implementation mechanisms for the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement etc".⁵⁸

Suggested Proposals

Whether or not India moves on the proposed IPI, joining of China as full member of the pipeline would offer it another opportunity to build on Beijing's so-called strategy of building what has been called a "string of pearls" across the Indian Ocean. Chinese participation can turn the Chinese-built Pakistani port of Gwadar into an energy hub which may also strengthen the ongoing defence ties between the two countries.

If the IP gas pipeline project is to be realized, bringing in China in the loop is important. The arrangement might reduce pressure on Pakistan. In addition, the odds of China supporting American efforts to isolate Iran would effectively be reduced; it might ultimately attract India as well. In view of the growing energy demand in South Asia, India may change its approach with regards to the IPI project. Both India and Pakistan should view the project as an evolving economic globalization. Thus, the regional cooperation could save them from a common future crisis which would also play a significant role in shaping and transforming regional politics and relations. Thus, both sides must realize that progress on IPI/TAPI is in their common interest which might pave the way forward for settlement of other outstanding issues as well.

Unfortunately, while the economic prosperity of these countries lies in regional cooperation, extra regional forces are negatively impacting and interfering in the regional socio-political landscape to the extent that such cooperation is unable to reach fruition. While engagement with Iran in the nuclear issue is important and must continue on a parallel track, nevertheless, the collective benefits of energy security for close to 3000 million people including China, India and Pakistan should not be compromised.

⁵⁸ Remarks of the Prime Minister at the Joint Press stakeout at Kabul, April 16, 2011, <http://www.pakistanembassy.de/index.php?id=194> (accessed on June 23, 2011).

As it was pointed out earlier on, these countries do not have many options, one day they might come back to undertake the project even against the US wishes but it would be too late for them to recover the loss. Further delay dominated by political factors is not in their interest. We also sincerely propose to the government of Pakistan that it should not give preference to the US interests over its own national interests. While Turkey being NATO ally can have gas from Iran, why not Pakistan. Similarly, if Iraq functioning under direct control of the US can enter into an agreement with Iran signing \$365 million gas pipeline supply deal what are the compelling reasons for Pakistani leadership causing serious delay in concluding the final deal between the two countries. Pakistani public is suspicious and very keen to know the plausible reasons of the delay.⁵⁹

The proposed pipeline once implemented would bring win-win situation for all stakeholders though it may have implications for some Middle East countries in economic terms. And most importantly, China, India and Pakistan the most populated countries in the world would also be taking due care of Kyoto Protocol by reducing greenhouse gasses thus, playing a positive role for their own people by providing neat and clean environment.

In worst case scenario, alternatively Pakistan may switch to the LNG scheme similar to that of Egyptian project providing natural gas in liquid form LNG to Turkey which had a plan to supply natural gas to Turkey through Israeli territory but opted for the LNG route, providing Turkey with up to 350 billion cubic feet of gas starting in 2000. This arrangement cannot be an alternative to a well-established pipeline. It is a very slow and costly affair. However, as pointed out earlier on, since Pakistan is in the grip of terrorism and would take quite some time to get over it therefore, perhaps the best option at present is to continue with LNG while concurrently surveying the probability of a secured overland route with flawless international assurances.

It does not mean that other issues especially the issue of Jammu and Kashmir be put at the back seat, simultaneous work is needed to keep our national objectives at the forefront. We should never allow our trade to dominate on our core issues which have direct linkage with our sovereignty and security of our nation and longtime stability of this region.

Pakistan's energy crises are too serious to be neglected or relegated to second priority. We cannot wait for India or for that matter China to come. I fully endorse the views of former Punjab Finance Minister Shahid Kardar who said, "We do not have the luxury of time. It has run out on us. We need to seize the moment, or we will be marginalized in the global system with increasingly difficult political, economic, and social challenges confronting us".⁶⁰

⁵⁹ The News International (Islamabad), July 2, 2011.

⁶⁰ Dawn (Islamabad), November 13, 2000.

In case of TAPI, an answer to protect the pipeline has to come from taking all stakeholders on board. The US and other western countries can be facilitators. To realize the advantage of this grand project, restoration of stability and peace in Afghanistan is essential. It is imperative that Afghanistan, India and Pakistan may join efforts and take ownership of their affairs so that they can overcome the pressing challenges. Trust building between the three countries is very important if they wish to accrue the collective benefits of the optimal utilization of the natural resources available in Central Asian states.

As indicated earlier on, energy and water security are interconnected factors and need to be dealt with collectively. In order to get due share from River Kabul, Pakistan must immediately construct one to two dams downstream so that it is able to exercise its right on this River later on. Without constructing the dams, Pakistan is likely to lose the legal battle in any International Court. Therefore, as an immediate step, Pakistan must get in an agreement with Kabul and ensure that before undertaking the mega projects, a treaty between the two countries is signed in accordance with the international law. Interdependency in energy is increasing with every passing day. Thus, it is worth emphasizing that trade flourishes under peaceful conditions, and regions will have to create those environments. Therefore, Islamabad, New Delhi, and Kabul must recognize their mutual interest, in a stable Afghanistan and stable Pakistan.

Construction and subsequent maintenance of gas pipe lines involving more than one country in a region can only succeed when they have mutual trust and common stakes. The proposed plans involving Afghanistan-Pakistan-India or Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline would also need accommodative approach by all because continuous flow of energy will create win-win situation for all stakeholders.

While the following recommendations are out of scope for this paper but they are still essential to create awareness and flash the point that since Pakistan has tremendous potential therefore, it can amicably manage the energy crisis provided it plans on short, medium and long term basis. The areas need to be highlighted include:

- Pakistan possesses tremendous potential to generate energy, its hydropower sector alone has the capacity to produce over 56773 MW energy besides coal, wind and solar sectors, provided they are very well planned and executed honestly involving huge investment coming from active public-private partnerships which is not coming.
- As per the Planning Commission Report of 2003, Pakistan would need 163000 MWe over the next two decades. We are too far away from achieving even 50% of the planned energy by 2030. Therefore, while IPI and

TAPI are important, Pakistan's survival lies in construction of dams and optimum utilization of coal worth \$ 25 trillion.

- And finally, the friendly countries should come forward to help Pakistan in exploring in Thar Coal mine project so as to cope up with timeline. Pakistan is fully geared up to provide enabling environments both in terms of physical and legal securities to the investors for the entire duration of the agreement.

Meanwhile, Pakistan as a nation must go for austerity measures at every level. While we may compromise on our comfort level at home but we must realize that Pakistan's industry must continue to run without a pause which provides guarantee of two time meals to our poor and most needy people. We have already lost over five lacks jobs due to closure of the industry because of energy shortage and we can't afford that the local investors may shift their resources to third countries as a trend is already building on and some investors have already shifted their business to other countries including Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.

Conclusion

Given the development on TAPI pipeline, the IPI gas pipeline project appears to have been shelved. While the possibility of TAPI getting mature will take quite some time, shelving the IPI because of political reasons are beyond comprehension. It is strongly believed that the economic activities that influence the world at large in medium to long terms should not be politicized. As I pointed out earlier, sooner rather than later, both India and Pakistan will have to get back to IPI even at the cost of annoying the US in the best interest of their own people.

If the US and its allies including other NSG countries can extend greater nuclear cooperation to India to protect their economic interests despite having serious concerns of nuclear proliferation, why can't India and Pakistan take the initiative to protect their economic interests through diversification of their energy resources and ultimately reaching out to the poorest of the poor' in their respective countries. That is the best way to serve their respective nations.

Pakistan desperately needs to enter into IP gas pipe line without further delay. Probably, Tehran would be willing to sell its gas more cheaply than Turkmenistan. While, Pakistan has problems of law and order in Balochistan, arguably it is a transition phase and will ultimately settle. I am very confident that peaceful resolution of Afghanistan problem would also lead to the resolution of Pakistan's domestic problems as well. With regards to energy security, it is a long drawn struggle in Pakistan to make every consumer and sector realize that there will be no national security, if there is no energy security.

Extreme caution in management, improvement in governing system and policy consistency with sincerity is a key to address the ongoing problems of energy security. While domestic consumers may be persuaded to sacrifice their own needs in order to promote and support the industrial sector which has ultimate bearing on them, the concerned departments must address the issue of line losses and energy theft.

The political leadership should avoid making false promises to provide energy beyond certain limits of the cities till the time the situation is improved by adopting all possible medium to long term measures. Similarly, the domestic consumers can also contribute towards national cause by applying austerity measures at all level while using standardized and efficient home appliances. If the austerity measures are to succeed; "Top down Approach" is a must. Nonetheless, there is no alternative to long term workable plans to address this serious issue.

THE FUTURE PROSPECTS OF SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION

Dr Raja Muhammad Khan*

Abstract

Established in 1996, as Shanghai Five, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was initially considered a counter weight to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Nevertheless, despite the presence of extra-regional forces in the region over last eleven years, the forum has contributed little towards either regional stability, or exit of these forces from the region. This can be attributed either to the lack of military muscle on the part of SCO members, or deliberately, to avoid further destabilization of the region owing to the likelihood of confrontation. However, the forum has shown its concern over the expansion of extra-regional forces. Internally, there is a requirement for increased integration at political, economic and security levels. The key partners: China as a rising global power; Russia as the resurgent super power, if taking a unified stance, have the potential to free the region from the influence of foreign powers. However, both pursue their own national interests and have their own stakes and economic and political objectives in the region. This internal politics of national interests, seemingly prevent the forum from presenting and acting as a cohesive body. Even economically the forum made more promises than its demonstrated performance. In the regional politics especially in Afghanistan¹, and Central Asia² so far, SCO

* Dr. Raja Muhammad Khan is Head of the Department of International Relations, Faculty of Contemporary Studies, National Defence University, Islamabad.

¹ A Comment by Michael C.H. Jones depicting the importance and the perceived aspirations of the objectives, strategy and future of the SCO as seen on <http://www.accci.com.au/JonesCommentonSCO.pdf> on September 3, 2012 on 1:30pm

² Augusto Soto, "A Central Asian Dimension of EU-China Relations", ISPI Analysis (Istituto Per Gli Studi Di Politica Internazionale), No. 130, July 2012 as seen on http://www.ispionline.it/it/documents/Analysis_130_2012.pdf

could contribute little for the promotion of peace and stability. Nevertheless, there is an urge among the SCO members to stabilize the region from the platform of this forum, either by denying the influence of extra regional powers, or else to ensure their own grip on regional politics. This paper is aimed at analysing the future prospects of the organization for the regional stabilization and political and economic integration.

Introduction

Control of the Eurasian landmass is the key to global domination and control of Central Asia is the key to control of the Eurasian landmass. Zbigniew Brzezinski³

Zbigniew Brzezinski is a renowned Polish American political scientist, geo-strategist, and writer of many books. He has been the National Security Advisor of President Jimmy Carter and has made enormous contributions in the fields of global politics and geo-strategy.⁴ In his much-celebrated book, entitled, 'The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives' he identified four regions wherein lie American stakes. These regions indeed forming a 'grand chessboard'⁵ include; Central Asia, Russia, East Asia, and Europe. In his opinion, the US may be the first super power in a true sense, and perhaps may be the last one.⁶ Upon Eurasia, the strategically significant region, there lies the challenges either for maintaining or otherwise, the future supremacy of United States. Since there are rising and resurgent powers in Asia and Europe, therefore, in order to maintain the contemporary world order with a single super power, U.S needs to manage the conflicts to its convenience both in Europe and Asia.

Coincidentally, the formation of Shanghai Five, in 1996 and Zbigniew Brzezinski's strategic vision surfaced through his legendary 'Grand Chessboard'-1997, almost overlapped each other. Later, the scope and membership of this organization was revised and it was renamed as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001.⁷ In the opinion of political scholars, formations of SCO conceivably

³ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy And Its Geostrategic Imperatives*, Basic Book, New York, 1997.p.45.

⁴ Tehran Times, November 20, 2008.

⁵ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy And Its Geostrategic Imperatives*, Basic Book, New York, 1997.p.45.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Official Website of SCO. Accessed on September 29, 2012 at; http://www.scosummit2012.org/english/2012-04/28/c_131558560.htm.

confirms the strategic thoughts of Zbigniew Brzezinski.⁸ After all, his vision viz-a-viz analogous assignments of dealing with the US national security from 1977 to 1981 ranked him at such an illustrious place. Even after his retirement, he remains associated with the US security policy formulation process. Brzezinski has been a close associate of Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of State, who still contributes significantly towards the US foreign policy.

With six members, five observers and three dialogue partners, today SCO is the foremost Eurasian organization, covering over 60% of Eurasian landmass and a population constituting a quarter of the globe. However, together with the observers and dialogue partners, SCO forms 50% of the global population too.⁹ As described by President Nursultan Nazarbayev in 2005, "The leaders of the states sitting at this negotiation table are representatives of half of humanity."¹⁰ It would be impulsive to say that, formulation of SCO was aimed to check the US or NATO expansion, yet for quite some time, political scientists have been considering this nascent organization as the substitute of the former Warsaw Pact. Nevertheless, ever since its transformation into a multilateral organization, its members have signed a number of documents, pacts, and agreements in various fields extending from security and economy to culture and education.

As revealed by the regional history, Sino-Soviet War-1969 provided an opportunity for the US to exploit the differences between two Communist countries of the cold war. It was undreamt of that there could be an escalation between former Soviet Union and China in those peak days of the cold war. According to William Burr, editor of the US 'National Security Archive Briefing Book', sequel to this conflict, the US manoeuvred through secret diplomacy to establish good relationship with China, thus strengthening its ties with the later to weaken its arch-rival, the former Soviet Union.¹¹ Pakistan and Romania played key role

⁸ William E. Carroll, "China in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Hegemony, Multi-Polar Balance, or Cooperation in Central Asia", *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, Vol. 1 No. 19, December 2011 accessed on http://www.ijhssnet.com/journals/Vol_1_No_19_December_2011/1.pdf

⁹ Sameer Jafri, Behind the Scene News: The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) accounts for 60% of the landmass of Eurasia, and as the SCO gets Stronger NATO Gets Weaker, *Pitts Report*, National International News (CMAC), July 6, 2011. Accessed on September 29, 2012 at; <http://www.pittsreport.com/2011/07/behind-the-scene-news-the-shanghai-cooperation-organisation-sco-presently-accounts-for-60-of-the-landmass-of-eurasia/>.

¹⁰ Rick Rozoff, The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Prospects For A Multipolar World, *Global Research Centre for Research on Globalization*, 22 May 2009. <http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-shanghai-cooperation-organization-prospects-for-a-multipolar-world>.

¹¹ The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict, 1969: the US Reactions and Diplomatic Maneuvers, A National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book (Declassified Documents 1-28) William Burr, Editor June 12, 2001, accessed on September 29, 2012, at; <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB49/>.

in brokering this secret diplomacy between the US and China.¹² During these peak days of the cold war, the US needed China and China in return got a chance of opening out and reaching over to West, thus reviving its economy and political vision with a new outlook towards the globe.

Since there are neither 'permanent friends nor permanent foes' in global politics, thus, former Communist countries once again seem united under the umbrella of SCO against their common competitor - United States. However, it is too early to predict about the resolve of this alliance. Nevertheless, Russia and China seem unanimous to evict NATO and the US from Afghanistan and the Central Asian region. From the forum of Shanghai Five, Russia and China were able to settle their border disputes after signing the Treaty on Reduction of Military Forces in Border Regions in 1997. This treaty provided an opportunity to all parties to have a consensus for the "reduction of military forces in the border region."¹³ Besides, the 'Treaty on Deepening Military Trust in Border Regions', formed the basis for establishing Shanghai-Five in 1996.¹⁴ Through this treaty, all members expressed their resolve for not engaging in any sort of aggressive military activities in their respective border areas nor would they conduct military exercises against each other. Member countries also decided to "develop friendly relations between the military and border personnel, and to exchange observers during border exercises."¹⁵

In the subsequent years, from the forum of SCO, China and Russia signed the 'Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation' in July 2001. It was a landmark event in the recent history of Russia and China. Following this treaty, there has been enhancement in the bilateral connections between these two countries. As stated by Interfax, the trade volume between China and Russia has reached to \$100 billion in 2012.¹⁶ This is backed by 40% annual rate since last two years. Both sides are working to double it (\$200 billion) by 2020.¹⁷ Indeed, the SCO Charter¹⁸ stresses on the promotion of mutuality among the members states. It lays emphasis on promoting peace, security and stability within the region through joint efforts. It also

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Eugene B. Rumer, Dmitrii Trenin, Huasheng Zhao, *Central Asia: Views from Washington, Moscow, and Beijing*, M.E Sharpe Inc, New York, 2007. p140.

¹⁴ Henry Plater-Zyberk, *Who's Afraid of the SCO?* Conflict Studies Research Centre: Central Asian Series 07/09, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom.

¹⁵ Renmin Ribao, 27 April 1996, p1; quoted in *The Success of the Shanghai Five: Interests, Norms and Pragmatism* by Qingguo Jia, www.comw.org/cmp/fulltext/0110jia.htm.

¹⁶ Giuseppe Paparella, *The Sino-Russian Relationship: The Next Axis Of Power? The Risky Shift*, June 28, 2012. Accessed on October 20, 2012 at; <http://theriskyshift.com/2012/06/sino-russian-relationship-next-axis-power/>.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ SCO, *Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization*, June 7, 2002, <http://www.sectsco.org/EN/show.asp?id=69>.

binds the member states to develop a just and rational political and economic order, following the democratic norms, as per internationally accepted norms.¹⁹ From the forum of SCO, voices have been raised in the past, asking for a timetable for the pull out of NATO and the US forces. Besides, since terrorism is a menace that all member states are facing in the region, there is unanimity in eradicating it through a regional approach. Establishment of Regional Anti-terrorism Structure (RATS) in 2004 was a landmark event in this regard.²⁰ Besides, Russia and some CARs have also signed some security related pacts like Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) for better security cooperation among themselves.

Multidimensional Roles of SCO

As per the basic declaration of the SCO, this organization has to strictly abide by the United Nations Charter; respecting the sovereignty and independence of all other countries. According to this, SCO follows the principle of 'non-alignment'.²¹ In 2006, the President of Kazakhstan, Mr Nursultan Nazarbayev, described the role of the organization as, "The SCO is neither a military bloc nor an exclusive alliance targeting third party."²² According to him, safeguarding regional security and developing cooperation in the field of economy, trade and investment are the key strategic roles of the SCO. Besides, the members have agreed to cooperate in the field of education, culture, tourism and sports. Nevertheless, economic cooperation is the hallmark of the organization. In this regard, the member countries have had approved a compendium on multilateral cooperation in the fields of economy, science and technology. For the organization, the principle tasks are to fight against evils like; "terrorism, separatism, extremism, drug-trafficking and illegal immigration."²³

As a Military Alliance

Ever since its establishment in 2001, SCO was considered as a counterbalance to NATO²⁴ or as a substitute to the former Warsaw Pact.

¹⁹ Shanghai Cooperation Organization [SCO], Declaration on the Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, June 15, 2001, http://www.ecrats.com/en/normative_documents/2006.

²⁰ SCO, The Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, June 15, 2001, <http://www.sectsco.org/EN/show.asp?id=68>.

²¹ Official Website of Shanghai Cooperation Organization, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/sco/t57970.htm>.

²² Kazakh President Underlines SCO's Great Achievements, Xinhua News Agency June 9, 2006, accessed on October 13, 2012 at; <http://www.china.org.cn/english/international/170851.htm>.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Simbal Khan, "Stabilization of Afghanistan: the US-NATO Regional Strategy and the Role of the SCO", as seen on http://www.issi.org.pk/publication-files/1299137179_72323919.pdf

However, there have been continuous sounding from its forum that it is a regional organization having neither any global ambitions nor intentions to pursue military motives²⁵. This aspect is amply clear from its charter, which states that the organization is based on the principles of 'non-alliance and non-confrontation.'²⁶ It does not aim at targeting any state or an organization, thus remains open to the international community for cooperation on global affairs. The maximum SCO has demonstrated in the past few years that, there have been joint military exercises among the members and collaborations in the field of defence and security, particularly cooperation against terrorism.

As a Political Alliance

Over the years, SCO has evolved into a full-fledged international organization with its own charter and well-formed structure. Members of this organization actively cooperate to resolve current political and security problems. Politically, it is becoming more active and effective with sustained mutual confidence among the member states. The organization (SCO) is fervent to boost security cooperation to safeguard regional stability, actively take part in the settlement of the Afghanistan issue, and steadily carry out regional economic cooperation. As a result, the SCO would play a more active and substantial role on the world arena and show even better prospects for its development. In its own stated aims, the SCO is not an organization that is against any groupings, regions or a particular nation-state, thus should not be seen as a threat but a vehicle for increasing economic and social prosperity in the region. The SCO has increased its openness and buoyancy to meet all challenges and, encourage member states to enhance their mutual political confidence. However, there is a general realization that, SCO has yet to make public its political integration for a major regional cause. Regional political experts have a view that, unlike EU, the SCO members lack the ideological and racial similarity, thus pursue different interests, even though having geographical contiguity.

As an Economic Alliance

There has been more economic cooperation among the members of the SCO than in the other fields.²⁷As part of the Eurasian Economic Community, the member countries have signed a framework agreement for enhancing economic cooperation in 2003. There is a free trade agreement among the SCO members. In order to overcome the economic crisis of the members, in 2011, China announced \$10 billion

²⁵ Shanghai Cooperation Organization [SCO], Declaration on the Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, June 15, 2001, http://www.ecrats.com/en/normative_documents/2006.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Masayuki Masuda, "China's SCO Policy in the Regional Security Architecture", The Tokyo Foundation Policy Research Brief, August 2010 accessed on http://www.tokyoofoundation.org/en/additional_info/PRB_ChinaSCO.pdf

loan for the economic uplift of SCO countries. Besides China, Russia has also promised economic assistance for improving the regional economic cooperation. As an organization, SCO has now attained the observer status in United Nations General Assembly, EU, ASEAN, OIC, and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). It is likely that, economic integration will grow among the members of SCO over the years. On the one hand, SCO has efficiently met the global recession, while on the other it has striven to promote the regional economic cooperation. Besides, it is trying to bring reforms and improvement on the financial, economic, and trade structures. Meanwhile, the international environment facing the SCO is now apt to be grimmer with the adjacency of hotspots in the region and the aggravation of international competitiveness on a global scale.

Expansion in the Organization

On the eve of 10th Summit of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), held in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, on June 11, 2010, its member states agreed to open the organization's membership for other countries of the region. Currently, India, Pakistan, Iran, and Mongolia have the observer status in this organization. Hectic efforts are underway by Pakistan²⁸, India and Iran for the membership of SCO.²⁹ Since the criteria of the membership is that, no state under UN sanctions or international embargo can get its membership, thus, it is unlikely that Iran gets such a status in the near future. Despite having their relationship with Iran, the key members of the Organization, Russia and China, would not grant Iran, the membership of SCO³⁰ at this critical juncture of the history, while annoying rest of the world. Besides, Russia and China are unanimous for not granting observer status of SCO to United States.³¹

Russia has repeatedly shown full support to the Indian membership of SCO.³² On the eve of 10th Summit, Russian Ambassador to India, Mr. Alexander Kadakin said in a statement that, our position has all along been that we want India as a full-fledged member of the SCO. He said that, irrespective of hurdles, "India meets all the

²⁸ Qandeel Siddique, Pakistan's Future Policy Towards Afghanistan: A Look at Strategic Depth, Militant Movements and the role of India and the US, DIIS (Danish Institute for International Studies) Report, "2011:08 as seen on http://www.diis.dk/graphics/publications/reports2011/rp2011-08-pakistans-future-policy_web.pdf

²⁹ Pakistani president calls for strengthened economic cooperation within SCO http://www.scosummit2012.org/english/2012-06/08/c_131640806.htm

³⁰ Ariel Pablo Sznajder, "China's Shanghai Cooperation Organization Strategy", Journal of IPS, Spring 2006 accessed on <http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/004/5367.pdf>

³¹ Yuasa Takeshi. Japan's Multilateral Approach toward Central Asia. Eager eyes fixed on Eurasia (Hokkaido University, Sapporo, 2007), P. 70

³² Ibid.,

requirements to be a member.”³³ Russia also supported Pakistani membership during the 11th Summit of SCO. China, however, unequivocally supported Pakistani membership of SCO.³⁴ Pakistan thoroughly pleaded its case for the membership during 10th and 11th Summits of SCO.³⁵

Pakistan believes in further increasing the regional cooperation through the platform of SCO and desires to be associated more closely in the fields of economy, trade, finance, transport, customs and communications. Expansion of the SCO could have a sizeable impact on the future shape and influence of the organization, as a large cohesive organization could become a dominant force in the region. Since the organization is broadening its scope by including more states into its membership, thus in the future, it can be presumed that, SCO may bring together multiculturalism in its ambit by having countries like Pakistan and Iran³⁶ on the one hand, and Eurasian countries on the other hand. Nonetheless, it is debatable, whether the SCO can integrate countries having diverse backgrounds and culture.³⁷

SCO and the Region: Peace, Stability and Prosperity

The organization members are determined to carry out all-around cooperation within the SCO framework and develop the organization into a reliable guarantee of regional peace, stability and prosperity. ³⁸ Over the years, SCO has established “over twenty large-scale projects” ³⁹ in areas like; banking, defence, economy, transport, energy, telecommunication etc. Except NATO, a military alliance, these projects have no parallel among the contemporary regional organizations. For development in the region, the forum seems determined to promote and strengthen, unity, cooperation, and desires

³³ The Economic Times, India pitches for SCO's membership, Afghanistan role, June 5, 2012.

³⁴ SreematiGanguly,” 2012 Meet of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO): A Step towards the Future?”, Institute of Foreign Policy Studies dated June 26, 2012 as seen on <http://www.caluniv.ac.in/ifps/Sreemati%20Ganguly.pdf>

³⁵ RizwanZeb, “Pakistan and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization”, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies Program, Vol. 4 No. 4 (2006) Pp. 51-60 accessed on http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/CEF/Quarterly/November_2006/Zeb.pdf

³⁶ Alexander A. Pkiayev, “Enlarging the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Is Iran a viable member?”, Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Moscow PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No 15, August 2008 accessed on http://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/pepm_015.pdf

³⁷ Marcel de Haas, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the OSCE: Two of a Kind?”, accessed on http://ftp.clingendael.nl/publications/2007/20071100_cscp_art_haas.pdf

³⁸ Fazal-ur-Rehman, “The Ninth SCO Summit: A Step Forward”, accessed on http://www.issi.org.pk/old-site/photos/THE_NINTH_SCO_SUMMIT.pdf

³⁹ Zhou Wa, China & Russia Quit the Dollar, The Wall Street Examiner, November 24, 2010. <http://forums.wallstreetexaminer.com/topic/911455-china-russia-quit-the-dollar/>

to maintain stability. During its 10th Summit, SCO finalized the strategies for fighting the three evil forces; terrorism, separatism, and extremism. It also safeguards security and stability; and advancing pragmatic cooperation among the members of SCO.

As security threats and challenges continue to emerge, SCO members should further cooperate in fighting all forms of terrorism and strengthen dialogue between different civilizations and cultures to prevent the growth of terrorism and extremism. Despite having instability and rampant terrorism in the neighbouring Afghanistan, the forum is trying to keep the region intact and free from the menace of terrorism. Even, the worst economic crisis, the forum has played a positive role in bolstering regional stability, spurring the economic recovery of its member states and striving for common development, and regional cooperation.

Member countries of SCO have intensified their mutual political and economic cooperation. They have also devised a new mechanism of consultation on global and regional issues. From the platform of SCO, member nations have joined hands to combat terrorism, drug production and trafficking and organized crimes side by side. During 10th Summit of SCO, it was emphasized that Central Asia should be a nuclear-free zone. This step will not only enhance regional peace and security but would also contribute towards global peace and security.⁴⁰

In order to meet the forth-coming challenges, the organization has attached great importance to substantial cooperation among the members. Besides, it has beefed up its self-development and expanded its external exchanges. Cooperation in political, security, economic, cultural and humanitarian areas is being expanded and organization's external exchanges are enhanced. SCO Secretariat is working to have collaboration with international organizations including; United Nations, Organization of Islamic Cooperation and European Union.

SCO: For a Stabilizing Role in Afghanistan

After a prolonged silence, China hinted in June 2012, that together with Russia, it would play a bigger role for the stabilization of Afghanistan. This statement of the former Chinese President Mr. Hu Jintao came just before 12th Summit of SCO, held in Beijing in June 2012. President Hu said, "We will continue to manage regional affairs by ourselves, guarding against shocks from turbulence outside the region, and will play a bigger role in Afghanistan's peaceful reconstruction."⁴¹ Mr. Hu emphasized that "We will strengthen

⁴⁰ SCO summit vows to boost regional peace, stability, prosperity, Xinhua, China.org.cn, June 11, 2010. http://www.china.org.cn/world/hu_sco_2010/2010-06/11/content_20240433.htm.

⁴¹ GlebBryanski and Chris Buckley, China's Hu sees role for regional bloc in Afghanistan, Chicago Tribune News June 06, 2012 Accessed on October 25, 2012

communication, coordination and cooperation in dealing with major international and regional issues.” He urged new cooperation models and proposed ways to identify non-resource sectors as a new priority for economic cooperation. He said that China would provide \$10 billion⁴² for undertaking projects in SCO countries.

According to Mr Zhang Deguang, former Secretary General of SCO and Chairman of China Foundation of International Studies (CFIS), “SCO can and will play a bigger role in Afghanistan after the NATO withdrawal.”⁴³ Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev called for setting up a special fund to complete projects in member countries of SCO. He pledged to take forward the spirit of SCO and specially mentioned the need for peace, progress and stability in Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan. Russia wants the Shanghai group to play a part in stabilization of Afghanistan, rather challenging the US and NATO role,⁴⁴ i.e. upholding the SCO policy of non-alliance and non-confrontation.⁴⁵

According to ‘The Global Times,’ a Chinese daily, under the current situation where NATO and the US are facing embarrassment in Afghanistan, SCO countries would not like to become a party or counterpart to this alliance. The forum is looking for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, following the pull out of the NATO and the US forces⁴⁶. Already China has invested a lot in Afghanistan. Afghanistan has been given an observer status of SCO during its 12th Summit. Afghan President, Hamid Karazai desired a strategic partnership with China and said: “Afghanistan will be expanding and strengthening relations with China.”⁴⁷ Chinese President Mr Hu assured President Karazai for a continued support. He said, “China will continue actively participating in international and regional cooperation concerning Afghanistan.”⁴⁸ Earlier, Mr Liu Weimin, spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry said, “Events in Afghanistan are of great concern to the security and

at; http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-06-06/news/sns-rt-us-china-russia-hu-afghanistanbre85504t-20120605_1_afghanistan-sco-china-s-hu.

⁴² Christina Y. Lin, China, Iran and North Korea; A Triangular Strategic Alliance, Gloria centre, Global Research in International Affairs. March 5, 2010. Accessed on October 25 at; <http://www.gloria-center.org/2010/03/lin-2010-03-05/>.

⁴³ SCO sees role in Afghanistan, Dawn, September 12, 2012. Accessed on October 25, 2012 at; <http://dawn.com/2012/09/12/sco-sees-role-in-afghanistan/>.

⁴⁴ SCO sees role in Afghanistan, Dawn September 12, 2012. <http://dawn.com/2012/09/12/sco-sees-role-in-afghanistan/>

⁴⁵ RuslanMaksutov, “The Shanghai Cooperative Organization: A Central Asian Perspective”, SIPRI Project Paper, August 2006 accessed on <http://archives.sipri.org/contents/worldsec/Ruslan.SCO.pdf>

⁴⁶ FabrizioVielmini, “The SCO Central Asian Dimension of the Afghan Crisis on the eve of ISAF Retreat”, ISPI Analysis (Istituto Per GliStudi Di PoliticaInternazionale), No. 132 July 2012 as seen on http://www.ispionline.it/it/documents/Analysis_132_2012.pdf

⁴⁷ Hu sees Afghan role for regional bloc, Reuters, BEIJING, Taipei Times, June 7, 2012. <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2012/06/07/2003534708/2>.

⁴⁸ The Economic Times, June 8, 2012. <http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/topic/shanghai-cooperation-organisation/quotes/2>

stability of Central Asia.”⁴⁹Indeed, regional countries and especially China is seriously concerned about the uncertainty and instability in Afghanistan.

In a statement, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said that member states should boost security cooperation to safeguard regional stability, including stepping up the fight against terrorism, autonomy and extremism, optimizing the model for cooperation in ensuring security for major international events, and carrying on joint anti-terrorism exercises.⁵⁰ Yang also called for better links among the SCO member states, boosting infrastructural construction, further facilitating trade and investment, and expanding cooperation in sectors such as finance, transport, energy, telecommunications, and agriculture amid the economic downturn.

During 12th Summit of SCO, surprisingly, India also backed Chinese call for the SCO's role in Afghanistan. Indian External Affairs Minister S.M Krishna, heading the Indian delegate, said, “SCO is a promising and alternative regional platform for discussion on the rapidly changing situation in Afghanistan.”⁵¹ For stabilization of the region, Uzbek President Islam Karimov emphasized for a political and economic cooperation and stepping up anti-terrorism efforts among the SCO countries.

Most of the SCO countries are geographically contiguous with Afghanistan, thus vulnerable to spillover effects of terrorism and Afghan-originated drug trafficking. Owing to these facts, they have an interest to stabilize this country. They developed a comprehensive strategic approach to deal with these issues. The SCO's members noted the situation in Afghanistan remained the main threat to security in the region, thus consider that the organization can assume responsibility for the future of Afghanistan. The organization encouraged the UN for a leading role and global mediation efforts to bring peace in Afghanistan. It also stressed the need for enhanced efforts to intensify the fight against all sections of drug production and circulation in Afghanistan.

“The SCO member states would like to coordinate with other international and regional institutions on the drug issue and called on the International Security Assistance Force to cooperate with SCO

⁴⁹ GlebBryanski and Chris Buckley, China's Hu sees role for regional bloc in Afghanistan, Reuters, Jun 06, 2012. <http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idtheUSBRE85504T20120606?irpc=932>.

⁵⁰ Michael Raska, China's defence aviation industry: searching for innovation, The Nation (Thailand), 22 Oct 2012. <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/spotlight.htm>.

⁵¹ Maj. Jefferson E. Turner, “What is Driving India's and Pakistan's Interest in Joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization?”, Centre for Contemporary Conflict, Strategic Insights Vol. IV, Issue. 8, August 2005 accessed on <http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2005/Aug/turnerAug05.pdf>

members in combating drugs," the declaration said.⁵² Apart from its members' desire, internationally it is felt that, SCO should also be a partner in stabilization of Afghanistan.⁵³ As presumed by scholars, the biggest test of the SCO would be its developmental role in Afghanistan. There have been continuous soundings in this regard in SCO summits particularly in Bishkek⁵⁴ in August 2007 and Beijing in 2012. The possibility of regional cooperation through SCO with other groups in the region like NATO is wide-ranging and has the capacity to be long lasting.

Varied Regional outlook of Major SCO Members

Whereas, there is a consensus based approach for the development of the region, there appear internal differences especially between major countries of the SCO on some of their areas of influence. Russia and China have their own outlooks and interests on the regional geo-politics of Central Asia.⁵⁵ These, indeed, are the impediments SCO may face in the days to come. Though both seek to bring robust peace in the region that is a crucial development, nevertheless, both are pursuing policies with a little difference of interests over Central Asia. Russia is more possessive about Central Asia and its resources,⁵⁶ aiming not to share those with any third country. China is making huge investments and promoting good will, trade and commerce with Central Asian States. Russia also has major concerns over China's involvement in Central Asia. Traditionally, both China and India have been massively relying on the Russian origin military hardware. However, owing to Sino-Indian differences and Russian intimacy with India, this resurgent super power is exercising restraint over the supply of its military equipment to China.

It is worth mentioning that upon economic and political collapse of the former Soviet Union in December 1991, its former republics formed Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).⁵⁷ All

⁵² Simbal Khan, "Stabilization of Afghanistan: the US-NATO Regional Strategy and the Role of SCO" accessed on http://www.issi.org.pk/publication-files/1299137179_72323919.pdf

⁵³ Jeffery Nickeson, 'Has the West Lost the Battle for Central Asia?' Defence and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, Vol. 35, No. 8, August 2007, p. 1.

⁵⁴ Marcel de Haas, "The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the OSCE: Two of a Kind?", accessed on http://ftp.clingendael.nl/publications/2007/20071100_cscp_art_haas.pdf

⁵⁵ Marcel de Haas, "The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the OSCE: Two of a Kind?", accessed on http://ftp.clingendael.nl/publications/2007/20071100_cscp_art_haas.pdf

⁵⁶ RuslanMaksutov, "The Shanghai Cooperative Organization: A Central Asian Perspective", SIPRI Project Paper, August 2006 accessed on <http://archives.sipri.org/contents/worldsec/Ruslan.SCO.pdf>

⁵⁷ Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Encyclopedia Britannica. Accessed on October 23, 2012 at; <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/>

Central Asian States are its members. Function of the CIS is to coordinate important policies of the member states particularly those related to defence, foreign relations and economy etc.⁵⁸ Russia being the successor of the former Soviet Union, intended on maintaining a hold over other states, especially the hydrocarbon rich Central Asia. Within CIS, in May 2002, a security organization was established with the name of Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Apart from Russia and some other former Soviet States, four Central Asian States (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) are its members. The major objective of this organization is to preserve the territorial integrity of the member states. As per former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, CSTO is the potential partner of NATO. Ivanov realizes that, "the next logical step may be to work out a mechanism for cooperation between NATO and the CSTO with corresponding, clearly defined spheres of responsibility."⁵⁹

Future Prospects

Since there has never been a concord on all issues by all members even at the level of UN or EU, therefore, expecting unanimity from the SCO forum, having a decade old history would be asking for too much. Nonetheless, it is the only forum that raised a voice for regional security ever since it came into being. In 2006, from the forum of SCO, NATO and U.S were asked to vacate the military bases, occupied by them in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Besides, the organization has been raising its concerns over the presence of extra-regional troops and their activities in the region. Currently, the organization may be behaving toothlessly or having forbearance, but has the potential to become a future competitor to the Western alignment. With over 60% Eurasian landmass, it is the only organization which can effectively pose itself as the "political bulwark against further U.S. penetration in the region."⁶⁰

With rapidly increasing economic and political cooperation among the members, SCO has been debating the aspects of military and security cooperation in the "Asiatic area." After the US announcement that by 2020, 60% of its Navel fleets would be deployed in the Asia-

128945/Commonwealth-of-Independent-States-CIS/128945yblinks/Year-in-Review-Links.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Globalsecurity.org. Accessed on October 23, 2012, at; <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/csto.htm>

⁶⁰ Richard Weitz, China-Russia security relations: strategic parallelism without partnership or passion? Strategic Studies Institute, ISBN 1-58487-360-4, August 2008. Accessed on October 30, 2012 at; <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub868.pdf>.

Pacific⁶¹, Russia and China felt more endangered. Thereafter, navies of both countries have decided to undertake joint exercises in the Yellow Sea, following the military exercises of the US and Vietnam. Besides, as major SCO countries, China and Russia have unanimously rejected the UNSC Resolutions⁶² sponsor by the US for a likely military intervention in Syria. This and many other cooperative actions of both at global level indicate that they have a realization that they can compete the growing the US and Western domination through a joint approach, rather independently.

According to the New York Times, SCO is prepared to preserve the regional security without involvement of the US or any other extra regional power. Moreover, SCO will not develop into a military alliance.⁶³ However, maintaining regional security has become its most significant mission. The establishment of the organization is based on a common strategic requirement, which is to curb the "Three Evil Forces" of terrorism, regional separatism and religious extremism. Over the past 10 years, SCO has conducted ten anti-terrorism exercises. Besides, it has resolved to fight against drug smuggling and transnational organized crimes and launched cooperation in many new fields, such as anti-money-laundering and the security of large-scale international activities.

It would be optimistic to say that SCO countries would deploy their forces for the security of the region and confront the NATO alliance. However, it would surely resist any foreign intervention in the region. Such an opportunity will be obtainable only after pullout of NATO and the US forces from the region. Regional integration and harmony among the members is the prerequisite for attaining such a level of commitment. Whilst SCO members are making all out efforts to block the entry into the region, NATO and the US would desist such a strategy.

Since the Central Asian region has huge hydrocarbon reserves, therefore, the sole super power and its allies may not allow a free ride to China and Russia. On many regional and global issues, each side expects a guarded response from the challengers. Then there is a resurgent Russia, striving for the restoration of its former status and a rising China, looking for a new towering position at the global standpoint.

In the views of some analysts, future of SCO may be viewed as an organization which takes into consideration all aspects of the region;

⁶¹ Leon Panetta: the US to deploy 60% of navy fleet to Pacific, BBC News the US and Canada, June 2, 2012. Accessed on October 30, 2012 at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-18305750>.

⁶² Paul Harris in New York, Martin Chulov, David Batty and Damien Pearse, Syria resolution vetoed by Russia and China at United Nations, the guardian, February 4, 2012.

⁶³ Zhang Hong, Shanghai Cooperation Organization not Asia's NATO, People's Daily, June 21, 2011.

economic, political and a wholesome security provider. However, the SCO, rather going for a brisk walk leading to confrontation, is resorting to a gradual approach of consolidating its gains. There is a general feeling among the realist scholars of international relations that in the past decade SCO did not attain much. This realization is there among the members of this organization too.

In order to make it an animated regional organization having a global acceptance, major members of SCO need to reorient themselves with a clear delineation of their national interests and larger organization's interests. If they are aiming to have their own domination over the region by making use of this platform, then the organization may not become a proficient forum and its members will be open for the manipulation by extra-regional powers. Therefore, sincerity and regional devotion and dedication would play a pivotal role in the future effectiveness of the organization.

Conclusion

As its members are viewing SCO as a vehicle for increasing economic and social prosperity in the region, therefore, the organization can play a fundamental role in stabilizing Afghanistan and Central Asian region. The organization has made a direct engagement between Central Asian nations and Russia and China. The circle of engagement of the organization would enhance with the increase in its membership. Countries like Afghanistan, Mongolia, India, Pakistan, and Iran, having observer status currently, would be a good addition in the organization if given permanent membership. Indeed, such multi-nationalism would make the SCO a key player in accelerating regional amalgamation and cooperation. Its aim seems to be more multi-faceted than simply to move towards balancing power or securing the region. SCO⁶⁴ is also focusing on economic and social integration of the region and has gone to great lengths to create confidence in its desire to promote prosperity and cooperation. The SCO continues to evolve into a stable representative unit that has broadened its responsibility to cooperating on social, economic and security considerations.

Afghanistan is a unique prospect that can be used as a confidence building exercise for SCO and NATO to work together because major players from these groups are active in the reconstruction and stabilization process. SCO can be a key stakeholder and important enabler of Afghan and Central Asian stability. Achieving a stable and prosperous Central Asia will rest on the success of this

⁶⁴ Alyson J.K. Bailes, Pal Dunay, Pan Guang and Mikhail Troitskiy, "The Shanghai Cooperation Organization", SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), Policy Paper No. 17, May 2007 accessed on http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/SIPRI-Shangai_Coop_Org.pdf

important regional security forum.⁶⁵Regional members have an opportunity through the SCO platform to turn Afghanistan into a peace bridge for the region and the globe. Besides, the organization can bring about a shift in focus by moving away from issues of weak and porous borders to measures that help build confidence so that the member states can augment internal security and direct finances for the economic and social prosperity.

⁶⁵ Matthew Hall, 'The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Partner for Stabilizing Afghanistan', Shedden Papers, p. 10.

AFGHAN END GAME AND PAKISTAN: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES

Lt. Gen Syed Athar Ali* (Retd.) & Syed Muhammad Ali*

Abstract

Afghanistan presents a compelling case study in the discipline of international relations as over the past few centuries, the dynamics of major power rivalries, international systemic changes, geopolitics, energy politics, insurgencies and the phenomenon of terrorism have not only affected the Afghan society but also left its lasting imprints on regional and global security. This Research Paper explores the relevance of the structure of International system; identifies the stakes and interests of the key international, regional and local actors in the Afghan End-Game; evaluates the international system and its relationship with the interests and behaviour of these actors, both in the inter-regional and intra-regional contexts. In addition, a way forward is recommended to help achieve a viable Afghan state and a stable society along with defining a stabilizing role, which Pakistan can play in this respect for both itself, this region and towards promoting international security. The paper also identifies the opportunities and emerging challenges for local, regional and global players and compares their convergences and divergences of interests. Lastly, it also suggests ways of contributing towards the security and stability of both the Afghan nation and this volatile region, at a time when major and long-term shifts are underway in the 21st century political and security architecture of the world.

Introduction

Afghanistan has remained significant to some of the major changes, which took place in the international political and security architecture of both 20th and 21st century. 23 years ago, the emergence of unipolarity from bipolarity had its roots in the asymmetrical warfare, which the Western world waged against the

Communist block for which Afghanistan proved to be the last frontier. According to the Structural realism paradigm, in an anarchic international system, it is assumed that state is the dominant actor whose means and ends for the pursuit of its national interests are neither moral nor immoral but amoral and driven by the anarchic structure of the international system. This research study will base its analysis and approach on these assumptions and attempt to study the causes and consequences of policies and strategies, which various states employ in the pursuit of their national interests determined by their capabilities and relative positions within the international system instead of moral considerations. Therefore, in the prevailing unipolar environment, based on the logic of structural realism, the analysis in this research paper assumes that the principal interest of the super power dominating the contemporary international system is to preserve this unipolarity and prevent the emergence or revival of potential challengers.

In this conceptual context, Kenneth Waltz' three levels of analysis provide a useful framework to deconstruct and understand the Afghan imbroglio by identifying and distinguishing between the interests of international, regional and local actors. These interests are determined by a variety of complex factors and considerations, some of which are interlinked.¹ This paper is an academic attempt to identify the interests of local, regional and international actors and ascertain their convergences and divergences and based on this conceptual framework, to recommend a viable way forward, suitable for both Afghanistan and the region.

A security dilemma is posed within the international system by virtue of its dynamic nature and due to the compulsion imposed upon a superpower to preserve its stature as a pre-eminent actor within the international system and the conflicting aspiration of emerging or regional players to exploit the receding influence of a declining superpower. In this context, the political necessities of the US are in conflict with the opportunities which China, Russia, Iran and Pakistan, which view the emerging Post-2014 political and security architecture of Afghanistan as a long-term opportunity. Therefore, Afghanistan provides a contemporary and compelling case study to analyse the relationship between the US's economic, strategic, political, and energy interests and the contemporary structure of the international system. In addition, the US represents the leader of the industrialized world and various scholars and strategists like Colin Gray and Bernard Brodie attribute the emergence of the post-World War-II world order as a direct consequence of the formidable the US industrial capacity. Therefore, securing and sustaining its long-term energy security, represents a goal which is vital to the sustenance of the US ' industrial

¹ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, The State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 263.

might, technological prowess, military industry, economic progress, its way of life and its international image as the leader of the free world.

In the foreseeable future, various the US international relations experts perceive China as the state, which is most likely to a credible challenge to the US's preeminence in the evolving international order. An economically, politically, diplomatically and strategically resurgent Russia represents another concern for Washington as it is reasserting its influence if not waging a direct claim over its periphery. Moreover, Iran presents the last and the foremost irritant towards virtually ensuring a complete control of the Middle Eastern energy resources as well as influence over the regimes, controlling these resources vital to the interests of the industrialized societies, to the policy dictates of Washington. Hence, controlling Afghanistan is key to securing its long-term energy interests, restricting or delaying the emergence of China, containing the resurgence of Russia, neutralizing and isolating Iran besides engaging the extremist forces with Asia.

Moreover, these international developments cannot be divorced from the domestic political and economic realities, which the US is currently facing. The dwindling public support for sustained military presence in Afghanistan, shaky economy, rising unemployment, Republicans' criticism and sagging morale of the US military personnel are important considerations for the Obama administration in his second term. President Obama has already developed a new term of advisors and policy makers, who can help lead the US foreign policy in his second term towards a new direction, aimed at protecting the long-term the US interests in the Asia-Pacific region, by diverting the US strategic orientation, its hard and soft power capabilities, military, diplomatic, intelligence, informational and economic resources accordingly, instead of keeping them entangled within the complex South Asian milieu.

Besides, the lack of proportionate long-term commitment and divergent interests of its allies also constrains the US policy options and pursuit of a cohesive strategy both in Afghanistan and the region. Therefore, blaming allies for lack of military success in Afghan conflict seems to be a political compulsion for the US administration rather than the reflection of strategic reality. In this respect, Pakistan continues to be the principal fall guy of this blame game, despite its unparalleled contribution in the War on Terror, losses of over 42,000 lives of its citizens and soldiers, almost 70 billion dollars worth of damages to its economy, infrastructure and the loss of an entire decade to its national socio-economic development. In case of Pakistan, the apparent and traditional disconnect between long-term national interests and the relatively short term strategic and economic compulsions of allying itself with the preeminent superpower has significantly constrained Pakistan's ability to pursue a foreign policy based on domestic popular aspirations and also preserve its economic and territorial sovereignty

at the same time. Pakistan's policies regarding Afghanistan, the US, Iran, Russia and terrorism need a detailed critical analysis in the above context. In the age of globalization, public access to information related to policies, a critical and free media, evolving culture of open and candid public debates has made Pakistan's traditional approach of dependence over external powers for meeting its domestic economic, development and security challenges difficult to sustain. Pakistani leadership's ability to perpetually balance the conflicting demands on the popular level makes sustenance of externally influenced foreign policy untenable.

A foreign policy based on defensive realism instead of offensive realism offers both Kabul and Islamabad an unparalleled set of opportunities and challenges, which if prudently and comprehensively dealt with, could contribute towards a peaceful, stable, prosperous and united Afghanistan, beside securing Pakistan's long-term national interests, and ensuring stability of the region. In order to evaluate the role and significance of each major player in the Afghan-end game, their interests and objectives need to be compared with the means available to them, which is discussed in the following parts of this paper.

Role of Key Players

Extra-Regional Players

According to the US Congressional estimates, the US has spent over 1.25 trillion dollars in the global war on terror, which is approximately twice the total cost of 2nd world war borne by the US tax payers². The Second World War allowed the US and its allies to transform the international system from multi-polarity to bipolarity. Whereas, the global war on Terror has accorded the US political legitimacy to preserve international unipolarity and exploit it for the pursuit of its geopolitical, geostrategic and energy interests in Asia. The events of 9/11 provided the US the opportunity to invade Afghanistan whereas the ideological roots and origins of Al-Qaeda, the main perpetrators of 9/11 did not belong to South Asia or for that matter, Afghanistan.

Moreover, the US initial insistence at not distinguishing between Al-Qaeda's transnational agenda and Taliban's local agenda seemed misfit in view of the ground realities of Afghanistan. Moreover, the US resorted to a 'global' War on Terror (GWOT), which from the very beginning should have been based on a Counter Terrorism strategy. In fact, it initially initiated a large-scale conventional war in Afghanistan including strategic bombing by large-scale employment of air power and carrier battle groups a massive deployment of

² Syed Muhammad Ali, "The Afghan end-game: Lessons for the US strategy," Strategic Studies, Vol. XXXI, No. 3, 2011.

conventional forces including those of its allies. After achieving regime change and physically gaining foothold in Afghanistan, in the second stage, the US restored to counter insurgency (COIN) strategy, which was pursued for almost 10 years. The US COIN strategy in Afghanistan led to huge military expenditure, significant the US casualties, complex operational and logistical challenges, created a domestic political vacuum, human rights violations and civilian casualties which could have been avoided had they resorted to a Counter Terrorism (CT) strategy right from the very outset.

The incorrect strategy of initially employing conventional warfare and subsequently counter insurgency (COIN) approach led to the largescale destruction of socio economic infrastructure, agricultural resource base and mass exodus of skilled man power. Moreover, it isolated the moderate and educated population within the society, essential for Afghan socio-economic survival and strengthened the black economy, narcotics trade and helped the warlords become the main political actors in domestic politics of Afghanistan. This situation raises serious questions regarding the strategic means employed by the US in Afghanistan during the last 11 years and the actual ends it desires, conducive to its long term national interests in the region. After eliminating its former *Jihadist* allies turned terrorists including Osama bin Laden, the US and NATO continued military presence in Afghanistan rises questions regarding its objective towards the region. The above discussion leads us to the need to identify the US 's actual interest; the pursuit of which resulted in the large-scale invasion, regime change and subsequent political, strategic and economic control of Afghanistan.

The US Objectives: A Brief Critical Evaluation

Based on the logic of Structural realism, as a sole super power in the current international system the US aspires to dominate the policies and politics of various regions, particularly those which it views as significant to its geo-strategic, geopolitical, economic, and energy interests. A long-term stay in Afghanistan and the domination of Central Asia are all corollaries to the multipurpose the US strategies in the region³.

It is widely believed that while anchored in Afghanistan, with a few bases in Central Asia, the United States has multiple objectives. As per the views of various writers and analysts, its long-term agenda includes the containment of China through multi-pronged approaches, planned to be implemented through its allies in Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and South Asia. The US already maintains a significant number of its military forces in all these regions. The US is moving closer towards ASEAN, being part of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation

³ Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars; the Secret History of CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004)

(TAC)⁴. It has recently concluded a nuclear deal with Vietnam⁵ and is about to secure military bases in the Philippines⁶. In the context of these measures, countering the rise of China is not restricted to South China Sea and Indian Ocean but also involved bringing Indian strategic, diplomatic and economic influence in Afghanistan and promoting New Delhi as an important player and counter weight to China, in the South Asian region.

In global politics, the US is highly conscious of a resurgent Russia and would take whatever measures it believes necessary to contest this power-balancing quest. Certain Russian actions, such as the attack on Georgia in 2008, the test firing of long-range intercontinental ballistic missile and a consistent and strong opposition of the US missile defence shield in the Eastern European countries, use of veto in Syria, criticism of the US role in Libyan regime change, expansion of military ties in Latin America and restoration of power projection capabilities particularly the revival of Russian long range strategic bomber patrolling over the Pacific Ocean are tangible factors indicative of Russian resurgence, a fact that is of serious concern for the United States⁷. Putin's return to power, growing energy dependence of Western Europe on Russia, revival of its military industry, and recent economic growth have contributed towards a more assertive Russian foreign policy in international affairs. This revival of diplomatic and strategic competition is a matter of concern for Washington.

Both Russia and China desire that the US should leave the region. They have even made use of the SCO's forum more than once to encourage the US into pulling out. Apart from these, due to its long-term strategic, economic and political significance for international power politics, influencing the energy politics of the hydrocarbon-rich Central Asian and Caspian regions has always been an American interest. The US aims to explore, influence and divert these valuable resources towards its strategic allies like India and western European countries, while at the same time limiting the control and influence of Russian and Chinese companies over regional energy politics.

Geography and history makes Iran an important player in the politics of Afghanistan and Central Asia. The US desires reduction of Iranian role in Middle Eastern and Central Asia politics as well as the containment of its ideological influence and its nuclear programme.

⁴ Mark E. Manyin, Michael John Garcia, Wayne M. Morrison, "the US Accession to ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC)", Congressional Research Service, May 5, 2009.

⁵ SauravJha, "Why a the US-Vietnam Nuclear Deal?", *Diplomat*, September 15, 2010.

⁶ Manuel Mogato, 'the US Military Seeks more Access in Philippines, not Bases', *Reuters*, February 2012.

⁷ William J. Lahneman, *Military Intervention: Cases in Context in Twenty-First Century* (the USA: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc. 2004).

The US and Eurasian Energy Politics

Geo-political, geo-strategic and energy security consideration constitute important drivers of the US foreign policy. The Eurasian energy politics reflect its aspirations to deny access to energy resources to potential challengers and instead diverting them towards existing or emerging allies. Washington desires that neither Russian nor Iranian soil be used to provide energy corridors from the CARs and the Caspian regions to destined European markets, and elsewhere in the world. The US prefers using the route from the Central Asia to Turkey and then on to Europe, as in the case of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline. This crude oil pipeline is 1768 km long and passes through Azerbaijan (Baku), Georgia (Tbilisi) and the Turkish coast (Ceyhan port) to Europe through the Mediterranean Sea⁸. For the rest of the region, especially India, the US desires a pipeline from Central Asia to India via Afghanistan and Pakistan. This the US strategy of bypassing emerging or resurging powers is in clash with long-term economic, energy and political interests of China, Russia and Iran in this region, which could prevent a cooperative environment between regional and extra-regional powers. Moreover, some senior the US military officers warned its political leadership against disproportionate reliance on hard power in its Afghan strategy. The assessment report of General Stanley McChrystal, the former commander of ISAF in Afghanistan in 2009 stated:

*"Resources will not win this war, but under-resourcing could lose it. Failure to provide adequate resources also risks a longer conflict, greater casualties, higher overall costs and ultimately, a critical loss of political support. Any of these risks in turn, are likely to result in mission failure."*⁹

Three years ago, Gen McChrystal predicted the failure of the US-led war in Afghanistan if political reconciliation and integration of the Taliban were not ensured.¹⁰ He was perhaps the only military commander who gave a candid and realistic assessment that there existed a total lack of understanding of the Afghan culture and society on part of ISAF officers and soldiers. General McChrystal also declared that the conventional employment of forces under the US, is a the US, part of the problem, rather than a way out.¹¹

Therefore, in the Afghan end-game, the US is expected to ensure security of its interests in the form of retaining military bases and other civil and military institutions supporting the US interests in the long

⁸ Eric Watkins, "BTC Pipeline Throughput Increasing in 2011", Oil and Gas Journal, 2010.

⁹ COMISAF's Initial Assessment, General Stanley Mac Crystal, August 30, 2009.

¹⁰ Eric Schmitt and Tom Shanker, "General Calls for More the US Troops to Avoid Afghan Failure", New York Times, September 20, 2009.

¹¹ Ibid.

run. In addition, the creation of a huge economically dependent security infrastructure in Afghanistan will keep it compliant to the long-term the US interests. From a Realist paradigm, ideological and political differences notwithstanding, Iran and the US seem to have a common interest in preventing the return to power by Taliban after the bulk of the US forces depart from Afghanistan. The ability of the US to preserve, promote and pursue its long term regional interests in Afghanistan will depend upon the survival of the political system, government structures and military organization which the US has helped create during the past 11 years. However, it remains to be seen whether this political system, state structures and democratization process can survive once the bulk of the US forces leave Afghanistan and the US financial assistance for Afghan government and military gradually reduces.

Indian role in Afghanistan

India, though non-contiguous to Afghanistan, is being cultivated up by the US as an unnatural yet major player in Afghan affairs at the cost of the long term national interests of immediate neighbours including Pakistan, China, Iran and Russia. According to the Federation of Pakistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry's 2007 estimates, India constitutes only 5% of Afghan annual imports and one fifth of Pakistan's exports to Afghanistan¹². In fact, Pakistani exports to Afghanistan are more than the combined total exports of the next 3 biggest trading partners of Afghanistan; the US, Germany and India. According to independent research estimates despite the large-scale military operations on both sides of the Durand Line since 9/11, the Pak-Afghan bilateral trade volume has increased over 14 times during the past decade.¹³

Therefore, based on these facts the US encouragement of New Delhi to be a major player in the economic and political affairs of Afghanistan is both disproportionate and unnatural. In fact, the steady grow pattern of the bilateral trade between Afghanistan and Pakistan highlights the robustness and strength of the deep rooted and historical ties between the Pakistani and Afghan societies, which have not been shaken or deterred by the disastrous episode of the WOT following 9/11.

On the strategic plain, Indian military and intelligence agencies presence in Afghanistan poses a serious threat to security of Pakistan. Their covert and clandestine activities in FATA, KPK and Baluchistan are a part of their overall strategy of making Pakistan's western borders

¹² Ibid.

¹³ "Pak-Afghan Trade Discussion Paper," PILDAT, accessed April 5, 2012, <http://www.pildat.org/publications/publication/FP/Pak-AfghanTrade-DiscussionPaperDec2011.pdf>

insecure and unstable. This scenario further complicates the security dilemma of Pakistan by posing a threat scenario on the western borders as well; thus, further accentuating conventional asymmetry between India and Pakistan on the eastern border. Consequently, it may affect Pakistani nuclear threshold viz-a-viz India in view of the enhanced post 9/11 asymmetries posing new threats to regional strategic stability. With regards to its enhanced partnership with the US, India is using Afghanistan as a perfect ground for developing suitable strategic partnership based on convergence of interests. With regards to Afghan society, India is enhancing its footprint and vigorously expanding her cultural, political, diplomatic, and military influence, detrimental to Pakistan's regional and traditional interests thereby isolating Islamabad. Besides, the US promotion of Indian military to train Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) portrays insensitivity of the US regarding religious, cultural, ethnic and historical realities of the Afghan society.

Interests of the NATO Allies

NATO's overall response towards WOT spearheaded by the US has been mixed. Whereas, diplomatically and politically they support the US initiative, however, barring U.K no other NATO ally is proactively participating in military operations in Afghanistan. Some coalition members states have been declined to take part in the actual combat operations. Their degree of support for military operations in Afghanistan has lately transformed into encouragement of the US to pursue political dialogue and socio-economic approaches towards Afghan stability.

Increasingly driven by their domestic political compulsions instead of maintaining an alliance with the super power, some of the European countries have pulled out or reduced their forces in Afghanistan. Besides domestic opposition, economic downturn in most Western countries is also a reason for their reluctance to invest their taxpayers' money in a war being waged thousands of miles away from their homelands and for ambiguous the US gains being pursued indefinitely. However, protecting the energy routes and eliminating terrorism could be considered as long-term objectives of the Western Europe for which a prolonged, costly and large-scale military presence and reliance over hard power rather than soft power is not essential.

Regional Powers

Iranian Interests

Iran is Afghanistan's fifth largest trading partner and maintains significance cultural and historical influence over its Non-Pushtun population. The Iranian interests driving its engagement with Afghanistan are aimed at dimensions, preventing other powers from

expending their influence and interest in Afghanistan, enhancing its ideological agenda, and participating and benefiting from Central Asian trade and South Asian energy market. Iran also provides its trade route to Indian trade with Afghanistan. In 2003, Iran and Afghanistan struck a deal under which the Afghan businessmen could use the Iranian port of Chabahar with the 90% discount in custom and port fees and 50% discount on warehouse charges as well as transit rights on the Iranian road network. As per another deal, India obtained similar preferences from Iran and Afghanistan for Indian goods through Chabahar and Afghanistan to CARs. Due to its traditional, historical, ethnic and ideological linkages inside Western Afghanistan, Iran has heavily invested in the Herat region, building transport infrastructure, electronic media, telecom sector and also laid electricity transmission lines, linking Western Afghanistan with the Iranian power grid¹⁴. Although Tehran deported Afghan refugees and immigrant workers, it has never closed the Iran-Afghan border and remains critical to the resurgence of Taliban in Afghanistan. In August 2008, the Afghan ring road which connects Delaram to Zaranj on the Afghan-Iran border was completed. This major project was financed and carried out by India. In addition, Iran is also building a major rail link connecting North Eastern Iran with Herat, which will ultimately connect Iran to Tajikistan.

Moreover, economic growth in Afghanistan could have positive implications for Iranian society as it could encourage many of the almost million strong Afghan refugees to return from Iran to Afghanistan and enhance Iranian influence on the Afghanistan politics, economy and policies in the post-2014 scenario.

Chinese Interests

China's interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan are complex and multi-dimensional, and are primarily driven by internal considerations. Currently, China's leaders are concerned that a significant drop in economic growth – a result of the global economic crisis – will lead to increased levels of unemployment and destabilizing levels of popular unrest. China's need to maintain economic growth and domestic stability significantly influences its approach towards Afghanistan and Pakistan. China certainly does not want to see nuclear-armed Pakistan be overrun by Islamic extremists. Nor does it want to see a degree of instability in either country that could complicate China's access to their resources, markets and transit routes. Additionally, of particular concern to Chinese authorities is the possibility that extremists could migrate from Afghanistan or Pakistan into China, or that their activities could catalyse extremist groups in its western provinces.

Regionally, China sees Afghanistan and Pakistan as components of a broader struggle for dominance over South and Central Asia.

¹⁴ Moshen M. Milani, "Iran's Policy Towards Afghanistan", *Middle East Journal* 60, No. 2, 2006, 251.

China's close relationship with Pakistan is largely a check against India's rise as a dominant power in South Asia. From this point of view, a stable and friendly Afghanistan gives Pakistan an important degree of "strategic depth" against India's nuclear capabilities and conventional military superiority. According to this logic, China benefits from an Afghanistan that is stable and friendly to Pakistan, because it allows Islamabad to focus on India. Thus, India's forays into Afghanistan are seen by some in China as designed to achieve following objectives; contain Pakistan, enhance its own energy security, combat terrorism, and contain China's development particularly of its western region, limit Chinese linkages with Central Asian region and deepening Indo-Afghan state and societies relations politically, economically, culturally and strategically.

Another key dimension of China's approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan is Beijing's perception of the United States. Since 2001, the United States has been profoundly focused on the "Arc of Instability" from the Middle East to South Asia, and the ongoing shift of military resources from Iraq to Afghanistan. In addition to requiring significant amount of policymakers' attention, this focus directly impacts the ability of the US leaders to engage in the Asia-Pacific region. This focus, combined with a difficult economic picture constraining future defence and international aid budgets, has necessarily diverted resources and high-level attention away from China and the Asia-Pacific, forcing the US to essentially operate in the region with one hand tied behind its back. Washington's focus elsewhere, and a relatively stable strategic environment with no military threats, reinforces Chinese perceptions of the current period as a "window of opportunity" allowing China to focus on its own economic growth and development.

To date, China's leaders have not directly criticized the implications of the US involvement in extended occupations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Beijing continues to view the United States as the world's most powerful nation and China's most important relationship, and does not want to jeopardize the US-Sino relations with unvarnished criticism or harping about the ongoing wars. However, since the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, official Chinese media has not hesitated to emphasize indications of instability, reports of civilian deaths, and questions about the US will to preserve stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan. China highlights problems in Afghanistan and Pakistan for several reasons. First, China perceives itself as the leader of the developing world and is therefore charged with highlighting what they see as instances of the US hegemony. Second, China seeks to cultivate positive relations with Muslim-majority countries for their natural resources, large consumer markets and their votes in various multilateral fora such as UN, CD, WTO, and SCO etc.

Another key driver of China's perspective on Afghanistan and Pakistan is concern about ties between Islamic militants in Afghanistan

and Pakistan and the Uyghur Muslim minority population in Xinjiang province. China is concerned that the militant Islamist ideology in Afghanistan could bleed into China's Uyghur population and feed what many in Beijing see as a terrorist problem. The difficulty for the US policymakers is distinguishing between terrorist groups and opposition of the Chinese Communist Party. China claims that a Uyghur separatist group called the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) has had contacts with Al Qaeda, and the US has designated ETIM as a terrorist organization. That being said, ETIM's true size and the accuracy of its reported connections with Al Qaeda remain unclear.

However, Beijing's concerns about its Uyghur population and possible connections with extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan raise questions about China's willingness to tolerate the US military forces in these countries as a tool to keep extremist forces pinned down and focused away from China. Chinese strategists are uncomfortable with a large the US military presence along China's border, and some analysts have expressed concern that the US bases in the region supporting operations in Afghanistan are part of a strategy to perpetuate the US domination of the region. At the same time, however, the US presence in Afghanistan prevents Al Qaeda from focusing on China and helps suppress Islamist groups along China's periphery.

Russian Interests

Russia does not view the long-term presence of extra-regional forces in its backyard as conducive to its national interests besides posing serious threats to its former republics¹⁵. However, based on its previous experience in Afghanistan, Moscow is pursuing a cautious approach not to get entangled in the internal Afghan affairs, which could prove costly to its own regional security. Moscow views the existence of extremist forces in Afghanistan as a threat within its sphere of influence, namely CARs and wants to restrict the extremist forces from expanding their influence in the CARs. Although, Russia views the US and NATO presence in its backward with concern, however, it does not want them to immediately depart, leaving behind a power vacuum which could be quickly filled with the resurgence of extremist elements.

Senior officials in Moscow publicly support the ongoing reconciliatory efforts with Taliban and are critical of pursuing a military approach towards the Afghan End-Game. They also believe that the regional stakeholders and neighbours can and should play a more positive, meaningful and constructive role in promoting Afghan and regional stability as compared to extra regional forces, except India.

What could be a matter of concern for Islamabad is the potential of Russia forming an alliance with Iran and India to support and sustain a Northern Alliance led power structure in Afghanistan instead of a

¹⁵ M K Bhadrakumar, "Russia Stops the US on Road to Afghanistan," *Asia Times*, January 27, 2009.

Pakistan supported Pashtun dominated Afghan political structure after majority of the US forces pull out.

Although Russia is concerned with the growing Indo-US strategic partnership and the gradual loss of its political influence over New Delhi; however, it remains to be seen to what extent Islamabad can translate these Russian concerns into opportunities for itself.

Local Actors (Afghanistan)

Karzai Administration

It can be safely assumed that the success and survival of the Karzai government beyond 2014 will depend upon its ability to be seen as acceptable to major global, regional and local stakeholders at the same time. Due to the complex, diverse and unique nature of Afghan polity, a strong, stable and united Afghanistan is only possible in which the interests and concerns of all Afghan major tribes, ethnicities and ideologies are accepted and accommodated by the multi-ethnic and diverse centre rather than a strong centre expecting all the political stakeholders to submit to its policies and preferences. In essence, Kabul should be seen by all Afghans as accepting their collective will instead of all Afghans accepting the individual will of whoever is in power in Kabul. In addition, the success and the popularity of any government is directly proportional to its ability to provide, ensure and implement socio-economic justice beyond all ethnic, ideological or political divides.

In its own interest, the onus is on the Karzai government to expand its engagement and dialogue with all Afghans and their representatives including the estranged Pashtuns to allow the process of reconciliation and reintegration to move forward and eventually succeed. In the End-Game, any future Afghan government, irrespective of its configuration, will be judged and is likely to govern, deliver justice, effectively cope with the rampant corruption, provide public welfare, create a viable economic environment and generate significant employment and investment opportunities. According to latest United Nations office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report, Afghanistan produces 93% of the world's total heroine, which is a major source of revenue for all illegal activities including illegal arms, sustaining war lords and continued instability in the Afghan society.

Taliban

Senior officials of the US administration such as Secretary Clinton and former Secretary Gates admittance of the US diplomatic engagement with the Taliban, opening of Taliban's representative office in Doha, Qatar, overt dialogue in Chicago and public reiteration by various key international players of the significance of peace and reconciliation effort with the Taliban, review of U.N's wanted terrorist list and release of inmates from Guantanamo Bay prove that a

substantive diplomatic effort is afoot with the Taliban. This multi-tracked reconciliation process represents the multilateral effort aimed at bringing peace and stability to Afghanistan through diplomatic means, an approach that Pakistan recommended since 9/11. In the words of a Pakistan former foreign secretary who has served both in Kabul and Moscow, for the peace and reconciliation effort to succeed, "A talk-talk rather than talk-fight approach would be more suitable".¹⁶

The maximalist Taliban position could be to grant them international political recognition; accommodation with future and mainstream political system; cessation of all military operations by foreign forces in Afghanistan; release of all prisoners held at Baghram, Kandahar and other air bases under the US/ ISAF; and Islamic Shari'ah to become the law of the land; and an earlier timeframe for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Afghanistan.

Pak-Afghan Correlation: Identifying Opportunities and Challenges

1. Political Dimension

No country has suffered more from the Afghan War than Pakistan. The colossal impact on all spheres and walks of life of this long-drawn warfare, has left a disturbing and deep imprint on not just the economic, social, political but also the cultural and psychological aspects of the Pakistani society.

The manner, in which the US and ISAF forces used massive force to fight terrorism in Afghanistan, not only led to the migration of Afghan people to Pakistan, putting additional pressure on its reeling economy but also created a major wave of anti-American sentiment on the societal level, creating additional challenges for the Pakistani government to maintain a stable alliance with the US against terrorism.

The war against terrorism, as per the US Congressional estimates, became overwhelmingly unpopular among the Pakistani nation, and led to the rise of Religious parties like MMA in the KPK province, which got into power riding this popular anti-American sentiment. This created further difficulties for the government in Islamabad to cooperate with the US as it was seen as an unpopular policy and further isolated the liberal forces within the Pakistani society as they were increasingly seen as pro-US among the conservative segments of society and media.

Another new development was the rise of private media after the 9/11 incident, in the form of large number of new TV channels, which helped create a new popular culture of accountability and transparency and open public debates on national and regional security

¹⁶ An Interview with former Foreign Secretary, Ambassador Tanvir Ahmad Khan, conducted in Islamabad on April 1, 2012.

issues, leading to additional pressures on the government regarding the exact details and nature of Pak-US cooperation in the War on Terror.

A major political dilemma was posed by conflicting local aspirations and international expectations to not just the President Musharraf's government but also the current government. Moreover, the effort by the government to build a broad-based national consensus against terrorism was not very successful and limited to media interactions and public statements of the leadership. Had a broad-based political strategy towards national consensus building against terrorism succeeded, the terrorists would have been politically, socially and economically isolated and the political fallout and cost to the state and the society would have been much lower. Such an approach would also have reduced the gulf between the right and left leaning segments of the society, further enhancing the national unity and therefore, the national resolve against Pakistan's enemies, both at state and sub-state levels.

2. Security Dimension

Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, Pakistan faced the gravest situation ever to its security when its armed forces were deployed simultaneously on both the eastern and western borders. Whilst in 2001-02 the stand-off was underway as a consequence of one of the largest ever Indian armed forces deployments on the Pakistani borders after the 1986-87 Brasstacks crises, Pakistan also had to move large number of its forces on the western borders, in support of its commitment to the war on terror. This accentuated its asymmetry viz-a-viz the Indian forces to an unprecedented level. Pakistan lost over 42,000 lives of its citizens including 12,000 soldiers and also created an environment, which was not conducive to investment, economic growth and normal business activity. This also aggravated the unemployment and general discontent of the society towards the government. Role of non-state actors and terrorists increased and expanded and led to almost 300 suicide attacks since 2002.

In addition, hundreds of drone attacks as well as air and ground violations carried out by the US and NATO forces over the territory of Pakistan, the attack on OBL compound in Abbottabad, attack on Pakistani military post at Salala, and shooting of Pakistani citizens by a the US national claiming to be a diplomat are but a few events which raise serious security concerns not only at the political and strategic leadership levels but also translate into large scale hostile public sentiment and raise serious questions regarding the real motives of extra-regional forces based in Afghanistan. Although Pakistan has taken extensive measures to ensure the safety and security of its strategic installations and assets, the presence of extra regional forces in neighbouring Afghanistan and their incursions into the Pakistani territory heighten the threat perception of Pakistan. Based on extensive

research, the Bureau of Investigative Journalism discovered that as a direct consequence of the drone attacks on Pakistan up to 2764 civilians including 160 children have been killed¹⁷.

**Estimated Total Deaths from the US Drone Strikes
in Pakistan, 2004 - 2012**

Timeline	Deaths (high)
2012*	84
2011	536
2010	993
2009	725
2008	314
2004-2007	112
Total	2,764

**Through March 13, 2012*

Due to their extensive use, Pakistan's conventional capabilities, weapon systems and helicopters and aircraft's service life were significantly reduced. The only notable addition to Pakistan's conventional weapon system during the last 11 years was the acquisition of 18 F-16 block 52 fighter aircrafts equipped with BVR capability. This aircraft was procured with only partial the US funding and the rest of the cost was met with Pakistan's own resources.

Notwithstanding these disturbing developments, Washington's long-term interest in developing India as a regional counter-weight to China is more significant than its interest in reducing military imbalance between India and Pakistan. This US approach further aggravates the security dilemma for Pakistan as Islamabad has traditionally reliance over the US to provide high-tech military equipment and economic assistant. In this context, Pakistan's traditional reliance over the US and its security concerns viz-a-viz India have been subordinated to the US attempt to prop up India as a major regional power. As a consequence, this US policy poses a long-term strategic threat to Pakistani regional security interests viz-a-viz India in which the sole super power is increasingly encouraging and supporting the Indian quest to emerge as a regional hegemon. Post 9/11 developments such as the 123 Agreement, the US assistance for the Indian ABM Programme, frequent joint military exercises, the recent attempt by the Obama administration to accommodate India into MTCR, Australia Group, Wassenaar Arrangement and Nuclear Suppliers Group further strengthen the above-mentioned concerns in Pakistan.

¹⁷ Counter Terrorism Strategy Initiative, "The year of the Drone: An Analysis of the US Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004-2012", New America Foundation, March 2012.

Insecurity and instability in Pakistani border region (FATA) has aggravated due to the prevailing security situation across the border in Afghanistan. The porous nature of over 2600 kilometres long border, presence of 3 million Afghan refugees inside Pakistan and the ineffective border control system in Afghanistan pose a serious security threat to Pakistan by allowing unrestricted movement of terrorists and their sympathizers inside Pakistani territory. Despite its best efforts, Pakistan could not restrict the cross-border movement of terrorists due to non-reciprocity from the Afghan side, which also cannot ensure an effective control on cross border movement. Pakistan's commitment to check the border crossing can be gauged by measures such as fencing of selected routes, installation of biometric system, and surveillance equipment along the border, and the border defence system of 821 posts as against 112 posts by the ISAF and ANA.

Besides physical damage, the psychological imprint of WOT has also affected all segments of Pakistani society leading to poor attention towards human rights issues, civil liberties, and psychological trauma of thousands of families. In short, a general sense of insecurity has gripped the entire nation which has seriously undermined the general quality of life and character of the nation.

3. Socio-Cultural Dimension

At the societal level, polarization, intolerance and increasing use of violence are a reflection of growing lack of trust between state and society and various schools of thoughts, thus weakening the national cohesion and social fabric. The role of media has also been quite damaging to the national morale and the national image internationally due to the manner in which it portrays the phenomenon of terrorism. The instantaneous weakening of state control over media after 9/11 has allowed the TV channels to focus on more controversial issues than credible and professional reporting of events further contributing to a situation of socio-economic chaos and popular discontent with state's ability to deliver justice, opportunity and create hope.

Negative perceptions created by national as well as international media have severely damaged the image of Pakistani nation internationally. However, this negative perception has been further reinforced by the extremist ideas displayed by certain individuals including some expatriates in different parts of the world.

Unchecked poppy cultivation in Afghanistan and drug trafficking has also affected the Pakistani society in a major manner. According to the figures quoted by the DG Anti-Narcotics Force, currently, Pakistan has almost 4-5 million drug addicts.

The numbers of terrorist attacks, sectarian violence and suicide bombings on business centres and religious gatherings have enormously increased after 9/11 and subsequent investigations have

revealed that a large number of suicide bombers were recruited from the Afghan refugee camps or were Afghan Nationals.

4. Economic Dimension

Since 9/11, Pakistan economy has been under tremendous pressure as a direct consequence of WOT as per official estimates the nation has suffered an economic loss of up to 70 billion dollars. Consequently, progress on welfare and development works has been severely affected. Besides, natural calamities like earthquake of 2005 and devastating floods of 2010 added to the miseries and further weakening of the economy. IDPs of Swat and Malakand as well as South Waziristan also added to the financial burden of the national exchequer. Financial cost of security measures undertaken at various tiers both in public and private sectors in terms of security equipment, weapons, vehicles, infrastructure and employment of personnel as guards has not been estimated but appears to be colossal. Following tables evaluates the Annual GDP growth rates, Annual Inflation rates and Foreign Direct Investment rates during Pakistan's association with the Global War on Terror¹⁸:

Timeline	Annual GDP Growth Rate (%)
1991-2000	3.9
2001	2.0
2002	3.2
2003	4.9
2004	7.4
2005	7.7
2006	6.1
2007	5.6
2008	2.0
2009	2.0
2010	3.0
2011	4.0

Table: *Annual Real GDP Growth Rate*

Timeline	Annual Inflation (%)
2000	3.6
2001	4.4
2002	3.5
2003	3.1
2004	4.6
2005	9.3

¹⁸ Ian S. Livingston and Michael O'Hanlon. "Pakistan Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security." Brookings Institute, 2012, 15-18.

2006	7.9
2007	7.8
2008	12.0
2009	20.8
2010	11.7
2011	16.0

Table: Annual Inflation¹⁹

Timeline	FDI in Total (\$US)
1995	723
1996	922
1997	716
1998	506
1999	523
2000	308
2001	383
2002	823
2003	534
2004	1,118
2005	2,201
2006	4,273
2007	5,590
2008	5,438
2009	2,382

Table: Foreign Direct Investment Inflows to Pakistan, 2001 through 2011²⁰

The rising inflation rates, lack of investment in industrial and public sectors, translate into dwindling employment opportunities, which further exacerbate crime rate, insecurity and raise the cost of doing business in Pakistan, shying away potential investors.

Despite Pakistan's unparalleled contribution in the GWOT, despite numerous requests by Islamabad, Washington has not increased the export quota for the Pakistani textile goods. Moreover, the 750 million US dollars, which were committed by the US administration for developing Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) in FATA, as means to encourage the tribal youth to contribute and benefit from mainstream participation in the socio-economic development for both their community and locality, have not been honoured.

In addition, the Coalition Support Funds (CSF) essentially represent the reimbursements of the expenditures undertaken by the defence forces of Pakistan, as part of their contribution towards the war on terror and do not constitute a the US military assistance programme

¹⁹ Ibid.²⁰ Ibid.

for Pakistan, as wrongly perceived in the mainstream media. This issue also highlights the trust deficit, long delays and bureaucratic problems, which further add to the troubles of this difficult strategic relationship between the US and Pakistan.

Pakistan also continues to suffer as a result of the US strategy to isolate Iran. Its energy needs have been further aggravated by the sustained the US pressure not to allow Pakistan to procure gas supply from Iran. In contrast, the US has repeatedly encouraged Islamabad to procure natural gas from Central Asian republics instead of Iran. According to a research study carried out by the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of the US Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC, *"the Central Asian Republics hold reserves of natural gas, oil and potential hydroelectricity which will be sold at prices five times higher to South Asia than to Russia."*²¹

The much talked about Kerry Luger Bill, instead of building trust and confidence between the two key allies against terrorism, has unfortunately become the symbol of distrust and lack of serious commitment on the part of the US to consider the genuine concerns and problems which Pakistan faces due to its role in the GWOT.

Offering the shortest and most direct route to outside world markets through its ports, Pakistan historically has remained the largest trade partner of Afghanistan, a reality which has not changed after 9/11 the US invasion of Afghanistan.

Of all the regional neighbours, due to various historical, geographical, cultural and other factors, Pakistan enjoys the biggest economic leverage over Afghanistan, not merely in monetary terms but also in terms of being the largest provider of its basic needs, which the land-locked country of Afghanistan and its society survives on. Moreover, Afghanistan also represents Pakistan's second biggest export market after the US, constituting 11 percent of its export revenues and more than the combined exports of India, China and Iran.

The 8th Session of Pak-Afghan Economic Commission (JEC), which was held on 16-17th January 2012 in Islamabad, provides an institutional mechanism for streamlining the economic ties between the two countries, has resolved to enhance the current US \$ 2.5 billion annual bilateral trade volume between Pakistan and Afghanistan to US \$ 5 billion over the next 3 years.

In fact, Afghanistan imports five times more commodities from Pakistan as compared to India, which further signifies the limited commercial and economic contribution, which India has or can make to the Afghan needs.

According to a Johns Hopkins University research study:

²¹ "Afghan Policy Paper," Johns Hopkins University. Accessed on 01 April 2012, <http://www.sais-jhu.edu/academics/regional-studies/southasia/pdf/Pappas%20Afghan%20Policy%20Paper%20v5.1.pdf>

*'After 2001, the new government in Kabul pivoted away from dependence on Pakistan towards closer relations with Iran and India, who had previously sponsored the Northern Alliance. Pakistan began to fear India's expanded diplomatic and development efforts in Afghanistan as cover for Indian intelligence operations directed against Pakistan.'*²²

Despite our continued economic sufferings due to the War on Terror, Pakistan has committed over 330 millions US dollars for development and reconstruction in Afghanistan. This amount is being spent on projects like Torkham-Jalalabad Road, Jinnah Hospital in Kabul, Nishtar Kidney Centre in Jalalabad, Engineering University in Balkh and various faculties in various Afghan universities across the country. Moreover, Pakistan has offered two thousand scholarships to Afghan students for education in Pakistani academic institutions. Currently, more than Six thousand Afghan students are studying in various Pakistani colleges and universities.

The Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA), which was signed in Kabul on 28th October, 2010 and came into force from 12th June, 2011 is an important bilateral trade related arrangement between the two countries, which Islamabad aims to extend beyond Afghanistan into Central Asian Republics.²³

Pakistan's Role in Peace and Stability in Afghanistan: The Way Forward

Major Decisions Need Major Analysis: Developing a Comprehensive Policy Mechanism

The current policy review that Pakistan is undertaking viz-a-viz the US, particularly in the context of its cooperation on WOT indicates Islamabad's aim to do a comprehensive cost benefit analysis of this partnership. However, this policy review which is underway regarding the 'Afghan End Game' would have been more timely and more appropriate when the Afghan game started after the 9/11 by allowing all existing and potential allies of the US to be consulted in terms of identification of common, realistic strategic objectives within a viable timeframe not to mention a clearly articulated exist-strategy. Such an approach would have also allowed the US and its allies closer collaboration at all levels of political, strategic, operational and tactical levels, minimized casualties and would have allowed a clearly rationalized, coherent and united war effort from the very beginning.

²² "Afghan Policy Paper," Johns Hopkins University. Accessed on 01 April 2012, <http://www.sais-jhu.edu/academics/regional-studies/southasia/pdf/Pappas%20Afghan%20Policy%20Paper%20v5.1.pdf>

²³ Interview with the Federal Secretary of trade and commerce of Pakistan on March 5, 2012.

However, instead of building a comprehensive strategy in collaboration with all its allies, Pakistan came under an unprecedented the US pressure after 9/11 to change its policy towards Afghanistan. Some the US experts have even stated that the US approach was less like that of a long-standing ally and seemed more like a case of coercive diplomacy²⁴. Hence, faced with an overt compellence to its security interests from its premier ally, Pakistan's responses were not based on a comprehensive multi-institutional review of its long-term national interests in the changing geo-strategic and geo-political environment and reflect realization of Islamabad's immediate need to secure its survival, traditional security interests and also to sustain a co-operative equation with the only superpower in the existing international system in an environment of unipolarity. Nevertheless, a foreign and security policy based on comprehensive institutional inputs from all institutions relevant to Pakistan's traditional and non-traditional security, sovereignty, economic progress and even human rights considerations and civil liberties should have been taken into consideration before taking an international position, to allow it to be sustainable both internally and externally, in times of economic and political difficulties.

Pakistan's Afghan policy highlights some of the fundamental systemic flaws in the national policy making mechanism. Both Kashmir and Afghanistan policy approaches indicate that major policy decisions are taken by individuals without taking institutions on board, which not only render these decisions unpopular within the institutions and among the general public but also isolates the individuals taking these decisions both from their own institutions and the nation at large. This also creates difficulties in the implementation of these decisions, no matter how sincerely or quickly they are arrived at. Most decisions related to security cooperation between Pakistan and the US have not involved a system of national consensus building through an open and broad based national discourse involving all segments of the society, their representatives, key stakeholders and opinion makers. This issue also contributes towards growing anti-American sentiments at Pakistani societal and individual levels, which makes pursuing these policies more difficult and unpopular for state and its institutions particularly during times of economic and political difficulties. This approach also creates a deficit of trust between the government and the nation due to the lack of transparency in the policy-making mechanism, detrimental to the long-term viability of both the government and the state.

This analysis reveals a fundamental flaw in the strategic culture of Pakistan in which ironically we have no clearly defined or operational institutional policy-making mechanism for our national security policy as such. Over the past 65 years, the policy-making

²⁴ Liam Collins, "United States Diplomacy with Pakistan Following 9/11: A Case Study in Coercive Diplomacy", (New Jersey: Princeton, 2008), 2.

system has perhaps not recovered from its colonial roots, executive-dominated traditions and bureaucratic practices. This creates a fundamental gulf and expectations gap between the executive dominated policy process and the society at large which creates a social division and political instability in an age of globalization. Therefore, evolving a fresh environment of free debate, intellectual input, and academic discourse is essential to mitigate the existing impediments in a comprehensive, broad based egalitarian policy making consistent with 21st century challenges that the Pakistani state and society currently face or are likely to face in future. The need to review and revise the fundamental policy making mechanism and organizational behaviour is far more important than a change in any particular policy like that towards Afghanistan or on War on terror. The absence of national security policy and its necessary comprehensive institutional mechanism, prevents our stance towards national and international security issues to be coherent and well-coordinated or even sustainable when faced with intense internal or external pressures or coercion.

Moreover, our national policy towards GWOT ought to consider the following factors before taking a position and aligning itself with extra-regional forces in Afghanistan: Pakistan's red lines of cooperation in the war in Afghanistan should not have been restricted to territorial sovereignty and foreign troops on its soil but also needed to incorporate identification of a specific timeframe, a comprehensive formula for the sharing of financial and operational costs, and limits on acceptable damage to its socio-economic infrastructure. In addition, the objectives of the military campaign must have been clearly identified, discussed and institutionalized to ensure sustained focus, realistic appreciation, strict compliance by both parties, facilitate cooperation, minimize mutual misperceptions, and reduce and equitably share costs of the joint war effort. Ten years down the line we are complaining about the loss to Pakistan's economy worth approximately 70 billion the US dollars. A realistic assessment of such projected losses should have been factored into our initial decision, negotiations and whatever eventual agreement or understanding which was necessary, before taking the decision to join the war without strong public and domestic support, particularly against an insurgency within its own borders, would be extremely difficult if not impossible.

A Revised Afghan Policy

An array of opportunities for a successful regional framework await us, provided mutual sincerity, cooperation, and commitment prevail and involves engaging regional and global stakeholders in peaceful efforts to guarantee Afghan security and to foster regional peace and stability. Notwithstanding the prevailing differences amongst Afghanistan's neighbors and regional states, there is a need to capitalize upon shared common interests and develop meaningful economic

engagement via regional fora such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), Shanghai Corporation Organization (SCO) etc.

Limits of Hard Power: A New Afghan Context

The ongoing conflict in Afghanistan provides persuasive evidence towards the notion that technology is not a substitute for knowledge and military power is not a substitute for understanding a society's culture where large-scale military operations are to be considered. In this context, in order for Pakistan to pursue and promote its regional and national interests viz-a-viz Afghanistan on a long-term basis, a major and comprehensive policy review is long overdue. More importantly, cooperation with international actors should have been based on our long term national interests viz-a-viz Afghanistan and its people whose aspirations, sensitivities and affinity with Pakistani nation should have dictated our Afghan policy in GWOT. A fresh approach based on realization of both the ground realities and the prevailing international environment is mandatory for Islamabad. Pakistan needs to formulate and pursue a soft power-based policy by shifting its strategic orientation from its current short-term state and government centric to a new long-term politico-economic and people centric approach and needs to convince its major allies to also transform their hard-power centric strategy towards Afghanistan into a soft-power based strategy. The entire war on terror has demonstrated the need that terrorism needs to be countered and eliminated on the societal front rather than focusing on a traditional inter-state context of warfare.

Therefore, a major soft power based approach, rooted in a thorough understanding of the diverse sensitivities and appreciation of cultural, ideological and historical differences in various civilizations is a fundamental and primary necessity for the international community, which needs to be coupled with selective and surgical use of hard power, instead of the opposite.

In this context, Pakistan, by virtue of its unique, major and historical relevance to the culture, society, ideology, ethnicity and history of Afghanistan, becomes vital to any soft-power based peace process and a negotiated end-game in Afghanistan.

However, the success of Pakistan's Afghan End Game policy depends on the critical question of Islamabad's political acceptability to all segments of Afghan society beyond ethnicity and ideological divide. Consequently, as the core pillar of its future Afghan Policy, Pakistan should aim to be seen as politically, culturally, ideologically and ethnically tolerant and acceptable to non-Pushtun segments of the Afghan society as well. In this manner, Pakistan will be viewed as a stabilizing force, which could unite the Afghan nation on the basis of peace, stability, economic progress and non-interference in the political

affairs of Afghanistan. Another core long-term national interest which must always be considered during policy formulation regarding this entire region is that Pakistan's territory and resources should not be made available or used by any power against any other state.

Instead of a hard power based approach, politico-economic strategies must lead the process. Investments made in hard power based structures such as ANA by the US and ISAF do not reflect realization of the limits of hard power in the conflict resolution process. Afghanistan's stabilization requires a holistic, peaceful approach, involving an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned reconciliation process supported by sustainable economic development in collaboration with immediate neighbours and encouraged and understood by extra-regional powers.

The strategic experience of the last two centuries indicate that the ethnically diverse Afghan society has always been a victim of 'The Great Game' between emerging and declining powers competing for their Geo-political, Geo-strategic and economic interests in this region. The involvement of additional players culturally, ideologically, and politically alien to the Afghan society could further undermine the future stability of the Afghan state. The encouragement of the US of the Indian involvement in Afghanistan is being viewed with suspicion by the majority of Afghans and both major regional players with major stakes in a peaceful Afghanistan, including Pakistan and China. For any socio-economic and development project to succeed in Afghanistan, it should be sensitive to culture, ideology and diverse ethnic mix of Afghanistan. One of the unique features of the Afghan society is that its population shares its history, religion, language, culture, and lifestyle with all its neighbours. Hence, only a delicate balance between the socio-economic contributions by its politically and culturally acceptable neighbours could create an unprecedented socio-economic and political equilibrium within the Afghan society and stabilize the conflict-prone state.

One of the major reasons behind the lack of success, acceptability and public support for all major powers interfering in Afghanistan over the last 200 years has been the same. The British, the Soviets, the Americans and presently the Indians are not socially, culturally and ideologically acceptable to the conservative and tribal Afghan society deeply conscious of its Muslim identity and tribal societal structure. Therefore, any political structure created by such a culturally and ideologically alien power has never succeeded and is unlikely to succeed in future as well because it is unacceptable to the majority of Afghan people due to differences in the value systems. If the US and ISAF forces hope to leave an Afghanistan which contributes to the international peace and security rather than harms it, they should engage with and encourage all Afghan neighbours to take the lead in stabilizing Afghanistan by creating a broad based and culturally and

ideologically acceptable political structure since they understand the dynamics of Afghan society and polity better than any other state or society and have a more dominant stake in evolving a peaceful Afghan society than extra-regional forces. In addition, the Afghan society also have deep-rooted centuries old relations with its neighbouring societies which the last 33 years old bloody conflict has not changed. Its biggest evidence is the fact that during both the Soviet invasion of 1979 and the US attacks in 2001, majority of the Afghans sought refuge, opportunity and hope in the Pakistani and Iranian societies and not in the western or Indian states nor did these states and societies feel the pain or share the burden of the Afghan people. Both in 1979 and 2001, The Afghans turned to Pakistan or Iran more than any other state or power for food, shelter, security and opportunity, reflecting their long-standing and robust historical bonds of trust between these societies, which perpetual warfare actually deepened rather than weakened.

In a tribal, under-developed but proud society like Afghanistan, no tribe accepts the monopoly over power, violence, resources and opportunities by any other tribe. Therefore, any government or military institution can only be acceptable and efficient if it is built beyond ethnic biases and allows people of all ethnicities and ideologies to tolerate each other, peacefully co-exist and contribute towards the building of a peaceful and progressive Afghanistan. In short, creating a political structure acceptable to the sole super power may serve its short term interests, but by virtue of being unacceptable and unpopular to the large segment of the society, could lead eventually to harming rather than bringing peace and stability to Afghanistan in the longer run.

A New Road Map for Peace: Development and Devolution instead of Destruction and Centralized Control

This new approach should aim to stabilize Afghanistan through development rather than destruction. Therefore, major international powers should devote their attention, policies, and resources towards development of socio-economic infrastructure compatible with the need to encourage economic development of Afghanistan instead of creating large and unsustainable military structures like ANA with disproportionate ethnic mix, which could further aggravate the long-term Afghan instability. In this case, the major portion of international aid and economic assistance should be allocated towards development projects in a balanced, equitable, transparent, just and proportionate basis throughout all the Afghan provinces instead of being spent on building large military forces, which in any case neither the Afghan state can afford in the medium-term nor reflects an ethnic, cultural and ideological composition acceptable to the majority of Afghan society.

With this view, it would be useful for both Pakistan and the Afghan Pushtun majority if the Pashtun leaders and representatives are encouraged to engage and improve their socio-economic relations with other non-Pashtun ethnic communities. In this context, the non-Pushtun elements resident in Pakistan since the 1979 Afghan War can play a leading role in not only expanding Pakistan's positive and constructive relevance to Afghan developmental process but also help create a broad-based, multi-ethnic yet mutually tolerant and relatively liberal Afghan society, conscious of the opportunities that the international phenomenon of globalization offers. This could lead to a win-win situation by reducing the trust deficit between Pashtun Afghans and non-Pashtun Afghans and enhance the socio-political stability of Afghanistan.

Conclusion: A Safer Transition of the International system towards multi-polarity

An accelerated phenomenon of globalization, growing economic interdependence between the East and the West for markets and finished products and between North and South for labour and natural resources and an unprecedented technology driven global socio-cultural interactions have created an all new environment in the history of the international system. These circumstances create both new challenges and new opportunities for both the rising, resurgent and declining powers within the international system for preserving world peace despite a changing world order. The growing Sino-US, Sino-European and Indo-US economic ties are but a few growing trends which emphasise the increasing need to promote ideological, cultural and ethnic tolerance between different societies. Afghanistan, therefore, provides a compelling case study as an opportunity between Eastern and Western civilizations to mutually help develop a stable and peaceful Afghan society which could allow the US and the Western Europe to pursue their traditional security and non-traditional security interests at the same time when Russia, China, Pakistan, Iran aspire for the same interests in this region. In this context, due to geographical and demographical factors, China has immense potential to contribute to the economic progress of Afghanistan, which could in return also enhance its own territorial integrity and political stability in Western China. A people-centric Approach between Pakistan and Afghanistan is essential since unlike the two states, the Afghan and Pakistani societies have deep rooted, historical, cultural, geographical, ideological and economic ties, unaffected by the GWOT. Therefore, a society-based approach rather than a state-centric approach is needed to stabilize and harmonize the Afghan society and isolate extremist forces.

Since China has no history of armed conflict with Afghanistan, it is in a unique position to play the role of the key economic driver of a large scale economic Marshall Plan, which will be acceptable to all

ethnicities resident in Afghanistan. Moreover, both Pakistan and China, by virtue of geographical contiguity offer unique economic, logistical, historical, geographical and technological advantages, unavailable to extra-regional powers. Western China is Muslim majority area in need of economic opportunities and large-scale investments by China in Afghanistan and provision of Chinese Muslim manpower to man these projects could not only help stabilize Western Chinese Socio-economic circumstances but also allow a peaceful transition to economic growth within Afghanistan through a regional approach sensitive to ideological and historical realities. Since no state and society is more ideologically, culturally, economically and historically integrated with the Afghan society, the international actors and powers willing to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan should capitalize on the unique advantages which the Pakistani people and society potentially offer as the preeminent driver of peace, progress and prosperity in this region.

According to a recent State Bank of Pakistan study, despite the on-going war on terror related military operations in the Pak-Afghan border regions, Pakistani exports to Afghanistan are far more than Iran and India and second only to China and maintained a higher volume despite a government ban on NATO supplies. However, the same official study highlights the risk to Pakistani economy potentially losing 2 billion dollars in export revenue and one of its major export markets and New Delhi replacing Islamabad, once Pakistan allows India a free-trade corridor to Afghanistan.²⁵ Coping with the socio-economic problems of the Afghan society, China will benefit in a multi-dimensional manner. It could be seen as a stabilizing force in the region, by building economic and cultural bridges with all ethnicities living in Afghanistan, it could be viewed as culturally and politically acceptable to all the Afghan neighbours. This could also allow it access to various Central Asian markets and expand its political influence in the region. In addition, this could eventually lead to building of long-term and sustainable strategic partnerships and alliances.

A proactive Chinese investment plan in Afghanistan could have significant strategic benefits such as allowing it to deepen and enlarge the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a major security block, rooted in both non-traditional and traditional security cooperation between its members, and a potential regional counter-weight to the influence and invasion of extra regional forces. This long-term strategy could rectify the turbulence, which the international order registered during the past 23 year-long episode of unipolarity.

Stabilizing Afghanistan by expanding the role of Pakistan, and building a soft power based coalition of regional partners could contribute meaningfully towards restoring bi-polarity in the international system. The post-World War II bi-polar international

²⁵ Shahid Iqbal, "Afghanistan Appears Strong Trade Partner", Dawn, May 1, 2012.

order, despite the introduction of various nuclear powers prove to be a more delicate, yet more predictable and coherent international political structure as compared to the turbulent pre-Cold War and violent post-Cold War contemporary international system engulfed by proxy wars, low-intensity conflicts, and terrorism. Stabilizing Afghanistan could be the key to rectifying the destabilizing trends and implications of not just GWOT but could also help restore the essential ingredients of balance of power, strategic stability and reducing the misperceptions between major emerging, declining or resurgent powers and limit the volatility within the complex and interdependent 21st century international politics. Lastly, it needs to be borne in mind, that to rectify the turbulent and volatile unipolarity into a more stable and predictable bi-polarity, the onus is on those states which not only have been the victims of unipolarity rather than the sole super power, whose over-arching interest in international politics has been to prevent or delay this transformation and preserve and optimally benefit from the present uni-polarity. This grand-strategy is neither permanent nor sustainable.

Whilst the Afghan Game is end-Game for some, it is the beginning of yet another new game in this region. But the lessons of British, Soviet and American campaigns in Afghanistan could help guide both new and old major players to define new soft-power-based rules to this game as compared to the traditional hard power based approach, which was not successful for all three superpowers which previously invaded Afghanistan.

Afghanistan was the last frontier of the 20th century great game, which led to the transformation of a bipolar world order into a unipolar international system. Pakistan played a pivotal role during the 1950s, 1970s, 1980s and once again after the 9/11 incident on behalf of the Western block in Afghanistan. In 1950s, it joined the Western alliance, in 1970 by bringing China and the US close to each other, it isolated Soviet Union and during the 1980s it helped win the last battle against Communism on behalf of the Western world. After 9/11 Pakistan is once again the frontline ally of the Western world against the new threat of terrorism and has borne the most cost. However, in the 21st century, the US attention is being drawn away from South Asia towards a new power equation, which is evolving in Asia-Pacific, as a consequence of the emergence of China and resurgence of Russia.

In this over-arching context, once again, Afghanistan end-game presents new opportunities to emerging and regional players to shape the international system to suit their regional and synchronize their global interests. Based on the logic of unipolarity, the US long term interest is in preventing or delaying the rise of China as a challenger to the US political, economic and strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Therefore, the US aims to develop important strategic partnership in South Asia, led by India, to contain, distract and divert the Chinese emergence by isolating it regionally, economically and

strategically. This is why, Washington is encouraging regional integration and improvement of relations between India and Pakistan by expanding political, strategic, technological and economic leverages over both New Delhi and Islamabad and also reducing Chinese leverage over Pakistan.

This makes Islamabad a vital player both in terms of future security calculus of South Asia and also offers it unique opportunities to improve its relations with New Delhi and also contribute towards future Afghan security and regional stability. History has offered Pakistan yet another chance to either remain passive and subservient to the international political status-quo or play a pro-active role in shaping a new security architecture in South Asia, based on the principle of collective security of natural partners with long-term stake in regional security instead of relying on un-natural partners with limited or short-term interests.

Meanwhile, Islamabad can also benefit from the opportunities that the Afghan End-Game is providing it for its own long-term traditional and non-traditional security by balancing its strategic interests with both a rising and an existing power. Like the key role it played during the 1970s in dividing the communism block by bringing China and the US closer, another opportunity awaits Pakistan to make a leading and meaningful contribution towards bringing the US and China together in stabilizing Afghanistan and contributing towards reducing their trust deficit. This will benefit both the US and Chinese regional interests and allow Islamabad to forge not only economic but also develop strategic and geo-political interdependence between an existing and rising power.

This could have far-reaching implications for promoting regional security, enhancing regional economic, trade and energy co-operation, reducing both traditional and non-traditional security by balancing its strategic interests with both a rising and existing power, enhancing regional strategic stability and promoting global peace by mitigating the global rivalry between Washington and Beijing. In an era of transformation of international system, this contribution from Pakistan could also prove to be vital for preserving world peace at a time when it is most needed. It can also have historical significance for a long time to come, because the core of the world political architecture is shifting towards Pacific after remaining in Atlantic for hundreds of years. What is being described in Washington as a challenge to western supremacy, can be transformed into an opportunity of mutual benefit between both east and west, with Pakistani help, by encouraging an existing and future superpower to co-operate in bringing peace first to Afghanistan and later to rest of the world. Defensive realism instead of offensive realism could hold the key to preserving the world peace in the 21st century between rising and existing world powers.

IRAN'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE UNITED STATES: RETROSPECTIVE PERSPECTIVE – 1988-1993

Dr Zulfqar Khan*

Abstract

In the Persian Gulf, Iran is the largest and potentially the most powerful country. Since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran's foreign policy toward the US has been profoundly affected by ideological considerations. The Iranian government's ideology was essentially based upon the late Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini's interpretation of Islam as it applies to the whole structure of society in all spheres of life.¹ According to Shireen Hunter, the Islamic Iran's vision of the world is polarised into two lines: power and ideology. She writes that Imam Khomeini had bifurcated the world into two opposite camps: those countries who are "arrogant" or "oppressors" (Mustakbarin- the then two superpowers, primarily the US), and the "down-trodden" or the oppressed (Muztasafin- Muslim and the Third World countries).² Imam Khomeini believed in the universal validity of Islam and its export to the world. In his words, Islam "is not peculiar to a country.... even the Muslims. Islam comes for humanity.... Islam wishes to bring all humanity under the umbrella of justice".³ Consequently, Imam Khomeini laid the principles of Iran's foreign policy on the basis of "neither East nor West", and termed the US as the "Great Satan".⁴

* Dr Zulfqar Khan is a Senior Analyst, Ministry of Defence, Pakistan; Visiting Fellow, Islamabad Policy Research Institute; and Visiting Faculty - Department of Strategic & Nuclear Studies, National Defence University, Islamabad, Pakistan.

¹ Shireen T. Hunter, *Iran and the World: Continuity in a Revolutionary Decade* (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990), 36.

² Ibid, 37.

³ *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report-Middle East & North Africa, FBIS-MEA* (Washington DC: 18 December 1979), 10.

⁴ *FBIS-MEA*, 10 December 1979, 29.

Genesis of Hostility

The other factors of Iran's hostile posture toward the US is due to the latter's "original sin" in planning the 1953 coup d'état which overthrew the government of Dr Mohammed Mossadegh. According to this view, the US conspiracy had implanted the seeds of Iranian resentment which "yielded the bitter harvest of the hostage crisis of 1979-80", and its subsequent antagonism with Washington. Shireen Hunter furthermore outlines that the second factor was the "Soviet centeredness" in the US foreign policy, which kept Washington preoccupied with the Cold War and the containment of communist threat thereby distorting the US policy toward Iran.⁵ This led to the US support of the Shah, regardless of the imperial regime's repressive domestic policies and external ambitions. Consequently, the Iranian public opinion identified the US with an illegitimate and autocratic government of the Shah.⁶ Therefore, the forces hostile to the US, when they came to power in 1979, were determined to eliminate the US influence and presence from their country. This culminated in the American hostage crisis, the break-up of their bilateral relations, and an all-out the US and Iran confrontation. According to Shaul Bakhsh, virtually all the economic, military, security and diplomatic relations with the US were severed and Washington, which under the Shah had been Iran's trusted ally, came to be treated as the Great Satan and Iran's arch enemy.⁷

Shah and the Islamic Revolution

The radical nationalist policies of the Shah era downplayed the importance of the Islamic elements in Iran's cultural development and instead glorified the pre-Islamic period. In the 1980s, the Islamic government of Iran had followed an equally extreme policy, vilifying Iran's pre-Islamic culture. This contradiction led to fragmentation of Iranian society and the undermining of its national cohesion. With the coming into power of Iranian radicals opposed to reconciliation with the US, the estrangement with Washington was quite a natural outcome. On the other hand, for the US:

Since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, containment of Iranian external influence has been the dominant American objective, accompanied by occasional efforts at engagement and limited bouts of armed conflict. Isolating Iran was relatively easy as long as the country faced hostile adversaries to both the east and west. Thus, it was Iraqi misbehaviour, not Iranian, which first brought American ground and air forces into the Gulf in 1990 and has kept them there ever since.

⁵ Hunter, *Iran and the World: Continuity in a Revolutionary*, 46.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Miron Rezun (ed.), *Iran at the Cross-roads: Global Relations in a Turbulent Decade* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1990), 115.

*The American invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq replaced regimes hostile to both Iran and the United States... With these two adversaries eliminated, Iran and the United States began identify each other as the dominant challenge.*⁸

A world dominated by the US political and military power was perceived as a serious cause of concern for Iran, and the Iranian mass-media persistently castigated the US attempt to dominate the world, and warned the Third World states of the US inspired threat to their security. In this context, the Iranian considered the 'anti-American and anti-Israeli elements of Iranian policy have historical and ideological roots', writes Dobbins.⁹ This was utilized by Tehran as geopolitical instrument to directly influence the Arab population. That it was not:

*...the Iranian military that its neighbours fear most, but rather the Islamic Republic's appeal to their populations as the ideological bastion of anti-American, anti-Israeli and pro-Shia sentiment, as the patron of Arab rejectionist forces, and as a source of funding, advice and arms for insurgent and extremist groups'.*¹⁰

Consequently, the Persian Gulf monarchies were quite fearful and apprehensive of Iran and looked up to the US for protection.¹¹ Conversely, Iran being a revolutionary state also sacrificed a lot, including facing of diplomatic isolation in order to sustain its status as an independent and prestigious regional entity.¹²

Iran-Iraq War and the US

The US naval presence in the Persian Gulf and its defence accord with Kuwait soon after the Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm), which could be replicated with the other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members worked to further reinforced Iran's fear of being encircled by the US and its allies in the region.¹³ In 1988, Iran considered the US "as the real instigator of the Iraqi" invasion of Iran on 22 September 1980, and in July 1988 Iran accepted the UN-brokered ceasefire after taking into consideration its diplomatic isolation and the US tilt toward Iraq.¹⁴ There were many reasons for Iran's acceptance of 20 July 1987 UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 598 on 18 July 1988, which Imam Khomeini

⁸ James Dobbins, 'Coping with a Nuclearising Iran', *Survival*, vol. 53, no. 6 (December 2011-January 2012), 38.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 39.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*, 42.

¹³ Mohammed Ziarati, 'Iran's National Security', *Middle East International*, 3 April 1992, 18.

¹⁴ R. K. Ramazani (ed.), *Iran's Revolution: The Search for Consensus* (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990), 57.

had described it as a "cup of poison" in the larger national interests.¹⁵ Before the ceasefire, the Iranian cities were being consistently bombed; the US naval presence was in the Gulf; there were attack on the Iranian oil installations and ships; there was a successful Iraqi offensive on Fao Peninsula; and the rupturing of diplomatic relations with the European Economic Community (EEC – now European Union). All these factors had tremendous effect on the policymakers in Tehran, and thus compelled them to drink the "cup of poison". In addition, the American warship Vincennes on 3 July 1988 mistook Iranian civilian aircraft for an air force plane and shot it down killing all passengers on board. The US government admitted the mistake, but preferred to accord an unofficial apology for the tragedy. This incident along with the other factors enhanced Iran's "sense of helplessness" thereby forcing it to accept the Resolution 598.¹⁶ The military balance by the middle of 1988 had too shifted in the favour of Iraq due to active the US participation in the Gulf. Furthermore, Kuwaiti and Saudi oil tankers were allowed to sail under the US and EEC countries flags, and the moving in of the American fleet in the Persian Gulf had virtually brought Iran into direct conflict with the US. The hardliners, including Ahmad Khomeini, son of Imam Khomeini, had argued for a policy of confrontation with the US. While the comparatively more moderate and pragmatic leaders like Hashemi Rafsanjani, who was then Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and also the Speaker of the Majlis (Parliament), admitted that "our policy was to make enemies, even with countries which stayed neutral (in the war). Now our policy will be not to create enemies".¹⁷ Naturally, this apparent change of policy was with the blessings of Imam Khomeini and the President Ali Khamenei.¹⁸

The Iran-Iraq War had alienated Tehran from its neighbours, more due to Iran's assumed ambitious policies in the region. This war further reinforced Iran's image of an expansionist state in the area, and on other hand, Iranians felt that they were victim of the US inspired aggression by Iraq. The Iranian government held the US responsible for the socioeconomic plight of the country that was the result of a long war. In spite of hostility against the US, Khomeini permitted Rafsanjani and President Ali Khamenei to improve Iran's bilateral relations with Europe. According to Shaul Bakhash, Iran after the war improved its relations with at least six countries, including the United Kingdom (UK) and France.¹⁹ Besides, Rafsanjani had expressed desire to effect negotiation with the US to improve their relations, which were under tremendous strain because of the Iran-Contra affair, and the kidnapping of American nationals -

¹⁵ FBIS, Near East and South Asia (NESA), Washington, 21 July 1988, 49-50.

¹⁶ Shaul Bakhash, *The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution* (New York: Basic Books Publishers, 1990), 272-274.

¹⁷ Safa Haeri, 'Shock, but no surprise', *Middle East International*, 22 July 1988, 4-5.

¹⁸ Sheherazade Daneshku, 'A Painful Time Ahead for Iran', *Middle East International*, 5 August 1988, 13.

¹⁹ Bakhash, *The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution*, 279.

especially Col. Higgins by the pro-Iran Shia Hizbollah in Lebanon. The radical clerical leader Ayatollah Mohtashami speaking about the prospects for improved relations with the US remarked that “a wolf is a wolf even in sheep's clothing”, thereby neutralising the prospects of improving ties with America.²⁰

Clash over the Foreign Policy Objectives

In this paper, an endeavour will be made to retrace the diametrically opposite nature of Iran and the US foreign policy objectives in the region starting from the end of the Iran-Iraq War till 1993. Special attention will be accorded to the peaceful transition of power in Tehran after the demise of Imam Khomeini in 1989; the role of new leadership in formulating the country's foreign policy; Iran's neutral stance in the Gulf War; their contest over the issue of Iranian activism; the quest for developing nuclear weapons; and Iran's alleged support of terrorism. The Iranian administration in the 1990s contended that the US continues to be hostile to the Islamic Revolution, that it is struggling for world domination, conspiring to oppose Iran's attempt to attain its rightful goal of materialising economic and security arrangements with the Central Asian Republics after the demise of the former Soviet Union (USSR), and that it is articulating a deliberate propaganda campaign against Iran on the issue of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and human rights. After the end of the Cold War, both countries considered the Gulf region important to their interests. On the other hand, the US administration since the break-up of the USSR attached great importance to the Muslim Central Asian states due to a fear of spread of Islamic activism there by Iran, while the latter naturally considered this region essential to its national interests. It was primarily due to traditional, cultural, linguistic, ethnic and religious affiliations with the peoples of these newly independent Muslim countries. This clash on the strategic policy objectives in the Gulf, Central Asia, and Iran's opposition to the US endeavours to effect peace between the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and Israel had proved to be a stumbling block in restoring amicable diplomatic relations.

Imam Khomeini writes Ayatollah Morteza Motahari writes that:

*He (Imam Khomeini) is a gift of Allah to our century, to our age. He is the living manifestation of the promise of the Holy Quran that Allah shall always dispatch, one who is to smash His enemies and bring the wayward back to the Right Path.*²¹

²⁰ FBIS-NESA, 7 October 1988, 57.

²¹ Quoted by Amir Taheri, *The Spirit of Allah: Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution* (London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd, 1985), 21. Amir Taheri has also enlisted the important slogans of the Islamic Revolution, and the Sources of Imitation, which amply reflect the authority the Imam Khomeini and his close Ayatollah associates enjoyed in all aspects of life, 326-330.

Imam Khomeini and other radical clerical leaders, including Ayatollah Morteza Motahari, considered the Revolution as the first step in a broader Islamic Revolution that would sweep the Arab world. The Gulf states, many with large concentrations of Shia population, were not only allies of Iran's adversary, the US, but also obvious targets for fundamental change, and a test of the viability of the Islamic Revolution.²² The US under the Carter and Reagan administrations, according to Robert Johnson, considered the Persian Gulf "as the third major theatre of the US-Soviet military competition", and went all out to sustain stability and the status quo in order to counter the export of Iranian Revolution to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.²³ The US had brought in its naval forces into the region so that Iran could not dominate the area, disrupt the oil supplies to the West, and accentuate the apprehension felt about the Iranian hegemony during the Iran-Iraq War, and the Islamic Republic's designs to promote their Revolution in the region. Robert Johnson articulates that for Iran "the Gulf war was the ultimate test of Iran's capacity to export its revolution because Iraq has the Arab world's largest Shia community and Iran attempted to bring the revolution to Iraq by force of arms". For Iran, Iraq had invaded it at the behest of the US and with the cooperation of the GCC allies.²⁴ Furthermore, the US had primarily established the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) and the Central Command (CENTCOM) in the 1980s to check the expansionism of the Soviet Union after the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and the Islamic Revolution in the region.

After the ceasefire, the hardliners considered the idea of re-establishing ties with the Western powers and the US with disdain, and believed that the so-called pragmatists like Rafsanjani were betraying the ideals of the Revolution by bargaining with its enemies. These radicals advocated a foreign policy in which Tehran's relations would revolve around countries like Libya, Syria, Algeria, and South Yemen. According to this approach, Iran would continue to destabilise and endeavour to export Revolution to the pro- US conservative regimes in the Gulf.²⁵ At the same time, Iran maintained indirect relations with the US through Switzerland, Algeria and Lebanon. All this was anathema to the radical clergy, and this rift in Tehran between the pragmatists and militant leaders continued till the death of Imam Khomeini on 3 June 1989.

Iran's relations with the EEC were affected in February 1989, when Imam Khomeini in a Fatwa (religious decree) condemned Salman Rushdie for writing a book titled - *Satanic Verses*, which was offensive to the

²² James A. Bill, 'Resurgent Islam in Persian Gulf', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 63, no. 3, Fall 1984, 108-127.

²³ Robert H. Johnson, 'The Persian Gulf in the US Strategy', *International Security*, vol. 14, no. 1, summer 1989, 122-124.

²⁴ *Ibid*, 149.

²⁵ John Bulloch and Harvey Morris, *The Gulf War: Its Origins, History and Consequence* (London: Methuen, 1989), 221.

Muslims. As Rushdie was British citizen, the European community jointly withdrew their ambassadors from Iran. The Iranian Majlis at the time voted to break diplomatic relations with the U.K. altogether. The Iranian clergy opposed to *rapprochement* with the West capitalised from the Rushdie affair, and argued that the West and the US were inveterately hostile to Islam and as Iran represented and propagated Islam, therefore, amicable relations were not feasible with the US and the West.

Iran after Imam Khomeini

Imam Khomeini two months before his death had dismissed Ayatollah Montazeri as his successor designate. Incidentally, Montazeri in the early phases of the Revolution had gained a reputation as one of the radicals who favoured the export of Revolution. Therefore, there were speculations that Khomeini's death would create a power vacuum and infighting between the Islamic Republic leadership. It was during this period that Iran's leadership was engaged in making constitutional amendments in regard to the roles of the President, Prime Minister and the Majlis. In spite of these predictions, the transition of power was peaceful and without infighting. Ali Khamenei was elected as the new spiritual leader, and Hashemi Rafsanjani as the Chief Executive, and later on in the elections the latter received a mandate as President.

President Rafsanjani after elections, abolished the office of the Prime Minister, and removed the hardliner Premier Hossein Moussavi, who had always opposed the idea of normalising relations with the US. Rafsanjani retained other pragmatist - Dr Ali Akbar Velayati (Foreign Minister), and dismissed radicals like Ayatollah Mohtashami (Interior Minister), Hojatolislam Moussavi Khoeiniha (Information Minister), and the head of the intelligence service, Ayatollah Rayshahi, from his cabinet. According to Shireen Hunter, six new members of the cabinet were the US educated ministers whom the hardliners eyed with suspicion.²⁶ In spite of induction of these moderate leaders, Iran's foreign policy's basic principles of non-alignment, "neither East nor West" were not changed. However, there was a desire from some quarters to improve relations with the West, but controversy on the prospects of normalising terms with the US remained in limbo. President Rafsanjani at a press conference in November 1989, in which for the first-time journalists from the US were allowed to participate, remarked that there was no Iranian expansionist designs neither they were endeavouring to export the Revolution to other countries, and expressed the desire to pursue peaceful foreign policy through diplomatic channels. He asked the foreign powers (indirectly to the US) to end their military and naval presence in the Gulf.²⁷

²⁶ Shireen T. Hunters, 'Post Khomeini Iran', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 68, no. 5, winter 1989/90, 134.

²⁷ Patrick Clawson and Charles A. Kupchan, 'Iran after Khomeini', *Orbis*, vol. 34, no. 2, Spring 1990, 246-247.

During this period, the question of the US hostages who were held by the pro-Iran Shia in Lebanon caused serious problems in obstructing the normalisation of their bilateral relations. This caused a lot of problems for the moderate Iranian leadership who were trying to gain support for a review of policy for ending hostility with Washington, and of doing whatever was possible for Iran to secure the release of the US hostages. The US and Iran relations further deteriorated in September 1989, when the Lebanese Shia leader Sheikh Abd-al-Karim Obeid was abducted by Israelis, and on the Israeli refusal to free Sheikh Obeid, the Hizbollah later announced that they had killed Col. William Higgins, and threatened to kill another captive Joseph Cicippio if their demand was not accepted. Subsequently, the US warned Iran of consequences if any the US hostages were harmed, and moved more warships into the Gulf.²⁸ Most significantly, probably for the first time since the Revolution, the US State Department recognised Iran's limitations and termed Iran's attitude toward the hostages as wiser²⁹, and it was also a fact that Tehran at this juncture could not afford a military confrontation with the US.

In September 1989, 186 members of the US Congress in a petition urged the US administration to support the Iranian opposition rather than try to hold moderates in power. This gave another chance to the Iranian hardliners to obstruct the endeavour to improve their relations on the pretext that the US still harboured ill-designs and animosity toward the revolutionary Iran. The Iranian moderate leadership was not strong enough to put their political career at stake on the bleak promise of normalising relations with the US in such circumstances.³⁰ Besides, the anti-Iran Arab governments like Egypt and the other the US allies in the region endeavoured to convince the US policymakers to retain their anti-Iran stance, and also the Israelis leaders came to regard Islamic Republic as a formidable threat to Israeli security than the Arabs.

The US and the USSR rapprochement reduced the US fear of Russian infiltration in the region and Iran; Washington's attitude was that after the end of the Cold War period Iran was strategically no more important to the US and thought that ultimately Tehran will come to their terms. Therefore, Washington continued its policy of "carrot and stick".³¹ While the moderates in Iran continued their efforts to lessen the US hostility, radical elements persistently opposed the idea of rapprochement with Washington.³² It is important to note that the issue of the release of Iranian assets by the US still remained undecided. Shireen Hunter commenting about the conflicting nature of both countries diplomatic relations concludes that:

²⁸ Hunter, *Iran and the World: Continuity in a Revolutionary*, 75.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ Hunter, 'Post Khomeini Iran', 145.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 146-147.

³² *Ibid.*

*the US-Iranian relations have been affected by the political ethos of the two countries.... In Iran's case, the traditional emotional and unrealistic streak of its political culture, its inability to tailor its aspirations to its abilities, and the bravado of its diplomatic style have contributed to its difficulties with the US.*³³

Iran's Neutrality during the Desert Storm

The 1990s changed the doctrine and the basic principles of Iranian foreign policy, especially after the end of the Cold War, rapprochement and later on disintegration of the USSR, and the Gulf War (Desert Storm). According to R. K. Ramazani, the Iranian foreign policy, which was earlier governed by the slogan of "neither East nor West", was now converted to the tenet of "both North and South". Iran under the monarchy had remained a country ambitious in foreign policy objectives, and since the Revolution, this instinct to dominate the region was still evident. Iran is basically not a revisionist state; neither had it had territorial claims on its neighbours. It is a non-Arab state who has fragile and insubstantial relations with even non-Arab and Sunni countries (Iran is predominantly a Shia Muslim state, which also makes it stand-out in the majority Sunni Islamic countries) like Pakistan, Turkey and Afghanistan. Therefore, after the demise of the former Soviet Union, Iran had tried to achieve its security and economic objectives in the newly independent Muslim states of the Central Asia. On the other hand, the US perceived that Iran was supposedly endeavouring to spread Islamic, terrorism, and violating the nuclear non-proliferation ideals, essentially in the region.³⁴ Rafsanjani speaking about the tenets of Iran's foreign policy said that:

*The western countries scream that 'the security of the Persian Gulf is in danger'. In fact the security and stability of the region are endangered so long as the reactionary regimes of the region continue their subservience to the United States and contempt for their own peoples, since this will lead to their being overthrown by their own people.*³⁵

In 1990, Rafsanjani assisted in release of two the US hostages from the captivity of Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine. He was by then convinced that Iran's close association with the hostage taking no longer served its national interests. Even an ideologically committed leader like Ayatollah Ali Khamenei himself, while accepting the ceasefire with Iraq had recognised this reality, although reluctantly, that at times the perceived interests of Islam could not be reconciled with those of

³³ Hunter, *Iran and the World: Continuity in a Revolutionary*, 77.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) dispatch in English, 15 July 1992. This was quoted by Shahram Chubin, 'Iran and Regional Security in the Persian Gulf', *Survival*, vol. 34, no. 3, autumn 1992, 65.

Iran's political system. United States failure to produce a positive gesture toward President Rafsanjani's overtures to help in the release of two American hostages created a bitter row in Iran. The spiritual leader Ali Khamenei categorically ruled out the future possibility of parleys with the US over the hostage issue, and while the hardliners like Mohtashami said that negotiating with the US would be tantamount to a "breaking of the last straw of Islamic Revolution and the Islamic Republic".³⁶ The Iranian government wished to secure the good will of the US by assisting in the release of hostages, which could assist Iran to take back its frozen assets in the US. Instead, President Bush reiterated that he would not bargain on the issue of hostages. The US Congress simultaneously voted to recognise Jerusalem as the Israeli capital, and decorated the Captain of the US S Vincennes, which shot-down an Iranian civilian passenger aircraft over the Gulf in 1988. This obviously accentuated more resentment in a cross section of the Iranian society and influenced Iranian foreign policy to further drift away from the US.

President Rafsanjani, after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, categorically condemned Iraq for invading a neighbourly country and termed this aggression as a "foolish" act, and suggested that Iran was ready to play the role of a "guardian" in the region.³⁷ The Iraqi regime unconditionally withdrew from the occupied Iranian territories, exchanged prisoners of war, permitted a large Iranian community in Kuwait to leave with all their belongings, and recognised the validity of the Algiers Accord of 1975 evidently to woo Iran. Simultaneously, Tehran also wisely declared its neutrality and expressed willingness to support all the UN resolutions, including that of imposition of sanctions against Baghdad. Rafsanjani, fearing the motives of the US forces in the region reiterated that they all must leave soon after the aggressor was punished, and rejected all requests by Saddam Hussein to cooperate with him in order to wage a Jihad against the "world arrogance" and "infidels".³⁸ The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait proved to be a blessing in disguise for Iran, because the latter had fought for nearly eight years, in spite of huge casualties and destruction costing billions of dollars; but still Saddam Hussein did not withdraw from the Iranian territories, exchanged prisoners, nor accepted the validity of the Algiers agreement. In spite of these benefits, the Iranian leadership was quite bitter about the quick response of the US and its allies, who swiftly condemned the Iraqi invasion, while they in the case of Iraqi aggression against Iran took about week to make a simple denunciation of the Iraqi attack.

³⁶ Safa Haeri, 'The row in Tehran', Middle East International, 11 May 1990, 5.

³⁷ Safa Haeri, 'Happy Days for Rafsanjani', Middle East International, 31 August 1990, 17.

³⁸ Ibid.

War and its Aftermath

After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Iranian concern about its exclusion from the security of the Persian Gulf was quite great, because Tehran considered that the US and its GCC allies still suspected Iran's designs in the region. President Bush speaking about the regional security prospects in March 1991 had excluded Iran from the future security plan in the Gulf, and the GCC members, including Egypt and Syria, under the Damascus Declaration of March kept Iran out on the pretext that Iran was a non-Arab nation and maintained that an "Arab peace force" was not being established against Iran.³⁹ According to R. K. Ramazani, during the Gulf crisis of 1990-91, Iran had used all the available diplomatic forums to find a peaceful solution to the Kuwaiti problem in order to minimise the future chances of the US military involvement and presence in the Gulf. The US President in a joint session of the Congress in March announced an increase in the US naval presence in the area, and increased its military collaboration with the GCC members.⁴⁰ The Iranian President Rafsanjani reacted quite vocally against the military involvement of the US in the region, and said that they had "never liked that and always criticised it, and we will continue to do so in the future. There are many other peoples in the region who do not approve of the presence of the American", and after the materialising of ten years defence accord between the US and Kuwait in September 1991; Rafsanjani expressed "extreme concern" over these developments.⁴¹ In fact, Iran's neutrality had earned it a considerable worldwide reputation and credibility, but stalemate in its relations with the US still continued. This is because internally there was still widespread hatred and resistance in Iran to improve bilateral ties with the US. At this juncture, even the US failed to make a single gesture of reconciliation toward Iran until Tehran accepted all the US demands, including release of hostages in Lebanon. Ahmad Khomeini, son of the late Imam Khomeini, opposing the idea of improving relations with the US, articulated that Iran must stay away from Washington and remarked that "our relations with them always remains as those between a lamb and a wolf".⁴²

Iran hosted an International Conference in October 1991 for the support of the Muslim Palestinian People's Revolution in Tehran ostensibly to neutralise the effects of the Palestine National Council's decision to attend the US sponsored Madrid Conference. Ali Khamenei in a message to the delegates attending the conference in Tehran bitterly criticised the Arab states, including Syria, with whom it earlier had cordial relations for participating in Madrid parleys. In contrast, President Rafsanjani adopted a moderate attitude and merely castigated the US and

³⁹ Ramazani, 'Iran's Foreign Policy: Both North and South', 403.

⁴⁰ Ibid, 402.

⁴¹ Quoted by Ramazani, 'Iran's Foreign Policy: Both North and South', 403.

⁴² Safa Haeri, 'Charming them Home', Middle East International, 17 May 1991, 13.

its Arab allies and expressed scepticism that Arabs were "naive in believing that Madrid will solve anything".⁴³ Some of the Iranian radical leaders believed that pressures from the US on Iran regarding its nuclear programme primarily stemmed from Iran's opposition to the US brokered Middle East Conference at Madrid.

Regime's Legitimacy

Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp note that, the foreign policy of Iran has been an important instrument in the hands of ulema (clerical leaders) to maintain politically motivated masses, and to retain the regime's legitimacy through its emphasis on the propagation of Islamic ideals. Secondly, the external threats posed to the Islamic Republic served as an alibi to the leadership in order to justify socioeconomic and other hardships faced by the people; and a renewed people's "commitment to the revolution".⁴⁴ Since 1991, Iran tried to formulate a policy whereby it could bring itself back into the region and possibly enable it to regain its pre-revolution clout when it enjoyed hegemony in the Gulf, as Tehran was then an important pillar of the US global security system. Obviously, the Revolution changed the entire edifice of Iran's pre-eminent position in the area, and its most trusted ally the US became an impeccable enemy. This animosity and hostility toward the US is still a significant source of political legitimacy, and revolutionary fervour. The Iranian mass-media still portrays the US as an evil empire that was conspiring to crush the Islamic Revolution, and of course, the ulema and the general public was still obsessively anti-US. This mutual mistrust and ideological polarisation had further accentuated after the end of the Cold War and disintegration of the former the USSR. The increasing Iranian influence in the Central Asian Muslim states; and on issues like Iran's alleged patronising of 'Islamic fundamentalism'; with the potential threats to Western and the US interests in Central Asia, the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, and the region stretching from Afghanistan to Morocco dominated US-Iran mutual perceptions. The US administrations, including that of President Clinton, also considered that Iran had designs to assemble nuclear weapons, and that it was allegedly abetting terrorism through hardcore Muslim organisation like Hamas in the Middle East, and in the Persian Gulf littoral states.

Islamic Activism, Terrorism and Nuclear Non-proliferation

According to Samuel M. Makinda, Iran was patronising of the "Islamists in Algeria, Sudan and in the Central Asian Republics has heightened Western fears about Islamic activism. It has threatened to turn

⁴³ Safa Haeri, 'The Anti-conference', Middle East International, 25 October 1991, 12.

⁴⁴ Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, 'Domestic Politics and Territorial Disputes in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula', Survival, vol. 35, no. 4, winter 1993/94, 11.

national movements into radical regional forces". Continuing his comments, he furthermore states that the US and Western nations threat perception was nourished during the Imam Khomeini's decade long rule from 1979 to 1989.⁴⁵ After the fall of the USSR and communism, the Iranian *ulema* took it as a "prelude to the downfall of the Western bloc", including the US, and they were apparently convinced that final victory would be gained by the Islamic Revolution in the area and in the world as a whole.⁴⁶

Amin Saikal talking about the perceived Iranian Islamic activism remarked that both the US and Israel had similar views about the alleged Iranian patronisation of radical elements in the Middle East, and that Israel's expulsion in December 1992 of some 400 followers of Hamas was partly designed by Israel to "reinforce the American belief that the threat of Islamic activism was expanding".⁴⁷ The Iranian *ulema* too believed that all the Islamic movements, which do not agree to the US expectations, policies and standards, are termed "fundamentalist" by Washington. Amin Saikal also outlined that the American and European interpretation of Islamic activism was "a dangerous misrepresentation of reality", because the West has been obsessed with the "Cold War mentality"; therefore, they were making this "misrepresentation".⁴⁸ Simultaneously, the Americans were apprehensive about Tehran's true motives in organising the Economic Co-operation Organisation (ECO) with the Central Asian and Transcaucasian Muslim states, and thought that it could be a prelude to the establishment of a Muslim bloc in the Southwest Asia dominated by Iran; because some 'Islamists' had already launched armed struggle in the Central Asia against the Russian influence in this connection.⁴⁹

The Iranian spiritual leader Ali Khamenei (popularly called the Rahbar - leader) maintained that the presence of the US forces in the region were "in the interests of Zionism and arrogance, to the detriment of Islam and Muslims and against the Islamic Revolution", and he further drew a parallel between the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait to the US "aggression against Grenada and Panama". He viewed that the US had manipulated the whole scenario in order to invade and subsequently to gain complete control over the Persian Gulf region.⁵⁰ The other hardliners also considered the US involvement in a similar way and took it as Washington's strategy to increase its influence, effect hegemony, and ultimately to pose a threat to the Islamic Revolution.

⁴⁵ Samuel M. Makinda, 'Iran, Sudan and Islam', *The World Today*, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, vol. 49, no. 6, June 1993, 108-109.

⁴⁶ Farhang Jahanpour, 'Iran-I: War among the heirs', *The World Today*, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, vol. 46, no. 10, October 1990, 187.

⁴⁷ Amin Saikal, 'The West and Post-Khomeini Iran', *The World Today*, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, vol. 49, no. 10, October 1993, 197.

⁴⁸ *Ibid*, 200.

⁴⁹ *Ibid*, 198.

⁵⁰ IRNA in English, 15 August 1990.

The Persian Gulf region is obviously significant both for the US and Iran. Dr Velayati, Iranian Foreign Minister, speaking about the importance of this region stated that "our most important and strategic border is our southern coast-line, the Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz and the Sea of Oman. This region is vital to us....we cannot remain indifferent to its fate".⁵¹ Moreover, as long as both countries remained adamant in pursuing their respective national interests in the region so inflexibly, then their bilateral relations were expected to remain hostile. *Prima facie*, Iran, primarily due to its geographical constraints and realities, continued its anti-US policies; because if it endeavoured to compromise anyway with the US on this issue then its entire revolutionary edifice, which was basically based upon anti-US and West stance, would get eroded. Besides, the hardliner's influence was still paramount in Iran and the moderates were not strong enough to bring about such a dramatic change in the foreign policy, and neither such a setback to Islamic Republic was in a position to sustain.

Another stumbling block against the restoring of cordial and amicable relations was America's constant accusation against Iran that its nuclear research programme was weapons oriented and aggressive in orientation. The other issues included the alleged Iranian militarization programme ostensibly to rehabilitate its armed forces strength to the pre-war level, and the declaration of Iranian sovereignty over the controversial island of Abu Musa in April 1992, and its opposition to the PLO and Israeli accord of 1993. In addition, Iran and Russia had signed an agreement in 1989 to sell weapons to Tehran, and the US administration believed that Russian policy was deliberately undermining its endeavours to politically isolate Iran in the region. In spite of the arms agreement, the Iranian leader was not oblivious of Russian "suppression of the Tajik Islamists during winter 1992-93 and made clear its difference with Moscow on this matter, the Iranian leadership promised to remain neutral and not to intervene in the internal affairs of Tajikistan".⁵² Daniel Pipes and Patrick Clawson commenting about Iran's foreign policy in 1993 remarked that it still remained "bellicose", and the clerical leaders, including moderates also stood for an aggressive brand of Persian nationalism ostensibly to create a "sphere of influence that includes Iraq, the Transcaucasus, Central Asia, Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf".⁵³

Conclusion

Iran's foreign policy, especially in regard to ties with the US, is unlikely to change in the near future. Both the US and Iran's national interests collide on almost all the vital issues, and both the countries have been *prima facie* reluctant to compromise on their strategic and regional

⁵¹ Quoted by Mohammed Ziarati, 'Iran's National Security', 18.

⁵² Roland Danureuther, 'Russia, Central Asia and the Persian Gulf', *Survival*, vol. 35, no. 4, winter 1993, 106.

⁵³ Daniel Pipes and Patrick Clawson, 'Ambitious Iran, Troubled Neighbours', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 72, no. 1, 1993, 125-126.

objectives. This conflict between Iran as a potential core regional power and the US as a sole superpower had intensified after the demise of the former the USSR. The growing the US dependence on the GCC and its Arab allies for the import of oil had landed it in an ideological conflict with Iran. The influence of Islamic revolutionary ideology and clergy was still supreme in Iran, and obviously anti-US. Daniel Pipes and Patrick Clawson observed that the Iranian regime had openly expressed their hostility toward the US through major ways: their alleged support of terrorism; the Islamic Revolution's continuous struggle to export revolution; its efforts "to de-stabilise Western allies" in the region; provision of financial and other material assistance to Hamas; an aggressive attitude toward the GCC states; its declaration of sovereignty over the Persian Gulf island of Abu Musa; and Tehran's extensive rearmament programme.⁵⁴ The other major contentious collision issues with the US were apparently over Iran's ambitious nuclear weapons oriented programme, and its expansion of "Iranian military power and exerting influence over a huge contiguous region" even under the Presidency of Hashemi Rafsanjani.⁵⁵

Iran's relations with the US took a further negative turn in 1993, when the Turkish Foreign Minister made an official visit to Israel after the PLO-Israeli Accord, and Tehran considered it as a conspiracy at the behest of the US to isolate Iran in the region. The Turkish government apparently attempted to improve its bilateral relations with Israel after the latter's peace agreement with the PLO in 1993. Besides, Ankara accused Tehran of supporting the Kurdish separatists in Turkey. The PLO-Israeli agreement alienated Iran from the conservative Arab states in the Middle East, including Syria (Iran's only ally in the area), who later on also held peace negotiations with Israel. R. K. Ramazani talking about the alleged dissension between the moderates and the hardliners stated that the leaderships of Ali Khamenei and Rafsanjani were divided between "the secular President and spiritual 'leader of the revolution'", moreover, both the leaders still fundamentally adhered to the principles of "the rule of the Jurisprudence (Velagat-e-Faqih)", which is an integral and pivotal part of Islamic Republic's constitution.⁵⁶ For Ramazani, the disintegration of the former the USSR had neutralised the Iranian foreign policy's principles of "neither East and nor West" concept, and now Tehran had adopted "both North and South" principles.⁵⁷

Since the Islamic Revolution, Iran had cultivated special relations with the Muslim and the Third World countries, and endeavoured to sever its dependent links with the US whom it regarded as the oppressor and arrogant state. While the US considered Iran a country that was sponsoring terrorism, Islamic activism, and pursuing an aggressive foreign policy; this American perception was primarily fostered by the US

⁵⁴ Ibid, 126-127.

⁵⁵ Ibid, 127.

⁵⁶ Ramazani, 'Iran's Foreign Policy: Both North and South', 394.

⁵⁷ Ibid, 393, 412.

Embassy hostage crisis. The image of Iran was further deteriorated due to the continued incarceration and abductions of the US, British, and French hostages in the 1980s and early 1990s by the pro-Iran Hizbollah in Lebanon. Iran had used hostages "as a bargaining chip" after the Iran-Contra scandal when their secret links with the US were compromised and severed (Imam Khomeini had termed the US as "wounded snake" after the Iran scandal).⁵⁸ Ali Khamenei during his address to the UN General Assembly Session on 22 September 1987, categorically stated that Iran believed in the "non-reliance on either East or West was another exceptional characteristic of this revolution which is now the fundamental policy of our revolutionary system".⁵⁹ But, since the demise of the former Soviet Union, the hardliners like Ali Khamenei and Ahmed Khomeini still resented the idea of rehabilitation of their relations with the US. Even by the end of 1993, Ali Khamenei speaking about the role of America in the PLO-Israeli Accord urged Palestinians to "learn from Iran, from Ayatollah Khomeini. They must obey Islam to free their country", and dubbed Arab countries talking peace with Israel as traitors who were being trapped by the conspiracies of the imperialist and the Zionist.⁶⁰ This Iranian perception vis-à-vis the US and the Arab states still persists to this day. This amply reflects Iran's foreign policy's directions, and its continuous adherence to the philosophy of Islamic Revolution. Moreover, the present day Iranian nuclear controversy too is guided by the principles of the Islamic Revolution's and traditional nationalist philosophy.

⁵⁸ John Bulloch and Harvey Morris, *The Gulf War: Its Origins, History and Consequences*, 222-223.

⁵⁹ Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's address to the UN General Assembly Session on 22 September 1987, and it was published as a booklet by the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, London, 1987, 6.

⁶⁰ Safa Haeri, 'Iran's Ferocious Opposition', *Middle East International*, 24 September 1993, 13.

NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION (NRR) IN SOUTH ASIA

Dr Tughral Yamin*

Abstract

India and Pakistan relations teeter precariously on the pivot of unresolved issues like Kashmir. Both countries possess well equipped conventional and strategic forces in order to deter the other from initiating hostilities. These are explosive ingredients that make the region a potential tinderbox. Cognizant of the challenges and hazards that threaten peace and stability both countries would like to reduce the risk of war. Over time, a number of mechanisms have been put in place to lessen the threat of war. These include a host of CBMs. Off late however, there have been developments, which are ominous and can potentially destabilise the region. The chief among these is the rising conventional force asymmetry, the development of the Ballistic Missile Defence Shield (BMDS) and Indian naval nuclear forces. There is a need for the two South Asian countries to engage in bilateral risk reduction measures covering both conventional as well as nuclear forces. India is not in a mood to engage with Pakistan and although the latter can ill afford a debilitating arms race, it finds it contrary to its security requirements to let India acquire a pre-eminent position in the nuclear forces. Differing national ambitions preclude easy solutions. The requirement is that a win-win situation is created, whereby the chances of war in the subcontinent are reduced substantially. The NRR concept needs to be overhauled and brought up to date through innovative diplomacy and out of the box thinking.

* Dr Tughral Yamin is Acting Head of Department of Strategic Studies and Nuclear Studies, National Defence University, Islamabad.

Introduction

India and Pakistan are located in a crisis zone. During the past six and a half decades they have fought wars and experienced wars and periods of high tension. The unresolved issue of Kashmir is at the heart of the conflict. Both countries possess well equipped conventional as well as nuclear forces. Scholars belonging to the nuclear pessimist group are of the view that the nuclear deterrent in South Asia is dangerous and any miscalculation in security calculus can actually lead to a nuclear war.¹ Such scenario, no matter how farfetched can be catastrophic for a region inhabited by one quarter of humanity. To reduce the possibility of inadvertent nuclear war, a mechanism known as Nuclear Risk Reduction (NRR) was developed during the Cold War. This was built around a collection of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). The Cold War NRR architecture was constructed around nine key elements, which included *inter alia* agreements not to change the status quo, not to indulge in nuclear brinkmanship, minimising or avoiding dangerous military practices, special reassurance measures for ballistic missiles and nuclear weapon systems, trust in the faithful implementation of treaty obligations and CBMs, verification measures, maintenance of reliable lines of communication, establishment of reliable and survivable command and control systems, efficient intelligence capabilities to track the disposition of opposing nuclear forces and commitments to continuously update the existing measures. Other things being equal, the success of this model has been attributed to a fair measure of good luck.²

India-Pakistan CBMs

The South Asian nuclear milieu has similarities and dissimilarities with the Cold War paradigm in a number of ways. Like Cold War Europe, the disputed territory of Kashmir is heavily militarised. The troops manning their posts along the LoC remain on high alert. It is different, however, in case of nuclear forces. Unlike the US and Soviet nuclear forces, the Indian and Pakistani nuclear warheads are in a state of de-alert i.e. these are not mated and are stored separately, during peacetime. In order to reduce the risk of war, a number of CBMs have been agreed upon. These cover the following areas:

LoC Violations. The violations along the LoC range from exchange of small arms and artillery fire to inadvertent border crossings by civilians and their cattle. An unofficial ceasefire has been in

¹ Read S. Paul Kapur, *Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia* (Paulo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007).

² Michael Krepon, "Nuclear Risk Reduction: Is Cold War Experience Applicable to Southern Asia?" www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/NRRMKrepon.pdf (accessed February 14, 2012).

effect since November 2003, but minor incidents still take place. A number of bilateral as well as third party measures are in place to reduce the tension along the disputed border. These include:

United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). This is the oldest military observer group of its kind in the world. The UNMOGIP's mandate covers the entire area of the disputed territory.³ However, the Indians are not very forthcoming in allowing the military observers to operate on their side of the LoC.

Flag Meetings between Local Commanders. This forum is activated on required basis to resolve issues in the Areas of Responsibility (AORs) of local commanders in the disputed territory of Kashmir.⁴ The meeting are held at the level of the battalion or brigade commanders to settle minor issues at their ends.

Violation along the International Border/Working Boundary.⁵ Irritants along the international border/working boundary are resolved by border guards. This is done through regular meetings between the officials of the Indian Border Security Force (BSF)⁶/Pakistan Rangers.⁷ In order to reduce the inventory of disputes, there has been agreement to return inadvertent border crossers immediately.⁸ There have also been proposals to carry out joint border patrols.⁹

Hotlines. Ever since the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, hotline between governments has become a standard practice to build confidence and reduce tension. The first hotline between Washington and Moscow, a teletype link was established in 1963. This was subsequently upgraded to speech facility.¹⁰ Telephonic hotlines exist

³ For details about their mandate read "United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)," <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmogip/> (accessed October 3, 2012).

⁴ "Army seeks flag meeting over ceasefire violation along LoC," The Indian Express, June 19, 2012, <http://www.indianexpress.com/news/army-seeks-flag-meeting-over-ceasefire-violation-along-loc/963942> (accessed October 3, 2012).

⁵ The Pakistan India border near the Pakistani city of Sialkot and the disputed territory of Jammu is referred to as the Working Boundary by Pakistan. For details read "Boundary Disputes between India and Pakistan," http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_XXI/1-51.pdf (accessed October 3, 2012).

⁶ Indian Border Security Force (BSF), www.bsf.gov.in/ (accessed October 3, 2012).

⁷ Pakistan Rangers (Sindh), www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/AWPReview/TextContent.aspx?pld=141 (accessed September 19, 2012), and Pakistan Rangers (Punjab) www.pakistanrangerspunjab.com/index.html (accessed September 15, 2012).

⁸ "India Pakistan Agree to return inadvertent Border Crossers immediately," AndhraNews.net, September 11, 2007, <http://www.andhranews.net/Intl/2007/September/11/India-agree-15152.asp> (accessed November 27, 2012).

⁹ Syed Amjad Shah, "BSF-Rangers mull joint border patrolling," Greater Kashmir, June 24, 2011, <http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2011/Jun/24/bsf-rangers-mull-joint-border-patrolling-35.asp> (accessed February 22, 2012).

¹⁰ Haraldur Þór Egilsson, "The Origins, Use and Development of Hotline Diplomacy," Discussion Papers on Diplomacy, Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael,' Issue 35 (2003): 5, http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2003/20030500_cli_paper_dip_issue85.pdf (accessed October 3, 2012).

between various government agencies of India and Pakistan and these have been extremely useful in reducing tension during the times of crises. Direct calls outside the hotlines have actually heightened tension. During the Mumbai crisis of November 2007, a direct call allegedly by the then Indian foreign minister Parnab Mukherjee to the President of Pakistan threatened war. This call was later dismissed as a 'hoax' but at that point in time, it actually aggravated the situation.¹¹ The institutionalised direct communication channels are listed below.

The Military Hotline. The military hotline between Army Headquarters was established following the 1971 war.¹² In December 1990, it was agreed to re-establish the hotline and to use it on weekly basis for routine updates. At the February 1999 Lahore Summit, India and Pakistan agreed to review all existing communication links with a view to upgrading the hotline between Director Generals of the Military Operation (DGMOs).¹³ The DGMO hotline channel is used most frequently and has been instrumental in removing doubts and reducing tension.

The Maritime hotline. The maritime hotline between the Indian Coast Guards and Pakistani Maritime Security Agency was set up through an accord signed in January 2004. This communication channel is used for exchanging information on maritime issues, including fishermen straying into each other's territorial waters.¹⁴

The Nuclear Hotline. In 2004, India and Pakistan agreed to establish a telephone hotline between the top civil servants in their foreign ministries to reduce nuclear risks.¹⁵ So far, there has been no report of this hotline having been actually used.

The Counter Terrorism Hotline. Another hotline was established between the interior ministries in March 2011 to control tensions from spiking during incidents of terrorism.¹⁶

Agreement on Prevention of Airspace Violations. This Agreement was signed by the foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan

¹¹ Nirupama Subramanian Hoax call to Zardari raises new concerns, *The Hindu*, December 7, 2008 <http://www.hindu.com/2008/12/07/stories/2008120750210100.htm> (accessed November 28, 2012).

¹² Pervez Iqbal Cheema, "More Confidence Building Measures," *Pakistan Observer*, October 13, 2007 <http://ipripak.org/articles/newspapers/moreconf.shtml> (accessed October 3, 2012).

¹³ Muhammad Irshad, Indo-Pakistan Confidence Building Measures, *Defence Journal*, August 2002, www.defencejournal.com/2002/august/confidence.htm (accessed February 22, 2012).

¹⁴ "Coastguards of Pakistan, India to set up hotline," *Dawn*, January 31, 2004, archives.dawn.com/2004/01/31/top8.htm (accessed February 22, 2012).

¹⁵ Peter Foster, "Pakistan and India to set up nuclear hotline," *The Telegraph*, Jun 21, 2004, www.telegraph.co.uk, (accessed February 22, 2012).

¹⁶ Dean Nelson, "India and Pakistan to establish counter-terrorism hotline," *The Telegraph*, March 29, 2011, www.telegraph.co.uk (accessed February 22, 2012).

in New Delhi on April 6, 1991. It has 10 articles and covers the mechanism of preventing air space violations.¹⁷

Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations and Facilities. This benchmark CBM was signed in Islamabad on December 31, 1988 and enforced on January 27, 1991. This obligates both countries to exchange the list of their nuclear facilities with geographical coordinates. Lists have been exchanged punctually on the first of January each year since 1992 despite extremely low points in the two countries' relations. The Agreement encourages each state party to "refrain from undertaking, encouraging or participating in, directly or indirectly, any action aimed at causing the destruction of, or damage to, any nuclear installation or facility in the other country." A nuclear installation or facility includes "nuclear power and research reactors, fuel fabrication, uranium enrichment, isotopes separation and reprocessing facilities as well as any other installations with fresh or irradiated nuclear fuel and materials in any form and establishments storing significant quantities of radioactive materials."¹⁸

Agreement on Advance Notification on Military Exercises, Manoeuvres and Troop Movements. This Agreement makes it mandatory for each side to give prior notice of military drills and troop movements to prevent speculations and counter movements. This was signed in New Delhi on April 6, 1991.¹⁹

Agreement on Pre-Notification of Flight Testing of Ballistic Missiles. This Agreement has been one of the most important CBMs in case of India and Pakistan. This requires the two countries to issue advance notifications of flight-tests of all kinds of ballistic missiles, three days in advance in a 'five-day launch window.' The warning includes Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) and Navigation and Weather Warnings in the Area (NAVEREAs). The Pre-Notifications are conveyed through the respective Foreign Offices and the High Commissions, as per the format. The Agreement requires that the test launch site(s) should not fall within 40 km, and the planned impact area should not fall within 70 km, of the International Boundary or the LoC. The planned trajectory of the ballistic missile should not cross the International Boundary or the Line of Control and should maintain a 40 km horizontal distance from the International Boundary and the LoC. The bilateral Pre-Notification exchanged, has to be treated as confidential, unless otherwise agreed upon. Annual meetings are to be

¹⁷ "Agreement between India and Pakistan to prevent Air Space Violations," <http://www.stimson.org/research-pages/agreement-between-pakistan-and-india-on-prevention-of-air-space-violation/> (accessed October 3, 2012).

¹⁸ South Asia Confidence-Building Measures (CBM) Timeline 1988 – Present, Stimson Center, <http://www.stimson.org/data-sets/south-asia-confidence-building-measures-cbm-timeline/> (accessed September 24, 2012).

¹⁹ "Pakistan India CBM Timelines," Jinnah Institute website: jinnah-institute.org/pak-india-pcm/pcm-timeline (accessed February 22, 2012).

held to review and amend the Agreement. The Agreement is automatically renewable after a five-year period and each country has the right to withdraw from it, giving six months written notice.²⁰

Joint Declaration on the Complete Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Both India and Pakistan are signatories of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). They have also signed a bilateral agreement on complete prohibition of chemical weapons. This Agreement was concluded in New Delhi on August 19, 1992.²¹

Agreement on Nuclear Test Moratorium. After the nuclear tests of May 1998, both India and Pakistan declared a unilateral moratorium on further testing. In 2004, the two countries formalized this no-test initiative into an agreement. The Agreement obligates each party to observe a moratorium on further nuclear testing “unless, in exercise of national sovereignty, it decides that extraordinary events have jeopardised its supreme interests.”²²

Agreement on Reducing the Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons. In order to reduce the risk of arising out of nuclear incidents, an agreement was signed on February 21, 2007. The validity of the Agreement was extended with mutual consent with effect from February 21, 2012.²³

Meetings and Dialogues. Meetings and dialogues have been held regularly at official and unofficial forums to build an atmosphere of trust. The unofficial and semi-official dialogues are organised within the framework of Track 2 and 1.5 series respectively. The aim is to let former retired officials from civil and military backgrounds to discuss options beyond the established positions. These meetings are held in a third country, out of media glare to allow the dialogists to participate in an atmosphere free of encumbrances. The official meetings are alternately held in Islamabad and Delhi at various levels of officialdom from heads of states and governments down to the experts. These meetings are categorised as:

Summit Level Meetings. Summit meetings between the heads of states and governments and states are a rare phenomenon but informal meetings on the sidelines of international conferences have taken place on a number of occasions. President Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan made a religious pilgrimage to Ajmer Sharif in India in his private capacity in

²⁰ Agreement between India and Pakistan on Pre-Notification of Flight Testing of Ballistic Missiles, <http://www.stimson.org/research-pages/agreement-between-india-and-pakistan-on-pre-notification-of-flight-testing-of-ballistic-missiles/> (accessed February 22, 2012).

²¹ “Pakistan India CBM Timelines,” Jinnah Institute website: jinnah-institute.org/pak-india-pcm/pcm-timeline (accessed February 22, 2012).

²² “India, Pakistan Agree to N-test Moratorium,” Business Standard, June 24, 2004, <http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/india-pakistan-agree-to-n-test-moratorium/154442/> (accessed November 27, 2012).

²³ Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Accord on reducing risk of nuclear accidents extended,” Dawn, February 22, 2012.

April this year. He took this opportunity to call upon the Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh. He used the opportunity to negotiate the release of the Pakistani octogenarian Dr Khalil Chishti held under murder charges for the last two decade.²⁴ Zardari also extended an invitation to the Indian PM to visit Pakistan, which he renewed in the Non Alignment Movement (NAM) conference held in Tehran in August.²⁵ It was expected that the Indian Prime Minister would take up on the offer and pay a return visit before the year was out. Such a visit would have generated a lot of goodwill and reduced tension, but this didn't materialise.

Minister Level Meetings. Pakistani foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar visited India in July 2011 and made a very good impact.²⁶ Her counterpart, S.M. Krishna, returned the call by visiting Islamabad in September, this year.²⁷

Secretary Level Meetings. The foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan met in July 2012 and reviewed the implementation of the existing nuclear and conventional confidence building measures (CBMs). They decided that separate meetings of the Expert Level Groups on Nuclear and Conventional CBMs would be held at a future date "to discuss implementation and strengthening of the existing CBMs and suggest additional mutually acceptable steps that could build greater trust and confidence between the two countries, thereby contributing to peace and security."²⁸

Expert Level Meetings. In the pursuance of what their foreign secretaries had formally decided, the nuclear experts, when they met in the sixth round of expert level talks held on December 26-27, 2011 at Islamabad,²⁹ agreed upon to move forward on proposals to extend two key agreements on pre-notification of ballistic missile tests and reduce the risk from accidents related to nuclear weapons.³⁰

²⁴ "Who is Khalil Chishti?" The Nation, April 10, 2012, <http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/national/10-Apr-2012/who-is-khalil-chishti-thenation-monitoring> (accessed November 27, 2012).

²⁵ "Manmohan Singh, Zardari meet on sidelines of NAM Summit in Tehran," August 30, 2012, Yahoo.com, <http://in.news.yahoo.com/manmohan-singh-zardari-meet-sidelines-nam-summit-tehran-154810142.html> (accessed November 27, 2012).

²⁶ Nikita Mehta, "Hina Rabbani Khar's Birkin Bag in the Spotlight," Wall Street Journal Blog, July 28, 2011, <http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/07/28/hina-rabbani-khar%E2%80%99s-birkin-bag-in-spotlight/> (accessed November 27, 2012).

²⁷ "Pakistan visit fruitful, says SM Krishna," The Times of India, September 9, 2012, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-09-09/india/33713197_1_pakistan-visit-hina-rabbani-khar-rehman-malik (accessed November 27, 2012).

²⁸ "India Pakistan Experts to meet over Nuclear CBM's," July 5, 2010, TwoCircles.net, http://twocircles.net/2012jul05/india_pakistan_experts_meet_over_nuclear_cbms.html (accessed November 27, 2012).

²⁹ "Pakistan, India to start talks on CBMs on 26th," Dawn, December 23, 2011.

³⁰ "India, Pakistan agree to move ahead on missile tests notification," The Economic Times, December 27, 2011,

Unilateral CBMs. Both countries have undertaken certain unilateral CBMs. These include:

Nuclear Policies. India has a draft nuclear policy, while the Pakistani nuclear position is well known and is based on a number of official statements issued from time to time. India claims to subscribe to a No First Use Policy. Pakistan has given no such understanding.

Nuclear Command & Control Authorities. Pakistani National Command Authority was created in 2000, while the Nuclear Command Authority was created sometime later. These are meant to formalise the nuclear command and control systems and lay down the correct chain of command.

Nuclear Export Controls. In 2004, the Pakistani parliament passed a bill tightening controls on the export of nuclear and biological weapons technology and missile delivery systems.³¹

Conventional Forces

Nuclear deterrence is not brittle. The tensile strength is enhanced through skillful diplomacy and imaginative posturing of conventional forces. In a hypothetical scenario, the situation will inclemently go from bad to worse. It will be preceded by a flurry of activity. This will include, not necessarily, in the same order: a war of words, severance of trade, expulsion of diplomatic staff, closure of air corridors, mobilisation of troops, hot pursuits and violation of air and ground space and perhaps a limited war. There will be time before or during the conventional war to pull back from the brink. Therefore, it is important that trust is built in the area of conventional forces as well. First and foremost is the deployment of conventional forces. Currently, the two militaries are deployed in a manner that these require some time to come into action. The Indian Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) aims to reduce mobilisation time and launching shallow manoeuvres below the perceived Pakistani nuclear thresholds within 72 to 96 hours of the initiation of hostilities. To actualise such a scenario, troops and equipment of the Indian strike formations have been deployed in the AORs of the holding formations, with a view to enabling eight integrated battle groups supported by integral aircraft, helicopter gunships, and self-propelled artillery to make swift inroads into Pakistani territory before it responds by pressing the nuclear button. The Indian Army has carried out drills in the Rajasthan desert to practice the CSD concept.³² Such developments are dangerous and serve no other purpose but skipping a number of rungs on the

³¹ "Pakistani Law Makers Pass Nuclear Export Controls," NTI, September 14, 2004, <http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/pakistani-lawmakers-pass-nuclear-export-controls/> (accessed November 27, 2012).

³² Azam Khan, "Understanding the Cold Start Doctrine," The Express Tribune, October 18, 2011, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/276661/understanding-indias-cold-start-doctrine/> (accessed February 22, 2012).

escalation ladder. This has triggered responses from the Pakistani side such as the development of short range missiles like Nasr.³³ A missile carrying a conventional warhead can always be misconstrued for the diabolical nuclear first strike, unleashing multiple retaliatory strikes. Such a scenario can only be avoided if there is a treaty on reduction of conventional weapons on the pattern of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). The CFE laid down the scale of conventional weapons i.e. tanks, artillery guns and aircraft in the European theatre.³⁴ A similar formula can be prepared for India and Pakistan, whereby troop and weapon deployment in offensive posture near the international border is reduced. This will reduce the threat of a quick invasion within the parameters of the CSD.

Anti-Ballistic Missile Forces

Another area, which is a cause of grave concern, is the Indian plan to erect a Ballistic Missile Defence Shield (BMDS). India has been evaluating Russian, American and Israeli ballistic missile interceptor systems.³⁵ They also have their eyes on the Israeli Iron Dome system to deter short range missiles.³⁶ Media reports suggest that Indians have tested Prithvi Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABMs).³⁷ The BMDS is a prohibitively expensive programme and is not inviolable against concentrated missile and air attacks, nonetheless, the threat of missile shield may have already triggered a missile race. Pakistan is investing a lot of resources in fine tuning their surface to surface and air to surface cruise missiles that can fly below the radar cover of the Indian BMDS. A missile shield will also heighten the temptation to go for a nuclear first strike in the opening phases of a war, dramatically and unfortunately shortening the nuclear ladder. There is a dire need to work out an Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty on the lines of the one that existed between the US and the USSR/Russian Federation before it was

³³ Read Shireen M. Mazri, "Battlefield Nukes for Pakistan: Why Hatf XI (Nasr) is essential for Pakistan's Defence Posture and Doctrine," Pakistan Defence Unit, September 2012, http://pakdefenceunit.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/105792427-battlefield-nukes-for-pakistan-why-hatf-ix-nasr-is-essential-for-pakistan_s-deterrence-posture-doctrine.pdf (accessed November 28, 2012).

³⁴ CFE Treaty, www.fas.org/nuke/control/cfe/index.html (accessed February 22, 2012).

³⁵ Sanjay Badri Maharaj, "Ballistic Missile Defence for India," www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/Today/Contemporary/328-BMD.html (accessed February 23, 2012).

³⁶ Indrani Bagchi and Josy Joseph, India eyes Israel's Iron Dome to counter Pak, puppets, The Times of India, Nov 23, 2012, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-11-23/india/35317887_1_iron-dome-short-range-rockets-short-range-missiles (accessed November 28, 2012).

³⁷ Martin Sieff, Space War, March 11, 2009, http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Prithvi_ABM_hits_target_missile_999.html, (accessed February 23, 2012).

scrapped in 2001.³⁸ This treaty should specify the number of interceptors that each country can deploy and the likely sites that each country would cover with an ABM umbrella.

The Naval Nuclear Forces

The third area, where asymmetries are on the rise is the Indian Ocean.³⁹ In 2013, the Indian Navy plans to add two powerful surface and sub-surface assets to their existing fleet. They will take possession of their second aircraft carrier, announced the former Admiral Gorshkov (INS Vikramaditya) late next year.⁴⁰ They also plan to deploy their nuclear-powered submarine Arihant sometime next year. This submarine is based on the design of Russian Charlie II class submarine, which was leased to India between 1988 and 1991. Arihant will carry ballistic missiles.⁴¹ Five versions of the Arihant will be fabricated in local dockyards.⁴² The introduction of nuclear submarines in the regional waters will be very destabilising indeed.⁴³ India has already acquired an Akula II class Russian nuclear-powered submarine, now called INS Chakra II.⁴⁴ Nuclear-powered submarines can go undetected for prolonged periods of time. Needless to say, Pakistan is also developing its own nuclear-powered submarine. Before it is able to do that, it may resort to stopgap measures like mining the submarine approaches and likely battle stations.

Proposed NRR Structure

Disarmament is ideally suited to eliminate the chances of war but a regional or a global zero remains a pipe dream. Bilateral arms

³⁸ ABM Treaty, www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/abm/abm2.html, SimilarYou +1'd this publicly. Undo, (accessed February 23, 2012).

³⁹ Iskander Rehman, "Drowning Stability: The Perils of Naval Nuclearization and Brinkmanship in the Indian Ocean," *Naval War College Review* (Fall 2012): 64-88, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/08/21/drowning-stability-perils-of-naval-nuclearization-and-brinkmanship-in-indian-ocean/djqy> (accessed October 3, 2012).

⁴⁰ "Delivery of Admiral Gorshkov delayed, may arrive only by 2013-end," *The Times of India*, September 18, 2012, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-09-18/india/33924837_1_admiral-gorshkov-aircraft-carrier-sevmash (accessed November 28, 2012).

⁴¹ Rajit Pandit, "India's elusive nuclear triad will be operational soon: Navy chief," *The Times of India*, August 8, 2012, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-08-08/india/33099651_1_ins-arihant-ssbns-slbm (accessed September 19, 2012).

⁴² "India Launches the Mysterious Arihant, Strategy Page, July 28, 2009, www.strategypage.com/htm/htsub/20090728.aspx (accessed January 12, 2012).

⁴³ India submarine 'threatens peace,' *BBC News*, July 28, 2009, news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8171715.stm, (accessed February 14, 2012).

⁴⁴ INS Chakra SSN, *Indian Defense Projects Sentinel*, idp.justthe80.com/naval-projects/submarines/ins-chakra-ssn, (accessed February 23, 2012).

control is another way to put brakes on sudden escalation. A range of political and military CBMs can strengthen the NRR regime and make it a workable option. In this respect, the following is recommended:

Revisit Past Proposals. There is a need to seriously revisit past proposals like South Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ), bilateral test ban treaty, No War Pact and Nuclear Risk Reduction Centre (NRRC). The No War Pact has been suggested by Prime Ministers Nehru and Shastri on the Indian side and Presidents Ayub Khan, Zia ul Haque and Musharraf on the Pakistani side.⁴⁵ The NWFZ and bilateral test ban treaty was suggested by Pakistan through Prime Minister Junejo in 1987.⁴⁶ Nothing would be lost if these proposals are brought out of the archives and re-examined. Accepting the NWFZ may appear like unilaterally accepting nuclear disarmament but then there can be imaginative variations like declaring certain areas of historical and cultural significance and heavily populated as non-nuclear target zones. Other areas can still remain fair game. No War Pact is still a possibility because it will not put caps on acquiring weapons but then it will build a domestic consensus against spending scarce national resources in the absence of a real enemy. Nuclear Risk Reduction Centre (NRRC) in South Asia was an idea that was suggested in 2004 and a paper was produced by the US Center of Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).⁴⁷ The idea did not find favour in official quarters. Perhaps it is time to give this idea another chance through bilateral discussions.

Identify Causes. There is a need to task think tanks on both sides to study past cases of wars and tensions and come up with a joint lessons learnt paper. These should then be accepted by both sides and methods be adopted at the policy and doctrinal level to avoid these in the future.

Monitoring. For any system to work, there is a need for transparency. This can only be done through mutually agreed monitoring measures like using existing national technical means, joint aerial observation and onsite inspections by neutral or national observers.

The Framework. There is got be a framework to develop a NRR. Ideas cannot be left hanging in mid-air. To build sturdy structure would require political will and conscious effort. If India feels that it is on a tremendous economic trajectory and that it does not need to engage with Pakistan, there will be no progress. No deal can be agreed on the basis of inequality. If the national leaderships are truly concerned about

⁴⁵ Siddharth Varadarajan, "No-war pact can cut both ways," The Times of India, July 11, 2001, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2001-07-11/india/27220958_1_india-and-pakistan-pact-war (accessed November 28, 2012).

⁴⁶ "Pakistan Proposes Nuclear Test Ban in South Asia," The New York Times, September 25, 1987, <http://www.nytimes.com/1987/09/25/world/pakistan-proposes-nuclear-test-ban-in-south-asia.html> (accessed November 28, 2012).

⁴⁷ Teresita Schaeffer, "Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in South Asia," CSIS, <http://csis.org/publication/nuclear-risk-reduction-centres-south-asia> (accessed November 28, 2012).

the welfares of their two people, they will always find ways to move forward. There are plenty of home grown and foreign ideas that can find roots in the South Asian strategic landscape to ease tensions and create an atmosphere of mutual trust and respect. For starters, NRR should be introduced into the national policies of the two countries as a long-term project. For this concept to succeed, it has to move beyond the realm of CBMs. This would require the changing of mindsets. From top down, this can be done by training political leaders, other stakeholders like academia, businessmen, youth and the popular media towards working jointly to build trust and reduce acrimony. Statements like 'all options are open,' should be avoided at all costs. Stereotyping and typecasting should be banned by law. Rabble rousers on both sides should be shunned as aberrations and not representatives of the common man. Foreign offices should be tasked to seriously identify convergences instead of divergences and methods identified to resolve peripheral issues like Siachin and Sir Creek. Efforts should be doubled to resolve intractable issues like Kashmir. This would be easier said than done but then it should not be given up as a lost cause. Loose ends must be tied up to remove all causes of friction.

Conclusion

For NRR to materialise there is a genuine need for honesty of purpose. It is a viable option provided that there is seriousness on both sides. Nuclear weapons have provided strategic stability in an accident-prone region in the last fourteen years, but this is a temporary phenomenon. An open-ended arms race, either in the realm of conventional weapons, or nuclear weapons can disturb this precarious balance. It also denies the common man essential utilities like food, clean drinking water, energy and basic health. A country investing in weapons of any classification or category does so at the cost of the welfare of its people. It is high time to move beyond acrimony and build understanding and trust in South Asia, so the two countries progress in all fields of human endeavour, while maintaining independent identity and spirit.

THE DETERRENCE VALUE OF PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS: AN EMPIRICAL ACCOUNT

NASIR MEHMOOD*

Abstract

This article aims at investigating the correlative relationship between Pakistan's national security and its nuclear capability. In this endeavor, the prism of neo-realism has been employed to logically explore and describe the character of Pakistan's national security aspirations with nuclear weapons. Subsequently, this proposed correlative relation has been tested against four empirical accounts. Soon after its inception, Pakistan began to experience grave external security threats to some of its core values - political independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Pakistan employed various security tools of internal and external balancing other than nuclear weapons to protect its core values against the threats of war and coercion of India. But, it could not secure the intended results. For example, three major wars with India: 1948, 1965 and 1971 (disintegration of the country and creation of Bangladesh) challenged national security of Pakistan immensely. Further, post India's Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) of 1974 strategic environment decisively influenced Pakistani decision-making elite to exploit the utility of nuclear weapons as a credible tool of internal balancing. Since the configuration of nuclear weapons in its national security policy, Pakistan has successfully neutralized the Indian strategies of war and coercion. For example, the accounts of Brasstacks Exercise of 1986-1987, Kashmir Crisis of 1990, Kargil conflict and military standoff of 2001-2002 demonstrate the centrality of the nuclear weapons viz-a-viz national security of Pakistan.

* Nasir Mehmood is Lecturer at Department of Strategic Studies and Nuclear Studies, National Defence University Islamabad.

Introduction

Pakistan experienced grave external security threats to its core security values - political independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, soon after its inception in 1947. India, Afghanistan, and later on the USSR attempted to undermine its core values in one way or another.

In order to guard its core values, Pakistan employed various security means of internal and external balancing. Under the strategy of internal balancing, Pakistan endeavored to strengthen its conventional forces. Whereas under the strategy of external balancing, Pakistan inked various multilateral security pacts - like SEATO and CENTO, and the bilateral Defence Pact with the U.S. during 1950s. Further, Pakistan explored the strategy of reconciliation with its adversaries.¹ For instance, Pakistan negotiated various security agreements with India during 1950s. Ironically, none of these security policies could shield Pakistan during 1971 War. Consequently, it had to experience the torment of disintegration. Subsequently, its threat perception intensified manifold in the wake of India's so-called PNE in 1974. Stephen P. Cohen aptly delineated the security situation of Pakistan in 1970s in the following words:

Some regard Pakistan as a latter-day Prussia, strategically placed to the south of the Soviet Union (and a ready-made surrogate for the American strategic plans), but others speak of Pakistan in terms of eighteen century Poland - to be swallowed up piece by piece by its neighbours - or expect it to be crushed in a vise whose jaws consist of the Soviet Union to the north and India to the south. At best, Pakistan might be an Asian Finland, required to subordinate its security policy to the will of its powerful neighbours.²

Pakistani decision-making elite, after appreciating fully such perilous national security landscape, decided to orchestrate nuclear weapons programme, in 1974.³ In fact, Pakistan contemplated nuclear weapons as an essential means not only to recover, but also to ameliorate its national security. As, Bharat Karnad forthrightly endorsed the relevancy of nuclear weapons with reference to national security:

¹ Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, *The Armed Forces of Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002), 1.

² Stephen P. Cohen, *The Pakistan Army* (London: University of California Press, 1984), 135.

³ Zulfqar Khan, "The Development of Overt Nuclear Weapon States in South Asia," (unpublished Ph.D's thesis, submitted at the department of Peace Studies, in Bradford University, 2000), 173.

The fact of the matter is that nuclear weapons have had their importance significantly enhanced as the ultimate safeguard of sovereignty and as enforcers of peace obtained on one's own terms.⁴

Since the maturation of military-oriented nuclear programme in 1984,⁵ Pakistan has competitively neutralized India's strategies of war and coercion on several occasions. The focus of this article is to apply the prism of neo-realism to dissect the behavior of Pakistan in acquiring and retaining nuclear weapons with regards to its national security.

Theoretical framework

Specifying national security

National security, generally, means the protection and promotion of the fundamental values of a state against internal and external threats. Nevertheless, there is no consensus among states in relation to the fundamental national security values and sources of threats. Consequently, different theoretical paradigms like realism, liberalism, Marxism, and feminism specify the concept differently. David A. Baldwin warned that the concept of national security could be dangerously ambiguous if used without specification.⁶ The principle of specification generally includes variables like that of security for whom, from which threats, and by what means, in the first instance. It is important to mention here that the lens of realism has been employed in this article to describe the concept of national security. For realists, a state's highest duty lies in its own preservation. While defining the core values of a state, John M. Collins has distilled the national security interests as:

The only vital national security interest is survival - survival of the State, with an acceptable degree of independence, territorial integrity, traditional life style, fundamental institutions, values, and honor intact.⁷

Similarly, Baldwin also opines that: "the concept of national security has traditionally included political independence and

⁴ Bharat Karnad, *Nuclear Weapons & Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy* (New Delhi: Macmillan Press Ltd., 2002), 4.

⁵ "Scientist Affirms Pakistan Capable of Uranium Enrichment, Weapons Production," *Nawa-i-Waqt* (Lahore), February 10, 1984.

⁶ David A. Baldwin, "The Concept of Security," in Paul F. Diehl, (ed.), *War*, vol. 1 (London: SAGE Publications Ltd., 2005), 12.

⁷ John M. Collins, *Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices* (Maryland: United States Naval Institute Press, 1973), 1.

territorial integrity as values to be protected.”⁸ The preceding description facilitates us in extracting that a state, generally, considers political independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity as its core values. Now question arises that either these values perceive threats from internal or external sources. Under the anarchic order of international politics, realists argue that threats of use of force or actual war are the perennial features of the interstate relations. Kenneth N. Waltz forthrightly claims that “among states, the state of nature is state of war.”⁹ So, one may safely establish that states, primarily, perceive national security threats from each other. Another related aspect of national security which requires specification is security by what means. According to realists, a state guards its national security with the instrument of its national power. Therefore, each state competes for its relative power. Wolfram F. Hanrieder, while synthesizing the correlative relationship between the variables of power and security, contends that “security and power are closely related.”¹⁰

Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences confirms these aforesaid deductions and explains the concept of national security as, “the ability of a nation to protect its internal values from external threats.”¹¹ Similarly, another question arises that how much security a state is required to guard these values. National security is a relative term. Absolute security is unattainable. Thereby, Baldwin evinces security as “a low probability of damage to acquired values.”¹² A state may have more or less security depending upon the availability of scarce resources and other policy objectives.

Apart from these specifications of the concept, yet there are some other specifications like ‘at what cost, and in what time period’.¹³ But, Baldwin argues, “Not all of the dimensions need to be specified all the time.”¹⁴

Neo-realism and state security

Neo-Realism considers structure of international system crucial to explain the behavior of states with respect to their national securities. Waltz has explained international system on the base of its structure. According to him, the structure of international system is grounded on three principles: 1) all units of the system are internally

⁸ Baldwin, “The Concept of Security,” 8.

⁹ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1978), 102.

¹⁰ Wolfram F. Hanrieder ed., *Arms Control and Security: Current Issues* (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1979), 1.

¹¹ Morton Berkowitz, and P.G. Bock, “National Security,” *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 11 (New York: The Macmillan Company & The Free Press, 1972), 40.

¹² Baldwin, “The Concept of Security,” 7.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 8-12.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

alike; 2) the ordering principle of the units in the system is anarchic; and 3) there is uneven distribution of power among the units. He considers first two variables constant - as all units are functionally alike and arranged under one ordering principle. By indicating this fact, he establishes that uneven distribution of power is the only independent variable, which directs the behavior of all units. Under such structural settings, each unit functions on the principle of "take care of yourself". So, this realization of self-security drives states to maximize their relative power.¹⁵ Nevertheless, neo-realists have been divided into two different strands - defensive realists and offensive realists, on the question of how much power states want. Offensive realists contend that states are potentially revisionist actor. Thereby, states indulge themselves into open-ended struggle for power.¹⁶ They claim that maximization of power is the ultimate goal of any state. However, Waltz criticizes this view and claims that it is destabilizing, and self-defeating perspective. Rather, he opines that states tend to be status quo oriented. They seek only appropriate amount of power for their security.¹⁷

From the above interpretation, one may easily deduce that defensive realism presents the likely behavior of a status quo state. On the other hand, offensive realism explains the probable outlook of a revisionist state. If we cautiously observe the pattern of international relations, we can easily find that the international community of states essentially comprises on these both kinds of states. Offensive and defensive neo-realist paradigms help significantly when a researcher aims at explaining the character of mutual interaction of a status quo and a revisionist state. Glenn Snyder aptly described that "...the two theories could work in tandem - the one chiefly explaining the security behavior of status quo powers, the other the behavior of revisionist states."¹⁸

John J. Mearsheimer admonishes status quo states that a potential revisionist state may adopt the strategies of war and black-mail¹⁹ to maximize its power. He proposes "balancing and buck-passing" as likely counter strategies to overwhelm the potential adversary. States can do internal or external balancing acts in order to deter or even to fight a war with adversaries. In internal balancing, a state strengthens its own defence at the expense of its resources, while in the external balancing, a state can make a defensive alliance with other states, especially with major powers in order to contain the

¹⁵ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 93- 106.

¹⁶ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 21.

¹⁷ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 126.

¹⁸ Glenn H. Snyder, "Mearsheimer's World-Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security: A Review Essay," *International Security* 27, no. 1(summer 2002): 158.

¹⁹ Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 12.

dangerous opponent. With the buck-passing strategy, state tries to rub shoulders with the great powers to check the aggressor while it remains on the sideline. As a matter of fact, the strategy of buck-passing is more intriguing, but it is very hard to achieve in the prevalent international system, as major powers, generally, display reluctance to protect the other state from its adversary at the expense of their own precious resources. So, one may assume that only the strategy of balancing is feasible for the states in order to guard their survival against the adversaries' strategies of war and black-mail. Now question arises either external balancing or internal balancing is appropriate. A deep analysis would endorse that nuclear revolution has strengthened the value of internal balancing in comparison to external balancing. Lawrence Freedman forthrightly deliberated the relevancy of nuclear weapons under internal balancing strategy for national security that:

*Nuclear weapons provide an ultimate guarantee of security against external aggression and thus, in principle can potentially protect the most vital interests in the most hostile environments, while avoiding dependence upon allies.*²⁰

Likewise, Waltz also endorsed that "defense and deterrence are strategies which a status quo country may follow, hoping to dissuade a state from attacking."²¹ These theoretical perspectives of neo-realism enable us to understand the character of national security aspirations of India and Pakistan. History has documented that India never remained status quo. It has always pursued national security policies to maximize its power in the region. It is continuously exploiting every possible opportunity to maximize its power at the expense of vital security values of other regional states. The track record of Indian foreign and defence policies is loaded with such examples. Contrarily, Pakistan, since its inception, is behaving essentially like a status quo state. It has drafted its national security policies to secure only appropriate amount of power to guard its national security values. And, it is quite evidential from its various national security endeavors, since independence to date. These include conciliatory approach towards its adversaries, formation of external alliances, relatively up-gradation of its conventional forces, and eventually acquisition of nuclear weapons. A holistic dissection would reveal that all these bids of Pakistan were aimed at securing merely balance of threats rather than balance of power.

²⁰ Lawrence Freedman, "Great Powers, Vital Interests and Nuclear Weapons," *Survival* 36, no. 4 (1994): 39.

²¹ Waltz, "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities", *American Political Science Review*, 84, no. 3 (September 1990): 732.

Pakistan's threat perception

Pakistan considers deterrence value of nuclear weapons as an ultimate guarantor of its survival in ever-changing regional and global security settings. As a matter of fact, Pakistan did not abruptly conceive nuclear weapons as an appropriate mean for its national security. Rather, Pakistani decision-making elite gradually realized the value of nuclear weapons. This evolution of nuclear thoughts occurred due to Pakistan's geographical characteristics, unsettled borders, lingering dispute of Kashmir, offensive capabilities and intentions of India, its own inability in maintaining a conventional deterrent against India because of resource constraint,²² its failure in seeking security guarantees from external powers and off course the incidents of 1965 war, 1971 defeat and of 1974 PNE of India. Apart from these direct motivational factors, there were some other supplementary factors like Pakistan wanted to attract the due attention of world powers in resolving its contentious issues like Kashmir, with India, to strengthen its diplomatic clout during any erupted crisis and to elevate the morale of its relatively weak conventional forces. In sum, all these direct and indirect motivational factors were principally security-driven. Thereby, one can strongly argue that Pakistan sought acquisition of nuclear weapons only to enhance its national security. Aliuddin has forthrightly explained this point and stated that:

*Nations in a position such as Pakistan's with a genuine concern for security and a history of conflict with hostile neighbours tend to lean on the first justification - that of security through an independent nuclear deterrence. Nuclear deterrence can be a substitute for usually optimistic and misplaced dependence on allies and outside sources of weapons. It can also strengthen a country's bargaining position. Given the ineffectiveness of the NPT, an indigenous nuclear capability appears as a desirable guarantee against threats to national sovereignty.*²³

It would be useful here to appreciate these motivational considerations in-detail. Pakistan's geographical contours lack sufficient strategic depth. Its main communication infrastructure is prone to India's offensive formations. Its main population centers locate very close to international border.²⁴ Its major industrial zones are concentrated in Punjab which shares a large border with India. Pakistan also contests disputed territories like Jammu and Kashmir, vaguely

²² Kamal Matinuddin, *The Nuclearization of South Asia* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002), 49.

²³ Aliuddin, "Pakistan's Nuclear Dilemma", *Seaford House Papers* (1990): 8.

²⁴ A.Z. Hilali, "Pakistan's Nuclear Deterrence: Political and Strategic Dimensions," accessed August 14, 2008, <http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume7/Dec2002Feb2003/PerceptionVolumeVII3AZHilali.pdf>

demarcated borders like that of Rann of Kutch and Siachen glacier. Since the appearance of the concept of nation-states at the international level, frontiers inherit considerable significance. Moreover, the significance of the protection of frontiers becomes manifold for a weak state like Pakistan - as territories elevate national power through different ways.

Undoubtedly the Indian leadership did not appreciate the emergence of Pakistan as an independent state, in 1947. Indeed, they desired to unravel the partition process.²⁵ Thereby, the Indian leadership posed numerous direct and indirect threats to Pakistan. In this connection, Indian leadership manipulated the due geographical, institutional, military²⁶ and economic share of Pakistan at the time of and immediately after its independence. Henceforth, Pakistan inherited weak conventional forces. Pakistan was lacking in training institutions, weapons and equipment and above all economic resources to boost its armed forces. Later on, Pakistan tried to upgrade its inferior conventional forces vis-à-vis India with the help of the U.S and the European countries. In its bid, Pakistan joined military alliances like SEATO and CENTO in mid 1950s. However, Pakistan could not develop its conventional military capability enough to deter India in 1971 due to the limited supply of weapons and equipment from its allies, arms embargos from the US during 1965 war, its own failure to initiate the required indigenization process of weapons production, its failure in establishing a sound economy to support military expenditure and lastly, the absence of consistent and competent national security strategies.

Since 1950s, Pakistan endeavored hard to seek external security shield from external powers primarily from the US and later on from China. However, it failed in getting substantial security cover against India. Even, China refused to intervene militarily on the behalf of Pakistan during 1971 War.²⁷ After the PNE of India in 1974, all nuclear powers did not accept Pakistan's request for positive security guarantee against the Indian nuclear threat. In the absence of security guarantee from the world's major powers, Pakistan's threat perception increased manifold.

Lastly, the post 1965, 1971 wars and Indian PNE in 1974 security appreciations compelled Pakistan to seek nuclear weapons as a reliable source of internal balancing. Post 1965 war security policy evaluations unearthed that the Kashmir issue would continue to exist as a major irritant in India-Pakistan relations.²⁸ Second, the notion of conventional inferiority vis-à-vis India was revisited among Pakistani

²⁵ Abdul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom* (Calcutta: Oriental Longmans, 1959), 242.

²⁶ Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan* (New York: Colombia University Press, 1967), 182-88.

²⁷ Bhumitra Chakma, *Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons* (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 20.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 16.

policy makers. Third, Pakistan's multilateral and bilateral security pacts did not provide any substantial political, military, psychological clout to Pakistan against India. Similarly, the debacle of 1971 brought certain security apprehensions among decision-making bodies of Pakistan. For instance, Pakistan could not deter India conventionally. India did not respect Pakistan's territorial integrity and political independence. And, India would not miss any opportunity to ruin Pakistan as an independent and sovereign political entity. No external power could be considered reliable during the need of hour.

Subsequently, the Indian PNE in 1974 appeared a direct threat to Pakistan's existence.²⁹ In addition, Islamabad perceived that India could also use its nuclear capability to blackmail it. Chakma has forthrightly described the threat perception of Pakistan that developed in the wake of Indian PNE in the following words, "Islamabad considered the Buddha Smile as a threat to its very survival and an instrument of 'blackmail' and 'coercion'."³⁰ Moreover, Pakistan also decided to acquire nuclear weapons because of some of the supplementary motives. For instance, Pakistan wanted to strengthen its diplomatic stature during crisis situation and to restore the morale of its weak armed forces and of its people that was lost in the wake of 1971 defeat. Cheema has succinctly pointed out this dimension and stated that:

*Bhutto not only saw the development of a nuclear weapons capability as psychologically reassuring for the armed forces and the population at large but also as a diplomatic leverage against friends and foes alike.*³¹

Another supplementary factor was that Pakistan wanted to draw the attention of world powers in resolving its contentious issues like Kashmir, with India. Kheli aptly elaborated this Pakistani motive in the following words:

The big powers have somehow come to accept the occurrence of conventional wars, the accompanying defeats and territorial occupation - the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War and the resultant dismemberment of Pakistan being a case in point. The use of unclear "device", on the other hand, is totally unacceptable.... To hold this weapon, then, is automatically to involve the major

²⁹ Zalmay Khalilzad, "Pakistan and the Bomb", *Survival* XXI, no. 6(November/December 1979): 246.

³⁰ Chakma, *Nuclear Weapons*, 21.

³¹ Zafar Iqbal Cheema, "Pakistan's Nuclear Policy Under Z.A. Bhutto And Zia-UL-Haq: An Assessment," *Strategic Studies* XIV, no. 4 (Summer 1992): 8.

*powers in the problems that may lead to its use, or in the solutions that may preclude its use.*³²

These preceding direct and indirect motives eventually forced Pakistan to appreciate nuclear weapons as valuable security shield. Kheli has aptly summarized Pakistan's appreciation of nuclear weapons and described that:

*Rather, the nuclear option is, in the Pakistani view, a means to an end: namely, national security. In the absence of conventional military power and satisfactory diplomatic alternatives to ensure security, the Pakistanis see the nuclear option...as a deterrent by presenting to the would-be attacker a credible threat of massive destruction.*³³

Pakistan's national security with nuclear weapons: an empirical account

Nuclear weapons are performing an important role in guarding Pakistan's national security. Nuclear weapons were figured in Pakistan's national security policy as a functional deterrent against external aggression and of any blackmail or coercion since 1987. To determine the role of nuclear weapons in Pakistan's national security, four empirical accounts have been studied in this research piece. These cases include: 1) Brasstacks Exercise of 1986-1987; 2) Kashmir Crisis of 1990; 3) Kargil Crisis of 1999; 4) and Military Standoff of 2001-2002.

Brasstacks exercise of 1986-1987

Brasstacks crisis erupted in late 1986 when the Indian military initiated a massive military exercise just twenty miles away from the international border in the Rajasthan sector, alongside the Pakistani province of Sindh. It was the biggest military exercise in Indian history-as it had involved the mobilization of two armored divisions, one mechanized division, and the six infantry divisions. The troops were carrying live ammunition.³⁴ Moreover, Indian troops were also enjoying full-fledge air support from the Indian air force. According to various security analysts, India had four main objectives in launching such mega military exercise along with the Pakistani borders. First, India intended to pressurize Pakistan in ceasing its alleged support for Sikh community which initiated arms insurgency inside India for a separate

³² Shirin Tahir-Kheli, "Pakistan's Nuclear Option and U.S. Policy," *Orbis* 22, no. 2 (Summer 1978): 362.

³³ *Ibid.*, 357.

³⁴ Abdul Sattar, "Nuclear Issues in South Asia: A Pakistani Perspective," *Pakistan's Security and the Nuclear Option* (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1995), 72.

homeland.³⁵ Second, India wanted to test its newly developed “Sunderji Doctrine” comprising on the concepts of mechanized, mobility, and air support.³⁶ Third, India was probably conceiving to initiate a war with Pakistan, so she could, in the pretext of war, cut Pakistan into two halves. Fourth, Indian military leadership was also interested in launching preemptive strikes in order to neutralize Pakistan’s nascent nuclear capabilities, once and for all.³⁷ In sum, these four Indian motives behind Brasstacks operation clearly depicted that India was contemplating to employ the strategies of war and blackmail against Pakistan.

On assessing these intensions of India, Pakistan not only mobilized its armed forces, but also activated its diplomatic channels. Pakistani leadership appreciated that such conventional means would not work effectively. Consequently, Pakistan felt it important to exploit the deterrence value of nuclear weapons to guard its national security against the threats of war and blackmail. In the first instance, Pakistan engaged in indirect nuclear signaling to India. In this context, Pakistani leadership arranged an interview of Dr. A. Q. Khan on March 1, 1987. This interview was simultaneously published in Islamabad, New Delhi, and London. In his interview, Dr. A. Q. Khan stated that:

*What the CIA has been saying about our possessing the bomb is correct and so is the speculation of some foreign newspapers.... nobody can undo Pakistan or take us for granted. We are here to stay and let it to be clear that we shall use the bomb if our existence is threatened.*³⁸

Nevertheless, Pakistani government, to retain the policy of nuclear ambiguity, astutely refused to endorse the authenticity of the interview. In the following days, the then Pakistani president Gen Zia-ul-Haq also got engaged in nuclear signaling in a comparatively less provocative manner. While giving interview to Time Magazine, he stated, “Pakistan has the capability of building the bomb whenever it wishes.”³⁹ Several security analysts are of the opinion that the indirect nuclear signaling of Pakistan did a positive role in diffusing the crisis.

³⁵ Cheema, “Conflict, Crisis and Nuclear Stability in South Asia,” paper presented at a workshop on New Challenges to Strategic Stability in South Asia, University of Bradford, in July 2004, accessed December 20, 2009, accessed on October 7, 2010, <http://www.sassi.org/pdfs/Cheema.pdf>.

³⁶ Devin T. Hegarty, *The Consequences of Nuclear Weapons: Lessons from South Asia* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1998), 96-97.

³⁷ Raj Chengappa, *Weapons of Peace: The Secret History of India’s Quest to Be a Nuclear Power* (New Delhi: Harper Collins Publishers, 2000), 322-23.

³⁸ Kuldip Nayar, “We Have the A-Bomb, Says Pakistan’s ‘Dr. Strangelove’”, *Observer* (London), March 1, 1987.

³⁹ William R. Doerner, “Knocking at the Nuclear Door”, *Times Magazine*, March 30, 1987, p. 42.

Cheema has endorsed the role played by nuclear weapons in diffusing the Brasstacks crisis and contended that:

*To defuse the Brasstacks crisis, Pakistan relied upon its nuclear weapons capability—this being the first time in the history of the Subcontinent that nuclear deterrence was invoked. The channels Pakistani reportedly employed in signaling an incipient deterrent capability, however, were unconventional and indirect.*⁴⁰

Similar kind of observation also came from the former foreign minister of Pakistan Abdul Sattar. He ranked the role of nuclear weapons very significant in defusing the Brasstacks crisis and stated that:

*Predictably, Pakistani forces made counter-deployments, which were considered threatening by India, although that was perhaps not the only reason why the crisis was defused. South Asia watchers consider the restraints imposed by the nuclear environment to be a prime factor in the happy ending.*⁴¹

The Kashmir crisis of 1990

In the late 1980s, Kashmiri freedom fighters succeeded in developing a full-blown secessionist insurgency in the Indian-held Kashmir. New Delhi blamed Pakistan for providing material assistance to the Kashmiri militants. On this pretext, India again mobilized its armed forces along with the Pakistani borders. Indian leadership had two main objectives behind this mobilization. First, India wanted to coerce Pakistan for ceasing its political and moral support to Kashmiris. Second, Indian military leadership was also inclined in carrying out surgical strikes against Pakistan. To pressurize Pakistan, India moved and deployed its main striking forces along with the Rajasthan border in the South and put the forces in defence mode in the North. The then Indian Prime Minister, V.P. Singh, warned Islamabad in the Lok Sabha, "Our message to Pakistan is that you cannot get away with taking Kashmir without a war. They will have to pay a very heavy price and we have the capability to inflict heavy loses."⁴² He also cautioned Indians to be "psychologically prepared" for a war against Pakistan.

⁴⁰ Cheema, *Conflict, Crisis and Nuclear Stability*, p. 5.

⁴¹ Sattar, "Nuclear Issues in South Asia," p. 72.

⁴² The Times of India (New Delhi), April 11, 1990.

In order to neutralize this imminent grave threat to its national security, Pakistan mobilized its armed forces. But in the backdrop of its conventional asymmetries vis-à-vis India, Pakistani decision-making elite again decided to invoke nuclear deterrent against any Indian bid to wage war or to blackmail it. Yet, it is a question mark among the academic circles till today that how Pakistan did nuclear signaling to India during the crisis. Apart from this debate, it is a recognized fact that the nuclear capability induces caution in the minds of the decision makers. Cheema described, "The crisis ended due to fear of escalation, nuclear deterrence and the US mediation."⁴³ Nevertheless, the role of nuclear weapons was more distinctive. Pakistani Senator Mushahid Hussain believed that:

*During May 1990...Pakistani policy-makers and defence planners were convinced that it was the Indian fear of Pakistani nuclear retaliation that deterred India from attacking Pakistan although its ground troop deployments were apparently poised for a surgical strike against Pakistan.*⁴⁴

Similarly, the former Indian Army Chief Gen. Sundarji also admitted the essential role of nuclear weapons in defusing the crisis and stated, "because of nuclear deterrence, the menu of Indian response to Pakistani provocation in Indian-held Kashmir no longer includes launching a bold offensive thrust across the Punjab border."⁴⁵ Former foreign minister of Pakistan Abdul Sattar again applauded the role of nuclear weapons in guarding Pakistan's national security during 1990 crisis and claimed, "The nuclear capability was again a factor in defusing the crisis that erupted in 1990 following the uprising in India-held Kashmir."⁴⁶

The Kargil conflict of 1999

The Kargil conflict kicked off in the spring 1999, when a small contingent of Pakistani army occupied some of the seasonally vacated Indian posts in the Kargil sector. However, literature is replete with conflicting explanations regarding the causes behind this maneuver of Pakistan. Most of the explanations are either too parsimonious or too biased. Few Indian commentators have described the episode of the Kargil war as another reflection of the revisionist behavior of

⁴³ Cheema, *Indian Nuclear Deterrence: Its Evolution, Development and Implications for South Asian Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 408.

⁴⁴ Mushahid Hussain, "The Nuclear Issue and South Asia: Security via Deterrence," *The News* (Rawalpindi), April 24, 1994.

⁴⁵ Hegarty, *The Consequences of Nuclear Weapons*, 99.

⁴⁶ Sattar, "Nuclear Issues in South Asia," 72.

Pakistan.⁴⁷ Similarly, Shaukat Qadir, a Pakistan-based security analyst, has opined that the ambitious personality traits of the individuals, who were part of the then Pakistani chain of command, were the root causes of it.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, conventional wisdom dictates that Kargil conflict cannot emerge in the strategic vacuum. Some of the leading South Asian security analysts have established that Pakistan initiated the limited Kargil offense to balance some of its historical strategic and tactical grievances vis-à-vis India. These historical grievances include India's illegitimate occupation of Kashmir, its role in Pakistan's disintegration in 1971, its occupation of Siachen Glacier in 1984 and subsequently its perpetual incursions along the Northern Line of Control.⁴⁹

On the pretext to overwhelm this limited maneuver of Pakistani troops, India heavily reinforced troop, weapons and equipment in the entire sector. Indian Air Force was called on too. Moreover, Indian leadership also started to rationalize other options-like widened the conflict across the other Pakistani borders along with the threat of nuclear weapons. According to an Indian study, nuclear warheads were readied, and delivery systems, including Mirage 200 aircrafts, short-ranged Prithvi missiles, and medium-ranged Agni missiles, were prepared for possible use.⁵⁰ These developments aggravated Pakistan's threat perception. To guard its core national security values, Pakistan decision making bodies decided to invoke nuclear signaling. Nonetheless, Pakistan did restrained nuclear signaling. The official Kargil Review Committee report of India, on December 15, 1999, confirmed that Pakistan conveyed "veiled" nuclear signals to India during the conflict.⁵¹ Ostensibly, U.S played important role in defusing the situation in July 1999. But, the distinctive security commentators believe that the nuclear capabilities of Pakistan performed decisive role in restraining India from further escalation. For instance, Timothy Hoyt succinctly contended, "India's mobilization in 1999 was obvious - the army cancelled leave, and moved elements of mechanized units to the borders of Gujrat, Rajasthan, and Punjab - but its reluctance to consider horizontal escalation strongly suggests that its was deterred."⁵² Waltz

⁴⁷ Jasjit Singh, "The Fourth War," in *Kargil 1999: Pakistan's Fourth War for Kashmir*, ed. Jasjit Singh (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 1999), 120-121; Y. M. Bammi, *Kargil 1999: The Impregnable Conquered* (New Delhi: Gorkha, 2002), 89-90.

⁴⁸ Shaukat Qadir, "An Analysis of the Kargil Conflict," *Rthe USI Journal* 147, no. 2(April 2002): 24-30.

⁴⁹ Feroz Hassan Khan, Peter R. Lavoy, and Christopher Clary, "Pakistan's Motivations and Calculations for the Kargil Conflict," in *Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict*, ed. Peter R. Lavoy (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 68.

⁵⁰ Chengappa, *Weapons of Peace*, 437.

⁵¹ The Kargil Review Committee, *From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000), 243.

⁵² Timothy Hoyt, "Kargil: The Nuclear Dimension," in a book on Kargil, Naval postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Quoted in Cheema, 'Conflict, Crisis and Nuclear Stability,' 9.

has also endorsed, "Kargil showed once again.... that the presence of nuclear weapons prevented escalation from major skirmish to full-scale war."⁵³ The preceding elaboration establishes that nuclear capability of Pakistan successfully harnessed India from initiating a full-fledge war against it.

The military standoff of 2001-2002

On December 13, 2001, five gunmen attacked the Indian Parliament. Fourteen people died including the five suspected terrorists. India, without clearly establishing the whereabouts and connections of these suspected attackers, held Pakistan responsible for it. Actually, Indian leadership inclined to manipulate the global anti-terrorism campaign against Pakistan. India mounted its largest mobilization in the past thirty years and concentrated troops and equipment along the Pakistani borders. India relocated its air assets along the LoC and borders with Pakistan. India also moved its naval ships to the Arabian Sea, closer to Pakistan.⁵⁴

On December 19, 2001, India's Home Minister, L. K. Advani sent demarche to Pakistan conveying India's intensions for launching surgical strikes against the alleged Islamic militants undertaking Jihad in Kashmir.⁵⁵ It was a direct threat to Pakistan. Soon after this, the Indian army chief, General S. Padmanabhan evinced that the recent military buildup was not an exercise and stated, "A lot of viable options (beginning from a strike on the camps to a full conventional war) are available. We can do it.... If we go to war, jolly good."⁵⁶ Later on, Pravin Sawhney, a leading Indian analyst, claimed that in January and June 2002, the Indian army was fully prepared to attack across the LoC.⁵⁷

From the outset, Pakistani leadership denounced the terrorists attack on the Indian Parliament. In order to counter the threats of Indian war and of coercion, Pakistan activated its armed forces. Pakistan also energized its diplomatic channels. On measuring the gravity of Indian threat, Pakistan again transmitted nuclear signals to India. During the crisis, the official channels of communication between Pakistan and India were totally disrupted.⁵⁸ This untoward development compelled both nuclear powered states to heavily rely on intermediary and indirect channels of communication. Both countries

⁵³ Kenneth N. Waltz and Scott D. Sagan, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003), 115.

⁵⁴ Khan, "Pakistan-India Military Standoff: A Nuclear Dimension," *IPRI Journal* III, no. 1 (Winter 2003):109.

⁵⁵ *The Times of India* (New Delhi), December 20, 2001.

⁵⁶ "Army Ready for War, Says Chief," *The Statesman* (New Delhi), January 12, 2002.

⁵⁷ Pravin Sawhney, "Conventional Parity With Pakistan," *The Pioneer* (New Delhi), June 29, 2002.

⁵⁸ Rahul Roy Chaudhury, "Nuclear Doctrine, Declaratory Policy, and Escalation Control," *The Stimson Center*, accessed November 5, 2007, <http://www.stimson.org/southasia/pdf/ESCCONTROLCHAPTER5.pdf>

attempted to send nuclear signals through public statements. In this connection, President Musharraf, in his televised address to Nation on Pakistan's National Day on March 23, 2002, conveyed indirectly nuclear signaling to India and stated that:

*By Allah's Grace, Pakistan today possesses a powerful military might and can give a crushing reply to all types of aggression. Anybody who poses a challenge to our security and integrity could be taught an unforgettable lesson.*⁵⁹

Ostensibly, President Musharraf did not use the word of nuclear weapons, but the words of "unforgettable lesson" had a clear connotation of nuclear retaliation, if India crosses the frontiers of Pakistan. Subsequently on May 30, 2002, President Musharraf again aired nuclear signaling to India while saying, "Even an inch" of Indian incursion across the Kashmir divide will "unleash a storm that will sweep the enemy...the people of Pakistan have always had faith in the ability of the armed forces to inflict unbearable damage to the enemy."⁶⁰ Again, President Musharraf avoided the word of nuclear weapons but "unbearable damage" could only be done with the nuclear weapons.

Eventually, this compound-military crisis ended without converting into a hot war between India and Pakistan. Admittedly, the US diplomacy, and the conventional deterrent of Pakistan jointly played a mentionable role in the diffusion of the crisis. But, the nuclear capability of Pakistan again played a prominent and visible role in containing India. Sridhar Krishnaswam noted that Pakistan's strategy of offensive defence, nuclear and conventional deterrence, and determination to resist the perceived Indian "hegemonic attitude" were the other factors that had restrained India from initiating a limited conflict.⁶¹ Similarly, Waltz also lauded the role of nuclear weapons in curtailing the crisis of 2001-2002 and restoring the peace in the South Asia. He notes:

*The proposition that nuclear weapons limit the extent of fighting and ultimately preserve peace again found vindication.*⁶²

Subsequently, Sawhney, while evaluating the role of nuclear weapons in ceasing the crisis during 2002, openly admitted that nuclear weapons

⁵⁹ Accessed December 12, 2007, http://www.infopak.gov.pk/President_address_23March.htm

⁶⁰ The News International (Rawalpindi), May 30, 2002.

⁶¹ Sridhar Krishnaswam, "We Can Take Offensive Into Indian Territory: Musharraf," The Hindu (Chennai), May 27, 2002.

⁶² Waltz and Sagan, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 124.

had played the prominent role in diluting the clouds of war in South Asia.⁶³

Conclusion

The preceding account reflects that the deterrence value of nuclear weapons has played a distinctive role in protecting Pakistan's core security values against any external threats of war and blackmail. Leading Pakistani scholar is of the opinion that had Pakistan possessed a nuclear deterrent in 1971, "The dismemberment of Pakistan could have been averted."⁶⁴ Nevertheless, Indian leadership is perpetually contemplating various strategic options - Ballistic Missile Defence, expansion of its nuclear programme and the Cold Start doctrine, to exploit prevalent regional strategic settings in its favour. Thereby, it is imperative that Pakistani leadership should remain upright in conceiving and subsequently adopting pragmatic counter strategic options in accordance to its national security interests. As, Albert Wohlstetter rightly cautioned nuclear states, "Deterrence demands hard, continuing, intelligent work, but it can be achieved.... The balance is not automatic".⁶⁵

⁶³ Sawhney, "Conventional Parity," *The Pioneer*, June 29, 2002.

⁶⁴ Mahbubul Haq, "Internal Nuclear Threat to South Asia," *Regional Studies*, XIV (1996): 27.

⁶⁵ Albert Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," *Foreign Affairs* XXXVII, no. 2(January 1959): 221-22.

BOOK REVIEWS

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Pakistan: The US, Geopolitics and Grand Strategies

Author: Julian Schofield and Usama Butt

ISBN: 978-0-7453-3206-2

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P*akistan: The US, Geopolitics and Grand Strategies* edited by Julian Schofield and Usama Butt is a welcome and most certainly a refreshing addition to the current literature on Pakistan. Unlike existing books on Pakistan, which tend to take a predominately the US or India focussed prism in considering the complexity and dynamics of Pakistan domestic and foreign policies, Schofield and Butt, in their introduction to the book, promise to provide more diversity and nuance. Importantly, their aim is to maintain that 'Pakistan's strategic affairs and its regional and foreign policies are not exclusively influenced by direct the US pressure' (pg.6), consequently the eleven chapters contained within the book are designed to flesh out this rather ambitious proposal. Whether this promise is fulfilled is another matter.

The book begins with Part 1, consisting of six chapters which, given the stated purpose of the book i.e. moving away from the US centrism, is rather puzzlingly entitled 'Part I: Pakistan-US relations'. The first of these chapters, written by Butt himself provides an excellent analysis of how Pakistan's elite needed an Islamic discourse to legitimise their power and dominance; while conversely, for Pakistan's masses, Islam is relevant as an ideology and not necessarily a 'need' as such. The fundamental argument of Butt's chapter is that while the consistent use of the 'Islamic card' ensured that Islam remained dominant in politics, the situation has now changed to the extent that, in the post 9/11 era, Islam has now become the narrative of the anti-elite and non-state actors. In short, an Islamic orientation and purpose is no longer the exclusive domain of the state, and therefore the state cannot seek to manipulate and use the Islamic card for political and military purposes. While Butt makes a convincing argument, arguably he overstates the case, i.e. that Islam is now in the hands

of anti-elite and non-state forces. Nevertheless, Butt's chapter is perhaps one of the best in the book.

The second chapter by Michael Rubin deliberates on the differing the US and Pakistan perceptions of national interest. For Rubin, this difference is most strikingly represented in Pakistan's fear of ethnic nationalism while conversely the US is equally concerned with Islamist movements. These differing threat perceptions have been consequential in the US -Pakistan relationship because they have hindered a genuine convergence of interests. For Pakistan, while Islamist movements are a concern, the bigger threat, given Pakistan's historical experience, is ethnic movements. Similarly, the US is more concerned with Islamist movements and therefore has limited concern for, and understand of, Pakistan's ethnic threats. Rubin presents a rather pessimistic future for the US-Pakistan relations.

The third chapter entitled 'The influence of domestic politics on the making of the US-Pakistan foreign policy' is disappointed, not least because, instead of focussing on Pakistan's domestics inputs vis-à-vis its policies towards the US, the chapter instead largely examines the domestic politics and perception in the US, and how these shape the US foreign policy towards Pakistan. A much more interesting and original account would have been an extended discussion of Pakistani inputs into its foreign policy.

The chapter by Nasir Islam is interesting in so far as it provides a useful monograph of the 'ups and downs' of the relationship between the US, Pakistan, and Afghanistan in the post 9/11 time-frame. Meanwhile, Shamshad Ahmad provides an eloquent and frank Pakistani perspective on the country's own quest for survival in a hostile regional environment and the perceived indifference of the US to Pakistan's security concerns. In particular, Ahmad notes that the US steps to enter into long-term strategic partnership with India belies insensitivity for Pakistan's concerns.

Ishtiaq Ahmad's chapter focuses on the Af-Pak strategy and explores the potential for a convergence of US-Pakistan interests on counter-terrorism. Ahmad's account is useful in the sense that it explores Pakistan's reluctance to comply with the US insistence of geographically expanding counterterrorism operations. In

keeping with some of the major themes espoused in the rest of the book, Ahmad questions the feasibility of the US expectations in this regard.

Part II focuses on Pakistan's foreign relations and consists of five chapters deliberating on Pakistan's relations with China, the Arab region, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and finally a chapter that examines Pakistan's nuclear security. In the first of these chapters, Julian Schofield provides a rather brief and concise account of China's interest in Pakistan and vice versa. Schofield suggests that the US measures to improve its strategic relations with India are likely to trigger an equivalent response by China vis-à-vis Pakistan. The chapter by Christian Koch is useful in the sense that it explores how the countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) can potentially liaise and expand their interaction with Pakistan in a way that promotes peace and stability in the latter. Stability in both Afghanistan and Pakistan is in the interests of the GCC. On this account, Koch suggests that the European Union (EU) is increasingly coming to the realisation that, in the face of failed unilateral the US policies in the region, the EU will ultimately be left to deal with the consequences. In this context, Koch suggests a similarity of interests, and therefore the potential for wide-scale cooperation, between the EU and the GCC in terms of promoting peace and stability in Pakistan.

Gawdat Bahgat's chapter on Pakistan-Saudi Arabia relations considers the long-term ties of the two Sunni states and predicts their continued friendship, as well as military and economic cooperation. The following chapter by Harsh V. Pant provides a lucid account of Pakistan's complex relations with Iran. Pant focuses largely on contemporary trends, in particular Pakistan's interest in Iranian oil, and the vexed security relationship between the two. Moreover, in discussing the growing Iran-India ties, Pant locates the dilemmas for Pakistan in the expansion of such ties. The last chapter by Shaista Tabassum provides a rebuttal of Western concerns around the security of Pakistan's nuclear technology. In particular, Shaista Tabassum is concerned with assessing the divergent postures the West adopts vis-à-vis Pakistan and India in the area of nuclear politics. Tabussum concludes a confidence in Pakistan's command and control of nuclear facilities, and dispels threats of a terrorist takeover of nuclear installations.

All in all, the various chapters contained within the book offer a much broader and contextualised view of Pakistan in the post 9/11 time-frame. Indeed a particular plus point of the book is the way in which it moves away from a the US-centric and even an India-centric framework to locate Pakistan's foreign relations. Such a focus is not only refreshing, but a trend that has hitherto received little academic attention. However, while the introduction to the book seeks to add more context and nuance to the study of Pakistan, there are instances where specific chapters fall short of this task; arguably some accounts within the book tend to revert back to an overwhelming focus on viewing Pakistan from a US prism. Nonetheless, the book provides an important contribution and is well worth a read.

Dr. Nazya Fiaz

Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations
Faculty of Contemporary Studies, National Defence University,
Islamabad.

Towards a More Cooperative South Asia

Edited by Tomislav Delinic & Nishchal Pandey
Published by Centre for South Asian Studies (CSAS)
& Konrad Adenaur Stiftung (KAS)
Year of Publication 2012

For its unique characteristics the region of South Asia has always attracted the critical analysis of intellectuals. Although consisting of democracies, the countries of the region are still plagued with poverty, underdevelopment, insurgencies and terrorism. Moreover, South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which has participation of all the South Asian States, is unable to positively address all those issues for which it was established.

“Towards a more cooperative South Asia” is yet another endeavour for identify the problems and opportunities faced by South Asian countries in their pursuit of regional cooperation. Edited by Tomislav Delinic & Nishchal Pandey, the book is a compilation of the speeches, statements and research papers presented at a regional conference on “Towards a More Cooperative South Asia”, organized by the Centre for South Asian Studies (CSAS) & Konrad Adenaur Stiftung KAS) in November 2011 in Kathmandu Nepal. The contributors to the conference were learned scholars and practitioners from Germany and various South Asian countries.

The idea of this book can be traced back to the concept presented by German statesman Dr. Friedbert Pfluger in which regional integration of Europe under European Union (EU) has been proposed as a formula for success for SAARC. In this connection, the statement of the German ambassador to Nepal also serves as a motivating factor to South Asian States for learning lessons from EU Experience.

The chapters in the book deal with regional affairs of South Asia in collective as well as individual dimensions. Challenges and opportunities for cooperation in South Asia, India’s apprehensions of China in the region and prospects and hurdles for SAARC are the major issues addressed by the researchers. Along with this, domestic political developments in the majority of the countries of South Asia have been highlighted. The history of democracy building in Bangladesh, successes and challenges of peace process in Nepal, rehabilitation and

reconstruction in post-conflict Srilanka and critical nature of Indo-Pak relations are the issues featured in the book.

Although EU is the most successful regional integration model, yet, its experience is not necessarily relevant to the South Asian political culture. Unlike European countries, the South Asian states do not have a common enemy against whom their interests could converge for regional integration. Further, no world power is favouring or helping build SAARC as a viable regional organization, like the US A did in the case of EU or Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). According to Dr. Pfluger, instead of dictating its will on smaller countries, Germany disproportionately shares the financial burden within EU. Such a behaviour is unexpected from India in South Asia because not only India is disproportionately huge vis-à-vis much smaller South Asian States but also because of the fact that India has global as well as regional ambitions.

Maj. Gen Dipanker Banerjee has suggested cooperative society in South Asia on the model of EU, but, it is pertinent to understand that convergence of interests for cooperation is possible when threats come from outside. In case of South Asian strategic environment, security of smaller States is threatened by the presence of a hegemon from within South Asia itself. The scholar has also proposed effectiveness of Southern Asian Silk route, linking South East Asia to Central Asia and further to Europe. However, for its implementation, instability in Afghanistan, which would serve as a bridge for the suggested inter-regional connection, has not been addressed.

Prof. Swaran Singh has studied India's apprehensions against China's role in South Asia, which indicates India's regional balance of power approach. He has suggested China's role within SAARC under the leadership of India. Considering the political, economic and global prowess of China the proposed relationship should be other way round.

For energizing SAARC, Ahmed Saleem has very rightly advocated the inclusion of bilateral political and strategic level issues; especially the nuclear issue between India and Pakistan, for discussions at its platform. For this to be effective, in place of traditional approach to security, deepening approach will have to be undertaken, in which focus is on human security. The researcher has highlighted the beauracatic hurdles in foreign ministries that limit the chances of success of SAARC. However, deep scrutiny of South Asian political culture, significantly of

India and Pakistan, would expose the fact that extremist elements of both sides hamper the political leadership of making any peaceful commitments in SAARC summits.

Prof. Dr. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema has shown optimism in the prevalent level of interaction between India and Pakistan for furtherance of peace in the region. In this respect, it is relevant to consider the influential radical views on both sides of the border that thinks otherwise. Despite the fact that conditions for cooperation are present due to various common threats faced by both arch rivals, still, it is worth considering that governments of both countries blame each other for instigating these threats.

In the chapter focusing on democracy building in Bangladesh, Brig. Gen Shahedul Anam Khan has pinpointed the conflict between major political parties of Bangladesh as the root cause of military interventions, which in turn derails the democratic process in the country. The lack of tolerance found in the opposing political groups is the hallmark of almost all South Asian States. That can be addressed by spreading quality education at the societal level.

Rajan Bhattarai has found politicization of security agencies and militarization of political parties as the chief reason behind instability in Nepal. This is another area of significance where South Asian political culture is not similar to the European political culture. And therefore, application of EU model in South Asia does not seem to work effectively.

Srilankan reconstruction model has been studied by Dr. Thusitha Tennakon. The rehabilitation of internally displaced persons (IDP's) as presented by the scholar needs to be studied by the policy makers of the region, especially in Pakistan, for addressing this issue.

While the overall structure, organization and presentation of the book is impressive, it is notable that the issue of terrorism with specific reference to Afghanistan has not been addressed within the book. Being a Member State of SAARC and having profound effect on the politics of South Asian region, Afghanistan and its prevailing instability must be critically scrutinized for suggesting the ways for promoting peace in the region. Nevertheless, the conference on "Towards a more cooperative South Asia" and compilation of its findings in the book has explored important areas of study for further research. Terrorism in Afghanistan, influential extremist elements, rehabilitation of IDP's, inclusion of nuclear affairs for discussion in SAARC and lack

of tolerance in the political culture of the region are the broad issues on which further research is needed.

Muhammad Umar Abbasi
Lecturer, Dept. of I.R, FCS
National Defence University, Islamabad

A.G.NOORANI, ARTICLE 370 A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR

Author: A.G.Noorani

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AG.Noorani, the author of *Article 370 A Constitutional History of Jammu and Kashmir*, is a lawyer specializing in constitutional law and history. He is a columnist for *Frontline* and *The Dawn*, and has authored various books on the theme relevant to the issue of Jammu and Kashmir. His various titles are related to the constitutional sensitivities of India, likewise this work consists of documents on Article 370 of the constitution which essentially envisaged temporary provisions with respect to Jammu and Kashmir. The publication is a collection of documents and provides an insight to the spirit of the Article amidst continuing controversy ever since its insertion in the constitution.

Article 370 was enacted in the Indian constitution on 17th Oct' 1949, after five-month long negotiations, "the state of Jammu and Kashmir is the only State in the Union of India which negotiated the terms of its membership with the Union" the author opined. As for its importance, he quotes Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram when he acknowledged in Rajya Sabha on 6th August 2010 that the Kashmir issue is a 'unique problem' which requires a 'unique solution' thus, 'it is important to win the hearts and minds of the people of Jammu and Kashmir' (pg: 2).

The author profoundly describes the Indian aspirations with regards to this Article while quoting Union Home Minister Gulzari Lal Nanda's address in the Lok Sabha on 4th December 1964 when he said:

'the only way of taking the Constitution (of India) into Jammu and Kashmir is through the application of Article 370... it is a tunnel. It is through this tunnel that a good deal of traffic has already passed and more will'.

The controversy also relates to the legal effect which Article 370 carries in the follow up of later amendments. In this regard, while quoting Nanda further, Noorani emphasizes on the fact that in the light of Article 368, the Article 370 can be

amended merely by a Presidential order. However, this led the spirit of the Article to die and its contents to drain over the past years. As, Nehru being 'conscious of the indelicacy of the metaphor' he writes, caused the Article to 'erode' by subsequent Presidential Orders. Going back into history, Noorani while analyzing the legal position of the 'Instrument of Accession' writes that, 'the instrument of Accession which the ruler executed on 26th Oct 1947 was accompanied, uniquely, by a letter of the same date signed simultaneously with the instrument. In law, such a document is a collateral document and the two form an integral whole, the letter has the same legal effect as does, indeed the Governor General's letter of acceptance dated 27th Oct' 1947.'

As the acceptance of the aforementioned letter was a legal prerequisite for the Governor General according to Article 6 (1) of Government of India Act 1935, thus Noorani further writes what the Governor General stipulated in his acceptance letter: as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invader; the question of the State's accession should be settled by reference to the people'. In addition, the Government of India acknowledged in 1948 that the accession would be considered provisional until the will of the people could be ascertained. The writer strongly asserts the accession to be purely only the will of the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir who declares in clause 7 of the Instrument that the constitution of the state would be drafted by its own Constituent Assembly and the Indian constitution would not be adopted.

The Maharaja's proclamation openly suggested that acceding to the Indian Union would not mean that its constitution would also be applied; however the framers of Article 370 gave Jammu and Kashmir a special status which according to them would pave way for inserting the state in the Indian Union. The accession was subject to six special provisions; firstly, Jammu and Kashmir would have its own constitution. Secondly, the Indian Parliaments powers over the state were restricted to only three sectors: defence, foreign affairs and communications. Thirdly, prior 'concurrence' of the state government was required before any constitutional provision of the Indian union were extended. Fourthly, the concurrence was strictly provisional and had to be ratified by the state's Constituent Assembly. Fifthly, the state's government authority to give the 'concurrence' lasts only till the State's Constituent Assembly is 'convened'. And finally, according to Article 370 (3) the president of India has the special powers to

abrogate the Article however; it is to be done after consulting the Constituent Assembly of the state.

Consequently, the Article 370 cannot be invoked if the State's Constituent Assembly has doubts regarding the aforementioned concerns or has taken decision regarding the constitution and range of jurisdiction over the state. However, when the state's first Assembly was convened on 31st Oct' 1951, it was not given authority to accord any 'concurrence' to the union. Thus, this leads to a conclusion that once the constitution of the state of Jammu and Kashmir was adopted on 17th Nov' 1956 and the Assembly was dispersed, the only authority to give more powers to the Union and accept the institutions of the Union other than those specified in the instrument of Accession simply vanished. Thus, all the additions to the Unions powers within the state of Jammu and Kashmir since then are unconstitutional.

Noorani takes the reader on an intensive journey of the constitutional history of the Article 370 with the help of original documents that corroborate the events of history. He himself declares that, 'given the political will, sincerity of purpose, and a spirit of compromise, it is not difficult to retrieve from the wreckage of Article 370 a Constitutional settlement which satisfies the aspirations of the people of Jammu and Kashmir.'

As long as the triangular nature of the dispute of Jammu and Kashmir is not addressed, the issue will remain an irritant for regional peace and security. The Article 370, if not used in good faith according to its true spirit, will never be accepted by the people of Jammu and Kashmir and even Pakistan. Thus the writer puts its rather strongly that, 'obviously, as well as redrafting of Article 370, a review of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, drafted in abnormal circumstances, to say the least, will be necessary. The amendments must be based on agreement between all the major parties in Kashmir. they must meet Jammu's concerns as well.'

Beenish Sultan
Research Associate, ISSRA,
NDU, Pakistan

DOCUMENTS

Document 1

Agreement on Strategic Partnership between the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Republic of India, hereinafter referred to as "the Sides",

RECOGNISING the time-tested and friendly relationship between the two countries, underpinned by historical and cultural ties;

EMPHASISING the fundamental and lasting importance of the Treaty of Friendship between the Government of India and the Royal Government of Afghanistan of 4 January 1950, and subsequent Agreements and Joint Statements;

PROCEEDING from a desire to further strengthen their traditional and historical ties to mutual benefit;

DRAWING upon their rich and fruitful tradition of cooperation in various fields since the establishment of their diplomatic relations;

CONVINCED that the further comprehensive development of their bilateral ties would promote progress and prosperity in both states and the region as a whole;

APPRECIATING the significant expansion of bilateral ties between the two countries and, in this context, the sincere and generous assistance that the Republic of India has provided to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan over the past ten years;

SEEKING to impart a long term commitment to their multifaceted bilateral relations and to actively develop them in political, development, economic, trade, scientific, technological, cultural and other fields in the years ahead;

CONFIRMING their adherence to the common ideals of peace, democracy, rule of law, non-violence, human rights and fundamental freedoms;

REAFFIRMING their commitment to international law, including to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter;

Hereby proclaim the establishment of relations of Strategic Partnership, as laid out in the following paragraphs:

General Principles

1. This Agreement, based on mutual understanding and long term trust between the Sides, envisages the elevation of the multifaceted ties between the two countries to higher levels, both in the bilateral field and in the international arena.

2. The Strategic Partnership between the Sides is based upon the principles of sovereignty, equality and territorial integrity of States, non-interference in their internal affairs, mutual respect and mutual benefit.

3. The Strategic Partnership between the Sides is not directed against any other State or group of States.

Political & Security Cooperation

1. The Sides agree to engage in close political cooperation and, in this respect, establish a mechanism for regular bilateral political and Foreign Office Consultations. Political consultations will be led by Foreign Ministries of both countries and include summit level consultations convened at least once a year. 2. The Sides agree to consult and cooperate at the United Nations and other international, regional and multilateral fora. Such cooperation is to be aimed at influencing decision-making in these fora in the interest of both countries.

Cooperation at the UN and multilateral fora would include:

(a) Joint initiatives on key regional and international issues;

(b) Support for the reform and expansion of the United Nations Security Council, including a permanent seat for India in the Council.

3. The Sides agree to establish a Strategic Dialogue to provide a framework for cooperation in the area of national security. The Dialogue will be led by NSAs and involve regular consultations with the aim of intensifying mutual efforts towards strengthening regional peace and security.

4. Security cooperation between the Sides is intended to help enhance their respective and mutual efforts in the fight against international terrorism, organized crime, illegal trafficking in narcotics, money laundering and so on.

5. India agrees to assist, as mutually determined, in the training, equipping and capacity building programmes for Afghan National Security Forces.

Trade & Economic Cooperation

1. The Sides commit to strengthening trade, economic, scientific and technological cooperation, as well as cooperation between

other bodies of business and industry representatives, with a view to expanding trade and economic relations.

2. In the interest of Afghanistan's sustainable development, and furthering economic interdependence between the two countries, the Sides commit to deepening and diversifying cooperation in sectors such as agriculture, rural development, mining, industry, energy, information technology, communications, transport, including civil aviation, and any other areas that the Sides may agree on.

3. The Sides agree to take effective measures to create a favourable environment to promote trade and investment. The measures shall include, among others:

- (a) Enhancing investment protection;
- (b) Simplifying customs and other procedures and promoting the removal of non-tariff barriers, and gradually lowering tariff barriers;
- (c) Working towards the creation of air-cargo facilities for promotion of commercial exchanges;
- (d) Cooperating in the areas of banking and finance, and improving credit and insurance facilities and;
- (e) Enhancing cooperation and coordination at international trade, economic and financial bodies.

4. To achieve a sustained expansion of bilateral trade and economic ties with a long term perspective, the Sides will establish effective mechanisms for interaction between Indian and Afghan entities. Specific measures will include:

- (a) Encouraging contacts between regions/provinces in both countries with a view to promoting trade, economic and cultural cooperation;
- (b) Mandating the relevant bodies of both countries to jointly explore the possibilities of regional trading arrangements with third countries;
- (c) Further enhancing the quality and international competitiveness of their goods by promoting cooperation between the institutions of quality assurance and standardization, and on new technologies; and
- (d) Encouraging greater cooperation between the Chambers of Commerce and Industries of both countries.

5. Recognizing that regional economic cooperation is vital to the future economic prosperity of individual nations, the Sides agree to cooperate, both bilaterally and through regional organizations in promoting regional economic cooperation. Regional economic

cooperation shall:(a) Envisage assisting Afghanistan emerge as a trade, transportation and energy hub connecting Central and South Asia and enabling free and more unfettered transport and transit linkages;

(b) Focus on development of regional infrastructure projects;

(c) Help facilitate the integration of the Afghan economy within the South Asian and global economies by opening markets for Afghan and Indian products for mutual benefit; and

(d) Strengthen regional cooperation under SAARC, of which both sides are members.

Capacity Development and Education

1. In the interest of Afghanistan's long-term, sustainable development, and building on the existing generous aid programme offered by India to Afghanistan, India commits to continue its assistance to the development and capacity building efforts in Afghanistan.

(a) Cooperation will, among other areas of focus, concentrate on the agriculture, mining and health sectors, reflecting Afghanistan's priorities; and

(b) India further commits to expand ongoing Small Development Projects (SDPs) for grass-root level development in the remote and rural areas.

2. The Sides agree to establish institutional linkages between their respective governments by encouraging cooperation between Ministries/agencies of the two sides. India offers the experience of its own institutional, administrative, political and economic systems as references that Afghanistan can study and benefit from in the light of its own needs and realities.

3. As part of its highly successful annual scholarship programme, and the broader strategy of support to higher education for Afghanistan, India will continue to expand education and training opportunities in India through the ICCR and ITEC scholarships, and multilateral-funded programmes.

(a) Responding to the requirements of Afghanistan, India will explore avenues to expand scholarships in medical, engineering and management institutes of India; and

(b) The Sides will also encourage and facilitate annual student exchange programmes at the school and university levels.

4. As part of its capacity building support for the Afghan government, India will continue and expand technical, training and other capacity building support to the various departments in

the three branches of government, including the Executive, Judiciary and the Parliament.

5. In response to Afghanistan's need to strengthen its administration and governance at national and sub-national levels, India offers its experience of governance at the national, state, district and local body levels, and technical assistance in setting up a permanent, career-based civil service suitable for Afghan realities.

Social, Cultural, Civil Society & People-To-People Relations

1. In pursuit of further expanding the existing people-to-people bonds that exist between the two countries, the Sides envisage greater exchanges between parliament, media, women, youth, sports, academic, cultural, intellectual and religious figures and bodies.

2. Through the India-Afghanistan Foundation, the Sides will seek to promote social and cultural ties, with a focus on arts, literature, poetry and so on, and further expand the exposure to each other's' cultural heritage and achievements.

3. The Sides will encourage and promote greater exchanges between media organizations in their respective countries, within the framework of an independent and free media.

4. Both Sides will work for the upliftment of women, their education and rights, and also for the poorer or weaker sections of their societies. 5. To encourage and expand interaction and legitimate movement of people between the two countries, the Sides agree to simplifying rules and procedures for travel by citizens of both countries. The Sides intend to:

(a) Promote tourist exchanges and cooperation between tourist organizations in both countries; and

(b) Encourage sister-city agreements between the cities/provinces/states of the two countries.

6. To facilitate legal cases involving nationals of one country in the other, the Sides will work towards agreements on mutual legal assistance in civil and criminal matters.

7. To promote relations between civil societies and, in particular, enable intellectual exchanges, the Sides intend to establish India-Afghanistan Round Table consisting of eminent persons representing different fields.

8. Both Sides agree to promote cooperation and exchanges in the field of sports.

9. Both sides agree to share and learn from each others' experience of the values and institutions of democracy, including

the sharing, distribution and devolution of powers, relations between the Centre and States/Provinces, electoral reforms etc.

10. The Sides agree to establish parliament-to-parliament exchanges between the two countries by organizing visits of parliamentary delegations and establishing parliamentary friendship groups in the two countries.

Implementation Mechanism

1. This Strategic Partnership would be implemented under the framework of a Partnership Council, which will be headed by the Foreign Ministers of both countries. The Council will convene annual meetings.

2. The Council will consist of separate Joint Working Groups on Political & Security Consultations, Trade and Economic Cooperation, Capacity Development & Education, and Social, Cultural and Civil Society, involving high level representatives from concerned Ministries/Authorities.

3. The existing dialogue mechanisms between the two sides will become part of the Council.

Conclusion

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Republic of India go forward in this partnership, re-asserting the fundamental and lasting spirit of the Treaty of Friendship between the Government of India and the Royal Government of Afghanistan of 04 January 1950, which states: "There shall be everlasting peace and friendship between the two Governments who will further strive to maintain and strengthen the cordial relations existing between the people of their respective countries."

Signed on the 4th October 2011 at New Delhi in four originals, each in Hindi, Pashto, Dari and English languages.

However, in case of any discrepancy in the text or difference in interpretation, the English text shall prevail.

(Manmohan Singh) (Hamid Karzai)

Prime Minister of the President of the

Republic of India Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

Document 2

Obama victory speech text, full transcript: Election 2012 speech I

Thank you so much.

Tonight, more than 200 years after a former colony won the right to determine its own destiny, the task of perfecting our union moves forward.

It moves forward because of you. It moves forward because you reaffirmed the spirit that has triumphed over war and depression, the spirit that has lifted this country from the depths of despair to the great heights of hope, the belief that while each of us will pursue our own individual dreams, we are an American family and we rise or fall together as one nation and as one people.

Tonight, in this election, you, the American people, reminded us that while our road has been hard, while our journey has been long, we have picked ourselves up, we have fought our way back, and we know in our hearts that for the United States of America the best is yet to come.

I want to thank every American who participated in this election, whether you voted for the very first time or waited in line for a very long time. By the way, we have to fix that. Whether you pounded the pavement or picked up the phone, whether you held an Obama sign or a Romney sign, you made your voice heard and you made a difference.

I just spoke with Gov. Romney and I congratulated him and Paul Ryan on a hard-fought campaign. We may have battled fiercely, but it's only because we love this country deeply and we care so strongly about its future. From George to Lenore to their son Mitt, the Romney family has chosen to give back to America through public service and that is the legacy that we honor and applaud tonight. In the weeks ahead, I also look forward to sitting down with Gov. Romney to talk about where we can work together to move this country forward.

I want to thank my friend and partner of the last four years, America's happy warrior, the best vice president anybody could ever hope for, Joe Biden.

And I wouldn't be the man I am today without the woman who agreed to marry me 20 years ago. Let me say this publicly: Michelle, I have never loved you more. I have never been prouder to watch the rest of America fall in love with you, too, as our

nation's first lady. Sasha and Malia, before our very eyes you're growing up to become two strong, smart beautiful young women, just like your mom. And I'm so proud of you guys. But I will say that for now one dog's probably enough.

To the best campaign team and volunteers in the history of politics. The best. The best ever. Some of you were new this time around, and some of you have been at my side since the very beginning. But all of you are family. No matter what you do or where you go from here, you will carry the memory of the history we made together and you will have the lifelong appreciation of a grateful president. Thank you for believing all the way, through every hill, through every valley. You lifted me up the whole way and I will always be grateful for everything that you've done and all the incredible work that you put in.

I know that political campaigns can sometimes seem small, even silly. And that provides plenty of fodder for the cynics that tell us that politics is nothing more than a contest of egos or the domain of special interests. But if you ever get the chance to talk to folks who turned out at our rallies and crowded along a rope line in a high school gym, or saw folks working late in a campaign office in some tiny county far away from home, you'll discover something else.

You'll hear the determination in the voice of a young field organizer who's working his way through college and wants to make sure every child has that same opportunity. You'll hear the pride in the voice of a volunteer who's going door to door because her brother was finally hired when the local auto plant added another shift. You'll hear the deep patriotism in the voice of a military spouse who's working the phones late at night to make sure that no one who fights for this country ever has to fight for a job or a roof over their head when they come home.

That's why we do this. That's what politics can be. That's why elections matter. It's not small, it's big. It's important. Democracy in a nation of 300 million can be noisy and messy and complicated. We have our own opinions. Each of us has deeply held beliefs. And when we go through tough times, when we make big decisions as a country, it necessarily stirs passions, stirs up controversy.

That won't change after tonight, and it shouldn't. These arguments we have are a mark of our liberty. We can never forget that as we speak people in distant nations are risking their lives

right now just for a chance to argue about the issues that matter, the chance to cast their ballots like we did today.

But despite all our differences, most of us share certain hopes for America's future. We want our kids to grow up in a country where they have access to the best schools and the best teachers. A country that lives up to its legacy as the global leader in technology and discovery and innovation, with all the good jobs and new businesses that follow.

We want our children to live in an America that isn't burdened by debt, that isn't weakened by inequality, that isn't threatened by the destructive power of a warming planet. We want to pass on a country that's safe and respected and admired around the world, a nation that is defended by the strongest military on earth and the best troops this -- this world has ever known. But also a country that moves with confidence beyond this time of war, to shape a peace that is built on the promise of freedom and dignity for every human being.

We believe in a generous America, in a compassionate America, in a tolerant America, open to the dreams of an immigrant's daughter who studies in our schools and pledges to our flag. To the young boy on the south side of Chicago who sees a life beyond the nearest street corner. To the furniture worker's child in North Carolina who wants to become a doctor or a scientist, an engineer or an entrepreneur, a diplomat or even a president -- that's the future we hope for. That's the vision we share. That's where we need to go -- forward. That's where we need to go.

Now, we will disagree, sometimes fiercely, about how to get there. As it has for more than two centuries, progress will come in fits and starts. It's not always a straight line. It's not always a smooth path. By itself, the recognition that we have common hopes and dreams won't end all the gridlock or solve all our problems or substitute for the painstaking work of building consensus and making the difficult compromises needed to move this country forward. But that common bond is where we must begin.

Our economy is recovering. A decade of war is ending. A long campaign is now over. And whether I earned your vote or not, I have listened to you, I have learned from you, and you've made me a better president. And with your stories and your struggles, I return to the White House more determined and more inspired than ever about the work there is to do and the future that lies ahead.

Tonight you voted for action, not politics as usual. You elected us to focus on your jobs, not ours. And in the coming weeks and months, I am looking forward to reaching out and working with leaders of both parties to meet the challenges we can only solve together. Reducing our deficit. Reforming our tax code. Fixing our immigration system. Freeing ourselves from foreign oil. We've got more work to do.

But that doesn't mean your work is done. The role of citizen in our democracy does not end with your vote. America's never been about what can be done for us. It's about what can be done by us together through the hard and frustrating, but necessary work of self-government. That's the principle we were founded on.

This country has more wealth than any nation, but that's not what makes us rich. We have the most powerful military in history, but that's not what makes us strong. Our university, our culture are all the envy of the world, but that's not what keeps the world coming to our shores.

What makes America exceptional are the bonds that hold together the most diverse nation on earth. The belief that our destiny is shared; that this country only works when we accept certain obligations to one another and to future generations. The freedom which so many Americans have fought for and died for come with responsibilities as well as rights. And among those are love and charity and duty and patriotism. That's what makes America great.

I am hopeful tonight because I've seen the spirit at work in America. I've seen it in the family business whose owners would rather cut their own pay than lay off their neighbors, and in the workers who would rather cut back their hours than see a friend lose a job. I've seen it in the soldiers who reenlist after losing a limb and in those SEALs who charged up the stairs into darkness and danger because they knew there was a buddy behind them watching their back.

I've seen it on the shores of New Jersey and New York, where leaders from every party and level of government have swept aside their differences to help a community rebuild from the wreckage of a terrible storm. And I saw just the other day, in Mentor, Ohio, where a father told the story of his 8-year-old daughter, whose long battle with leukemia nearly cost their family everything had it not been for health care reform passing

just a few months before the insurance company was about to stop paying for her care.

I had an opportunity to not just talk to the father, but meet this incredible daughter of his. And when he spoke to the crowd listening to that father's story, every parent in that room had tears in their eyes, because we knew that little girl could be our own. And I know that every American wants her future to be just as bright. That's who we are. That's the country I'm so proud to lead as your president.

And tonight, despite all the hardship we've been through, despite all the frustrations of Washington, I've never been more hopeful about our future. I have never been more hopeful about America. And I ask you to sustain that hope. I'm not talking about blind optimism, the kind of hope that just ignores the enormity of the tasks ahead or the roadblocks that stand in our path. I'm not talking about the wishful idealism that allows us to just sit on the sidelines or shirk from a fight.

I have always believed that hope is that stubborn thing inside us that insists, despite all the evidence to the contrary, that something better awaits us so long as we have the courage to keep reaching, to keep working, to keep fighting.

America, I believe we can build on the progress we've made and continue to fight for new jobs and new opportunity and new security for the middle class. I believe we can keep the promise of our founders, the idea that if you're willing to work hard, it doesn't matter who you are or where you come from or what you look like or where you love. It doesn't matter whether you're black or white or Hispanic or Asian or Native American or young or old or rich or poor, able, disabled, gay or straight, you can make it here in America if you're willing to try.

I believe we can seize this future together because we are not as divided as our politics suggests. We're not as cynical as the pundits believe. We are greater than the sum of our individual ambitions, and we remain more than a collection of red states and blue states. We are and forever will be the United States of America.

And together with your help and God's grace we will continue our journey forward and remind the world just why it is that we live in the greatest nation on Earth.

Thank you, America. God bless you. God bless these United States.
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012>

Document 3

Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution 2042 (2012)

14 April 2012

Security Council

SC/10609

Department of Public Information

6751st Meeting (AM)

Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution 2042 (2012),

Authorizing Advance Team to Monitor Ceasefire in Syria

Syria's Representative Pledges Support for Mission, Stresses Sovereignty

The Security Council today authorized an advance team to monitor the ceasefire in Syria, which it said all parties “appeared to be observing”, while calling again on the Government to begin a pull-back of military forces from population centres and cease the use of heavy weaponry in those areas.

Unanimously adopting resolution 2042 (2012), the Council also authorized a team of up to 30 unarmed military observers “to liaise with the parties and to begin to report on the implementation of a full cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties”. It underlined the importance of pulling back military forces and urgently implementing in full the six-point plan proposed by Kofi Annan, Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and the League of Arab States.

Calling on the parties to ensure the safety and free movement of the advance team in order to allow it to carry out its mandate, the Council stressed the primary responsibility of the Syrian Government in that regard. It also reiterated its call for the authorities to allow immediate and unimpeded access of humanitarian personnel to all populations in need of assistance.

The Council stated its intention, if the cessation of violence was sustained, to establish immediately a United Nations supervision mission in Syria to monitor all relevant aspects of Mr. Annan's plan, after consultations between the Secretary-General and the Syrian Government. For that purpose, it requested a formal proposal by the Secretary-General, not later than 18 April 2012.

Following the resolution's adoption, Council members expressed hope that it would end the violence in Syria and called upon all parties to abide fully by the Joint Special Envoy's six-point plan. However, the representatives of the United Kingdom, France, United States and others expressed regret that unified action by the Council had only come after more than a year of repression and the deaths of an estimated 10,000 people. It represented only a first step towards lasting peace and the fulfilment of the Syrian people's aspirations, the stressed.

The Russian Federation's representative said today's measure was consistent with his country's long-held view that stopping the violence in Syria was the primary goal, alongside avoiding external intervention. The text had become much more balanced through extensive negotiation, he added.

Syria's representative said the text was still unbalanced as it did not lay enough of the onus for maintaining the ceasefire on armed opposition groups. However, the Government supported Mr. Annan's mission and measures that would restore the country's stability, he said, pledging support for monitoring efforts, while warning that they must respect Syria's sovereignty. "The time for violence is gone," he said. "The time for stewardship over us is gone as well."

The meeting began at 11:20 a.m. and ended at 12:30 p.m.

Resolution

The full text of resolution 2042 (2012) reads as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Recalling its presidential statements of 3 August 2011, 21 March 2012 and 5 April 2012, and also recalling all relevant resolutions of the General Assembly,

"Reaffirming its support to the Joint Special Envoy for the United Nations and the League of Arab States, Kofi Annan, and his work, following General Assembly resolution A/RES/66/253 of 16 February 2012 and relevant resolutions of the League of Arab States,

"Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Syria, and to the purposes and principles of the Charter,

"Condemning the widespread violations of human rights by the Syrian authorities, as well as any human rights abuses by armed groups, recalling that those responsible shall be held accountable,

and expressing its profound regret at the death of many thousands of people in Syria,

“Noting the Syrian Government’s commitment on 25 March 2012 to implement the six-point proposal of the Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and the League of Arab States, and to implement urgently and visibly its commitments, as it agreed to do in its communication to the Envoy of 1 April 2012, to (a) cease troop movements towards population centres, (b) cease all use of heavy weapons in such centres, and (c) begin pullback of military concentrations in and around population centres, and to implement these in their entirety by no later than 10 April 2012, and noting also the Syrian opposition’s expressed commitment to respect the cessation of violence, provided the Government does so,

“Noting the Envoy’s assessment that, as of 12 April 2012, the parties appeared to be observing a cessation of fire and that the Syrian Government had started to implement its commitments, and supporting the Envoy’s call for an immediate and visible implementation by the Syrian Government of all elements of the Envoy’s six-point proposal in their entirety to achieve a sustained cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties,

“1. Reaffirms its full support for and calls for the urgent, comprehensive, and immediate implementation of all elements of the Envoy’s six-point proposal (annex) aimed at bringing an immediate end to all violence and human rights violations, securing humanitarian access and facilitating a Syrian-led political transition leading to a democratic, plural political system, in which citizens are equal regardless of their affiliations, ethnicities or beliefs, including through commencing a comprehensive political dialogue between the Syrian Government and the whole spectrum of the Syrian opposition;

“2. Calls upon the Syrian Government to implement visibly its commitments in their entirety, as it agreed to do in its communication to the Envoy of 1 April 2012, to (a) cease troop movements towards population centres, (b) cease all use of heavy weapons in such centres, and (c) begin pullback of military concentrations in and around population centres;

“3. Underlines the importance attached by the Envoy to the withdrawal of all Syrian Government troops and heavy weapons from population centres to their barracks to facilitate a sustained cessation of violence;

"4. Calls upon all parties in Syria, including the opposition, immediately to cease all armed violence in all its forms;

"5. Expresses its intention, subject to a sustained cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties, to establish immediately, after consultations between the Secretary-General and the Syrian Government, a United Nations supervision mission in Syria to monitor a cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties and relevant aspects of the Envoy's six-point proposal, on the basis of a formal proposal from the Secretary-General, which the Security Council requests to receive not later than 18 April 2012;

"6. Calls upon the Syrian Government to ensure the effective operation of the mission, including its advance team, by: facilitating the expeditious and unhindered deployment of its personnel and capabilities as required to fulfil its mandate; ensuring its full, unimpeded and immediate freedom of movement and access as necessary to fulfil its mandate; allowing its unobstructed communications; and allowing it to freely and privately communicate with individuals throughout Syria without retaliation against any person as a result of interaction with the mission;

"7. Decides to authorize an advance team of up to 30 unarmed military observers to liaise with the parties and to begin to report on the implementation of a full cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties, pending the deployment of the mission referred to in paragraph 5 and calls upon the Syrian Government and all other parties to ensure that the advance team is able to carry out its functions according to the terms set forth in paragraph 6;

"8. Calls upon the parties to guarantee the safety of the advance team without prejudice to its freedom of movement and access, and stresses that the primary responsibility in this regard lies with the Syrian authorities;

"9. Requests the Secretary-General to report immediately to the Security Council any obstructions to the effective operation of the team by any party;

"10. Reiterates its call for the Syrian authorities to allow immediate, full and unimpeded access of humanitarian personnel to all populations in need of assistance, in accordance with international law and guiding principles of humanitarian assistance and calls upon all parties in Syria, in particular the Syrian authorities, to cooperate fully with the United Nations and

relevant humanitarian organizations to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance;

“11. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the implementation of this resolution by 19 April 2012;

“12. Expresses its intention to assess the implementation of this resolution and to consider further steps as appropriate;

“13. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

“Resolution Annex

“Six-Point Proposal of the Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and the League of Arab States

“(1) commit to work with the Envoy in an inclusive Syrian-led political process to address the legitimate aspirations and concerns of the Syrian people, and, to this end, commit to appoint an empowered interlocutor when invited to do so by the Envoy;

“(2) commit to stop the fighting and achieve urgently an effective United Nations supervised cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties to protect civilians and stabilize the country;

“To this end, the Syrian Government should immediately cease troop movements towards, and end the use of heavy weapons in, population centres, and begin pullback of military concentrations in and around population centres;

“As these actions are being taken on the ground, the Syrian Government should work with the Envoy to bring about a sustained cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties with an effective United Nations supervision mechanism.

“Similar commitments would be sought by the Envoy from the opposition and all relevant elements to stop the fighting and work with him to bring about a sustained cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties with an effective United Nations supervision mechanism;

“(3) ensure timely provision of humanitarian assistance to all areas affected by the fighting, and to this end, as immediate steps, to accept and implement a daily two hour humanitarian pause and to coordinate exact time and modalities of the daily pause through an efficient mechanism, including at local level;

“(4) intensify the pace and scale of release of arbitrarily detained persons, including especially vulnerable categories of persons, and persons involved in peaceful political activities, provide without delay through appropriate channels a list of all places in which such persons are being detained, immediately begin organizing access to such locations and through appropriate

channels respond promptly to all written requests for information, access or release regarding such persons;

“(5) ensure freedom of movement throughout the country for journalists and a non-discriminatory visa policy for them;

“(6) respect freedom of association and the right to demonstrate peacefully as legally guaranteed.”

Statements

MARK LYALL GRANT (United Kingdom) welcomed the adoption of the resolution, but expressed regret that it had come about only after the Syrian people had suffered more than one year of brutality at the hands of their Government, resulting in more than 10,000 deaths. Reiterating support for Mr. Annan's work and the full implementation of his six-point plan, he said: “A narrow window now exists to improve the situation on the ground,” adding that it provided the rationale for deploying the advance group. However, that was only a first step, he said, emphasizing that the Syrian Government must now meet all its commitments under the six-point plan, and ensure that the monitoring group had full freedom to accomplish its mandate. Opposition groups must also cooperate and not give the Government any excuse to renew military action, he added.

VITALY CHURKIN (Russian Federation) said the degree of suffering and the possibility of further destruction had put the Syrian situation “front and centre”. The Russian Federation had consistently warned against external interference, while supporting a political process to end the violence, and today's resolution was consistent with that effort, as it included requirements of both parties. Noting that the text had become more balanced through long negotiations, he said the observer team, which would include one Russian member, must be deployed in strict accordance with the resolution. The Council, meanwhile, also awaited a detailed proposal from the Secretary-General for a more extensive mission, and it was essential that all Syrian parties quickly refrain from violence, abide fully with the six-point plan and begin a peaceful negotiating process.

PETER WITTIG (Germany), noting that the resolution just adopted was the first since the start of violent repression by the Syrian regime, welcomed the Council's unity of action, which had come “deplorably late, but hopefully not too late”. The cessation of violence had largely held, but new reports of attacks by regime forces were now coming in. Indeed, too many promises by Damascus had not been met; it had yet to make the fundamental

change of course demanded by Joint Special Envoy Annan, including a halt to military forward movement and the return of heavy weapons to the barracks. Violence would only truly end when those conditions were met, he said, adding that arbitrary detentions, torture, sexual violence and violence against children must also end immediately.

Applauding the opposition's halting of all its activities, he said the swift deployment of the advance team would be essential to the cessation of all violence. However, conditions for the deployment of observers must be in place, and the mission must be able to implement its mandate quickly. Too often, United Nations missions had turned into "pawns in technical games", and that must not be allowed to happen again. The Council must send the message that any such impediments would come at a high price. He emphasized that no observer mission on the ground could replace the will of the parties to end the violence and reach a peaceful settlement, and that accountability for the crimes committed must be an essential element of the transition process. "There cannot be a return to the status quo."

LI BAODONG (China) said his country had always maintained that the sovereignty, territorial integrity, choices and will of the Syrian people must be respected, and that the conflict must be resolved in a peaceful manner. Urging all parties to honour strictly their commitment to end all forms of violence and allow for an inclusive political process to begin, he said the Joint Special Envoy's solution was a way forward, and China appreciated and supported his efforts. China further called on the international community to guard against words or deeds that might stand in the mission's way, he said, adding that its deployment, with the consent of the Syrian Government and aimed at swiftly kicking off the task of supervision and the cessation of violence, would help implement the six-point plan and launch the transition process at an early date.

MOHAMED LOULICHKI (Morocco) said the adoption of the resolution was a practical translation of the efforts of the United Nations and the League of Arab States, and of the good-faith efforts of their Joint Special Envoy to implement General Assembly resolution 66/253, the Council presidential statement of 5 April, and the relevant resolutions of the League of Arab States. Since becoming a member of the council, Morocco had been involved in all efforts aimed at allowing the Council to speak with one voice as the only option to influence events in Syria. In

that respect, today's resolution was an important landmark that hopefully would represent a decisive Council position.

He recalled that the Arab League, at its recent summit, had expressed support for Mr. Annan's work to achieve a swift and lasting peace as well as the immediate implementation of his six-point plan, thereby allowing for a political solution and a response to the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people. Morocco hoped that the deployment and actual work of the advance team would begin as soon as possible in order to verify the end of all violence and to create an environment suitable for an observer mission. Today, the Council had also reaffirmed its support for Syria's sovereignty and territorial integrity, in line with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

RAZA BASHIR TARAR (Pakistan) said the resolution was an important step towards a peaceful resolution of the situation in Syria, with full recognition of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Strongly backing Mr. Annan's work, he said it had shown the effectiveness of combining preventive diplomacy with mediation. All sides should cooperate with the Joint Special Envoy and pursue a peaceful settlement of the crisis, he said.

NÉSTOR OSORIO (Colombia) said the resolution was first and foremost a call upon the Syrian Government for a cessation of violence after more than a year of atrocities. Colombia fully supported the full implementation of Mr. Annan's plan, particularly measures that would lead to dialogue and a lasting political resolution.

GÉRARD ARAUD (France) said he hoped the resolution would be a turning point that, in the short term, ended the violence, which had, in fact, de-escalated in the past days, though today's attacks on the population of Homs had led to doubts. "We will judge the Syrian regime by its acts and nothing else," he said, pointing out that the de-escalation had only come after much repression, for which there must be criminal accountability. In all areas of the plan, the Government must meet its commitments fully, he emphasized. An end to violence meant an end to all torture, arbitrary detentions, forced disappearances and other human rights violations committed by the regime for more than 13 months.

In order for the monitoring mission to succeed, it was critical that the regime pull back its troops and heavy weaponry from population centres, he continued. The aim was not just to freeze the situation on the ground, but to lead to steps that would allow

the realization of the Syrian people's aspirations through a peaceful political solution. He welcomed the unity regained by the Council today and paid tribute to Mr. Annan's work, while noting that the consensus among members was fragile and the country still teetered on the edge of civil war. He called on all of them to remain united and be prepared to take actions that would lead to a lasting end to the violence.

HARDEEP SINGH PURI (India) said his country had consistently supported all efforts to end the crisis through an inclusive, Syrian-led political process that met the legitimate aspirations of the people. It was a matter of satisfaction that Joint Special Envoy Annan's efforts had resulted in a cessation of violence, he said, welcoming that development as well as the Syrian Government's commitment to the six-point plan. India expected the opposition also to adhere to the relevant parts of the plan, he said, expressing hope that all parties, including the opposition, would implement their responsibilities regarding the advance mission to be deployed. Noting the Government's support for an inclusive and Syrian-led political process, he urged it to maintain that support in order to end the crisis without further bloodshed. It was also necessary that all countries in the region and beyond show their support for the Joint Special Envoy's plan, he added.

KODJO MENAN (Togo) recalled that Council had previously not managed to speak with one voice on Syria. Today, in deciding to authorize a limited monitoring team to facilitate the complete and immediate implementation of the Joint Special Envoy's six-point plan, it had sent a message in unison. Togo firmly supported implementation of the resolution by all parties, and pledged its support for Mr. Annan and his team. "For a long time now, all Syrians have been awaiting this type of action from the Council," he said, adding that the resolution should pave the way for the initiation of a political process that would allow all Syrians to make a contribution in building a free and prosperous nation.

AGSHIN MEHDIYEV (Azerbaijan) said his delegation had from the outset expressed its full support for the Joint Special Envoy and his six-point proposal. The Council had also supported Mr. Annan's mission from its inception, and the resolution today was another example of its unanimity. It was important that the resolution reaffirmed the Council's commitment to Syria's sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity, he said, adding that he had voted in favour of the resolution in the hope

that its adoption would lead to the end of human suffering in Syria.

JOSÉ FILIPE MORAES CABRAL (Portugal) said the resolution was a first step that had come tragically late, and much more must be done to avoid a civil war in Syria. Calling on the Government to cooperate fully with Special Envoy Annan and immediately implement his full six-point plan, including the pull-back of troops, he said all parties must guarantee freedom of movement for the monitoring mission and its advance party. Those responsible for human rights violations must be held accountable, he emphasized, calling for an end to armed violence in all its forms, and for a credible, Syrian-led political process.

BASO SANGQU (South Africa) also called for an end to all violence to and expressed support for Mr. Annan's plan, calling on all sides to implement fully all their commitments. South Africa welcomed the steps already taken and called on all sides to guarantee the safety and access of the monitoring mission and its advance team. He underlined the importance of respecting Syria's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and of helping the country work for a peaceful resolution of the crisis.

GERT ROSENTHAL (Guatemala) said his country had always held that the violence in Syria must cease immediately and that "the only way" out was a process of political dialogue, led by Syrians that would result in the reforms that the country's people demanded. Guatemala's support of the resolution not only pursued those aims, but implied its total support for the Joint Special Envoy's initiative, while also reflecting its continuing support for the Arab League's search for a peaceful outcome to the Syrian situation, he said.

Council President SUSAN RICE (United States), speaking in her national capacity, said that after more than a year of brutal violence by the Assad regime, after some 10,000 deaths, 45,000 people driven out of Syria and many more out of their homes, after the "grotesque destruction" of towns and neighbourhoods, the Government had finally said that it was ready to "step back from its murderous policies". The Council, for its part, had said today that it would judge the Government by its actions and not by its words. It had taken a step towards fulfilling its responsibilities, she said, adding that it was "about time". A fragile calm appeared to be prevailing and would hopefully continue, she said.

Nonetheless, “we are under no illusions”, she stressed. Two days of calm after a year of violent rampage hardly proved that the regime was serious about its commitments. More deaths had been reported just today and such renewed violence cast serious doubts, yet again, on the cessation of violence. The opposition had honourably sought to expand the fragile calm, barely responding to those actions by the regime, which must meet all its commitments, not just the bare minimum. “And it must do so now,” she emphasized.

The Arab League had proposed a way forward to end the violence and meet the aspirations of the Syrian people, but the regime had responded with broken promises and an outrageous escalation of violence, she said. That horrific cycle had lasted way too long, and the Syrian people must be allowed to exercise their rights and freedoms peacefully and without fear. Commending the opposition again for the restraint it had shown during the ceasefire, she urged the Government to honour its commitments “that are clear to everyone”.

The resolution just adopted established the Council’s intention to launch a larger mission if it was clear that that ceasefire was holding and that the Government was cooperating, she said. On the other hand, any Government obstruction of its work would raise serious concerns about moving forward. The United States expressed its appreciation for the Joint Special Envoy and its commitment to his plan, which aimed for legitimate and stable governance in Syria, she said. “The opportunity is there, the burden is now on the Syrian Government to seize it.”

BASHAR JA’AFARI (Syria), recalling the recent killings of a son of the Imam of Syria and a university professor, said the authorities had arrested two young men who had confessed to the crimes. Each had been promised \$800 for every crime they committed. That was an answer to those who questioned the existence of armed gangs in Syria, he said, stressing the importance of urging them to end their violence, as some had indeed done today. Syria would spare no effort to ensure the success of Mr. Annan’s mission and end the crisis, which threatened the country’s stability.

He went on to say that the Syrian Government had taken serious measures to comply with Mr. Annan’s plan, declaring its intention to end armed confrontations and providing frequent updates on its efforts in that regard to Mr. Annan, in addition to accepting a monitoring mission. However, the mission must act within the

limits of Syrian sovereignty, which “represented a red line that cannot be crossed under any condition”. Meanwhile, there had been an increase in terrorist acts as well as threats to use a refugee crisis as an excuse for imposing buffer zones and foreign military intervention.

Some delegations did not hold armed gangs to account for their violence, even though some 50 violations had been recorded since the declaration of the ceasefire, he said, adding that he found it “puzzling” that those who claimed to care about human rights did not care about violations committed by armed gangs, including kidnapping, torture, recruitment of child soldiers and use of civilians as human shields. Accounts of such atrocities had been documented, and Mr. Annan must obtain guarantees from the armed gangs that they would abide by his plan. Certain States must also stop encouraging them to continue the violence and avoid national dialogue.

Describing the recent conference in Istanbul as an attempt to undermine Mr. Annan’s mission, he said some participants had proposed that Gulf countries fund the armed groups, offering \$100 million to “feed the flames” of the crisis. What did it mean when some States said they supported Mr. Annan’s mission while engaging in such actions? he asked. The States encouraging further armed opposition must be held to account, and those supporting sanctions must be held responsible for the additional suffering in Syria, he emphasized, noting that a settling of regional scores in the current crisis exacerbated factionalism and could cause a much greater conflagration.

Syria was ready to continue cooperating with Mr. Annan, he said, expressing hope that the Joint Special Envoy would not allow any party to escape its commitments. While today’s resolution was not balanced, it was in Syria’s interest to cooperate with measures aimed at restoring stability. Those who had voted in favour of the resolution could help by ending sanctions and taking other measures that would help the Syrian people, instead of arming Israel. “The time for violence is gone,” he said. “The time for stewardship over us is gone as well,” he added, referring to the upcoming anniversary of the end of the French mandate over Syria. *

The 6750th Meeting was closed.

<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10609.doc.htm>

Document 4

Amendments To Annexes I, II, IV and V of the Protocol of 1978 Relating to The International Convention For The Prevention Of Pollution From Ships (Regional arrangements for port reception facilities under MARPOL Annexes I, II, IV and V)

THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION COMMITTEE,

RECALLING Article 38(a) of the Convention on the International Maritime Organization concerning the functions of the Marine Environment Protection Committee conferred upon it by international conventions for the prevention and control of marine pollution,

NOTING article 16 of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the "1973 Convention") and article VI of the Protocol of 1978 relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the "1978 Protocol") which together specify the amendment procedure of the 1978 Protocol and confer upon the appropriate body of the Organization the function of considering and adopting amendments to the 1973 Convention, as modified by the 1978 Protocol (MARPOL 73/78),

HAVING CONSIDERED draft amendments to Annexes I, II, IV and V of MARPOL 73/78,

1. ADOPTS, in accordance with article 16(2)(d) of the 1973 Convention, the amendments to Annexes I, II, IV and V of MARPOL 73/78, the text of which is set out in the annex to the present resolution;
2. DETERMINES, in accordance with article 16(2)(f)(iii) of the 1973 Convention, that the amendments shall be deemed to have been accepted on 1 February 2013 unless, prior to that date, not less than one third of the Parties or Parties the combined merchant fleets of which constitute not less than 50 per cent of the gross tonnage of the world's merchant fleet, have communicated to the Organization their objection to the amendments;
3. INVITES the Parties to note that, in accordance with article 16(2)(g)(ii) of the 1973 Convention, the said amendments shall enter into force on 1 August 2013 upon their acceptance in accordance with paragraph 2 above;

4. REQUESTS the Secretary-General, in conformity with article 16(2)(e) of the 1973 Convention, to transmit to all Parties to MARPOL 73/78 certified copies of the present resolution and the text of the amendments contained in the annex;

5. REQUESTS FURTHER the Secretary-General to transmit to the Members of the Organization which are not Parties to MARPOL 73/78 copies of the present resolution and its annex.

ANNEX

AMENDMENTS TO MARPOL ANNEXES I, II, IV AND V

1 New paragraphs 3bis and 4bis are added to regulation 38 of Annex I:

3bis Small Island Developing States may satisfy the requirements in paragraphs 1 to 3 of this regulation through regional arrangements when, because of those States' unique circumstances, such arrangements are the only practical means to satisfy these requirements. Parties participating in a regional arrangement shall develop a Regional Reception Facilities Plan, taking into account the guidelines developed by the Organization. The Government of each Party participating in the arrangement shall consult with the Organization, for circulation to the Parties of the present Convention:

.1 how the Regional Reception Facilities Plan takes into account the Guidelines;

.2 particulars of the identified Regional Ships Waste Reception Centres; and

.3 particulars of those ports with only limited facilities.

4bis Small Island Developing States may satisfy the requirements in paragraph 4 of this regulation through regional arrangements when, because of those States' unique circumstances, such arrangements are the only practical means to satisfy these requirements. Parties participating in a regional arrangement shall develop a Regional Reception Facilities Plan, taking into account the guidelines developed by the Organization.

The Government of each Party participating in the arrangement shall consult with the Organization for circulation to the Parties of the present Convention:

.1 how the Regional Reception Facilities Plan takes into account the Guidelines;

.2 particulars of the identified Regional Ships Waste Reception Centres; and

.3 particulars of those ports with only limited facilities.

2 New paragraphs 2bis and 2ter are added to regulation 18 of Annex II:

2bis Small Island Developing States may satisfy the requirements in paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 of this regulation through regional arrangements when, because of those States' unique circumstances, such arrangements are the only practical means to satisfy these requirements. Parties participating in a regional arrangement shall develop a Regional Reception Facilities Plan, taking into account the guidelines developed by the Organization. The Government of each Party participating in the arrangement shall consult with the Organization for circulation to the Parties of the present Convention:

1. How the Regional Reception Facilities Plan takes into account the Guidelines;
2. Particulars of the identified Regional Ships Waste Reception Centres; and
3. Particulars of those ports with only limited facilities.

2ter Where regulation 13 of this annex requires a prewash and the Regional Reception Facility Plan is applicable to the port of unloading, the prewash and subsequent discharge to a reception facility shall be carried out as prescribed in regulation 13 of this annex or at a Regional Ship Waste Reception Centre specified in the applicable Regional Reception Facility Plan.

3 New paragraph 1bis is added to regulation 12 of Annex IV:

1bis Small Island Developing States may satisfy the requirements in paragraph 1 of this regulation through regional arrangements when, because of those States' unique circumstances, such arrangements are the only practical means to satisfy these requirements. Parties participating in a regional arrangement shall develop a Regional Reception Facilities Plan, taking into account the guidelines developed by the Organization.

The Government of each Party participating in the arrangement shall consult with the Organization for circulation to the Parties of the present Convention:

1. How the Regional Reception Facilities Plan takes into account the Guidelines;
2. Particulars of the identified Regional Ships Waste Reception Centres; and
3. Particulars of those ports with only limited facilities.

4. New paragraph 2bis is added to regulation 8 of Annex V [Text of revised Annex V, adopted by resolution MEPC.201(62).]:

2bis Small Island Developing States may satisfy the requirements in paragraphs 1 and 2.1 of this regulation through regional arrangements when, because of those States' unique circumstances, such arrangements are the only practical means to satisfy these requirements. Parties participating in a regional arrangement shall develop a Regional Reception Facilities Plan, taking into account the guidelines developed by the Organization. The Government of each Party participating in the Arrangement shall consult with the Organization for circulation to the Parties of the present Convention:

1. How the Regional Reception Facilities Plan takes into account the Guidelines;
2. Particulars of the identified Regional Ships Waste Reception Centres; and
3. particulars of those ports with only limited facilities.

[http://iea.uoregon.edu/pages/view_treaty.php?t=2012-Amendments-1973-](http://iea.uoregon.edu/pages/view_treaty.php?t=2012-Amendments-1973-PollutionFromShips.EN.txt&par=view_treaty_html)

[PollutionFromShips.EN.txt&par=view_treaty_html](http://iea.uoregon.edu/pages/view_treaty.php?t=2012-Amendments-1973-PollutionFromShips.EN.txt&par=view_treaty_html)

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Faculty of Contemporary Studies
National Defence University, Sector E-9,
Islamabad, Pakistan
Ph: (92-51_____)
Fax: (92-51_____)
Website: _____
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